

THE COLD WAR AND ITS ORIGINS

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THE COLD WAR AND ITS ORIGINS

1917-1960

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VOLUME TWO
1950-1960

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PART III

THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA
1945-55

THE FALL OF CHINA TO COMMUNISM

1927-1950

If Russia's dominance of Eastern Europe is by far the most important outcome of World War II in the West, the success of the Communist-led Revolution in China is the greatest consequence of the war in the Far East. The future of the Mao Tse-tung movement was already alarmingly predictable to the leaders of the West when Hiroshima was atomized on August 6, 1945.

This event both hurried and limited the effects of the Soviet Union's participation in the war with Japan and it was followed by our prompt but ineffective measures to limit and contain the Chinese Revolution. Together these two developments ended all prospects of effective Russo-Western collaboration in the Far East. Then in turn, the triumphant march southward of the Chinese Red armies fed the belief generated by events in Europe that Russia was moving relentlessly toward world empire.

The giant error of confusing Asiatic revolution with Russian imperialism held disastrous consequences for the welfare of the Oriental peoples as well as for post-war relations among the great powers. By 1950 it had committed both power blocs to a conflict in Korea that threatened to become world-wide.

The prospect of raising up China as a major power and the arbiter of the East in the place of perfidious and reckless Japan was the moulding factor in Roosevelt's Pacific policy. To Americans generally this policy seemed both good and attainable. They were therefore unprepared for the explosive force of the Chinese Revolution. The shock, bitterness and disillusionment which stemmed from the collapse of our plans for the Far East widened the stream of the Cold War and tightened the lines of conflict around the globe.

If the unification of China under a communist regime had not occurred, the transformation of the Pacific Ocean into an American lake would have commended itself to the American people, if at all, more as a proper precaution than a compelling defensive step. There would not have been an irresistible pressure to make re-armed Japan into an American bastion or, for that matter, a placid acceptance of the MacArthur policy to preserve the power of the Japanese feudal *élite*. Colonialism in South East Asia could not have been dressed out in the uniform of an anti-Communist ally.

At the same time that it drastically altered our Pacific policy, the China debacle plunged the United States into the bitterest domestic debate on foreign affairs since the controversy over the League of Nations. The group loosely denominated the "China Bloc" charged that the Administration pursued a course of craven appeasement toward the tools of Russian imperialism, the Chinese Communists. The Nationalist government was held to be a brave and loyal ally which was bled white by eight years of

resistance to Japan, betrayed at Yalta, denied adequate aid to fight the Reds, and finally sabotaged and deserted.¹

In a long and impressively documented White Paper on China, the State Department presented the Administration's explanation that the outcome of events in China was due to conditions beyond American control. Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government collapsed, not for want of adequate diplomatic, military and financial support, but because of developments largely within China itself.²

The literature of both defense and criticism of the American record in China makes abundantly clear the fact that American policy rested on an inadequate base in three respects: (1) under-estimation of the revolutionary forces at work; (2) lack of appreciation of the result of eight years of warfare on China's social order; and (3) the formulation of policy after 1944 almost entirely within the context of Russo-American relations.

FIRST STAGES OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

China's century-old revolution moved by a series of clearly marked stages from the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion of 1851 to the establishment of the People's Republic of China at Peking in 1949.³

The revolutionary process was set in motion by an enormous increase in population. To this was added the impact on the millennial Confucian order of Western trade, religion and culture. Despite its strange, messianic leadership, the T'ai-p'ing movement was essentially a peasant uprising whose tide did not begin to ebb until it had swept across South China to the lands around Peking.

Toward the end of the century, the Confucian literati seized the revolutionary leadership. They were aroused by the piecemeal destruction of China by Western imperialism. Their model was the conservative Samurai-led coup in Japan, which saved the island empire from Western domination and the feudal order from peasant destruction. However, the literati were unable to reform and preserve the old order and the center of the revolutionary stage was taken by Sun Yat-sen's alliance of Western trained students, provincial *satraps*, and seaboard merchants with Western connections. The founding of the Republic in 1911 and the adoption of a constitutional system gave rise to the expectation in the United States that China, remoulded in our image, would soon find stability, peace, and well-being in the practice of democracy, but lacking either a broad peasant base or unity of purpose among the allied groups, the movement speedily lapsed into warlordism. On the advice of an American political scientist, Yuan Shih-k'ai attempted to rebuild China by founding a new dynasty. Emboldened by the prospect of Yuan's failure and the preoccupation of the Western powers with war in Europe, Japan moved in to reduce the hapless country to the status of a Japanese dependency.

¹ This thesis is elaborated in George Creel, *Russia's Race for Asia*, New York, 1949; and Freda Uney's two books, *China at War*, New York, 1939; London, Faber, 1939; *The China Story*, Chicago, 1951.

² Department of State, *United States Relations With China*, Washington, 1949, hereinafter referred to as the *White Paper*.

³ For a succinct summary of the first four of the five phases of the Revolution, see John King Fairbank, *The United States and China*, Harvard U.P.; Oxford U.P., 1948.

Japanese plans for a Chinese protectorate failed to take into consideration the impact which World War I would make on Chinese society. War-boom wealth built new factories, recruited tens of thousands of industrial laborers from the peasant villages, and greatly enlarged the stream of students pursuing the new learning of "science and democracy." The state of social ferment set working by the war along the full length of the Chinese seaboard broke up the pattern of the static Confucian order and prepared the minds of millions for new allegiances.

Meanwhile, the growth of provincial autonomy since the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion, particularly in the period following the collapse of the republic, had fostered the idea that the solution of China's political problem lay in the creation of a federal United States of China. The country's weakness in the face of Japan's brazen Twenty-one Demands led to the opposing conviction that only through a strong unitary state could security and independence be had. Stubborn resistance to Japan's wartime encroachments and widespread opposition to her designs on the Shantung peninsula at the Versailles Conference finally erupted into the May Fourth Movement of 1919. Led by the new Western-oriented literati, the movement became the first in China's revolutionary process to seek the loyalty of all major classes, within the framework of nationalism, reform, and progress. Merchants added their support to the student protest with boycotts against Japanese trade and the new labor unions went on strike to destroy Japan's market in China. When the students boldly struck out to lead the inarticulate peasant masses in the village, China's gathering revolution moved to a new critical stage.

In the decade which followed the failure of the 1911 Revolution, Dr. Sun Yat-sen continued to maintain his preeminence as leader of the nationalist cause, at the same time that he demonstrated his incompetence to organize effectively the revolutionary forces. The Canton Government, which the Kuomintang-National People's Party, survivors of the original republican parliament—proclaimed in 1918, was more often a front for the provincial interests of the South China warlords than an instrument for achieving the goals of the revolutionaries. Sun alternated brief periods of ascendancy in the government with flights for safety to his home in the French concession at Shanghai. As a refugee there in 1919 he witnessed the tidal sweep of the May Fourth Movement through China's first city and struck an alliance with the student agitators. Though Sun was unable immediately to make effective political capital out of the alliance, despite a re-organization of his party, the identification of the Kuomintang with the Student Movement held momentous consequences.

Kuomintang-Communist Collaboration, 1923-1927. Comintern emissaries recognized these potentialities and began the cultivation of Sun. In 1922, following his latest ouster by irate Cantonese militarists, the discouraged Kuomintang leader was ready to make a deal. If it was a marriage of convenience it was a logical one. Sun had fruitlessly sought aid at various times from Japan and most of the Western powers. He now reasoned that he had to take help where he could get it. Moreover, if China had listened warily to

the blandishments of the Bolsheviks, she still had listened. While the country was giving vent to bitter disappointment over the Versailles handling of the Shantung question, Russia had offered to give up unequal treaties, extra-territoriality, concessions, and all other imperialistic acquisitions of the Czars in China.⁴

A year later, the Baku Congress called for an Asiatic crusade to root out colonial exploitation and free the peoples of the East. Abram Adolphe Joffe, the Russian representative, now extended to Sun not only a categorical declaration of support for the Kuomintang objectives but also an equally firm statement rejecting Communism and the Soviet system as unsuited to China's present needs. Finally, the Comintern was in a position to provide some financial assistance and, even more important, the organizing ability in political and military matters which had been so notably lacking under Sun's leadership. Soviet influence was further heightened by the stand-pat status quo policy of the imperialist powers, who warned Peking against Bolshevik appeals but insisted on treaty rights in Manchurian railways and Chinese tariffs. Inability of the *tuchun* government at Peking to maintain order, reviving fears of great power intervention, contributed to the pro-Russian orientation.

A number of factors apart from the promise of the Kuomintang influenced Moscow to offer collaboration with Sun. The tiny Communist Party founded in 1921 was too weak to be used as the chosen instrument of Comintern policy. Soviet gestures toward the wary northern warlord government did not bear any kind of fruit until 1924. In the Yangtze region Wu Pei-fu enjoyed the favor of the British. In contrast, Canton was the center of revolutionary activity and the stage for the most impressive leftist demonstrations.⁵

Support of revolution in China was viewed as a two-edged sword in Comintern hands. Marxist-Leninist doctrine held that the capitalist world was staving off the inevitable proletarian revolution by maintaining its workers just above subsistence with its intake from colonial countries. The triumph of Chinese nationalism would strike a heavy blow at the capitalist enemy as well as win Russia an ally.

The resulting period of collaboration, which saw members of the Chinese Communist Party admitted as individuals to the Kuomintang, lasted from 1923 to 1927. The Kuomintang was reorganized on the model of the Russian Communist Party. A strong "model" government was set up at Canton. Whampoa Military Academy was opened to train officers for Nationalist armies. Cadres of political workers softened up the hinterland, in preparation for the long-planned military drive northward against the warlords. At length the coalition of right-wing militarists, left-wing Kuomintang members, and Communists, loosed their forces. In a few months, flushed with triumph, they reached the Yangtze. In a few more months the coalition disintegrated

⁴ Declaration of July 25, 1919, quoted in Pauline Tompkins, *American-Russian Relations in the Far East*, New York, 1949, pp. 340-3.

⁵ In 1922 the China Socialist Youth League and the All-China Labor Congress, both communist-oriented organizations, convened in Canton. A successful May-Day strike in Hunan, organized by Mao Tse-tung, disclosed the explosive forces awaiting exploitation. Robert Payne, *Mao Tse-tung: Ruler of Red China*, New York, 1950, p. 76.

and the Soviet-Kuomintang collaboration ended in a white terror staged by the Kuomintang right wing. This sudden collapse was entangled in a maze of involved political struggles, but the larger outlines are clear.

The Left Crushed. The movement which swept out of Canton was the nearest thing to a popular one ever touched off in modern China up to that time, enlisting as it did practically all patriotic Chinese—students, peasants, provincial warlords, merchants, labor leaders and soldiers. But since the political leaders of the Canton—and later the Wuhan—government sought not only a unified and independent China, but a thorough-going social revolution as well, vested interests in Chinese society—particularly the bankers and industrialists of Shanghai and the landlords and *tuchuns* of central and northern China—ranged themselves in opposition. Sharing the hostility of these groups were the treaty powers and Western chambers of commerce, who associated the security of their interests with a docile and inert people.⁶

However, the momentum of the revolution was so great that only vigorous big-power intervention, or factionalism and treachery from within, held any promise of arresting it. The success of the march northward and the mushroom growth of peasant and industrial labor unions greatly increased the prestige of the radical leadership entrenched in the Wuhan cities and widened the gulf between them and the Kuomintang conservatives. The latter, like the Shanghai capitalists, wanted no social upheaval.⁷

Counter-revolution came hard on the heels of General Chiang Kai-shek's approach to Shanghai. The first manifestation occurred in mid-February of 1927. Chiang calmly held his troops out of the metropolis while a coalition uprising, timed to assist in its capture, was crushed. Several weeks later Chiang defied the Wuhan leadership, refusing to attend a meeting of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in Hankow. Instead, he drove into Shanghai and established his headquarters in the foreign concession, stronghold of the right-wing opposition. From the ensuing negotiations, which included compradors as spokesmen for foreign capital, Chinese bankers and industrialists, and the organized underworld, there emerged the basis for a new counter-revolutionary Kuomintang.⁸ Shanghai's business

⁶ Dorothy Borg, *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928*, New York, 1947, pp. 338-43.

⁷ Lawrence K. Rosinger, *China's Crisis*, New York, 1945, p. 13.

⁸ Chiang is presumed to have had contacts with the Green Circle and other underworld gangs when he was a minor broker in Shanghai earlier in his career. Much of the work of slaughtering Shanghai working men was carried out by Tu Yueh-sen, opium king, to whom Chiang supplied arms. Tu remained an important figure in the Kuomintang until 1949, when the "Soong Dynasty" was in the last stages of devouring itself. See Jack Belden, *China Shakes the World*, New York, 1949, p. 143.

It is to be noted that the merchant-industrialist-banker class viewed favorably the Sun movement so long as it promised to sever the chains which restricted the comprador to the smaller share of the production of the West-comprador alliance and to raise tariffs to protect their business ventures. But when the revolution threatened also to destroy their landlord allies and give power to urban labor they were anxious to find a leader who would stop the revolution and hold the masses in their age-old stupor. See Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, New York, 1938; London, Gollancz, 1937.

élite, native and foreign, promptly cashed in on their financial advances to Chiang. He turned upon his left wing. Labor unions were smashed and thousands of betrayed liberals, socialists and communists were ruthlessly massacred—an event never forgotten thereafter by the Communist leaders. From Shanghai the White terror followed the wake of the counter-revolutionary march.

An obliging Peking *tuchun* raided the Russian embassy at the proper moment to lend support to the counter-revolutionary claim that the Shanghai coup was a bold move to prevent the conquest of China by Russia.⁹ Evidence captured revealed that Borodin, the chief Comintern adviser to the Kuomintang, acted regularly on direct instructions from Moscow and that the Comintern had plans for the sovietization of China.¹⁰

Acceptance of the thesis that a planned coup was imminent, by which the ill-informed, far-removed dialecticians of the world revolution would drop the Kuomintang, like "so many squeezed-out lemons," and suddenly effect the communization of China, ignored the realities of the situation at Hankow. Among these were the absence of a Red army, conflict within the Communist Party ranks, and the weakening influence of some of the visionary foreign agents, whose ignorance of China and China's needs disgusted native radicals.¹¹

Though Chiang speedily exiled the Comintern emissaries and Russian influence was eliminated, the Kuomintang was still a house divided against itself. There remained, for example, the deep gulf between the radical, non-communist Fourth Army, which came from the areas where the Tai-p'ing tradition still lingered, and the rightist First Army under Chiang.¹²

Instead of presaging progression of the Sun reform and modernization movement along moderate lines with a Western flavor, the Shanghai *coup d'état* engendered an entirely different development. As one of the most competent first-hand students of the Kuomintang, Graham Peck, has observed, the new Kuomintang was founded

"through opportunism, treachery, and murder. Though many men who had been double-crossed and massacred were Communists, the men who did it became cheats and murderers. Their future behavior was as likely

⁹ The raid of Chang Tso-in on the embassy stemmed from *tuchun realpolitik* and was partly inspired by Japanese policy. Chang received arms from Japan. His rival, Marshal Feng, the "Christian General," looked to Russia for arms from the overland route. Chang strengthened his own hand *vis-à-vis* Japan and struck a blow at Feng by his anti-Bolshevik campaign.

¹⁰ Much has been made by Chiang's apologists from the evidence that the Chinese Communist Party was subsidized by the Comintern. See Creel, p. 33.

¹¹ The righteous anti-Communism of Chiang was also tempered by Russian gold. His first drive for power in Canton, during which he bagged a large number of liberals and Reds in his military dragnet, was promptly compromised when Borodin arrived from Peking with the means to finance the northern march. See Hallet Abend, *My Life in China, 1926-1941*, New York, 1943, pp. 18-19. David J. Dallin, *The Rise of Russia in Asia*, New Haven, 1949, p. 215; London, Hollis & Carter, 1950.

¹² Robert Payne, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-8.

¹³ Victor A. Yakhontoff, *The Chinese Soviets*, New York, 1934, pp. 121-2; London, Allen & Unwin; Paul H. Clyde, *The Far East*, New York, 1948, p. 525.

to be corrupted by their own past acts as if their victims had worn any other political label. . . . The way they came to power determined the personnel, techniques, direction, and final destination of their government. Shorn of the ideological words, this coup had been no different from China's other classics of warlord trickery and cruelty, motivated by greed for power and profit. . . . The later development of Chiang's Kuomintang did proceed logically along the lines forecast by the *coup d'état* which gave it birth."¹³

For the short run, these men were able to arrest, even to turn back, the revolution. Utilizing the remarkable Chinese technique which Peck calls "balance of weakness," fortifying the Confucian base of its power in the name of "national regeneration," and putting up a façade of Western reform, the Kuomintang erected its rule on the exploitation of the vast peasant foundation of Chinese society and ended it through ever constricting circles by destroying itself.¹⁴

"*Land to the Tiller.*" The peasant revolution was in the womb of history. In refusing to midwife its birth the Kuomintang left that opportunity by default to the Communists. The choice was perhaps irrevocably made at Shanghai in 1927. As practically all contemporary writers on the Far East—Forman, White, Jacoby, Belden, Payne, Rosinger, Gould, Fairbanks, Bodde, Peck, Lattimore, Lauterbach, Isaacs, Peffer, Snow, Epstein, Watts, and even the State Department authors of the White Paper, have with remarkable unanimity made crystal clear in a spate of books, it would have made a mockery of history itself for the Kuomintang to have triumphed after World War II. When the time came that the unfinished revolution could no longer be stopped, the Kuomintang had to be swept away, and, logically, the communists had to win. The tremendous affair ground on with the inexorable logic of a Greek drama to its destined end. If Chiang had come to terms with the agrarian revolution, the Kuomintang would have ceased to exist.

The alternative was to subdue the people, and then to recast the dissolving social order in a strengthened Confucian mould, which Chiang outlined a decade later in *China's Destiny*. In addition to the secret instruments of repression, the Kuomintang devised the *pao-chia* system, which was the prototype for the block systems of authoritarian control developed in Nazi Germany and Japan. In the rural areas *pao-chia* became the means of preserving the alliance with the landed gentry, extorting the taxes which maintained the government, and delivering the hapless recruits to the Kuomintang armies. A concomitant of the counter-revolution was the network of oriental alliances and understandings with provincial warlords which enabled

¹³ Graham Peck, *Two Kinds of Time*, New York, 1950, p. 69.

¹⁴ This process began at the county level where the Kuomintang banks "muscle in on the usury racket" of the pawnshops and H. H. Kung's financial network set up lending cooperatives in partnership with rural bourgeoisie. These in turn were opposed by the gentry cooperatives which got much of their money to lend farmers from government banks. Party office holders also entered the picture as allies of the gentry. From these internecine fights only the richest landlords and their bureaucratic allies emerged. Thus more allies for the Communists were won at almost all levels. See Jack Belden, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

Chiang to "unify" China and confer on Nanking the appearance of national strength.

Meanwhile, the history of the revolution up to 1927 had shown that the peasants, 80 per cent of the country's 450,000,000 people, had remained impervious to any revolutionary appeal but one, "land to the tiller." The usurer, the tax gatherer, the extorter of rents as high as 65 per cent of the crops, the recruiter of farm youth for the army were to millions of peasants the same person—the landlord. Chained to the land system by the delicate balance between limited food supply and teeming population, the peasant had but one means of escape—revolution. It became the fashion of Kuomintang economists and American apologists for Chiang to show the futility of land reform by showing that redistribution would give each peasant farmer less than an acre in most of China. Ergo, the remedy was industrialization and population control, not land reform.

Yet the case is by no means clear cut. Before the Japanese war there were thousands of landlords who owned hundreds of acres each. The fractionalization of landlord holdings into many tiny tenant holdings created the illusion of small ownership. Also, the triumph of Chiang brought added burdens to the farmers. In spite of the Kuomintang law slicing rents 25 per cent, the gentry actually increased their share sometimes by as much as 25 per cent. Jack Belden, who has written the best eye-witness account of the last stages of the agrarian revolution, points out that the concentration of land ownership under the Kuomintang went forward with great acceleration after 1937.¹⁵

Government bureaucrats and militarists acquired hundreds of thousands of mow by foreclosure, forcible dispossession, or seizure from the surrendering Japanese. Mounting taxation in kind and the blight of occupying armies victimized millions of farmers. As inner corruption increased, middle peasants, small landlords, and finally many of the older rich gentry themselves became entangled in the multiplying tentacles of the new bureaucrat-landlord alliance. Likewise the Kung banking system pushed deeper into the usury system at the expense of the rural money lenders. Apart from the land question itself, the loosening of order under the impact of war increased the rapacity and exactions of the lords of the compound, building higher and higher the thirst for revenge.¹⁶

Communism Goes Native. Romantic revolutionaries sent into China by the Comintern to collaborate with Dr. Sun's Kuomintang were ill-prepared to grasp the complexities of the Chinese revolution. Under the spell of the 1917 revolution and the inept directions of their Moscow supervisors, they gave a bungling leadership to the radical left. To these Bolshevik doctrinaires, the

¹⁵ Belden, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-3.

¹⁶ "Not only had the tenant to bring 50 per cent of his crops to the manor, but also his personal and family problems. In Shansi, I found that landlords often governed all wedding ceremonies and funerals. . . . The power of the landlords gave them control over village women, especially the wives of their tenants, with whom they could have whatever relations pleased them."—Belden, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

To this picture must be added the labor corvée, debtor prison, child slavery, traffic in girls, and police power, all usually in the control of the landlord.

key to success lay with the urban proletariat, who, as in Russia, could lead the peasants. The effort to apply the Russian formula to the Chinese scene was a patent failure by 1930. The urban workers were entirely too few, too new and inexperienced, too concentrated in the seaboard cities and foreign concessions, and too backward culturally to be the catalyst of revolution.

The failure of foreign leadership made way for native. Retiring to the lake country after the destruction of the Wuhan government, Mao Tse-tung, who travelled outside of China's borders for the first time in 1949, and Chu Teh renewed the revolution at the village level. Though they continued to talk in *orthodox Marxist-Leninist jargon, the methods they applied were pragmatic*: redistribution of land, reduction of interest rates, lowering of rents, abolition of concubinage and foot binding. Yet the influence of orthodox revolutionary theory was still strong enough in 1930 to force the movement to try to re-establish itself in the cities. The defeat of Li Li-san's army at Changsha enabled Mao to force the recall of Li to Moscow and establish his own leadership more firmly. So long as the Chinese Soviet Republic, proclaimed at Juichin in 1931, followed the practical line worked out by Mao, it thrived. Sizeable armies were recruited and millions of peasants came under its sway.¹⁷

Between 1930 and 1933 the Red armies blunted and turned back four "annihilation" campaigns of the Kuomintang. Meanwhile they organized at Juichin a Kiangsi soviet, with an elaborate labor code and other trappings which showed that the functionaries had not yet completely escaped the narrow confines of Bolshevik revolutionary theory. Inexperience, and inefficient, sometimes culpable bureaucracy, inadequate revenue and an unimaginative and unrealistic effort to modernize rural working conditions seriously handicapped the movement and prevented an effective organization of all the soviets under central control.¹⁸ These factors as well as the strategic blunders of Chang Kuo-Tao and the Comintern agent, Li Teh, a German who served as Mao's adviser, aided Chiang in his fifth annihilation campaign in 1934, when Chiang threw 900,000 men at the Kiangsi stronghold. The "fiery wall" maneuvers of the Kuomintang, planned by German General von Falkenhausen, tightened a noose around the Red bastion. More than a million peasants lost their lives in the ensuing struggle.¹⁹

Threatened with extermination, Mao and General Chu Teh led a main body of Red regulars in a break-through to the west and south. Thus began the 6000 mile Long March. The end, not foreseen at the time, took the army to the loess lands of the North West in time to find themselves athwart the line of the 1937 Japanese penetration, with a bedraggled force of some 20,000 men. The Long March confirmed the communist movement in the leadership of the peasant revolt and in guerrilla tactics. Moreover, it established the reins of control firmly in Mao's hands and settled the issue of native,

¹⁷ The problem was guns, not men. A steady stream of volunteers and Kuomintang deserters fed the Red armies. Payne, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-29.

Creel insists that the Reds, on their hit-and-run marches followed "the invariable policy to impress all able-bodied males."—Creel, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

¹⁸ Nym Wales, *Inside Red China*, New York, 1939, pp. 240-60.

¹⁹ Edgar Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

pragmatic leadership over visionary, foreign agent direction. The remnant left in Kiangsi survived as guerrillas and emerged after the Shanghai phase of the new Sino-Japanese war as the New Fourth Army under Han Yeng.²⁰

Meanwhile, confronted with the impact which the communist land measures had made on the Kiangsi peasant, the Kuomintang felt impelled to launch a salvaging operation of its own. The New Life Movement, which gained wide favorable attention abroad through the representations of pro-Chiang propagandists, was at best no more than a pseudo-reform movement.²¹

THE UNITED FRONT YEARS

While the relentless Chiang Kai-shek prepared to exterminate the communist "bandits" now entrenched in Shensi, China's history was again profoundly altered by another student movement reminiscent in its suddenness and explosive patriotism to the May Fourth Movement of 1919. In October of 1935 Chiang sent the Manchurian army of General Chang Hsueh-liang to Sian to blockade the forces of Mao. This decision coming at a time when the Japanese were making obvious moves to detach the northern provinces around Peking, aroused country-wide dissatisfaction. The Kuomintang's pro-appeasement foreign minister, Wang Ching-wei, was wounded by a nationalist. The next month the campuses of the country erupted into a "National Salvation" movement which in a matter of months became the most representative organization in China.²²

Chiang's determination to put the destruction of the Chinese Communist Party ahead of resisting Japan only added fuel to the protest movement. He suppressed the National Salvation Union and flew to Sian, on December 7, 1936, to negotiate for an attack on the communist rear. His plan for a frontal attack by the young Marshal Chang's *Tungpei* army in the fall of 1936 was made without regard for the feeling of the Sian armies or the rapidly changing sentiment of the people.

The Chinese Reds had long been aware of the potentialities of national resistance against the Japanese, but had been unable to exploit it. The Juichin Government in the fastnesses of the Kiangsi hills had declared war on Japan after the first Shanghai incident. While the Red army was still climbing the Szechuan mountains on its Long March, the Red Central Committee issued a manifesto for a united front.²³ This plea was repeated a year later and several times in the weeks preceding the Sian incident Mao addressed his pleas not only to Chiang but to the Salvationist leaders, and to the provincial warlords and semi-independent generals.²⁴ An understanding between the Communists, Marshal Chang and General Yang at Sian was already being formulated when Chiang, alarmed at the "unreliability" of these troops made his second trip

²⁰ Edgar Snow, "Han Yeng's Lost Red Army," *Asia*, April 1939, p. 203.

²¹ Chen Han-Ming, *New Life for Kiangsi*, Shanghai, 1933, *passim*; Gould, *China in the Sun*, New York, 1946, p. 801.

²² Lawrence K. Rosinger, *China's Wartime Politics, 1937-1944*, Princeton, 1944, p. 14.

²³ On August 15, 1935, as described in I. Jack, *China: the March Toward Unity*, New York, 1937, p. 13.

²⁴ *China Today*, Vol. III, No. 4, January 1937, pp. 40-4.

to Sian in December 1936.²⁵ When Chiang revealed his decision to displace Marshal Chang, send the Tungpei' troops south, and prosecute the war against the Reds, the dissident generals promptly took him into custody and he was forced to have several talks with the Communist leader Chou En-lai. Far from hatching the "kidnapping" plot, the Communists, once assured that he would call off the civil war, acknowledged Chiang's leadership and worked for his release.²⁶ Their action was based partly on the conviction that only Chiang could head a coalition front and partly out of fear of General Ho Ying-chin, whose bent toward appeasement had been shown during the earlier Japanese penetration of the northern provinces.

With Chiang in captivity and threatened with a "people's trial," Ho moved swiftly to establish his own control of the government by striking hands with the exiled Wang Ching-wei and preparing for a punitive expedition that would in all probability result in Chiang's death. Wang, in Germany at the time, held conferences with Hitler and inner circle Nazis in anticipation of a new regime at Nanking. When Chiang at last realized the meaning of developments at Nanking, he dropped enough of his hauteur to negotiate with his captors and thereby won his release.²⁷

Chiang returned to this capital on a wave of popularity since most Chinese assumed that he had agreed to the main demands of his captors: end of the civil war, release of political prisoners, coalition government, carrying out of Sun Yat-sen's program, freedom for the Salvation Union and other organizations to function, a united front against Japan. Both the Chinese and foreign language press took up the plea for peace and communist-Kuomintang collaboration.

Japan tried to prevent the formation of the united front by adopting a conciliatory attitude and extending offers of economic cooperation to Nanking in the spring of 1937. However, the national mood was such that the Kuomintang could not yield to these enticements and by mid-summer it had worked out an understanding with Yen-an through a series of parallel statements issued by the two groups. This was the signal for Japan to attack, since every month's growth of national unity made the realization of a "cooperative China" more difficult to attain. Up to the clash at the Marco Polo Bridge, where the eight-year Sino-Japanese war was ignited, Chiang did not lead the Chinese nation. Rather, a reluctant Chiang was put forward by patriotic demand as a symbol of national unity and led by popular pressure into the defense of national existence.

Revolution Within a War. Few, if any, wars have been fought in which there have been so many miscalculations of the underlying forces as the

²⁵ The Marshal's troops, exiled by Japanese aggression in Manchuria, had no heart to fight Chinese when an alien enemy possessed their homes. Moreover, Chang was aware that Chiang would not be displeased if the Tungpei' army was cut to pieces in a campaign against the Communists.—*General Chiang Kai-shek*, New York, 1937, p. 118.

²⁶ Statement of W. H. Donald, friend of Chang and adviser to Chiang, quoted in the *New York Times*, February 28, 1945. See also E. A. Selle, *Donald of China*, New York, 1948.

²⁷ Rosinger, *op. cit.*, p. 43; Charles P. Fitzgerald, *Revolution in China*, New York, 1952, pp. 74-6; London, Cresset.

Sino-Japanese war. Japan's miscalculation was in point of time the greatest. She thought she knew China from the files of dossiers which pinpointed every rift and rivalry, every army and armory, every major resource of field and mine. She had no intention of destroying the Chinese state, but sought rather an acquiescent China within the yen bloc. After the swift conquest of the east coast, the terrible rape of Nanking (a deliberate act of "persuasion"), and the occupation of the Wuhan cities in the summer of 1938, the Japanese armies confidently rested on their arms and awaited the expected capitulation. What the dossiers did not reveal, as White and Jacoby eloquently point out in *Thunder Out of China*,²⁸ was that in the two decades since the May the Fourth Movement China had become a nation and this was a people's war of resistance. Through the rot and corrosion of long years of warfare this fundamental sense of unity survived, not only to thwart the Tokyo blue-rinters but to break the Kuomintang when its leaders failed to learn the same lesson. When Chiang lost his claim on the national loyalty, neither his cleverness in warlord politics nor billions of dollars in American aid could save him.

Most Kuomintang leaders themselves had little faith in China's ability to withstand Japan's war machine. In 1937 they found themselves in the unwelcome position of having to lead the resistance against Japan when they preferred to settle the issue of the Communists. From the start some of them contended it was better to have an understanding with the invaders in order to deal with the Reds. Chiang himself was quoted as saying in 1941, "you think it is important that I have kept the Japanese from expanding during these years. . . . I tell you it is more important that I have kept the Communists from spreading. The Japanese are a disease of the skin, the Communists are a disease of the heart."²⁹

Defeatism and appeasement were never absent from the Kuomintang camp. Wang Ching-wei went over to the Japanese, as did thousands of lesser figures. The leaders had not foreseen the role of guerrilla warfare and the fighting village, but this development only increased the Kuomintang fears of social revolution, and shifted the emphasis from fighting the Japanese to preparation for a showdown with the Reds.³⁰ The Kuomintang's answer to the spread of guerrilla resistance through thousands of villages behind the Japanese lines was, before the end of the war, a negotiated Oriental understanding with the Japanese and the puppet regime at Nanking, which in effect guaranteed absorption of the puppet leaders and armies into the Kuomintang and protection to the Japanese war-criminal generals in case of a Western victory, in return for support against the Communists. An American observer at Chungking reports that these talks were proceeding as early as 1943. Tao Hsi-hsun, who was Chiang's "ghost" assistant in writing *China's Destiny*, and Wu Kai-hsien shuttled from Chungking to Nanking in pursuit of an

²⁸ Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, *Thunder Out of China*, New York, 1946, p. 54; London, Gollancz.

²⁹ White and Jacoby, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

³⁰ Chung denounced the Communists for their land reforms and tax reduction program, saying that they were promoting "social turmoil."—*The New York Times*, April 4, 1941.

understanding.³¹ As it became evident following the recall of Stilwell that America was determined to keep Chiang in power, the Generalissimo's bargaining position with the puppets increased.

Neither the West nor Russia, which left the Communists to go their own way and sent aid exclusively to Chungking, evaluated the factors at work any more effectively than the Japanese or the Kuomintang. Nor did the Communists in their most sanguine hopes expect the yeast of revolution to work the full results it did, nor were they willing by 1945 to settle for a quarter loaf. Nevertheless, from the beginning of the war, the Communists identified their movement with the Asiatic revolution by merging themselves with the people. They armed the peasant—something that the Kuomintang dared not do.³²

Abandoning an uncompromising Marxist line, Yen-an devoted itself to the twin objectives of national survival and land reform. Reduction and equalization of taxes, lowering of rents, promotion of cooperatives, adult education, popular discussion of problems and community decision, popular election of local governments, and officials who, unlike any previously known by the peasants, were both honest and benevolent, made the communist regime genuinely popular. Thus integrated with the civil economy, the Red guerrilla movement spread eastward to the coast and became a conspiracy of resistance which closed in against the Japanese-held lines by night and receded to the fields and paddies by day.

Except for Chu Teh's defeat of the first Japanese thrust through Shansi-Shensi in 1937, the Reds fought few pitched battles. In contrast, the Kuomintang engaged largely in positional warfare, sacrificing as many as 70,000 men in a single fight. This difference in method of warfare has led to the charge that Yen-an largely sat out the war while the Nationalists bled and died. This claim not only sidesteps the fact that the Kuomintang, as the enemy of peasant revolution, was barred from guerrilla strategy but it ignores the success with which the Reds harassed the occupying armies. By the end of the war the Eighth Route Army claimed 600,000 partisan and regular effectives and the New Fourth Army, operating north of the Yangtze, 300,000.

The testimony of a Western banker from Peking that the communist successes were due to "their own incorruptibility and honesty, their energetic patriotism, their devotion to practical democracy, their faith in the common people and the continuous effort they made to arouse them to action and responsibility," is supported by the findings of an impressive list of neutral observers.³³ In 1944, when Roosevelt's pressure for reform and a coalition war effort was strongest, Chiang opened the blockade against the Communists to permit a party of foreign and Chinese press correspondents to visit

³¹ Peck, *op. cit.*, pp. 580-1. Peck places considerable credence in the rumor that the agreement guaranteed Chiang immunity from invasion in an angle around Szechuan known as the Tai-Tungkwan line.

³² Unless moving into battle, Kuomintang peasant conscripts were customarily deprived of their arms. Guns were kept under the watchful guard of dependable troops.—*Ibid.*, p. 216.

³³ Quoted in Edgar Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 507.

Yenan. Among them were Gunther Stein and Harrison Forman,³⁴ whose accounts corroborate Edgar Snow's optimistic *Red Star Over China* (1938) and Mrs. Snow's (Nym Wales) *Inside Red China* (1939). Others to support their view were the English correspondent, Stuart Gelder, Agnes Smedley, Evans F. Carlson, and Michael Lindsay.³⁵

Though most of these accounts have been bitterly attacked by the China Lobby as partisan, equally favorable reports came from the American military mission which Chiang, after more than a year of stubborn refusal, permitted to go to Yen-an in the summer of 1944.³⁶

That the State Department received a similar picture is evidenced in the memoranda of Foreign Service officers John P. Davies, Raymond P. Ludden, and John Stewart Service for 1943-1945, which are reproduced in part in the *White Paper*. Miss Smedley's story of the social and humanitarian aspects of the wartime Red program, in which she describes the liberation of women from Confucian bondage and the new sense of individual worth, was supported by the postwar findings of Jack Belden, Derk Bodde, I. Epstein, and to a great extent by the conservative appraisal of the missionaries, Claire and William Bond.³⁷

One of the most revealing reports noted that "We have seen how the formerly barren Shensi country" had been transformed into an area making "the Eighth Route Army the best fed and clothed in China." Also "every soldier carried a trophy, a Japanese pistol or rifle."³⁸

Decay in Chungking. Uniformity of a different color permeates the accounts of the wartime sojourn of the central government at Chungking. The picture of its arrival presents a government sustained by the sacrificial loyalty of the people and commanding the best talent of modern China. At its departure, after seven years which permitted its inner compulsions to come to fruition under the Szechuan mists, it was a debilitated politico-military machine, racked with corruption, opportunism, and demoralization. Its armies had long since lost their morale. To the bitterly disillusioned people of Free China, its rule was a blight equal to that of Japan. The liberated cities of the coast met the arriving Kuomintang functionaries with flags and cheers. In a matter of weeks the populace was viewing them as a plague of locusts. At that point nothing, not even the terrible war weariness of four hundred

³⁴ Gunther Stein wrote *The Challenge of Red China*, New York and London, McGraw, 1945, and Harrison Forman, *Report From Red China*, New York, 1945; London, Hale, 1947.

³⁵ Stuart Gelder, *The Chinese Communists*, London, Gollancz, 1946; Agnes Smedley, *Battle Hymn of China*, New York, 1943, London, Gollancz; Evans F. Carlson, *Twin Stars of China*, New York, 1940.

For Lindsay's authoritative first-hand accounts, see *Amerasia*, April 1944, *Journal of Politics*, November 1947, and his pamphlet, "North China Front," discussed in *New Statesman and Nation*, January 13, 1945.

³⁶ This was in response to Wallace's request.—*White Paper*, 555. For the views of the intelligence officers, see Rosinger, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

³⁷ Derk Bodde, *Peking Diary*, New York, 1950; I. Epstein, *The Unfinished Revolution in China*, Boston, 1947; Bond and Bond, *Two Years with the Chinese Communists*, New Haven, 1948.

³⁸ *The New York Times*, July 1, 1944.

million souls, could save their rule. American aid and diplomacy postponed the debacle, but the verdict of history was already on the wall.

Behind the fastness of the Yangtze gorges Chiang and his personal coterie experienced a steady increase in power from the exigencies of the war. In the loss of the coast and the Yangtze basin he also sloughed off warlord rivals. Others he was able to reduce by the simple expedient of throwing their armies athwart Japanese thrusts or transferring them from their provincial bases. Separation from the industrial and banking classes of the coasts likewise narrowed the Kuomintang class alliance and redounded to the advantage of the inner circle of politicians and generals. The net result of the confinement of personal power in the hands of this group was to bring to the fore the worst tendencies present in the 1927 coup. The war lost its national character and became a war for personal ends. Liberals were alienated and then imprisoned. Censorships, secret police, regimentation of youth, party control of the universities, and the other customary trappings of the one-party state became the familiar features of control. Chiang's personal offices in the government multiplied.

Within the great Red Basin teeming with 70 million folk, the Kuomintang faced the same challenge which Mao accepted first in Kiangsi and later in Shensi. Away from the cities and the Western influence of the coast, the Kuomintang was face to face with the agrarian problem. Logically, it should have mobilized the peasants and their town relatives to complete the revolution. Instead, it embraced its back country allies, the landlords. More and more the government took on the philosophy of a gentry government—anti-foreign, concerned with prerogatives and control. Long before Pearl Harbor, most of the national economy had been absorbed by personal and paternalistic monopolies, either in the form of governmental bureaus and commissions like the National Resources Commission or family institutions like the banks of "Daddy" Kung and T. V. Soong. While speculation and diversion from governmental sources swelled the foreign deposits of inner circle figures by hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars, private business languished. The industrial cooperatives floundered and failed, carpet baggers edged out native Szechuan interests and tax levies pauperized the economically defenseless.

Our Unknown Ally. When Pearl Harbor made this government our ally, it was an almost unknown quantity to official Washington. Concerning Ambassador Gauss's predecessor at Chungking, Nelson T. Johnson, Graham Peck observes that he lived "the equivalent of sixty miles out of the capital by train" and was "contentedly uncritical of the Kuomintang, apparently because of deep admiration for Madame Chiang."³⁹

In December 1941 only 20 per cent of the State Department personnel had been transferred from occupied to Kuomintang territory. Only one consulate office, at Kunming, out of the thirteen operating in China, was in "Free China." Not until after midsummer of 1941 was a military mission established at Chungking. It is not surprising that the romantic view of the "Christian

³⁹ Peck, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

rulers" stressed in the American popular press was also held in official Washington circles. The advice of Clarence E. Gauss, himself an "Old China Hand," was rejected on occasion and the embassy, as the war progressed, was not always kept informed on U.S.-China relations.⁴⁰

Immediately after Pearl Harbor, and in addition to \$400 million approved for Lend-Lease, Chiang asked for a \$500 million loan in credits and gold from the United States and a similar amount from Britain. Gauss warned in the strongest terms that not more than half of this amount could be used constructively, even allowing 50 per cent for waste and corruption, and urged that portions of the loan should be earmarked for agrarian reform, industrial cooperatives, small business and imports from Russia.⁴¹ Secretary of State Hull raised the figure to a suggested \$300 million. When Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau agreed with Stanley K. Hornbeck's proposal that Chiang should be given what he asked, an inter-departmental conference restored the original figure. Before the vigorous protests of Chiang, who took the position that the "advance" was due China for her heroic resistance—and without any strings attached—the American Government backed down from the second of the Gauss proposals. Thus was missed the initial opportunity to compel the Kuomintang, through a "loan" designed to shore up a collapsing economy, to save itself through grass roots reform. For this decision it appears that Mr. Hornbeck, the head of the impeccably conservative Far East division of the State Department, assumed the major responsibility, since the others either agreed with or deferred to his opinion. Apparently little thought was given to the adverse effects of an unrestricted political loan. Its history, recorded in the *White Paper* and corroborated from other sources, shows that it may even have accelerated the spiral of inflation. It weakened the Kuomintang system, encouraged resistance to reform, increased speculation and peculation, and stimulated Kuomintang intransigence toward the communists. Moreover, it committed America to Chiang rather than to China so deeply that later efforts to extricate our policy from the mire were unavailing.

