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HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI
HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
BY
FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI
GENERAL OF CAVALRY (RETIRED)
Author of " Germany and the Next War"
NEW YORK GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
COPYRIGHT, 1014, BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
EDITOR'S PREFACE
GENERAL VON BERNHARDI'S book "On War of To- day" is one of the most important military works that have appeared in recent years. It is of special interest at the present moment as an exposition of the ideas underlying the German plans for the war with the Al- lies, and the methods on which the German staff rely in their operations in the field.
The book is an attempt to show how war can be successfully conducted with the enormous masses of men now thrown into a conflict between nations, the armies of millions that put the whole fighting power of a people into the battle line. General von Bernhardi insists that while certain fundamental principles of war must always hold good, their practical applica- tion has to be considerably modified now that these "armies of masses" are brought into action, and have to employ weapons and appliances more efficient than any which were used in earlier wars.
The book was written for experts, and all serious students of war should read the complete translation of the work issued last year by Mr. Hugh Rees. But many readers will be glad to have the condensed ver- sion of General Bernhardi's treatise contained in the following pages. Some of the more technical details of the original work have been omitted; but nothing has been thus set aside which affects the writer's main argument. So, too, a choice has been made among the numerous examples from military history by which
VI
he illustrates it. The more interesting of these are given ; for the others the reader can refer to the com- plete translation. Throughout, the author's own words are used, only here and there a more familiar expression is substituted for one which would not be so easily understood by a reader unacquainted with the technical phraseology of German military literature. The work is none the less interesting because the General does not always slavishly follow the theory of the German Army Regulations. He boldly departs from the mere letter of these when he has to show what must happen in the conflct of great armies in the field. The reader will of course understand that the opinions General Bernhardi expresses as to the policy of our own and other Governments and their action in the past are given without comment or correction, though Englishmen will in many instances regard the view thus put forward as hardly consistent with the facts as we know them. He is writing as a leader of German military opinion for German readers, and looks at matters from a standpoint hostile to ourselves. As we read his words we must remember this. The book is a revelation of German policy as well as of German ideas on the way in which war should be con- ducted with modern weapons and under the new con- ditions of to-day.
CONTENTS
PAOB
EDITOR'S PREFACE v
AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION ix
CHAPTER I
THE SECRET OF MODERN WAR .... 3
CHAPTER II
ARMIES OF MASSES 19
CHAPTER III
FORCE AND NUMBERS 41
CHAPTER IV
MODERN ARMS AND APPLIANCES • • • 57
CHAPTER V
THE IMPORTANCE OF CAVALRY QI
Note on the march of great armies . .104 CHAPTER VI
SELF-RELIANCE, METHOD, AND COMMAND . .
vii
viii CONTENTS
FACE
CHAPTER VII
ATTACK AND DEFENCE ..... 135
CHAPTER VIII
THE OBJECT AND THE CONDUCT OF WAR . - 159
CHAPTER IX
TIME, SPACE, AND DIRECTION .... 183
CHAPTER X
PRINCIPLES OF COMMAND * 2OQ
CHAPTER XI
NAVAL WARFARE ......
CHAPTER XII
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT .... 247
AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION
IN the following pages I have tried to summarize as briefly as possible the results of many years of study and of preliminary labours with a view to furnishing the reader with a survey of all that concerns the con- duct of modern war. Much has been written on the various branches of the science of war. But a book embracing them all and showing their relative de- pendency seems to be wanting; and yet it is only by distinguishing and appreciating their connection with the whole science that the true value of each branch can be properly gauged. I think that with this book I have filled a gap in military literature.
I think that I am serving progress by my work, and that I am at the same time in harmony with the best traditions of our glorious past. It was always timely progress which has led us to victory, and has given us from the outset a certain amount of su- periority over our adversaries. Such a superiority we must try to gain all the more in future as well, since it is only too likely that, with the present state of affairs in the world, we may be forced to fight against superior numbers, while, on the other hand, our most vital interest will be at stake. The political situation as it is to-day makes us look upon such a war even as a necessity, on which the further develop- ment of our people depends.
Germany supports to-day 65,000,000 inhabitants on
IX
x AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION
an area about equal the size of France, whilst only 40,000,000 live in France. Germany's enormous popu- lation increases annually by about 1,000,000. There is no question, agriculture and industry of the home country cannot give permanently sufficient employ- ment to such a steadily increasing mass of human beings. We therefore need to enlarge our colonial possessions so as to afford a home and work to our surplus population, unless we wish to run the risk of seeing again the strength and productive power of our rivals increased by German emigration as in former days. Partitioned as the surface of the globe is among the nations at the present time, such territorial acquisi- tions we can only realize at the cost of other States or in conjunction with them; and such results are pos- sible only if we succeed in securing our power in the centre of Europe better than hitherto. With every move of our foreign policy to-day we have to face a European war against superior enemies. This sort of thing is becoming intolerable. The freedom of action of our people is thereby hampered to an ex- traordinary degree. Such a state of affairs is highly dangerous, not only for the peace of Europe, which, after all, is only a secondary matter for us, but, above all, is most dangerous to ourselves. It is we, whose economical, national, and political development is being obstructed and injured ; it is we, whose position in the world is being threatened after we have pur- chased it so dearly with the blood of our best. We must therefore strive to find out by all means who is for or who is against us. On this depends not only the possibility of carrying into execution the political aims befitting the greatness and the wants of our country, but also the very existence of our people as a civilized nation.
AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION xi
Hand in hand with the increase of population and the growth of political power, resulting from our struggles for a united Germany, trade and industry rose to an extent hardly experienced by any nation before. Germany's output in brain work is at the same time greater than that of any other people. Our prominent importance as a civilizing nation is plain to everybody since the German clans have joined hands to form one powerful State. We ourselves have become conscious of being a powerful, as well as a necessary, factor in the development of mankind. This knowledge imposes upon us the obligation of as- serting our mental and moral influence as much as possible, and of paving the way everywhere in the world for German labour and German idealism. But we can only carry out successfully these supreme civilizing tasks if our humanizing efforts are accom- panied and supported by increasing political power, as evinced by enlarged colonial possessions, extended international commerce, increased influence of Teu- tonic culture in all parts of the globe, and, above all, by a perfect safeguarding of our political power in Europe.
Opposed to these efforts are the most powerful States of Europe. France wants to take revenge for 1870-71, and regain its old political hegemony. Russia has a lively interest in not allowing our strength to increase any further, so that she may pursue her po- litical plans in the Near and Far East undisturbed by Germany. Russia may also, perhaps, dream of a future supremacy in the Baltic. If at the present mo- ment— weakened as she is by recent events in the Far East — she seems to pursue pacific tendencies, she is sure to return to her policy of aggression sooner or later. And, finally, England is particularly hostile
xii AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION
towards us, in addition to France. The phenomenal development of our commerce and industry may in time become dangerous even to the British oversea trade; the tremendous increase of our navy is felt as a constant menace on the other side of the Channel, at least should England be involved in a great war elsewhere.
We can be certain that Great Britain will most seriously resist any real extension of Germany's power, which, however, does not include the acqui- sition of some Central African territories.*
It is possible that in case of war we will have to face all these enemies single-handed. At least, we must be prepared for this. The Triple Alliance is purely defensive. Neither Austria nor Italy are bound by treaty to support us in all cases of war or under all circumstances. In so far as their own advantage is not touched, they take no interest in Germany's world-politics; and it must at any rate be left an open question whether their statesmen will always be far-sighted enough to make the lasting advantage of their States the pole of their policy even at the risk of a war. We are thus, in all that is essential, dependent on our own strength, and must plainly see that on the power of our defensive forces alone de- pends, not only our future development, but our very existence as one of the great Powers of Europe.
It is true the world is dominated to-day by the idea of war being an antiquated means of policy, un- worthy of a civilized nation. The dream of eternal peace has got a hold on vast sections of the community in the Old and particularly in the New World. Whereas, formerly, in addition to Emanuel Kant, only enthusiasts and visionaries were the champions * Written in September, 1911.
AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION xiii
of universal brotherhood, the Governments of great and powerful States have now seized this idea as well, and are cloaking themselves with the mantle of a su- perior humanity. The arbitration courts, which the contracting Powers engage to obey, are meant not only to lessen the dangers of war, but to remove them altogether. This is the publicly avowed object of such politics. In reality, it is hardly caused by an ideal love of peace, but is evidently meant to serve quite different political purposes.
It is obvious that, above all, all those States are interested in such treaties, who wish to cover their rear so as to be able to pursue the more undisturbed and ruthlessly their advantages on other parts of the world's stage ; and from this argument at once follows that such treaties, where not confined to some dis- tinctly limited spheres of right, are only a disguise to conceal other political aims, and are apt to promote just that war, perhaps, which they pretend it is their intention to prevent.
We Germans, therefore, must not be deceived by such official efforts to maintain the peace. Arbitra- tion courts must evidently always consider the existing judicial and territorial rights. For a rising State, which has not yet attained the position due to it, which is in urgent need of colonial expansion, and can only accomplish it chiefly at the cost of others, these treaties therefore augur ill at once as being apt to prevent a rearrangement of power. In the face of this widespread peace propaganda, and in opposition to it, we must firmly keep in view the fact that no arbitration court in the world can remove and settle any really great tension that exists and is due to deep- seated national, economical, and political antagonism; and that, on the other hand, it is impossible to change
xiv AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION
the partition of the earth as it now exists in our favour by diplomatic artifices. If we wish to gain the posi- tion in the world that is due to us, we must rely on our sword, renounce all weakly visions of peace, and eye the dangers surrounding us with resolute and unflinch- ing courage.
In the situation we are in, absolutely necessitating an extension of power, and requiring us to force our claims in the face of superior enemies, I think the law of self-preservation ought to have dictated to us an increase of our defensive forces by all means available, so as to throw into the scale at the decisive moment the full strength of our 60,000,000 populace. This we have not considered necessary. Universal service, which formed the basis for our military and political greatness, is the law with us, it is true, but we have not enforced it, as a matter of fact, for a long time, because we shirk the sacrifice we ought to make in the interest of our armed forces and of our future. The further development of our army in proportion with the growth of our population is completely para- lysed for the next five years by a law of the Empire. We seem to have forgotten that a policy, to be suc- cessful, must be backed by force, and that on the other hand the physical and moral health of a nation depends on its martial spirit. We have accustomed ourselves to looking upon our armaments as a heavy burden, borne unwillingly, forgetting thereby that the army is the well from which our people constantly draws afresh strength, self-sacrificing spirit, and pa- triotism. In the hour of danger we shall have to pay in blood for what we have neglected in peace, from want of willingness to make some sacrifice.
But we have to reckon with all these circumstances as given factors. The enmities surrounding us can-
AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION xv
not be exorcized by diplomacy. Armaments, under modern conditions, cannot be improvized at will the moment they are wanted. It seems impossible to get ahead of our rivals in matters technical. So much more, therefore, must we take care of maintaining spiritual superiority in case of war, and of making good, by will-power on the one hand, and by the skill of our operations on the other, the superiority in material and personnel possessed by our likely ad- versaries.
The more we study the nature of the art of war, and the more fully the army is alive to what is essen- tial in war in general, and in the conduct of modern war in particular, the more uniformly and to the point will every portion of our army co-operate in war, and the greater will be the mental and moral superior- ity we shall gain over our enemies.
CHAPTER I THE SECRET OF MODERN WAR
CHAPTER I
THE SECRET OF MODERN WAR
THE nature of modern war is not a simple matter. It is subject to numerous modifications according to the character of the contending parties and of the various theatres of war. It is altogether different when we are fighting in the Balkans or in Manchuria, when Russians are fighting against Japanese, or Spaniards against Riff-Kabyles. The fundamental principles of war certainly remain the same, wherever it is waged; but special conditions cause in each case special meth- ods of employment of the fighting forces, and these latter, again, will frequently differ.
If we are moving with forces of some size in a desolate, roadless, or mountainous country, we are obliged to adopt proceedings altogether different from those obtaining in a vast, slightly undulating plain, where railways and a well-built and extensive network of roads abound. Again, things will be different if we carry on war with small armies in a country little cultivated, like the English in South Africa, or are operating with armies of the size of those of the Great European Military Powers in a richly cultivated and densely populated theatre of war.
It is this latter sort of war which we are concerned with most, for it is such a war we ourselves will have to wage, and this kind of war it is that stares us in
4 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
the face like an inscrutable sphinx. There seems to be no doubt that, in a war like this, forces will assert themselves which we have no experience to gauge, and the effect of which we can scarcely properly realize. Whole nations are called up to take the field against each other. They are going to fight with arms of patterns more perfect than ever before. The pro- portionate numbers of infantry, artillery, and cavalry are quite different from those of former times. Means of transport will be used to an extent and of such a perfect type as we have never seen used before by any army in the field. Every technical means is pressed into the service to facilitate communication. Even the air must be conquered; dirigible balloons and flying machines will form quite a new feature in the conduct of war. The question also arises how modern permanent fortification will affect the com- bat. It seems that all trade and industry must stop, when every capable youth is called away from work. It has been said that the effect of modern arms is such as to incapacitate the weakened nervous system of the highly civilized nations of Mid-Europe to re- sist this effect for any length of time. And lastly, we must also weigh the influence of naval warfare on what is going on on land, and what its effect will be on the whole campaign. The course of events at sea may mean starvation for the population. In short, a future war will reveal to us a series of seemingly incalculable forces. One might almost come to think that success in war will be more or less a matter of chance, which can in no way be influenced by fore- sight; that the will of the commander may be, so to say, switched off in the uncontrollable play of these tremendous forces; that we can only call up these forces, and then leave it to the mere effect of their
THE SECRET OF MODERN WAR 5
powers, to produce whatever they choose from this turmoil.
I think it is not so, after all. If we closely examine the possible effect of all the new phenomena which in a future war must assert themselves, and then test them in their relation to the general laws of warfare, we must succeed in getting a general idea of the na- ture of modern war, and in ascertaining a method by which we can act most suitably.
It is true there are still experienced and prominent soldiers who think that, in spite of all changes in armaments, Moltke's strategy and conduct of war is the last word on the subject, and that it is now merely a question of finding out by what principles Moltke acted, so as to be prepared for successful military operations in future as well.
I do not think that such an interpretation corre- sponds at all to Moltke's spirit and genius. The very way he acted seems to prove the truth that in every war we must make use of the lesspns of the past only in so far as we can apply them to, or modify them in accordance with, the changed conditions of our time. He, of all men, was the one who worked with an open mind at all that concerns the conduct of war. He never disregarded the lessons of any war, nor was he satisfied with them alone. He was ever looking ahead, to turn to account new developments.
That is the way he has shown us. We are not to rest satisfied with what he has thought and done, but to go on unfettered, turning to account fresh develop- ments. We are to examine the conditions under which a future war must be conducted without blindly believing in authorities, and, from what Moltke and the German wars of unification have taught us, to
6 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
develop new ideas and principles according to modern requirements.
"How the actual operations will turn out next," writes the Field-Marshal in a memorial of November, 1 86 1, concerning a future campaign,* "becomes more uncertain, indeed, the further we trace their progress. Yet we may consider the most likely contingencies, because they always start from given and permanently existing conditions. Experience of former wars must not be neglected, but is no safe guide for our days. Fifty years or a century have since passed and changed the political and strategical situation. . . . To arrive at the result intended, the only way left to us is to try to anticipate in outline the military events of the future, and get thoroughly acquainted with the present conditions. Here we have to reckon partly with unknown and changeable factors, yet, on the other hand, often with known and permanent ones. We cannot arrive at a result correct in all essentials, but we can ascertain what is probable, and this, in war, is always the only basis on which we can found our measures."
What the Field-Marshal expresses here seems to be of a more general application, I think, than he meant it to be. What he says of the "actual operations" applies to war in general; for is not war experience the only possible foundation of military knowledge, the material, as it were, of which theory is in need for a scientific structure of a doctrine of war, whilst the changed conditions and new phenomena of the moment always create, by their presumable future development, new factors, which in actual warfare peremptorily demand consideration? But the past, the present, and the future are invariably dominated
* Moltke's "Military Correspondence," Part iii, No. 4.
THE SECRET OF MODERN WAR 7
by the general laws which are always and everywhere inherent in war as a social phenomenon.
If, therefore, we wish to recognize the probable character of a future war and the new demands it will make on its conduct, we must proceed from the two- fold point of view which Moltke considers necessary to adopt in weighing matters.
By the lessons which we learn from military history and our own experiences of war we must try to dis- cern "the permanent factors" with which we have to reckon, and the laws of development. This is the only way we have for further guidance of what in war is altogether possible and feasible. War experience alone enables us to become aware of all the frictions, moral influences, chances, and personal elements in war, which all are of far-reaching importance, and almost completely beyond theoretical appreciation. But we must next closely examine under what external and internal conditions a future war must probably be conducted; how the conduct of war will be affected by the changes in military matters since we gained our last experiences in war ; what effects these changes will produce. We must examine how far the results of our up-to-date war experiences will be influenced by these new phenomena, and we must try to find out in what directions this kind of influence is likely to assert itself. In this way alone can we succeed in ascertaining the conditions that will probably obtain in the next war, and in gaining some guiding rules for our action.
But that is just the point. It is not enough for us to discern the nature of modern war, and thus to some extent satisfy a theoretical want; we rather wish to be able to develop from this knowledge a doctrine for acting in the field — a law, as it were, of future victory.
8 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
If we survey the history of those wars, the course of which we can judge in some measure, we become aware of many instances where fighting dragged along without leading to a final and decisive issue. Neither side displays any special faculties that might turn the scale one way or the other. The result is then mostly some compromise between the belligerents which leaves matters pretty well as they were before, or the issue is brought about by the gradual wearing down of the weaker party. In other wars, on the contrary, a real issue is rapidly come to between two armies of apparently equal strength. Often it is the numeri- cally weaker army which obtains the most decisive victory. When this happens, it is either a great Cap- tain whose genius has turned the scale, or it is some particular circumstance which gave victory to the one party — a happy coincidence of favourable con- ditions; a numerical or tactical superiority; a special kind of armament; a moral superiority inherent in the character of an army; or a superior principle of acting. Where such peculiar advantages are placed in the hands of a great general who understands how to make a thorough use of them, success is, of course, all the greater. Our own Prussian history shows us repeatedly examples confirming the correctness of this view.
Under Frederic William I it was discerned that the fire of infantry was the decisive factor in action. Fire tactics were therefore brought up to an extraordinary degree of perfection. The introduction of the iron ramrod proved exceedingly advantageous to increas- ing the rapidity of fire. The Prussian infantry is said to have delivered ten rounds * per minute even at that
* Must be a misprint. Never known it more than five. — Translator.
time. But rapidity of fire of that kind, and the pre- cision of all movements as a sine qua non to it, were only possible with an iron discipline and a training which no other army could boast of to an equal de- gree of perfection. The Prussian infantry moved in rigid formations in an order which never failed even under the greatest stress, and thereby, as well as by its fire, proved superior to all its enemies.