Disintegration of the Coalition. For more than a year before Pearl Harbor the Kuomintang-Communist coalition had ceased to exist except in name. During the first year, when the Chinese were resisting the Japanese advance at all points, the spirit of cooperation was high. But before the last offensive had engulfed Hankow, the Kuomintang began repressive measures against Communist organizations. Alarmed at the unexpected expansion of Communist control through guerrilla-civil organization of the countryside, Chungking in 1939 began a systematic effort to contain the Reds by a band of steel thrown up across Shensi.⁴² A year later the line was sealed and the trickle of military equipment and money promised the Communists under the 1937 truce dried up completely. Thereafter, not a bullet or a pill reached the Red armies from the Central Government.⁴³

⁴⁰ See Gauss's complaint quoted in the *White Paper*, p. 491.

⁴¹ Message of January 8, 1942, quoted in the *White Paper*, pp. 473-6.

⁴² *The New York Times*, November 16, 1939.

⁴³ *White Paper*, p. 536.

Relations between the two wings of the coalition reacted somewhat like a barometer to the international scene. Outbreak of war in Europe led to a temporary cessation of military clashes. In November 1939 Chiang promised to call the "National People's Assembly" demanded by the Communists and liberals. Lessening of Japanese pressure, coupled with the "Phony War" in Western Europe, released a new surge, with serious fighting in Shensi in early 1940. Later in the summer, in conjunction with the German sweep through France and a Russian order that aid would be stopped if Russian material were used in internal clashes, Chiang engineered a rapprochement which recognized the Shen-Kan-Nin Border Region government, doubled the recognized size of the Eighth Route Army, and approved guerrilla administrative districts in Shensi and Hopei.⁴⁴ Disturbed by the new accord, the Japanese launched a drive into Shensi.

The new trend was violently reversed after the Battle of Britain went against the Germans and America's halting measures to aid China were stepped up. The internal balance in the Kuomintang shifted rightward with the return of Ho Ying-chin to Chungking in the late summer of 1940.⁴⁵ In October he issued the order to the New Fourth Army to abandon its base in the lower Yangtze basin and move into the famine-gripped district north of the river. This guerrilla army, an estimated 100,000 strong, was establishing a growing popular base in this rich region from which the occupation of Shanghai and perhaps Nanking would be an easy step with the end of Japanese resistance. The order had the twofold purpose of removing this threat and weakening the army by uprooting it from the local economy. Remarkably, Yen-an after protracted negotiations agreed to comply and this army was ambushed and largely destroyed by Szechuan troops in early January. Despite the claim of Chiang Kai-shek that "punishment" was visited on the army because of insubordination, the Kuomintang chose to turn this region over to the Japanese, to head off social revolution and preserve their ultimate primacy in the Yangtze basin.⁴⁶

In the spring of 1941, against the backdrop of German successes in the Balkans and the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact, effort was made through the Peoples Political Committee to overcome the impasse between the two armed parties. Negotiations foundered on the communist demands for the creation of a "joint government committee to supervise national policy," recall of the "Central China Suppression Army," and an end to the blockade.⁴⁷ Mounting Kuomintang fear of the communists threatened to erupt into an all-out attack on the Border Region when some of the generals, alarmed by German successes in Europe and a twin-pronged Japanese offensive designed to knock China out of the war, joined hands against the move.⁴⁸ Perhaps an

⁴⁴ The *New York Times*, November 19, 1939; February 2, 1940; and August 1, 1940 (used in this order). See also, Rosinger, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

⁴⁵ The *New York Times*, August 29, 1940.

⁴⁶ T. A. Bisson, "China's National Front: Problems and Policies," *Foreign Policy Report*, July 15, 1941; Edgar Snow, "Is It Civil War in China?" *Asia*, April 1941; the *New York Times*, January 18, 1941.

⁴⁷ The *New York Times*, March 10, April 4, 1941.

⁴⁸ Hugh Dean, "Political Reaction in Kuomintang China," *Asia*, July 1941, p. 214.

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⁴² *The New York Times*, November 16, 1939. ⁴³ *White Paper*, p. 536.

When Chiang went to Cairo at the end of the year to confer with Roosevelt, he left out of his retinue political, military and economic specialists with whom the Americans might open disturbing conversations. Roosevelt expressed particular regret at the absence of T. V. Soong. The fact that Chiang's vagueness on military matters had to be made up by Stilwell's interjections with facts and figures did not improve the Generalissimo's feelings toward his nominal co-chief of staff. However, Chiang saw the point at once when Roosevelt pointed out the necessity to satisfy Russia's desire for a warm water port in Manchuria and agreed at the time on Dairen,⁵⁵ the *quid pro quo* being for Chiang, of course, a free hand from Russia for dealing with the Chinese Communists after the war. Thus what was later decried as the Yalta sell-out was grasped long in advance by Chiang.

THE STILWELL PERIOD

The year 1944 marked a watershed in the history of American policy in China. Signs of economic and military disintegration were already alarming American officials before the close of 1943. The bales of paper yuan, printed in Philadelphia and flown over the "hump" were being fed into the currency bloodstream at the rate of five billions a month. Prices were two hundred times above the pre-war base. Chiang thought gold bullion was the cure. But the trouble was the loss of popular faith, not in the yuan but in the government. While prices galloped upward, industrial production steadily declined, the victim of official and semi-official monopolies, graft and political interference.⁵⁶

Along the front, the armies, miserably fed, clothed, and armed and often robbed by their own officers, showed little will or capacity to fight. Victimized by their grain-holding officers and provincial officials, the soldiers in turn plundered those even more defenseless, the peasants. At the bend of the Yellow River, the outraged peasants loosed their vengeance on General Tang En-po's defeated army when the Japanese crashed through the Honan front in May.⁵⁷ While the Chen brothers (C.C.) clique tightened its hold on the government, the opposition ranks grew in size and discontent spread among non-Central field commanders, particularly the Cantonese and Kwangsi generals.⁵⁸

The military bankruptcy of the Kuomintang was soon revealed when the Japanese loosed their 1944 spring offensives. In Honan 60,000 Japanese soldiers, paced by guerrillas utilizing Chinese Communist tactics, brushed aside a half million Kuomintang soldiers. Driving south to destroy Chenault's nearly defenseless air bases and open an inland rail route, from

⁵⁵ Chiang's statement quoted in Embassy memorandum on Wallace-Chiang conversation, June 23, 1944, *White Paper*, pp. 555-8.

⁵⁶ Brooks Atkinson in the *New York Times*, January 19, 1944.

⁵⁷ *White Paper*, p. 65. There had been a rebellion in Kansu in 1943. Philip Jaffe estimates that a million peasants took part, but there was no direct attack on Central armies before 1944.—*New Frontiers in Asia*, p. 177.

⁵⁸ White and Jacoby, *op. cit.*, p. 129. Marshal Li Chi-sen attempted to separate a chunk of South China, but failed.—Peck, *op. cit.*, pp. 578-9.

even more important restraint through the next two years was the increasing enfeeblement of the Kuomintang economy. As it became evident that China's future hinged on the outcome of the world war, both sides settled down to an uneasy truce while continuing the joust of words at Chungking. In September 1943 Chiang was still professing publicly that the Communist problem "is a purely political problem and should be solved by political means."⁴⁹

Meanwhile, the anti-communist blockade continued to immobilize an estimated million Nationalists and numerous divisions of the Eighth Route Army, and each side, particularly after Stalingrad, El Alamein, and the American Pacific victories, plotted its war policy mainly in terms of its emergency strength at the war's climax in China, when the Americans—and perhaps Russians—should arrive in force. The Communists were involved in an aggressive organization of the rural regions toward the coast, where they would be entrenched and waiting. Clashes in force between Red units and ex-Kuomintang puppet troops occurred, giving plausibility to the claim of a few Kuomintang apologists that Yen-an was primarily the aggressor against Nationalist armies.⁵⁰

Kuomintang strategy, far from being expansive, became a holding operation. Of primary concern was the delicate balance by which the military and bureaucratic hierarchy maintained itself in power. Nothing must be done that might endanger that balance. In the controversy between General Joseph Stilwell and General Claire Chennault over the prosecution of the war from South China, which reached a boiling point early in 1943,⁵¹ Chiang favored the Chennault strategy of an air offensive against the Japanese because it promised the least interference with the status quo.⁵² Stilwell warned that Chennault's ambitious air bases would be unsafe unless heavily defended by ground forces—a forecast amply borne out later.

Chiang fairly early came to view Stilwell as a threat because of the latter's mission to achieve victory through remaking the Chinese fighting forces. Late in 1943, a dismal year in Chungking, Chiang sought a characteristic remedy for the decaying Nationalist cause, a billion dollar loan from the United States.⁵³ When Washington hinted at sending a mission to look into the matter of economic reform and industrial rehabilitation, the irritated Madame Chiang bluntly told the embassy that the group had better stay home if they proposed coming for any other purpose than to expedite the loan, or the U.S.A. should arrange to go it alone in the war against Japan.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Statement to the Central Executive Committee, September 13, 1943, quoted in *China Handbook, 1937-1945*, p. 68.

⁵⁰ Lin Yu-tang, *Vigil of a Nation*, New York, 1945, p. 114.

⁵¹ Samuel Lubell, "Vinegar Joe and the Reluctant Dragon," *Saturday Evening Post*, February 24, 1943, p. 9.

⁵² At the Trident conference, T. V. Soong pleaded the Generalissimo's case for strong air forces.—William D. Leahy, *I Was There*, p. 160.

⁵³ Apparently first raised with the military. See the Gauss memorandum, December 23, 1943, in *White Paper*, p. 1490.

⁵⁴ Gauss memorandum of January 16, 1944, quoted in the *White Paper*, pp. 493-5.

promptly.⁶⁴ In 1943 Chiang was on the verge of demanding Stilwell's recall when the palace politics of Madame Kung and Madame Chiang, supporting the Whampoa-C.C. clique rightists against the Political Science Club reformists, intervened. Differences on strategy and Chiang's anger over America's unwillingness to hand over the control of lend-lease to China—a situation for which he held Stilwell to a great extent responsible—added to the difficulties between the two.

In view of these differences, it is easy to see how the Stilwell crisis came to be viewed primarily as a personality clash. Actually, it went much deeper than that. Chiang was not unaccustomed to Chinese generals challenging his concept of strategy and even defying his commands. Where situations required it he could take into his official family warlords who had plotted or rebelled against him. Apart from any question of personal behavior or strategy in Burma, Stilwell was feared because his policies threatened Chiang's delicately balanced power structure.

Stilwell's mounting disgust was revealed in a 1944 diary entry: "We were fighting Germany to tear down the Nazi system—one-party government, supported by the Gestapo and headed by an unbalanced man with little education. . . . China, our ally, was being run by a one-party government (the Kuomintang), supported by a Gestapo (Tai Li's organization). . . . To reform such a system it must be torn to pieces. . . . Because it was expedient to back this government, it was not necessarily advisable to endorse its methods and policies. We could have required some return for our help."⁶⁵

At Cairo, Chiang had warned that China would collapse unless substantial help was rushed. It was agreed to push a strong Burma campaign to reopen overland communications, a decision which, it was decided at Tehran, must be postponed. Returning from the Near East, Roosevelt nevertheless moved to bring about the minimum conditions which Stilwell held to be necessary to salvage the China front: reorganization and retraining of the Kuomintang armies, a new united front, direct command by Stilwell over both Kuomintang and Chinese Communist armies, and anti-inflation measures to be worked out with the assistance of an American mission.

Rapid deterioration of the military front caused Roosevelt to dispatch Vice-President Henry A. Wallace to Chungking in June of 1944. The Vice-President won a half-hearted acceptance of Roosevelt's offer to mediate between the Communists and Kuomintang and Chiang's approval of an American intelligence mission to Yen-an. On the matter of a united front the Generalissimo was unyielding. His minimum terms required the surrender of the Red armies to Central control, a step which American observers were sure the Communists would reject as suicidal to themselves.⁶⁶

Mounting American Pressure Upon Chiang. Two weeks after the Wallace mission, Roosevelt bluntly asked Chiang to put Stilwell in command of all military resources in China, "including the Chinese Communist forces," and

Manchuria to Indo-China, the Japanese swept along for as much as 30 miles a day.⁵⁹

The mounting debacle, with all of its political implications for the postwar period, was described in starkly accurate terms in the reports of the Foreign Service officers attached to the China-Burma-India command. The Generalissimo was biding his time for a war with Yenan, Davies warned in 1943, and "we may anticipate that Chiang Kai-shek will exert every effort and resort to every stratagem to involve us in active support of the Central Government. We will probably be told that if fresh American aid is not forthcoming all of China and eventually all of Asia will be swept by communism."⁶⁰

Shortly before Wallace's arrival, Service summarized the plight of the Kuomintang, the memorandum stressing the following significant points: (1) the literate and salaried classes were being liquidated; (2) Kuomintang authority was weakening outside the cities; (3) peasant resentment was mounting; (4) provincial groups were gaining in power; (5) civil war between the Kuomintang and Communists was considered inevitable; (6) central control over the armies was being replaced with a new warlordism; (7) Chiang had forfeited the respect of the intellectuals; (8) on the political front the desire of Kuomintang leaders to preserve their power overrode all other considerations; (9) measures to check inflation were rejected because they would injure the landlord-capitalist class; and (10) the suicidal policies of the Kuomintang were inherent in the party, which could no longer hold the loyalties of the people because of the threat of foreign invasion.⁶¹

Growing Tension. For two bitter years General Stilwell had been struggling with the growing inadequacies and evasions of the Chinese Government. At length he refused to have anything further to do with General Ho,⁶² who, like Chiang, feared American activities would be a liberal, undermining influence. Stilwell's use of lend-lease funds to wring concessions was a limited but effective means of overcoming some of the Kuomintang-erected handicaps.⁶³ While primarily concerned with measures to win the war, he recognized the political significance of our military policy and its relationship to the postwar settlement. This understanding was strengthened through day-to-day contacts with Chinese foot soldiers, in whose fighting qualities he had great faith.

Personal relations between Chiang and Stilwell were never cordial. The master of intrigue and indirection had little in common with his blunt, direct chief of staff. The latter spoke his opinions of Chiang and the Kuomintang without restraint and his remarks probably reached the Generalissimo's ears

⁵⁹ The Japanese learned the guerrilla lessons too late to reverse their fate in China. However, Peck, who was close to the scene of the South China drive, testifies that they worked with remarkable success. Peasants were set off against Kuomintang armies. The grain-controlling minority were executed to prove that Nippon's armies were liberators. The Kuomintang armies were rendered ineffective by guerrilla penetration in advance of the Japanese columns.—Peck, *op. cit.*, p. 576.

⁶⁰ *White Paper*, p. 571.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 567-71.

⁶² Eldridge, *Wrath in Burma*, New York, 1946, p. 300.

⁶³ Joseph W. Stilwell, *Stilwell's Papers*, New York, 1948, p. 321.

hand when the General, ignoring his advice to suppress the message, upset everything. If Hurley's record in China had not been marked by naivete and over-optimism, this claim might demand more credence. Nor does it square with the Oklahoman's admission later to Stilwell that he (Hurley) had lost him the command.⁷¹ This is much nearer the truth.

Hurley Aids Chiang. Hurley had ostensibly been sent to Chungking in compliance with Chiang's request for someone who understood political as well as military matters. The real purpose of his mission was two-fold: (1) to obtain American control of the Chinese armies and (2) to mediate between Chungking and Yen-an. After two weeks of negotiating he had failed to obtain the first goal, and there is no available evidence to indicate that he had made more than nominal progress. Only the most resolute support of the September 19 ultimatum offered any assurance of success. Unfortunately, as his later record revealed, he had no real comprehension of the issue at stake in the Stilwell question, and his hearty disapproval of the ultimatum strengthened Chiang's resolution to find some way around it.⁷²

In his message to Roosevelt recommending Stilwell's recall, Hurley's conversion to the Chiang cause is reflected in the redefinition of the purpose of his mission: "In giving me this assignment you told me that you had decided to uphold the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek as a part of the overall purpose to keep the Chinese army in the war and prevent a collapse of his country. . . . There is no other issue between you and the Chinese Generalissimo."⁷³

The Roosevelt ultimatum confronted the Generalissimo with more than a mere choice of accepting a man toward whom he held a strong personal dislike. The alternatives were to accept the risk of losing American aid or to bow to complete American direction of the Chinese war effort. Without American friendship and aid the Kuomintang had no strong expectation of retaining its hold on China. On the other hand, American aid accompanied by the radical reforms projected by Stilwell also threatened the tottering Kuomintang structure. It is small wonder that in the days following the ultimatum Chiang cast about desperately with promises and protests which reflected his plight.⁷⁴

In less than a week Chiang decided he might avoid the dilemma he faced by making a personal issue of Stilwell's position. An aide-memoire was sent to Washington communicating the Generalissimo's feelings. In the ten days preceding the official American reply on October 5, the Stilwell case was lost in toto. Nelson weakened on the lend-lease question. Stilwell, striving to salvage part of his program, sought a compromise with General Ho whereby he would waive the demand to control and supply the Chinese Red armies. In Washington H. H. Kung picked up an intimation from Harry Hopkins that Roosevelt might bow if the removal demand was pressed.⁷⁵ The effect

⁷¹ Stilwell, *op. cit.*, p. 345.

⁷² White and Jacoby, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

⁷³ William D. Leaby, *I Was There*, p. 271.

⁷⁴ Stilwell's reports quoted in the *White Paper*, p. 68.

⁷⁵ *The New York Times*, November 3, 1944; Joseph Alsop, "The Foredoomed Mission of General Marshall," *Saturday Evening Post*, January 21, 1950.

give him *carte blanche* authority to coordinate and direct the entire military effort. Chiang's hedged acceptance, asking that Roosevelt first send a man acquainted with political as well as military matters to discuss the problems, was the usual Kuomintang game of procrastination and an indirect attack on Stilwell's views of the Chinese political situation.

While the hard-pressed Chiang played Fabian tactics, the rout in Southeast China began to assume catastrophic proportions. Not only the forward Chennault air bases, but Kweilin and even Kunming and Chungking itself were endangered. Roosevelt sent another message on July 15, without results. On August 10 and again on August 23 the President urged Chiang to comply. Two days later Chiang sent for Gauss and told him that Roosevelt was making the Chinese Reds more "recalcitrant." He suggested that the proper course was for Washington to pressure Yen-an into submitting to the Central Government. Gauss rejected the suggestion and countered with the proposal that the American view might be met by the formation of a war council composed of all parties.

Chiang now yielded enough on the crucial military question to designate Stilwell commander-in-chief, but when confronted with the General's sweeping program for reorganizing the Chinese armies he balked at surrendering the substance of command. Though both Pat Hurley and Donald Nelson had arrived to support the Roosevelt policy, the Generalissimo apparently believed that he could still avoid acceptance. He now insisted upon complete control of lend-lease.

As September wore on without any apparent progress by Hurley and Nelson, it became evident that only the sternest pressure would force Chiang into line. It came in the form of the Roosevelt message of September 19 which has been described as one of the strongest ever exchanged between the heads of friendly states.⁶⁷ The President laid upon Chiang personal responsibility for the threatened catastrophe in South East China, because he had not taken the steps repeatedly urged on him. The message concluded with sweeping demands for reform and action.⁶⁸

"Mark this day in red on the calendar of life," Stilwell exulted in his diary. "At long, at very long last, FDR has finally spoken plain words, and plenty of them, with a firecracker in every sentence. 'Get busy or else.' A hot firecracker. I handed this bundle of paprika to the Peanut (the Generalissimo) and then sank back with a sigh."⁶⁹

China bloc spokesmen insist that the message was a blunder, delivered against sound advice in the very hour when Chiang was on the verge of conceding the whole of American demands under the adroit cultivation of Hurley,⁷⁰ and made worse because delivered in person as an act of sadistic triumph by a vindictive Stilwell. This explanation concentrates primarily on the Chiang-Stilwell "feud" and accepts the Hurley claim that success was at

⁶⁷ General Marshall wrote the message. See Herbert Feis, *The China Tangle*, Princeton, 1953, pp. 188-9; Oxford, 1953.

⁶⁸ *White Paper*, p. 68; White and Jacoby, *op. cit.*, p. 221. ⁶⁹ Stilwell, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

⁷⁰ Joseph Alsop, "Why We Lost China: The Feud Between Stilwell and Chiang," *Saturday Evening Post*, January 7 1950.

movement had expanded to encompass 850,000 square kilometers and 90 million people. It would take foreign intervention on the scale of Japan's invasion of China to make it even probable that Chiang could crush the Communists. Since this was improbable, the Communists "are in China to stay. And China's destiny is not Chiang's but theirs."⁷⁹

A course of political realism, these reports further stressed, would require continued recognition of Chiang Kai-shek "for the time being." But the United States must not "indefinitely underwrite a politically bankrupt regime," and in anticipation of Russia's entry into the Pacific war "we must make a determined effort to capture politically the Chinese Communists, rather than allow them to go by default wholly to the Russians." The logical step toward this end would be a "coalition Chinese Government in which the Communists find a satisfactory place."⁸⁰

When within four months the Hurley policy had reached the bankrupt stage, a February 1945 memorandum warned in the strongest terms that "diplomatic means" had failed. Inasmuch as the Chinese situation closely paralleled the Yugoslav situation before Churchill issued his declaration of support for Tito, a statement of policy modelled on Churchill's ("... to judge all parties and factions dispassionately by the test of their readiness to fight. . . . This is not a time for ideological preferences for one side or the other.") would regain freedom of policy for the United States and the "Generalissimo would be forced to make concessions of power and permit united-front coalition."⁸¹

This reporting was both factually sound and remarkably prophetic. Yet for more than a year, during the Hurley mission, no effort was made to re-shape American policy in keeping with the hard realities revealed. An even greater irony was that in spite of the most explicit warnings against it in these reports, diplomatic and military leaders bound the United States to Chiang's Government irrevocably by commitment after commitment. In the meantime, the Asiatic revolution passed American policy by, as it passed the Kuomintang by.

THE HURLEY MISSION

In failing to obtain control of China's armies, Hurley lost all leverage on Chiang, who gained strength almost daily from the course of events. First was the calling off of the Japanese offensive in the fall of 1944. Next was the opening of the Burma road in January, over which poured lend-lease supplies to prop up his reeling war machine and strengthen the blockade against Yen-an. Other factors were the retraining and rearming program of Wedemeyer and the impending defeat of Germany.

Hurley's Coalition Campaign. Hurley's first major gesture as an amateur diplomat was a dramatic one. Assuming the initiative, he flew to Yen-an, where he submitted a remarkable program of his own drafting. The

⁷⁹ Davies Memorandum of November 7, 1944, *White Paper*, pp. 567 and 573.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, November 15, 1944, *White Paper*, p. 574.

⁸¹ Ladden-Service Memorandum of February 14, 1945, *White Paper*, pp. 575-6.

of Kung's news was electric. Chiang summoned a secret meeting of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee to hear his decision that Stilwell must go. He further preened himself before his supporters by announcing that Nelson had agreed to hand over control of lend-lease.

Stilwell Recalled. In Washington Marshall stood for firm support of Stilwell, but Hurley advised that it would be an unworkable arrangement. Roosevelt, confronted with almost a *fait accompli* in Chungking, which his emissary's diplomacy had helped to bring about, let the axe fall on his fiery general and, when Gauss resigned in protest over the situation, designated Hurley as ambassador.

When Stilwell left Hurley with a curt farewell at the airport, there ended the great opportunity to bring about a middle-of-the-road political order in China and keep American policy in the Far East solvent. What happened thereafter, the strange Hurley "mediation" period and the Marshall mission, was anti-climactic.

Roosevelt's choice of a man to put over his policy was, in this instance, particularly unfortunate. He wanted a man of action who would brush aside protocol and procrastination and get things done. The ebullient Oklahoman, who had already acquired experience at the Tehran conference and a number of out-of-the-way places in the Orient, seemed to fit the bill. However, he combined a strong anti-communism with remarkable political naivete, extreme intolerance toward opposing points of view, and strong confidence in the soundness of his own judgment. When he arrived, American policy turned on a feather. When he left a year later, a solvent policy was almost hopelessly beyond redemption.⁷⁶

Sound Advice Ignored. Nevertheless, American policy need not have floundered in confusion and indecision. Reports submitted by foreign service officers in China shed enough light to enable this country to avoid the approaching fiasco. They emphasized that while the Kuomintang was pursuing a suicidal course, the Chinese Communists were following policies which were "historically and evolutionarily sound."⁷⁷

Far from sitting out the conflict, the Reds were spearheading a war against the Japanese "aggressively waged by a totally mobilized population," and this total mobilization was made possible by "an economic, political and social revolution." For the first time the people "have been given something to fight for."⁷⁸ Because of this "mass support, mass participation," the Communist

⁷⁶ It was Hurley's contention that nothing more had been sacrificed in the Stilwell crisis than a man. Alsop insists that General Wedemeyer could have received the full authority demanded for Stilwell, but Marshall bluntly rejected the offer.—Alsop, "The Foredoomed Mission of General Marshall," *Saturday Evening Post*, January 21, 1950.

What Marshall rejected, however, was a command in theory when there was no hope that the theory would be translated into practice. Though T. V. Soong was kept in Chiang's cabinet, the arch reactionary, General Ho, retained his position as secretary of war and chief of staff. Marshall correctly judged the realities and for the time being kept America out of unlimited commitments to Chiang's regime.

⁷⁷ Davies Memorandum of June 24, 1943, *White Paper*, p. 565.

⁷⁸ Service Memorandum of October 9, 1944, *White Paper*, p. 566.

disbanding of the corps of political experts assigned to General Albert Wedemeyer, Stilwell's successor. Wedemeyer had known China only briefly, and that many years earlier. Hurley knew even less.⁸⁷

Unfortunately, China had been off the front page since the passing of the Kweilin crisis the preceding fall. The President and the nation had been immersed in the problems of Europe and the setting up of the United Nations. The dispersion of policy formulation and administration was still another factor in the situation which enabled Hurley to hammer out a personal policy stemming from prejudice, ignorance, and vanity.

He returned to Chungking by way of Moscow, where after conversations with Stalin he optimistically assumed that he had won from the U.S.S.R. a green light for this policy in China. Now the Yen-an Reds would be compelled to come to terms with Chungking by "the logic of events," he reported to Washington.⁸⁸ In the logic of events was the Sino-Soviet treaty, on which talks were then proceeding favorably in Moscow. So, also, was the fighting machine which Wedemeyer was building. Since the 1911 revolution the only politics which China had known was army politics. Yen-an could not be blind to the future political balance when the 39 fit and ready Wedemeyer divisions would be dropped on the scales. In the ensuing conversations Hurley advised the Communists to accept membership on an advisory committee and await a meeting of the constituent assembly, three-fourths of whose members had been picked by Chiang a decade earlier from among tested and true reactionaries.

We Move the Kuomintang into North China. V-J Day came upon the Hurley policy like a thief in the night. Not only had the Communists not been forced to come to terms with Chungking, they were at a decided advantage in the race for control of Occupied China. Since the Stilwell policy had been rejected, there was no unified command to require a peaceful and orderly movement for disarming the Japanese and restoring Chinese control. Expectations that Wedemeyer's New Army would conquer all of South China and converge on Shanghai with the support of the American fleet were now much dimmer. Left to themselves, the Kuomintang might have its hands full with this region alone, without challenging the Reds in their home base in the north.

Hurley had believed that there was basic unity in China and only a recalcitrant armed minority stood in the way, a minority which would be forced by "the logic of events" to accept the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and the dominance of the Kuomintang. He likewise identified American security with the rule of the Kuomintang over all of China, including the 90 million souls controlled from Yen-an. The logic of this policy committed American resources to fulfil these assumptions. American power must make up for the second guessing of amateur diplomacy.

There was no hesitation. With surrender imminent, Chiang, Hurley and Wedemeyer conferred on plans for flying Kuomintang armies to key points.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Feis, *op. cit.*, pp. 267-73; *White Paper*, pp. 87-92; Laurence Salisbury in *Far Eastern Survey*, April 25, 1945; White and Jacoby, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-7; Maxwell Stewart, "The Myth of Patrick Hurley," *The Nation*, November 10, 1945.

⁸⁸ *White Paper*, p. 102; Feis, *op. cit.*, pp. 278-89.

⁸⁹ *The New York Times*, August 14, 1945.

Communists were delighted, since the draft went far beyond anything previously advanced or that they had hoped for. It proposed a unified military effort under a coalition military council, a coalition government of all parties, and full guarantees of free speech and press, habeas corpus, free assembly, and even freedom from fear and want.⁸² Such a program would have meant the over-night death of the authoritarian Kuomintang. It is small wonder that Hurley's good friend, "Mr. Shek," courteously rejected it. Nevertheless, Hurley still attributed to Chiang opinions which he himself had quickly formed about the Yen-an Reds: (1) that they were not recognized as communists by Russia; (2) that Russia was not supporting them; (3) that they were not agents of the U.S.S.R., and (4) that Russia favored an understanding between Yen-an and Chungking.⁸³ On these assumptions he continued to work for a settlement, though he replied to the communists' question as to what had happened to his proposals that he hadn't realized the difficulties involved.

When the second round of conferences initiated by the Ambassador opened in January, he had obviously shifted his viewpoint. By the end of the month he was a full partisan of the Kuomintang cause. The minimum which Chiang was willing to offer was a far cry from the settlement originally proposed by Hurley. There was no prospect that the Communists would accept the continuation of one-party government, Chiang's undiminished power, and the surrender of their own armies in exchange for a few insignificant government posts.⁸⁴ On reporting the breakdown of negotiations, Hurley took satisfaction in the fact that he had not "agreed to any principles or supported any method that in my opinion would weaken the National Government or the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek."⁸⁵ Though it had been a cardinal point with Stilwell to get arms to the fighting Reds, Hurley had recommended in January that military supplies should go only to the Nationalists. He rejected out of hand Chu Teh's request for financial assistance, to win puppet troops away from the Japanese and support sabotage and demolition work behind the enemy lines. He held that while this might be a sound military step, it would be unsound politically since it would undermine Chiang's leadership.⁸⁶

The Embassy Purged. While Hurley was in Washington in February-March 1945, the entire political staff of the Embassy in Chungking, led by Chargé George Acheson, sent a report to the State Department which was precipitated by Raymond Ludden's return from the Communist headquarters at Yen-an. This memorandum stated that our support of Chiang was making him uncompromising, oversure; that Communist strength was growing and would present us with a grave dilemma when we landed in China; and that civil war was the probable outcome.

To avert it they recommended that both the Government and the Communists be supplied with arms, in an effort to gain some hold over the latter. This message led to a showdown between Hurley and the State Department which resulted in the transfer of the Embassy staff in Chungking and the

⁸² *White Paper*, pp. 74-5.

⁸³ Hurley report quoted in the *White Paper*, p. 73.

⁸⁴ *The New York Times*, February 15, 1945. ⁸⁵ *White Paper*, p. 82. ⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

support such unrestrained adventurism, even if there were promise of success. The only alternative was a new approach to establish by mediation a coalition government. Thus was official recognition paid to the failure of the Hurley adventure. In a rage, the Ambassador resigned on November 26, and for some days thereafter filled newspapers and Congressional committee chambers with verbal pyrotechnics of a spectacular variety.

An Anti-Russian Policy. Prospect of an early victory in the Far East had released latent or subdued fears of Russia in the minds of American political and military leaders. The A-bomb was dropped partly to retain in the hands of the West the administration of Japan and the Far East peace settlement. Plans were advanced by the admirals to make the Pacific into an American lake, through a network of island bases. Military intervention after the armistice to establish Chiang in control of China was a logical extension of this policy.

The question of defining the "Chinese problem" within the context of Western-Russian power relations has a World War II history which dated from the Chennault-Stilwell conflicts. Chennault was wedded unchangeably to the Generalissimo, and he built up a staff which accepted this tenet with the same single-mindedness. Chiang's triumph was essential to America's security. The Chinese Communists were Russian tools. Should they win, the U.S.S.R. would score a decisive victory in the Far East. Therefore, they must be denied help or encouragement. This group, among whom was the columnist Captain Joseph Alsop, passed over into the Wedemeyer camp with Stilwell's downfall. Ultimately Hurley was received as a fellow convert into their ranks. In their view China was practically offered to the Communists "like a trussed bird on a platter" because of failure to accept from the beginning unqualified and unlimited support to Chiang.⁹⁵

A more realistic appraisal of the Chinese Communists, as Alsop was to admit later, was advanced from the rival Stilwell camp.⁹⁶ Against this sober consideration, the "palace politics" explanation of the fateful turn in Kuomintang politics appears superficial indeed.⁹⁷

Were the Chinese Communists Russian Puppets? The answer to this question, to which Hurley and the pro-Chiang bloc gave an assumptive Yes, could be

⁹⁵ Joseph Alsop, "The Feud Between Stilwell and Chiang," *Saturday Evening Post*, January 7, 1950. Chennault wrote Stilwell in 1944 that the United States faced the choice of abandonment of its interests in the Far East and "a naked contest for influence with the Soviet Union."—Alsop, "We Opened the Door for the Communists," *Saturday Evening Post*, January 14, 1950.

⁹⁶ *The Nashville Tennessean*, July 26, 1951.

⁹⁷ It is the contention of Alsop that had the United States supported the "Modernists" (like T. V. Soong) and had Stilwell been recalled in 1943, when Chiang was on the verge of asking for his dismissal, the reform element in the Kuomintang would have emerged triumphant and a modern, efficient government would have been the result. This event was prevented when Madame Kung and Madame Chiang used Stilwell as a tool to force T. V. Soong from power and entrench the reactionaries.

Alsop further insists that Stilwell's Burma strategy dangerously weakened the Kuomintang government both politically and militarily, precipitating the 1944 defeats and so reducing Chiang's strength that the Communists succeeded by default.—See Alsop, "The Foredoomed Mission of General Marshall," *Saturday Evening Post*, January 21, 1950.

In an unprecedented aerial feat, the Tenth and Fourteenth Air Force shuttled tens of thousands of Nationalist troops to Hankow, Nanking and Peiping. While the Communist New Fourth Army pushed into Shanghai's suburbs, American transport planes dropped Chiang's Ninety-fourth Army to seize the city. An American fleet picked up Wedemeyer's best divisions at Canton and rushed them to North China. In all, between 400,000 and 500,000 troops were shifted by air and water.⁹⁰

More than 50,000 American marines were rushed to key areas in the north to hold them from the communists. Among them were Peiping, Tientsin, the key railroads from these centers, and the Shensi coal mines.⁹¹ By December 1, 1945 the American forces within the older communist controlled territories north of the Yellow River exceeded 100,000 men.⁹² Full speed was given to equipping an 8 group air force and a navy, and transfers of military material and lend-lease supplies were speeded up. Under the guise of carrying out the armistice terms, the United States shared in an outright military alliance with the Kuomintang, the Japanese (who were directed to retain their arms and hold all strategic areas until they could be taken over), and puppet troops, to wrest North China from the Chinese Communists.

By November, when it was evident that Chiang could not consolidate China north of the Great Wall without more aid, he created a crisis by insisting on help in taking over Manchuria, into which the Communists were moving in large numbers. This was the logic of the Hurley policy. Wedemeyer was counseling Chiang to concentrate on intramural China. But "face" was as important to Chiang as logistics, and much more important than reform, and the initiative was Chiang's not Wedemeyer's. This, too, was the logic of the Hurley policy.⁹³

Washington sat down to review the decision of October 13, when Truman had approved continued political support of Chiang and the military measures recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Hard facts to be faced, as stated by Wedemeyer, were the carpet bag behavior of the Kuomintang officialdom and the rapid alienation of the people who had so lately welcomed the Nationalists back to the coast. Economic and social reform, plus honest administration, would hold South China, the General had reported. Only an understanding with the Communists, which was unlikely, would enable Chiang to stabilize the North. The best solution for Manchuria would be a Big Three trusteeship.

Ambassador Hurley demanded all-out intervention for Chiang. Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, who also saw the issue as primarily a West-Soviet conflict, insisted this was the time and China the place for a firm policy. John Carter Vincent, who did not see it so simply, was opposed.⁹⁴ Secretary of State Byrnes was keenly aware that public opinion would not

⁹⁰ *White Paper*, p. 312. Chiang Kai-shek changed the name of Peking to Peiping. His version is used hereafter until he lost control of China.

⁹¹ *The New York Times*, November 11, 1945; *White and Jacoby*, *op. cit.*, pp. 281-3; *White Paper*, p. 312.

⁹² *The New York Times*, December 2, 1945.

⁹³ Wedemeyer Report of November 20, 1945, quoted in *White Paper*, p. 131.

⁹⁴ *Time*, December 3, 1945.

look abroad for antecedents or inspiration or guidance in working out its own distinctive phase of the Socialist World Revolution.

Mao likewise laid down a different base and a slower order of progression for the Chinese Communist revolution than the Bolshevik example. Its base he held to be peasant rather than proletarian. In its evolution, it must begin as a semi-bourgeois state in which class cooperation and individual enterprise below the big state-owned industries of national importance would be encouraged. The period of the "new Democracy," unlike the NEP period in Russia, was viewed as a distinct stage of long duration.

Mao's document had a fundamental meaning which the West could afford to ignore only at its own risk: before the Communists had captured the Chinese revolution, the revolution had captured them. Their victory, therefore, would not mean an automatic extension of Soviet power. It followed then that it was not necessary for us to starve it during the war or fight it by proxy through the Kuomintang as a phase of the power struggle. There was nothing more mischievous for world peace and Western policy than the Chennault-Hurley thesis that the Communist problem in China challenged the West to a "naked contest for influence."

Russia and the Chinese Communists. The indigenous quality of Chinese Communism and its lack of subservience to Moscow remained consistently distinguishable features after 1937. This was acknowledged in 1951 by Joseph Alsop, who confesses that Davies, Stilwell's adviser, evaluated the movement correctly during the war.¹⁰¹ Absence of Russian advisers and Russian-made material was noted by all wartime visitors to Communist territory. Under the terms of the 1937 Sino-Russian non-aggression pact, Russian goods flowed over the Lanchow Road to Shuangshihpu and the northern front until the German attack in 1941. Ironically, some of these war goods apparently went to strengthen the Kuomintang blockade above Sian against Yen-an.¹⁰² At one time Moscow sent the Chinese emissary, Ho Yao-tan, back to Chiang with word that help would be stopped unless the material was used against the Japanese.¹⁰³ Peck observes that a year later the diversion to the blockading armies was still continuing.

Far from giving evidences of launching a race for Asia in the closing months of the Pacific war, Russia indicated a readiness to accept a Far East settlement as a part of a general plan of peaceful co-existence with the West.¹⁰⁴ There is no reason to believe that Stalin's frequent disavowals of Chinese Communists as orthodox Marxists was a form of pleasant deceit designed to lull Western diplomats into passivity. Nor is there any reason to dismiss his reiterated pledges of support for the Chinese Nationalist government as a disguise for his real intentions. It had been assumed by American officials in Chungking that Russia would demand as a prerequisite to a Sino-Russian

¹⁰¹ See Alsop's column in the *Nashville Tennessean*, July 26, 1951.

¹⁰² Peck saw many of the Russian convoys.—*Two Kinds of Time*, pp. 230-1.

¹⁰³ *The New York Times*, February 2, 1940.

¹⁰⁴ For Russia the essential thing was the dominance of Eastern Europe. For unchallenged influence in Poland, Russia was willing to acquiesce in American leadership in reorganizing and stabilizing China.—J. Alsop, the *Nashville Tennessean*, August 8, 1951.

found in the history of the movement. In the first place, as the incidents of 1927 took on perspective, the Chinese communists began to draw certain lessons from their experience. One was the doubtful validity of Russian revolutionary direction, when this counsel failed to square with Chinese experience. In the blunders of the Twenties Stalin had shown feet of clay. Again, they had learned that with Stalin Chinese interests came secondary to his own and those of Russia. At the close of World War II this knowledge was to make Yen-an leadership reject Russian direction in the matter of accepting a place of hopeless inferiority with the Kuomintang, an arrangement not unlike that which Stalin directed them to take after Chiang's coup in Canton in 1926. The lesson taught by this experience was that, within the common ideological framework, the interests of the Communist Party in China were not identical to those of the Soviet Union. And, finally, in Kiangsi Mao Tse-tung hammered out the painfully learned lesson that the Marxism-Stalinism evolved in Russia did not fit China.

These lessons, once learned, brought forward the leadership of the native Communist movement and the evolution of a new experimental communism. It is significant that the expelled Li Li-san, the exponent of the "adventuristic" form of Marxism, was able to return to China after the war only as a professed convert to Mao-ism. By the time the Communists had arrived at Yen-an, the Comintern had ceased to intervene in the affairs of the party.⁹⁸ In 1943 Mao stated that his party had received neither advice nor assistance from the Comintern in the intervening years. The statement was made on the disbandment of the Comintern in May 1943.⁹⁹

"*The New Democracy.*" In 1940 another guide post for Western policy makers was set up by Mao when he published the *New Democracy*, a Chinese theory for Chinese communism. Mao rejected the concept which held Marxism as a complete system already worked out in Russia and having universal applicability. In so doing, he rejected Moscow as the Vatican of Communism and freed the Communists of each country to work out their own communist order. In specific terms he classed unadulterated Marxism with other foreign imports as potentially harmful to China. "Such Marxism," he decreed, "is useless. The point is to grasp the general truths of Marxism and apply them to the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, i.e. to first achieve the Sinonization of Marxism."¹⁰⁰

The vigorous nationalism of the Chinese Communist revolution was proclaimed in the central place assigned by Mao to Sun Yat-sen. Dr. Sun's *Three People's Principles* were accepted as revolutionary doctrine to be fulfilled during the period of the "New Democracy." The revolution need not

⁹⁸ Max Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia*, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, 1947, p. 215.

⁹⁹ Payne, *Mao Tse-tung*, p. 165.

¹⁰⁰ Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee No. 5, H R. Rep. 154, Eighty-first Congress, first session, *On the Strategy and Tactics of World Communism*, supplement 3, C, "Communism in China," p. 90 This document quotes the *New Democracy* in full.

Marshall arrived in Chungking on December 22 and secured the signing of a truce between the Government and the Communists on January 9. Truce teams, consisting of a representative of each side with an American officer as chairman, were organized, and everywhere they went they were greeted by the people with pathetic eagerness.

On January 10 a Political Consultative Conference (PCC) met, with the Democratic and the Youth Parties also represented. Eventually it was agreed that a new State Council would be the supreme organ of government. Ministers would be responsible to it and the President's veto of its acts could be overridden by a three-fifths majority. The non-Kuomintang parties would designate half of the members. A committee was to propose revisions of the 1936 Draft Constitution to a National Constitutional Assembly on May 5, 1946.¹⁰⁷

Progress continued during February. A formal agreement for the integration of the Communist forces into the National Army was signed on February 25 with much ceremony.¹⁰⁸

The Truce Emasculated in Marshall's Absence. The outlook was so good that Marshall returned to Washington, on March 11, to speed rapid action on credits to China, whose war ravaged people were badly in need of aid. He conferred also on all aspects of policy relating to China and did not return until the middle of May. By that time the work which he had so patiently and firmly accomplished was in ruins.

Even before he left, the Right-wing elements of the Kuomintang had been mobilizing to defeat the truce—through different secret police organizations, the fascist "Blue Shirts", the Youth Corps, secret societies, landlord associations, bandit and pirate groups, local and provincial officials.¹⁰⁹ Even the powerful underworld organizations in Shanghai and the warlord cliques united with all the others in fearing change and in believing they could prosper best under the Kuomintang.

These groups raided great mass meetings and smaller assemblies held to discuss the PCC issues, kidnapped and beat liberals and waged a press campaign against all officials who had worked for peace with the Communists. Red newspapers were wrecked. Newspapers were banned in Peiping and Canton. The Shanghai police registered intellectuals, restricting their activities. In Sian a Democratic League newspaper staff was beaten and the editor shot. When a lawyer took the case to court he was executed.¹¹⁰

During the first half of March the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee emasculated the PCC agreements. It ruled that it would have to approve appointments to the all-important State Council. It repudiated the principle of ministerial responsibility and gave the president dictatorial

¹⁰⁷ *Time*, February 4, 1946, p. 34; *White Paper*, pp. 612-17.

¹⁰⁸ *The New York Times*, February 27, 1946.

¹⁰⁹ Gumber Stein, "China's Conflict," *The Yale Review*, Summer, 1946, pp. 644-5.

¹¹⁰ *The New York Times*, December 19, 1945, February 11, 25, June 16, 1946; White and Jacoby, *op. cit.*, pp. 295-6; Agnes Smedley, "We Are Building a Fascist China," *The Nation*, August 31, 1946, p. 237.

treaty an agreement between the Kuomintang and the Communists, but Russia signed the treaty without demanding a Yen-an-Chungking understanding and without diplomatic support for the Communists.

Willingness of Yen-an after August 14, 1945, to accept a surprisingly moderate settlement which would leave the Communists with only twenty divisions and political control of the old border region (with vice-mayors in large cities where the communists were strong) no doubt arose from the pinch in which they found themselves as a result of the nearly simultaneous ending of the war and the signing of the Sino-Russian treaty. Negotiations broke down in October because the Communists refused to yield political control over the four and one-half provinces above the Yellow River to which they had brought social and economic reform. Apart from putting an end to the Communist Party itself, surrender to the Kuomintang would mean a return of the tax plunderer, the usurer, the landlord, and the corrupt bureaucrat to these lands.

Hurley was already on his way to America to plead for unlimited intervention for Chiang to crush the Chinese revolution when the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations were ended. Mao had elected to fight.

THE MARSHALL MISSION

General Hurley's explosive resignation led President Truman to put in a prompt call to General George C. Marshall to go to China and see what he could do about the deteriorating situation.

On December 15, 1945, the President gave Marshall a directive to "effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in North China." An attached memorandum by Secretary of State Byrnes held that the National Government was the best base for democracy, but it must be broadened to include those groups not now in it. At the same time General Wedemeyer was directed to help the Government get its troops to Manchuria and to supply them.¹⁰⁵ Later in the month the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers approved the American policy for China.

It was not a brand new policy, for General Hurley had already been working for a coalition government in China. The much condemned coalition idea goes back to him, and to many others. As far back as August 16, 1944, Brooks Atkinson, a thoughtful reporter of the *New York Times*, cabled: "The time has come for relaxation of party dictatorship and the formation of a coalition government." The Government, he said, is "cut off from the people." Still earlier Nathaniel Peffer wrote that the intellectual Chinese "have just lost faith in Chungking." The Democratic League, a wartime union of small middle class parties, strongly opposed to the government monopolies which stifled private enterprise, wanted the Government reorganized. In May 1944 the League lashed at the one-party state and argued that if democracy was postponed until after the war it would never come.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ *White Paper*, pp. 605-8.

¹⁰⁶ Harold M. Vnacke, *The United States and the Far East, 1945-1951*, Stanford, 1952, pp. 35, 39; the *New York Times*, August 18, 1944; the *New York Times Magazine*, May 14, 1944; Owen Lattimore, *China, A Short History*, New York, 1944, p. 205; Lawrence K. Rosinger, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

port of Dairen, for which position they had a legal justification under the Sino-Russian treaty of August 14, 1945.¹¹⁴ The Nationalists held only the area up to Mukden, and the Communists controlled nearly all of the rest of Manchuria, especially the rural regions. It was outside the big cities that they took over most of the dumps of Japanese arms, which helped them greatly to hold Manchuria and arm North China.

This may have been a decisive turn in the military fortune of the Reds. If so, it was a development inherent in the situation. They were everywhere in Manchuria, and if the Russians had desired they could not have prevented many Japanese arms from falling into their hands. It would have been a big undertaking to gather up all of these arms and transport them into the hands of the Nationalists, even if the Russians had agreed to do so or wished to do it. That they did not want to, with the Americans pouring Chiang's troops into Manchuria, is evident. The help the Chinese Reds obtained from Russia was of this negative character, in contrast to the positive training, equipment, supply and transport which the Americans gave to Chiang.

Moreover, it is to be remembered that important as the Japanese arms in Manchuria were to the Reds at a critical time, the Americans gave the Nationalists immensely more arms than the Russians permitted the Reds to take in Manchuria. We helped them also to take over great quantities of Japanese arms in the cities of China proper. Yet it was the American equipment which really armed the Reds, by capture, surrender or outright sale by the Nationalists to the Reds. Virtually all observers agreed about that. The victory parades staged by the Reds in all the big cities were observed by many foreigners and "though amazement was expressed at the quantity of American weapons displayed, there were few (if any) reports of Russian tanks or guns being seen."¹¹⁵ Derk Bodde, Professor of Chinese at the University of Pennsylvania, was in Peiping when the Reds came in. He counted "over 250 heavy motor vehicles of all kinds—tanks, armored cars," trucks, ambulances, jeeps—and what made it especially memorable to Americans was the fact that it was primarily a display of *American* military equipment.¹¹⁶ With this source of supply available to the Reds "there was no need for Russia to compromise herself in the eyes of the world by giving them active assistance." That she did not do so is further proved by the fact that the Nationalists were never able to produce many captured weapons of Russian origin. Those which were exhibited may well have been obtained direct from Russia during the period when the Russians sent arms to Chiang, up to the time they were attacked by Germany in 1941.¹¹⁷

"The history of all revolutions and civil wars invariably shows that a threatened ruling class finds the cause of its misfortune not in itself, but in

¹¹⁴ *White Paper*, p. 126.

¹¹⁵ John Blofeld, *Red China in Perspective*, London, Wingate, 1951, p. 236.

¹¹⁶ Derk Bodde, *Peking Diary, A Year of Revolution*.

¹¹⁷ Blofeld, *op. cit.*, p. 236. That the Russians aided Chiang up to this time, from self-interest, is well attested. Harrison Forman reported the passion with which Communist General Chu Teh spoke of the \$300,000,000 of war supplies sent by Russia to the Nationalists, along with planes and pilots, while "we, their ideological allies, received nothing!" —Forman, *Blunder in Asia*, New York, 1950, p. 179.

powers, reduced the non-Kuomintang representation in the proposed coalition government and ruled out provincial legislatures. By refusing to abide by the PCC decisions, the Kuomintang reactionaries doomed the Marshall mission to failure.¹¹¹

Their handling of the elections to the National Assembly also had the same result. The PCC had apportioned the delegates with great difficulty in a way which gave the minority parties a chance to get perhaps a fourth of the 2,050 delegates, 400 of which were to be elected. Then the Kuomintang rigged the elections, permitting only reliable voters to vote and breaking up Democratic League demonstrations of protest.¹¹²

Since the truce was based on the PCC political agreements it collapsed when they were vitiated. Fighting broke out in Mukden on March 11. The Communists took Changchun and held it until driven out on May 23. By April open civil war was in progress in Manchuria with the Communists on the offensive. Truce teams met obstruction from both sides. On April 23 the Communists announced that they would not participate in the National Assembly called to meet on May 5, giving as reasons the changes made by the Kuomintang CEC in the PCC agreements.

Manchuria Looted by Russia. In this period the American-Russian rivalry exercised an increasing influence on developments. The Russians greatly aggravated the situation by looting the industrial machinery of Manchuria, which contained as many factories and railways as the remainder of China. The motives for this destructive campaign appear to have been a mixture of the following: fear of the American-dominated Kuomintang Government and a desire to deprive it of the great arsenals in Manchuria; doubt that the Chinese Communists could control Manchuria, or China; and a desire to recoup their own great war losses.

The pretext that the machines belonged to the Japanese carried little weight in China which was swept by large demonstrations of anger and protest, demonstrations which led the Russians to hasten the withdrawal of their armies from Manchuria late in April, 1946. Earlier they had twice agreed to delay their scheduled departure at the request of the National Government, which wanted time to get its troops ferried to Manchuria.¹¹³

Both Sides Obtain Arms. Even in April the Government was not ready, partly because the Russians had steadily refused to permit them to use the

¹¹¹ Lauterbach, *Danger From the East*, pp. 280, 334.

¹¹² John Hersey, "Letter from Peiping," *New Yorker*, May 4, 1946, p. 93; Lauterbach, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

¹¹³ The Chinese Ambassador notified the State Department on December 1, 1945, to its astonishment, that his Government had asked the Soviet Government to retain its troops in Manchuria another month. They were due to leave December 3.—*The New York Times*, December 2, 1945.

At the Moscow Conference Molotov told Byrnes that the Chinese Government had asked the Soviet troops to stay in Manchuria a second extra month, until February 3, 1945.—*The New York Times*, December 28, 1945.

See also, Lawrence K. Rosinger and Associates, *The State of Asia*, New York, 1951, p. 37; London, Allen & Unwin, 1953, for an account of both extensions.

capitalist structure of the Chiang regime forced it, even against its will, to rob its subjects." The Formosa massacre turned many people in China sharply to the left. "A paradise had been turned into a Devil's Island."¹²¹

In Red China life was hard, but the agrarian reforms had raised the standard of living, and honest, simple administration had won the warm loyalty of the peasants.

In this situation, after ten years of war, the continuance of civil war was bound to be fatal to the side which the public blamed for keeping it going, and as time went on public feeling increased against both the Kuomintang and the Americans.

Deadlock. On May 30, Marshall made a strong public appeal for peace and compromise and he secured a 15 day truce in Manchuria on June 6, which soon broke down. Negotiations were interminable and differences irreconcilable. The Reds would not agree that Nationalist troops should come into their areas, abolish their reforms and set up the kind of administration which was ripening all of China for their harvest. But the Government had to extend its sovereignty to win the struggle. The issue, of course, was always the control of particular provinces. Marshall proposed detailed compromises which were always vitiated by the reservations advanced by both sides.

In July the Government opened a general offensive, aided logistically by the American military authorities, which was desperately resisted. Simultaneously, the Government continued the suppression of the liberal Chinese. A peace delegation was beaten up in Nanking and two famous professors assassinated on the streets. Fifty-six educators addressed an appeal directly to the American people, asking them to stop their government from "destroying our chances for peace and democracy," and Madame Sun Yat-sen asked the United States to quit aiding the Nationalists. However, President Truman announced the continuation of lend-lease to China and in Congress the transfer of 271 naval vessels to the Chinese Government was authorized.¹²²

Discontented American Troops in an Untenable Position. In these circumstances feeling against the American marines mounted in all parts of China. The fundamental contradiction in Marshall's position was becoming starkly apparent to the Chinese, if not to the Americans. He was attempting to mediate a civil war in which his own Government was an active, powerful participant on one side. He was trying to stop the war with his left hand and fighting in it with his right hand.

In Shanghai, Chiang's chief citadel, 54 anti-civil war groups united in demanding that American aid to Chiang be halted immediately and American troops withdrawn from China. A mass meeting at Chengteh made the same demand.¹²³ Yet the United States continued to finance, train, arm and transport Chiang's troops to fight the Communists, few of whom would ever have gotten into contact with the Reds otherwise.¹²⁴

¹²¹ Belden, *op. cit.*, pp. 334-97.

¹²² *The New York Times*, July 30, June 24, July 9, 1946; Lauterbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 337-8.

¹²³ *The New York Times*, June 23, July 3, 1946.

¹²⁴ "Conflicts in China," *the New Republic*, August 5, 1946, p. 116.

foreign agents or powers," and China is no exception.¹¹⁸ It was not Russian aid to the Reds which defeated the Kuomintang, and the lavish American aid which they received could not save them.

In judging Russia's late-in-the-evening, left handed aid to the Chinese Reds it is also essential to remember that they saw American power advancing to their borders through the Kuomintang, whereas China is on the other side of the Pacific ocean from the United States.

Inflation and Massacre. When Marshall returned to China in May the really remarkable agreements he had obtained in the early part of the year had fallen apart, along with China herself. He returned, too, from a deepened Cold War atmosphere in Washington. Henry Lieberman wrote that it was plain that Russo-American differences elsewhere "resulted in attempts to prevent Communist domination of China."¹¹⁹ It was easily assumed that the issue in China was not revolution but Soviet imperialism.

Meanwhile, the Kuomintang bureaucrats continued to feather their nests royally, as the civil war was financed with printing press money. The bank note circulation went up from one trillion dollars in August 1945 to four in May 1946. By the end of 1946 it was a quintillion and a half. It had increased almost exactly a million times since 1936. Food costs had gone up 2000 times. All who depended on wages had to live by squeezing, speculating or stealing. Even the Supreme Court struck for higher wages. In the countryside the peasants had to pay all manner of exactions, including rice levies for many things, even the celebration of Chiang's birthday.¹²⁰

It was at this time that the Kuomintang oppression of the Formosans climaxed in a massacre in which from 5000 to 20,000 people were killed. Belden has an unforgettable account of what he learned on the island of carpetbagging seizure of all Japanese property, the displacement of great numbers of trained technicians in business and government by Chiang's hangers-on, the selling of UNRRA supplies for fabulous profits, the spread of prostitution and mistreatment of women, a cholera epidemic—in short, the rapid breakdown of every phase of Formosan life until "the very term 'Chinese' became a synonym for something both hateful and ridiculous."

The people of China were used to this kind of treatment, but the outraged Formosans, accustomed to at least hard justice under Japanese rule, finally tried to resist by holding back the rice harvest. This brought Chiang's troops over from the mainland and they staged a reign of terror for weeks in March 1947, killing all those who had protested Kuomintang rule and thousands of others, along with robbery and rape, to terrorize the Formosans into submission. The terror worked. The unarmed people submitted and went on, lost "in the mares of Kuomintang double-crossing and triple checking." The "bureaucratic

¹¹⁸ Jack Belden, *op. cit.*, p. 368. Speaking of the time when the Communists took over North China, he says that it was obvious to everyone that there were no Russians or Russian arms in the area, which was separated from Siberia by a thousand miles of forests and mountains.

¹¹⁹ *The New York Times*, August 25, 1946.

¹²⁰ Chen Han-seng, "Monopoly and Civil War in China," *The Far Eastern Survey*, October 9, 1946, p. 308; Lauterbach, pp. 257, 263; *the New York Times*, June 5, 1946.

had been proved once more that foreign troops used to suppress Communist revolution rouse the people against the invaders and aid the revolution. In both cases the position of the conservative groups whom we tried to save was made worse.

The Reactionaries Chided Futilely. On August 10 President Truman sent a message to Chiang Kai-shek expressing disappointment over the failure to implement the PCC agreements, regretting the suppression and assassination of the liberals and expressing our "increasing belief that an attempt is being made to resort to force, military or secret police rather than democratic processes to settle major social issues." There was a growing awareness that "the hopes of the people of China are being thwarted by militarists and a small group of political reactionaries." It could not be expected, the President's message continued, "that American opinion will continue its generous attitude toward your nation unless convincing proof is shortly forthcoming that genuine progress is being made toward a peaceful settlement of China's internal problems." Furthermore, it would be necessary "to redefine and explain the position of the United States to the American people."

In Chungking Marshall reinforced the President's position, reminding Chiang firmly that continued hostilities "might end in collapse of the Government and of the country's economy. The Generalissimo must remember that the long lines of communication and the terrain favored the employment of Communist guerrilla tactics." The chaotic conditions then developing would not only weaken the Kuomintang but would also afford the Communists an excellent opportunity to undermine the Government.¹²⁸

However, these *démarches* had no effect. Chiang replied on August 28, 1947 to the President's message. He ignored its substance entirely and asserted merely that peace depended on the Communists giving up "their policy of seizing political power through the use of armed force."¹²⁹

Action was therefore taken to reduce and then suspend temporarily the shipment of certain combat items to Chiang, in an attempt to extricate our Government from its untenable dual position as mediator and munitioneer of the Chinese civil war. These gestures were without effect, since Chiang's "reserves of material were ample."¹³⁰

Knowing that he had ample supplies, and that President Truman would not dare to tell the American people the blunt truth about conditions in Kuomintang China, Chiang announced on September 30 a drive on the Communist main headquarters at Kalgan, and planned four other offensives to round out his military successes before the Constitutional Assembly met on November 12. Chou En-lai, the chief Communist negotiator, told Marshall promptly that a drive on Kalgan would mean "a total national split," and the next day Marshall wrote to Chiang that if a basis was not found at once for terminating the fighting he would ask for his own recall. Though he blamed the Communists for many actions, giving basis for the belief that their actual intent was to seize power, he thought the Government's military offensive

¹²⁸ *China White Paper*, pp. 176-7.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 652-3.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

It was this duality of American foreign policy which convinced the Kuomintang reactionaries that the United States would always support them, a well founded conviction. When a rightist government is engaged in civil war legality is everything, but when a leftist government fights for its life, as in Spain after 1936, its legality avails it nothing. "Non intervention" choked off its supplies.

This distinction is clear enough to us, but it was not so plain to the wracked people of China, nor to the hapless American troops there. Our troops were in China ostensibly to disarm the Japanese troops and send them home, but they knew they were taking part in a Chinese civil war. Many of them had seen the miserable, half-starved Kuomintang conscripts, and the abysmal misery of the Chinese people. Others had suffered from the profiteering and graft of the merchants, landlords and politicians who sat out the war with Japan. Now some of them found themselves blasting small Chinese villages "unmercifully," not knowing "how many innocent victims were slaughtered."¹²⁵

Having little to do except guard railways, mines and bridges for the Nationalists, it is not strange that our troops organized "We Want to Go Home" demonstrations and bombarded their Congressmen and relatives with demands for return. As during the Western interventions in Russia, 1918-20, it was being proved that there are limits to what you can do with war weary troops from democracies, at the end of a great war. This should be borne in mind by those who think that we could have thrown in more troops and conquered China for Chiang, if we had only had more resolute leadership.

Naturally, the desperately beset Chinese Reds, faced with steadily growing Kuomintang military power, waged steady propaganda against the American troops in China, and the inevitable cases of rape, traffic accidents in which rickshaws were run down by heavy trucks, drunken fights and brawls supplied plenty of tinder.

"Americans Go Home!" demonstrations multiplied until finally on December 24, 1946 two marines were accused of raping the daughter of a high Government official in Peiping and there was a national explosion. The Peiping Municipal Government protested. Students in six universities struck. The Democratic League took a hand. The Kuomintang *Peiping News* declared that public sentiment was "aroused to a fury." Though often instructed to be discreet, it could no longer keep silent. Anti-American demonstrations became so frequent that the Government had to order their dispersal.¹²⁶

On January 29, 1947 it was announced that all American armed forces in China would be withdrawn immediately, except the 700 man Military Advisory Group and a navy training base at Tsingtao.¹²⁷ As in Russia after 1918, it

¹²⁵ A letter from a marine to Representative Hugh de Lacy, the *Congressional Record*, 79th Congress, 2nd session, January 24, 1946, p. 225.

¹²⁶ Thurston Griggs, "Americans in China; Some Chinese Views," *Foundation for Foreign Affairs*, Washington, 1948, pp. 7-8.

¹²⁷ "The Closed Door," *Newsweek*, February 10, 1947, p. 45.

men that the Reds could not launch an offensive—lacking supply bases, transportation corps and heavy equipment.

This development stimulated the already great revolt of the teachers and students in Kuomintang territory, all of whom were charged with being Reds.¹³⁵ Shopkeepers and business men began to contribute voluntarily to Communist war funds, while the advancing Reds organized the country districts as they advanced—on foot, but rapidly.

In the United States a twelve page article by William C. Bullitt in *Life*, lavishly advertised, incited open military intervention in Chiang's behalf "to keep China out of the hands of Stalin." One more billion dollars would do it.¹³⁶

In November and December 1948 the Nationalists suffered a disastrous defeat at Suchow, the strategic key to Shanghai and Nanking from the north, even though Chiang had concentrated 400,000 men to defend it. Two armies in one army group surrendered without fighting. The others were outmaneuvered by the Red generals and captured or destroyed one at a time. Then Chiang again threw good armies after bad, as in Manchuria, by bringing down 120,000 men from Hankow. They were cut to pieces. Finally he sought, too late, to have the large Suchow garrison retreat to defend Nanking and it also was put out of action completely. Chiang then had no important troops left.¹³⁷

By this time the Kuomintang leaders were suffering from "a mortal sickness of the soul," remembering that they had started out in their youth to lead a revolution and ended up as oligarchs merely defending their power and doing it futilely.

Peiping and Tientsin surrendered at the end of January 1949 and both cities saw well fed, rigidly disciplined Communist troops march in. They were courteous, efficient and cheerful, in marked contrast to the miserable Kuomintang conscripts. Chiang retired temporarily from the Presidency to permit a peace delegation to go to Peiping, but the Red demand for the surrender of Chiang, H. H. Kung, T. V. Soong and the two Chen brothers as war criminals was too much, and the war continued. Shanghai was captured on May 27, after which the American marines were promptly withdrawn from Tsingtao and the Reds marched in on June 2, 1949.

The final scenes in Canton and Chungking were "a fitting epilogue to the reign of the Kuomintang." Far from being a place in the sackcloth and ashes of failure, Canton just before the end was a scene of riotous living, restaurants and dance halls crowded, with prostitution and gambling in full swing. It "seemed like a city gone mad," with everyone out to make all he could before flight. In Chungking great fires gutted the business district, followed by mass executions. Then officials jammed the planes with their possessions and flew away. The biggest ones used their last bit of power everywhere to get plane space for Formosa or Hongkong.¹³⁸

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 201; Belden, *op. cit.*, pp. 397-412.

¹³⁶ William C. Bullitt, "Report to the American People on China," *Life*, October 13, 1947, pp. 35ff.

¹³⁷ Belden, *op. cit.*, pp. 420-2.

¹³⁸ Blofield, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-18.

plans had passed "well beyond" the necessity of safeguarding the Government's position.¹³¹

This letter led to renewed parleys, lists of points, and a hum of peace talk in Chungking which resulted in the usual deadlock, while the Nationalist armies took Kalgan on October 12 and broke the Manchurian deadlock early in November by seizing Chefoo, and isolating the Reds in Shantung. Chiang then ordered a general cease fire for the Constitutional Assembly meeting.

It was dominated by the Kuomintang throughout, in the absence of the Communists who refused to attend. Most of the 2050 delegates had been chosen by it in 1936. The constitution adopted made the President responsible only to the National Assembly, which he need not convene until the last 90 days of his term of office. The Democratic League, excepting the Social Democrats, rejected the document as illegal and its reception by the people was lukewarm.

General Marshall went home in January 1947 and made a statement to the American people in which he strongly condemned the untruthful Communist propaganda and the "dominant group" of irreconcilable Kuomintang reactionaries, whose influence "though subtle or indirect has been devastating in effect." They "had evidently counted on substantial American support regardless of their actions." He saw hope only in "the assumption of leadership by the liberals in the Government and in the minority parties, a splendid group of men."¹³² This, of course, was the one thing which would not happen.

The Collapse of the Kuomintang. What did happen was the rapid collapse of Chiang's impressive looking structure of power. His cause was already lost in Manchuria, where the hostility of the people took the heart out of his troops cooped up in a few cities. His commanders wanted to evacuate, and his American advisers urged Chiang to do so. General Wedemeyer said his position there was hopeless, but Chiang refused to budge.¹³³ The result was the subjection of the large city populations to a long and terrible hunger siege, without fuel in the Siberian winter when one was lucky to get dog's flesh or rat's meat.¹³⁴ Changchun and Mukden did not fall to the Communists until late October 1948, when Tsinan and other cities also surrendered almost without a struggle, 300,000 troops surrendering, including 50 generals ordered to fight until death.

Meanwhile, in the Spring of 1947 Chiang had turned the Yellow River back into an old channel in Shantung making 100,000 people homeless and compelling tremendous efforts to save the homes of 400,000 others, efforts which enhanced Communist leadership while hatred of Chiang mounted. However, this stratagem did not prevent the one-eyed Communist General Liu Po-cheng from crossing the Yellow River on June 30, 1947 and advancing south to the Yangtze, in flat contradiction to the belief of the American military

¹³¹ *White Paper*, pp. 661-2. On October 10 our Ambassador, Dr. John Leighton Stuart, long a resident of China, commented on "the present enemies of China, which are the narrowly partisan or selfishly unscrupulous or ignorantly reactionary forces among her own people."—Department of State *Bulletin*, October 20, 1946, p. 724.

¹³² *White Paper*, pp. 687-9. ¹³³ Belden, *op. cit.*, p. 382. ¹³⁴ Blofeld, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

men that the Reds could not launch an offensive—lacking supply bases, transportation corps and heavy equipment.

This development stimulated the already great revolt of the teachers and students in Kuomintang territory, all of whom were charged with being Reds.¹³⁵ Shopkeepers and business men began to contribute voluntarily to Communist war funds, while the advancing Reds organized the country districts as they advanced—on foot, but rapidly.

In the United States a twelve page article by William C. Bullitt in *Life*, lavishly advertised, incited open military intervention in Chiang's behalf "to keep China out of the hands of Stalin." One more billion dollars would do it.¹³⁶

In November and December 1948 the Nationalists suffered a disastrous defeat at Suchow, the strategic key to Shanghai and Nanking from the north, even though Chiang had concentrated 400,000 men to defend it. Two armies in one army group surrendered without fighting. The others were outmaneuvered by the Red generals and captured or destroyed one at a time. Then Chiang again threw good armies after bad, as in Manchuria, by bringing down 120,000 men from Hankow. They were cut to pieces. Finally he sought, too late, to have the large Suchow garrison retreat to defend Nanking and it also was put out of action completely. Chiang then had no important troops left.¹³⁷

By this time the Kuomintang leaders were suffering from "a mortal sickness of the soul," remembering that they had started out in their youth to lead a revolution and ended up as oligarchs merely defending their power and doing it futilely.

Peiping and Tientsin surrendered at the end of January 1949 and both cities saw well fed, rigidly disciplined Communist troops march in. They were courteous, efficient and cheerful, in marked contrast to the miserable Kuomintang conscripts. Chiang retired temporarily from the Presidency to permit a peace delegation to go to Peiping, but the Red demand for the surrender of Chiang, H. H. Kung, T. V. Soong and the two Chen brothers as war criminals was too much, and the war continued. Shanghai was captured on May 27, after which the American marines were promptly withdrawn from Tsingtao and the Reds marched in on June 2, 1949.

The final scenes in Canton and Chungking were "a fitting epilogue to the reign of the Kuomintang." Far from being a place in the sackcloth and ashes of failure, Canton just before the end was a scene of riotous living, restaurants and dance halls crowded, with prostitution and gambling in full swing. It "seemed like a city gone mad," with everyone out to make all he could before flight. In Chungking great fires gutted the business district, followed by mass executions. Then officials jammed the planes with their possessions and flew away. The biggest ones used their last bit of power everywhere to get plane space for Formosa or Hongkong.¹³⁸

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 201; Belden, *op. cit.*, pp. 397-412.

¹³⁶ William C. Bullitt, "Report to the American People on China," *Life*, October 13, 1947, pp. 35 ff.

¹³⁷ Belden, *op. cit.*, pp. 420-2.

¹³⁸ Blofeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-18.

CONTINUING ISSUES

Thus ended the revolution which had begun in China fifty years earlier, before the Communists came to power in Russia. Once again a world war had opened the way for communism to take over a great people, by disrupting all established order, moving many millions of people about, subjecting everybody to all the horrors of war, including economic misery and general chaos. It cannot be too often reiterated that these world wars are the very father of communist revolution, creating all the conditions for the dedicated apostles of Marx to seize power.

Nor can it be doubted that World War II isolated the Kuomintang Government in Chungking, where its self destructive tendencies multiplied to such an extent that the Chinese people rapidly rejected it when the war was over.¹³⁹

Communist "Conspiracy." It was a part of the Kuomintang tragedy that Chiang Kai-shek himself "never could get it into his head that he was facing a revolution and not a conspiracy."¹⁴⁰ This, too, was an illusion cherished by many powerful Americans, and through them it was probably shared by a large majority of the American people. What happened in China was just the result of clever Russian plotting. Everywhere else it was the same. James Burnham wrote a book based on the proposition that there is no relation between communism and bad social conditions. Communism comes to a nation only "through the activities of a trained and centralized international enterprise with headquarters located in the Soviet Union and agents operating everywhere on earth." It is simply a giant conspiracy, which he proposed to outlaw and then exterminate.¹⁴¹

This conspiracy doctrine satisfied our need to be on a righteous plane, far above communism, but it will not prevent communist revolution, if other world wars come, or if either feudalism or colonialism hangs on too long. Nor does it dispose of the Red governments of Russia and China as going concerns.

Actually, the Russians underestimated the Chinese revolution as much as the Americans did. They were bemused with the idea that a communist revolution must come from the urban workers. In this respect the Chinese Reds were unorthodox. They had no "logistics" or experience in positional warfare. Chiang, with the great power of the United States behind him looked like the wave of the future to Moscow. Accordingly, after Japan's defeat the

¹³⁹ If any reader doubts that the Kuomintang was defeated by its own greed and corruption, by its shocking misrule and its determination to prevent desperately needed reforms, I suggest that he read together: Jack Belden, *op. cit.*, and Graham Peck, *Two Kinds of Time*. Peck, a Phillips Academy-Andover-Yale man, spent his time behind the Kuomintang lines. Belden, a seasoned reporter, roamed the communist areas, but they both tell the same story. The two books make an unforgettable record, full of gripping human interest, more absorbing than a novel.

No one could read these books without knowing that he has read the authentic story of one of the world's greatest revolutions.

¹⁴⁰ Belden, *op. cit.*, p. 437.

¹⁴¹ James Burnham, *Containment or Liberation*, New York, 1952, pp. 158-66. He speaks of the Soviet population as 800,000,000 (p. 36).

Kremlin invited the Chinese Reds to send representatives to Moscow, where, in Stalin's words, "we told them bluntly that we considered the development of the uprising in China had no prospect." The Chinese were advised to join Chiang's government and dissolve their army. They agreed to do so, went back to China "and acted quite otherwise."¹⁴²

Certainly, in the words of a wise student of China, Russia's acts in Manchuria "do not support the simple belief in a world conspiracy planned years ahead, and foreseeing every turn of the world situation." Like their American rivals, the Russians acted from inadequate knowledge, grasped for shortsighted temporary advantage and improvised in a situation which they did not expect.¹⁴³

American Folly and Treason. Long after the triumph of the Revolution in China a large part of the American people refused to accept the result. They refused to believe that it was an elemental development which was beyond their control. This was partly because it seemed good partisan politics to blame the Truman Administration, and partly because Americans were unable to believe that there was any problem in the world that they could not handle, if they only put their minds to it. Never defeated in a foreign war, the decisive factor in two recent world wars, conquerors of a continent, they have never had any evidence that their powers might be limited. Therefore, if Chiang was defeated in China it *must* have been due to the folly or treason of some of our leaders.¹⁴⁴

Both folly and treason were passionately alleged: the treason of our trained China experts on the ground who correctly reported the decadence of the Kuomintang; and the folly of Truman and Marshall in trying to compose the civil conflict and form a democratic government.

The most specific charge was that Chiang was winning the civil war when the Marshall Mission reached China and stopped him. Then the clever Communists increased their strength during the truce and won.

Did the Marshall Mission Defeat Chiang? It appears to be true at the time the Marshall Mission was announced, in mid-December 1945, that the Communists had been badly worsted militarily on the Manchurian frontier,¹⁴⁵ but it does not follow that Chiang was on the point of winning the civil war. The basic situation was that the Reds had won firm control of some 90,000,000 people in North China during the war, by fighting the Japanese, by organizing the rural districts, supplying simple, honest administration and justice, by

¹⁴² Quoted from a conference with Stalin attended by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Edvard Kardelj, on February 10, 1948.—Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito*, New York, 1953, p. 322. Similar statements by Stalin to Hurley and others have been discounted on the ground that he was simply pulling the wool over our eyes. Stalin would have no motive for doing that with the Yugoslavs. Nor after their break with Moscow could they have any reason to fabricate a story which puts Stalin in the light of meaning to keep his treaty with Chiang's Government.

¹⁴³ Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

¹⁴⁴ D. W. Brogan, "The Illusion of American Omnipotence," *Harpers Magazine*, December 1952, p. 23.

¹⁴⁵ The London *Economist*, January 12, 1946, p. 47.

cutting rents, banning usury, checking the arbitrary rule of the landlord over every aspect of peasant life, by freeing the women from male dominance, by making the region economically viable, by relying on volunteer service in the army instead of conscription, and by making themselves so completely one with the people that they had their warm support. As John King Fairbank put it, peasant rebellion in North China had become "a self-sustaining operation, self sufficient and likely to keep on expanding."¹⁴⁶

This was the mighty power which we denied all right to receive the surrender of any Japanese arms, a quite legal decision, but was it wholly moral? The Communists had cooped the Japanese up in the cities and frustrated them.

We did our best to bypass the Reds for six months, helping Chiang to occupy the key cities and railways, hauling his troops into the area, to which they never could have gone under their own steam, and doing our best to help him get Manchuria as well, where the Kuomintang was not wanted, and where the Communists and their allies were in control.

This again was quite legal. Ostensibly we were simply helping the Government to recover its territories from the Japanese, but in reality we were trying to help Chiang recover them from the Communists. Moreover, he had nothing to offer the North Chinese. He brought only military force, with which to suppress the efficient, humane administration of the Reds and to substitute the grasping tyranny of his henchmen. This is what happened wherever he did recover control.

We therefore found ourselves in a state of affairs which was neither moral nor practical. We were helping one side of a civil war, and the wrong side from the viewpoint of the Chinese people, who in the Red districts had something to fight for and knew how to do it. They were ready to give the Kuomintang, or us, the same treatment which had frustrated the Japanese. Chiang might have been winning some military successes, but could he reverse the revolution which the Reds had already accomplished? And were we justified in trying to impose him on the North Chinese and Manchurians?

These were questions which would have given any responsible American government pause. There were only two alternatives to the course of trying to end the civil war and get the warring factions together. One was to get out of China promptly and let the revolution take its course. That would almost certainly mean the eventual victory of the communists, in a decade or so. The other course was to ship great numbers of American troops into China and try to conquer the Chinese people, that is, to accomplish what the Japanese from their nearby power bases could not do.

Aside from the immorality of such an attempt it was not a campaign that the American people would tolerate. The war was over and everyone wanted the boys to come home, most of all the boys themselves. Moreover, if we plunged in to conquer China for Chiang there were the Russians to consider, with whom we had a fast growing animosity. They were near at hand and could throw into the arena far more than we could.

There was, accordingly, ample reason for an attempt to settle the civil

¹⁴⁶ Fairbank, *The United States and China*, Harvard U.P.; Oxford U.P., 1948, p. 335.

war, and Marshall deserves all honor for the valiant, sustained campaign he waged in China. At first he seemed to have succeeded, and had he stayed vigilantly in China, instead of coming home in March to get funds for her, he might have won. However, the essential condition for success, if success was attainable, was denied him. That was the total cessation of all aid to Chiang. *Only that could have forced the honoring of the PCC agreements. Instead we aided Chiang all along and convinced his reactionaries that we always would, until we were finally driven out of China by Chinese public opinion. Our error lay not in trying to mediate, but in failing to hold the scales even.*

It is not certain, either, that the Reds gained by the truce. During the year we built up Chiang's military power to formidable heights. The Reds had time to organize some new districts, but they lost others. Nor did they have any reason to desire a military showdown. They were always strongly confident of the final outcome of a war to the finish, but they never expected to conquer China so quickly. They thought it would take many years of fighting.

But wouldn't it have been suicidal for Chiang to take them into his government, since communists always take over entirely if given any seats at all? Here the answer must be affirmative. The communists were sure that they could win the extension of their reforms through the democratic process, and in all probability they would have taken over China peacefully. Yet the process would have been slow, and the Kuomintang would always have had the alternative of mending its ways administratively and sponsoring some reforms itself. If China had gone communist by degrees, also, it would have had a communism different in some respects at least from the all-out brand which total power has produced. Such a China, too, owing its birth to us would not have been bitterly hostile.

Of course, the Kuomintang never intended to submit to political competition with the Reds. It was so allied with the reactionary landlords that it could not accept the communist reforms, and it had no desire to do so. Nor did it have anything to offer to the Chinese people. Certainly there could not be a real coalition government since neither of the two parties had any real constitutional basis.

In these circumstances it is probable that no effort at mediation could have succeeded. One cannot unite a dying oligarchy with a rising revolution. Nor was it in our power to suppress the revolution which the war had really turned loose. The communist sweep in China was directly due to World War II, which in turn was the result of our failure to back the League of Nations in 1920, and to organize collective security when the conditions were both ripe and favorable.

But scapegoat hunters are never willing to look that far back for the real causes of their frustrations. Leaders long dead cannot easily be flogged. Live victims are required.

These were found in the persons of our unexcelled China experts—John Carter Vincent, John Patton Davies, John Stewart Service and Edmund O. Clubb—who were hounded out of the State Department and persecuted for years because they reported the truth from China, and in General George

C. Marshall, who tried to prevent the collapse of our hopes in China when it was already too late.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷ In his 60,000-word attack on virtually the entire public career of General Marshall, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy charged that "the full weight of Stilwell, of Davies and these young men were thrown in the balance of the conspiratorial, subversive Reds against our ally the Government of China."—"The History of George Catlett Marshall," *Congressional Record*, June 14, 1951, Vol. 97, Pt. 5, pp. 6556-6602. Quoted from p. 6573. (Both the grammar and the history are McCarthy's.)