Frederic the Great next recognized, immediately after the first battle he took part in, that fire and order alone would decide nothing if they were not accom- panied by a resolute offensive. In further develop- ing fire tactics, on the one hand by concentrating ar- tillery at the decisive points, and, on the other, by making the power of fire everywhere subservient to the most determined offensive, he created a new factor of superiority over his adversaries, which asserted itself the more decisively, since he raised at the same time the manoeuvring power of his troops to such a height that no other hostile army could equal him therein. He further saw that cavalry was only of tactical value, under the conditions then prevailing, if it understood how to make use of the speed of the horse by a vigorous charge. By making this idea the leading principle of cavalry tactics, he made the Prus- sian cavalry the most victorious in the world. And, finally, in opposition to the learned strategists of his time, he saw the inexorable nature of war. Every- where, wherever he possibly could, he tried, strategi- cally as well as tactically, to bring matters to a most decisive issue, giving expression to this idea also in the form of his attack. Only by thus accumulating the actual factors of superiority did he succeed in fighting victoriously against a world in arms.
But the linear tactics which had developed in this
io HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
way degenerated after Frederic's death into a system of artificialities, without any practical value. Over the mechanical art of leading troops the spirit of the principle and guiding idea was lost; strategy, too, set up the wildest systems. With this the Prussian army lost its all-conquering superiority. This became at once apparent in the wars of Frederic William II. The soundness of the troops, it is true, enabled them to be victorious on the battlefield, but the conduct of the war on the whole was wanting the great decisive features which result only from a clear perception of war's real nature. The conduct of war lost itself more and more in conventional forms, which were bound to have an effect all the more disadvantageous as the tactics were defective too and did not meet the new demands originating from the revolutionary wars.
In this way all the factors gradually disappeared which had made the Prussian army victorious. The wars dragged along without any decisive issue until Bonaparte appeared and brought into the conduct of war a new element of superiority. By opposing brute force to the learned and conventional mode of conducting war in his time, and by aiming at the utmost attainable with the simplest means, the great Corsican became irresistible to the armies of his age, until these in turn made use of his same principles against him, and until, by means of the Prussian army, recruited from the people by universal service, a new weapon was forged which, above all, proved superior through an idealism peculiar to that army.
This acquisition it was which led humiliated Prussia to renewed victories. By retaining universal service after the war, while all other States returned to the old system of professional armies, Prussia once more acquired a powerful superiority over her rivals. This
THE SECRET OF MODERN WAR n
superiority was enhanced by Prussia alone recognizing in time the importance of breech-loading arms and taking advantage of their greater efficiency. The result was the brilliant victories of 1866 and 1870-71. It does not seem likely that under modern condi- tions we shall be favoured once more by Fortune in a similar manner. All the States on the Continent of Europe have introduced universal service, and have thus formed national armies; all over the world are in use the most modern and most effective weapons; everywhere a most prolific use is made of every tech- nical appliance; everywhere in Europe the training of the troops is most zealously attended to, and the preparedness for war perfected to the utmost. A de- cided superiority of one army over any other can no longer be attained under these conditions. Nor can we count upon a stroke of good fortune as we had in our last wars, where a Bismarck conducted our policy, and a Moltke our armies; just as little dare we rely on the favour of special circumstances like, perhaps, a lucky political constellation, which state- craft might take advantage of with bold resolution. It may be we have, as a counterweight against the probable numerical superiority of our likely adver- saries, other advantages to throw into the scale ; above all an officers' corps, as no other army has, with an imperturbable offensive spirit and a uniformity of mind and feeling of duty which guarantee the stead- fast and resolute actions of everybody. Yet these are imponderable forces, which it is impossible to look upon as fixed factors in the reckoning, and against which must be set off the national advantages of our adversaries. Who is there that will deny, for instance, the high military qualities possessed by the French
12 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
soldier, or the stubborn and often-tried power of re- sistance of the Russians?
If it is thus impossible for us to gain a numerical or material superiority, and if, on the other hand, we have no right to claim a moral superiority for our army as a distinct asset of power, the question is forced upon us, whether it may not be possible to gain a start on our adversaries by some other means which might vouchsafe us the possibility of victory over these stronger enemies? The answer to that question we can only gather from the experiences of the past.
If we study the campaigns of great soldiers and examine the causes of their victories, we shall find that in the first instance always moral qualities en- forced victory. Superior resolution, boldness, daring, and steadfastness paralysed the energy of the enemy, and carried forward the victorious troops to the per- formance of extraordinary deeds.
It must, however, be well understood that it was not the superiority of the procedure by itself which in- sured victory ; the mode of action became only superior in reference to that of the opponent and to the whole of the conditions governing war at the time. Frederic the Great won his daring offensive battles because his adversaries faced him mostly with an inactive defen- sive, and were unable to paralyse his bold manoeuvres by suitable counter-moves, embarrassed as they were by the rigid forms and views of warfare of their time. Napoleon gained his splendid victories over the inadequate strategy and tactics of his opponents; and the principle of envelopment of Moltke's era led to success simply because the enemy did not adopt suitable counter-measures.
These reflections show us that it is above all a ques-
THE SECRET OF MODERN WAR 13
tion of discerning the weak points inherent in the modern military system and conduct of war. Only by recognizing this fact may we succeed in arriving at a standard of action which will ensure us a superiority on which we can rely.
He who fully sees and completely masters the diffi- culties arising from modern conditions in the conduct' of war; he who has a clear and detailed insight into what can be done with modern war-appliances and what not, and how these must be used, therefore, to have the maximum effect; what, on the other hand, we must avoid, so as not to upset the powerful mech- anism of a modern army; he who by reason of such intelligence has arrived at clear and definite princi- ples of acting, and is perfectly aware of the decisive factors leading to success, particularly under mod- ern conditions — he will, at the outbreak of war, ob- tain a distinct superiority over an adversary, who from the outset either acts on wrong principles, or tries only in war itself to arrive at that clearness which he was unable to attain by his mental work in peace- time. This kind of superiority is, however, very much enhanced if we apply the knowledge we have obtained to the preparation for war, which, in fact, is already part of the conduct of war itself. The execution of what has been recognized as the most suitable is then greatly facilitated, and to the mental superiority, which reveals itself in the method of action, a ma- terial superiority is added. That side will be superior in a way its opponent can scarcely retrieve, which, well aware of the decisive importance of the subject, has striven for, and has obtained, superiority by work- ing for it in peace-time.
If, for instance, it should be proved that the com- mand of the air will be the decisive factor in a future
i4 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
war, the army possessing the most effective aerial fleet would evidently have a decided advantage, though in other less important departments it may be inferior to its adversary.
It is, therefore, not a question of competing with our likely enemies in all the various branches without distinction, such as raising huge armies, increasing artillery and ammunition, improving heavy artillery and siege trains, extending the railway system, and employing every modern technical appliance. A com- petition like this would be ultimately decided by finan- cial superiority, which we scarcely possess. We must rather exert ourselves to prepare for war in a distinct direction, and to gain superiority not in every branch, but in the one we have recognized as decisive, whilst taking a correct view of all other important branches.
Much independence of thought and determination is required of him who acts in this spirit in a responsible position and stakes success in war, so to say, on one card. All depends, then, on whether a future war has been correctly estimated. Every error in decisive questions must prove fatal. Yet it is the only possible way for obtaining an unquestionable superiority, and almost every great captain has followed it.
All the more is it necessary to see perfectly clear in these matters by studying them thoroughly. We must resolutely get rid of the influence of conventional views and opinions, extend and thoroughly sift in every department the ideas we are forming about a future war, trace to their utmost limit the conse- quences of all that may be new in a coming war, and then try to discover with inexorable logic the weak and the decisive factors in the whole picture thus un- folded before our eyes. If we approach this task with an unbiassed mind, keep a tight rein on our imagina-
THE SECRET OF MODERN WAR 15
tion, and strictly adhere to realities, the investigating mind will see unveiled -the mystery of a future war; the sphinx will speak and we shall descry the law of future superiority.
If, on the other hand, we only want to learn from the experiences of former wars without working out the practical result of these experiences, if we only try to bring into line, more or less mechanically, the new phenomena of our time with the old views, we must resign all idea of mastering the situation and making the most of it to our own advantage ; in that case the war of the future will continue to be some- thing uncertain, a riddle, the solution of which is looked for and expected by the events of the future. But the task is to solve the riddle in advance. That kind of mental labour must bear rich fruit. It will best prepare victory. It must be done.
CHAPTER II ARMIES OF MASSES
CHAPTER II
ARMIES OF MASSES
IF we review the whole of military history as far as we have access to it, we become aware of an infinite series of different forms of war; war we see constantly changing. "War," says Clausewitz, "is a perfect chameleon, because in each separate case it changes somewhat its nature."
But if we look closer into the military events, we perceive that in war, as in almost all other spheres of life, a certain constancy reigns supreme; that cer- tain features constantly recur; that certain relations between mode of action and success often remain the same.
First, from its nature, the object of war is always the same, we wish, as Clausewitz has already defined it, to impose our will on that of the enemy, by either annihilating or damaging him, or warding him off; or, maybe, we want to force him to do, or to give up, what is to our advantage. Secondly, every combat is governed by the law of attack and defence. An action outside the limit of these two notions is alto- gether unthinkable. And, thirdly, all actions in war are influenced by the physical, mental, and moral qual- ities of men.
All laws and principles which can be derived directly and purely from these three factors must evidently be looked upon as permanent laws and of general ap-
19
20 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
plication in war, which retain their decisive influence under all circumstances.
But in a certain sense the character of the theatre of war also accounts for some definite features of an invariable type.
In war on land, ground and the action of troops affect each other in many ways, always in the same manner. Defiles oblige us to decrease the front if we wish to pass them; steep gradients render upward movements difficult; eminences afford good view; ranges of hills cover from sight and direct fire; and similar instances of general application may be cited frequently. Naval warfare, on the other hand, is enacted on a storm-swept plain, and is subject to cer- tain immutable laws from the nature of the sea. The same applies to the air and to the combats we shall see there in the future. But whatever may be the theatre of war, there remain but the three factors — the object, the form of action, and human nature — which determine the permanent soul of war from which the immutable laws of the art of war must be deducted.
The impossibility of theoretically developing these laws in their totality must be plain to everybody. Nevertheless, principles of this kind are as necessary for the practical conduct of war as are the general laws which form its basis. All military actions are regulated by them from day to day. All tactical regu- lations as well as all measures of organization are due to them. To describe these convincingly and to explain them clearly is the purport of every practical doctrine of war.
The difficulty of discovering irrefutably these im- portant principles of warfare is chiefly due to the fact that it is very hard, on the one hand, to procure all
ARMIES OF MASSES 21
the material facts, from which these principles must be derived, and that, on the other hand, we all may look upon this material from very different points of view. And, indeed, we find that the same experiences of war are not always judged alike in the different armies, and that new phenomena in the military world are not seldom appreciated differently.
It will, therefore, never be possible • to arrive at incontrovertible results in all that concerns military matters, as they are so uncertain and changing; but we must rely on the theory of probabilities. To get as near to certainty as possible by its aid will be the most we can hope to attain. Yet even then, in so far as it concerns principles derived from experience of war, we have to get over one difficulty more, and that is, we must find out whether the conditions are still the same as those under which a certain law was recognized as being a guide for us; whether we are, therefore, allowed to apply the principles resulting from that law straight to our own action in the pres- ent, or even in the future, without coming into conflict with the reality of things. The conditions continually change which determine the essential features of war, and it is not always easy to determine the amount and the kind of that change and its probable influence on the incidents of a future war.
The outward conditions determining war, we know, do not change by leaps and bounds, but do so gradu- ally. Even the most momentous inventions and im- portant social revolutions do not suddenly produce a change of all the factors influencing war. Thus it has taken centuries after the invention of gunpowder before the fire-fight obtained its own, and it is scarcely possible to gauge to-day the probable effect of aerial navigation on the future conduct of war; for it is
22 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
almost always impossible to discern the full signifi- cance of new inventions and innovations. In con- formity with the slow change of the ruling factors, the laws governing the mutual relationship of things, and, jointly with these laws, the periodical principles of warfare as well, change but gradually. That which in the past was fundamentally right may therefore often be so in the present, in spite of certain develop- ments having occurred, and form as a rule a reliable guide for recognizing the future, because things will develop according to a law, and, to a certain degree, can therefore be determined in advance. An example will suffice to show how the past in this way can be made to serve the future.
At the time of Frederic the Great the armies were greatly dependent on supplies from magazines, or, at least, they thought they were. Every pressure on their own lines of communication seemed to them a great danger, every threat on those of the enemy a great success. The pressure on the enemy's lines of communication became thus one of the most impor- tant maxims of operations. Napoleon, on the other hand, supplied his armies chiefly from the resources of the theatre of war. By this he made himself al- most entirely independent of supplies from depots. A pressure on his lines of communication affected him little ; tactical victory put an end to all anxiety caused by this pressure. His procedure was no doubt very advantageous so long as he was able to subsist on the country and sure of tactical victory. The moment he failed in both, as in Russia, the army perished from want of regular supplies from magazines. In the campaign of 1870-71 we used Napoleon's system in combination with supplies from depots, which an- swered well in opulent France. But we would griev-
ARMIES OF MASSES 23
ously err should we think that this was the last word on the subject; and when Field-Marshal v. der Goltz lays it down as law that we need not mind a threat" to our lines of communication, but must, by striking forward, force the enemy to abandon his threats,* the validity of such a law is very limited, and rather applicable only if we are sure of victory and can live on the country without needing the lines of communi- cation during the time before we gain the victory. But if in future, as will be most likely the case, situa- tions arise in which armies are really dependent on supplies from depots, the strategic importance of the lines of communication will again assert itself to an enhanced degree, and similar principles in the conduct of war will prove necessary as they — mutatis mutan- dis— obtained at Frederic's time.
This example will suffice to make it clear in what way the development of military matters is subject to certain laws, and how greatly the knowledge of these may help us in shaping the future.
(After pointing out the danger of attempting to elaborate a rigid system of the "laws of war" which may easily degen- erate into a mere rule-of-thumb method, and insisting on the necessity of any theory of war taking full acccount of the conditions of the time, the author proceeds to consider the effect of numbers in the wars of to-day.)
Of all the features which are destined to influence the conduct of war under present conditions, and cause it to strike new lines, it is the levy of masses, above all, which no doubt will give its peculiar stamp to the next war.
In the Central European States the whole male pop- ulation, as far as it is able to carry arms, will be called * v. der Goltz, "Krieg und Heerfiihrung," 1901.
24 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
up, armed, and organized in tactical formations. In case of any hostile invasions, it is more likely than not that a "people's war" would be organized in the true sense of its meaning. The obligation of every citizen to serve is a generally accepted principle.
It is true, not all those obliged to serve are given a military training in peace-time. In Germany, for in- stance, this is far from being a fact for some time past. Yet everywhere enormous hosts are to be mobilized in case of war, not only for the defence of the native soil, but also for attack. It is right, to some extent, to speak of the armies of millions of modern times, the like of which have not been seen before in his- tory.
It is, of course, out of the question that armies like these can be of a uniform character. There are in Europe militia armies and standing armies, which are absolutely different in character. In the latter the line regiments, augmented on mobilization by the latest annual contingents of reserves, and numbering in their ranks most of the regular officers and non- commissioned officers, are more efficient than troops of the second and third lines, which are composed of contingents of maturer ages, and which it is impos- sible to provide with fully competent officers.
The most efficient troops are called upon to face the enemy in first line, and to carry the war outside the country. The others are charged with the duty of furnishing the garrisons of fortresses, guarding railways, and occupying the districts conquered; or they serve to replace casualties suffered by the actual field army, or by any other fighting troops. All must at least be able to delay an enemy's attack by local defence, and to fight the enemy as guerillas should he cross the frontiers.
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The consequence of this general levy is that the military value of the armies is very much more than formerly dependent on the character and nature of the nations themselves. The more of the population are enrolled into the righting army, the more the spirit of the troops thus composed will be determined by the physical power as well as by the political and social spirit of the nation. An army with a discipline handed down from generation to generation, recruited from a vigorous folk accustomed to obedience, which has learned to limit its desires for the good of the common weal, and at the same time is trained to hard work and in the profession of arms, will give a better account of its power of resistance against demoraliz- ing influences, as well as against the sufferings, fa- tigues, and privations of a campaign, than the army of another nation, which is physically weakened, in- fected by revolutions, or disused to arms owing to in- creasing opulence. Sound political training, preser- vation and strengthening of the spirit of discipline and subordination, readiness to make sacrifices in the in- terest of the community, which constitute the really loyal spirit of a citizen, are the necessary conditions for carrying on successfully the war of masses in our age. Where, however, the recruits who enter the army are accustomed to resistance and insubordina- tion against all authority, the mechanism of a mod- ern army runs the grave risk of breaking down even under the pressure of conditions which by themselves alone would not be decisive.
This development entails the further and, perhaps, still more important consequence, that the political importance of war has completely altered. Owing to the fact that all classes of the nation are affected, and that personal sacrifices are imposed on each individual
26 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
family, wars for frivolous or dynastic purposes be- come impossible. We can and must uphold by force of arms only the really vital interests of the country. The resolve to go to war is also rendered very difficult to-day, because war affects most deeply every member of the community. The sacrifice in wealth and blood that must be exacted will probably surpass everything we have experienced hitherto ; and the dangers of such an enterprise, as well as the consequences of defeat in war, will be far greater than ever. Prussia's crushing defeat at Jena in 1806, and her rising in the memo- rable year of 1813, give us, perhaps, an idea of what the sacrifices will be in a modern war, and the oppres- sion a nation will have to suffer in all likelihood should the war bring on defeat and with it the conquest of the country by the enemy. That France did not suffer in a similar way in 1870-71 is due to the broadminded humanity with which the Germans conducted the war. But it is not at all certain that other people will mani- fest an equally high moral standard.
Preparation of war in peace costs, as it is, large sums, and claims a considerable portion of the national revenue. If we mobilize, the necessary expenditure rises enormously. As most of the labour will be with- drawn at the same time from the market, and all means of living be stopped thereby, the whole of do- mestic life must be shaken to the core.
It has been asserted, and seemingly substantiated scientifically, that no State could carry through a war waged with the masses levied in our days. It would not only mean absolute domestic ruin, but war itself would be completely paralysed soon after its out- break; the economic strength for maintaining such huge armies would simply fail. For this reason alone
ARMIES OF MASSES 27
a war of that nature between two civilized nations would become impossible.
I think this view is going much too far. It is in the nature of human things that they regulate them- selves automatically, as it were. Economic impossi- bilities do not crop up suddenly and all at once ; they assert themselves gradually. Owing to the stress of the situation acting in a similar manner in both camps, the belligerents will be obliged to adapt themselves gradually to the existing situation. We can, for in- stance, hand over workmen to some industrial and agricultural concerns from the second and third lines, when they are not immediately wanted for military operations. The victor in the first decisive battles may be able to demobilize altogether the forces in rear of the army the moment the danger of hostile invasion has passed. The vanquished will sue for peace all the more readily the more impossible it ap- pears to him, from an economical point of view, to re- establish the balance of power upset by defeat. But where in an indecisive struggle the adversaries keep each other in check, the standard of their efforts will be gradually lowered, and success will ultimately fall to him who can boast of the highest moral energy and self-sacrificing spirit, or, where on both sides the moral motives are of an equally high standard, can hold out financially longest to finish the war. In this way the factors ruling the conduct of war will automatically adapt themselves, as it were, to the economic condi- tions, and a compromise between what was intended and what was possible will of necessity be the result.
If we have thus established that an unfortunate war must entail far more disastrous economic consequences than ever before, and may lead to complete economic ruin, yet the inference that war with modern armies
28 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
could not be carried to the bitter end from reasons of economy is not justified.
Two points of practical importance result, however, from these considerations. First, the economic super- iority of a nation forms by itself an essential factor of success, and the way a State manipulates its finances must have a far-reaching influence on the conduct of war. Secondly, all special preparations for war must be carried out with the /greatest seriousness, with the utmost consistency, and without false economy. There can be no doubt that nowhere will half or insufficient measures be punished more severely than in the sphere of armaments. The losses entailed by an unfortu- nate war are so great, the venture of risking these losses by insufficient preparation is so dangerous, that even the greatest sacrifices for armaments seem justi- fied under all circumstances.
From a purely military point of view, the growth of armies renders all military action much more dif- ficult. This difficulty is already felt when training soldiers. In order to raise the masses required for war without increasing the cost of peace training un- duly, the terms of service had to be reduced con- siderably in recent times. The training of each man must therefore be completed in a very much shorter time than formerly, and this imposes in consequence a much severer task on officers and non-commissioned officers. A very great amount of labour is moreover thrown on them by the fact that a very much greater number of recruits passes through their hands than in the smaller armies of the past, and that the numer- ous trained men must be retrained again and again to keep them permanently efficient. The consequence is that the strength of the trainers is taxed already to the utmost in peace time.
ARMIES OF MASSES 29
Another effect of these conditions with which we have to reckon is, that with the growing size of the armies the tactical worth of the troops is gradually decreasing. The greater the numbers which must be raised for war, and the more men must be therefore trained in peace, the more difficult it becomes to have available suitable officers and non-commissioned of- ficers to train the men and to lead them. In war, moreover, the first line will be weakened by having to detail officers and non-commissioned officers to new formations, and the more there are of these new for- mations, the more this will weaken the first line. This must impair the steadiness of the troops, and evidently cause a moment to arrive when the advantage of numbers is no longer of any value as compared with the tactical worth of the troops. It is just this point which the latest wars bring forcibly home to us. The levies of the French Republic, in spite of their numeri- cal superiority, were of no avail in 187071 against the firmly-knit battalions of the Germans; and the Japanese, in spite of the notorious numerical in- feriority of their army, invariably defeated the nu- merically superior Russians. In this respect the American War of Secession is also exceedingly in- structive. Again and again the numerically superior armies of the Union succumbed to the tactically and morally better trained forces of the Confederates.
The conduct of war itself is further made more difficult by the masses of men. It will, in the first instance, prove exceedingly difficult to move the vari- ous armies, which together form a modern army, by a uniform idea, and to direct them in such a way as to ensure the participation of every portion in the main issue, without wasting forces in minor operations. But the difficulties also grow with the number of
30 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
troops, from a technical point of view. Railway trans- port, and the systematic movement of very large masses, their provisioning, the necessity of keeping them permanently efficient, and, therefore, of pro- viding for the constant supply of ammunition, the evacuation of wounded and sick, the pushing forward of the necessary drafts of men, horses, and material, the guarding of all important roads and lines of com- munication of the army, all these necessities present problems in the technical conduct of war which are very difficult to solve.
The enormous number of troops raised obliges us to select large areas for assembling them, and to make a thorough use of the network of roads within those spaces so as to be able to bring to the front as large a number of troops as possible. The same considera- tion will often oblige us to march on each road as many troops as possible. The number of troops on each road is again limited by the possibility of supply- ing them, and by the necessity of bringing into action — though perhaps not on the same day — the rearmost troops before the righting strength of those in front is exhausted. The necessity of provisioning the troops and of replacing armaments demands at once that, on all lines of advance, stores of equipments and pro- visions must be collected, pushed forward, and issued to the troops without this mechanism being allowed to stop for a single day. The difficulty is enhanced when, owing to the number of troops, "living on the" country" becomes impossible, and all supplies have to be brought up from the rear.
The strategic mobility of the large modern armies is, under these circumstances, palpably far inferior to that of smaller armies, which, at least, in a rich theatre of war that provides supplies without diffi-
ARMIES OF MASSES 31
culty, could move with much greater freedom. It is, moreover, evident that a large army, with numerous march columns moving parallel with each other, needs more time for wheeling, concentrating, and forming a battle line than a smaller one, and has to contend with greater difficulties of supply. Topographical obstacles, too, are manifestly more difficult to over- come by large masses than by smaller bodies. Owing to the clumsiness of all movements, and the time they take, all decisions of headquarters must be prepared long beforehand; it is therefore impossible to make always constant use of the intelligence daily received about the enemy. This again obliges us to push recon- naissance very far ahead, so as to have as early as possible information about the enemy's measures. This increases the depth of the army on the march, and with depth grows the difficulty of operating. All these conditions must be thoroughly considered, if we wish to form a clear idea of modern warfare. Yet even they do not include all the difficulties of operating which arise merely from the number of troops.
In most cases, especially when we are obliged to fight against superior numbers of the enemy, we will have to apportion to the actual Field Army troops of at least the second line — therefore reserve forma- tions in Germany. These will be inferior to the line troops in power of marching, as well as in discipline and fighting qualities. The men comprising them are still perfectly efficient physically at their age of from twenty-four to thirty years, but often no longer ac- customed to particular military exertions. Nor can rapidly created new formations ever prove as thor- oughly trained and steadfast as a body of troops firmly welded together in peace time. A standard infantry can only be created under modern conditions
32 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
in war, and when facing the enemy. To raise cavalry reserve units to the same level as regiments of the line is altogether impossible, and new formations of artillery will but very gradually attain the same ef- ficiency as a unit thoroughly trained and knit together in peace, and thoroughly practised in shooting and driving. Headquarters are therefore obliged to reckon even in the first decisive battles with troops of varying tactical value.
As regards tactics, very considerable difficulties as- sert themselves, also, in the employment of masses, which with smaller bodies do not exist at all, or to a less extent. The use of ground for tactical purposes has become very much more difficult for the huge armies of modern times, than was formerly the case, especially on the defensive. It is exceedingly difficult to find defensive positions suiting armies of some nine to twelve army corps. In most cases we will have to include in the position portions of ground affording no advantages to the defence at all, or, worse still, fa- vouring the attack. With the mass of troops avail- able, we can, of course, occupy the less favourable sections of the ground more strongly, and thus try to neutralize the disadvantages we have to take into the bargain ; yet we must bear in mind that the advantage of the defensive, of being able to spare troops just on account of the ground, is partly lost thereby, be- cause we are obliged to employ troops in passive de- fence, which, if the whole position had been better, we could have used for other purposes. A similar disadvantage asserts itself, also, in the tactical offen- sive. It will not always be easy to find spaces suf- ficiently favourable for deployment of the large num- bers in the attack of modern armies. Often we shall be forced to deploy troops on unfavourable ground.
ARMIES OF MASSES 33
In this way the modern armies of masses render the conduct of war difficult in many ways. But they themselves contain besides an element of danger that must not be underrated.
The mechanism of such an army is so enormous and complicated that it can only be kept going, and be directed, if all its parts work fairly reliably, and if it is spared great and extensive moral shocks. We cannot, of course, count upon the fortunes of war keeping us free from experiences of this kind, just as little as we can count upon being victorious in every action. These shocks can be got over if they are felt only locally. But when large concentrated masses are once out of hand, when panic has seized them, when supplies fail throughout, and the spirit of in- subordination is rampant in those masses, they are not only powerless to resist the enemy, but become a positive danger to themselves and to their own com- manders.
War conducted with large modern armies is there- fore, in any case, a risky game, taxing to the utmost the resources of a State in men and money. Under such circumstances it is only natural that measures are adopted everywhere to make it possible, should war break out, to finish it rapidly, and quickly relieve the tension which must arise when the whole nation is called to arms.
This has caused arrangements to be made for the mobilization, immediately at the beginning of the war, of all the nation's fighting power, and for the strate- getic concentration of as many troops for simultane- ous action as space and other conditions will permit. From this it follows that at the outbreak of war, a great and unexampled contest of millions of men will
34 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
take place, which will impress on modern war, in its initial stage at least, its special feature.
But we cannot assume that the conditions which result from the calling up of a whole nation's strength, and from strategetic concentration at the threatened frontier at the beginning of the war, will continue throughout its whole progress.
If in the Russo-Japanese War peculiar circum- stances caused the armies to arrive in the theatre of war slowly and by degrees, and to grow constantly stronger in numbers as the struggle proceeded, it will probably be the reverse in a Central European War.
I have already pointed out that in the course of a long war the economic conditions must from physical necessity tend to reduce the employment of masses. But there are some other reasons tending in the same direction.
There will first and foremost be the natural waste, which will very rapidly reduce the masses in the field. Apart from the losses in action, the waste in men was very great already in 1870-71. The loss by march- ing alone, until the first actions took place, was 8 to 9 per cent., and during the war the companies espe- cially became greatly reduced, often to half, and even less, their full establishments. The waste was also great, of course, in the drafts that had come out. All this will no doubt be far worse in future. In the vast numbers called up we must be prepared to find in- ferior men. The losses the troops of the first line will suffer when marching are therefore sure to be greater than formerly; they will enormously swell when we must operate with troops of inferior quality. We must also reckon with the fact that some men of the older contingents of reserves, fathers of families, and politically unreliable subjects, will try, by some pre-
ARMIES OF MASSES 35
text or other, to escape service, and often so, perhaps successfully. In 1870-71 in France, during the sec- ond phase of the war, the republican authorities were frequently obliged to use the most stringent measures to get the men to serve. Large numbers will be there- fore lost from this cause. The course of the war will probably produce similar effects. The efforts made at the very beginning of the war are so great, that it is scarcely possible to increase them, at least in countries like France, which raises its last men on the first day of mobilization. If such an army is vic- torious, the inducement for further great exertion ceases, but if the war takes an unfavourable course, it will often seem hopeless to continue it when the supply of men has been exhausted, and the force that brought these masses into the field will then give way.
All these circumstances will probably cause the size of the armies to dwindle away rapidly after the first decisive battles, especially when the physical and moral strength of a people does not come up to the high demands a modern war exacts. The war of masses will thus undoubtedly lose much of the character pe- culiar to it during the progress of events. In the conduct of war itself, conditions are also likely to arise, giving a different stamp to the combats after the first great decisive battles. It is quite a different thing when two intact armies meet on equal terms at the frontier, or when one army victoriously invades the enemy's country, and the other, beaten, but fight- ing in its own country, retreats. The conditions under which the struggle is continued then change in many ways, as we shall discuss afterwards. The war of 1870-71 already took the course here described,
36 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
though not in so clear a form as we may expect to see in future.
The Russo-Japanese War, it is true, was of a char- acter altogether different. From beginning to end it was a uniform struggle of two modern armies; yet we cannot accept this as a proof at all that matters will take a similar turn in future. The conditions were quite peculiar which forced upon it this uniform na- ture. The main forces of both contending armies were in this case tied to the only existing railway, because they were dependent on it for their supplies. That railway formed the clamp which kept both armies closely concentrated and obliged them on the whole to advance against each other frontally. But noth- ing justifies the assumption that in countries with an extensive railway system, permitting the use of differ- ent bases, things will be the same as in Manchuria. We must, rather, come to the conclusion that, owing to the enormous size of the armies, a future war in Central Europe will be of a twofold nature. The war at the time of concentration will reveal the special features of a modern war with masses. The opera- tions afterwards, however, which must result from the first great decisive battles, will be more like those we have witnessed hitherto. This latter period will be less distinguished by the special modern features due to the size of the combined forces in strategical and tactical operations than by the achievements of modern military technics, which will, of course, mani- fest their far-reachin,g influence also during, and im- mediately after, concentration for war. In addition to the effect of masses in future wars we must, there- fore, also thoroughly investigate into these modern war appliances if we wish to gain a clear conception of the nature of the next war.
ARMIES OF MASSES 37
But before we turn to the description and examina- tion of these mechanical appliances we must once more consider numbers in their all-important relation to force. Mass (numbers) and force are not identical. Force does not at all grow always in the same ratio as numbers. Between force and numbers there is, rather, a relation that often varies and depends on a variety of circumstances, demanding more than ever special consideration at this age of enormous armies.
CHAPTER III FORCE AND NUMBERS
CHAPTER III
FORCE AND NUMBERS
WHEN we were glancing at the inevitable consequences of calling up for war, in our days, the whole nation, we became aware of the fact that the masses them- selves contained some elements of weakness, that they are sometimes even a kind of danger to our own conduct of war, but that nevertheless all States of Europe are dominated by the "mania for numbers," and that the general tendency is rather to increase the levies to the utmost limit of financial and personal capacity. There is no idea of stopping this for the time being. Numbers seem to the present generation the decisive factor in war.
The importance attributed to numbers in general by all Continental States of Europe is naturally based on the assumption that, taking armament, equipment, and recruiting as about equal, the efficiency of the various European Armies would be about equal, that we could consequently attain a distinct and tangible superiority only by superiority of numbers.
But this faith in numbers is a delusive idea. The experience of war at all times makes this clear, and nothing is more dangerous than to expect numerical superiority to do what it cannot perform by itself. The size of the armies employed is certainly one of the most decisive factors of force. Yet we must not overrate its importance. For the theory of war, the
41
42 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
notion of numbers is at first the only possible gauge we have for estimating force; but the practical soldier, when applying theory, must always remain aware that force is equal to numbers only in theory, and not at all so always in practice.
The numerical strength of an army is at first the only factor of force which can be ascertained for certain. All other components of this force can only be estimated, and are thus liable to deceive in an in- finite variety of ways. Knowledge of the enemy's numerical strength gives us, for all that, some kind of safe guide for judging what we may expect he can do, if we add that knowledge to our estimation of his military qualities, weaknesses, and peculiarities. In- deed, this guide may become an absolutely safe one if we have become acquainted already, by experience of war, with the enemy's peculiarities and efficiency, and are therefore no longer dependent on mere guess- work. It was thus possible, for instance, on the Ger- man side, after the battles of Woerth and Spicheren, to get a precise idea of the high tactical worth of the French army, its mode of fighting, and want of initia- tive on the part of the leaders. If, in addition, exact intelligence was available about their numerical strength, German headquarters held a safe guide for determining the vital force of the enemy. Where, of course, the armies are composed of troops differing in value, their total numerical strength affords no safe guide for what the enemy is capable of doing. Yet we must remember that even troops of different value at the beginning of the campaign, let us say first-line troops and new formations, may during the war attain a certain amount of equality. The weaker and less efficient elements will gradually disappear from the ranks, owing to the fatigues and privations; death
FORCE AND NUMBERS 43
will have its due, taking away too often the best and most daring men ; war experience is gained by all por- tions, and by degrees makes up for the deficiency in training. All these elements work together, to efface gradually the difference in the value of the troops. If once this stage is arrived at, if the enemy has be- come aware of this development by experience, his intelligence about numbers will again be to him the decisive factor for estimating the enemy's power.
The same, of course, holds good for our own troops too. If their qualities are so well known to their commander that he can form a correct estimate of them, numbers afford him the scale by which to meas- ure the force he must stake in each individual case to ensure success. If we are altogether justified in assuming the value of the troops of both belligerent parties as perfectly equal, numbers will form the ab- solute gauge for what force we must use.
In the practical conduct of war, numbers will there- fore always form one of the most essential factors in strategical calculations, and of success. Yet numerical superiority is not always the most important condition for success.
There are often occasions where superior numbers are of no avail. When Bourbaki attacked the position on the Lisaine, he was altogether unable to deploy his forces on the comparatively narrow space he had selected for attack. Of the 326 guns he had brought with him he could only get 80 into position; his in- fantry had no room for deploying their superior num- bers; and so he had to give in before the numerically weaker enemy; and during his retreat his numerical strength brought further disaster upon him, because he was unable either to move, or supply in a proper manner the numbers he had.
44 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
Conditions may arise where time makes it impos- sible for the numerically stronger party to concentrate superior masses at the proper moment. In other cases, again, it is the tactical and operative clumsiness of armies which makes it impossible for them to use their superior numbers effectively in the face of a more mobile and tactically better organized enemy. Mili- tary history abounds in such examples.
Further, there may be situations in which large masses mean destruction owing to the disproportion between the numbers and the nature of the theatre of war. Poverty of the country and few roads mostly go together, because roads are not made arbitrarily, but originate from traffic of men and goods, and can only exist in proper proportion to this traffic. There may very well be cases where it is positively impos- sible to provision troops beyond a certain number, and to keep them efficient to fight and to move. The most telling example of this fact is furnished by Napoleon's campaign in 1812 in Russia, where the bulk of the army did not succumb to the rigours of a Russian winter, as legend will have it. It mostly perished during its advance, because, with a sparsely populated and roadless country, it was impossible to march the army divided, and supply it regularly. Then the hungry mass broke all bonds of discipline; the losses on the march grew enormously, and of the whole grand army, which, more than 300,000 strong at the beginning of the campaign, had begun its ad- vance under the personal command of Napoleon, some- thing like 123,000 men only reached the battlefield of Borodino, and only 90,000 Moscow. These rem- nants only perished from hunger and the cold during the retreat.
If, in the cases mentioned, numbers were of no use
FORCE AND NUMBERS 45
owing to the peculiar and unfavourable conditions prevailing, we learn, on the other hand, from innumer- able examples of military history, that even under the most favourable conditions for operating with, and deploying, troops, the advantage of superior numbers was neutralized by the superior military and moral worth of the numerically weaker party. The Romans conquered the world with inferior numbers; and we need only open the great book of Prussian history to become aware of this fact from our own glorious past.
The moral worth of troops thus gains decisive im- portance in addition to numbers, and this, under the conditions of modern warfare, will weigh all the more heavily in the scale. The capability of modern troops to endure fatigues and fight with energy, and their moral strength under privations and disaster depend, under modern conditions, on many other things, and differ, therefore, much more from those prevailing at the time of professional armies, which contained in their ranks many veteran soldiers, who had faced death a hundred times. Less than formerly must we, therefore, gauge to-day the efficiency of an army by numbers alone.
The value of modern troops rests on national char- acter, and on the system of service; on the moral and physical soundness of the men; on the training of man and horse ; on armament and, equipment ; on the obedience to which the men have been educated; on the amount of self-reliance and initiative which is, nevertheless, developed in them ; in no small measure, on the confidence the men have in their superiors ; on the esprit-de-corps by which the troops are animated ; and lastly, on the ready zeal and devotion which the personality of the commander is able to rouse and to preserve. The power of an army further depends on
46 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
the proficiency, intelligence, and heroism of the of- ficers. The value of armies will therefore vary ac- cording to the general state of civilization of the na- tions, and their military institutions, and so long as the national character and the state of culture of the nations, from which the armies spring, differ, as is still the case in Europe, we do not go wrong, in spite of the similarity of all military organization, in assum- ing that the various armies differ very much in their military efficiency.
We have already pointed out, that even within one and the same army, the various categories of troops are of very different character, and that by filling up the cadres, existing in peace, with reserves on mobili- zation, the value of a unit may even be lowered.*
The strategist in the armchair does not, of course, like these things, and it is at any rate very much sim- pler in all military plans to operate with tactical units as if they were as equal as the pieces on the draught- board, and not of varying value. We would, in that case, have a fixed rule for estimating the power of
* An instructive illustration of this fact is afforded by the Imperial French Army in 1870. Here, the reserves called up often became a source of weakness, and brought the seeds of disintegration into the ranks of the well-disciplined peace-formations. The example of Lapasset's Brigade, be- longing to the Fifth Corps, is in this respect especially char- acteristic. This brigade had joined the Second Corps, dur- ing the retreat from the Saar. Arrived in front of Metz, the brigade commander asked to be allowed to hand over his reservists to the fortress garrison. He thought he could do better with the weaker peace establishments alone. His request was granted, and indeed it was this brigade which never budged an inch of ground, in spite of the. most vio- lent attacks of the Germans, whilst other French troops in less difficult situations were often much shaken in their morale. — Lapasset, 1817 to 1875, "Memoires," 1900.