THE CRUCIFIXION OF KOREA

1945-1954

THE background of the Korean war has many similarities with the great power struggle in Germany. Korea was divided first as a matter of military convenience and courtesy. Russian troops entered Korea first on August 10, 1945. *American troops did not land in South Korea until September 8. By this time most of North Korea was in Russian hands.* Anticipating their rapid advance, the United States had proposed a demarcation line at the 38th Parallel, in order to prevent the Russians from coming down to the tip of Korea. This was readily agreed to by the Soviet Union, and, as in Germany, the temporary line became permanent.¹

This happened because both the Soviet Union and the United States wished to mold the whole of Korea in its own image. The Soviets wanted a communist Korea which would be a friendly neighbor and ally, while the Americans desired a democratic Korea, which would be a part of the West.

These conflicting aims prevented the Koreans from setting up a government and working out a political system of their own. Unfortunately for them the American and British heads of State had decided at the Cairo Conference in 1943 that Korea should be free and independent "in due course," with deference to the assumption that the Koreans had been governed by Japan for forty years and would not know how to manage their own affairs. Later, in December 1945, at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference, "in due course" came to mean a joint trusteeship for five years.

KOREA DIVIDED

The People's Republic Suppressed. These decisions of the Great Powers frustrated the efforts of the Koreans to set up a government of their own choice, which they were quite able to do. They had had a resistance movement during the war which organized revolutionary committees throughout Korea promptly upon Japan's surrender. There were a few Communists in nearly all of these committees, because they were in the resistance, and they were the only party which had members everywhere. In a revolutionary time the committees naturally leaned somewhat toward the left, yet they contained representatives of all groups, including the conservatives. For example, in the

¹ George M. McCune, *Korea Today*, Cambridge, Harvard U P., 1950, pp. 44-5; London, Allen & Unwin. Secretary Acheson testified in the MacArthur Hearings (Pt. 3, p. 2104) that the division at the 38th was recommended by the Secretary of War, was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee, and by the President.

important province of Cholla Nam Do the committee was headed by a pro-American Christian pastor and had a conservative executive council.²

These Committees of Preparation for National Independence held a representative national assembly in Seoul on September 6 and formed a national government with jurisdiction over all of Korea, North and South. This was two days before General John R. Hodge landed in Korea at the head of the first American occupation force. He brought with him the usual American official suspicion of resistance movements and had nothing in his instructions about working with the native Korean government, which sent delegates to welcome him. Hodge had come to deal with the Japanese Governor General. For five weeks, also, he had to rely solely on military men to govern South Korea, before the first hastily assembled civil affairs personnel arrived, completely untrained for Korea. When they came the pattern was already well set.

During this time the new Peoples Republic Government was ignored by the Americans. "Sincerely disturbed by the use of Japanese and collaborators," its members violently attacked the Military Government by poster and pamphlet. On October 5 Military Government appointed an Advisory Council which contained many "well known collaborators" and suggested the establishment of an indefinite trusteeship. On October 10 Military Government stated that it was the only government in South Korea and called for an end to the pronouncements of "irresponsible political groups," acts which "crystalized a large part of Korean thinking into an anti-American mold." The people felt that "the liberators had become the oppressors."³

In the provinces the Peoples Republic had preserved order, in the main, and had such full control that weeks and months passed before the authority of its committees could be ended. In Cholla Nam Do this effort led to an outbreak of terrorism and the suppression of the Peoples Committee, whose original heads had been "for the most part respected men of the community." The mistakes and dishonesty attributed to the Peoples Republic officials were not more frequent than was to be expected in troubled times, nor than "similar actions by Americans in succeeding months," and "if the Peoples Republic exhibited radical tendencies, it only reflected with reasonable accuracy the views of the Korean majority."⁴

When finally a "Congress" of the Peoples Republic met on November 20, 1945, and refused to dissolve itself, General Hodge declared its activities unlawful. Thereafter the exile Korean Provisional Government of Dr. Syngman Rhee was favored and its effort to acquire popular support assisted. On February 14, 1946 a Representative Democratic Council headed by Rhee was formed and since its membership was heavily Rightist the leading liberals refused to participate. The United States accordingly fostered a government for South Korea based on the landlords, capitalists and other conservative elements.⁵

This would have been the natural tendency of the conservative army officers who directed the occupation of South Korea. The facts that the Peoples

² E. Grant Meade, *American Military Government in Korea*, New York, 1951, p. 55. This is an excellent account of the events preceding the Korean war. The author was a member of U.S. Military Government in Korea and had the active assistance of a dozen of his colleagues in assembling the material for the book.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-62.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 69-72.

⁵ McCune, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-52.

Republic tended toward the left, and that the Russians accepted and used its committees in North Korea, removed any doubts about its usefulness. That the Koreans had demonstrated "ability to plan and administer" did not save the Republic. It "did not seem to be dominated by American democratic thinking" and since its program was more acceptable to the Soviets it might come soon under Russian control. Its recognition would probably have seemed "an American diplomatic defeat, and this fact alone was decisive in shaping the attitude of the United States toward it."⁶ Thereafter, both military and civil affairs officials united in a common determination to help the South Koreans toward self-determination "in the American way," and only "within the conception of American political propriety."⁷

In North Korea the same principle was applied, except that the North Koreans had to bend toward Communism and the service of Russian interests. "Extreme care was taken by the Russians to keep themselves in the background" and the Koreans of their choice were permitted to exercise considerable real authority. A government was formed, headed by Kim Il-Sung, a leading Korean communist and revolutionist against Japanese rule, who had been operating in Manchuria for a number of years.

Land Reform. His Government carried through land reform during March 1946, beginning with the large amounts of land in the hands of the Japanese, or of the landlords who had cooperated with them. Some 725,000 landless tenants received one half of the existing farm land in North Korea. For these reasons there was much loyalty to the North Korean regime from the start.⁸

In South Korea 686,965 acres of former Japanese holdings were sold to 587,974 tenant families in accord with a Military Government decree of March 22, 1948, two full years after the North Korean land reform. This reform was so popular that nearly all candidates in the election of May 10, 1948 campaigned for further distribution of privately owned lands. However, the Rhee Government delayed a new land reform law repeatedly and as late as October 1949 it was not being enforced at all. Meanwhile, tenants were being forced by the landlords to buy the plots they tilled on unfavorable terms, or be evicted.⁹

Deadlock on Unification. Given the desire of two Great Powers to reproduce their systems of government in Korea it was quite certain that the December 1945 agreement of the great powers, calling for the formation of a united Korean government, could not be carried out. The Joint Commission for this purpose met from March 20 to May 8, 1946, without reaching any agreement about the Korean groups which should be consulted. The Russians found a formula for excluding many of the Rightist groups, that is, anyone who had ever expressed criticism of the proposed great-power trusteeship. In turn the Americans insisted on consulting *all* of the Korean groups and "with the jails in our zone filled to the rafters, the word *all* (could) mean only the wide assortment of groups controlled by Syngman Rhee."¹⁰

⁶ Meade, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

⁸ McCune, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-2, 201-7.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 133-8.

¹⁰ Mark Gayn, *Japan Diary*, New York, W. Sloane Assoc., 1948, p. 431. Gayn adds that our chief delegate, Major-General Albert E. Brown, was known to feel that war with Russia was not far away and his conduct was colored by this belief.

The unhappy Koreans, who only wanted to be rid of all foreigners, rapidly became two countries with very different social outlooks, both halves of the nation suffering great economic hardship from its artificial division.

A second session of the Joint Commission in the summer of 1947 having failed to reach any agreement, the United States referred the matter to the UN General Assembly, and on November 14 the Assembly adopted, by a vote of 40 to 6, a resolution creating a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea to expedite its independence.

UN Sponsored South Korean Government. The Soviet Union having refused to permit the Commission to enter North Korea, it eventually decided to hold an election in South Korea alone, in spite of considerable dissent from its Australian and Canadian representatives. Middle of the road and Leftist groups united in opposing a separate election, on the ground that it would divide the country permanently and that a free atmosphere for conducting an election did not exist in South Korea. Only the Rightists favored the separate election. Both the Communists and the extreme Rightists formed terrorist bands and 589 persons were killed in the six weeks prior to May 10, 1948, the date of the election. It resulted in a heavy Rightist victory and the UN Commission certified that the results "were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commission." These parts could not have been very numerous since the Commission only had thirty people to observe the elections.¹¹

On December 7 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring the new government at Seoul to be the only lawful government in Korea, because it was based upon free elections conducted in accordance with democratic methods. A permanent Commission was also sent to Korea to supervise the withdrawal of troops throughout Korea which the resolution had recommended.

Korea and Formosa Not in Our Strategic Perimeter. Up to this time there was a strong tendency in the United States to write Korea off as an indefensible liability. Both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. had removed their troops, and although nearly three-fourths of the twenty-four million Koreans were in South Korea the character of its government made its ultimate survival doubtful. It was difficult to argue, also, that the tip of the Korean Peninsula, on the other side of the earth, was essential to our strategic security. In the MacArthur Hearings, Secretary Marshall testified that Korea is of material strategic importance to us, "if we can afford it, and find it possible to maintain it," but "it is not absolutely vital." General Bradley added that "we had always hoped we would not have to fight in Korea." General Wedemeyer argued that we should never have put ground troops into Korea and should pull them out, in order "to take the strategic initiative away from the enemy."¹²

Early in January 1950 Secretary Acheson spoke repeatedly in public,

¹¹ McCune, *op. cit.*, pp. 229-30. It is McCune's opinion "that the elections were not in fact a free expression of the Korean will."

¹² *Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 82nd Congress, First Session, Pt. 1, p. 373; Pt. 2, p. 753; Pt. 3, pp. 2362, 2395* Hereafter referred to as the *MacArthur Hearings*.

defining an American defensive perimeter from the Aleutians through Japan to the Philippines, which would be protected under all circumstances. He spoke of persevering in the work of democratic reconstruction in Korea, but offered it no guarantee against military attack.¹³

On December 23, 1949, the State Department sent a private circular to its diplomats abroad to prepare them for the fall of Formosa and for our non-intervention. On January 2, former President Hoover and Senator Taft demanded the use of the Navy to defend Chiang, and the next day the confidential circular of December 23 leaked to the public from Tokyo, forcing the Administration to decide whether to stand by its decision not to fight for Chiang and Formosa. It did so on January 5 in a firm, clear, written statement by President Truman saying that the United States would not give "military aid or advice" to Chiang and would not "pursue a course which would lead to involvement in the civil conflicts in China." He reaffirmed our pledges at Yalta and Potsdam to give the island back to China.¹⁴

This was a position which was clearly in accord with our national interests and with our bitter experience in China. Having "lost" everything in China except the offshore islands, wisdom dictated that we did not become involved in a distant, untenable war over them. This remained our policy, also, down to the outbreak of war in Korea. On May 2, 1950, Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, gave an interview to the *U.S. News and World Report* in which he said that he was afraid that South Korea would have to be abandoned. He thought the Communists were going to over-run Korea when they got ready, just as they "probably will over-run Formosa."

This interview was given a front page spread in the *Tokyo Nippon Times* on May 3, alerting MacArthur, Rhee and Chiang to the fact that South Korea was still not within our defense perimeter. Connally said flatly that "Of course any position like that is of some strategic importance. But I don't think it is very greatly important. It has been testified before us that Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines make the chain of defense which is absolutely necessary."

In other words our military authorities had arrived at an obviously common sense conclusion, but many important people opposed it. As Connally

¹³ See Acheson's address at the National Press Club, January 12, and in San Francisco on March 15, 1950.—Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs*, 1950, p. 53. When attacked in the *MacArthur Hearings* for his omission of Korea and Formosa, he replied that he had named only the places where we had troops and which we were clearly committed to defend. As to the other areas, he maintained that "no person can guarantee them against military attack" and such a guarantee was "hardly sensible or necessary."—*MacArthur Hearings*, Pt. 3, pp. 1740-1.

¹⁴ I. F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War*, New York, 1952, pp. 19-20. This is an intriguing book written by an able, experienced newspaper man. It is based upon the belief that powerful Republican forces, including MacArthur, were intensely interested in "the problem whether the Truman Administration could be brought to commit itself to military support of the remaining anti-Communist regimes in the Far East" (p. 17).

The book is based entirely upon an analysis of published accounts and is a keen examination and collation of them. While many readers would not accept some of Stone's deductions, others cannot be ignored. The volume contains much food for thought.

continued, "A lot of them believe like this: They believe that events will transpire which will maneuver around and present an incident which will make us fight. That's what a lot of them are saying: 'We've got to battle some time, why not now?'" This was close to saying that some influential people were seeking a war.

Forces Working to Shift the Perimeter. One of these was bound to be Chiang Kai-shek, whose Formosa regime was certainly doomed unless something happened to bring the United States to his aid, and nothing short of a war was likely to do that. This was underlined by the fate of the Baguio Conference held in the Philippines May 26-30, 1950. In July and August Chiang conferred with Rhee and President Quirino of the Philippines in an effort to promote a Pacific Union conference which might save his regime and that of Rhee. The conference of seven Asiatic States was finally held a year later, but Quirino was unable to get either Formosa or South Korea invited and the conference demanded that the big powers take no action in the Far East without consulting the Asian nations—including neutralist India and Indonesia.¹⁵ This was the opposite of what Chiang and Rhee wanted.

By this time Syngman Rhee was almost as acutely in need of rescue. He also had been standing outside the American defense perimeter, yet was under heavy American pressure to hold elections which would shake his police state rule.

As in China, the American Government had tried belatedly to find middle of the road groups who might share in the South Korean Government, which was quite unwilling to admit them. The New Korean constitution gave very great powers to the President, and Dr. Rhee, armed with these powers, was not disposed to liberalize his government.

Early in January 1950 Dr. Philip C. Jessup, United States Ambassador-at-Large, told South Korean officials that our experts were dissatisfied with the severe restraints on civil liberties which it had imposed. He also told the National Assembly, at a time when many of its opposition deputies were either in jail or out on bail, that "strength is not simply a matter of arms and force."¹⁶ A little later, on April 7, 1950, Secretary of State Acheson sent a note to President Rhee which threatened the loss of American aid unless elections were held in South Korea. The note reflected a long series of less formal American efforts "to persuade the South Koreans that they must check inflation and must hold elections," as required by their new constitution.¹⁷

The South Korean Government Defeated. New elections were held on May 30, 1950, in which the moderate elements participated, and the Rhee Government was decisively repudiated. The "anti-Rhee factions won more than 120 of the 210 seats. The regime was left tottering by lack of confidence, both in Korea and abroad."¹⁸ Rhee could count on only 47 votes in the new Assembly.

¹⁵ Stoen, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

¹⁶ McCame, *op. cit.*, pp. 256-7.

¹⁷ *New York Herald Tribune*, April 8, 1950.

¹⁸ *U.S. News and World Report*, July 7, 1950, p. 29. The article notes that Rhee lived in a sumptuous palace, ringed with armed guards, and gathered power to himself. His secret police, which had been trained by the Japanese and "behaved in much the same old way," became "a feared and reviled body."

This deteriorating situation for both Chiang and Rhee was a matter of concern to their warm friend, General MacArthur, who, speaking in Seoul at the ceremonies inaugurating South Korean Independence in August 1948, said of the 38th Parallel: "*This barrier must and will be torn down. Nothing shall prevent the ultimate unity of your people as free men of a free nation.*" Speaking of "issues of the most complex nature known to political experience," he continued: "The manner in which those issues are resolved will determine in large measure not only the unity and well being of your people *but also the future stability of the continent of Asia.*"¹⁹

The two passages which MacArthur italicized in this address pledged him not only to assist in unifying Korea for Rhee, but to do it in a way which would promote "*the future stability of the continent of Asia,*" a goal which involved the destruction of communist power in Asia.

Rhee could be sure of support from MacArthur, who patted him on the back at the Tokyo airport in 1949 and said in substance, "You can depend upon it that I will defend South Korea as I would defend the shores of my own native land."²⁰ A little later, at the end of 1949, MacArthur talked forcibly to visiting Republican Senators about holding Formosa. Secretary of Defense Johnson then sent two of his principal assistants to Tokyo to talk to MacArthur and they "got an earful."²¹

In the Spring of 1950 the MacArthur-Chiang-Rhee trio received a powerful ally in the person of John Foster Dulles, who was reluctantly reappointed as Republican Adviser to the State Department by President Truman on April 6, 1950, after his acrid campaign and defeat for the New York Senatorship. The first explosion of McCarthyism was violently under way and it was thought that Dulles might take some of the heat off the Administration. Instead, he went to the Far East in June 1950 and joined MacArthur's drive for a stiff policy in Asia. Comparing MacArthur's "moral might" to the power in the atomic bomb, he talked of our policies being under review, "taking account of changing situations" and added that this applied "to Formosa also."²²

Mr. Dulles visited South Korea on June 19 and made an address to the National Assembly in which he predicted with absolute confidence that "As you establish here in South Korea a wholesome society of steadily expanding well-being, you will set up peaceful influences which will disintegrate the hold of Soviet communism on your fellows to the north and irresistibly draw them into unity with you."²³ The next day Dulles visited the 38th Parallel frontier and was photographed in the midst of a group of South Korean military officers looking over a map, while our Ambassador to South Korea looked through glasses over into Red Korea. This photograph, printed in the *Herald Tribune*, on June 26, 1950, carried the unfortunate suggestion that a military campaign into North Korea was being planned. It enabled Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko to hint strongly that the signal for the alleged attack by South Korea on North Korea had been given by Dulles.

¹⁹ John Gunther, *The Riddle of MacArthur*, New York, Harper, 1951, p. 169.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

²¹ Bert Andrews, the *New York Times*, June 28, 1950.

²² *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 22; the *New York Times*, June 23, 1950.

²³ Richard P. Stebbins, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

From Korea Dulles went to Tokyo for conferences with General MacArthur. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and General Omar Bradley, head of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, had just been conferring with MacArthur. When Dulles arrived on June 21 he was in a buoyant mood, telling reporters that he expected "positive" results from his talks with MacArthur. The next day, after a long talk with MacArthur, he predicted "positive action by the United States to preserve the peace in the Far East."²⁴ Pressed for an explanation, Dulles replied that he thought the pooling of his conclusions and those of Bradley and Johnson would lead to "some positive action, but I cannot forecast what."²⁵

Why was Dulles so sure that "positive action" was impending, after his visits to the 38th Parallel, Seoul and MacArthur? On his way home Dulles said in Honolulu, three days after the Korean war began, that he had known when he was in Korea that the situation was "critical," but the North Korean attack "came sooner than expected."²⁶

The published reports of the three day conferences between MacArthur, Johnson and Bradley, which began on July 18, spoke mainly of MacArthur's intense preoccupation with a possible Russian war. The Washington chiefs were given the "most accurate information available here on the Soviet Union's military position on the mainland and its potentialities for aggression in the Pacific in case of war."²⁷ An advance briefing declared that Japan would "not be a second Bataan." The Russians could bomb Tokyo and other cities and all our airfields. But our counter attack could destroy Vladivostok and its supply dumps, cut the Trans-Siberian Railway to pieces and throw open all Siberian centers to round-the-clock attack."²⁸

In his talks with our defense chiefs MacArthur also insisted emphatically that the hands-off Formosa policy be changed and Formosa defended against attack by China. However, on June 23, Acheson told his news conference that the United States planned no change in its Formosa policy. It still stood when war broke out.²⁹

This spate of top level activity by Dulles in Korea and Japan, and by MacArthur, Johnson and Bradley in Tokyo during the last half of June, with its accompanying publicity, suggested a change of American policy in the Far East. In discussing the deliberations at MacArthur's Headquarters the *New York Herald Tribune* spoke, on June 23, 1950, of holding a line in the Far East, including Formosa. Though deprecating the bad political consequences of aligning ourselves behind the seriously discredited Chiang Government, the editor believed that "Basic decisions" were being prepared in Tokyo and "if they combine firmness with boldness and imagination, an effective Far Eastern policy can still arise from the ruins of the old."

The apparent imminence of a new U.S. policy in the Far East could have indicated the advisability of prior action to the North Korean leaders, or their Soviet advisers.

²⁴ *The New York Times*, June 21, 22, 1950.

²⁵ *The London Times*, June 23, 1950.

²⁶ *Facts on File*, 1950, p. 203-K; Stone, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

²⁷ Lindsay Parrott, *the New York Times*, July 21, 1950.

²⁸ Richard Hughes, *the London Sunday Times*, June 18, 1950.

²⁹ *Facts on File*, 1950, pp. 203-D, 213-E.

Was this feared in Seoul? After Senator Connally's statement of May 2 assuming that both Formosa and South Korea would be "overrun," and Secretary of State Acheson's refusal the next day to promise any aid, there was a brief outcry from Rhee, and on May 10 the South Korean Defense Minister warned that North Korean troops were moving in force toward the 38th Parallel and that there was imminent danger of invasion. From that date until the war began "there were no statements from Seoul. There were no inspired press dispatches from Tokyo."³⁰

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

The war took the American people, and President Truman apparently, completely by surprise; likewise General MacArthur's Headquarters in Tokyo. MacArthur's biographer, John Gunther, who was in the General's entourage at the time, is emphatic about that. Both "the South Koreans and Americans in Korea, to say nothing of SCAP in Tokyo, were taken utterly by surprise. They were as blankly astonished as if the sun had suddenly gone out. . . . Our eyes were shut, and even our feet were sound asleep." In Korea "a high American intelligence officer" had just expressed the opinion that South Korea was the "safest place in Asia." Its army was "the best in Asia" and could wipe out the North Koreans with no difficulty if an outbreak occurred.³¹

In Washington there were immediate charges that the Central Intelligence Agency had been caught asleep and Admiral Hillenkoetter, its chief, was immediately called before the Senate Appropriations Committee in a private session in which he mollified Senators Bridges and Knowland, two of the Administration's strongest critics on Asiatic policy. His file of dispatches convinced them that CIA had been "doing a good job."³²

UNTCOK Reports. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea reported, on June 27, that there had been no reason to believe "that invasion was imminent." It had held a conference with the South Korean defense authorities on May 12, receiving "important and detailed information" about an extensive build-up in the North, but two officers of the U.S. Military Advisory Group evaluated the same information differently, seeing no immediate danger and being confident that the South Korean Army could "handle the forces of the North Korean regime in case of attack."³³

Beginning on June 9, UNTCOK sent out "field observers" who travelled "along the 38th parallel from this day until June 24." Their report to the UN on June 29, 1950 exonerated the South Korean Army. It was "organized entirely for defense" "in depth," with no ammunition dumps up front, no activity on the roads. Indeed the South Koreans were so lacking in all the heavy weapons that an invasion by them would have been "impossible." On the other hand, the North Koreans occupied forward salients and were reported to have removed civilians from the border. But no reports had been

³⁰ Stone, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

³¹ The *New York Times*, June 27, 1950.

³² Gunther, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-6.

³³ *Ibid.*, September 15, 1950. Text.

received "of any unusual activity on part of North Korean forces that would indicate any impending change in general situation along parallel."³⁴

This report signed by Szu-Tu, a Nationalist Chinese, was completed on June 24 and the war began the night after the UN field observers returned to Seoul. The observers did not, accordingly, see the war begin. UNTCOK had to rely on the reports of the South Koreans. Its first report to the Secretary General quoted the radio allegation of North Korea that the South Koreans had invaded during the night and were being pursued South. President Rhee "expressed complete willingness for Commission broadcast urging cease fire." It looked like full-scale war. A meeting of the Security Council was suggested but a "more fully considered recommendation" would be communicated later.³⁵

On June 26, UNTCOK sent a two page background summary recounting the relentless propaganda campaign from North Korea for two years, including its June 3 and 10 broadcasts for unification and "elections throughout Korea." This led UNTCOK to send a representative north of the parallel on June 10 to receive the text of the Reds' proposal "and convey personally to three northern representatives the Commission's desire for peaceful unification." These three men "came South next day carrying copies for all but a few of the leading parties and political personalities of the Republic." They were immediately arrested by the South Korean authorities, an action which was "denounced violently by the Northern radio."

Still another North Korean unification plan was "denounced by the South Korean press, political parties and leaders as sheer propaganda," a conclusion which the Commission agreed with, in the light of "the utterly unexpected invasion on June 25." Though North Korean General Kim Il-Sung was still repeating his charge that the South "having rejected every Northern proposal for peaceful unification had drowned its iniquity by launching an invasion force across the parallel," the Commission thought that "all the evidence continues to point to a calculated coordinated attack prepared and launched with secrecy."³⁶

A third cable on the same day suggested UN mediation. A fourth referred to the long tour along the parallel just ended by its military observers and suggested "on basis this evidence" the North was "carrying out well-planned, concerted and full-scale invasion," while the South Korean forces "were taken completely by surprise as they had no reason to believe from intelligence sources that invasion was imminent."³⁷

Who Was Surprised? This constant insistence that the South was taken absolutely and completely by surprise raises the question why no indication of an invasion could be obtained. The border was long, the country very rough, the people on both sides spoke the same language. Did the South Koreans have no spies or any other channels of information from the North? Could a big military build-up really be completely hidden?

Gunther, who reported Tokyo's total surprise, apparently thought so, for

³⁴ Department of State, *United States Policy in the Korean Crisis*, pp. 21-2. Called *White Paper* hereafter.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 18-20.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

he was sure that four divisions and three brigades, 70,000 men and 70 tanks could not be "simultaneously launched from four different points" on short notice. To get such forces ready and in position "with perfect synchronization" must have taken "at least a month," probably six weeks.³⁸ Was it impossible to get any hint of such large movements?

Apparently it was impossible, for General MacArthur said in his first report to the UN that "The character and disposition of the Republic of Korea army indicated that it did not expect this sudden attack."³⁹ Yet MacArthur's *alter ego* and intelligence chief, Major-General Charles A. Willoughby, wrote "The Truth About Korea" for the *Cosmopolitan* magazine in December 1951 and referring to the "alleged 'surprise' of the North Korean invasion" said: "The entire North Korean Army had been alerted for weeks and was in position along the 38th Parallel."

The version that we were completely surprised is also contradicted by a statement made by an intelligence officer at MacArthur's Headquarters on July 30, 1950 during a briefing of correspondents. He told them that "the North Korean Army had not carried out the mobilization plan at the time the war began June 25 . . . only six full divisions had been ready for combat when the invasion started, although the North Korean war plans called for thirteen to fifteen."⁴⁰

Was it possible that the North Koreans were the ones who were surprised? There was no compelling reason why they should attack, since Rhee's prospects were increasingly poor. Indeed, Secretary of State Acheson testified later that the Far East Command, the CIA, the Department of the Army, and the State Department representatives here and overseas were "all in agreement" that a North Korean attack in the summer of 1950 did not appear imminent. Why not? Because "the view was generally held that since the Communists had far from exhausted the potentialities for obtaining their objectives through guerrilla and psychological warfare, political pressure and intimidation, such means would probably continue to be used rather than overt military aggression."⁴¹

That is, all the responsible agencies of our government agreed that Communist prospects for taking over South Korea without war were good, if not excellent, "far from exhausted," knowledge which was certainly not hidden from Rhee. We do not know that his forces began the Korean war, though his later conduct more than demonstrated that he was fully capable of doing so, as will become apparent later in this chapter.

There was also an impression at MacArthur's Headquarters when the war broke out that the South Koreans had begun it. John Gunther relates that "one of the important members of the occupation" was "called unexpectedly to the telephone. He came back and whispered, 'A big story has just broken. The South Koreans have attacked North Korea!'"⁴²

Gunther dismisses this incident as perhaps due to a garbled message or perhaps a repetition of the "blatant, corrosive lies of the North Korean

³⁸ Gunther, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

³⁹ *MacArthur Hearings*, Part 5, p. 3384.

⁴⁰ Walter Sullivan, the *New York Times*, July 31, 1950.

⁴¹ *MacArthur Hearings*, Part 3, pp. 1990-1.

⁴² Gunther, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

radio." It would seem a little strange for MacArthur's organization to be getting its information from the North Korean radio, though that could have happened. But it is still more strange that two of MacArthur's officers should believe the South Koreans had attacked, and that the one who received the message should whisper about it.

If the officers remembered Rhee's threats to unify Korea by force they would not reject out of hand a report that he had moved to do so. On October 31, 1949, his minister of Defense announced in Tokyo that his army was ready and waiting to invade communist North Korea, but had been restrained by American officials. He told a press conference that "if we had our own way we would, I'm sure, have started up already, but we had to wait until they (American government leaders) are ready. They keep telling us, 'No, no, no, wait. You are not ready.'" The Minister added that "we are strong enough to march up and take Pyongyang within a few days." On the same day, President Syngman Rhee told officers and men of the visiting U.S. Seventh Fleet, aboard the Flagship *St. Paul*, that his Government would not much longer tolerate a divided Korea, "and if we have to settle this thing by war we will do all the fighting needed."⁴³

We do not know that the South Koreans put these threats into practice. However, we do know that the sudden outbreak of war on June 25, 1950, accomplished three things: (1) it put the full power of the United States and the United Nations behind Rhee's tottering government; (2) it threw the protecting arm of the U.S. Navy around Chiang Kai-shek, whose days were otherwise briefly numbered, and (3) it relieved MacArthur's anxieties, especially about Formosa, and opened up the prospect that under his leadership "issues of the most complex nature known to political experience" would be solved in a way that would promote "not only the unity and well being of your own (Rhee's) people but also the future stability of the continent of Asia."⁴⁴ The unity of Korea could not possibly be achieved in South Korea. First "this barrier must and will be torn down." Nor could "the future stability of the continent of Asia" conceivably be determined in tiny Korea. A much wider theater would be required for that.⁴⁵

North Korea Best Prepared. In Washington there had been enough fear of a South Korean attack to lead us to leave only defensive weapons when Korea was evacuated, no tanks or airplanes. In January 1950, also, our Government had informed Seoul that if it attacked North Korea all aid from the United States would immediately be terminated.⁴⁶

Before their departure the Russians are believed to have trained 24 North Korean divisions and supplied them with 500 excellent tanks. They had also supplied planes, but limited them to 150, fearing that if the North Koreans

⁴³ *New York Herald Tribune*, November 1, 1949.

⁴⁴ Quoted from MacArthur's oration at Seoul in 1948, Gunther, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

⁴⁵ In his excellent study, *Korea, A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations*, New York, 1956, Leland M. Goodrich said that the position of the Rhee Government was quite clear. It believed "that the use of armed force was necessary to unify North and South Korea" (p. 74).

⁴⁶ Brig.-Gen. W. L. Roberts, Chief of the U.S. Military Advisory Group. Quoted in Stebbins, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

went South they would lose their heads and attack shipping in the straits or bomb American-held Japan.⁴⁷

OUR DECISION TO FIGHT

When the North Korean army plunged across the 38th Parallel on June 25, 1950, with planes, tanks and heavy guns, President Truman, who was vacationing at his home in Independence, Missouri, at once made up his mind to repel the invasion. Both his intimate and official advisers agree that his mind was made up before he reached Washington, where he brushed the photographers away grimly with the remark "We have a job to do."

When he met with his top civilian and military advisers that same Sunday evening one of them reported that he talked the way he did when he first decided to launch the Truman Doctrine and the Greek-Turkish aid program, with the notable difference that this time "he wanted to move with United Nations support." His advisers all agreed that there must be resistance, in what one conferee called the "finest spirit of harmony I have ever known."⁴⁸

The President's decision also cleared the air in Washington temporarily. All the controversy about how to fight Russia and where was stilled. Everybody assumed that Russia had given the order for the invasion. Anyway she had armed her protégé and it was attacking ours. David Lawrence wrote that there was "such a sigh of relief throughout Washington today that it's like a breath of fresh air in a stuffy room. The Republicans and the Democrats are once again united on an unpartisan foreign policy."⁴⁹

It was the leading characteristic of bipartisanship in foreign affairs that it always worked when a tough policy against the Soviet Union was being applied. A powerful wing of the Republicans had complained bitterly for years that the Truman Doctrine was not being applied in Asia. Now that it was to be backed by force of arms there was harmony and a united public opinion, until the question had to be decided whether to expand the Korean War into a world war. Then there was fierce dissent again from the decision not to do so, from those who wanted to smash communism in Asia.

The United Nations Activated. Before the President's return the Secretary General of the United Nations was called at 3:00 A.M. on June 25, told briefly of the North Korean attack and urged to call a meeting of the Security Council. Ambassador Muccio's cable was not read to him or laid before the Security Council. The first UN Commission telegram was before it. Both documents reported a large-scale Northern invasion, but neither attempted to judge which side had begun the fighting.

Nevertheless, on the afternoon of June 25, the Council adopted the U.S. resolution condemning the armed attack on the Republic of Korea, demanding an immediate withdrawal and calling on all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ See two articles by an escaped Russian military officer, Kyril Kalinov, in *The Reporter*, September 26 and October 10, 1950.

⁴⁸ AP dispatch, *New York Herald Tribune*, June 29, 1950.

⁴⁹ *New York Herald Tribune*, June 28, 1950.

⁵⁰ Security Council, *Official Records*, 5th Year, Document S/1501.

This resolution was possible only because the Soviet Government had been boycotting the Security Council for two months, because of its refusal to seat the delegate of Communist China. The Russian delegate was in New York and might have returned to veto action against North Korea, but he didn't. Why then did the Kremlin permit the North Koreans to move during its absence from the Security Council? Was there just a possibility that the North Koreans had taken the bit in their own teeth and marched without orders from Moscow, or without its knowledge? This possibility was excluded by our faith in the power and deep strategy of the Kremlin, leaving "one of the more intriguing mysteries in the history of the Politburo's operations,"⁵¹ one which no one could solve.

On the 27th the President ordered "United States Air and Sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support." On the same day the United States called upon the Security Council to invoke sanctions against North Korea and it recommended "such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."⁵² This time Yugoslavia voted "no," because she thought the Council did not have enough information to enable it to fix responsibility for the outbreak. Egypt and India did not vote, suggesting the doubts of Arab-Asian countries, which were to grow as the war continued. There was, accordingly, only the essential majority of seven votes. It was also very hasty action, since it by-passed the usual attempt at mediation, as in Palestine and Kashmir, and made no effort to get North Korea's side of the case.

President Truman's order for "cover and support" preceded the authorizing resolution. It also commanded the Seventh Fleet to neutralize Formosa, leaving its disposition to be determined in the future. Increased military assistance was also ordered for the Philippines and the French forces in Indo-China.⁵³ After a personal reconnaissance in Korea, General MacArthur recommended that American ground forces be thrown in,⁵⁴ and the order was given for their use on June 30.

A Line Drawn in Asia. These moves were clear evidence that the Korean war had precipitated a decision in the Truman Administration to reverse its carefully reasoned policy in East Asia and halt the advance of communism all along the line in that region, steps which appeased temporarily the Republican opposition, which had been bitterly combating the Administration's decision not to prevent the seizure of Formosa by Red China. Internal unity was sharply promoted, but our Allies in Western Europe disagreed strongly with the wisdom of this unilateral decision on Formosa, taken without consultation with them or benefit of UN. The President's statement of June 27 appeared to them to draw a Truman Doctrine line in the Far East, rather than to concentrate on defending the authority of the United Nations Charter.

⁵¹ Richard P. Stebbins, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

⁵² The meaning of the words "in the area" came to be important later when the advance of UN troops into North Korea was in question.

⁵³ *New York Herald Tribune*, June 28, 1950.

⁵⁴ Testimony of Senator Morse and General Wedemeyer, *MacArthur Hearings*, Part 3, pp. 2532-3.

The Cold War character of our action in Korea was further highlighted by a blunt American note of July 27 to Russia requesting assurance that the U.S.S.R. "disavows responsibility for this unprovoked and unwarranted attack, and . . . will use its influence with the North Korean authorities to withdraw their invading forces immediately." The Soviet reply put all responsibility on the South Korean authorities, opposed all interference "in the internal affairs of Korea," and denied the legal force of the Security Council's decision.⁵⁵

Cold War Factors. From the standpoint of the great power struggle, the grounds for defending South Korea were strong. It was believed that if the North Korean aggression succeeded, Indo-China would be almost certain to fall under Communist control, with the aid of whatever Chinese forces were necessary. The snowballing effect of Communist triumphs might make Thailand and Burma relatively easy conquests. Since Indo-China is strategically the key to all South East Asia, the stubborn communist guerrilla movement in Malaya might be expected to gain momentum, with aid from the north, and gun-running to the Huks in the Philippines would not be too difficult. Both in the Philippines and Japan, also, the psychology of Red success would operate powerfully. In the end it might be difficult to hold Japan, especially since she cannot exist, apart from American doles, in the absence of trade with China and South East Asia. As in every crisis of the Cold War, the image of the falling dominoes was allowed free rein.

A Communist sweep in Asia would tend to "paralyze the defense of Europe,"⁵⁶ where another doubtful economic situation existed, on top of some unstable social conditions. In West Europe the feeling might well spread that resistance to the Red "wave of the future" was hopeless.

Thus far the Truman Doctrine had been enforced in Europe, but it had been a dismal failure in East Asia. If now the tremendous triumph of communism in China were capped by further Red gains in Asia the effect on Europe might be decisive. In the United States, too, the result might well be decisive politically for the Truman Administration. Its foes were already making capital bitterly about the non-enforcement of the Doctrine in China. If it collapsed in Asia there would be a mighty outcry indeed. A stage in the Cold War had come which seemed to compel a defense of the Doctrine in Asia.

These considerations were sufficient to induce resolute action in Korea, without going to the defense of the United Nations. Up to this time enforcement of the United Nations Charter had not been a compelling motive in Washington. The UN was brushed aside in Greece, and independent action taken to defeat the Communist guerrillas. In Indonesia the United States had brought strong moral pressure to bear on the Netherlands in the Security Council, but no troops and planes were sent to fight the Dutch when they defied a UN cease fire order. Nor did the United States mobilize the UN to save the infant Israeli Republic when five Arab states invaded Palestine in

⁵⁵ *White Paper*, pp. 63-4.

⁵⁶ *Secretary Acheson, MacArthur Hearings*, Part 3, p. 1717.

1948 to overturn by force the partition plan adopted by the UN General Assembly. Defiance of the United Nations could not have been more flagrant, but the United States moved no troops and planes to save the victims of Hitler's hate who had gathered in Israel, and who appeared to be on the point of being destroyed by the armies of UN members converging on them from all sides. In the end Israel was saved by her own heroic fighting, with arms obtained largely from communist Czechoslovakia. The United States gave no armed support to Israel as the ward of UN.

It seems to be quite clear that it was the Cold War factor which impelled President Truman and his advisers to go to the aid of the UN's ward, South Korea, when she was under attack by a communist army trained by Russia. The "enemy" had to be turned back and the United States badly needed the aid of the UN. The other UN members would probably contribute little armed force. Indeed, at first we were not equipped to handle troops of many tongues, diets and costumes, and with various kinds of training, but the moral authority of UN would be invaluable in mobilizing world opinion on our side. Still more important, it would help to keep all Asia from turning away from us in revulsion against the defeat of a new Asiatic state by forces easily labelled "imperialist." This was a very great danger. It would be unrealistic to accept the interpretation that the United States acted primarily to save the imperilled UN in Korea.

When all this is said, it is not to be doubted that the American Government had come to realize that the UN was a long-term asset in the Cold War, and very much worth saving because of its world mission. The men in the Blair House meetings unquestionably remembered that the League of Nations had died ignominiously by degrees, because in crisis after crisis no great power would ever fight for the League's law. The ghosts of opportunities lost—Manchuria, Ethiopia, Spain, the Rhineland, Austria and Czechoslovakia—surely sat at our council table, along with that gargantuan ghost wearing the smug, sinister features of "appeasement."

Russia Had Pushed the Button. These were the reasons which impelled President Truman "suddenly to alter the basic American strategy and to fight a land war in Asia, which we had expressly and deliberately decided we would not do."⁵⁷ Moreover, the equally important and perhaps still more fateful decision on June 27 to protect Chiang on Formosa was entirely an *ad hoc* decision, taken against an equally well weighed policy decision.

Our entire Far Eastern policy, carefully considered on the basis of American military security was reversed in a day or two, because it was felt that the North Korean invasion was a blow in the Cold War ordered by Moscow and that it must be met. As Acheson said in the *MacArthur Hearings*, "It was fully realized that the timing of any move in Korea would be ordered from the Kremlin."⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Walter Lippmann, the *Nashville Tennessean*, March 12, 1952. Evidence that Lippmann spoke accurately is found all through the *MacArthur Hearings*. See Part I, p. 242, Part 2, pp. 930, 932, Part 3, pp. 1681, 1763, 1818, 1821, Part 4, pp. 2574, 2597.

⁵⁸ Part 3, p. 1991.

The Kremlin had pushed the button. Its creation, the North Korean Republic, would never have moved otherwise. Moscow had ordered it.

This was the basic assumption on which the Korean war was fought. It soon became an article of faith and is still almost never questioned. Even in 1955 a full-length article examining our entry into the Korean war never raised the faintest question about Moscow's role in ordering the invasion.⁵⁹ Yet the same article records our pre-Korea considered judgment that "the Politburo would not engage in overt forms of aggression which involved the risk of a general war," at least for several years. The knowledgeable Alsops spoke of "the basic assumption underlying American policy" being overturned. The expectation that the Soviets would not risk a general war was in accord with George Kennan's emphasis on the principle of caution in Soviet behaviour, a thesis well substantiated by Nathan Leites.⁶⁰

What then had led the cautious Stalin, whose country was still gaping with war wounds, "clearly and consciously" to risk a world war?⁶¹

The leading Washington correspondents, in close touch with official opinion, reflected several theories which explained Stalin's assumed reversal: (1) that the Korean move was "merely a diversion move prior to the major Soviet blow, possibly against Iran;" (2) the "soft-spot probing theory," reporting a State Department "consensus," that "the Korean attack is another bit of 'feeling out,' of probing for soft spots;" (3) the "will testing" theory, by which "sources close to top American policy-makers" were "certain" that the attack was similar to Hitler's early moves; (4) the "demonstration" theory, whereby "Korea was only the first of a series of Soviet demonstrations of Russian strength and American weakness;" and (5) the Dulles theory that the attack was a strategic move to put Japan "between the upper (i.e. Sakhalin) and lower (Korean) jaws of the Russian bear," and also to dislocate the "positive" plans of the United States, especially the "hopeful, attractive Asiatic experiment in democracy"—Rhee's regime in South Korea.⁶²

The analogy of Hitler's step-by-step conquests ran through several of these explanations of Russia's plunge in Korea, oblivious of the fact that Hitler was a gambler, whereas Stalin never had been.

All of these theories were so plainly suppositions that they soon merged into the attrition theory. Stalin had decided to bleed us white by a series of small wars around the vast rim of the Red world, always using his satellite troops, not Soviet men. Thus Korea would be followed by Indo-China, Iran, and no telling what else, as Stalin sat in the Kremlin calmly calculating when the time had come to push the next button and send United States troops flying into another bloodletting operation thousands of miles from home.

This theory had the merit that it was logical. It accepted the full logic and consequences of the Truman Doctrine and the containment policy. Stalin was assumed to say: "All right, let's play the game your way."

⁵⁹ Alexander L. George, "American Policy Making and the North Korean Aggression," *World Politics*, January 1955, pp. 209-32.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 210, 221. Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism*, Glencoe, Illinois, 1953, pp. 47-53.

⁶¹ The Alsops, the *Washington Post*, July 5, 1950.

⁶² George, *supra*, pp. 211-15.

It was the realization that, granted his omnipotent power to push satellite buttons, he could wear us out in trying to enforce containment that led to mounting anger and increasing cries to bomb China, using A-bombs, anything to break this fatal and frustrating cycle of Stalin's satellite wars. Yet the bloodletting and the attrition didn't become serious until we had freed South Korea and decided to conquer North Korea. That was our decision, not Stalin's. Up to that time neither Stalin nor Mao had lifted a finger to prevent the defeat of the North Koreans in South Korea.

When the war began no evidence of Soviet responsibility or complicity existed. "Numerous commentators noted the unwillingness of American official spokesmen to charge the Soviet Union with direct responsibility for unleashing the attack."⁶³ The charge was never made officially, as it certainly would have been if evidence had been in hand and, to the best of my knowledge, no substantiation of the assumption of Russian complicity in starting the war has ever been produced.

The Korean adventure was, accordingly, a reply to an assumed move of the Kremlin in the Cold War. No evidence has come to light "that the possibility of an alternative military strategy was considered," or "the possibility of accepting the military loss of the South Korean peninsula." No one examined these alternatives to see if they were really disastrous. Certainly no one dreamed that currently with our plunge to the Yalu so high and unimpeachable a conservative as the British Duke of Bedford would write that if "a long and exhausting war with China's millions" and perhaps worse evils ensued, "any impartial person would have to admit that the substitution of the bad Government of North Korea for the equally bad Government of South Korea would, after all, have proved the lesser evil if it had been allowed, and that it would have been wiser to deal with the problem of morale in Korea by indirect methods, slower but in the end perhaps more sure than war."⁶⁴

No lesser person than a British Duke could have questioned our assumption that nothing could be worse, or more irremediable than an extension of communism. This motif of the Cold War so dominated us that the civil war character of the Korean war was almost totally ignored. The fact that Koreans on both sides of the line felt strongly enough about the unification of their country to be willing to fight for it was not mentioned. Indeed, the fact that the two antithetical regimes in Korea hated and despised each other, and that each was burning to liberate the oppressed Koreans from the other, was not considered. In a word, the strong probability that this was a true civil war, which both sides were itching for and either might have begun, was not weighed.

Did North Korea Act Without Kremlin Orders? No one questioned the Moscow push button explanation of the war until Wilbur W. Hitchcock, a former member of U.S. Military Government in Korea, wrote a disturbing article in *Current History* for March 1951 entitled "North Korea Jumps the Gun." In this article Hitchcock pointed out that on the outbreak of the war the Communists had lost four real advantages or prospective gains: "a

⁶³ George, *supra*, p. 230.

⁶⁴ *The New York Times*, November 26, 1950.

favorable rearming ratio; the neutrality of certain peoples; the element of surprise; and the imminent recognition of Red Chinese delegates by the United Nations."

Searching for reasons why these valuable things should be thrown away, Hitchcock examined half a dozen possible explanations and found none of them productive. It was not a feint to cover a blow at Formosa. The Soviet Union did not return to the United Nations until too late to veto its action. China did not intervene until North Korea was all but lost. The popular theory that Stalin fully expected our intervention and was out to wear us down by attrition assumed that Stalin would wish us to greatly expand our armed forces and war production. Since no rational explanation could be found for a Soviet adventure in Korea, Hitchcock came to the conclusion that the attack on South Korea was ordered by Premier Kim Il-Sung of North Korea, not only without instructions from Moscow but without its knowledge.

This, he reasoned, was why Malik, the Soviet delegate, did not attend the UN Security Council meeting and veto UN action in South Korea's behalf, though when he did return he held up all action during his August presidency. If Moscow had planned it, the attack could as easily have come a month later, when Malik was in the chair. He did not return to the Security Council on June 25 because Moscow was still piecing the news together and trying to find out what had happened. The *Sunday Worker*, Communist paper in New York, was completely scooped on the outbreak, said nothing about it and on Monday was still very indecisive about what was going on. In the meantime the United States had led the United Nations into a condemnation of and conflict with North Korea, while the entire Communist world appeared to be confused and inarticulate. Soviet propagandists would certainly have had a story ready, explaining the attack with full details, if Moscow had ordered the job, yet they were caught with their mouths open and nothing coming out.⁶⁵

This carefully reasoned explanation of what happened on June 25, 1950, made no headway during the war, partly because we believed that no Communist anywhere ever did anything without orders originating in Moscow. All were puppets and none would dare exercise the slightest initiative. Therefore the puppet North Koreans would never dare to attack unless ordered to do so. It was simply inconceivable that Kim Il-Sung would do anything important without orders from Moscow.

This version also accorded with our belief that Stalin possessed a master brain which was ceaselessly employed to surround, confound and destroy us, in spite of all the evidence that he had never gambled before World War II and was mainly concerned in holding what he had won during it. This conviction that Stalin must have planned to suck us into the Korean trap was formed without considering the volatile and determined nature of the Koreans.

Since June 1950 we have learned a great deal about the Koreans. We have certainly learned, for example, that Syngman Rhee was abundantly capable of starting the Korean war. We have discovered also that he is not the only

⁶⁵ Wilbur W. Hitchcock, "North Korea Jumps the Gun," *Current History*, March, 1951, pp. 136-44.

Korean who is impulsive or headstrong. Nor is there any reason to doubt the passion of the North Koreans to "liberate" South Korea. They were as impatient about the division of their country as Rhee was. They had been well trained, armed and indoctrinated by the Russians. New shipments of arms had just arrived. Time was passing and a golden moment had come. Rhee had just been soundly repudiated at the polls. There was also a bumper rice crop waiting in the South for the first time since World War II.⁶⁶ The North Koreans were also furiously angry over Rhee's arrest, detention and probable execution of the three envoys they had sent to Seoul on June 11, after a UN representative had gone into North Korea on June 10 to discuss peaceful unification.

In these circumstances would the heady North Korean leaders wish to be told by the cautious and canny Stalin, who had so much to lose by any false move in the Cold War, that the time was not ripe for unifying Korea?

The North Koreans knew from their infiltrators that they could sweep quickly to Pushan, as they would undoubtedly have done had not President Truman taken a quick decision to reverse our policy and oppose them.

This reasoning does not prove that the North Koreans came south on their own will power, but pending the marshalling of conclusive evidence to the contrary it provides an explanation of the events of June 1950 more reasonable than the theory that the cautious Stalin pressed a button in Korea and then failed to veto UN action when he could readily have done so.

In any event the Korean war demonstrated the extent to which a balance of power conflict is likely to transfer the power of decision from the major powers to small allies, who may be entirely irresponsible, or worse, but gain the power to commit their principals.

THE NORTH KOREAN INVASION

It was hoped in Washington at first that bombing would be sufficient to disrupt the North Korean invasion, but it was soon apparent that ground troops would have to be sent.

As they trickled in, the South Korean Army was quickly defeated, almost within a week, though units of it continued to fight in later engagements. The South Koreans were outnumbered and out-armed and they also lacked the burning will to victory which characterized the North Korean troops. The Red Koreans were, said General MacArthur, "as smart, as efficient and as able a force as I have ever seen in the field."⁶⁷ They were maneuvered out of a quick occupation of all South Korea by MacArthur's decision to throw a brigade of American troops into their path by air. This tactic caused the North Koreans to pause a few days for the bringing up of supplies, before they wiped out our small force. "Fighting with skill, savagery, and a total disregard for casualties" the North Koreans rapidly outflanked the defenders and swept rapidly down the peninsula, but time had been gained to organize a large bridgehead around Pushan.⁶⁸ By the end of July the defenders were

⁶⁶ Wilbur W. Hitchcock, "North Korea Jumps the Gun," *Current History*, March, 1951, pp. 136-44

⁶⁷ *MacArthur Hearings*, Part 1, p. 230.

⁶⁸ Stebbins, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

compressed into it, a development which stirred intense feeling in the United States, and apprehension as well.⁶⁹ If Russia could take raw Asiatic peasants and convert them into tough, well trained troops fired with an intense will to victory, she might repeat the feat, it was argued, at various places around her vast perimeter and draw the United States into an endless succession of little wars, far from the U.S.A., fought by her satellites, while her own troops remained uncommitted.

This dismal consequence was not blamed upon the Truman Doctrine, which had invited it, but upon the diabolical cleverness of the Russians, who continued to receive unquestioned credit for having pushed the North Korean button on June 24th. Drew Pearson did assert categorically that the Communist government in Peking did not know the attack was to be made and that it had sent a stiff protest to Moscow,⁷⁰ but no one suggested that Moscow might also have been surprised by the attack.

The civil war aspect of the Korean struggle was hardly ever mentioned or thought of. The fiercely fighting North Korean troops were assumed to be fighting Russia's battles, for Russia's purposes. That they might be driven by a conviction that they had something to fight for, and to carry to the rest of their country, was an unpalatable thought which no one voiced.

Cries For a Showdown With Russia. Instead of considering the deep seated social revolution which is running throughout Asia, and what to do about it, new demands arose for drawing a line, and for a preventive war upon the Soviet Union as the source of all evil and danger. Herbert Hoover urged that Russia and her satellites must be thrown out of UN, because they had turned that body into an "instrument to protect Red imperialism."⁷¹ The House of Representatives applauded a member who urged that the cities of the North Koreans be atom-bombed unless they withdrew in a week's time.⁷² David Lawrence suggested that the United States sever diplomatic relations with Moscow and call on all other governments to do likewise. Senator Knowland said in the Senate that if Russia really wanted war America would not shrink from it.⁷³ Harold E. Stassen urged the United States to serve notice on Russia that further communist aggression anywhere in the world would bring war to Russia. Walter Lippmann thought this idea highly dangerous, because nobody could draft the ultimatum and make its meaning clear, and because the military power to back it up simply did not exist.⁷⁴

The latter consideration was highly pertinent, since the Korean war was demonstrating daily that air power could not stop the advance of a determined army, even though it had no planes of its own. The illusion that a few heavy

⁶⁹ In contrast with the high morale of the North Koreans, the American boys were mainly green occupation troops from Japan, untrained for real war and unaware of why they were suddenly in the midst of it. The average G.I. concluded that "someone has put him in a mess he does not understand." It was not surprising that "some American units have run like scared rabbits without inflicting much damage on the enemy."—*The Nashville Tennessean*, August 6; *New York Herald Tribune*, August 13, 1950.

⁷⁰ *The Nashville Tennessean*, July 7, 1950.

⁷¹ *New York Herald Tribune*, July 12, 1950.

⁷² *Ibid.*, July 13.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, August 11.

⁷⁴ *The Nashville Tennessean*, August 16, 21, 1950.

bombers carrying A-bombs could win wars at vast distances was being daily dissipated, without reducing the demands for drastic action against Russia.

On August 15 the Supreme Knight of the Knights of Columbus urged the formation of a new UN without Russia and the breaking of diplomatic relations with her. On the same day Representative F. R. Coudert, Jr. introduced a resolution calling upon the President to say whether the United States would fight if Russia made a move in any one of eighteen sensitive areas over the globe, which he enumerated.⁷⁵ On August 27 Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews, the nation's leading Catholic layman, told an audience at the Boston Navy Yard that the United States should be willing to pay "even the price of instituting a war to compel cooperation for peace." This utterance was sharply disavowed at the State Department as playing into the hands of the Russians,⁷⁶ who were conducting an immense peace campaign throughout the world centering on the Stockholm Petition. This document, which stressed the outlawing of atomic attack, had already been signed by more than a hundred million people, not all of them under duress. Some 32,000,000 signatures were obtained in Western Europe during the first two weeks.

At the Air War College, Montgomery, Alabama, General Orvil Anderson had been having a series of lectures in which a preventive war was openly urged by Father Edmund Walsh of Georgetown University.⁷⁷ Two days later, General Anderson was suspended for offering to "break up Russia's five A-bomb nests in a week" and for predicting that for every month the Russian military machine was "permitted to grow, two more American cities may well face annihilation." His superior, General Vandenberg, reminded him that "the premise that war is inevitable is not only untrue but most dangerous."⁷⁸ However, this did not prevent four Southern Senators from making statements indicating approval of the disciplined officer. Senator Richard B. Russell, of Georgia, told reporters that "to keep on saying to the American people and the world that we will not strike first and that we will wait until our land is desolated and our cities made crematoriums for our dead is just plain foolish."⁷⁹

Congressional mail revealed a large increase in the number of citizens who wanted to drop bombs on Moscow, and Americans returning from Europe were "shocked by the war talk and the emphasis on war preparedness they encounter at home." The French and British Foreign Ministers meeting with Secretary Acheson on September 12, 1950, were also surprised "at the heated atmosphere of the United States" and deeply shocked by Acheson's insistence that Germany be rearmed immediately. Lying directly in the supposed path of Russian armies and A-bombs they feared not only the return of austerity and the "anti-conscription feeling that inspires the youth of Europe," but also that rearmament might provoke Russia to move while she could.⁸⁰

⁷⁵ *New York Herald Tribune*, August 16, 1950.

⁷⁶ *The New York Times*, August 27, 1950.

⁷⁷ Drew Pearson, *the Nashville Tennessean*, August 31, 1950.

⁷⁸ *New York Herald Tribune*, September 2, 1950.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, September 16, 1950.

⁸⁰ Anne O'Hare McCormick, *the New York Times*, September 18, 1950.

The *Herald Tribune* correspondent A. T. Steele returning from a long term of duty in the Orient was surprised to "note how widely the idea of the 'inevitability' of a third world war has become fixed in American minds and to observe the resignation with which the idea is accepted." He was also surprised at the number of people on both of our coasts who were being led by bomb jitters to buy property outside the great cities.⁸¹

Yet at times it seemed that Russia might not be spending all her energy in making arms with which to visit a vaster Pearl Harbor upon us. On September 12 plans were announced to bring 20,000,000 acres of arid land north of Iran under the plough. A 660 mile canal and three large dams with power plants were involved. Two gigantic dams across the Volga, at Kuibyshev and Stalingrad were also projected. A few days later, plans for another Dneiper dam were published which would divert water into a vast system of canals irrigating another 8,000,000 acres. Men and materials for these huge projects were already being assembled. The schedules called for their completion successively in 1955, 1956 and 1957.⁸²

MacArthur's Visit to Formosa. In Tokyo General MacArthur gave continuing evidence of his willingness to expand the war. On the night before the decision to resist in Korea, he had given strong assurances that he would "guarantee" success, whether Russia came in or not. A few days later he bombed the capital of North Korea before receiving permission to do so.⁸³ Late in July MacArthur flew to Formosa for a cordial visit with Chiang Kai-shek. The JCS were worried about the security of Formosa and MacArthur "decided to go down and make the reconnaissance myself." When he reported this decision to Washington a message came that "some one, I think it was the State Department, would prefer some officer other than myself to go down there. But as I was the responsible officer and was charged with the defense, I decided to go myself."⁸⁴

After his visit Chiang issued a statement speaking of "Sino-American military cooperation" and of "our struggle against communist aggression." Great Britain at once disclaimed responsibility for American actions on Formosa and there was general unrest in the United Nations. Presidential Assistant W. Averell Harriman flew 16,000 miles to Tokyo to brief General MacArthur on Far Eastern political affairs, to use President Truman's words. Harriman was greeted with press announcements that MacArthur would emphasize that the United States must be prepared to meet the Communist

⁸¹ *New York Herald Tribune*, September 14, 1950.

⁸² *Ibid.*, September 13, 22, 1950. About the same time the report of a secret trip to the Soviet uranium mines in East Germany described good housing and plenty of food, with the best entertainment, "our own sports stadium and dance bands" and no secret police surveillance. The workers could not travel outside the mine settlements without passes. Wages were very high, but dust lung disease was common.—*Ibid.*, September 25, 1950.

⁸³ Drew Pearson, the *Nashville Tennessean*, July 6, 18; James Reston, the *New York Times*, July 9, 1950.

⁸⁴ *MacArthur Hearings*, Pt. 1, p. 123. MacArthur believed "that to the average Asiatic Chiang Kai-shek stands out as the great symbol against Communism." People everywhere "that are inclined toward Communism oppose him, completely and absolutely; but he does stand as a symbol of an invincible determination to resist Communism" (p. 111).

challenge elsewhere in Asia, as in Korea, and make that plain to all, "because of the nature of the Asiatic people." In the General's view "the chips are down in Asia."⁸⁵

MacArthur's Message to the VFW. Two weeks later MacArthur sent a message to a Veterans of Foreign Wars convention at Chicago describing the dire consequences of letting Formosa fall into the hands of a hostile military power. The document was issued to newspapers, press associations and magazines, but was not submitted to any of MacArthur's superiors in Washington.⁸⁶

In this message MacArthur declared that to give up any of the "bulwarks of our Pacific Ocean strategic position," i.e. Formosa, "would shift our future battle area 5000 miles eastward to the coasts of the American continents, our home coast." To give up Formosa would also expose all our friends in the Pacific to "the lustful thrusts of those who stand for slavery against liberty." That is, we and our friends could hold nothing in the Pacific unless we held every position in it, including Formosa.

Nor would we run any grave risks in refusing to return Formosa to China. "Nothing could be more fallacious," declared MacArthur, "than the threadbare argument . . . that if we defend Formosa we alienate Continental Asia. Those who speak thus do not understand the Orient. They do not grant that it is in the pattern of the Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership."⁸⁷

In other words, the triumphant Chinese Reds, the Indians and other peoples lately freed from colonial rule would bow to force in the matter of Formosa with true Nineteenth Century submissiveness. Newly won independence in Asia had not changed "Oriental psychology" at all.

This deliverance led D. W. Brogan, one of the most sympathetic interpreters of American affairs in Britain, to say that MacArthur had

"given a display of insubordination that has no parallel in modern American history. . . .

"Without consulting, or what is worse, informing his hierarchical chiefs, General MacArthur sent a message in open contradiction of the public policy of the United States Government and, with a skill that could not have been greater if it had been ordered by Moscow, has inserted a wedge in the weakest joint of Anglo-American relations and has done his best to make a palpable fraud of the American claim to be the agent of the United Nations."⁸⁸

MacArthur's personal Formosa policy had the further effect of embarrassing the United States in the United Nations. Secretary Acheson testified later that MacArthur had "talked about our island chain in the Pacific, of which Formosa

⁸⁵ The *New York Times*, August 6, 13, 16, 1950.

⁸⁷ The *New York Times*, August 29, 1950.

⁸⁸ The *Spectator*, September 8, 1950.

⁸⁶ Stebbins, *supra*, p. 239.

On August 12 the *New Statesman and Nation* had written that MacArthur was making something like a private alliance with Chiang, countenancing Chiang's naval and air blockade of China, in flat defiance of President Truman's instructions.

was implied to be a part," dominating "with air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore." If we lost this line war would be "inevitable."

The Soviets, Acheson continued, had at once charged, throughout September, that MacArthur had "torn the cover from the real intentions of the United States, that our real purpose was to seize Formosa for ourselves." There was thus ground for charging us "with doing something which we never had any intention of doing whatever, which was seizing the island, taking it away from the Chinese and using it ourselves."⁸⁹

Hearing about MacArthur's Olympian utterance to the VFW, President Truman ordered him to withdraw it, two days before its scheduled release, but publication could not be prevented. In Washington, Caleb Philips reported that MacArthur had made no secret to various visitors of "his belief that our present policy in the Pacific is a naive hash of ignorance and misguided hope." By this time "the last vestiges of bi-partisanship had disappeared as far as Far Eastern policy is concerned."⁹⁰

Walter Lippmann thought that we had been "teetering on the edge of fearful danger." Without President Truman's prompt disavowal of MacArthur's actions China might have become convinced that we meant to keep Formosa and she might have decided to sweep us out of Korea.⁹¹

This danger appeared to be removed in the middle of September when the Inchon landings took the North Korean armies in the rear and led to their rapid withdrawal northward and disappearance into the hills.⁹²

Should North Korea Be Occupied? At this juncture Joseph Alsop, who had been covering the war from Korea, wrote a remarkable article in which he explained that though our bombers had done great damage we had never possessed local control of the air over the battlefield. Accordingly, there had been many occasions in which "even two enemy intruder fighters, attacking the interminable lines of our transport moving over the appalling Korea roads in broad day light would have been enough to produce a twenty-four hour tangle" and we would "have lost our foothold in Korea." At various times the situation in the beach-head "threatened to come totally apart at the seams." Yet no enemy planes ever came, because the Russians were not "prepared to play the game at all."⁹³ They had given the North Koreans their training and original equipment and refused to take part in the war itself, when only a little help would have been decisive.

If it be assumed that the Soviets had assented to the North Korean invasion, they had certainly played the alleged game in very limited fashion.

⁸⁹ *MacArthur Hearings*, Pt. 3, pp. 2002-3. The intention toward Formosa which Acheson so warmly disavowed was substantially carried out by a Republican Administration in January and February 1955.

⁹⁰ *The New York Times*, September 3, 1950.

⁹¹ *New York Herald Tribune*, September 19, 1950.

⁹² Concurrently Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson was dismissed and General George Marshall succeeded him.

⁹³ *New York Herald Tribune*, September 29, 1950. See also Walter Lippmann, *ibid.*, October 5, 1950—"the Russians laid it down firmly and emphatically that . . . the North Koreans would be on their own and that they must not call on the Soviet Union to rescue them." Joseph Alsop reiterated the point on October 11.

Would the United States do so? This question became acute as the UN armies neared the 38th Parallel. The UN resolution of June 27 had stated the objective "to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

This was a proper and necessary objective. Now that it was nearly achieved there was ample reason for being satisfied with it. On the surface the UN might do as it pleased with North Korea, because neither Russia nor China had given it the little aid it needed to seize all of Korea. But all the basic factors counselled restraint. North Korea was one of the most sensitive and strategic areas in the world. It was of the utmost importance to both Russia and China that it not be in hostile hands. Politically also its control was vital to them. There was no more reason to believe they would endure the setting up of a pro-Western government there, by force, than there was to believe that the United States would tolerate the forcible establishment of a communist state in Lower California, by force. Insisting on the unification of Korea would be pushing the other side too far, especially since a decisive economic factor was involved. The Japanese had built a series of great power dams in the far north of Korea, and they were supplying power both to North Korea and to north Manchuria. The Rhee Government's threat to deny power to Manchuria when it got the dams was a serious matter.

There was also a grave moral factor involved. The UN was in Korea to repel aggression, not to commit it. From the balance of power standpoint it would be a fine thing to go into North Korea, clean out the Reds and set up a model Western democracy, but the UN was engaged in the business of defeating aggression. It was not its function to alter the balance of power in the Far East, especially since its moral writ had no force in the vast area between Seoul and Stettin.

Nevertheless, as early as August 12 William Frye reported in the *Christian Science Monitor* that "The United States had indicated that it plans to lead United Nations armies across the 38th Parallel into North Korea," and the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, hearing such talk from both the Pentagon and the State Department, wrote a significant editorial on August 19 in which it noted the use of the "half-slave, half free" argument by our UN Ambassador Austin and warned that it would be "decidedly unrealistic" to assume that neither Russia nor China would intervene. Urging that a hard headed appraisal of the situation suggested limited objectives, the editor cautioned that if we risked a new world war by crossing the 38th, "The Reds could claim, and with logic, that such a move would constitute an invasion and the act of an aggressor."

THE INVASION OF NORTH KOREA

This vital factor notwithstanding, the West became intoxicated with victory and decided to abolish the North Korean state it had been fighting thus far as an international aggressor. Military arguments began to be raised. The UN forces could not stop at an artificial line. The aggressors must be stamped out, or they might come over again. Even the UN Secretary General Trygve Lie announced that it was not enough to win obedience from the

North Koreans and their withdrawal. "The aim of the United Nations is and must be a united and independent Korea."⁹⁴

On September 30, U.S. Ambassador Austin called upon the United Nations to remove the "opportunities for new acts of aggression" by denying to "aggressor forces" any "refuge behind an imaginary line, because that would re-create the threat to the peace of Korea and of the world." This argument was superficially plausible, but it overlooked the fact that behind a democratic Korea created by the UN would lie the enormous threats of Red China and Communist Russia. The acceptance of the 38th Parallel as "an imaginary line" also gave substance to the claim of the North Koreans that they were fighting a civil war in their own country. If the 38th Parallel line had no validity of any kind, then the North Koreans had a right to ignore it.

Heretofore we had been fighting to defeat the removal of the 38th boundary by force, with many statements of our determination to drive the aggressors back behind it. Now we proposed to remove the boundary by force ourselves. This moral reversal was strongly stated by Sir Benegal Rau, the delegate of India, at the UN, as follows: "It would impair faith in the United Nations if we were even to appear to authorize the unification of Korea by the use of force against North Korea, after we had resisted the attempt of North Korea to unify the country by force against South Korea."⁹⁵

Warnings from China. On October 1, General MacArthur demanded that the North Korean forces "in whatever part of Korea situated" lay down their arms and cease hostilities "under such military supervision as I may direct." In Peking Premier Chou En-lai declared that the Chinese people would not "supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by imperialists."⁹⁶

This warning was evaluated much more realistically by the men in Korea who would have to fight China than by General MacArthur or the political leaders safely ensconced in Washington and London. The latter were full of belligerence born of victory, certain that Chou's warning was "just a continuation of the Red propaganda line," in the words of a State Department spokesman.⁹⁷ But as the Chinese warnings were repeated "a dread apprehension gripped the headquarters" of the Eighth Army commanded by Major-General Walton H. Walker. He and his brother officers knew what it would mean if the Chinese marched.⁹⁸

On October 3 Premier Nehru, of India, declared that the Korean war contained "seeds of a mighty conflict," and warned that military leaders should

⁹⁴ *The New York Times*, September 9, 1950.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, October 4, 1950.

Seoul was recaptured on September 30 and the liberators received a cool welcome because of the damage done to every part of the city by planes and artillery. Army and Marine commanders protested that the damage and heavy casualties were useless. They contended that "a triumphal entry into the city" was ordered "as soon as possible and we gave it to them, but it cost us and the Koreans plenty."—*Ibid.*, October 1, 1950.

⁹⁶ *The Nashville Tennessean*, October 1, 1950.

⁹⁷ *The New York Times*, October 2, 1950.

⁹⁸ S. A. L. Marshall, *The River and the Gauntlet*, New York, 1953, pp. 6-7. Marshall was the official Infantry Operation Analyst with the Eighth Army.

not carry it "too far."⁹⁹ Heavy Chinese forces had been moved north into Manchuria beginning in July and by September they were in a position to intervene.¹⁰⁰

The General Assembly Resolution of October 7. These grave warnings were disregarded and an American-British resolution was put through the General Assembly on October 7 which directed MacArthur to take all appropriate steps to insure conditions of stability "throughout Korea" to establish "a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea."¹⁰¹ The resolution was sponsored by Australia, Brazil, Cuba, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines and the United Kingdom. The Indian Resolution had been defeated 32 to 24.

In this "somewhat oblique fashion," as General Marshall termed it, General MacArthur was given authority to cross the 38th Parallel and eliminate the Peoples Republic of North Korea. This authority was, however, always considered in Washington to be "permissive, rather than mandatory."¹⁰²

The Assembly's resolution was only a recommendation. It had no power to "legislate" on the Korean question, or any other. Nor did the UN Command have authority to "execute" such "legislation." The Assembly action was taken, moreover, against the will of the two enormous Communist states which had common borders with Korea and over the opposition of India, Yugoslavia, and five Arab States. The majority of 47 to 5, with eight abstentions, reflected the willingness of most UN members to follow the United States, but certainly not the will of Asia, upon which Korea was a tiny peninsula.¹⁰³

With his unrivalled access to official opinion and Washington events, Walter Lippmann laid the main responsibility for the advance northward upon "the pressure of General MacArthur and his political supporters." President Truman and Secretary Acheson "were fully warned not to make the error" of attempting to conquer North Korea, but they let themselves be pressured into it and then under "the pressure of another set of generals and our allies" could not go through with it. This was "a classic example of the terrible cost of allowing a theater commander to make high policy, disregarding the wider information and overriding the better judgment of the civilian authorities." The end result was that this cardinal error "made the Korean problem insoluble."¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ *New York Herald Tribune*, October 4, 1950

¹⁰⁰ Asked by Senator McMahon if he could give "a summary of the messages that you got from the theater commander relative to the intention of the Chinese to intervene," General Collins replied: "It would be rather voluminous. This paper I have here is actually an analysis of the various stages of intelligence. You see it is a quarter of an inch thick."—*MacArthur Hearings*, Pt. 2, p. 1234

¹⁰¹ *United Nations Document, A/1422*, pp. 12-13.

¹⁰² *MacArthur Hearings*, Pt. 1, p. 362.

¹⁰³ Leland M. Goodrich, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-39. Goodrich notes that action to destroy the North Korean army was not mandatory under the October 7 resolution, the resolution of June 27, or the Charter, and that peaceful settlement is a UN objective fully as important as suppressing aggression (p. 143).

¹⁰⁴ *The Nashville Tennessean*, August 3, 1952. MacArthur's "principal supporters were beginning to shout that his hands were being tied by the United Nations."—Thomas J. Hamilton, *Freedom and Union*, January 6, 1951, p. 27.

When MacArthur's primary responsibility for the invasion of North Korea is recorded, it remains true that others in Washington and London were sure that the Parallel should be crossed and Korea forcibly unified. British Foreign Secretary Bevin was as emphatic about that as Ambassador Austin and even Lester B. Pearson, of Canada, ordinarily far more level headed, called for an advance of the UN forces "far beyond their present position," if the North Koreans did not surrender. James Reston reported that nobody high in the UN or the United States Government "will be satisfied merely to drive the North Korean Army north of the Parallel."¹⁰⁵

On October 3, four days before the UN resolution, the South Korean Third Division crossed the Parallel and by October 7th it had advanced eighty miles against little resistance.¹⁰⁶ As the American forces advanced rapidly, another Chinese statement was issued saying: "Now the American forces are attempting to cross the 38th Parallel on a large scale. The Chinese people cannot stand idly by with regard to such a serious situation as is created by the invasion of Korea by the United States and its accomplice countries."¹⁰⁷ However, these repeated Chinese warnings and the agonized appeals of Sir Benegal Rau of India were ignored.

Wake Island Conference. On October 15 President Truman flew to Wake Island for a conference with General MacArthur, taking with him a large staff of his experts. Given a choice of meeting the President at Wake Island or at Honolulu, far to the West, MacArthur chose Wake.¹⁰⁸ The General was a little late in meeting the President's plane and he chose to shake the hand of his Commander-in-Chief instead of saluting him. MacArthur had come reluctantly and the conference ended hours ahead of schedule, the General being preoccupied and impatient to return to Tokyo.¹⁰⁹

In this conference the General told the President that resistance would end in North Korea by Thanksgiving. When asked about the chances of Soviet or Chinese interference, MacArthur replied: "Very little." In the first or second months their intervention would have been decisive. Now it was no longer feared. If they tried, the Chinese could only get "50,000 to 60,000" men across the Yalu River and "if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter."¹¹⁰

At the time MacArthur made these statements to the President he knew, from many sources, that the Chinese were already in North Korea in force. This grave charge was made by Gordon Walker, Assistant Foreign Editor of the *Christian Science Monitor* in a copyright article on November 29, 1951.

¹⁰⁵ The *New York Times*, September 30, 26, 1950. Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia and Premier Einar Gerhardsen of Norway did oppose crossing the Parallel, though Norway helped sponsor the enabling resolution to do so in the UN on October 7.—The *New York Times*, September 22, 29, October 2, 1950.

¹⁰⁶ United Nations Documents, S/1840, S/1843.

¹⁰⁷ The *New York Times*, October 12, 1950.

¹⁰⁸ Marshall, *MacArthur Hearings*, p. 439.

¹⁰⁹ The *New York Times*, October 16; Drew Pearson, the *Nashville Tennessean*, October 23, 1950; John Gunther, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

¹¹⁰ *Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference* on October 15, 1950, compiled by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Washington, 1951, p. 1.

Walker wrote that the "overwhelming bulk of evidence available to newsmen in Tokyo" showed conclusively that at Wake Island MacArthur "was fully aware that a Chinese expeditionary force of major proportions already had moved across the Yalu River into Korea." This information had come from Nationalist quarters on Formosa, British Intelligence at Hong Kong and from Koreans parachuted along the Yalu who had walked back through the enemy lines.

MacArthur deceived the President in this vital matter because he feared that his plan for an offensive to the Yalu might be vetoed. Nor did the President have any success in convincing him that "communism, especially in China, cannot be overcome by armed force."¹¹¹

On returning to Tokyo MacArthur promptly issued a statement favoring the proclamation of a "Pacific Doctrine" which would reaffirm American determination to give assistance to any nation in the Far East, threatened from within or without by Soviet Communism.¹¹²

Naturally there was no meeting of minds about Formosa. When he returned to Tokyo MacArthur issued a statement saying: "It is known here that General MacArthur holds unalterably to the view that Formosa should not be allowed to fall into the hands of a potential enemy of the free nations of the Pacific." This led the President to say at his press conference that "Formosa was settled a month ago, or five weeks ago, and there was nothing about Formosa to be settled with General MacArthur."¹¹³

For the time being President Truman's policy of holding the future status of Formosa in abeyance prevailed, but in January 1955 MacArthur's view was completely accepted, at the risk of a third world war.

Back in San Francisco the President made a broadcast in which he charged that the great size and strength of the Soviet armed forces posed "a constant threat to world peace" and invited the Soviet Union to prove its desire for peace by lifting the Iron Curtain.¹¹⁴

The Rhee Government Carried Along. On October 12 the United Nations Interim Committee approved a resolution which made it clear that the Syngman Rhee Government of South Korea had authority only over that area. It directed that the UN Command should be responsible for the civil administration in North Korea and asked the Supreme Commander to advise the committee of steps taken to implement these requests. The Rhee Government promptly indicated its defiance and announced that it would send its own civil administrators into North Korea. Soon reports began to come back of wholesale executions of people by Rhee's forces, women and children included. Officers of the 29th Commonwealth Brigade broke up executions scheduled near their sector.¹¹⁵ The Rhee Government had extended its

¹¹¹ The *New York Times* on October 11, 12, 1950, forecast that the conference would try to impress this "basic principle of policy" upon MacArthur.

¹¹² Marguerite Higgins, *New York Herald Tribune*, October 18, 1950.

¹¹³ The *New York Times*, October 19, 20, 1950.

¹¹⁴ *New York Herald Tribune*, October 18, 1950.

In Pittsburgh General Eisenhower strongly condemned the preventive war idea. Nobody could explain how war prevents war.—The *Nashville Tennessean*, October 20, 1950.

¹¹⁵ The *New York Times*, October 13, 14, 22, 24, December 19, 22, 1950.

authority into North Korea in defiance of the United Nations and with the acquiescence of Rhee's friend, General MacArthur.

The Policy of Holding Back American Troops Negated. MacArthur had had instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff not to use anything but South Koreans near the Manchurian frontier, but on October 24 he lifted these restrictions, without consulting Washington, and enjoined his commanders to drive forward with all speed, utilizing all their forces. On the same day the Joint Chiefs called his attention to the violations of his instructions and he replied on the 25th that the Korean troops were not of sufficient strength or well enough led. It was "military necessity" to use his American forces. General Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army, did not believe that these arguments were valid, or that there was any reason why MacArthur could not consult the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ask for a change in his instructions.¹¹⁶

Lie's Term Extended. In the United Nations a long struggle took place over the re-election of Trygve Lie as Secretary General. When Lie's re-election was vetoed by the Soviet Union in 1950 the United States insisted on his retention, on the ground that failure to re-elect would constitute punishment for his strong stand on Korea. A compromise plan was rejected. The Soviets then offered to support either Nervo of Mexico, Rau of India, or Romulo of the Philippines. Romulo had been second to none in support of the UN's action in Korea.

On October 25, Ambassador Austin, speaking with "great emotion," threatened to veto any candidate other than Lie. Since we had previously reserved the veto for cases in which our national security was at stake, he declared that Lie's re-election was a matter that "concerns the security of my own country, the security of the Far East, the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere."¹¹⁷

Though the other three candidates had appeared to be acceptable to the other UN members, they were now obliged to withdraw. The Philippines and India joined in sponsoring a resolution which extended Lie's term for three years. It was reasoned that an extension of his term would avoid an illegal evasion of Russia's veto.

Philippine Sickness Acute. On October 28 the Bell Economic Survey Mission reported to President Truman on the parlous state of affairs in the Philippines. A report described bluntly the kind of social conditions which were steadily bringing communism to all Asia. The Philippine Government was collecting only 60 per cent of its expenditures in taxes. Its large foreign exchange receipts, including large sums from the United States, had been "dissipated in imports of luxury and non-essential goods, in the remittance of high profits and in the transfer of Philippine capital abroad." The inequalities in income grew steadily greater, the profits of businessmen and landowners rising while wages and farm income were held down. Most agricultural and industrial

¹¹⁶ *MacArthur Hearings*, Pt. 2, pp. 1239-41, 1300, 1302.

¹¹⁷ *The New York Times*, October 19, 24, 25, 26, 1950.

workers had "no faith that their economic position can or will be improved." Inefficiency and corruption in the government service were widespread.¹¹⁸

Instructions to Keep Back from the Yalu Rejected. In Korea the UN forces continued their advance northward. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had reluctantly sanctioned MacArthur's violation of his instructions not to send American troops near the Manchurian or Soviet frontiers, but they continued to try to keep them some distance back. On November 24 the JCS advised MacArthur about the growing concern of the other members of the UN over the danger of a general war if his forces approached the frontiers too closely and suggested five cautionary measures, among them that he should not send his forces down to the Yalu river, but hold these forces, principally South Koreans, in the hills "dominating the approaches to the valley." He was also advised that the UN forces "continue to make every effort to spare hydroelectric installations" and that "the ultimate handling of the extremely sensitive Northeast province (fronting the Soviet Union) would await UN procedures."

In his reply the next day MacArthur rejected all of these procedures as "provocative of the very consequence" the JCS were seeking to avoid. It was necessary to destroy all North Korean forces and it would be "utterly impossible to stop on the commanding terrain south of the Yalu, as suggested. As for the hydroelectric installations that "would not be a major factor, either to the Chinese Communists or to the Soviets." After he had consolidated his position on the Yalu he would use South Korean troops there, "as far as possible."¹¹⁹

Four days earlier, on October 21, MacArthur had announced: "the war is very definitely coming to an end shortly. It looks as if we have closed the trap."

Chinese Forces Strike. Early in November his reports indicated contact with "a fresh enemy force" and on November 5 strong Chinese forces struck at the same time that a broadcast in Peking rallied the Chinese people for a struggle against the "American imperialists," who were charged with wanting not only to destroy the Korean Democratic Peoples Republic but to annex Korea, invade China, rule over Asia and "conquer the whole world." They were "copying the old trick of the Japanese bandits—first invading Korea and then China."¹²⁰

This, of course, was incredible nonsense to the West, which found it so easy to believe implicitly that the Communists were out to conquer the world and proclaimed the fact constantly. Few Americans were able to understand that the Chinese Red leaders, smarting under the memory of a full century of humiliating control by Western Imperialism, might have a very lively fear of its return. Yet every nation is governed by its past fears, especially if they have been of a very tragic nature.

¹¹⁸ *The New York Times*, October 29, 1950. On November 5 the United Nations revoked its diplomatic ban on the Franco regime in Spain by a vote of 38 to 10, a similar effort to achieve the two-thirds majority having failed in the Spring.