FORCE AND NUMBERS 47
an enemy, and could not only employ our own troops indiscriminately, but also augment them at will, so long as we have trained men, and money. But such a strategic calculation would hopelessly break down in the face of the stern realities of war; and to meet these successfully we must always reckon with the actual values ; not numbers decide, but force.
The elements, however, from which force origi- nates, are almost all imponderable, and we can never succeed in expressing in a formula, universally appli- cable, the ratio that exists between force and num- bers, and in fixing the limits beyond which increase of force through increase of numbers will be neu- tralized by the elements of weakness which under cer- tain circumstances result from such increase of num- bers. But some points may be noted which should never be lost sight of.
We must first of all remember that the tactical in- crease of force, which we may hope to gain by rein- forcements in numbers, vanishes if accompanied by strategic disadvantages which neutralize or even ex- ceed this tactical increase of force. We can certainly never be too strong in battle, yet there may be situa- tions where we must give up numbers in return for other advantages. This will be the case, for example, if the opportunity is favourable for acting rapidly, and would be lost, should we wait until the largest numbers possible are concentrated. The accumulation of troops may also impair their mobility and deployment to such an extent as to turn the tactical advantage aimed at into a positive disadvantage.
We must, secondly, be clear on the point that numerical strength is only effective as such, if the troops employed are actually fit to do the work im-
48 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
posed on them. Nowhere more than in war is it neces- sary to deal with realities only.
Lastly, we must never forget that the moral and mental factors of force are always the ruling factors, and, within certain limits — which in each case must be very differently defined according to special circum- stances— are more important than the numerical fac- tors. This goes even so far as to make the force of psychical impulses sometimes counterbalance almost completely all other defects, and the influence of one single great personality may raise to a marked degree the general level of efficiency of whole armies — nay, even of whole States.
If the greater efficiency of troops is thus a factor which to some extent may make up for inferiority in numbers, and, with equal numerical strength, repre- sents a decisive superiority, we should think that, at least, with equally efficient troops on both sides, supe- rior numbers under otherwise equal conditions should guarantee us victory at least in theory. Yet military history proves that it is not so.
The reason for this apparent inconsistency is very simple. The way of conducting war it is which gives victory to the one or the other party. By the ad- vantages of natural or artificially prepared ground, by the greater advantages he may derive from his armaments, and by other circumstances, forces accrue to the defender, which sometimes suffice to establish his superiority over the enemy; the assailant tries to gain superiority by the advantages inherent in the initiative and in offensive tactics. By this means he may succeed in defeating portions of the enemy's forces before the latter can concentrate them all against him, and in becoming by this local victory the numerically stronger party. The superiority which
FORCE AND NUMBERS 49
one or the other side may thus obtain, may and can be even so pronounced as .to compensate for the original inferiority, and thus procure for the weaker army, supposing the troops to be equally efficient, the possi- bility of conquering the stronger enemy. But for such success we must always presume superior leadership, which can change almost everything to its favour. Here again we are confronted by an entirely impon- derable power. It will never be possible to determine what the effect of this power will be in each case. The increase of force produced by the absolute confidence of the troops in their leaders; the terror spread by a great name; the elasticity of genius in the moment of danger; and the importance of ingenious plans of operation positively defy all calculation. But when we see generals, who are not equal to their task, bring to naught the best performances of troops and the ef- fect of greatly superior numbers ; when, on the other hand, we notice the successes gained by great captains against overwhelming odds, no room is left for doubt that great generalship is of decisive importance, and that it can make up for greatly superior numbers of the enemy.
Yet experience and theoretical considerations show again that the most ingenious generalship is bound to fail when opposed to superior numbers that exceed a certain limit; that numbers, when they can act as such and are large enough, can neutralize all mental and moral superiority; that an equalization of num- bers by genius is, after all, only possible within cer- tain limits, and that a certain amount of numerical superiority is simply crushing, physically.
Two means, we have seen, a commander has to get the better of even a stronger enemy. He can, by making clever use of the tactical advantages of the
50 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
defensive, or by some successful offensive action, in- flict such losses on the enemy as to neutralize thereby his superior numbers, or, at least, their efficient em- ployment. If we start from this fact, we necessarily arrive at the following result : A general may neutral- ize the superiority of an enemy, if the proportionate numerical strength on both sides leaves any chance at all of inflicting on the enemy, one way or the other, losses large enough to neutralize his superiority. But if the numerical superiority of the one party is so great as to preclude the weaker party from decisively affecting, even by possible successes in the tactical defensive or by successful offensive actions, the total effect of the enemy's numbers, then no generalship avails to neutralize the effect of such superiority.
This is the most essential law of numbers.
The great captain of the French Revolution may be cited as an example. Especially in his first cam- paigns in 1796, the ever-victorious Corsican repeatedly succeeded in overpowering, by local victories, far su- perior forces of the enemy with an army that at first had been totally neglected. By seizing his opportunity when his enemies were separated, he, with his con- centrated forces, first defeated one group of the en- emy, and then turned round to defeat, with the same force, the other group. His enemies never succeeded in .uniting their forces against him; but the portions first defeated represented such a large fraction of their whole available force, that by their defeat the original superiority was lost.
The latest wars show the same law. The Japanese were surely perfectly clear on the point, when they attacked Russia at the beginning of 1904, that all the military forces of the Tzar were many times superior to their own. But there was doubtless the chance of
FORCE AND NUMBERS 51
conquering those forces of the enemy which could be employed within a measurable time, victories which were bound to shake the whole edifice of Russian power to its foundation, and make the enemy inclined to conclude peace. We know the events proved this reckoning correct.
All the examples cited clearly show us the law of numbers in a positive sense. The numerically weaker conquers because he is strong enough to beat such a large portion of the enemy's forces locally in attack, or to weaken the stronger adversary materially and morally in the defence, to such an extent as will coun- terbalance, by the one way or the other, the original disparity in numbers.
Military history, however, shows us also that this law cannot be infringed without punishment. When Napoleon, who so often and so brilliantly had beaten superior numbers with weaker bodies, wanted to en- force victory with an army so much weaker than those of his enemies that even the most famous local victories could no longer change their pro- portionate numbers, he succumbed, and was bound to succumb.
We have convincing proof of it in the campaign of 1814. Napoleon turned against the Silesian army which was marching in separate columns, dealing it crushing blows and driving it back with heavy losses. But this success was not enough to restore, even to some extent, the balance of the total forces; and when this victorious general went in turn for the main army of the Allies, he succumbed in the face of the enemy's masses, though they were used even with little energy.
A similar thing happened in the American War of
52 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
Secession. For a long time General Lee, the great leader of the Southern army, was constantly able to restore the balance of force by local victories, gained on the inner line over the numerically far superior enemy, reducing the latter's superiority over and over again. But his resources declined; all the vital com- munications of the Southern States were gradually cut off, making the superiority of the North so over- whelming that no local victory could any longer reduce it, and no local defence make up for it. And thus the valiant band of heroes of the Southern States was ultimately obliged to surrender its arms, which it had so chivalrously wielded — before a positively crushing superiority.
The law of numbers teaches also a positive doctrine. If it shows us, on the one side, the limits which even genius and its inspiring strength cannot transgress in this life without being wrecked; it shows us, on the other, how much even a limited force may achieve. By this law success, at least within certain limits, is no longer at the mercy of purely material forces; Napoleon's dictum proves false — that victory is on the side of the big battalions; the mechanical superiority of numbers does not reign supreme; genius of leader- ship, superiority of mental and moral forces will come to their due so long as they do not strive after the impossible; a bold and clear-sighted policy may look forward to well-deserved success.
This holds good for our German Fatherland as well. If Germany is involved in war, she need not re- coil before the numerical superiority of her enemies. But so far as human nature is able to tell, she can only rely on being successful if she is resolutely deter- mined to break the superiority of her enemies by a
FORCE AND NUMBERS 53
victory over one or the other of them before their total strength can come into action, and if she prepares for war to that effect, and acts at the decisive moment in that spirit which made Frederic the Great seize the sword against a world in arms.
CHAPTER IV MODERN ARMS AND APPLIANCES
CHAPTER IV
MODERN ARMS AND APPLIANCES
AFTER having attempted to reduce the importance of numbers to its true value, and give force its due with regard to numbers, we must now cast a glance at the military appliances by which the human mind has been unceasingly endeavouring to enhance force by pressing into its service the powers of Nature.
Among the mechanical achievements of our age, modern arms rank first, because they directly affect fighting. They must be considered first. But it would not answer my purpose if I gave a complete survey of the present state of armaments in the different armies. I must leave that to expert knowledge in each particular branch. For me, it is a question of tracing the influence of arms on the conduct of war. I there- fore need allude to technics only in so far as it is necessary to understand tactics.
The infantry being always the decisive arm, its armament is, above all, of the greatest importance. This is shown in all wars by the fact that the losses caused by infantry fire are always considerably higher than those through other arms.
The efficiency of infantry arms in the different armies is approximately the same since the small cal- ibre has been adopted everywhere. Their rapidity of fire is great. About twenty rounds can be fired per
57
58 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
minute. In compliance with its range, the sights of almost every new weapon are provided with a scale of 2,000 metres.* Most armies use the modern pointed bullet. Differences in armaments which might affect tactics do not exist anywhere. The German rifle, in particular, may be said to be a good one in every re- spect. It quite comes up to modern requirements. Its efficiency, rapidity, and accuracy of fire are good. Its construction is simple and serviceable. Somewhat be- hind time is, perhaps, the French Lebel rifle, which, in addition to other defects, has still its magazine along and underneath the barrel, whilst all other armies have introduced centre-magazines. Conse- quently, they are in France seriously engaged with the question of re-arming their infantry, hoping to gain thereby a start, especially over Germany.
For all that, with the adoption of small calibre and clip-magazine, as well as with the introduction of smokeless powder, and of pointed projectiles, the development seems to have reached a certain climax, and to have come to a finish for the time being.
Some States, it is true, are considering whether the time has not come for adopting an automatic rifle, which would allow of a very much greater rapidity of fire. Trials have shown that up to 100 rounds per minute can be fired with such a rifle, which at the present moment is actually being introduced in Mex- ico. France and England are hard at work construct- ing a similar weapon. In both these States the re- quirements to be fulfilled by this kind of arm have been made known officially, proclaiming thus a public com- petition, as it were. France seems to be nearer the solution of this problem than England. Commandant * About 2,200 yards, or i}4 miles.
MODERN ARMS AND APPLIANCES 59
Chauchat has invented a machine-rifle ("fusil mitrail- leuse") weighing but 16 pounds, and enabling one man to fire 200 to 300 rounds per minute. Efforts are being made to construct from this model an infantry rifle not exceeding 8 pounds in weight. An armourer of the small arms factory at St. Etienne is said to have already produced such a weapon which, with a calibre of 6.5 mm., comes up to all requirements. It is not known whether it has a chance of being adopted. Trials are, at any rate, pushed forward vigorously, and we may be sure of France introducing a new rifle at no distant date, an automatic rifle, or one with magazine case.*
The most material influence exercised by the im- provement of infantry rifles is the dissolving effect produced on infantry formations in action.
Under modern conditions, closed bodies of infantry cannot expose themselves to rifle fire even at distant ranges, say 2,000 yards, without suffering most serious losses. As soon, therefore, as there is a chance of coming under fire, the infantry must deploy for ac- tion, so as to pass quickly into extended order the moment the enemy's fire begins to tell. All further manoeuvring is then out of the question ; forwards or backwards is here the only thing permissible and pos- sible. The troops can only fight in single rank in loose skirmishing lines. Circumstances, ground, the en- emy's fire, and our own intentions determine the in- tervals between the skirmishers. Within effective range, infantry can only advance by rushes or crawl- ing, making at the same time the best possible use of the ground. Efforts will be made in most cases to decide the fire action at the medium ranges of 1,000 or 800 yards. It is not likely that on open ground we
*"La France Militaire," No. 7,851, January 25, 1910.
60 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
can approach the enemy's position closer than this be- fore his fire has been at least partly fought down or subdued.
The character of fighting has altogether changed through all this. While it was formerly a question of leading the men forward in more or less closed bodies, under the direct control of their officers, with a por- tion only of the men extended in skirmishing lines or swarms, all the fighting troops now move in extended order, where each man fights and acts individually. Officers can no longer assert a direct influence, as formerly; the greater noise during an action renders it more difficult for orders to be heard. Often the few officers left can only act by their example during the action itself. The supports as well are obliged to advance over open ground in extended order, and can no longer follow the firing line so closely as for- merly, because the dangerous zones behind that line have been very much increased, owing to the flatness of trajectories, and because the shrapnel fire directed against the foremost fighting lines forces the supports to keep at a proper distance, if they do not wish to suffer unduly without being able to inflict any damage themselves. On that account all distances in action have increased.
Through the introduction of an automatic rifle, effect of fire, it is true, would probably be increased; but many disadvantages would result therefrom. The new weapon would allow an overwhelming mass of projectiles to be hurled upon the enemy in the short- est possible time at a given moment in action; the physical labour of the men when firing would be re- duced. On the other hand, a great deal more ammu- nition would be spent, of course, and there would be greater danger of wasting ammunition than there is
MODERN ARMS AND APPLIANCES 61
now. The question further arises whether it will be possible for the men to carry sufficient ammunition in attack to take full advantage of the rifle. Should these rifles carry still farther than the best of our pres- ent rifles, the troops will probably have to deploy for action earlier. But it is scarcely likely that the fore- most fighting line will have to extend in yet looser formation. The limits at all compatible with an or- derly conduct of the fight have been reached as regards that point. I do not believe, on the whole, that the introduction of automatic rifles would cause tactics to change appreciably. Without doubt, it would benefit the defence in the first instance.
Nor is another new invention likely to affect tactics. It is the so-called "flame-killer," a material manufac- tured in the form of powder, which, added to the charge, does away with the flash at the muzzle without impairing accuracy of fire.
Infantry fire is very much enhanced by machine guns which, with ballistic properties equal to those of the modern infantry rifle, can deliver 600 rounds per minute, the gun being at the same time designed to sweep with its fire a certain frontage of the target by means of a slowly acting traversing arrangement for the barrel.
The effect of these guns at known ranges against low targets is very destructive when the gun is care- fully served. But when the range is wrongly esti- mated, or the gun is improperly served, fire effect is very much impaired, the cone of dispersion being much shallower than that of infantry fire, where the individual marksmen commit manifold errors in aim- ing and firing, and thus cause a greater depth of the cone even when the range is known. But with ma- chine-gun fire the error committed by the gun is al-
62 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
ways the same for each projectile, and the cone is therefore very shallow. Chance hits, as with infantry fire, are nearly impossible. By providing machine- guns with telescope sights it was thought better aim- ing could be insured; but the vibration of the gun when fired renders the use of that appliance difficult. Hoses have been introduced to carry on the steam generated by the water in the cooling apparatus when the gun is fired rapidly, so as to prevent the steam from being seen, making it thus more difficult for the enemy to range on the guns in action.
The efficiency of the machine guns in use to-day and adopted by the different armies is approximately everywhere the same. Germany has adopted Maxim's system with hoses for steam exhaust, like most of the other great armies. Telescope sights are not used. France attaches great value to equipping the army with machine-guns. She has procured large numbers of them, and apparently tries by these means to make up for her shortness in infantry, which she can no longer increase owing to the numbers of her popula- tion. She has adopted Hotchkiss's and Puteaux's sys- tems. The latter system is said to be undergoing im- provements which raise the rapidity of fire from 600 to 800 rounds per minute. France takes also an inter- est in the construction of light machine-guns in the form of a rifle like that of Chauchat, which I have mentioned. England, it is said, has resolved upon the introduction of a similar rifle as well. For the mo- ment the British Army is equipped with Maxim and Colt machine-guns. Two guns are attached to each battalion, and six to a cavalry brigade. Austria has adopted for the field army Schwarzlose's, and for for- tress warfare Skoda's machine-guns. The other great military powers are equipped with Maxim guns, partly
MODERN ARMS AND APPLIANCES 63
apportioned to infantry and partly to cavalry, to raise their fire force. The mode of transporting the guns depends on the method in which they are intended to be used, and varies in the different armies. The guns are partly carried on pack animals and partly on wagons, whence they are placed for firing on a sledge or gun-carriage. If need be, they can be fired straight from the transport wagon, or the gun-carriage is at the same time used as the means of transport. Expe- rience alone can tell which of the patterns are the most useful.
It can scarcely be doubted that the machine-guns, especially when used in numbers, will exercise a cer- tain amount of influence on tactics. If these guns are to co-operate with infantry in action, the latter will somewhat have to look after that auxiliary arm, the employment of which depends so much on special cir- cumstances. There is a risk, then, especially in the attack, of infantry regulating its advance too much by the machine-guns, and losing thereby its freedom of action.
The weapons of field artillery have developed as rapidly as those of infantry. The effect of this arm has enormously increased since our last wars. The ballistic properties have been considerably improved since 1870-71, and the ranges have materially lengthened. Through the use of smokeless powder the possibilities of the effect of artillery, and through the adoption of new guns and projectiles, the nature of this effect, have been greatly enhanced. Shrapnel shell is used in addition to common shell. The effect of both kinds of these projectiles has greatly increased. In addition, combined projectiles are lately being in- troduced, which can act as common shell or as shrap- nel shell. It is anticipated that this kind of universal
64 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
shell, or composite projectile, will be adopted by all armies within measurable time. By the fuse-setting apparatus the setting of fuses for the different ranges is rendered easier and more rapid ; it does away, at the same time, with a source of inaccuracy due to setting the fuse by hand. A mechanical time fuse, with clock- work that starts on a round being fired, is designed to diminish the irregularities in the acting of the time fuse, and to lengthen the shrapnel range. But this in- vention has so far not been adopted anywhere. Through the introduction of guns with their barrels recoiling, rapidity of fire is, however, very materially increased, because the rough corrections, at least, for relaying the gun approximately after each round, are done away with. By the use of shields the gunners are pretty fairly, though not perfectly, protected against fire from shrapnel and infantry. The rapidity and accuracy of fire is further affected very advan- tageously by the improvements in the apparatus for laying the guns. The independent line of sight allows a division of labour between two gunners, thus facili- tating and accelerating laying, especially for searching fire. The telescope sight makes it easier for the layer to see clearly and aim accurately at the target, in spite of the long ranges at which artillery is firing to-day; this, again, reacts favourably on the accuracy of fire. The hinged stereo-telescope, owing to its optical prop- erties and its fixed stand, makes it possible to find out and clearly trace in detail even targets otherwise diffi- cult to see on the ground; it allows, moreover, the effect of fire to be well observed by those who fire.
In addition to guns, which held the field alone for some time, howitzers have recently been introduced again. The necessity of destroying the enemy's field entrenchments and hitting targets behind cover has
MODERN ARMS AND APPLIANCES 65
brought this about. These guns are apportioned to the field troops as light and heavy field howitzers. The former have calibres of 9.5 to 10.5 centimetres, and the latter of 12 to 15.5 centimetres. Both have auto- matic recoil and protective shields, and can be used for direct as well as for high-angle fire.
The heavy howitzers, to which everybody attaches great importance, use direct fire against solid upright targets like walls, buildings, entanglements, etc., with ordinary common or high-explosive shells, and against shield batteries and living targets with common shell or shrapnel. Opinions differ on the use of the latter. We have not introduced them in Germany.
Of decisive importance for the tactical employment of artillery is, lastly, the development of indirect fire, which, owing to the modern means of laying guns, can be manipulated with great certainty, so long as the commander is able to watch the target. The artillery can thus be effective without laying itself open to fire that can be observed. The gun is laid with the help of auxiliary aiming points. So much importance was attached in France to this kind of fire that the guns always fired indirectly, as a matter of principle, using auxiliary aiming points (point de reperage}. But the new Artillery Regulations of autumn, 1910, have abandoned this extreme view.
When firing from covered positions, the fire is watched from observation ladders, carried as a rule on observation wagons, and provided, if need be, with protective shields, or it is watched from points in the country, from which the targets can be seen, and which can be connected with the firing battery, if necessary, by telephone, for the transmission of the commander's orders. Laying for indirect fire is facilitated by the
66 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
panorama telescope, which allows an unlimited and direct use of auxiliary aiming points.
Lastly, we must mention the quick-firing guns of small calibre, which, with a bore of 3.7 centimetres and similar diameters, can fire about 300 rounds per minute, and are effective even up to 5,000 metres. In the South African war, these so-called pom-poms proved of great service, so much so that the English cavalry was supplied with them after peace was con- cluded.* The great mobility of these guns, the ease with which their fire can be observed, and the rapidity with which a certain amount of effect can be obtained, make them seem an arm especially useful for cavalry. But, for all that, they did not find favour with the German army.
The field army of the German Empire is equipped with a 7.7 centimetre quick-firing gun. It is sur- passed in many ways by more recent patterns, yet it comes up to the tactical requirements. Its mobility, at any rate, is excellent. It is equipped with time- shrapnel for 5,000 metres range, giving a forward ef- fect of 300 metres for the cone of fire at the most favourable ranges ; and with common shell that can be used also with time fuse ; but the use of common shell with time fuse is effective only when the bursting point is in a distinct position with regard to the target ; the common shell with time fuse is therefore not a partic- ularly serviceable projectile. No other State, for that reason, uses common shell with time fuse. But the range of shrapnel has been increased to 6,000 metres and more by almost all other nations. The Japanese are even said to have attained a range of 7,500 metres for time-shrapnel. The independent line of sight, which Germany has not yet adopted, is being used al- * Have been withdrawn since. — Translator.
MODERN ARMS AND APPLIANCES 67
ready in various other armies (France, England, Tur- key, Italy, partly in Russia, Belgium, and others).
Besides guns, the German artillery is equipped with light quick-firing field howitzers, to be used for direct as well as for high-angle fire, and thus able to cut through strong overhead cover of field entrenchments. Its shrapnel has the same range as that of the guns, with slighter effect in depth. This howitzer fires a newly-constructed composite projectile (05), which can be either used as common shell or as shrapnel shell. As common shell with time fuse, it is more effective against targets behind cover when the bursting point is correctly situated, than the common shell of guns; and for percussion shell it contains a contrivance for setting the percussion fuse "with delay."
Owing to the large calibre (10.5 centimetres), each round of a howitzer is more effective than one from a gun. But this difference is counterbalanced by the greater rapidity of fire from guns, and by the fact that the howitzer batteries carry less ammunition than the gun batteries. The greater number of light pro- jectiles gives more chances of hitting when sweeping and searching than the smaller number of heavy pro- jectiles. The replenishing and supply of ammunition is also affected by the difference in calibre; on the other hand, owing to the adoption of a universal pro- jectile, the preparedness of howitzer batteries for any kind of fire is materially increased.
The German heavy 1 5-centimetre quick-firing field howitzer can cut through the strongest overhead cover of field entrenchments, and fight down in a very short time field artillery recognized as such, and under ob- servation. It uses only common shell with percussion fuse, with or without retardation for high-angle fire. Its explosive and detonating force is very great, and
68 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
therefore likely to shake the morale of troops, even if there is not much actual damage done to materiel or personnel. But the heavy field howitzers are no good against permanent or provisional works. If the field army is to deal with them, heavier guns must be ap- portioned to it. Even the 21 -centimetre mortar, with which the German heavy artillery is equipped for that purpose, and which is going to be replaced by an im- proved type of the same calibre, may sometimes prove insufficient. So it will be necessary to introduce still larger calibres. Such a gun, a 25-centimetre howitzer on gun-carriage, has already been constructed by Krupp, as we see from "Loebell's Annual" of 1910.
Long guns of large calibre, designed more for for- tress and siege warfare, can also be attached to the heavy artillery of the field army for special purposes. They are the 10 and 13 centimetre guns of latest de- sign. The latter ranges up to 2,000 metres and more, and by its far-reaching and effective shrapnel fire may sometimes be of great use for enfilading the enemy's approaches, searching the ground in rear, and similar objects.
To be complete, I may yet mention that the 13- centimetre gun and the 21 -centimetre mortar of recent construction are provided with a contrivance by which means the guns need not be fired from platforms, and can traverse unfavourable ground, such as soft ground and marshy meadows, and use country roads.
Closed bodies of troops can no longer move to-day within the zones of effective artillery fire. When coming within its range, we are obliged to unfold the masses coming up by the roads and to split them up into fractions, so that these may find some cover on the ground, at least from sight. This is all the more necessary because the roads can be enfiladed by indi-
MODERN ARMS AND APPLIANCES 69
rect artillery fire with the aid of maps. The forma- tions when moving must also be chosen so as to offer as small a target as possible to the cone of dispersion of shrapnel fire. We will be often forced to cross dan- gerous stretches of ground by night and approach the enemy's position under cover of darkness. As a re- sult of this increased effect of artillery, it becomes nec- essary to begin the attack formation, where it is not covered by ground, much sooner than hitherto ; indeed, at distances, generally, preventing personal reconnais- sance of the ground and of the enemy's measures by the leader, thus obliging him to make his decisions on what information he receives from his reconnoitring. It is obvious that this distant artillery fire must affect strategy and tactics widely as regards time and space. All preparatory movements of troops on the battle- field itself must be made beyond the zone of artillery fire, and thus begin a long way off. If hostile aviators can see these movements, they must be made if possible so as to avoid the zone of indirect artillery fire as well. All enveloping movements must therefore begin at some distance from the battlefield. They must be carefully veiled or initiated by night marches, if they are to be a surprise. Greater distances must be kept between the lines of infantry following behind each other, owing to the great depth of shrapnel fire; the intensity of fire has contributed to loosen the fighting formations of infantry, which in turn causes the bat- tlefields to increase in extent out of proportion with the number of troops engaged. All this taken together requires reconnoitring to be done more rapidly, so as to group the forces early, not only according to the wants of strategy, but of tactics and the future con- duct of the action itself as well. Modern fire affects, of course, the tactical employment of cavalry too.
70 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
The infantry being obliged to deploy for action early, still more so is this necessary for cavalry, which presents a more favourable target than its sister arm. Nor can it hope to escape the effects of the enemy's artillery by the rapidity of its movement when the guns are properly served ; it will suffer grievous losses if it comes under effective shrapnel fire when in dense formations. Cavalry must, therefore, adopt loose for- mations early in action so as not to afford the enemy's artillery a good target. The occasion for cavalry to charge infantry under specially favourable circum- stances will also be rare, considering the formations in which infantry fights and the effect of modern fire- arms as described already in another chapter.* But when cavalry is obliged by circumstances to charge the front of troops steadily firing, the form of charge must be altogether different from what it was before. It can no longer use the line in two ranks when charging infantry in action, as that would be simply self-de- struction. The cavalry will try to cross the dangerous zone at its greatest speed, several lines deep in single rank, with intervals between the troops, and with closed bodies in small columns in the rearmost line. It will, if possible, advance on the broadest front per- missible, and from different directions, so as to dis- tract the hostile fire. Frontal charges made on artil- lery lines have more chances to succeed than on in- fantry firing, if the charge is delivered in suitable for- mation. But it is hardly ever likely that on the battle- fields of to-day artillery can be charged in front with- out the necessity of charging infantry at the same time. Charges on the flanks and rear of artillery, however, have great chances of succeeding now as before. But these will be of very rare occurrence in direct co- *Vol. i., book i., chap, ii., p. 39.
MODERN ARMS AND APPLIANCES 71
operation with infantry, and then only on a small scale. The cavalry is thus almost completely driven away from the common battlefield of the other arms by the modern weapons, and mainly restricted to acting on the flanks and rear of the hostile army. On the other hand, cavalry is now itself equipped with firearms, and can use them when charging is impossible. This opens to cavalry new spheres of activity, which promise great and important results if it understands how to make full use of its mobility, by being mounted, for acting in decisive directions with its firearms.
Firearms absolutely rule tactics to-day, and dictate to tactics their laws. They have altogether changed the conditions under which cavalry can act, conditions which the cavalry cannot disregard without losing its place in modern war. The way in which it must act in future will be described in another chapter.
The need for greater fire effect that asserts itself in all branches of warfare has even led to our falling back on methods which seem to be altogether anti- quated. For close combat, especially for the posses- sion of entrenched positions and permanent works, it has become necessary to look for some means of com- pensating for the artillery fire which cannot accom- pany the attack up to the last stages, nor support the defence to the very last. So we have fallen back on hand grenades, which, at close ranges, are hurled into the enemy's works, where they explode. Such projec- tiles may also be thrown from small mortars. The development of these missiles is not yet in its final stage ; more may be expected of them in the future.
Krupp has lately constructed a contrivance for throwing bombs that will probably be of much serv- ice.* A bomb filled with high explosives, and fixed to * "Kriegstechnische Zeitschrift," vol. v., 1910.
72 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
a guiding rod, is inserted into the loaded cannon at the muzzle, with the guiding rod first, and in such a way as to bring the bomb to sit on the muzzle, whence, on discharge, it is thrown forward with sufficient ac- curacy at a high angle of elevation. The projectile, weighing over 80 kilograms, attains a maximum range of 300 metres, and owing to its very steep trajectory can be thrown behind any cover. The cannon rests on a gun-carriage that can be put on wheels, and is narrow enough to be moved about in the trenches. Its effect is solely due to the fire, smoke, and air-pres- sure produced by the enormous explosive charge. Nothing can keep alive in its proximity. The suffo- cating smoke and the poisonous gases will make it probably impossible for any one to occupy the parapet behind which some of these bombs have exploded. Perhaps obstacles can also be destroyed by these pro- jectiles, and men be rendered unconscious in the de- fences of the ditch. The importance of this new arm can only be established by experiments.
The efforts also for fighting balloons with artillery have already produced some fair results. Captive balloons can be brought down easily by any field ar- tillery with shrapnel fire, and against non-captive bal- loons and other air-craft good results have already been obtained with guns designed especially for that purpose.
The perfection of firearms having thus plainly af- fected the tactical employment of all arms and their formations when in motion or in action, to such an ex- tent as to cause protection to be sought, against undue losses as well as against view, by an increased use of natural cover, by looser fighting formations, and by movements at night, has led, on the other hand, to greater value being attached to artificial cover.
MODERN ARMS AND APPLIANCES 73
The infantry, which is the most exposed, made the first efforts to guard against the effects of the enemy's fire. Trials were made to protect the skirmishers by bullet-proof equipments (Dove's cuirass) ; recently the knapsacks were armoured, so that the infantry men should find some cover when lying down behind them. But all these devices are of no practical value so far. Extensive use, however, has been made in the last wars of earth cover, constructed before and during an action; and we may be sure of similar efforts being made in future.
Shallow trenches for skirmishers lying down chiefly protect against frontal fire of infantry; deep, narrow trenches for firing standing, which are sometimes pro- vided with splinter-proof overhead cover, give protec- tion from shrapnel fire as well. Strong overhead cover provides protection against high-angle fire for sup- ports held in readiness close in rear of the foremost line; covered approaches allow reserves to be led for- ward into the firing line unseen and without loss. If time and material are available, closed earthworks can be built to form specially strong pivots of a defensive position.
Artillery, too, feels the need of cover. This is clear- ly seen by their efforts to take up covered positions and fire indirectly. It has also led, as we have seen al- ready, to the introduction of protective shields, which give fair cover from frontal shrapnel and infantry fire. Batteries facing each other frontally cannot therefore hurt each other much by shrapnel fire. We must try to cause damage by full hits of common shell. The composite projectile of the German field howitzers will, without doubt, prove particularly ef- fective for that purpose. We can also endeavour to obtain hits behind the shields by oblique fire. To meet
74 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
such fire it has been often proposed to use broader and curved shields. But these could not procure complete cover either. At any rate, a frontal duel between ar- tilleries of equal efficiency can only be decisive to-day if a large amount of time and ammunition is spent; artillery can, therefore, hold out for some time under the fire of hostile artillery without even sufficiently replying to it. Both these points are important for the tactical conduct of an action.
Cavalry, when it decides to use the carbine, will feel the want of entrenchments as well. The Boers in Africa, who were really fighting as mounted troops only, have, as we saw, made continual use of entrench- ments. But the experiences gained there scarcely apply to European conditions. The African horse- men seem to have carried their entrenching tools in their oxen wagons, and it is only due to the incredible slowness of African warfare that the tools were al- ways in time for use. This would be impossible dur- ing active operations in Europe. Here, the experiences of the American War of Secession may rather apply. During the great cavalry combats of those days, use was also often made of firearms, but we hear little of cavalry entrenching, while infantry did so extensively in the defence; the actions came off too rapidly and energetically for that; and so they will probably in a future war. Still, cavalry may often find itself in future in situations where it will be obliged to en- trench for an obstinate defence, especially in locali- ties. The fewer means cavalry has for that purpose, the more it needs to make the best use of ground and existing buildings for neutralizing the effect of mod- ern arms.
The preceding comments having demonstrated that, in field operations, fire and cover have increasingly
MODERN ARMS AND APPLIANCES 75
affected each other, we see that the same process, but to a greater measure, has taken place in fortress war- fare. The heavy garrison guns have also developed in a manner altogether surprising, and attained ranges and force of percussion necessarily affecting deeply the construction of permanent fortifications.
Where it was a question of securing certain objects against being reached by hostile fire, the works cover- ing them had to be pushed further forward to meet the longer range of the guns; where, on the other hand, cover was to be provided from the effects of that fire, the defender was obliged to have recourse to alto- gether new constructions. Under no circumstances could he suffer the attacking artillery to be superior in this respect. If, in active operations in the field, the construction of cover is not always convenient, though often an auxiliary means that cannot be avoid- ed, effective cover from the enemy's fire in for- tress warfare is by itself the determining factor. And thus, to attain complete cover, concrete and armour plates were adopted, efforts being made as far as pos- sible to secure the objects against hostile fire by their position as well.
Under the force of circumstances two typical forms of modern permanent fortification have been evolved, namely, large army fortresses, and barrier forts. The object of the latter is to block certain communications, and to secure the possession of some important points in the country, whence the surrounding ground can be commanded by artillery; and, where coast defences are concerned, to sweep the channels or defend points specially favourable for landing. The large fortresses, on the other hand, are meant to secure the possession of large towns, which, for some reason or other, are of strategic importance. It being impossible, owing
76 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
to their size, to secure them by continuous lines, we surround them with a chain of forts pushed far in ad- vance, which must possess great power of resistance, and form, as it were, pivots of defence. The intervals between these works are defended by the garrison of the fortress, and strengthened by suitable entrench- ments. Intermediate works and ammunition depots, of permanent construction, are to facilitate an ener- getic defence.
The disadvantage of these large fortresses is their extent. They need strong garrisons for their defence and take away forces from the field army. We must, therefore, when constructing such fortresses, always impose some limitations on ourselves as to the number of points to be fortified as well as to their extent. But the various defensive works, be they barrier forts or forts of a fortress, we must withdraw from the en- emy's sight as much as possible, by site and structure on the one hand, and on the other must make them as capable of resistance as possible. Overhead and outside cover are made of concrete, and the guns are placed in the permanent works protected by armour. Observing stations are armoured, too. The flank de- fences of the ditches are secured against direct fire by being placed behind the counterscarp, or sunk in the bottom of the ditch, where they can scarcely be struck by direct fire.
In the face of these new means and kinds of forti- fication, the siege artillery adopted guns of a calibre growing larger and larger; accuracy of fire was striven after as far as possible, so as to pierce the solid cover and hit the small targets presented by the armoured cupolas topping the armoured turrets. These things developed pretty well alike in all the great armies. In Germany, the garrison artillery is equipped with
MODERN ARMS AND APPLIANCES 77
15-centimetre howitzers — being the same gun as the heavy artillery of the field army — with the new 21- centimetre mortars, and with long lo-centimetre and 13-centimetre guns, which later have replaced the long 15-centimetre gun. The 1 5-centimetre howitzers are chiefly meant for fighting down the artillery and in- fantry positions. The field artillery is co-operating with these guns in the defence as well as in the at- tack. The 2 1 -centimetre mortars are mainly used against the strongest works of the enemy, and against guns protected by armour. These latter are partly heavy guns for distant ranges, and partly quick-firing guns of small calibre for close defence and for sweep- ing ditches and obstacles.
It is, however, not anticipated that decisive results will be obtained with these guns against modern cover. All that can be obtained, perhaps, is a temporary throwing out of gear of the armour turrets' mech- anism, thus causing their fire to be kept down. But experiments in peace and experience of war have dem- onstrated that heavier guns than those mentioned are wanted actually to demolish modern works. If we bear in mind the enormous strength a real modern for- tress may possess, we must realize from the outset that considerably stronger guns must be used than our 2 1 -centimetre mortars.*
For instance, 200 armour turrets have been ordered for the fortifications of Antwerp, each turret being armed with two 1 5-centimetre guns; for some fortifi- cations of Reval, 20 armour turrets for 3O-centimetre guns are said to be provided; and in America, gun- trials have been made against armoured concrete more
* The experiences of the attack on the forts of Liege and Namur show that the Germans have obtained these heavier guns since this was written. — Editor's Note.
78 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
than 6 metres thick. Modern artillery must take ac- count of all this kind of cover in fortress warfare so
as at least to match it.
*****
The art of war has, perhaps, profited most by recent progress in practical science ; the rage, even, for being as modern as possible in that field goes in many ways far beyond what may be of practical value. We must not overrate the importance of practical inventions for war, nor, above all, imagine that mechanical appli- ances, be they ever so excellent, can make amends for deficiency in military and moral qualities. But we must, on the other hand, with inexorable logic and consistency, theoretically and practically, draw the con- sequences actually and necessarily resulting from this progress in technics. To foresee these actual and necessary consequences of new mechanical achieve- ments, and to take notice of them in practice, is one of the most essential tasks in the preparation for war even, and Prussia especially can boast of brilliant suc- cesses in this domain in times past. To examine the achievements of modern times from this point of view seems, therefore, a task especially needful.
We have seen that the effect of modern firearms ex- ercises a great and direct influence on the character of the combat, and, therefore, on the conduct of an ac- tion ; and we had to acknowledge that, indirectly, strat- egy is affected as well by the altered nature of battle.
It is just the reverse with the influence of the means of transport on the conduct of war. They directly increase strategic mobility of the troops, and benefit the strategic grouping of the forces; but indirectly they are of some importance for the conduct of battle, by promoting the independence of the troops of their lines of communication, by facilitating the bringing up
MODERN ARMS AND APPLIANCES 79
of supplies, and by creating possibilities for concentra- tions and movements which did not exist formerly. Commanders acquire thereby greater freedom of action.