¹¹⁹ *MacArthur Hearings*, Part 2, pp. 1228-30

¹²⁰ *The Nashville Tennessean*, November 5, 1950.

Moves for a Truce. After the first setback from Chinese forces, "abrupt calm" developed on the battlefield. Britain strongly urged the United States to permit the Chinese to occupy a buffer zone. Dispatches from Moscow on November 14 related that the Chinese intended to drive the U.S. forces out of Korea, and on the 16th China sent a message to the United Nations justifying its right to help North Korea resist "American aggression" and vowing to fight until it was ended. On the same day Defense Minister Emanuel Shinwell told the British House of Commons that Britain was seeking in consultations with other governments to bring the hostilities to an early conclusion and "to limit their extent." Churchill supported this endeavor.¹²¹ On November 22, "well informed sources" in Washington indicated that agreement on a plan for a buffer strip along the Manchurian border was near and awaited "primarily approval of its military details by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur." Final agreement was expected momentarily.

MacArthur's "Home by Christmas" Offensive. MacArthur gave his answer to these efforts to end the war by flying to the front and launching 100,000 men toward the Yalu River in two giant encircling movements which if successful "should for all practical purposes end the war." Informally, he called it a "home by Christmas" offensive. His two wings were so far apart that it was difficult to establish any liaison between them and none was attempted except through Tokyo.¹²²

This reckless plunge, coming after all the Chinese warnings and after his forces had already been thrown back by Chinese forces once, aroused strong uneasiness in the Pentagon. General Omar N. Bradley, Chief of the JCS, testified that "a lot of people were worried about the fact that the Tenth Corps were isolated from the rest of the Eighth Army and the right flank of the Eighth Army was exposed." As one step to lessen the danger the JCS suggested to MacArthur that the two forces be placed under one command in the field, instead of directed by him from Tokyo, but this was not done.¹²³

The Chinese forces quickly entered the huge gap between the two UN armies and turned general assault into headlong retreat, bringing also a storm of criticism upon MacArthur from our European allies. Delegates at Lake Success wanted to know why he should launch an offensive just on the eve of the arrival of the delegation of Chinese communists at Lake Success. The French Government felt that he had possibly "launched his offensive at this time to wreck the negotiations by the French and the British for a settlement of the frontier issue with the Chinese Communists." The British *New Statesman and Nation* declared that MacArthur had "acted in defiance of all common sense, and in such a way as to provoke the most peace loving nation." The "task now is to persuade the American public that Communist China is no longer a backward colonial territory, but a Great Power which must be accepted

¹²¹ *The New York Times*, November 14; *New York Herald Tribune*, November 16, 17, 1950.

¹²² *New York Herald Tribune*, November 24, 1950; Peter Fleming, "War in Korea," *Spectator*, December 8, 1950, p. 645; *MacArthur Hearings*, Pt. 2, p. 974.

¹²³ *MacArthur Hearings*, Pt. 2, pp. 973-4, 1251.

on terms of equality."¹²⁴ The conservative French newspaper, *Le Monde*, observed that "the obstinate refusal by Washington to let the representatives of the real China enter the UN, the taking over of Formosa, the presence of G.I.'s at the Manchurian border, had created a psychosis of encirclement which could not be alleviated by the added threat of bombing attacks on Chinese territory."¹²⁵ A British writer added the highly pertinent observation that "when foreign enemies believed to favor counter-revolution approach revolution's frontiers, the flash-point of patriotic resistance is certain to be reached."¹²⁶

A responsible American writer, McGeorge Bundy, went further and plainly labelled MacArthur as a provocator. Neither our own policy nor that of the UN required his dash to the Manchurian border "and this MacArthur knew. . . . The decision was his; it was provocation."¹²⁷

The general belief that MacArthur had deliberately sought to extend the war was voiced by one of his biographers as follows: "MacArthur, having scouted the ground personally for what was to have been his final advance crashed into a colossal trap—moreover, a trap about which he was fully aware."¹²⁸

"*MacArthur's Disaster.*" The *New York Herald Tribune* underlined editorially the deliberate nature of the blunder in an editorial headed "MacArthur's Disaster." When a Chinese attack suddenly unhinged his army's advance in early November he had issued a dramatic communique complaining that the Communists had "committed one of the most offensive acts of international lawlessness of historic record." Continuing, MacArthur had said that "a possible trap was surreptitiously laid calculated to encompass the destruction of the UN forces." Then, said the editor, "Just nineteen days later General MacArthur walked directly into the trap he had described." It was "difficult to put confidence in the military capacity of a headquarters which has so gravely compounded blunder by confusion of facts and intelligence."¹²⁹

One of two conclusions was inescapable. Either MacArthur was a highly incompetent military commander, or he was deliberately trying to extend the war into a conflict with China.

Confronted by disaster MacArthur denied he had meant the home by Christmas part seriously. He declared that the United Nations faced "an entirely new war" and called upon it for "a solution," a remark which many regarded as a proposal to carry the war to China.

In the United States there was some puzzlement at these sudden developments. Headlines asked "What does Mao want?" The *U.S. News and World Report* giving the "Inside Story of the Korean Muddle," on December 8, 1950, explained that "Communist China sent the North Koreans across the

¹²⁴ *The New Statesman and Nation*, December 2, 1950, p. 529; December 16, p. 613.

¹²⁵ Quoted by Lionel Durand in *The Progressive*, February 15, 1951, p. 11.

¹²⁶ E. M. Gull, "Korea: A Restatement," *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 179, March 1951, pp. 137-8.

¹²⁷ "Appeasement, Provocation and Policy," *The Reporter*, January 9, 1951, pp. 15-16.

¹²⁸ John Gunther, *op cit.*, p. 39.

¹²⁹ December 6, 1950.

38th Parallel and plotted a simultaneous attack upon Formosa when the U.S. Seventh Fleet interposed its strength as a preventive." Apparently it hadn't been Russia which had ordered the Korean Reds over the border after all, but China.

However, at Lake Success Ambassador Austin still refused to concede to China any independent interest or will along the vital Yalu River. He declared that "only one conclusion can be drawn from the action of the Peiping regime; it has acted against the interests of the Chinese people and on behalf of Russian colonial policy in Asia."¹³⁰

The A-Bomb Rattled. On November 30 President Truman read a very grave statement to his Press Conference, calling for world-wide mobilization against communism, and afterwards added some remarks indicating that if military action against China was authorized by the United Nations, General MacArthur might be empowered to use the atomic bomb at his discretion. He said there had always been active consideration of the bomb's use. It was one of our military weapons.

This rattling of the bomb had an electric effect upon our allies in Europe, who had every reason to believe that they would be obliterated if A-bombs started dropping. When told of the President's statement a Belgian official gasped "Oh, No!" One of his colleagues said that if the bomb "should be used I'd rather not think about what would happen." France and Germany were alarmed. Indeed, "the alarm came rolling back in waves from all over the world."¹³¹ For several days "the State Department was deluged with cables and official visits from North Atlantic Pact ambassadors, asking where General MacArthur was leading the United Nations."¹³²

In Britain the shock was profound. Prime Minister Attlee hastily conferred with Winston Churchill and in the House of Commons demands for action became so imperative on all sides that Attlee hastily left the House to send a telegram to President Truman saying that he was coming over. Then he returned to tell the House of his trip and received a cheering ovation from the entire House. His decision was applauded by the British press and people, regardless of party. At first it was thought that the French Premier would go also, but it was decided that he should visit Washington later.

Speaking from London on December 3, 1950, Howard K. Smith, the distinguished Chief of the Columbia Broadcasting Company's European staff, described a "universal" revolt against our policy in Europe. It had been welling up in every party in each country for some time. The language of the newspapers was virtually the same from Stockholm to Rome. Europe was never so united as it was behind Attlee's mission to Washington. It was the general feeling that the United States was too much in the habit of taking vital decisions without consulting her partners, and of making many decisions to placate the Republicans.

Smith then traced the steps in the revolt of European opinion, one which came from below forcing protest at the top. The steps were: (1) MacArthur's

¹³⁰ *The New York Times*, December 8, 1950.

¹³¹ Thomas Stokes, *the Nashville Tennessean*, December 3, 1950.

¹³² Drew Pearson, *ibid.*, December 6, 1950.

visit to Chiang Kai-shek, who did not have a friend in Europe. All agreed that MacArthur had no mandate whatever, as a UN Commander, to visit Chiang. (2) After the UN had banned the introduction of Rhee's Government into North Korea, MacArthur had deliberately permitted it, negating his claim that he had always obeyed UN directives. (3) MacArthur's insistence on shoving the British buffer zone proposal aside and launching his big offensive to the North. The opinion of all Europe was voiced by a peer in the House of Lords, who asked: "Is General MacArthur trying to start a third world war?"

Accordingly, Smith concluded, Attlee was coming to Washington as the spokesman of 750,000,000 citizens of the free world. He came promptly and conducted his mission with great tact and skill, striving in each appearance, public and private, to cement the alliance between the two nations. The communique which was issued at the close of the conference on December 8 did not mention the use of the A-bomb. It was the general understanding that he had not been able to persuade the President to promise that the bomb would not be used without conference. Nevertheless, on his return to London he declared himself satisfied.

The A-Bomb Immobilized. He had grounds for his satisfaction, for two reasons. The world-wide outcry of alarm at the suggestion of using the bomb had really made it impossible for the United States to use it, unless we ourselves were attacked first with A-bombs. We had a clear warning that otherwise world opinion would recoil from us. Moreover, the British and the French had it in their power to prevent the A-bombing of Russia, since they controlled nearly all of the air bases from which the attack would have to be launched. It would be doubly necessary, therefore, to have their consent before A-bombs could be used, a consent which they were never likely to give unless Russia had first used them. Their own doom was too certain to permit any other course.

The effect upon the peoples of Asia of our being the first to use the A-bomb is also a factor generally overlooked, but highly important. The Canadian External Affairs Minister, Lester B. Pearson, pointed out that "certainly its use for a second time against an Asian people would dangerously weaken the links that remain between the Western World and the peoples of the East." The military advantages of the bomb "are likely to be far outweighed by the reactions among the peoples of the world," Pearson added, urging that the three atomic energy nations of the West—the United States, Britain and Canada—be called for joint consultation before the "immense and awful" decision to use the bomb is made.¹³³

¹³³ *New York Herald Tribune*, December 5, 1950.

A few months later, on April 10, 1951, the same Canadian minister created a sensation in the UN by warning that the days of "easy and automatic relations" with the United States are a thing of the past. He emphasized repeatedly that Canada intended to march forward with the United States, "in pursuit of objectives which we share," but that she was unwilling any longer to be "merely an echo of somebody else's voice." Canada intended to prevent the United Nations from becoming "too much the instrument of any one country." —*The New York Times*, April 11, 1951. The article was headlined: "Canada Bars Role as Yes-Man of U.S."

Scorched Earth Retreat. Meanwhile, the UN forces retreated precipitately, in bitter sub-zero temperatures, all through December and January. One large force was taken out of a bridge-head at Hungnam; the others made their way south by land, employing a "scorched earth" policy which left millions of Koreans homeless and hungry, while stories of huge Chinese forces, anywhere from 1,000,000 to 1,500,000, came out of Tokyo, though the number actually employed was nearer 400,000.¹³⁴

Allied Dissent. The dilemma which this military disaster posed for the United States was described by James Reston in a long, authoritative article in which he detailed the debates between Attlee and Acheson at Washington.

The British argued that there should be comprehensive peace negotiations with China, covering all the questions at issue. Acheson was willing to talk about a cease-fire with the Chinese on the 38th Parallel, but he would talk about Korea alone—no negotiations on Formosa, or the recognition of the Peking Government, or its right to China's seat in UN. If strictly limited negotiations were rejected he would pursue a limited war in Korea, lest the Japanese and others begin making deals with Moscow. He would not negotiate from weakness.

The British "took a totally different approach." They felt that there was no chance of getting peace unless all the issues were considered. The Chinese having the military advantage would surely refuse to negotiate on Korea alone, and this fundamental difference remained when the British returned to London. Reston added that Canada was "more strongly opposed to the Acheson Far Eastern policy than the British," and that Western Europe was against us in this argument. Our allies had had their doubts about crossing the 38th, and these had grown as we ignored China's warning and ended their efforts to get a buffer zone in North Korea. Now there was something of a rebellion within the Western coalition against the "tough" U.S. policy in the Far East.¹³⁵

Disaster Reactions. Walter Lippmann evaluated the Truman-Attlee conferences as having averted any sudden decisions which would break up the Atlantic alliance.¹³⁶ But the mental and emotional pressure of the Korean disaster upon American leaders continued to be extreme. Nothing comparable had ever happened to the United States before. President Truman, who had long refused ever to go abroad to meet Stalin again, had to be dissuaded, by some reports, from going to Moscow to "lay it on the line" to Stalin—"it" meaning the atomic bomb. Henry Wallace, who had deserted his Progressive Party soon after the North Korean invasion in June now accepted the orthodox view of the Cold War. He was sure that Russia wanted to dominate the world. He said: "Her actions in Western Tibet prove that she is out to dominate all Asia, and therefore the world."¹³⁷

The Alsops, also giving the Kremlin credit for full mastery of China,

¹³⁴ William Stringer, the *Christian Science Monitor*, January 11, 1951.

¹³⁵ James Reston, the *New York Times*, December 10, 1950.

¹³⁶ *New York Herald Tribune*, December 11, 1950.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, December 4, 1950. It was China, not Russia, which was taking over Tibet.

thought the Truman-Attlee conferees were "alike in not really knowing which way to turn or what to do." The *Herald Tribune* specialists in disaster were now certain that the Kremlin had "speeded up its time-table in a way that the worst pessimists never anticipated." MacArthur's rash dash to the Yalu was given no credit for precipitating events. In the "crucial directive No. 68," issued in March 1950, said the Alsops, the National Security Council had set "the time of utmost peril as 1953-4. By then the Council agreed the Soviet Union would be ready for major aggression." But now "the new time of utmost peril is 1950-1." Now the experts and leaders of our government "expect major Soviet aggression now, today, tomorrow, next month, next spring, next summer." It was no use "pretending that much can be accomplished" before the crisis, but every man and weapon "will surely be needed somewhere, somehow and soon."¹³⁸

Anne O'Hare McCormick reported again that travellers arriving from Europe, and even from Canada and Mexico, were "astonished at the state of alarm that prevails in this country. Some call us over-excited, even hysterical," but others wondered if they had been asleep.¹³⁹

Truman Doctrine Fruits. Discussing "The Crisis of Confidence," Lippmann asked again whether a succession of resounding global declarations and snap decisions to fight wars constituted statesmanship. In the place of a reasoned doctrine of national security we had the Truman Doctrine, in the application of which, and contrary to the considered judgment of every competent soldier, the American army and all its reserves had been sucked into a peninsula of Asia "in defiance of overwhelmingly superior forces." Great doctrines must not be improvised merely to get some appropriations for Greece and Turkey and great military commitments must not be made "in a few excited days, reversing the whole strategical judgment of the past."

It was nonsense, said Lippmann, "to suppose that the smaller number can encircle and contain the larger and that this can be done across two oceans." There would be an ever stronger demand for armed isolationism "if the inflated globalism of the Truman-Acheson policy is not deflated." The reaction could also take the form of a preventive war, which would use our allies as expendable material and destroy them.¹⁴⁰

The disaster in Korea did indeed reveal the tragically impromptu nature of the Truman-Acheson foreign policy. Needing a few hundred million dollars from a parsimonious Congress, they had thrown out the world girdling Truman Doctrine of containment, a project manifestly beyond our power to enforce, since we live on the small island and the Soviet Union is at the heart and center of the much greater World Island. Then when the Doctrine proved

¹³⁸ *The Nashville Tennessean*, December 10, 24, 1950.

¹³⁹ *The New York Times*, December 16, 1950.

¹⁴⁰ *The Nashville Tennessean*, December 19 and 20. Herbert Hoover made two powerful addresses in this period which won acclaim from a large part of the press. On December 20, he argued that "a land war against this Communist land mass would be a war without victory." We could never reach Moscow and the Reds could never invade North America. He urged that the Western Hemisphere be made "the Gibraltar of Western civilization," holding both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.—*Herald Tribune*, December 21, 1950.

unenforceable in Asia the Republicans drove Acheson and Truman, by slow reluctant steps, to the point of plunging suddenly into war in Korea. Defeat resulting, with the explosive aid of a self-willed Republican general, there seemed to be nothing to do but declare a national emergency, on December 16, 1950, and appropriate astronomical sums in an effort to enforce containment.

Nine months before the Korean war the Russian achievement of the A-bomb had deprived Acheson and Truman of their only existing means of enforcing containment. Thereafter they could not use the A-bomb without losing or destroying their allies in Europe. But instead of altering their policy they resolved to mobilize the greatly superior industrial resources of the Western world and press on through an infinitely dangerous zone to a time when containment could be enforced by H-bombs and arms of all kinds. Steady nerves and "total diplomacy," which means no diplomacy, would do it.

Truman was a resolute and courageous man, but it was Acheson who supplied the iron resolution to push the policy of arming for negotiation without wavering. Nor did any diplomat in all modern history ever gamble more baldly and coolly, for the highest stakes. It was Acheson who suddenly confronted our Allies on September 12, 1950, with what Lippmann called "the grossly miscalculated and misinformed effort to re-arm the Germans."¹⁴¹ German rearmament would mean not only an all-out American commitment to defend Western Europe, "but to liberate Eastern Europe." Such commitments came from paying more attention to "immediate popularity at home than to a prudent estimate of the national resources."

Taking up Acheson's formula that it is possible to negotiate only from equal or superior strength, Lippmann replied that the resort to diplomacy was never so essential as when a nation does not have that equal or superior position. It was "a catastrophic error to suspend diplomacy and to teach people to feel dishonoured by diplomacy, on the theory that the race of armaments must first be won." The truth was that it would never be won unless diplomacy compensated for our military weakness.

There was "no justification whatever," Lippmann continued, for thinking that the Russians and the Poles would obligingly wait until we had military superiority when all they had to do was to move larger and larger parts of their enormous forces over toward the Elbe. Russia had warned us on October 18 that she would "not tolerate" the revival of the Germany Army. It would be an "unforgivable omission" if the West did not engage the Russians "deeply and patiently and persistently" in negotiations about German rearmament.¹⁴²

Russian Warnings About Germany Ignored. Coming on the heels of the ignored warning from China, one would have thought that the Russian warning about Germany would be heeded, since it was reinforced by another equally grave warning from Moscow to London and Paris in mid-December,¹⁴³ and emphasized by still more serious notes to Britain and France on January 21,

¹⁴¹ *The Nashville Tennessean*, December 20, 1950.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, December 6, 1950.

¹⁴³ *The New York Times*, December 17, 1950.

1951, reiterating "in language of great force" the contention that remilitarization of Germany constituted a prime threat to European peace.¹⁴⁴

These warnings were buttressed by the common sense knowledge of the average man "that the rearming of Germany will be the flash-point for World War III."¹⁴⁵ The Germans knew in their bones that their rearmament was the one thing that would make the Soviet peoples accept war.¹⁴⁶

Yet none of these considerations had the slightest effect on Acheson. He went to Brussels on December 17, 1950, "nevertheless determined to proceed despite these open warnings." The headline said that he went "to prod West on defences," and he secured an agreement from the North Atlantic powers to establish an integrated armed force, which Germany would join later. Many delegates were nervous, but they went along. One of the delegates commented that the meeting was harmonious, "but it is essentially unsound." Foreign Minister Schuman was sure that the Kremlin was not fooling, and another diplomat deplored Acheson's failure "to remember what he himself would do were he in the position of an enemy."¹⁴⁷

This was one thing that Acheson was incapable of doing. He came home telling Congressional leaders that the Brussels Conference had laid plans for building a 3,000,000 man army in three years.¹⁴⁸ Salisbury warned from Moscow that German rearmament was crucial to the Kremlin, that the question whether there would be a third world war depended on what was done about it,¹⁴⁹ but Acheson and Truman were deflected not a whit. Truman closed the year with a speech in which he called the Reds the present day heirs of Mongol killers and summoned all men to mobilize against "the menace" of the inheritors of Ghengis Khan and Tamerlane, who were "the greatest murderers in the history of the world."¹⁵⁰

Diplomatic Deadlock. In this atmosphere it is not very strange that the Chinese delegation which had come to Lake Success to discuss the Formosan question proved to be full of bitterness, rejecting a cease-fire proposal as a trap and returning to Peking with nothing to show for their trip. With our armies still retreating rapidly, China's terms—the evacuation of Korea and Formosa, recognition, and China's seat in the UN—offered the United States Government nothing, particularly since it was engaged in a contest of will to avoid negotiating with Russia until the United States was the stronger party militarily. A Gallup Poll showed that a majority of Americans were willing to seat Communist China in UN, if a majority so voted. The vote was 57 per cent for, 28 per cent against and 15 per cent non-committal.¹⁵¹ However, the contrary argument soon prevailed in Washington that China could not "shoot" her way into the UN. All of its charter members, it might be added,

¹⁴⁴ *The New York Times*, December 17, 1950.

¹⁴⁵ Raymond Danell in a dispatch from London to the *New York Times*, December 17, 1950.

¹⁴⁶ Drew Middleton, *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ C. L. Sulzberger, the *New York Times*, December 19, 1950.

¹⁴⁸ Ned Russell, *New York Herald Tribune*, December 23, 1950.

¹⁴⁹ *The New York Times*, December 25, 1950.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, December 24, 1950.

¹⁵¹ *The Nashville Tennessean*, January 11, 1951.

were shooters. Non-shooters, like Sweden, had to wait a while before being admitted.

THE CHINESE INVASION OF SOUTH KOREA

The Chinese then became "dizzy with success" and decided they would sweep us out of Korea. They crossed the 38th late in December and pressed well into South Korea before a battle line was set up across the peninsula late in January. Early in that month MacArthur thought he would probably have to evacuate Korea, but the situation improved rapidly and by the time General Collins reached Korea, in mid-January, he was able to announce confidently that the UN troops would remain in Korea.¹⁵²

Lippmann counselled the evacuation of Korea, but for the purpose of concentrating great strength in Japan as the background for a peace treaty with Japan and a general Far Eastern settlement. He thought this preferable to declaring Red China the aggressor and carrying on a limited war which at best would be futile and at worst would lead to a catastrophe throughout Asia. He suggested, too, that withdrawal should not be accompanied by "the noisy speeches, the trite generalities and the empty gestures which those who are administering our interests in the United Nations seem so addicted to." They had declaimed enough and protested too much.¹⁵³

World-Wide Appeals for Negotiation. As the year 1951 opened there were some who still wanted negotiation, before the two sides reached the never-never land of mutually satisfactory armaments. On New Year's Day Pope Pius XII again called upon the Soviet Union and the Western powers to negotiate a settlement of their differences, and a week later Dr. O. Frederick Nolde, preaching in the Washington Cathedral, recognized the current in which we were caught when he cautioned that "as we grow stronger, we must be careful to increase rather than to diminish our readiness to negotiate." He called for a rejection of pride and face-saving tendencies in favor of results.¹⁵⁴

The National Council of the Churches of Christ in America also issued an appeal to the Government to negotiate without appeasing, and to "implement, with all possible dispatch, a program of assistance to the underprivileged peoples of the world." To believe that nations were "being driven into war by some blind destiny beyond their power to resist is fatalism of the most pagan sort," the appeal said.

On January 12 the nine prime ministers of the British Commonwealth

¹⁵² *The New York Times*, December 31, 1950; the *Christian Science Monitor*, January 16, 1951; *MacArthur Hearings*, Pt. 1, p. 737. Senator Taft advocated evacuating Korea and "releasing" Chiang's forces upon China. Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia urged evacuation because he feared the spread of the war in Asia would touch off World War III and engulf his country.—*The Nashville Tennessean*, January 8; the *New York Times*, January 8; *New York Herald Tribune*, January 10, 1951.

¹⁵³ *The Nashville Tennessean*, January 12, 1951. During the month of August 1950, while Soviet delegate Malik was carrying on a violent propaganda campaign as chairman of the Security Council, Ambassador Warren Austin had won spontaneous applause from television audiences by his "tough, arrogant, sneering" speeches. He became "the big shot of the United Nations."—Bascomb Timmons, *ibid.*, August 6, 1950.

¹⁵⁴ *The New York Times*, January 1, 8, 1951.

issued a declaration at the close of their conference in which they made it clear to the world, as they had to each other, that "we would welcome any feasible arrangement for a frank exchange of views with Stalin or with Mao Tse-tung. We should in the name of humanity make a supreme effort to see clearly into each other's hearts and minds." We "must do what we can to understand those who appear to differ from us."

The peace and prosperity of the free world could not be assured while millions live in poverty, the statement continued. For this reason the Commonwealth had sponsored the Colombo Plan of economic and technical aid to Asia (a little Marshall Plan of which not much was heard in the United States). The problem of peace was that of removing the causes of war; of easing tension and promoting understanding; and of "being at all times willing to discuss our differences without foolishly assuming that all attempts to secure peace are a form of appeasement."¹⁵⁵

Supremacy Through Power. This appeal from our best friends struck no answering chord in the United States, where the emphasis was all on prevailing by power, not on understanding those who differed from us.

Governor Thomas E. Dewey expressed the Acheson-Truman Cold War doctrine perfectly when he delivered his third inaugural address on January 1. Portraying the great triumph of the Kremlin in embroiling us with China, he urged that in addition to maintaining "our priceless superiority in atomic warfare" we should "also maintain invulnerable bases around the world" from which to send the bomb. He did not say what we would think if the Soviet Union sought to encircle us with such a ring of death-dealing bases, but he was sure that we still had "the mightiest industrial plant in the world" and that "much of the industrial might of Germany and Japan can also be mobilized—this time on the side of freedom, if we are swift and strong enough in action."¹⁵⁶

General Emmet (Rosie) O'Donnell wanted to use the A-bomb on the Chinese at once. "They'll understand the lash when it is put to them," he said. As Marquis Childs pointed out: "Here for every Asian is a picture of the bent back submitted to the lash of the white master."¹⁵⁷

Branding China. This was the motif which continued to guide the action of the United States. We had the power and it would prevail. In his address of

¹⁵⁵ *The New York Times*, January 13, 1951. The Commonwealth chiefs also regarded as premature and ill-timed the U.S. proposal to brand China as an aggressor.—Jack Lait, *New York Herald Tribune*, January 9, 1951.

¹⁵⁶ *New York Herald Tribune*, January 2, 1951.

Planners in Washington, London and Paris all agreed that the Soviet Union would not attack during 1951, but the Alsops would not have it so. They fixed April, May or June as "the probable date of the final Soviet move in Europe," and repeatedly pointed to Yugoslavia as the point of attack.—*The New York Times*, January 5, 8; *the Nashville Tennessean*, January 7, 9, 28; February 8, 1951.

Charles G. Ralls, national commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, declared that we had been at war with Soviet Russia for 20 years. This was true "because every five-year plan of Russia has been aimed at world revolution."—*The Nashville Tennessean*, January 7, 1951.

¹⁵⁷ *The Nashville Tennessean*, January 19, 21, 1951.

December 20 Herbert Hoover had demanded that the United Nations "declare Communist China an aggressor" and this became the national battle cry. China should be branded and sanctions levied against her.

On January 5, the United States sent notes to 29 governments warning that the UN might collapse unless China was branded, and our delegates brought similar pressure on the delegates of the 29 nations at Lake Success. However, the desire for another cease-fire effort was too strong and our Government felt compelled to await this effort, especially since it was sure that the attempt would fail. The UN proposal submitted on January 11, 1951, called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops "by appropriate stages," and a conference by the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China to work out a settlement, including the Formosan question and China's representation in the UN.

Reports that the Administration was not resisting this proposal produced a terrific outcry in the Congress, which was not lessened by China's counter proposal of a seven nation conference and the withdrawal of the U.S. Seventh Fleet from the Formosan Straits. Though the Chinese note was not addressed to the United States, Secretary Acheson promptly denounced it as unacceptable, demanding further UN action. Most of the Arab-Asian bloc and some of our European allies held that the Chinese reply was not a rejection, but a bargaining step. Prime Minister Nehru of India warned that to brand China as an aggressor would be "to bolt and bar the door to a peaceful settlement in the Far East,"¹⁵⁸ but the United States would not be denied. A terse resolution branding China and demanding further action against her was introduced in the General Assembly on January 20 and pressed to swift passage. On the 19th the House of Representatives passed a resolution demanding branding, with only two dissenting votes. It was timed to confront the UN Political Committee when it met at 3:00 P.M. on the same day.

In the debate Sir Benegal Rau denied that China's reply was a rejection; it was "partly acceptance, partly non-acceptance, partly a request for elucidation, and partly a set of counter proposals." On the 22nd Rau presented some further modifications of the Chinese reply and the United States was unable to block a 48 hour adjournment to consider these points.

The next day the U.S. Senate passed unanimously a demand that China be branded and a declaration that she should not be "admitted" to UN, and on the 25th the Senate sidetracked for four months India's request for 2,000,000 tons of wheat urgently needed for famine relief. On the same day President Truman issued a statement announcing his preference for "calling an aggressor an aggressor," and the branding resolution passed on January 30, after amendments to placate the stout opposition to sanctions and to alleviate fears that it would close the door to peaceful settlement.

"*Trading Policy for Time.*" Lippmann found no satisfaction in these events. They reminded him of September 1950 when Mr. Acheson "ordered Mr. Austin to mount his white charger and lead the hosts of righteousness across the 38th Parallel," having no clear idea of what would follow after we had

¹⁵⁸ *The New York Times*, January 18, 1951.

lined up the votes at UN. Now again the adjectives resounded and the periods were rolling, with the result that we had exposed our own weakness in Asia. The issue was Asia, yet of the countries of Asia we had with us on the branding vote the Philippines, Thailand and Formosa. In the Middle East we had some votes, but we had "no important supporters in Asia, and only reluctant supporters in Europe." We had "used the whole apparatus of the United Nations to make a spectacular demonstration that Asia is not with us." The victory for which Mr. Austin thanked God was "a self-inflicted defeat."

There was little reason, Lippmann concluded, to hope that Acheson, who had survived during the past year by "trading policy for time," would not now have to go through the door of expanded hostilities in Asia. This kind of thing would go on until we got "a Secretary of State who had the confidence of the nation and does not have to appease his personal enemies."¹⁵⁹

This was perhaps the keenest thrust ever made at Secretary Acheson. While his enemies were yapping at his heels for not fighting China, and for sheltering a horde of alleged Communists in the State Department, he had actually been trading sound policy for additional time in office, by appeasing his opponents. Lippmann might have added that each concession that Acheson made only whetted the appetite of his enemies.

What Was Gained? The entire episode gained no credit for American leadership in the UN. The extreme tactics used to force the branding resolution through had employed everything in our arsenal of pressure weapons, short of steaming a couple of battleships up the East River and training their guns on the UN's new headquarters. The forcing of our will upon many friendly and reluctant governments had left them in the frame of mind described by James Reston when he wrote that the United Nations would have taken pleasure in passing a resolution that it was the sense of the members that the United States had been "undiplomatic, unwise, emotional, contradictory and slightly hypocritical in its handling of the Chinese Communists for more than a year now."¹⁶⁰

Moreover, China could have been branded sooner if the United States had not insisted in tying economic and military sanctions into the resolution. Yet the Truman Administration did not want to spread the war by applying military sanctions to China. It was still following the course of attempting to appease its domestic opposition and it was using the UN to draw off some of the opposition criticism from itself.¹⁶¹

On the issue of branding China, our Government correctly represented infuriated American public opinion, stymied on the battlefield for the first time in its history. Yet, aside from assuaging our pride somewhat and fortifying our sense of moral rectitude, what was gained? If there was doubt in some men's minds throughout the non-American world about our moral position after we crossed the 38th, the branding resolution would hardly kill the doubt. Nor would it remove the conviction in Asiatic and European minds that the Chinese were acting in self defense.

¹⁵⁹ *The Nashville Tennessean*, February 5, 1951.

¹⁶⁰ James Reston, *the New York Times*, January 28, 1951, Section IV, p. 3.

¹⁶¹ James Reston, "Why We Irritate Our Allies," *Harpers Magazine*, May 1951, p. 33.

What the branding resolution did was to inflict a scarring wound on the national pride of revolutionary China and make it certain that the Korean war would go on at least until a frightful mountain of casualties compelled negotiation. After this resolution was passed we had no choice but to pursue what we ourselves labelled the policy of "Operation Killer," slaughter without end until Chinese pride could be smothered, temporarily at least, in a sea of blood—slaughter also which "lost us what we cannot afford to lose—the mind of man in Asia."¹⁶²

The war ground on accordingly for another six months, at which time we claimed 1,165,000 enemy casualties to 246,000 on our side, and a stalemate settlement seemed in sight. If the estimate of enemy casualties be cut in half, say 750,000, the same figure would probably approximate the military losses on both sides after the aggression of North Korea was decisively defeated. Surely this is a heavy price to pay for the double error of invading North Korea and denying China's moral right to react against MacArthur's race to her borders.

Stalin's Protest. The dynamic of the Cold War led toward discounting anything the Russians might say, and to refusing to listen to what they said. Nevertheless, the comments of Stalin on the branding of China were arresting. He declared in a *Pravda* interview on February 16, 1951, that "one must lose the last vestiges of conscience to contend that the United States, which had appropriated Chinese territory—the island of Taiwan—and which invaded Korea close to the frontiers of China" was the party defending itself. By making this "shameful decision" the United Nations was "turned into the tool of aggressive war." It was "not so much a world organization as an organization for the Americans." It was "taking the inglorious road of the League of Nations. In this way it is burying its moral prestige and dooming itself to disintegration."

Was Russia Arming for World Conquest? In the same interview Stalin denied at length the charge that Russia was arming for war. He declared that there was no state in the world which could "develop civilian industry to the full, lavish great constructive projects," requiring hundreds of thousands of millions in budget expenditure, "continue the policy of systematic price reduction for consumer goods," invest enormous sums in restoring the national economy destroyed by the German invaders and on top of all this "multiply its armed forces and develop its war industries." Such an attempt would mean certain bankruptcy. He cited the experience of Britain to show that an arms race leads "to developing war industry, to curtailing civilian industry, to stopping civilian construction work, to increased taxation, to a rise in the price of consumer goods."¹⁶³

In the autumn of 1951 it was difficult for any American to deny that these were the effects of the arms race, even upon the giant American economy, and the same effects would have to operate much more forcibly in the very much weaker Soviet economy. On the other hand, it was not to be doubted that Russia never disbanded her great war machine, as we did. That would be

¹⁶² Pearl Buck, "What Asians Want," *Christian Century*, June 27, 1951, pp. 760-3.

¹⁶³ *The New York Times*, February 17, 1951.

impossible in a country that had suffered as she had. The war classes of men were doubtless demobilized, but the army was not. It was, of course, greatly reduced, but enough of the war industries were kept running to keep a great force well supplied. A steady policy of this kind could preserve great armed strength and still leave large resources for reconstruction and peaceful development.

That the latter was proceeding vigorously in the Soviet Union was indicated in a research article by Harry Schwartz in the *New York Times* on January 29. By vast canal building operations the Russians expected by the spring of 1952 to move ocean going ships from the Black Sea to the Baltic, across the great Russian plain, and by 1957, when the huge Volga dams were completed, they hoped to eliminate the effects of summer drouth on the waterway levels. Schwartz ascribed a strategic motive to these giant undertakings. However, aside from the prospect of land-locked Russia being blockaded, the linking up of "8000 miles of riverways in the Don and Dnieper basins with about 18,000 miles of riverways in the Volga valley and in Northwest European Russia" would be of immense peacetime benefit to the Soviet Union, along with the avoidance of the long circuitous sea route from the Baltic around Western Europe through the Mediterranean and the Black Seas.

THE MACARTHUR CRISIS

Victory at the 38th. After two months more of fighting, General MacArthur visited the Korean battlefield, on March 7, and issued a statement saying that a stalemate was indicated, assuming "a continuation of the existing limitation on our freedom of counter-offensive action." A few days later, General Ridgway, who had largely superseded MacArthur as the actual commander in Korea, declared that if the war ended with UN troops at the 38th Parallel he would consider the result "a tremendous victory."¹⁶⁴

So it would be, from the standpoint of the United Nations. It would accomplish exactly what it set out to achieve, the defeat of the North Korean aggression. But alas, Ridgway was not expressing that idea. "We set out to stop Communism," he declared, voicing our Cold War objective.

Regardless of which war we were fighting, the idea of stopping the war around the 38th was attractive to Lake Success. On March 13 UN diplomats reported that the idea of unifying Korea by military victory was being quietly dropped. More and more Western delegates were saying that the restoration of peace and security "in the area," meant South Korea, not the whole country.¹⁶⁵

Unless something were done it seemed apparent that a stalemate was going to be accepted. The issue was acute also because the UN forces were approaching the 38th Parallel again. The situation was ripe for some diplomatic initiative. There seemed to be a tendency for our actor-diplomats, as Lippmann called them, "to turn off the lights, shut down the microphones . . . and let a few men absent themselves from publicity for a while."

Behind the scenes a serious effort was being made to work out an overture

¹⁶⁴ *The New York Times*, March 8, 13, 1951.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, March 14, 1951.

to the Chinese which might stop the war. It was to take the form of a public statement by President Truman and the text was being circulated to the governments of the 13 UN members which had troops in Korea.

The proposed statement pointed out that "the aggressors" in Korea had been driven

"back to the general vicinity from which the unlawful attack was first launched and that, therefore, the principal objective of repelling North Korean and Chinese Communist aggression against the South Korean Republic had been achieved.

"It asserted that further United Nations objectives, such as unification and the establishment of a free government in all of Korea, could and should be accomplished without further fighting or blood-shed.

"The Chinese Communists were, in effect, given an invitation to cease fire and to agree to a settlement of outstanding issues by negotiation."¹⁶⁶

The proposal did not openly abandon the objective of a united, Western-controlled Korea, but it practically did so by suggesting an end to the fighting when it was near the 38th. Peace by negotiation, instead of by unconditional surrender and victory, was plainly offered. It was to be a real peace including "the peaceful settlement of other problems, as is envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations." China would have a good chance of gaining her seat in the UN and of recovering Formosa, even from the Western majority, since in both cases the long term logic was on her side. For its part, the authority of the UN would be vindicated and maintained, an epochal gain in world history.

While this hopeful solution of an essentially stalemated situation was being canvassed among the 13 Allies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a dispatch to MacArthur, on March 20, 1951, which said

"State planning a Presidential announcement shortly that with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggressors, United Nations now prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea. United Nations feeling exists that further diplomatic efforts toward settlement should be made before any advance with major forces north of the thirty-eighth parallel. Time will be required to determine diplomatic reactions and permit new negotiations that may develop.

"Recognizing that the parallel has no military significance, State has asked Joint Chiefs of Staff what authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks to provide security for United Nations forces and maintain contact with the enemy. Your recommendation desired."¹⁶⁷

Two matters were discussed in this message, both very clearly. The first paragraph carried the momentous news that a major attempt to end the war by negotiation was to be made, "before any advance with major forces north

¹⁶⁶ Testimony of General Collins in the *MacArthur Hearings*, Pt. 2, p. 1195; the *New York Times*, May 27, 1951.

¹⁶⁷ Marshall's testimony, *MacArthur Hearings*, Pt. 1, p. 343.

of the thirty-eighth parallel." The second paragraph recognized that tactical movements across the 38th might be necessary, "to provide security for United Nations forces," and asked what authority MacArthur desired to have for this limited purpose *during the negotiations*.

This was plainly one of the most important messages ever sent to the military headquarters of UN in Tokyo. To say that it meant nothing to MacArthur is to say that his sense of self sufficiency had indeed become absolute.

A Truce Frustrated by MacArthur. Four days after he received this vitally important message, MacArthur issued a cease-fire proposal of his own, in terms that were certain to be rejected. His message to the enemy explained in detail how Red China had failed on the battlefield, how it lacked the industrial capacity to provide the critical items necessary to the conduct of modern war, how with the "development of existing methods of mass destruction" China's numbers could not win. Therefore the enemy must be "painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea," by bombing and blockading China, would doom her "to the risk of imminent military collapse."

After this threat, which he had absolutely no authority to make, MacArthur went on to say that he stood ready to "confer in the field with the commander-in-chief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations" might be accomplished.¹⁶⁸

In other words, if the Chinese would confess themselves licked, the Supreme Commander would accept their surrender, though it was not the Chinese who were proposing a cease-fire. Knowing well that he was meddling in politics, MacArthur was careful to talk about "military means" of achieving the UN's objectives, meaning the unification of Korea under our auspices. The "military means" of doing this were, obviously, not an armistice in the field but a vast expansion of the war. MacArthur toured the battlefield after his statement, making it plain to the newspapermen that he did not intend to let the Chinese regroup above the 38th.¹⁶⁹

The General had completely torpedoed the effort of the United States and the United Nations to bring the slaughter in Korea to an end. Peking spurned the MacArthur "offer" as an insolent ultimatum, not justified by military events, and there was nothing to do but abandon the UN's effort to stop the war. Marshall said later:

"At the time the foregoing statement was issued the clearance of the proposed Presidential declaration with the other thirteen nations having forces in Korea had very nearly been completed. In view of the serious impact of General MacArthur's statement on the negotiations with these nations, it became necessary to abandon the effort, thus losing whatever chance there may have been at that time to negotiate a settlement of the Korean conflict."¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ *The New York Times*, March 24, 1951.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, March 25, 1951.