The most important means of transport are, of course, the railways, which alone make it altogether possible to concentrate, move, and supply the huge numbers of modern armies. The efficiency of this grand means of communication has been substantially raised since the last great wars of Germany. All the Great Powers of Europe have striven to enlarge the railway nets, often even from a military point of view chiefly.
In case of war, the whole railway service is placed under military authority. All railway administrations, with their whole personnel and materiel, come under the military railway authorities. The whole railway service, as applied to military purposes, is in Germany controlled by the Director of Field Railways. Most of the railways continue of course to work as in peace generally, even in case of war. Those lines which come under war conditions are expressly named. They will be those lines which are considered as being in the theatre of war or in its neighborhood. On these lines, too, the railway service remains in the hands of the civilian railway directors and administrations, but the basis of all traffic on them is the military time- table. How far the carrying capacity of the railway is to be made use of is decided by the Director of Field Railways, who also issues orders as to whether, and to what extent, public traffic may be allowed. Public traffic is never allowed, as a matter of principle, on the lines in the actual theatre of war.
"Military management" takes the place of war man- agement on those lines which have been captured dur-
80 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
ing the war, or have been constructed by the military authorities. "Military management" may also be or- dered for lines which work under peace or war man- agement. In that case the military directors of rail- ways take over the administration and control of the lines.
Owing to the importance the railways have gained to-day for all movements of troops, it is not only a question of making use of all existing railways; it may also become necessary to build new lines, to re- pair those destroyed by the enemy, and, on the other hand, to render useless lines used by the enemy, or those which we must leave in his hands.
Special means of transport will still be necessary to communicate between railheads and troops, and the amount of transport must become the greater the more the troops outdistance these railheads. The impor- tance of these means of transport grows when only few railways are altogether in the theatre of war, and when the army conquering invades the enemy's coun- try, where all the railways have been thoroughly de- molished, and when, lastly, we do not succeed in rapidly and completely repairing what has been de- stroyed.
In all European wars, draught animals were almost exclusively used, so far, for this kind of transport, exceptionally, perhaps, pack animals. But it is ob- vious, and is confirmed by experience as well, that this mode of supplying troops is bound to be very slow and difficult. The draught or pack animals need first of all themselves a good deal of supplies, if they are to keep efficient; and secondly, their power of marching is certainly very limited — at any rate, not at all materially greater than that of the troops them- selves; and this causes the troops sometimes to re-
MODERN ARMS AND APPLIANCES 81
strict their movements out of regard for supplies. It was, therefore, one of the first problems for mechanics to design means for limiting, as much as possible, transport by animal power.
Motors now do away with this defect. They are the latest achievement in military transport service, and seem specially fitted for facilitating materially the transport of goods behind the armies. All draught animals can now be spared, which is of greatest im- portance ; a few vehicles can carry very much greater loads than those of draught animals, and the speed of these vehicles is much greater than that of the former columns, thus enabling the troops to be sup- plied without their needing to shorten the marches demanded by strategy.
Whenever personal reports or communications be- tween distant headquarters are of importance, or even desirable only, the motor-car is a suitable means of conveyance. The car is certainly tied to good roads, but then there is no need for shunning little detours since, owing to its speed, the car can cover in a very short time even long distances. Motor-cars are also suitable for conveying orders. These cars make it possible for superior headquarters to remain longer in billets for further work, and yet to be in their new quarters at the proper time. They can also be used for guarding telegraph lines and sometimes signal stations; the small autos especially can relieve the cavalry very much of orderly and relay duties. The private motor-cars are thus on the border between the means of transport and the actual means of com- munication.
But we cannot warn too strongly against overrating the efficiency of motor-cars, and, thus, their military importance. Their mechanism is still very delicate,
82 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
and easily deranged, when not treated carefully, and when not kept clean. Damage to tyres is of every- day occurrence; barricades, wire entanglements, and similar things, cleverly arranged, may easily prove fatal to motor-cars, especially at night. Their use is, therefore, chiefly confined to the roads within safe reach of our own troops, and not too much endangered by hostile inhabitants. The cars will, of course, be also used sometimes in districts threatened by the enemy, but in that case we can never count for certain on a journey being successful. The performance of this kind of conveyance depends on many conditions, which may easily upset all calculations. Their use as a means of communication in the foremost line, or even for reconnaissance, is therefore very limited. We have built armoured motor-cars, it is true, which are to be used in enterprises likely to be interfered with by the enemy, and have even armed these cars with light guns and machine-guns, but no serious military value can really be attached to these experiments. By being armoured, these motors lose their chief ad- vantage, namely speed and handiness.
The whole telegraph service is organized to accom- pany and facilitate operations in a successful offensive war. But whether it will be always possible to es- tablish and change communications seems rather doubtful. The demands made in this respect are ex- ceedingly exacting, and can scarcely be met, espe- cially when retrograde movements become necessary. To take up and relay lines behind an army advancing is always possible; but when we retire, we will often be obliged to abandon the material; the possibility of permanently maintaining telegraphic communica- tion with Headquarters of Commands will then be doubtful; and if we further bear in mind that in vast
MODERN ARMS AND APPLIANCES 83
districts the lines will be threatened by the popula- tion or hostile patrols it becomes obvious how exceed- ingly important it is to have means of communication not dependent on connecting wire.
This want is met by field signalling appliances and wireless telegraphy.
The former is an optical telegraph with which either sunlight or a powerful signalling lamp is used.
Far more useful and applicable is wireless telegra- phy. By it communication can be established for long distances, and without visual connection, and it is al- most altogether independent of weather and ground. But, electric waves extending in the air in all direc- tions, there is the disadvantage of foreign apparatus reading our messages as well. We guard ourselves against this by using cipher, and adopting special measures.
The equipment of wireless stations is very com- plicated and bulky, and must be carried on wagons. A thoroughly trained personnel is necessary to serve it. Its use with the troops is, under these circum- stances, inadmissible. But wireless telegraphy is ex- cellently adapted for connecting the highest commands with each other and with the advanced army cavalry, which should be equipped with wireless stations as a matter of principle. The apparatus taken in the field can safely transmit intelligence up to 200 kilometres, as far as it has been developed to-day. Good service will also be rendered by wireless telegraphy in connect- ing besieged fortresses with the country outside, and in the defence of coastlines. Probably all countries have therefore established permanent wireless stations in the big fortresses and at other important points. It must further be assumed that all European armies have similar arrangements to our own, and that we
84 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
can hardly lay claim to being superior in any of these technical departments.
Modern technics have thus tried to ensure the safe transmission of intelligence in all sorts of ways and manners ; and though each of the means has its weak- nesses and disadvantages, yet, taking them all to- gether and in combination, they will, in a most decisive manner, contribute to making it possible for the mod- ern armies of masses to be led. Their importance for active operations in war cannot be rated too highly.
These means of communication will materially aid command in battle too. With the size of modern armies and with the extension of battlefields conse- quent thereon, it is much more difficult than formerly to ensure the safe transmission of orders and reports ; on the other hand, it has become very much more important for proper connection to be maintained with subordinates in action, through the fact that the size of the masses employed makes it very difficult to counter-order measures once adopted. To-day it is therefore still more important than formerly to have reliable means of communication between com- manders.
If intercommunication between the leaders, and be- tween them and their troops, is only maintained by mounted men (adjutants, orderlies, etc.), uniform control of an action is possible only within a com- paratively limited space. Mechanical communication must therefore step in for longer distances. If the roads are favourable, motor-cars can be used for that purpose; sometimes flag and field signalling may be worked; and lastly, telegraph lines can be laid as well on extensive battlefields if the corps telegraph de- tachments are requisitioned. But the most suitable appliance for such purpose seems to be a telephone
MODERN ARMS AND APPLIANCES 85
that can be easily handled. These considerations have led to telephone detachments being formed for head- quarters of superior commands; these detachments are equipped with 8 kilometres of a light field cable that can be laid in about twenty minutes per kilo- metre. The stores are carried on a wagon, which also carries the men. Telephone connection ensures direct personal intercourse between the commands concerned, but this at the same time harbours a cer- tain amount of danger. It is, that superior com- manders may feel tempted to encroach upon the sphere of subordinate leaders by meddling with details with- out being able to judge of what is going on ; and that the subordinate commanders may try, by asking ques- tions, to shift to higher quarters responsibility which it is their own duty to take. Demoralization may also easily spread from one command to the other by means of the telephone. The apparatus must there- fore be used with deliberate caution, and only by the proper authorities. The advantages it affords are so great, however, that we cannot dispense with its use on the battlefield. Good use can also be made of the telephone detachments when the troops are at rest, either to connect the main body in quarters with the reserve of outposts, or army corps headquarters with the divisions, and these with each other when the corps telegraph detachment is not available.*
* Reliable reports say that a simplification of the field telegraphs is planned, and has already been tried at the Emperor's manoeuvres in 1911; namely, the corps telegraph detachments, less the Morse apparatus, have been amal- gamated with the telephone detachments of the higher com- mands to form larger telephone units. These will be at the disposal of army corps commanders, and used by them in sections according to wants. The telephone detachments with the troops are not affected by this reorganization.
86 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
The troops themselves, with their present tactics, have also felt the want of telephone connection of the various units with each other and with their com- manders. The troops have therefore been equipped with telephone appliances as well.
The covered positions taken up by artillery, when the leader is often at an observing station some dis- tance from his command, have made it necessary to connect him with his men by telephone to make it possible for him to direct the fire. But the difficulty of bringing to the knowledge of subordinate officers the orders of the higher artillery commanders in the long artillery lines, especially when stationed in groups, often makes telephone connection between the various commanders a necessity too.
The infantry telephone is very suitably applied on outpost duty; and, as personal transmission of orders is almost impossible during an attack, the infantry tries to make the best of signalling flags and tele- phones in action, as well. But these aids are scarcely to be relied upon. When the powerful material and psychical effects of an offensive action assert them- selves, there is no room at all any more for the special issue of orders demanding deliberation and an altered course of action ; one law prevails then alone : the iron will to beat the enemy.
We must finally mention the latest achievements in technics, namely, aeronautics.
The various kinds of air craft, like the motor vehi- cles, are important as a means of reconnaissance, of communication, and of transport ; and they promise to be much more so than hitherto. For the present, of course, airships and flying machines cannot be con- sidered quite perfect for war service. But it is merely
MODERN ARMS AND APPLIANCES 87
a question of time for that problem to be completely solved by mechanics.
The Zeppelin airships are, owing to their size, very stable, have great lifting power and a wide radius of action. They are, moreover, in so far safe against injury as the gas that carries the balloon is distributed among a good number of independent gas-tight com- partments; the balloon, therefore, need not neces- sarily come down, if some of them have been emptied. But these airships have this against them, that they cannot be taken to pieces, but must be shelved in spe- cial sheds, and that they cannot be transported. An empty Zeppelin balloon can only be moved for a very short distance, and then only with the aid of a very great number of men. To use these airships we need, therefore, specially prepared anchorages. At the be- ginning of a war they will go forward from the per- manent sheds established in the frontier districts, and can then return to them after finishing their trip. But when we advance into the enemy's country, we must carry portable sheds if we wish to continue using these ships. And so these have already been provided ; they can be taken by rail, and have proved their worth at trials in manoeuvres.
Compared with the rigid airships, the semi-rigid and non-rigid airships have considerable advantages. The semi-rigid balloon is quickly mounted, the gas being applied direct; owing to the rigid frame or keel to which it is attached, it possesses comparatively great solidity; it can be taken to pieces and moved about, and therefore be used without requiring a shed. The rigid keel, however, which can be taken to pieces, makes the ship need several wagons for transport. The size of the ship, as used, so far, in Germany, pre- vents it having the carrying capacity or the wide
88 HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR
radius of action of a Zeppelin ship. But its present measurements are not at all final, and may easily at- tain those of a Zeppelin balloon, as matters stand to-day in the world of technics. The Parseval airship is still easier to get ready and to dismantle than the military semi-rigid airship, and can be transported on two wagons. The disadvantage of both these sys- tems is that any serious injury to the cover will in- fallibly bring down the balloon, since the gas is not distributed in numerous independent compartments as in the Zeppelin. Still, both these kinds of airships, semi- and non-rigid, can directly accompany the troops, and be used anywhere. This renders them al- ways much more useful for military purposes than Zeppelin's system, which is, moreover, much more dependent on the weather, and has yet to prove its military worth.
It is, of course, an advantage if sheds can be pro- vided sometimes for semi-rigid and non-rigid airships, as we then need not empty and refill the balloons again when in daily use. Portable sheds, taken into the field, will benefit these airships too.
CHAPTER V
THE IMPORTANCE OF CAVALRY
THE fire of modern rifles and guns has deeply affected the tactics of the three arms, as we have seen. While it has altered only the form of fighting of infantry and artillery, and the manner of their tactical employ- ment, without touching the importance of both these arms as a whole, and within the army, it has had a far greater influence on cavalry. Not only the tactical formations used by cavalry in action have changed, but its employment is altogether different.
The effect of modern firearms, with all its conse- quences, has caused occasions for successful charges against firearms to be of very rare occurrence in the latest wars, and they will be rarer still in future. Such charges have, however, positively ceased to be of de- cisive importance in battle, by reason alone of the comparative small numbers of cavalry. Owing to the enormous size of modern armies and the extent of the battlefields, a successful charge of even so large a body as a cavalry division could no longer bring about a decision by itself. But the cavalry has nevertheless hitherto stuck to the fiction that its relation to the other arms was still similar to what it was formerly — that an action of the three arms combined was possible even to-day, as in the days of Frederic and Napoleon. The cavalry looks now, as it looked then, upon a charge in battle as its paramount duty; it has almost
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deliberately closed its eyes against the far-reaching changes in warfare. By this it has itself barred the way that leads to great successes. The responsible military authorities have failed in the same way. Very reluctantly the cavalry was armed with firearms, at first even with quite useless weapons, and it is but very recently that the German cavalry got an efficient rifle ; its use is still looked upon as. quite a subordinate matter. The tactical exercises of cavalry divisions are still carried out as of old; we still cannot bring our- selves to enter heart and soul upon the tasks imposed on us by the new order of things. Superior com- manders, too, are still imbued with obsolete ideas, and employ cavalry according to these ideas. The Em- peror's manoeuvres in 1909 furnish an interesting example of this. Cavalry owes its decline to all these circumstances. But whether it will gain in future the place due to it will, above all, depend on whether the rank and file will resolve with open eyes to break with the ideas of the past, and devote themselves to the tasks of the present without reserve.
The German cavalry need not, for all that, give up the hope of successfully charging infantry and ar- tillery. Any one who wished to deduce from my re- marks that I thought the time for such charges was a thing of the past would completely misunderstand me. I am rather of opinion, and have always stood up for it, that modern infantry will sometimes present a favourable object for a charge, especially when it is a question of infantry of the second and third lines. If such infantry is demoralized by the dissolving in- fluences of modern action, is out of hand of the com- manders, and no longer fires deliberately, it will easily enough become a prey of a bold cavalry charge from various directions if the ground offers at least some
THE IMPORTANCE OF CAVALRY 93
advantages. Such situations are sure to arise even to-day, especially in pursuits. The enemy's artillery, standing far behind the foremost fighting line, can also often be attacked by cavalry, though not in front, yet from the flanks, and especially in rear, if the en- emy has used up his reserves.
Obsolete I only hold to be that opinion which thinks that the main task of our cavalry is to co-operate di- rectly with the other arms and to charge in battle; which desires to subordinate all action of cavalry to this task, treats fire-fight of cavalry merely as a last resource, and would like to restrict the strategic free- dom of that arm by constant deference to its possible employment on the battlefield.
If the cavalry takes the field in a future war with notions of that kind, it will certainly not give us that advantage which we otherwise can expect, and have a right to expect, from it.
The relations of cavalry to the other arms, and altogether to the conduct of war, have, as a matter of fact, completely altered. An action of the three arms combined in the old sense, as is still hovering before the mind of our cavalry soldiers as a delusive ideal of bygone times, is no longer feasible at all. The partici- pation of cavalry in the decisive action of infantry and artillery is no longer necessary. All the more im- portant it is to be absolutely clear on the tasks which a future war will demand the cavalry to solve, and on the mode by which these tasks must be solved. The superior commanders and the cavalry itself must learn to deal with these problems, and prepare them- selves to carry them out, if the cavalry is to continue to be a useful instrument of war in the future.
Reconnoitring and screening must be mentioned first of all in this connection. Both have eminently
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gained in importance under modern conditions. Ad- vantageous as it is to have as accurate and as early information as possible on the enemy's measures, and to screen our own concentrations and movements with the object of surprising the enemy and increasing thereby the chances of success, the advantage will be all the greater when great masses are concerned. The larger the armies are which are being moved, and the longer it therefore takes to concentrate them or change their direction of march, the more important it becomes to reconnoitre in time, so as to be able to initiate early enough the measures which may have become necessary through the facts ascertained by reconnaissance. Modern arms indirectly influence reconnaissance in so far, too, as, owing to the long- range and effective indirect fire of artillery, we must deploy for action sooner than formerly. It will be very exceptional for superior commanders to recon- noitre personally before such deployment. They are thus almost entirely dependent on the results of cavalry reconnaissance, not only for their operations, but also for their dispositions for battle. This makes cavalry reconnaissance all the more valuable, but also calls for greater efficiency of that arm.
The cavalry must precede the armies as far forward as possible, to beat the hostile cavalry and push it back vigorously, so as to allow our own patrols to approach rapidly the hostile columns and discover their movements. So long as an efficient hostile cavalry is in the field, our own will be hampered in all its enterprises, and accordingly obtain little infor- mation. We must further bear in mind that the enemy's cavalry may decline to fight with cold steel, using the carbine instead, and be supported in this action by detachments composed of all arms. The
THE IMPORTANCE OF CAVALRY 95
cavalry must therefore be prepared to undertake in- dependent operations of an extensive nature and be able to beat by dismounted action strong hostile forces, or to turn them. If it can do both, then, and only then, will it carry out its object.
Offensive power is, however, not enough for cav- alry; it must have also learned to push out its recon- noitring bodies rapidly and systematically, and to send back as fast as it possibly can to the headquarters concerned the early information it has obtained. Great horsemanship, combined with daring boldness and vigilance of patrols and reconnoitring squadrons, are necessary to attain these objects; all mechanical means must, moreover, be used to promote rapidity of gain- ing and transmitting intelligence of decisive impor- tance. The army cavalry must therefore be equipped and conversant with wireless telegraphy, telephones, signalling apparatus, and flying machines. The cav- alry must also keep as much as possible in constant touch with any dirigible airships that may be avail- able. The airships must arrange their action so as to work ahead of the cavalry, and furnish it with intelli- gence about large concentrations of the enemy or their approach to enable the cavalry to adopt its measures accordingly. These ships must therefore beat the en- emy's airships and flyers, and start early to meet them with that object. To ensure co-operation in recon- naissance on land and in the air, it will often be ad- visable to place the cavalry and airships under one uniform command. The intimate co-operation of these two arms will best ensure success. We will also be obliged to attach to the cavalry specially designed guns to support our airships in their fight against those of the enemy, or to fight them independently.
Early reconnaissance is particularly important to
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that party which has resolved to remain on the de- fensive, strategically or tactically. That party has then surrendered the initiative to the enemy, and must conform to his will. It cannot arrange for suitable measures of defence until sufficiently informed as to the grouping and main direction of attack of the en- emy; it runs the risk of being too late with these de- fensive measures, if it does not receive correct intelli- gence about the enemy's measures in ample time. At the same time, it will be its concern to screen the po- sition of its own reserves, so as to deliver a counter- attack by surprise. The assailant, on the other hand, who seizes the initiative and imposes his will on the enemy, is in the first instance interested in screening his concentration and his main direction of attack so as to act by surprise, and thus make it 'impossible for the enemy to adopt his counter-measures in time. But it is also desirable for him to gain a knowledge of the strength and grouping of the hostile reserves, so that he may not come unexpectedly on stronger forces than he had anticipated. In this way the cavalry has al- ways to face the double task of simultaneously recon- noitring and screening; and it will often have to de- cide on which of these activities it has to lay the greatest stress. When screening, it will, above all, be a question of warding off with firearms any hostile attacks, because effective screening is generally only possible by defensive action in combination with ground. Sometimes only when advancing must we try to screen offensively by boldly attacking every hostile party, down to a single patrol, pushing them back, and endeavouring to capture the enemy's dispatch-riders. If screening is to be supported by airships and flyers, it can be only done offensively by attacking the hostile aerial fleet and trying to render it harmless.
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When we are reconnoitring, and not screening, we must always try to come to close quarters with cold steel, as we wish to attain our object quickly, and must therefore decide an action rapidly, and that can only be done by charging. In case of need only, when there is no other course open, must we have recourse to the carbine. Since both parties have an equal in- terest, as a rule, in gaining rapid success, we are justified in assuming that during the first period of a war there will be great cavalry charges, and that only that party will have recourse to firearms which, from experience, has become aware of the enemy's superiority when charging ; the party using its firearms must then be beaten by dismounted action as well. From this it follows that cavalry, intent on carrying out its duties, must also prove superior in dismounted action, so as not to lose in fire action the superiority it has gained with cold .steel.
In addition to reconnoitring and screening, the cavalry must at all cost act on the enemy's lines of communication. This is of the utmost importance in modern war. The larger the armies, the less they are able to live on the country; the quicker and the farther the firearms shoot, the more ammunition will be spent. In equal measure grows the importance of supplies and of the lines of communication; the in- terruption of regular supplies may prove then all the more fatal. Here, therefore, is a field for the cavalry to achieve far-reaching successes. Even tactical de- cisions may be affected, at least indirectly, by the enemy's supplies of ammunition being cut off directly in rear of the battlefield.
In view of these dangers threatened by cavalry, both parties will take pains to guard in sufficient strength with troops, at least of the second and third
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lines, those communications which may be endangered. It will therefore not be easy for the attacking cavalry to carry out its mission. It will not only have to beat the enemy's cavalry, which will certainly oppose it, off the field, but it must also operate independently on the flank and in rear of the enemy for days, and perhaps for weeks, entirely separated from its own army, and be able to capture by swift attack any sup- ply columns on the march or while parking, as well as depots on the lines of communication. The cavalry must therefore be specially equipped for these duties, and have substantial fighting power, not only mounted, but above all dismounted. If its own strength is not sufficient, cyclists must be attached to it, because a combination of cavalry with cyclists will undoubtedly prove altogether extremely effective.
Fears have been expressed that enterprises against the enemy's communications might jeopardize the par- ticipation of cavalry in battle, and thus, of course, its participation in pursuit or covering retreat as well. The German cavalry training, too, warns, as it were, against these kinds of enterprises,* because the cavalry might be diverted from what is still considered its paramount duty — namely, charging in battle. Views forming the basis of such regulations are in no way in harmony with the requirements of modern war, and completely misjudge the relative value of employ- ing troops. I think, moreover, that the objection of raids diverting a well-led cavalry from its proper duties is perfectly untenable. If the raid is made in a decisive direction — that is to say, in a direction in which the commander-in-chief has decided to bring about the final issue; if the cavalry commander is
*"Exerzier Reglement fur die Kavallerie," paragraphs 527 and 395.
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kept constantly informed of the intentions of general headquarters and on the general situation, which seems feasible by wireless telegraphy or by some other means, he can easily move towards the enemy's army when the crisis is approaching, and appear on the day of battle on the flanks and in rear of the adversary like Stuart at Gettysburg. The raid itself will lead him in the decisive direction.
He who wants to keep the cavalry always in close proximity to the flanks or even behind the battle-front, will never derive any advantage from that arm under modern conditions; the cavalry will in that case stand idling about on the battlefield, vainly waiting for its chances to come. Freedom and movement, together with every kind of action, are the life and soul of that arm, which is bound to decay if it does not succeed in adapting itself to modern requirements.
The cavalry in the North American War of Seces- sion, approaching its tasks with an unbiassed mind and not being hampered by tradition and routine, soon found the right way for great activity. The South African War, too, is very instructive in this respect. General Buller, who seems to have been still imbued with perfectly antiquated ideas about cavalry, always wanted to have that arm on his flanks to cover them, even when they were not at all threatened; he thus hampered all freedom of action of cavalry. The con- sequence was that his cavalry did nothing. General French, on the other hand, took the opposite stand. Extensive raids around the enemy against his flanks and rear was the principle of his action, and he would have done even more than he did in this direction, had not General Roberts repeatedly clipped his wings and held him tight, and had not the horses completely broken down. But the fundamental ideas of his
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cavalry leading were undoubtedly right, strategically as well as tactically. A warm adherent of cold steel and ever ready to charge, he still knew the full value and importance of the firearm, and never hesitated to attack dismounted whenever it suited the case.
But it has not only been asserted that raids against the enemy's lines of communication will jeopardize the cavalry's participation in battle — it has been further asserted that these kinds of enterprises are not at all possible under modern conditions. The numerous lines of communication-defence troops, and the extensive telegraphic system of European theatres of war, would make it always possible to concentrate superior forces against such cavalry and paralyse its action. I think this view is wrong.
Certainly, at the beginning of the war occasions for such enterprises will be rare. When the French army is concentrating on one line from the Belgian to the Swiss frontiers, we cannot dispatch a cavalry corps on the French lines of communication. But when, during the course of the war, different and separate army groups will be forming — as will always be the case — a suitably-equipped cavalry will certainly be able to operate against the enemy's flanks and rear. If we study the campaign of 1870-71 from this point of view, we shall not be long before we arrive at this conviction.* Of course, the troops employed on such a raid must not only have considerable fighting power, but must also be equipped with columns and trains
* The German General Staff, too, seems to share my opin- ion. When discussing the great Russian raid under Misht- shenko against the lines of communication of the Japanese, the General Staff holds my view that the second period of the war in 1870-71 shows a whole number of cases where such raids could have been carried out successfully, and expressly emphasizes that the failure of the Russians was
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capable of moving as rapidly as the troops themselves, making them, for some time at least, independent of the country, as well as of their own lines of communi- cation. By destroying the enemy's railway and tele- graph lines, as well as by spreading false intelligence, the raiding-corps must try to keep the enemy uncer- tain about its activity, and render his concentration for a counter-offensive difficult. By demonstrative movements, and rapid marches, sometimes carried out at night, the corps must deceive the enemy, escape his countermoves, and appear where the blow is least expected. It is, of course, altogether presumed that these demands are met when cavalry is employed in- dependently in this way as well as in reconnaissance and pursuit. If these demands are satisfied, the raids will prove feasible too. Their importance is generally underrated. I not only think them possible, but a downright necessity, as we shall see when we deal with the strategic operations; and I believe that raids will not only favourably influence the decisive issue in bat- tle, but also lead the cavalry in a favourable direction on the battlefield itself.
At the final issue of battle the cavalry divisions can also take their due share only if they are able to act with firearms in considerable strength. There being no longer any question of cavalry co-operating con- stantly and closely with the other arms in the way it is still done with infantry and artillery, the cavalry, combined into large masses, must try to intervene from the flanks of the line of battle, and to become effective chiefly by the direction of its attack. That
no proof against the feasibility of such enterprises in future. ("The Russo-Japanese War: German Official Account, the Raid to Yin-kou, and the Battle of San-de-pu," vol. v. Hugh Rees, Ltd.)
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must be made against the flanks and rear of the en- emy. Its mobility enables the cavalry to envelop the enemy's flanks and penetrate to his rear. It must not be afraid of abandoning, then, altogether its own lines of communication for the time being. It will always be able to regain them again. If it is opposed by the enemy's cavalry, that cavalry must be attacked with- out hesitation, beaten, and pursued with portions of the force. This is presumed for all further enterprise. If it is successfully accomplished, then the road is open to great achievements. The moment has now arrived when the cavalry can render invaluable services to the other arms, though not in direct co-operation, by drawing upon itself hostile troops, and preventing them from intervening in the decisive issue. The vic- torious cavalry will first employ its artillery, machine- guns, and, if need be, its carbines against the enemy's flanks, reserves, artillery, and ammunition columns, and use every opportunity for acting offensively, mounted and dismounted, without, however, engaging in an obstinate fight against superior numbers. Its mobility enables it here again to get away, and rapidly reappear at another place. The cavalry must per- petually try to threaten and damage the enemy where he would feel it most, but must reserve its main fight- ing power for the moments of the crisis. At these moments it must not mind heavy losses if it can effec- tively contribute to gaining victory. It will reso- lutely attack and push back in good time the detach- ments the enemy has pushed forward for protecting his flanks and rear, and thus have the road clear when the final crisis arrives. It is then of great consequence that the cavalry should act effectively at all costs, and intervene in the decisive combat itself by charging, if that can be done, otherwise by fire action.
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Of great importance is, lastly, the co-operation of cavalry in pursuit. Direct pursuit in front, as will naturally follow from the nature of the fight, must, of course, be chiefly left to the infantry and artillery, armed as they are to-day, because the bullet reaches farther and surer than the swiftest charge. But to pursue along the flanks of the enemy is the share of the cavalry, which must try to forestall the hostile march-columns, break into their flanks, and head them off, especially at places where the ground is favour- able for causing delay to the flying enemy. The vic- tory having been bought with streams of blood, the time has now come for reaping the harvest by in- flicting on the retreating enemy losses twofold and threefold the amount we have suffered. Fire and cavalry charges — where the demoralization of the en- emy allows it — must do here equal damage.
The fact that vigorous pursuit was never under- taken by cavalry in recent times, at least not in Euro- pean theatres of war, has led people to think very often that the idea of cavalry pursuit is mere the- ory, and can never be turned into practice. I do not share this opinion, but think that this fact is simply due to the manner in which cavalry was employed,.and to its defective equipment.
It is clear, then, that in almost all its spheres of action the importance of cavalry in war has very much increased with the growth of armies, though its employment differs somewhat from that of former times. But that army is sure to derive a great ad- vantage which is firmly resolved to discard antiquated views and assign to its properly equipped cavalry those duties which modern arms and military exigen- cies have imposed upon it.
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NOTE
[The March of Great Armies — General von Bernhardi discusses in detail the problem of the marching and supply of the great masses of men that form the armies of to-day. He points out that in order to diminish the length of the columns it will often be necessary to use the whole width of the road and march in double column, cyclist and motor companies of engineers going out in front to clear away obstacles and widen the road at difficult points. He also discusses the question of marching across country and night marching:
"Owing to the many roads sometimes required, but not available in the operations of large armies, we may want to shorten the march columns with a view to accelerating con- centration on the one hand, and on the other of facilitating supplying the troops from the rear. To attain these objects, double columns of route are used. This makes the march itself more difficult, especially on dusty and bad roads; but it is only feasible if the roads permit the march to be con- tinued on such a broad front during the whole time it lasts, or if narrow portions of the road can be turned. It is there- fore advisable, if such difficulties are anticipated, to bring up some engineers who, covered by cavalry and cyclists, precede the column with the object of widening the road where necessary, of marking out a military road, or of making fords passable. We must, at any rate, avoid form- ing again the single column of route during the march.
Similar reasons to those necessitating the shortening of columns of route may sometimes induce us to march across country. When turning defiles, when deploying for action, and on other occasions, we must often leave the regular roads altogether. The troops must, therefore, be practised also in marching across country, so as to get rapidly over any difficulties that may arise.
The idea of performing long marches across country seems somewhat monstrous in our eyes to-day. We are so spoiled in making our operations dependent on roads that we can scarcely realize any other mode of operating. And yet it is quite natural, requiring nothing that has not been proved possible by the experience of wars of former times.
NOTE 105
Frederic the Great's army often marched for miles across country. I need only mention Schwerin's advance to the Battle of Prague as an example of this. Engineer parties were often attached to the heads of columns to remove or bridge likely obstacles. We see these measures adopted already in the First Silesian War. Artillery and transport, if possible, used roads. We have not the least cause for assuming that what was possible then would be impossible to-day. The opposite is true. The engineers are to-day far more efficient than formerly, and the country is gener- ally more cultivated and richer in roads. Even when we are marching across country we can now and then use roads, though not first-class roads, of course. There is no reason, either, why the artillery and transport of, say, two army corps should not march to-day, as then, on the road, while the infantry is marching on both sides of it, advanced guards going ahead, marking out and making possible the way for the infantry. This procedure may sometimes be very much more practical than marching two army corps behind each other by one road, or shortening the march columns. One thing is, of course, necessary, and that is that when march- ing in this way there must be one uniform command. If there is no metalled road at all, the artillery must move across country, too, and, in case of need, the necessary transports as well, if the object cannot be reached by a roundabout way. The marches must then be made shorter. Engineers will, in such cases, always precede the column. It will be as well to make frequent changes in the units marching at the head of the column, because they have the hardest task. If the track across country is once firmly trodden down, there are, as a rule, no longer any special difficulties. Of course, we do not march like this at ordi- nary times; but when large armies are closely concentrated marching in this way may greatly enhance their power of operating. Naturally, it is always desirable to have the country to be traversed reconnoitred beforehand.
"Like marches across country, so will night marches be- come necessary in a future war more frequently than hith- erto. They will be used to escape, for instance, reconnais- sance by balloons, to avoid losses by artillery fire, or to ap- proach the enemy's position unobserved. If marches have to be executed across country in the dark, it is absolutely
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necessary to reconnoitre the country minutely beforehand and to fix landmarks which cannot be missed even in dark- ness. Such marches cannot be arranged off-hand; they must be carefully prepared. The troops, too, must be prac- tised in them, and acquire a certain amount of skill in marching by night if they wish to avoid disorder at de- cisive moments. At night we should not march in double column on roads, because difficulties increase in darkness, and controlling the column is easier if one side of the road is left free. But when marching across country it will be advisable sometimes to execute the movement in shorter and broader columns, so as to keep the troops better in hand."
In discussing the question of supply, he points out that with the huge masses of to-day it is impossible for an army to live on the resources of the country. It must depend on supply trains — usually of motor wagons — working from the nearest railhead, and drawing supplies of food, ammuni- tion, etc., from magazines accumulated at advanced bases. This makes the problem of changing the direction of the advance a difficult one, and an operation against the line of communications, if successful, will have a greater effect than ever before, for the result will be that immense masses of troops will be in danger of starvation. He insists that instead of working the supply of a group of army corps as a single unit, it will be necessary to provide each corps with its special supply train, carrying such a reserve of supplies as will make it possible to keep the corps sup- plied for a few days either when the communications are endangered, or when a change of direction is being made and the whole general system of supply is being transferred to a new group of roads. He analyzes in detail several possible changes of direction in order to show how in each case the problem of temporarily supplying the troops and shifting the lines of supply may be best solved. He then returns to the general question of the handling of great armies in war.]
CHAPTER VI SELF-RELIANCE, METHOD, AND COMMAND
CHAPTER VI
SELF-RELIANCE, METHOD, AND COMMAND
WE have seen that the fire of modern arms forces us to give up all close formations in action, and to form loose skirmishing lines in the foremost fighting line, as loosely as the necessity of effective fire will permit. The fronts in action correspond with this looseness, and with the wider extension of the skirmishing lines caused by it. The same number of troops can to-day embrace a far greater space than formerly if a greater organization in depth is not insisted upon. The artil- lery is, owing to the distant fire of the enemy's artil- lery, obliged to use indirect fire. The cavalry has al- most completely disappeared from the common battle- field of the other arms. With the enormous size of the army have also grown enormously the extent of the battlefields and the areas of operation. The vital points in the existence of armies, their organization, and the method of moving them, are altogether differ- ent from what they were formerly. All this causes an absolute change in the formal conditions of strategy and tactics.
But with the forms so also have changed the spirit- ual means which give life to these forms. The army and its leaders must of course be animated by bold- ness and initiative as much, and, perhaps, even more to-day than in the wars of the past, if we want to be successful. But the physical and moral qualities by
109
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which this spirit must manifest itself are, on the other hand, in many ways, different from those prevailing at the time of close formations. Especially must the in- fluence of command be different from what it was formerly. In this regard no one has as yet arrived at a perfectly clear conception of what it should be, and in spite of completely altered conditions in actions and in operations, tendencies assert themselves over and over again, of working with means belonging to a past age. The latest wars show this in a striking manner.
It is, therefore, necessary to acquaint oneself thoroughly with the actual nature of modern war and combat, with the object of arriving at a perfectly clear conception of them.
Let us first of all present to our minds what a mod- ern action demands from the two chief arms, and be- fore all what the mode of action is which decides matters, namely, the attack, without which a victory can hardly be conceived. The infantry advances in widely-extended lines. The influence of commanders, as far as it is transmitted by orders, is small. Exten- sion is too great, the noise of battle too loud, the tension of nerves too severe for the voice to be heard. Laboriously the most urgent directions are passed on along the line from man to man. At close and decisive ranges the example of the officers only prevails. But the enemy's projectiles reap a terrible harvest, par- ticularly among the leaders, who are obliged to expose themselves most. All influence upon the men then fails, units become mixed, everybody is left to him- self; the man as such becomes prominent, yet not the man who is led to victory, but the man who wants himself to conquer. Almost all the time he is in ac- tion he is left to himself. He himself must estimate
SELF-RELIANCE, METHOD, COMMAND in
the distances, he himself must judge the ground and use it, select his target and adjust his sights.; he must know whither to advance; what point in the enemy's position he is to reach ; with unswerving determination he by himself must strive to get there. Arrived in the enemy's position, he must know what he is to do. If the attack is not progressing, if it is impossible to gain ground in the face of the enemy's fire, he must create cover for himself. If it comes to reteating, he must obstinately cling to the ground fighting.* Hardly ever can he count upon receiving directions from his superiors. But what holds good for the private, holds good all the more for the leaders of all grades. They cannot count upon receiving orders in the midst of fighting. It is as a rule impossible to send directions from the rear into the foremost fighting line. To count upon reliable communication by signs from the rear to the front is a fancy no serious soldier should entertain for one moment. Once the troops have come within effective ranges of the enemy's fire all regular and comprehensive issue of orders ceases. All success is entirely dependent on the clear-sighted ac- tion of individual groups and men, on the example of leaders, or of those who feel called upon to lead. This is what a modern infantry action looks like; self-reliance is everything. It was so, it is true, in the last wars, during the final stages of infantry combat, but in future the stage where initiative is everything will begin much sooner than formerly, and from the outset in a manner much more pronounced.
Artillery action will Reveal similar features. So long as the batteries are under cover, are firing indi- rect, and are exposed only to sweeping and searching
* Vide v. Bernhardi, "Taktik und Ausbildung der Infan- terie."