¹⁷⁰ *MacArthur Hearings*, May 7, 1951, Pt. 1, p. 344.

In his defense MacArthur admitted that he had received the JCS message of March 20, but he asserted that "it had nothing whatever to do with my statement, though. The President is constantly, as I understand it, engaged in methods to try to bring the thing to an end, and the message I received hadn't the slightest bearing upon the statement I put out, which was a military appraisal, my military appraisal of the situation, and my offer to meet the commander-in-chief to discuss peace terms." He had done it twice before, MacArthur continued, and "there is nothing unusual or unorthodox or improper that I can possibly read into the statement I made on September 24 . . . I mean March 24." Questioned by Senator Morse, MacArthur said that the message of March 20 to him was "merely normal." The "purpose of the message was to find out what modifications might be necessary in limiting our advances north."¹⁷¹

This is perhaps the classic example of a general grown so great that nothing which the President of the United States or the United Nations did meant anything to him. He was willing for the President to be busy "constantly" trying "to bring the thing to an end." It didn't matter to MacArthur, or doubtless to legions of his worshippers, but his brush-off of the President and the UN did not pass with his military colleagues and superiors. Marshall agreed with the statement that MacArthur "jumped the gun," putting us "again" in the position of speaking "with two voices" and said that "it should have been evident to him that that would very seriously complicate, if not terminate at that time," the President's effort as "the executive agent of the United Nations."

Bradley testified "I certainly would not have issued any such statement under those circumstances." Collins said that MacArthur "had been clearly notified" by the JCS that the President intended to speak very shortly and "he thereby as a field commander did something that a field commander ought not to do with respect to a proposed statement by his Commander-in-Chief." One or two parts of the two statements were so similar that Admiral Sherman wondered if MacArthur had obtained a text of the President's proposed statement through one of the 13 nations concerned, but General Vandenberg held that "whether the text had been sent or not would have made very little difference to me." He would either have cleared his armistice statement or waited for more information, and General Wedemeyer, who was very sympathetic to MacArthur, agreed that MacArthur "should have communicated with his commander-in-chief in advance of offering terms of surrender in the field."¹⁷²

Later MacArthur came close to admitting in a speech to the American Legion that he had deliberately torpedoed the President's effort to stop the war. There was, he said, "little doubt that the yielding of Formosa and the seating of China in the United Nations was fully planned when I called upon the enemy commander in Korea on March 24 to meet me in the field to arrange armistice terms." He had "unquestionably wrecked the secret plan to yield on these issues as the price for peace in Korea." Then "there followed the

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, Pt. 1, pp. 70-2.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, Pt. 1, p. 899; Pt. 2, pp. 900, 1193, 1545, 1591; Pt. 3, p. 2349.

violent Washington reaction against me for what was actually so normal a military move."¹⁷³

The intentional frustration of the political objectives of the United States Government and of the United Nations was to MacArthur only "so normal a military move."

MacArthur's March intervention produced "virtually unanimous unhappiness" at Lake Success, and a wave of anger throughout the Western world, not to mention its effect in the Communist orbit. On March 31, the pro-American London *Economist* greeted it as "one of the most mischievous of all his pronouncements." *The Times* of March 29 was hardly less indignant. The House of Commons seethed and the French press was equally critical. Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Minister of External Affairs, declared it was "unwise and dangerous for Generals to interfere in political strategy," and Premier Nehru of India grimly promised his uneasy colleagues that "certainly no field Commander is going to lay down the policies of the Government of India."¹⁷⁴

On March 26 it was announced that the President had directly ordered MacArthur to obey the directive of December 6, 1950, that all speeches be cleared before issuance, but the State Department reprimanded the General so gently that on March 31 the *New Statesman and Nation* scoffed at this method of handling "the great panjandrum" and on April 9 the *New Republic* thought there would be little effect on "this colossal egotist."

One of the two serious errors which Leland Goodrich found in his study of our conduct of the UN policing operation in Korea was the "lax control over the United Nations Commander in the field" which was exercised in the early stages. It was true that we supplied nine-tenths of the men and the money. Nevertheless it was a collective operation, in which the existence of all the lesser UN members came to be at stake. Even then we did not submit willingly to United Nations control. The United States resisted the establishment of any "representative committee of the UN Members to provide guidance for the collective military action." It was not until after disaster came that a regularized procedure of consultation, the Committee of Sixteen, which only partly filled the need, was established.¹⁷⁵

MacArthur's Formosa Troops Letter to Martin. It was impossible for MacArthur to heed the views of the Members of the UN, when their fears demanded the limitation of the war and the acceptance of his defeat in North Korea. So instead of obeying the consensus in the United Nations he tried to appeal directly to the American public. On April 5 Representative Joseph W. Martin, Jr., Republican leader in the House of Representatives, read to that body a letter from MacArthur calling for a new foreign policy. He wanted to land Chiang's Formosa troops in China and fight Communism in Asia rather than in Europe. "Here in Asia," he said, "is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest . . . here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words."

¹⁷³ *The New York Times*, October 18, 1951.

¹⁷⁴ *The New York Times*; *Manchester Guardian*, March 29, 1951.

¹⁷⁵ Goodrich, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-7.

MacArthur Dismissed. This complete disregard of all efforts to curb him led President Truman to decide at once that he must dismiss MacArthur, though he did not do so until five days later, at 1:00 A.M. on April 11.¹⁷⁶

Speaking to the nation that same evening, Truman first assailed the Kremlin at length for its "monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world" and declared unequivocally and repeatedly that "we do not want to see the conflict extended. We are trying to prevent a world war not to start one." He did not intend voluntarily "to become entangled in a vast conflict on the continent of Asia." The Communists might extend the war, but it would be "wrong—tragically wrong—for us to take the initiative in extending the war."

Asserting that the door was open to peace, if the Communists realized that they could not defeat us in Korea, the President proposed a cease-fire in Korea, with concrete assurances that the fighting would not break out again.

In MacArthur's address on April 19, 1951 to an informal joint session of Congress, which the Republicans had forced, the General advocated holding all the islands off the coast of Asia, including Formosa. He lauded the "just and enlightened administration" which Chiang was giving the Formosans, hailed the Philippines as "a mighty bulwark of Christianity in the Far East," with unlimited capacity for high moral leadership in Asia, and confidently expected that "the existing unrest will be corrected."

Assailing China for having "a lust for expansion," he disavowed sending any ground forces to China, except Chiang's, "with logistical support," and argued for air and sea war on China. He thought that "the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves."

The issue thus squarely joined was obscured for many days by the most remarkable outburst of emotion which the United States had ever seen. MacArthur's tumultuous reception in San Francisco had been without parallel. Another red fire and confetti reception awaited him in Washington and in New York "the huge outpouring of humanity broke all records." An estimated 7,500,000 people turned out to cheer the General, half of them from out of town. The Los Angeles City Council adjourned "in sorrowful contemplation of the political assassination" of General MacArthur. Many demanded the impeachment of the President. National frustration, political passion and hero worship all combined to make the General's welcome without any precedent.¹⁷⁷

Just before the *MacArthur Hearings* began on May 3, 1951, Senator Robert A. Taft, who had argued against the North Atlantic Pact and troops for Europe, saying often that our policy there would provoke Russian attack, came out strongly for the MacArthur thesis. Taft asserted that in planning

¹⁷⁶ *The New York Times*, April 15, 1951.

¹⁷⁷ *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 20; *The New York Times*, April 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 1951.

Yet the wave of feeling was soon over. At the time it appeared that MacArthur might be an unbeatable Republican candidate for President. However, all the efforts in his behalf failed, even after he had made an oration to the 1952 Republican National Convention which did not strike fire. Another General, one who had fought in Europe, was nominated and elected President.

decisive action to end the Korean stalemate the United States "must not be stopped by any hesitation about the possibility the Russians may come into the war." Taft wanted to go "the limit" in aiding Chiang to invade China, though he was not willing to "land a single American soldier" in China.¹⁷⁸

MacArthur's Defense. The MacArthur hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, sitting jointly, began on May 3, 1951 and ended August 17, producing five volumes of testimony and documents ranging over the whole of our post-war foreign policy, especially as it related to the Far East—a record which requires several weeks of labor to digest.

The hearings were presided over by Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia, very ably and fairly. They were conducted throughout in a dignified, judicial manner and were a model of what a congressional investigation should be, a sharp contrast to many that were to follow.

As the first witness, General MacArthur testified blandly that he was not conscious of any friction between him and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was not aware "that there was any divergence of basic thought between myself militarily and Washington." He rejected the possibility of drawing a line between political and military situations and attached so little importance to his letter to Representative Martin that when it was published he had to consult his files "to see what the letter was." When he received the State Department's letter of March 20 saying that any further statements by him must be coordinated, as prescribed in the order of December 6, 1950, he did not relate this at all to his letter to Martin, which he had written on March 20 and had already sent off. It had been "merely a routine communication such as I turn out by the hundreds." He had not disobeyed either in letter or in spirit any directive or order which had come to him in "the slightest" degree. He hadn't the "faintest idea" of being insubordinate. He was "not conscious of having trod even close to any such thing."¹⁷⁹

On the subject of his desire to bomb Manchuria and blockade China MacArthur did not think the Sino-Russian mutual defense treaty of 1950 important. When asked by Senator Wiley if he had any information about the treaty, he replied: "None, sir," though when Senator Kefauver read the treaty to him the next day, with its reference to "aggression on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite in any form with Japan in acts of aggression," he said that his earlier answer "was devoted to any special knowledge." Earlier he had admitted that the terms of the treaty were "so elastic" that China might expect assistance from Russia, but he "wouldn't speculate" on what Russia would do if China were bombed. He didn't think that our bombing of the Sino-Russian railways to Port Arthur and Vladivostok would be considered a threat to Soviet basic interests. It was "a minor point," and blockading Russia's base at Port Arthur would be just a "small incident" and would not "materially affect in any way" Russia's decision to enter a global war.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ *The New York Times*, April 28, 1951.

¹⁷⁹ *MacArthur Hearings*, Pt. 1, pp. 13, 27, 45, 47, 113, 197, 53.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 196, 275, 249-50, 253, 261.

He refused to be concerned about the consequences of extending the war, almost closing his mind to them as "speculative." Whether the Chinese would ever give up Formosa was "entirely speculative." He would not speculate on Chiang landing on the mainland and being wiped out. What forces the Communist powers could launch against us in the Far East was "speculative." Our air and sea power could take care of them. It "would be a master folly to contemplate the use of United States ground troops in China," but he "did not believe it would be necessary." Our losses in Korea were so serious "that we must face that problem irrespective of what the future, the speculative future may have in store." He agreed with Senator Wiley that his program would not precipitate Russia into battle, that she would "choose her own time irrespective of what we do," though he added that this was "speculative." Also war with Russia in the Pacific would not have "any appreciable effect" upon our defense of Western Europe.¹⁸¹

The Consequences of Spreading the War. In other words, MacArthur regarded a third world war with complete equanimity. But his military colleagues did not. General Marshall testified that our allies had voted "solidly" against "hot pursuit" of planes into Manchuria. MacArthur's policy involved the risk of all-out war with Russia "at the expense of losing our allies and wrecking the coalition of free peoples throughout the world." MacArthur had a right to his views, but it was a "wholly unprecedented situation" for a local theater commander to be publicly expressing his displeasure at and his disagreement with the foreign and military policy of the United States. There was "no other recourse but to remove him." He had not been dismissed for one of his offenses, but because they were cumulative.¹⁸²

Bombing Manchuria was a two way street. The war in Korea was a limited war which Marshall hoped would remain limited.¹⁸³

General Omar Bradley held that MacArthur's strategy "would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy," a sentence which condensed the whole case against MacArthur perfectly. Bradley was not prepared to "rush headlong into a showdown before we are ready." It was our strategy to avoid "a total war which could only bring death and destruction to millions of Americans, both in the United States and on the battlefield." Our objective was peace without appeasement.¹⁸⁴

General Joseph L. Collins held that MacArthur's lack of sympathy with his government's basic policies created a real danger of bringing on a world war. He himself believed in collective security, having "seen too much of these damnable wars," but "sheer military reasoning" was against an all-out war with China at that time, especially since the United States would have lost its allies and had to act alone, had it followed MacArthur's recommended action.¹⁸⁵

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, speaking for the Air Force, drove home the same points. Air bombing of China probably would not be conclusive. It

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 52, 117, 78, 103, 69, 196, 256.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 598, 610.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 1187, 1218, 1224-5.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, Pt. 1, pp. 325, 413.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, Pt. 2, pp. 732-3.

would not "go to the heart of the industrial centers" which were supplying the Chinese armies, and if these were attacked in Russia then we would have to try to destroy the Russian air force at the same time—all with a "shoe string airforce," considering our global responsibilities. In fact, the attrition connected with bombing China would "leave us naked for several years to come."¹⁸⁶

For the Navy, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman explained through many pages the legal, practical and political complications that a blockade of China by the United States would entail. He thought a blockade of Dairen would mean war. The Russian military outlook was "colored very completely by the concept of defense of territory." As for aiding Chiang to invade the mainland, he did not "know how to conduct an amphibious operation in which the troops fight but the ships don't." He was not convinced that Russia wanted a general war. He thought the Russians had instigated the North Korean aggression, but his intelligence in connection with the Chinese entry was "less convincing." He was convinced that extending the war "would jeopardize our long-term national security on a global basis."¹⁸⁷

Thus each one of the Joint Chiefs spelled out the disastrous and unmanageable consequences of extending the war with which MacArthur had so blithely refused to concern himself. He had avoided facing any consequences by labelling them all as "speculative," but the Joint Chiefs could not escape their responsibility in that manner. They faced it and saw no satisfaction for wounded pride in another world war, nor any victory.

Equally important was their judgment that the objective of unifying Korea by military means would have to be given up. Bradley recalled that our original mission was to repel the aggression and he thought something less than unifying Korea could be considered a victory. Driving the Reds out of Korea was "not our objective." General Vandenberg was "not aware" that this was our objective. He thought it was a negotiated peace, an understanding which Secretary of State Acheson soon confirmed on June 1, 1951. We wanted a unified, free Korea but he did "not understand it to be a war aim." Our aim was to defeat the aggression on South Korea.¹⁸⁸

THE TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS

These statements, buttressed as they were by the whole drift of the MacArthur hearings, plainly invited a negotiated peace in Korea. Yet the enemy made no response, in spite of his terrible losses under "Operation Killer," which the Chiefs of Staff testified was intended to bring about a negotiated peace.¹⁸⁹

Negotiations Invited and Accepted. Finally, on June 22, the Voice of America called upon the Soviet Union to halt the Korean War at or near the 38th

¹⁸⁶ *MacArthur Hearings*, Pt. 2, pp. 1378-80, 1399.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 512-17, 1333, 1584, 1580, 1529. Marshall had learned from the naval authorities that a naval blockade would "leak like a sieve" (Pt. 1, p. 355).

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, Pt. 2, pp. 955, 937, 1385; Pt. 3, p. 1729.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 968, Bradley; p. 1191, Collins.

Parallel, appealing to Jacob Malik to "say the word the whole world is waiting for." The broadcast added:

"Trygve Lie, the Secretary of the United Nations has said 'if a cease-fire could be arranged approximately along the Thirty-eighth parallel, then the main purpose of the Security Council resolutions will be fulfilled, provided that the cease-fire is followed by a restoration of peace and security in the area.'

"There's a wide open door Mr. Malik. Walk right in."¹⁹⁰

The next day Malik accepted the invitation in a United Nations broadcast, saying: "The Soviet peoples believe that as a first step discussions should be started between the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the Thirty-Eighth Parallel."¹⁹¹

On June 25 the Chinese official newspaper announced that the Chinese people fully endorsed the proposal, but this statement was embedded in such a mass of vituperation that it didn't indicate very enthusiastic acceptance. The Chinese reaction was slow, and when it developed it brought in the Formosa issue and China's seat in the UN.¹⁹² On June 29 General Ridgway broadcast an invitation to "the Commander-in-Chief, Communist Forces in Korea" to discuss an armistice, and the invitation was accepted 29 hours later.

Early Disputes. The two sides met first at Kaesong, in Communist territory, on July 8. Tension developed on July 12 when 20 Allied newsmen were not admitted to the truce zone and the UN delegation turned back. Negotiations then ensued to make Kaesong a neutral area and on July 28 the first major snag was reached. The Communists demanded a truce line along the 38th Parallel and the UN stood for a line corresponding to existing battle positions, refusing to concede the withdrawal of all foreign troops. The UN line extending thirty miles north of the 38th in the West was considered to be a much more defensible line.

On August 22 the Reds began a barrage of charges that the conference area had been bombed and a bombing of Kaesong was alleged. General Ridgway thought the charges a "frame-up," but the Chinese suggestion of surreptitious action by the South Korean Government was not unreasonable, since it had strongly opposed the truce negotiation.¹⁹³ Finally, on September 12, the UN High Command acknowledged that the eleventh complaint had a basis. On the 17th Ridgway proposed renewal of the truce talks, an offer which was accepted two days later. On Ridgway's demand the talks were moved to Panmunjom, the Chinese suggesting that the neutral zone be enlarged. This was done after Ridgway had admitted that, despite standing instructions, UN planes had strafed Panmunjom and Kaesong.

Following a strong UN offensive in October, to speed the truce, stalemate in the talks ensued, occasioning uneasiness among the Allies. On November 17 a UN proposal of the existing battle line as a truce line, provisionally for 30 days, was accepted and headway was made on the issues of inspection to

¹⁹⁰ *The New York Times*, June 23, 1951.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, June 24, 1951.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, June 26, 1951.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, August 26, September 2, 1951.

enforce an armistice and UN troop rotation before the end of 1951, but there was still stalemate over the questions of prisoner exchange and North Korean airfields.¹⁹⁴

The Prisoner of War Issue. Virtually the whole of 1952 was consumed in fruitless negotiating over the prisoner of war issue. The Reds demanded the return of all prisoners, forcibly if necessary, while the UN Allies stood for voluntary repatriation. On this issue the Reds had precedent on their side. Up until lately prisoners had wanted to go home, so full repatriation was the accepted usage in international law. However, the Allies had had painful experience after World War II in carrying out this custom. Some of the Soviet troops and a great many of the slave laborers and other refugees in Germany from the Soviet-controlled lands had refused to return, and when force was used to compel them many had killed themselves.

On humane grounds this experience could not be repeated, but there was an equally vital political angle. It was a loss to the free world to lose people who wanted to opt for it, and a denial of our principles to force people to leave our lands, but the probabilities in connection with another world war were even more compelling. In that event, a great number of communist citizens might be willing to defect if they knew that they would not be sent back. If atomic warfare did not make this consideration irrelevant, it might be very important to both sides, so important that in the truce talks neither side could afford to yield appreciably or quickly.

On January 3, 1952, the Soviet Union proposed at the UN General Assembly a special meeting of the Security Council, with the Foreign Ministers replacing the permanent representatives, to deal with East-West tensions, beginning with the Korean truce talks. The United States rejected this proposal sharply.¹⁹⁵

At Panmunjom the deadlock continued, with the Communists steadily building up their military strength and the allied peoples daily becoming more reluctant to see the casualty lists grow with heavy fighting.

On February 5 the Communists proposed a high level conference, to be held three months after the cease-fire to negotiate the conditions for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and other questions related to the peace in Korea, but the UN rejected discussion of non-Korean questions. This was agreed to on February 16 and two weeks later the UN troop rotation issue was settled on the basis of permitting the rotation of 35,000 UN troops a month.¹⁹⁶

In March the Peking radio began its charges that the UN was engaging in germ warfare, a charge which was soon echoed in the United Nations by the Soviet delegate. Riots also broke out in the UN prison camps, leading to the killing of 69 prisoners by their guards on February 23, and 12 on March 14. On the 23rd several minor truce issues were settled.

Late in April a two-week recess was held to permit the polling of UN prisoners to see whether they wanted to be repatriated, and only about 70,000

¹⁹⁴ *The New York Times*, October 7, November 18, December 30, 1951.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, January 6, 1952.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, February 16, 24, 1952.

of the 173,000 prisoners voted to go home. This result was an unwelcome surprise to both sides, since it was hoped that the numbers affected would not be large, and led to renewed deadlock. The defection of so many was a prestige blow the Reds could not accept.

On May 8 an American Brigadier-General was captured at Koje Island prison and released three days later, after a colonel had signed a letter promising there would be no more forcible screening for repatriation, an implication which was at once repudiated by his superiors. This led to the forcible breaking up of the big prison stockades.

Late in June a 500 plane UN raid blasted the large hydroelectric plants in North Korea and touched off a violent controversy in the General Assembly, our allies fearing an extension of the war. Two other great raids did heavy damage, but General Van Fleet estimated that at the front the Reds had 2½ times the combat strength of the UN ground forces and twice the artillery power.¹⁹⁷

Still heavier air bombings of Pyongyang and virtually all other industrial objectives in North Korea continued, and in mid-October the Reds launched strong land attacks. White Horse Hill changed hands ten times during one week. At the end of the month two other strategic hills were lost.

Early in September the United States announced that we would place Korea on the agenda of the General Assembly on October 14 if there was no prior settlement. Opening the Assembly, Secretary of State Acheson urged the UN to show its staying power. South Korea was invited to come to the Korean discussion by a vote of 54-5 and North Korea failed to receive an invitation 38-11. The United States finally accepted an Indian plan for ending the war, but Russia rejected it.¹⁹⁸

Korea in the 1952 Election. Late in the American presidential campaign General Eisenhower made his famous pledge to "go to Korea," if elected, and see what he could do to end the war. There was nothing he could do by going, but the promise was one of the main reasons for his election. The Korean war had become a never-ending nightmare to a large part of the American people, especially those with men in the armed services or draftable relatives. It went on and on in the muddy or frozen hills of Korea, the casualties steadily mounting, until many were ready to vote for any new leaders who would try to end it. The Gallup polls showed Korea to be one of the top reasons for Eisenhower's victory.¹⁹⁹

The "Unleashing" of Chiang. Eisenhower went to Korea early in December and on the 24th his aides were reported to be moulding a plan to compel peace. A week later Prime Minister Churchill boarded a liner for the United States, allegedly in alarm over our plan to use Chiang's troops against China.²⁰⁰ He arrived on January 6 and promptly said on landing that "certainly we think

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, June 1, 1952.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, October 24 and December 15, 1952. UN prison riots on October 2 and December 16 were put down with a loss of 146 lives.

¹⁹⁹ *The Washington Post*, January 21, 1953.

²⁰⁰ Drew Pearson, the *Nashville Tennessean*, January 6, 1953.

it would be a great pity for the United States and the United Nations army to wander all about this vast China."²⁰¹

A few days later General Bradley said he did not know how to end the Korean war and he had met no one who did, but on February 1, Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy emerged from the White House saying that using Chiang's army in China was "a bright idea," and James Reston described a policy of confronting the Communists with "stern alternatives," the chief of which proved to be the "unleashing" of Chiang. Since President Truman's order of June 27, 1950 Chiang had been both protected by the U.S. Seventh Fleet and forbidden to attack China. Now the Fleet would still protect him but no longer restrain him. This threat to China was made formally in the new President's State of the Union message on February 2. There was, said President Eisenhower, no longer "any sense or logic" in restraining Chiang. Two years later it was to be apparent that there was neither sense nor logic in permitting Chiang's mosquito bombers to enrage the Chinese dragon.

At the moment the enemy build-up in Korea was so massive that there was no prospect of breaking his lines. Robert Alden reported from the front that the Chinese had proved to be such prodigious diggers that their infantry were all ensconced in a maze of tunnels and deep shelters under the mountains. "Every time" the UN took a prisoner he was in good spirits, well clothed and fed, with few complaints about his military leaders. Moreover, the Reds were so well supplied that they threw 20,000 to 30,000 rounds of artillery and mortar shells against our lines in any day that tactics seemed to require it. In short, they had won the battle of supply in spite of our air superiority, which was steadily dwindling as more and more jet planes attacked our bombers, making daylight raids very risky and the B-29's nearly obsolete.²⁰²

On February 5, 1953, China asked for a resumption of the truce talks, while fear of our Chinese policy mounted abroad. As Secretary of State Dulles "tripped through Europe with lightning speed," Foreign Minister Eden "literally laid down the law on the Far East."²⁰³ Premier Nehru of India totally disapproved of Washington's decision on Formosa.²⁰⁴ At the United Nations our 14 fighting allies shied away from such plans as a blockade of China. A British source insisted that the urge to do something to end the Korean war must not lead to doing anything silly.²⁰⁵

Final Negotiations. At length, on March 29, the Reds accepted a long standing invitation to trade sick and wounded prisoners, and launched the sharpest fighting in five months. Two days later Premier Chou En-lai proposed that the deadlocked armistice be settled by turning over to a neutral state all war prisoners who refused repatriation, after hearing explanations by their compatriots.²⁰⁶

On April 2 Walter Lippmann wrote that the prisoner of war question had never been a proper subject for negotiation by military commanders. If it

²⁰¹ *The New York Times*, January 6, 1953.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, February 1, 1953.

²⁰³ Drew Pearson, *The Nashville Tennessean*, February 10, 1953.

²⁰⁴ *The Nashville Tennessean*, February 12, 1953.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, February 20, 1953.

²⁰⁶ See text, *The New York Times*, March 31, 1953.

imperilling the Allied line and on the 18th Rhee's men set free 25,000 anti-Red prisoners, who were soon lost in Pusan. This calculated move averted an imminent signing of the truce. Washington and UN officials were angry, but orders to recapture the escapees were of little avail. Less than a thousand were recovered by our efforts. An embarrassed letter to General Nam Il of North Korea and a bitter North Korean reply; a firm letter to Rhee and a scorching reply, did not advance the truce much, though the exchanges probably saved it. General Mark Clark's denial that we connived in the release was not believed by the Reds. Pressure by Clark on Rhee not to sabotage a truce further produced a little hope, but Hanson W. Baldwin noted that Rhee's action had put in question the whole "concept of unified military action to repel aggression," created doubt that any future orders by the UN Command to Rhee's troops would be carried out, hardened the Communists and divided the Allies.²¹²

A long letter of June 20, 1953, from Rhee to General Clark was made public on the 25th in which Rhee threatened to pull his forces out of the UN Command if a truce was signed. For a week the strongest efforts were made by General Clark and Assistant Secretary of State W. S. Robertson to persuade Rhee not to commit national suicide. A high level conference between Rhee and the United States was offered outside Korea and away from the atmosphere of "near riot" which he had created.²¹³ This appeared to soften Rhee a little, and on June 30 the Communists drove his army off of four hills as a further persuasion, 63,000 artillery rounds being fired at his troops in one day.

On the same day he was demanding "a total and iron-bound military alliance" pledging the United States to march north with him if within 90 days the Reds had not moved toward a unified Korea. Robertson's seventh talk with Rhee did not yield much. He was close to open enmity with the armed forces which had saved his regime, and they were in great peril because of what he might do at any moment. Nevertheless, a four-hour session of the National Security Council decided that the United States could not allow Rhee to dictate its foreign and military policy, or to involve it in permanently garrisoning the Yalu River, even if that line could be reached.²¹⁴

Rhee issued a Fourth of July message to the American people urging them to stay in the war, stressing the idea of "ever expanding world communism" which he knew was an article of faith with them. A four-day meeting of the top American generals in Korea with United States Army Chief of Staff Collins in Tokyo was reported to be considering plans for coping with a South Korean rejection of the truce. Then Senator William L. Knowland, Republican leader in the Senate, blamed the Administration for the "break" with Rhee, asserting that Rhee had not been consulted enough. Knowland backed Rhee's intransigence fully and was "definitely" opposed to using military force to make the South Koreans agree to a truce. He wanted a united Korea conceded in the truce terms.²¹⁵

²¹² *The New York Times*, June 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 1953.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, June 25, 28.

²¹⁴ Marquis Childs, *the Nashville Tennessean*, July 9, 1953.

²¹⁵ *The New York Times*, July 5, 6, 1953.

Daily talks with Rhee continued. On July 8 the Reds asked for a meeting of liaison officers. General Clark called for a resumption of the truce talks. On the 11th the Peking radio asked for proof that the UN could make Rhee obey an armistice.

Finally, on July 12, it was reported that Rhee had agreed to a truce. On the 15th an agreement by the American, British and French Foreign Ministers committing their countries to fight together again if the Communists should *renew their aggression after an armistice in Korea was published*. The next day Peking charged that secret deals made by the United States with Rhee blocked an armistice. On the 17th a firm message was handed the Communists promising Rhee's compliance, but additional guarantees were demanded and the South Korean troops were again hit hard on the battlefield.

On July 23 Rhee once more imperilled the truce by issuing a press statement saying repeatedly that he had decided conditionally "to postpone our determination to get the Chinese Red troops out of Korea before the signing of an armistice" for a period of 90 days, while a political conference was held. After that he intended "to carry on our fight unilaterally." Both the President and Secretary Dulles countered with statements that they believed Rhee would honor his word, twice given in writing, not to do anything to obstruct a truce.

At last, on July 27, 1953, the armistice was signed, after three years and one month of undeclared war and two years after the truce talks began.

ABORTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS

The next day Dulles announced that he would very shortly fly to Korea for conferences with Rhee. A delegation of top flight Senators would accompany him: Acting Majority Leader William F. Knowland, H. Alexander Smith, Minority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard B. Russell.

Dulles also revealed that "We have agreed through Assistant Secretary Robertson that if after ninety days it seems the conference is a sham and unproductive and is being availed of by the Communists as a cover for carrying on subversive activities in Korea, we would join with President Rhee in walking out of the political conference."²¹⁶

It was not therefore totally strange that while Dulles was making this statement Rhee should be telling James B. Reston in Seoul that it was "inconceivable" that the United States would fail to reopen the Korean war if the Communists refused to agree to the unification of his country. Rhee was glad Dulles was coming to see him for he had some things to say to him about "fighting the Communists or dying." He was fierce in his condemnation of those who were "foolish enough to believe" there was any way to settle the Korean question by peaceful means. He made it clear that the sole object of the truce was to secure agreement by the Communists that all of Korea should be governed by his regime and he scoffed at the idea that the United States was not committed to renew the fighting if the political conference did not attain this agreement within ninety days.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, July 29.

When this interview made it plain that nothing had been or could be said to Rhee which would shake his frozen determination to conquer North Korea, three of the Senators who were to accompany Dulles into the den of this aged lion found at once that they could not leave Washington. Only Senator Smith failed openly to eschew the trip.²¹⁷

In London the Labor opposition raised a storm over the Dulles commitment to Rhee. Attlee thought Dulles' statement a very dangerous one and Attlee represented such "a wide current of feeling in the country" that our Government made half a dozen reassuring pledges to him.²¹⁸

A "Two-Sided" Conference Imposed on UN. Dulles and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. went to Korea early in August and negotiated a treaty committing the United States only to "meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes," in the event of another attack on Korea. Dulles agreed with the Lodge concept of a Korea conference limited to the two sides, and on Korea only. The British, Canadians, French and others came to the UN Assembly in mid-August expecting an entirely different kind of conference. They wanted a round table conference, which would consider Korea first and then go on to other trouble spots, such as Indo-China and even China's seat in the UN. India and other Asiatic powers would sit and an effort would be made to pacify the whole of the Far East.²¹⁹

In the UN Political and Security Committee both the French and the British delegates argued for this policy. The United Kingdom wanted "a true conference and not a negotiation between two sides," "a peace conference at which many voices would be heard," not "a kind of political Panmunjom." This statesmanlike approach was dismissed by Lodge as a Mother Hubbard conference "covering everything and touching nothing." Even if he had desired a broad effort to make peace Lodge did not dare to attempt it, since behind him was the figure of Rhee with his overmastering passion to unify Korea by force. If India attended the conference "Rhee would walk out." Therefore the decision was for a single issue, two-sided conference.²²⁰

The shortsightedness and unreality of the Rhee-bound approach was explained by Lippmann on August 19. It was unusual for a great power thus to "invite a showing of how few governments agree with it, to dramatize to the world its isolation among the leading powers of Asia and of Europe." We could not possibly achieve our diplomatic objectives in Korea by excluding the powers that must live with it. No enduring Korean settlement was conceivable which was not underwritten by China, Russia and Japan. The notion implied in our truce proposals that a lasting Korean settlement could be made by the U.S.A. and China could not be taken seriously.

²¹⁷ *The New York Times*, July 31, 1953.

²¹⁸ Drew Pearson quoted Walter S. Robertson as being personally opposed to the truce. He thought it would "present much more difficult problems than it would solve," adding "If you know of a more frustrated man than yours truly, I would like to meet him." He thought that China would trade the unification of Korea under Rhee for access to the vast riches of South East Asia.—*The Nashville Tennessean*, August 3, 1953.

²¹⁹ Marquis Childs, *The Nashville Tennessean*, August 19, 1953; *The New York Times*, August 9, 1953.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

In a real conference, Lippmann continued, the Indians would in all probability have taken the lead, as they had in bringing about the truce. They would have proposed a plan for really free elections throughout Korea, which Rhee could not accept since he "could not win the election." This was the real reason for India's exclusion.²²¹

In order to forestall India's participation in the political conference Lodge announced, on August 20, that the United States would vote against seating India. The announcement appeared to be made to help persuade the twenty Latin American delegates, some of which had "already decided to vote for India," to vote with the United States.²²²

Surveying the situation Hamilton noted that this announcement surprised practically everybody at the UN and led to general agreement that the decision was "unfortunate for every reason." There was now a definite tendency to throw off American leading strings. The United States had "dominated the Free World" since World War II, because of its power, and its power had not declined, but "American influence has."²²³

This observation was borne out when India's participation in the conference received 27 votes to 21 with 11 abstentions. The majority was made up of the Asian, African, British Commonwealth and Soviet bloc countries. The minority was composed of the United States, 17 Latin American countries, Greece, Pakistan and Nationalist China. The abstainers included several West European and Asian countries which had intended to vote for India until the United States announced its position.²²⁴

Since the vote was short of a two-thirds majority the opposition of the United States was effective and India withdrew her name from consideration for the conference the next day. Thus the one influence which might have facilitated a political settlement in Korea, and in the Far East, was eliminated. The method by which this result was accomplished was described in the *New York Times* "Week in Review" on August 30 as follows: "At the end of the session, a delegate who had voted against India was asked what his reasons had been. He grabbed his wrist, gave his arm a twist and walked away," expressing "a fact that was common knowledge at the UN last week: the United States had brought heavy pressure to block the resolution on India."

On September 6 the first period for prisoner of war exchange ended, with about 15,000 Chinese and 8000 North Koreans still resisting repatriation. Then the period of "explanations" began, under the tactful but firm control of Indian Army officers and men delegated for this purpose. The men resisting return objected violently and only a handful of them were won over by the Red explainers, the others eventually being shipped to Formosa.

On September 12 the United States and Britain agreed that Peking would not be seated in the United Nations in 1953 and on the 19th the United States rebuffed a Chinese proposal that four Asiatic states be included in the Korean conference.

²²¹ *The Nashville Tennessean*, August 19, 1953.

²²² Thomas J. Hamilton, *the New York Times*, August 21, 1953.

²²³ *Ibid.*, August 23, 1953.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, August 28, 1953.

Continued Threats to Resume the War by Rhee. On the 28th Rhee rejected a United States plan calling for the neutralization and unification of Korea, announcing that he would give the proposed conference 90 days to unify Korea according to his desires, after which he would resume the war, expecting "that all friendly forces now in Korea will assist us toward that objective."²²⁵

This defiance left Washington "just as alarmed as London" about Rhee's action, since his army still had the power to reopen the war, in spite of certain logistical decisions, such as the withholding of gasoline to curb his power to strike. Since the best part of our Army was in Korea, on the flank of the South Korean Army, a delicate situation was created. Nothing since the end of World War II had caused Washington officials "quite so much anguish as the prospect of having to decide what to do" if Rhee resumed the war.²²⁶

In other words, the United States was very close to being the prisoner of the stubborn little dictator whom it had gone to war to bail out of certain defeat and oblivion. Now he had been built up to the point that he felt able to take control of UN and United States policy. As Lippmann observed, Rhee was "threatening to destroy himself unless he has his way." Too many diplomatic darlings had been created and encouraged to see themselves as indispensables.²²⁷

The humiliating and almost helpless plight in which we found ourselves had not been foreseen when the Truman Doctrine pledged us to defend everywhere the Rhees, Chiangs and comparable elements. By this time we should have been able to understand that the North Koreans might have had grounds for feeling, after Rhee had jailed their envoys, that his unalterable policy of ruling or ruining Korea could be coped with only by forcibly suppressing him.

A few days later a Congressional committee discovered that Rhee was snarling the rebuilding of his shattered country from United States funds earmarked for the purpose. Instead of using the money to house his destitute people and create jobs for them, he wanted to span Korea with four-lane super highways, equipped with chains of motels. He desired a big radio station and wanted a new Capitol building simply because the Japanese had built the existing one. He thought the funds should be used to build "memorials to his administration."²²⁸

Rhee tore up so many reconstruction plans that the U.S. economic mission decided he thought the billion dollar reconstruction fund, promised him when he finally agreed not to oppose an armistice, was "his price for cooperation," and that he had a "personal right" to spend the entire sum as he chose. In the opinion of a high U.S. official, his "one man" regime was "the most inefficient government I have ever seen," but Rhee had learned, as one top diplomat in Seoul described his technique, that all he had to do was "to stand on his tiptoes and scream loudly" in order to get what he wanted.²²⁹

²²⁵ *The New York Times*, September 28, 1953.

²²⁶ James Reston, *the New York Times*, October 14, 1953.

²²⁷ Lippmann, *the Nashville Tennessean*, October 22, 1953.

²²⁸ Clayton Knowles, *the New York Times*, November 9, 1953.

²²⁹ Robert Alden, Seoul, *the New York Times*, December 14; *the New York Times*, December 15, 16, 1953.

On February 11, 1954, Rhee again threatened to renew the war, saying that he was "not bluffing" and that at the very least he would expect aid in gasoline and munitions. His envoys did go to the Geneva Conference in April, which ended the Indo-China war but made no progress in unifying Korea.

Rhee's Demand in Washington for Atomic World War. Then in July Rhee came to the United States and addressed a joint session of Congress, on July 28, 1954, bidding the United States to join him in war on Red China. He urged Congress to put the U.S. Navy and Air Force behind two million Asiatic troops—his and Chiang Kai-shek's—and not to worry about what the Soviet Union would do. Taking "the MacArthurs, the Van Fleets, the Radfords, the Knowlands" and others at their word, he offered the United States a good chance to "justify the destruction of the Soviet centers of production by the American air force, before the Soviet hydrogen bombs had been produced in quantity."²³⁰

Rhee had heard so much talk from eminent Americans about "privileged sanctuaries," "liberation" and "massive retaliation" that he took these sweeping slogans seriously. But when he confronted official Washington with its own formulas a British correspondent observed that his speech was greeted with an uneasy silence. "Admiral Radford was almost alone in his applause. Shock was visible on many faces. Congressional comment after Rhee's speech was unusually hesitant and his proposals received no immediate support."²³¹ The *London Times* added, on July 30, that the speech "produced a silence that has not been felt in Congress for a long time." Members "took exception to using Capitol Hill as a rostrum to advocate deliberately such provocative measures."

Proceeding to Philadelphia, Rhee exhorted the United States to overcome its fear of the atomic age and stand up against Russia as the "positive and fearless" leader of the free world. Facing the Russian bear the United States, he said, "does not hide its fear and this leads to vacillation and a policy of yielding a little here, a little there, and still more some place else."²³²

Returning to Korea, Rhee moved to make certain that only death should break his grip on South Korea. On October 14 he proposed three methods for reducing the number of newspapers by 85 per cent. There was too much criticism of his administration. On November 28 he forced to a vote in the Korean Assembly a proposal to amend the constitution to enable him to remain as President for life. An attempt by Rhee's henchmen to prevent the clerks from announcing that the proposal had failed by one vote to receive the necessary two-thirds majority produced a fist fight, which resulted in the resignation of twelve members from Rhee's party. Needless to say, the life term for Rhee soon went through.²³³

²³⁰ *The New York Times*, July 29, August 1, 1954.

²³¹ David Walker, *London News Chronicle*, July 29, 1954.

²³² *The New York Times*, August 2, 1954.

From the same platform Cardinal Spellman warned that "we dare not longer be lethargic or indifferent to Communist infiltration, aggression and sabotage in our country." "Half-way measures" were not sufficient. Though the country had been convulsed with McCarthyism and Red-hunting since the Spring of 1950, he did not feel that enough had been done on the anti-Red front internally.

²³³ *Ibid.*, October 15, November 29, December 10, 1954.

Long before this Rhee had become South Korea. His arbitrary will was the government. He had fired 200 cabinet ministers and nothing could be done apart from him.²³⁴ His police machine held the people in a firm grip, which he maintained in 1958 and 1959 by ejecting the growing opposition from parliament and jamming through additional "laws" to perpetuate his rule.

CONCLUSIONS

From the events detailed in this chapter several conclusions emerge.