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fire, regular control can certainly be exercised over large units. But when artillery has to unlimber in the open, and can be taken under fire, the effect of which the enemy can watch, not only the combined action of large units, but the issue of orders by battery com- manders themselves will soon fail, or sometimes be- come altogether impossible. Sections and single guns will be obliged to fire independently, as often was the case in 1870-71 ; for the voice of the officer com- manding the battery will not be heard, transmission by word of mouth will likewise become impossible in the din of battle, and soon numerous officers will have fallen. I am convinced we are deceiving ourselves if we believe a regular control of fire to be possible under these circumstances. The self-reliance of in- dividual subordinate leaders and men, and not a uni- form control, will be the decisive factor in the last instance.
These conditions are bound to exercise a far-reach- ing influence on the issue of orders. The troops can only act with self-reliance in a proper manner if they are thoroughly and sufficiently informed as to the in- tentions of the commander and the object of the fight. During the action itself any communication can reach the troops, especially the infantry, in exceptional cases only, namely, when for the time being they have reached some cover, where the commanders can, on the one hand, deal with the troops directly, and on the other receive orders themselves.
Under these circumstances the troops have to rely, as long as the action lasts, solely on what they knew about the object of the action and the co-operation of the various units before the battle began. This is over- looked too often.
To-day the mode of issuing orders in manoeuvres
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is such that the troops often do not get a combined operation order at all. Special instructions are often given to commanders of units alone when charged with a definite task. The connection of this indi- vidual task with the whole plan of action is very often not apparent in these instructions. That commander then issues his orders in a similar manner. In this way every one, of course, gets to know his special duty, but rarely how to co-operate with neighbouring bodies. Even if the superior authorities have issued an actual operation order, the effect is mostly the same. Only superior commanders become acquainted with it, issuing but parts of it as a rule to their subordinates. And so it happens that even brigadiers and colonels are often unable to get a clear view of the situation. Captains, to crown all, know nothing at all, as a rule, about the plan of battle, merely receiving for their companies some direction from the battalion com- mander, who habitually counts upon being able to send further orders to the troops during the action by his adjutant, because of real danger there is none in peace time. At the same time superior commanders are too frequently found in the foremost line, where they can survey all, and adopt suitable measures, with- out realizing that all this is impossible in real action.
We must break with this system altogether. A new method of issuing orders must take its place, if we do not wish command to fail on active service; for what we have practised in peace will be done habitu- ally in war, however impracticable it may be.
In order to prevent the self-reliance of the various groups and men leading to confusion during battle, and that they may act in accordance with the inten- tions of Headquarters, it is imperative to adhere rigor- ously to a systematic issue of orders before entering
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battle. Everybody must know so much of the general situation as is requisite for him to know within the sphere of his command, to enable him to act with self-reliance under any circumstances, even should the conditions be found to differ from what the order presumed, or change in the course of action. He only who knows the plan of the whole is able to act suitably in sudden emergencies. There will certainly be cases when there is no time to proceed systematically and when the situation calls for prompt and instantaneous action; but the conditions of modern war generally require and allow orders to be issued in detail and systematically, because the attack must begin far away from the enemy, and the reserves must as a rule be held back far in rear. Prompt action, too, as oc- casion may demand, which precludes us from issuing detailed and special orders, can take the most correct and suitable form only if based on the general situa- tion previously made known. The successful attacks in future will materially depend on the first measures adopted and on the method of issuing orders. General Headquarters must, therefore, always issue a clear and comprehensive operation order distinctly showing the object of the battle, the general plan, and the co-opera- tion of the various parts; and this order must not be communicated to the superior commanders alone; everybody must know its essential portions.
The same principles hold good for the defence, ex- cept that here all is naturally less difficult. In a de- liberate defence there will surely always be time enough for regular and detailed orders to be issued; and also during the battle itself, especially when the fighting troops are lying under cover, it will often be possible for orders to reach them.
It is necessary, also, to issue to the artillery orders
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which will enable and permit everybody to act with self-reliance. It is not at all enough to indicate to the various artillery brigades and batteries their posi- tions and targets. Far more important is it for all to be informed on the tactical object of the fire. The artillery must know the task given to the infantry in the battle, and must be in a position to judge fully how it can best aid the infantry in solving its task, so that all subordinates, knowing the situation, are perfectly free to act with self-reliance at the given moment.
Acting with self-reliance in the sense and spirit of General Headquarters, and of the uniform plan of battle known to us, is the decisive factor in modern battle.
Matters are somewhat different with cavalry. If it is used dismounted, it must, of course, be systemati- cally furnished with orders like any other troops ; nay, even more so, as there is the additional care for the led horses, which the commander concerned can only station correctly if acquainted with the general situa- tion and the plan of action. But in real mounted ac- tion detailed orders are well-nigh impossible. Every- thing is enacted in rapid succession, at a rapid pace, in the shortest possible time, and only by a brief order and word of command can the will of the leader pro- duce action. Sometimes the trumpet may also help to intervene. But it is possible to issue orders here in this way, because behind the commander are his troops to-day, as formerly, in close formation, able to hear his voice and trained to act with regularity on the briefest call or hint.
If the individual is, therefore, tied here to the mass, all the more prominent become the initiative and self- reliance of the superior leaders. They must always
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be fully acquainted with the strategic situation from which the action develops; the general and guiding plan of action must be briefly communicated to them. They must have learnt to understand from a few tersely coined words the idea and the will of the supreme commander. They must, however, not re- ceive this will in the form of an order, but as a task, leaving them full liberty in the choice of the means for its execution. The supreme commander cannot know how the subordinate commander will find the situation, he cannot discount the enemy's counter- measures in advance, and must, therefore, leave to his subordinate all the more perfect freedom of action, as there will never be time for asking questions and giving subsequent directions during the rapid course of a cavalry action.
If independence of action in cavalry combats is thus generally restricted to superior commanders, and down to squadron commanders only when they are charged with a special duty, the necessity of independent action of even the smallest group becomes all the more promi- nent when the main duties of cavalry are involved — namely, reconnoitring, screening, and raids on the en- emy's lines of communication. Reconnoitring squad- rons, patrols, and other detached bodies, cannot be given stringent orders, but only tasks, which they must try to solve with self-reliance, in the spirit of a situation about which they have been informed. They will often find the situation different from what the superior was able to tell them ; it will often change in the course of events. Over and over again will the individual be called upon to show judgment and de- termination. A strict method and the greatest self- reliance must go hand in hand here, to enable every one to respond to this call.
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Reconnoitring, screening, and reporting must be arranged systematically; the system must be clearly expressed in the detailed instructions given to the members concerned, to enable them to understand the connection of these three duties ; this system must become a second nature to all the troops, so that every one can find his way about in it. Every individual member, on the other hand, must be trained in self- reliance and be left to exercise it, so that when the situation changes and the enemy's action is felt every one is able to act suitably in the spirit of the whole. The cavalry soldier must, more than any other in- dividual of the army, rely upon himself when on stra- tegic service, and upon his own judgment as well as upon his boldness. The amount of his self-reliance is at the same time the measure of his work.
The same reciprocal effect between system and self- reliance as required by the combat and strategic ser- vice of cavalry must, under modern conditions, be also demanded from the conduct of operations and the action of the various units during the operations. All movements of masses must be carried out system- atically, if maximum performances are to be at- tained. In arranging the marches and regulating sup- ply it is absolutely necessary, as we have seen, to be strictly systematic, so as to prevent most serious checks in the movements of the whole army. Its mobility di- rectly depends on this system being adhered to, and commanders of troops must fully master its laws to be able to fulfil their duties. Yet the system alone is not enough for the proper execution of the strategic movements.
Two factors appear as a disturbing element ; firstly, friction, which asserts itself in all actions in war, is caused by misunderstandings, unforeseen accidents,
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personal failings, and similar reasons, and will always exercise anew a paralysing influence on the mechan- ism; and, secondly, the intervention of the enemy. When one or the other of these disturbances in the systematic course of a military operation occurs, it is bound to have an effect all the more injurious, the greater the tension under which the whole and neces- sary system was working. In such a case there is only one means of keeping the entire mechanism going, namely, the self-reliant action of every link in the chain of this system, in taking care that the wants of the movement are first of all met by increased march performances of some portions and other suitable measures, and that next the disorder in the whole mechanism is again removed.
But such self-reliant action is only possible when all individual members are informed on the general situation. Here again, therefore, arises the necessity for a systematic issue of orders, which, without re- stricting individual action more than is necessary, must transmit enough of the knowledge on the general situ- ation and the strategic object to enable the various portions in case of need to act with self-reliance in the proper manner. The modern means of communica- tion and intelligence certainly facilitate in all such cases the co-operation of every part, but for all that do not replace self-reliance.
The way in which the English conducted the South African War is, in this respect, extremely instructive. Here a system of perfect centralization of command prevailed. Every strategic and tactical movement was prescribed by the central authority to the minutest detail ; personal initiative was confined to the narrow- est limits. When it appeared it was at once sup- pressed, and where initiative proved necessary it failed
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nearly always. Especially when Lord Kitchener be- came Commander-in-Chief, centralization of com- mand appeared in its acutest form, giving rise to alto- gether stereotyped measures. The result matched the action. As little as they ever succeeded in beating the Boers decisively in the first part of the campaign, as little did they succeed in suppressing the guerillas in the second part. The self-reliant initiative of a de Wet, a de la Rey, and a Botha defied all the thumb- rule measures of British General Headquarters, which positively precluded all independent action of subordi- nate commanders. The English must confess, and they do confess, that their army completely failed in this respect.* Complaints on the purely literal obedi- ence and want of self-reliance and initiative of the English generals were heard from all sides. They characterize the opinion the English had of their own army. It had apparently ceased to appreciate that self-reliance is everywhere necessary corollary to any systematic action.
The larger the portions of an army with which we have to deal, the more independence must be granted to them, because General Headquarters cannot survey the details so well with large bodies of troops as they can with smaller ones.
A divisional commander knows exactly where each of the units belonging to his command is at the mo- ment; a general commanding an army corps knows exactly the area occupied by his divisions, and the positions of the supply depots apportioned to him, and, if his corps is marching by one road, the whole appa- ratus of his lines of communication. The commander of an army, on the other hand, is not informed on the interior arrangements made by the army corps. He * "The Times' History of the War in South Africa."
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only deals with army corps and the lines of communi- cation; it is the business of the corps to arrange in detail the intercourse with the latter. The Comman- der-in-Chief finally deals with the area of operation and the objectives of the various armies, with the rail- heads and intercommunication in general. It is im- possible for him to survey the detailed arrangements of the armies, still less of the army corps.
The larger the command of a general, the less, therefore, must he interfere with the details of the ar- rangements for which his subordinate commanders are responsible: for orders emanating from General Headquarters and interfering in matters of which the authority issuing the order cannot know the details, generally prove infeasible or cause, to say the least, grave inconveniences; these grow with the size of the operating masses, because with them frictions and possible misunderstandings increase.
This caused Field-Marshal Moltke to issue no further orders at all to the armies or independent army portions, but to send them only directives. The object to be attained was communicated to the army commanders, and they were given certain points of view on which they were to act. Where their spheres of action came in contact with each other, a dividing line was indicated, or one portion was placed under the command of the other. But the mode of execut- ing their task was, as a rule, left to the subordinate commanders, and only occasionally did the Field-Mar- shal intervene by giving definite instructions on how to act.
The experiences gained with this system were not always satisfactory. Repeatedly it became apparent that army commanders were unable to grasp the spirit of Moltke's brief directives, because they were not
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conversant with Moltke's train of thought. Collisions and strategic difficulties were the consequence. I need only mention the advance of the First and Second Armies to the Saar, and the operations against Mac- Mahon ending at Sedan. In both cases the mode of issuing orders did not suffice to bring about regular systematic movements. Too much independence was left to the subordinate commanders; they did not en- ter into the spirit of Moltke's orders, and the tech- nical difficulties of the operations ordered were neither recognized nor overcome. In future we shall be obliged to develop Moltke's system further.
Directives of a general nature, like those given at that time, would not always suffice to-day for the co- operation of several armies.* We shall often have to adopt more detailed and definite measures for guaran- teeing uniform action in the enormous mechanism of modern armies and for preventing the various bodies from disturbing each other. The numbers are now greater than before in proportion to the space avail- able. This often causes the various portions of the whole army to be in close touch with each other, thus necessitating some definite instructions to be given. Yet we must again guard against going too far in this direction. Only what is absolutely necessary must be ordered. The greatest possible independence of the various portions must always be preserved. It needs much training of the mind, great tact, and a per- fect mastery of the technical elements of warfare to find the proper limits between what must be ordered
* The directives given also by General Freiherr v. Falken- hausen in his book, "Flankenbewegungen und Massenheer," are not sufficient I think. The areas of operation of the vari- ous armies are not clearly defined it seems and the system of reconnaissance and subsistence not definitely regulated.
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and what must not be ordered. The personal char- acter of the subordinate must also be considered. To one may be left more freedom, the other we must tie by more definite orders. The psychological moment plays here a great role. At any rate, operations of modern armies must never be ordered which can only succeed if everything is arranged to the minutest de- tail by General Headquarters, and, as a matter of fact, can be so carried out. There is then still al- ways the danger of invincible friction being produced. When practising in peace, on the manoeuvre field as well as on the map, we are always tempted to limit the independence of subordinates in the interest of our own intentions and views, many succumbing to this temptation. I have repeatedly had this experience. At war games, when dealing with strategy, General Headquarters ordered operations which could only be executed if the marches were systematically ar- ranged in the minutest detail by General Headquarters down to the army corps and their trains. The neces- sary orders were dispatched in long telegrams to the various army corps. It was quite arbitrarily assumed here that the troops lived entirely on the country and were followed by regularly formed echelons of their columns and trains. The connection with the depots and railheads was not considered at all, else the whole arrangement would have been recognized as impossi- ble in theory alone. These assumptions were un- natural; the writing and transmission of the orders were impossible as regards time. The whole pro- cedure would have failed on active service, for the most part in the issue of orders alone. In other cases the lines-of -communication system would have broken down. And if we now imagine such a procedure tak- ing place, let us say, in the thinly-populated fields of
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Russia, we shall be able to realize ^11 the danger of conceiving war based on arrangements of this sort. Paper can stand a lot of things, but in reality we pay for such follies with lost battles and ruined armies. The temptation to issue such orders for ensuring the co-operation of various bodies during intricate opera- tions has often asserted itself in war, too. In South Africa, as I have mentioned before, English General Headquarters completely succumbed to it. During the so-called "drives," for instance, a similar mode was adopted. Everything was ordered by General Headquarters, to the smallest detail, even regarding supply columns and their movements. Here only small detachments were certainly involved, scattered over a wide space, and an enemy consisting as a rule of some few hundred undisciplined Boers. Yet the system failed. Because of the nececsity of adhering to the system ordered, the enemy was of less concern, and the Boers remained masters of the situation.*
If, by ordering too much, we sometimes produce the opposite of order and co-operation, and therefore thoroughly fail in our object, we must never, on the other hand, out of regard to the self-reliance of sub- ordinates, be afraid of ordering plainly and distinctly
* These "drives" were arranged in regular shooting fash- ion. The tract of country to be driven over for Boers lay, as a rule, between two blockhouse lines approximately par- allel with each other. At one of the open ends troops were posted like sportsmen, as it were, toward whom a line of beaters drove the Boers from the other open end. During night the beaters bivouacked in small groups of about six men.
All the large detachments of the Boers of course broke through, partly on the flanks and partly through the line of beaters, and then marched wherever they liked. Only strag- glers were caught, at the expense of an enormous amount of force, of money, and of Kitchener spirit.
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what is really necessary. Moreover, no subordinate leader must be left in the dark as to what is to be done. But this "what is to be done" must always keep within the limits of what can be carried out practically without the shadow of a doubt, and must never be de- termined by what is merely desirable.
A study of the Russian War in Manchuria is highly instructive in this respect. There was no end of or- ders. Every commander encroached upon the sphere of his subordinates, often ordering details with which he had nothing to do. But the troops were never clearly and distinctly told what they were to do. Su- perior commanders hardly ever expressed their will in unambiguous terms. Everybody shirked responsi- bility. It was never plain whether the desirable was really to be attained by all means. A firm resolution was never apparent. By this mode of issuing orders the firm will to conquer was ultimately drowned.
Command in modern war demands the greatest amount of tact, wise self-restraint, and rigorous clear- ness. The problem of command is not only to move the troops and concentrate them for action; its task is the wider one of causing self-reliant action of the spiritual forces of the army and its leaders, and of producing, as if by magic, the maximum perform- ances, and of carrying away the whole to perform the greatest deeds by concentrating all self-reliance and all mental and moral forces upon the attainment of the object indicated by the Commander-in-Chief.
It is a delusion to believe this to be possible without staking one's full personality, and yet we see a modern tendency trying to limit the very personal element in command.
In an essay of the "German Review," called "The
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War of our Days," * is described in a specially strik- ing manner — certainly more humorously than profes- sionally— the kind of command people often prefer to call "modern" to-day: "The Commander-in-Chief is further in rear in a house with spacious writing rooms, where wire and wireless telegraphy, telephone and signalling appliances are at hand, where crowds of motor-cars and motor-cycles, ready to go any dis- tance, are waiting for orders. Here, in a comfortable arm-chair, in front of a large table, the modern Alex- ander has before him the whole battlefield on a map; thence he telephones stirring words, and there he re- ceives the reports of the army and corps commanders, of the captive balloons, and of the dirigible airships."
It is an idea much in vogue to-day, and given here, perhaps, in too extreme a form, that the Commander- in-Chief, the supreme leader, ought to be far behind the front in a central position, in rear, surrounded by all the adjuncts of modern technics; but, surely, the question instinctively rises in all of us, whether it is really imperative for the General-in-Chief to abandon, as here described, all personal influence, and to con- fine himself to telephoning from the arm-chair "stir- ring" words, the stirring force of which may then be fairly doubted.
It seems to me, we must not judge of matters in this one-sided and summary fashion, as was done there.
First of all, I think we must make a difference be- tween strategic and tactical command. The opera- tions of the army must, of course, be directed from a central office as was done by General Headquarters in 1870-71.
* Deutsche Revue, January, 1909, "Der Krieg der Gegen- wart."
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At such a place the Commander-in-Chief can dis- pose over all the necessary rooms maps, and all the means for issuing orders. Here will also con- verge all the means of communication — chiefly, there- fore, telegraph lines — for keeping General Headquar- ters constantly informed of all that is happening, and of the course of operations, and for transmitting its orders. Efforts will be made to change quarters not too often, so as not to interrupt too much consecutive work. General Headquarters therefore follows the army only by stages. Army Headquarters manages in a similar manner so long as the operations are pro- ceeding and the troops are marching, while, of course, Army Corps Headquarters will always remain with their troops.
But matters are altogether different the moment tactical command is involved. Here we shall have to distinguish between cases of a varying nature; for the manner of command must be quite different when a single army is fighting a battle, or when even several armies are fighting united on the battlefield, from what it must be in a great battle, in which the bulk of the forces of the whole army are taking part in various distant groups.
In the latter case it may sometimes be imperative, owing to the great extent of the battlefield or owing to the distances apart from each other of the various local battlefields, for the Commander-in-Chief to re- main in centrally situated headquarters, though the necessity for such action will surely not always arise. But his activity in that case will be altogether different from what the anonymous author of the "German Review" depicts. The Commander-in-Chief will then, of course, only deal with his army commanders ; from them alone he receives reports, to them alone will he
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send his instructions. He will allow himself to inter- fere with the details of army commands, and to send orders to individual corps, only in exceptional and urgent cases. He will retain direct command only