1. *There is grave doubt about Rhee's part in the origins of the Korean war.*

It was not possible to raise this question during the war, since the validity of the UN action in Korea depended on North Korean aggression. Perhaps the weight of evidence still lies in this direction. The vigor and speed of the North Korean invasion of South Korea, and the adequacy of the preparation behind it cannot be questioned. Yet it is increasingly probable that the invasion may have been touched off by an attempt by Rhee's forces to march to the North, or to provoke an invasion.

It is a matter of record that Rhee and his Defence Minister had been threatening to invade North Korea for months. They were ready to "take Pyongyang within a few days" and "do all the fighting needed."²³⁵ It is further established, also, that Rhee had been decisively defeated in the election of May 30, 1950, an election which the American Government forced upon him. His regime was "left tottering."²³⁶ He had no political future unless war broke out, and his will power was entirely sufficient to bring war about. His pre-war threats to march north were discounted during the war, but after it began the report that Secretary of State Acheson "never was quite sure that Rhee did not provoke the Red attack of 1950" was amply justified.²³⁷ Rhee's burning passion to unify his country by force was demonstrated throughout the war. There has probably never been more complete proof of the adamant nature of one man's will. Nothing that happened after the war began ever deterred him from his goal of ruling over the whole of Korea. Long after it was evident to everyone else that this objective could not be achieved, he persisted in it. After the Korean stalemate was fully registered, long days of argument and pressure by our representatives repeatedly talked him out of the folly of one more dash for the Yalu, but he never gave up his purpose.

Rhee did everything he could to prevent a truce being signed and to sabotage its operation, especially by turning several thousands of disputed prisoners of war loose. Finally, he came to the United States, taunted us with our timorous fear and called upon the Congress to its face to wage an atomic world war in order to give him North Korea.

It is difficult to imagine how a man could go further, and one cannot think of a case of more stubborn and determined adherence to an aim. Since nothing

²³⁴ Drew Pearson, the *Nashville Tennessean*, July 27, 1954.

²³⁵ See above, pp. 599-600.

²³⁶ *U.S. News and World Report*, July 7, 1950, p. 29.

²³⁷ Holmes Alexander, the *Portland Oregonian*, August 24, 1953. The article continued that "Acheson discovered, and Dulles has rediscovered that Rhee, in the true fashion of Oriental despotism, will not permit the rise of a possible rival or logical successor."

changes or could change Rhee's objective, and since he urged the suicide of the human race, certainly of the West, in an effort to achieve it, it is quite clear that he would not have boggled at starting a civil war in Korea in June 1950, either in the vainglorious expectation of carrying it through himself or of being bailed out by his American friends, including John Foster Dulles, who had conferred with him intimately and praised his rule only a few days before the war began.

We do not know that Rhee began the war, but we do know that he had ample reason to do so, from his personal standpoint, and that he was totally capable of touching off the conflict. Everything that we have learned about Rhee and his secretive, despotic methods since mid-1950 amply justifies the belief that he would have started the Korean War to advance the personal and patriotic ends which he has since been openly willing to further by any and all means, including the world catastrophe of a hydrogen war. He has fully demonstrated that if he did not begin the Korean War it was only because the Reds beat him to it.

2. The original snap decision to defend South Korea was justifiable.

It was a snap decision. It was taken quickly by President Truman and his advisers, mainly on the feeling that the Cold War would be lost unless we fought. There was no careful study of the many factors and consequences involved. On the contrary, the decision reversed the carefully considered verdict of the Defense Department that Korea was not essential to our strategic security and that it was about the last place where we should fight a war. Nevertheless, the UN supplied both the means and a moral objective for fighting in Korea. A successful UN police operation which would also further our main aim of stopping communism was an objective worth some risk.

Given our nearby forces in Japan and Okinawa, there was also a reasonable chance that we could defend South Korea, if Russia or China or both did not come in. We did nearly lose it, but General MacArthur's well planned Inchon landing averted imminent disaster and gave both the U.S.A. and the UN a relatively quick and cheap success—only three months of war and some thousands of casualties. The gamble had paid off. The banner of the UN had been respected by both Russia and China. Neither had lifted a military finger to save the North Koreans from defeat.

3. The decision to conquer North Korea was the cardinal error in our foreign policy to date.

It was a plain invitation to disaster. It challenged and ignored the strategic interests and the prestige of both the Soviet Union and China, both of whom had demonstrated great fighting power during World War II and each of which had emerged with enhanced pride and power. There was no reason whatever for believing that either of these powers would permit itself to be pushed to the wall, strategically and ideologically, let alone in both respects. That conclusion required only a cursory knowledge of geography and politics.

Militarily, our danger in moving into North Korea was infinitely multiplied.

It was conceivable that we could impose military settlements on a finger tip of Asia, but sheer adventurism to move into that continent in the face of two great military powers. Yet we took this plunge, just before the fierce Korean winter, and General MacArthur made defeat certain by disregarding all the instructions to him to carry out a discreet occupation. Instead, he dashed for the Yalu up both sides of Korea with his wings wide open to attack from the center.

In this fashion an easy and successful defense of collective security was turned into a long drawn out war of attrition which lasted another three years, increasing United States casualties from 27,610 on October 27, 1950 to 144,173 when the war ended. By this time South Korean military casualties had mounted to 1,312,836, and other UN casualties (British, etc.) 17,260, a total of 1,474,269 for the UN. War casualties on the other side were estimated to total 1,540,000 killed, wounded and captured.

Total war casualties thus exceeded 3,000,000, of which South Korean dead accounted for 415,004 and North Korean-Chinese dead a still larger number.²³⁸

If civilian casualties, both North and South, be added a total approaching 5,000,000 would be indicated, with something like 2,000,000 dead. Approximately four-fifths of these totals were casualties suffered after the UN had liberated South Korea in September 1950.

This extension of the war laid Korea in ruins from end to end and the final stalemate was a victory for the Communist powers, because Oriental troops had thrown back and held the troops of the greatest power in the West, with full control of the air at its disposal.

The catalogue of our losses from this unnecessary fiasco is long indeed. China was built up into a major military power. Her peasant troops out-dug us, fought us on fully equal terms and learned to use every kind of weapon except atomic bombs, including jet planes. China was more rapidly and successfully unified under the heat of the war and her already deep hatred of us greatly increased. She was welded closely to Russia, to her great profit in military and industrial development, and to the long term gain of both countries. In the process China strengthened her hold on Manchuria and soon began to regain influence in or control of all the great border areas between herself and Russia. She also won the sympathies of nearly all the Asiatic peoples and proved again that the great white powers can no longer enforce their will in Asia.

Far from ending "communist aggression" in Asia, our invasion of North Korea made us unable to do anything about the conquest of Indo-China by Communism. The memory of the long drawn out horror of Korea was too keen in the minds of our people to permit another war in an Asiatic peninsula. All that Secretary of State Dulles could do was to flee from the scene of the peace making in Geneva to the sanctuary of Capitol Hill in Washington.

These were losses enough for one mistaken move, but the internal consequences in the United States were equally damaging. In our anger and humiliation over the failure of the war for North Korea we used our Latin

²³⁸ *The Americana Encyclopedia*, p. 387; *Time*, November 13, 1950, p. 23.

American bloc in the UN to force it to brand China as an aggressor. All of Asia except Thailand rejected the verdict. The overwhelming majority of mankind was opposed to it, yet the placing of this brand upon China gave a kind of moral justification to the indefinite barring of China from the UN. Then the never-ending frustrations of the Korean war inflamed American feeling against China to such an extent that a powerful school of thought worked for China's destruction and we were led into the folly of guaranteeing Formosa for Chiang Kai-shek, as well as South Korea for Syngman Rhee.

All the while, also, the interminable Korean war fed the fires of McCarthyism until most of the year 1954 was given over to vast national circuses, inquisitions and judgments centering around the man whose skyrocketing power over us shook the confidence of all the allies in our sanity as a nation. His investigating committee and others led the nation in an orgy of Red-hunting, witch hunting and scapegoat killing which at the close of 1954 eventuated finally in the expulsion of John Patton Davies, Jr. from the Foreign Service, after being cleared eight times, not for treason but for having "bad judgment" a time or two several years ago. Then the Agriculture Department found our outstanding expert on Japanese land reform, Wolf Ladejinsky, a security risk because he had relatives in Russia. By this time Paul G. Hoffman, Chairman of the Studebaker-Packard Corporation, could write that "The United States, the strongest nation in the world, became sick with a malignant fear for which there seemed to be no remedy."²³⁹

To this the publisher of the esteemed *Louisville Courier-Journal* added that "Our illness goes deeper than any one man. It is a malady of the soul that summons all the evil forces of the Inquisition, of the Cheka, of Hitlerism, of Stalinism, of the Ku Klux Klan, and all those nauseous forces which claim dominion over the conduct and the souls of other men."²⁴⁰

The achievement of this sad state of mind and reputation in the world was of course due to the excessive whipping up of the Cold War itself, but the three year extension of the Korean war which followed our attempt to take over North Korea was the inflamed center of the Cold War during all this time.

Finally, the three year war for North Korea converted a successful defense of collective security into a major campaign of the Cold War. The police operation was lost in a trial of strength between the East and the West, in which our Allies hung grimly on to our coat tails to prevent the expansion of the struggle into a world war on MacArthur's plan, while we continually blamed them for their small contributions to a conflict in which they no longer believed. Men continued to speak of the UN, but everyone knew that the war had become a struggle between the United States and the Communist world, in the most unfavorable place for the United States.

When all this is said it must be remembered that Harry Truman did not

²³⁹ Hoffman, "To Insure the End of Our Hysteria," *the New York Times Magazine*, November 14, 1954, p. 9.

²⁴⁰ Mark F. Etheridge, "Of Whom Shall I Be Afraid?" *Southern Newspaper Publishers' Association Bulletin*, August 22, 1953, p. 5.

compound his grievous error in trying to take over North Korea by expanding the Korean war into a world war. In spite of his anger and humiliation he firmly refused to be responsible for inviting a world war when millions of Americans, including some very powerful ones, execrated him for not doing so. He kept the war limited at the expense of his own popularity and at the cost of losing the 1952 election for his party.

4. *The Republicans won the Korean war.*

An article in the *London Times*, September 6, 1954, explained how elements in the Republican Party had seen in the loss of China to the Communists "a potential source of immense partisan advantage," if the blame "could be laid on the shoulders of Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson" and not on the Chinese Nationalists. "A campaign was therefore launched by the Republicans to excuse the Generalissimo and to turn him into a hero let down by a United States Administration allegedly riddled with Communist sympathizers. This was so successful that it ran far beyond its intended target. Not only did it do untold electoral damage to the Democratic Party, but it laid the basis for a significant change in American policy," that is, from protecting Chiang on Formosa to returning him to the mainland.

It must be said for the Truman Administration that it held out against this campaign for a long time, but it was in a poor position politically to refuse action when the Korean war broke out. On December 6, 1950, Holmes Alexander published a syndicated column in which he quoted an Administration senator, who was as close to Truman, Acheson and the Pentagon as anyone in Washington, as saying that "if the Republicans hadn't been hammering on Harry Truman he'd never have gone into Korea."²⁴¹

Truman went into Korea and his popularity skyrocketed until after the fatal decision to plunge into North Korea. Thereafter the Korean war became a leading reason for the defeat of the Democratic Party in 1952. This verdict appeared in both the public opinion polls and in the observations of seasoned reporters. Thomas L. Stokes wrote that the use of the Korean war issue in the 1952 election was "enough to turn a stomach hardened to political extravagance. Korea was found to be the best issue with the Mid-Western farmers, and it was played above all others." There were "no limits to distortions and falsifications."²⁴²

Truman lost the Korean war politically when he let the Republicans drive him into it and then failed to commit them to it by a resolution of Congress in June 1950, as he could easily have done with an overwhelming majority. He could have had another sweeping endorsement also when he invaded North Korea in October. But in the absence of Congressional mandate his political enemies were able to saddle him with the responsibility for "Truman's war," after it became a great weariness, and to bring about the defeat of his party.

Then when the Chinese began to push Chiang's troops out of the approaches

²⁴¹ Reprinted by Ernest T. Weir, Chairman of the National Steel Corporation, on the back cover of his "Statement on our Foreign Situation," January 5, 1951.

²⁴² *The Nashville Tennessean*, September 3, 1953.

to Formosa and to threaten that island in January, 1955, President Eisenhower was able to go before a Democratic Congress and obtain a pre-dated blank check declaration of war with full power to fill it in as he saw fit.

This result was obtained the more easily since Eisenhower had made peace in Korea and had established himself as a peace-minded President.

Finally in 1956 the newspaper men who travelled widely during the campaign were nearly unanimous in putting the Korean War high on the list of reasons for Eisenhower's re-election. The people had not forgotten the long drawn out dread and frustration of the Korean War years.

5. Korea was an innocent victim of the Cold War.

The Koreans did not ask for the division of their country, even temporarily. They also organized a government which was broadly representative and quite capable of governing the country. But neither the U.S.S.R. nor the U.S.A. would permit this government to function. Each insisted on creating a government for half the country in its own image. In this attempt the Soviets succeeded, but the United States brought a twenty-year emigré back to Korea and permitted him to build himself up into a lifetime despot capable of inviting the American people in their own capital to join him in self destruction.

Division having resulted and hardened, two successive attempts to unite Korea by force were made, but the outcome was a great power war which nearly destroyed Korea and did not significantly alter the division of the country. On the contrary, the division was hardened and South Korea was left an overpopulated, undernourished, unviable country, existing only on the military dole of the United States and under a police state government which was a standing invitation to revolution—Red or otherwise.

6. The balance sheet of the Korean War was heavily negative.

Beyond these tragic results for the Korean people, the consequences for our own people were profound. We were humiliated, frustrated, divided and worn out by the strange, never-ending conflict. But, worse still, our Cold War fears, hates and phobias which were already deeply enough ingrained were driven deeper still. People thought they had incontrovertible proof of the dogma of world conquest by Moscow—or was it by Peking? Soon Mr. Dulles merged both into "international communism."

On the other side of the Cold War lines there was absolute certainty that the imperialist Americans were out to conquer the world. Look what they had tried to do in Korea! What would they do next?

The result was an immense armament program in the West, resolutely forced upon the much less convinced Europeans by the Americans, which would absorb some three hundreds of billions of dollars in the next six years, funds which could have made us friends in underdeveloped countries around the world and also enriched living in the West. These efforts to ward off the now "certain" next Red blow of course called for similar counter measures in the East, both sides fearing that the other was bent on inaugurating a third world war.

At the time it did seem that the Americans had learned how expensive the

sweeping commitments of the Truman Doctrine could be. Yet, incredible as it may seem, they were soon voting blank checks in the Congress to a new Republican Administration by nearly unanimous majorities, empowering it to go to war for Formosa, Quemoy and the Matsus—Chinese islands on the far side of the Pacific—in very cloudy contexts.

COLONIALISM, COMMUNISM AND
NATIONALISM IN SOUTH EAST ASIA

1945-1954

It was the double impact of the two world wars which made the liberation of all of Asia from Western control unavoidable.

How the forces turned loose by World War II swept through China has been detailed in chapter twenty. Elsewhere their operation was just as inexorable. By March 4, 1946, the pressure in India for independence was so strong that the British Labor Government wisely declared that India was free to leave the Commonwealth. On June 16th Indian leaders were invited to form an interim National Government and on August 15, 1947, the transfer of power was completed, peacefully and to Britain's lasting advantage. India chose to remain in the Commonwealth.

Similarly in Burma, on January 28, 1947, a British White Paper outlined steps toward independence. Elections were held on April 9. On July 23 Prime Minister Attlee said that Burma was free to leave the Commonwealth, and she did so early in January 1948, after an important treaty with Britain had been concluded on October 17, 1947. Again Britain profited greatly by recognizing the inevitable, as she did also in offering Ceylon full Dominion status on November 13, 1945, an offer which Ceylon accepted by the free will of the people on February 4, 1948.

In all of these cases a long established colonial status was ended peacefully and by mutual consent. Britain honored, just before it was too late, the promise inherent in her own free institutions of eventual freedom for all of her subject peoples, with the result that in her former Asian colonies British influence is now high, and welcomed, along with British economic enterprise.

The British people, and especially the British Labor Government, were wise enough to accept the logic of freedom and also to bow to the inevitable when it loomed on the horizon. Unfortunately, neither the Dutch nor the French were able to do this. There was a powerful additional reason why they should do so, since during the war they had been ousted from the control of their Asian colonies by the Japanese, who had left behind them both the explosive doctrine of "Asia for the Asians" and functioning new revolutionary governments, along with the knowledge that the Western imperialists had once been chased out by Orientals.

Instead of coming to terms with history the Dutch and the French both closed their eyes to it and eased themselves back toward control of their former riches in the baggage of the British armed forces, which moved in to repatriate the Japanese armies. The result was nearly five years of strife and

turmoil in Indonesia and twice as many in Indo-China, before independence was wrenched from the hands of the Dutch and French, leaving a deep-seated legacy of hatred for them in their former colonies.

INDONESIA

The early centuries of the 350 years of Dutch rule in Indonesia were based on the principle of Coen, the founder of Batavia, that the subject peoples were cattle, fit only for slavery and exploitation. The Indian leader Panikkar found it "difficult to speak with restraint" about the "inhumanly oppressive plantation system" by which the Dutch made a whole nation into estate coolies of the Dutch East India Company, until this system was interrupted by 14 years of British rule after 1811 and followed by the direct rule of the Dutch Government, which was still rigorously exploitative.¹

In later generations the Dutch developed the islands enormously and made them the richest colonies in the world, for the Dutch, but little of the benefits went to the natives.² Only one out of five children received some primary education, designed to keep them at the same level as they were. The illiteracy rate was 92 per cent.³ The money economy introduced by the Dutch disintegrated the subsistence-barter village economy and compelled the natives to work for subsistence wages on Dutch plantations. Sanitary measures then checked the death rate markedly and an explosion of population vastly increased the number of wage earners and atomized the remaining land holdings of the natives, who were at the mercy of Indian or Chinese money lenders.⁴ Even subsistence was more and more dependent upon export crops and the vagaries of the world market, especially during the disastrous thirties.⁵

A Republic Proclaimed. All of these conditions created an atmosphere of despair, and a determination not to submit to a reimposition of Dutch rule after World War II. The Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed on August 17, 1945, precipitating a frantic order from the Dutch in Australia placing Indonesia under Japanese command until the British could get there. Lord Mountbatten also instructed the Japanese not to hand over any administrative functions to the Republic headed by Soekarno, who was soon pilloried by the Dutch as a Quisling and collaborationist. He had collaborated with the Japanese, for nationalist ends, and in defeat they had facilitated his proclamation of the Republic.⁶

The first Allied mission, including the Chief of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration, arrived on a British cruiser September 15, 1945, and

¹ K. M. Panikkar, *Asia and Western Dominance*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1953, pp. 110-18.

² J. S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, Cambridge U.P., 1948, p. 440.

³ V. Thomson and R. Adloff, *Cultural Institutions and Educational Policy in South East Asia*, New York, 1948, p. 68.

⁴ Erich H. Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in South East Asia*, Columbia U.P.; Oxford U.P., 1949, pp. 20-5.

⁵ See also J. H. Boeke, *The Evolution of the Netherlands Indies Economy*, New York, 1946, pp. 11-12, 19, 158-62.

⁶ Raymond Kennedy, "The Test in Indonesia," *Asia and the Americas*, August 1946, p. 341.

discovered that the Indonesians had been expecting an American occupation. Quotations from our Declaration of Independence and Lincoln's Gettysburg Address were displayed throughout Batavia.

Finding that the Republic was the *de facto* government of Java and much of Sumatra, the Dutch began to recruit armed forces in Holland and the Japanese began to disarm the Indonesian field police.⁷ The first British troops arrived on September 29 and the bulk of the British forces proved to be Indians who promptly fraternized solidly with the Indonesian people—a factor which became a marked determinant of British policy. On the other hand, violent incidents multiplied rapidly as contingents of trigger happy Dutch and Ambonese troops cruised through Batavia.

To minimize the violence Soekarno ordered all Indonesians off the streets at dark and his order was strikingly obeyed. He warned Major Crockett, the American representative, that if their independence were denied, his people would run amok.⁸ Protests against the use by the Dutch of American vehicles bearing U.S.A. markings led later to a request from Washington that the labels be removed. It was not until October 20 that the State Department took notice of the situation in Indonesia, saying that the United States favored a negotiated settlement, but a radio appeal from Soekarno that Washington act as arbiter went unanswered.

While the United States, the home of revolution against colonialism, was silent, effective help came from Australia which cancelled in July an "agreement in principle" to train 30,000 Dutch troops. Then the Australian labor unions refused to load any munitions that might be used against the Indonesians.⁹

On November 14 Soetan Sjahrir, who had a spotless record of non-collaboration, became prime minister, at a time when General Christison, the British commander, was using Japanese troops in combat with Indonesians. Sjahrir's Political Manifesto of November 1 offered to protect Dutch lives and capital and to honor the pre-war debts of the colony, if Indonesian independence were accepted, but soon an unbridled terror against the Dutch broke out leading to large-scale use by the British of Japanese troops, who were commended for their excellent showing in battle.¹⁰

As the situation deteriorated steadily, the Indonesian people looked hopefully to the United States as a country which would understand their revolutionary struggle, but they encountered only silence. One group of Indonesian women even set out for the United States to appeal to the Daughters of the American Revolution, thinking that "these ladies will surely understand our problems and help us to obtain independence."¹¹ Little did they know how the very idea of revolution had become anathema to the D.A.R. and to most other Americans. They did not understand that Roosevelt, who had a genuine aversion even to British imperialism, was gone and that his

⁷ *The Knickerbocker Weekly*, November 5, 1945, p. 6; December 31, 1945, p. 19.

⁸ Frederick E. Crockett, "How the Trouble Began in Java," *Harpers Magazine*, March, 1946, p. 282.

⁹ *The New Statesman and Nation*, October 6, 1945, p. 222.

¹⁰ Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

¹¹ Robert Payne, "The Challenge of Asia," *Pacific Affairs*, March 1948, p. 55.

successors regarded the keeping of allies for the Cold War as the primary consideration.

It fell to Clement Attlee, Prime Minister of the British Labor Government, to call the Dutch leaders to his official residence at Chequers for the purpose of insisting that negotiations with the Indonesian Republic begin. This was readily agreed to, the relatively liberal Acting Governor-General of the Indies, H. J. van Mook, suggesting that he would construct a cabinet in the islands prepared to give them independence in 15 or 20 years. In August a limited United Nations trusteeship, with a fixed terminal date, would have been accepted by the Indonesians, but by December the Dutch proposal was much too late.

The Linggadjadi Agreement. On February 8, 1946, the Ukrainian delegate to the United Nations Security Council proposed the establishment of a commission to go to Indonesia and report what the situation was, but the resolution was defeated, along with an Egyptian proposal to forbid the use of Japanese troops "against the Indonesian national movement" in any circumstances.¹²

However, negotiations between the Netherlands Government and the Indonesian Republic had begun and finally, on November 15, 1946, the Linggadjadi agreement recognized the Republic as having *de facto* authority over Java, Madura and Sumatra. Dutch and Allied troops would gradually be evacuated and by January 1, 1949, a United States of Indonesia would be created with three component parts, of which the Republic would be one. Thus the vast archipelago would be divided into three relatively equal states territorially, though the Republic would have most of the people, and the federal government would be united with the Netherlands as an equal, sovereign power.

This proposed federation was unreal, because the Republic contained 85 per cent of the population of the Indies and accounted for nearly nine-tenths of its export and import trade. The assumed equality of the three areas in the federation was therefore illusory.¹³ Realizing this, the Dutch set to work to try to pare down the Republic. They mobilized some of the feudalistic leaders to set up, on December 25, 1947, a new state of East Indonesia which was soon revealed to be a puppet state.¹⁴

Then on May 4, 1948, another puppet state was formed in the western third of Java,¹⁵ and finally, on May 12 and 17, states were set up in West Borneo and East Borneo, in violation of the Linggadjadi agreement that the new federation should be organized by cooperation between the Republic and the Netherlands, and by democratic means. The old policy of divide and rule was being applied.

A Dutch blockade of Java continued also, leading to large-scale smuggling which was costly to the Republic but did keep it going, since it was nearly self sufficient. Its economic position improved a little, whereas the economy

¹² United Nations Security Council, *Official Records, First Year, First Series, No. 1*, pp. 223 ff.

¹³ Charles Wolf, Jr., *The Indonesian Story*, New York, 1948, p. 45.

¹⁴ *The Roundtable*, March, 1947, p. 133; *the Economist*, November 1, 1947, p. 723.

¹⁵ Wolf, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-9.

of the Dutch controlled islands deteriorated and the strain on Netherlands' finances increased. The Dutch were also incensed by the expansion of the Republic's foreign relations contacts abroad, especially in India which seethed with indignation at the events in Indonesia.

Dutch "Police Action." In the meantime Dutch troops continued to pour into the Republic until the Dutch military position was as strong as its political and economic positions were weak. Accordingly, the Dutch issued a 10,000 word ultimatum with four main demands, on May 27, 1947, and when the Republic did not accept them the Dutch army of 110,000 men struck at midnight on July 20, in what was called "police measures of a strictly limited character." The real object of the drive was to destroy all Republican armed forces and isolate the Republic in as small an area as possible in Central Java, preparatory to later measures.

On July 30, both the Australian and Indian Governments separately requested the Security Council to consider the situation, amid general reluctance to take action upon what was alleged by the Netherlands to be an internal affair, but an Australian resolution calling for a cessation of hostilities and peaceful settlement was adopted promptly, Belgium, France and Britain, the three colonial powers, abstaining. Having accomplished its military objectives, the Dutch Government ordered a cease-fire on August 4.¹⁶

The Dutch attack aroused strong disapproval in the United States. On July 22 the *New York Times* stated flatly that the campaign could be neither understood nor condoned, and on the 30th the *Christian Century* said that the Dutch action was equivalent to a declaration of war on the infant Republic. In Asia intense indignation was stirred. General Carlos Romulo of the Philippines said in the Security Council that it was a queer trick of language which labelled the desperate acts of ill-armed people fighting for freedom on their own soil as "atrocities," while the deliberate acts of a people armed with cannon and tanks and bombing planes against people armed with little more than spears was "civilized warfare."¹⁷ In India, Nehru issued a statement which came close to being a Monroe Doctrine for Asia.

Renville Agreement. A United States offer of good offices to effect a settlement was not accepted by the Republic and the Council established two bodies, a Commission of Consular Officers in Batavia to report on a cease-fire, and a Committee of Good Offices to promote a political settlement. The latter group contained representatives of Australia, Belgium and the United States and was headed by Dr. Frank P. Graham, President of the University of North Carolina.

After months of hard labor by this body a new agreement was signed between the Netherlands and the Republic on board the U.S.S. *Renville*, January 17, 1948.

The Renville Agreement was based on the large Dutch conquests during the fighting, which enabled the Dutch to control half of the sugar mills of

¹⁶ United Nations Document, S/466, August 4, 1947.

¹⁷ United Nations Security Council, *Official Records*, 2nd year, No. 95, October 9, 1947, p. 2536.

Java, 75 per cent of its rubber, 65 per cent of its coffee and 90 per cent of its tea, along with many other products.¹⁸ On Sumatra the oil fields had been seized. These gains largely reversed the economic situation, putting the Dutch in a much stronger position and the Republic in a far weaker state. Its situation was worsened also by a high handed action of Van Mook on August 29 in drawing a line along the spearheads of the Dutch conquests and claiming the right to mop up everything behind it. This action compelled 35,000 Republican troops to evacuate positions held.¹⁹

Then the basic issues which the Linggadjati Agreement had not been able to resolve frustrated the many principles laid down in the Renville Agreement. The Republic strove to maintain its *de facto* authority, including its army and foreign relations contacts, until sovereignty should be transferred from the Netherlands to the projected United States of Indonesia, while the Dutch worked incessantly to destroy the Republic or cut it down to manageable size before such a transfer. Outside the Republic the Dutch multiplied new states and sought to get controllable governments in the remainder of the islands.²⁰

The economic objectives of the two sides were also irreconcilable. The Republic intended to nationalize the lucrative administrative jobs, the rich inter-island shipping traffic and the large profits from the export trade, all in the hands of the Dutch, while the latter sought to regain all of their colonial exploitative privileges, if possible. The Dutch fought for their empire, which so largely supported them, and the Indonesians for freedom and the use of their own resources. Nothing could bridge that gap, or the total distrust of each side for the other. A Communist revolt against the Republic was put down in September 1948, but the Dutch then said the Republic was not strong enough to handle the Communists.

The Second Dutch Assault. So the deadlock continued until the Dutch decided to use the mailed fist again. On December 19, 1948, parachutists dropped on the Republican capital at Jogjakarta and seized it, capturing Soekarno, Hatta and other Republican Government leaders. All other military objectives were obtained with ease.

The Republic was close to extinction, but the Dutch had overplayed their hand. World-wide indignation grew and extended into the United States Government, which as late as November had vainly sought to exclude the Republic from a UN Economic Committee for Asia which was convening in Australia, from which the Dutch walked out. Now Merle Cochran, the United States representative on the UN Committee of Good Offices, wrote a stinging condemnation of the Dutch attack and the United States asked for an emergency meeting of the Security Council on December 20. In the ensuing debate condemnation of the Dutch action was unanimous and a resolution was adopted ordering the release of the captured Republican leaders.²¹ On

¹⁸ U.S. *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, November 1, 1947, p. 17.

¹⁹ J. Foster Collins, "The United Nations and Indonesia," *International Conciliation*, March, 1950, p. 131.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 154-5.

²¹ *United Nations Document*, S/1150, December 24, 1948.

January 21, another resolution changed the CGO into a formal UN Commission for Indonesia and pressure continued to force a Dutch retreat. Simultaneously, a conference of nineteen Asian, Australasian and Middle East States at New Delhi, India, urged the Security Council to stronger action, and some of its suggestions were accepted.

Even more decisive was the effect of this second Dutch "police action" upon opinion in Indonesia. Nearly all of the leaders and people of the many puppet states set up by the Dutch in the vast realm which they sought to hold saw that mastery was the Dutch objective, and from that time on opinion gravitated toward the Republic. As had happened in China and was to happen in Indo-China, it was discovered that the Dutch controlled the cities, ports and main communication lines, but little else. The countryside was filled with Republican guerrillas which the Dutch could not put down. Their physical strength was not sufficient, their financial condition was increasingly grave, especially since the United States now cut off financial aid, and their moral position had collapsed.

"*Merdeka*"—*Independence*. There was therefore nothing to do but restore the Republican Government, though this was delayed until July 6, 1949. Then a new series of agreements was negotiated with the Republican leaders at the Hague, from August 23 to November 2, 1949, providing for a nominal union of the United States of Indonesia with the Netherlands, but these dispositions did not stop the drift of all Indonesia toward the Republic and independence, which became a fact on August 17, 1950.

The forces turned loose in Asia by World War II had proved to be too much for the Dutch to handle, as they were to prove later too much for the French in Indo-China. In both cases the Japanese had not been able to hold the colonies for themselves, but by breaking the European grip for a few years they made it impossible for the Europeans to return and re-establish their control.

The United States avoided a similar experience in the Philippines by honoring in 1946 the prior pledge of the Tydings-McDuffie Act of March 24, 1934, setting 1944 as the definite date of Philippine independence. This precedent also had its effect in defeating the Dutch and the French, and the wisdom of the British in setting free their India-Burma-Ceylon empire supplied another model which others could fail to follow only at their peril.

INDO-CHINA

Indo-China was an artificial creation of French imperialism. Geographically it is divided into East and West by a great mountain divide. On the West side live the peoples of Laos and Cambodia, racially and culturally akin to India and Burma, who now take a keen interest in them. On the East side of the long peninsula, along the China sea, dwell the Annamites, or Vietnamese, originally a nomadic people who were forced by the Chinese to settle down in Tonkin, and after four centuries of conquest and assimilation by the Chinese, beginning in 213 B.C., they became a part of Chinese civilization in Annam, meaning the "Pacified South."²²

²² Virginia Thompson, *French Indo-China*, New York, 1937, p. 19; London, Allen & Unwin, 1937.

These factors strongly suggest that the current dispute over Indo-China should be settled by an East-West division of the peninsula, instead of the North-South split which the Cold War has brought about.

French imperialism in Indo-China was founded on Roman Catholic missionary activity. Two Jesuit priests founded a mission in 1615. The first company for Indo-China trade organized in 1665, announced that it would combine commercial and religious activities by "transporting priests who would assist commerce by overseeing trade negotiations." Considerable missionary success was destroyed by the anti-Christian hostility of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but the few missionaries who remained became liaison agents for the military who initiated the conquest of the peninsula in 1858. Prior to this the French had gradually edged toward control over the destinies of the Indo-Chinese during the preceding century.²³

Beginning in the south, where the great Cochin China rice bowl lies, the French moved north and struggled intermittently with the Chinese, who came to the aid of Annam, for Hanoi and Tonkin until 1885, when a French war with China broke Chinese suzerainty over Tonkin.²⁴ Thereafter the French divided Annam into three parts, the better to rule it. This was a mistake, since Annamite nationalism had been strongly forged in a thousand-year struggle against Chinese domination. The French "tried by different administrative methods to sunder what history had knit together throughout twenty centuries of common traditions."²⁵ Though the Cambodians and Laotians accepted the protection of the French against hostile neighbors, the Annamites did not.

The Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905 stirred Annamite hopes and led many to go to Japan for study, only to find on their return that the enormous French Administration was still closed to them. Students returning from France, who had learned about the French and American Revolutions, encountered the same difficulty—even after Wilson's principle of self-determination, the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Ghandi movement in India had all questioned the immutability of colonial rule. At the same time the wholesale barbarism of the Christian Westerners in killing one another during World War I invalidated their claims of a moral right to rule. In 1923, after the war, one Ho Chi Min, the son of a noble, went from Paris to Moscow to study communist methods and in 1930 he organized a Communist party, which led a widespread revolt of starving peasants afflicted by a series of natural calamities, a revolt which was suppressed by the French during 1931 with "great damage and brutality. French retribution was swift and cruel." Suspects were "condemned en masse, often without real trials or evidence." The French Foreign Legion was turned loose, "the prisons were filled and thousands killed."²⁶

²³ Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

²⁴ Thomas E. Ennis, *French Policy and Developments in Indo-China*, Chicago, 1936, pp. 46-50.

²⁵ Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

²⁶ Ellen J. Hammer, *The Struggle for Indo-China*, Stanford U.P.; Oxford U.P., 1954, pp. 84-6. This is an outstanding book.

World War II. When World War II broke out the French did not even attempt to gain the help of the Indo-Chinese peoples. Instead they let the Japanese walk into the colony and gradually yielded actual control in return for the preservation of the visible forms of their government.²⁷ Far from organizing an underground movement against the Japanese, for fear of stirring nationalism, they continued to put down native uprisings and jailed thousands of nationalists.²⁸

This went on until the Japanese seized full control of the country on March 9, 1945, and asked the Emperor Bao Dai to cut the country off from France by rallying nationalist sentiment. As one means of doing so he revived the name Vietnam, and with the aid of the Japanese was able to join Cochin China and Tonkin to Annam, thus re-establishing the ancient unity of the Vietnamese people. Soon after, on March 18 and April 8, both Laos and Cambodia declared their independence.²⁹

In France the Gaullist Cabinet announced on March 24, 1945, a new semi-autonomous status for Indo-China, partly as an effort to ward off an international trusteeship which Roosevelt had proposed at Teheran, but which Churchill had blocked. Roosevelt had advanced the same idea to Hull in January 1944, saying that France had milked the country for a hundred years and that the people of Indo-China were entitled to something better than that.³⁰

The proposed autonomy was some advance over straight colonial rule, but it left power solidly in the hands of the French and pointed toward breaking Vietnam again into three parts. The plan had little appeal for the Vietnamese, who remembered keenly the substance of French rule. As in Indonesia the traditional subsistence economy of the village had been disintegrated by the necessity of raising taxes which sometimes amounted to one-fifth of the peasants' meager income. They lost their land to landlord-usurers, who acquired large estates while the remaining peasant holdings became smaller and smaller as they were divided among many children. In the Tonkin delta 6,500,000 people crowded into 5790 square miles. Most of them could afford only two meals a day. These people were subjected to three French monopolies, on salt, opium and alcohol. Salt was badly needed for a vital fish diet. Opium smoking was promoted as one of the financial props of the government. Each village was required to consume its quota of alcohol and the laws were enforced by venal hired mandarins and foremen, against whom the people had no rights of appeal. If they worked in the few industries, wages were very low, and the profits of empire were sent back to France instead of being invested in the country. The gap between rich and poor constantly widened.³¹

It was conditions and memories like these which helped Ho Chi Min to perpetuate his Communist party and to place 10,000 guerrillas in the field

²⁷ Hammer, in *The State of Asia*, ed. Rosinger, pp. 227-8.

²⁸ Lennox A. Mills and Associates, *The New World of South East Asia*, Wisconsin, Minnesota U.P.; Oxford U.P., 1949, p. 230.

²⁹ Eleanor Lattimore, *Far Eastern Survey*, May 23, 1945, pp. 132-3; *the New York Times*, March 12, 14, April 11, 1945.

³⁰ Hammer, *The Struggle for Indo-China*, pp. 42, 44.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-70.

in North Indo-China under a young teacher and Doctor of Law, Vo Nguyen Giap, who graduated from many prisons to become a military genius. His men harassed the Japanese and helped downed American pilots out of the country, receiving some American aid in return.

By May 1945 Ho had created a liberated area of six northern Tonkinese provinces and when the Japanese surrendered on August 14 he called a national congress and became the head of a new government. By this time his Vietminh organization had become "a broad national movement, uniting large numbers of Vietnamese regardless of their politics, and reaching down into the masses."³² Emperor Bao Dai was forced to abdicate on August 26, becoming the Supreme Councillor of the Republic, and on September 2 a Declaration of Independence, modelled after our own, was issued.

At the Potsdam Conference it had been decided that the Chinese should receive the surrender of the Japanese above the 16th parallel and the British below it. Though actually in control of Vietnam, Ho's Government did not oppose the incoming forces. The Chinese occupied Hanoi on September 11, 1945 and exercised an occupation relatively benevolent to Ho until February 1946.

The French Return. In the South developments were more tragic. On September 2 a large procession broke ranks and looted French houses, after a friendly priest was shot on the steps of the Cathedral. Tension was high when British and Indian troops arrived in Saigon by plane on September 12, 1945. The British Commanding General, Douglas D. Gracey, arrived with strict instructions from the British Labor Government that his sole mission was to disarm the Japanese. He was not to get involved in keeping order. However, he promptly "took it upon himself" to restore South Indo-China to the French. He imposed the most rigorous martial law at the request of the French and permitted the arming of interned French troops, after which "the French population went wild; they insulted and attacked any Vietnamese who dared appear on the streets, while French and British soldiers looked on."³³ In some places the British and French used Japanese troops against the Vietnamese, but on one occasion the Japanese looked on while French people were massacred.

All of Gracey's measures were "aimed directly" at Ho's Committee of the South. Finally, on October 9, Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin signed an agreement with France recognizing her administration in South Vietnam, and after an agonizing wait for troops General Leclerc began the reconquest of Indo-China on October 25, 1945. He thought it would take about a month.³⁴

In Hanoi Jean Sainteny, a moderate Frenchman who headed the French Military Mission, found himself isolated. Both the Chinese and the Americans in South China had impeded his return and would do nothing to aid him. Neither would the Japanese. The American and Chinese Governments were not keen about restoring French control and his own Government would not give him power to negotiate with Ho's Government, which had the overwhelming support of the Vietnamese, even among the 2,000,000 Catholics,

³² Hammer, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 116, 118, 120.

who also wanted independence. In July a feeler from Ho's headquarters had suggested independence on a definite date, four or five years later, but Sainteny could not discuss that.

He did manage to occupy the French palace, but lived under guard while the nondescript Chinese Nationalist army spread over the country like a cloud of locusts, looting and black marketing. A Chinese merchant in Hanoi thought they were worse than the atomic bomb. They stayed until the French finally conceded, on February 28, 1946, all of China's demands to get them out—the end of French extraterritorial rights in China, the part of the Haiphong-Kunming Railway in China and free access to a Chinese free zone in Haiphong. Even then it was midsummer before the bulk of the Chinese army was out.³⁵

This year of grace enabled the Vietminh Government to consolidate its power. It banned prostitution and gambling; abolished several taxes, though its "voluntary" contributions proved to be just as heavy; passed social legislation; promoted education in a country 80 per cent illiterate through a vast network of local committees, and coped with the disaster of a great flood.³⁶

Ho's "Free State," Nevertheless, the withdrawal of the Chinese forced Ho to come to terms with the French and on March 6 he signed an agreement with Sainteny in which France recognized his Republic as "a free state with its own government, parliament, army and finances, forming part of the Indochinese Federation and the French Union"—a formula strikingly like that which the Dutch sought to implement in Indonesia. A referendum should determine whether the three Ky—Tonkin, Annam and Cochin China—should be united. A Vietnamese-French conference was also promised.³⁷

This conference which Ho wanted at once in France was not convened at Fontainebleau until July 6, four months later, after an abortive preliminary conference at Dalat in Indo-China. It had foundered on Cochin China, which the French were determined to keep separate from Vietnam since it contained the bulk of their investments. The Fontainebleau conference also came to naught when Admiral d'Argenlieu, the French High Commissioner in Indo-China, who was also a monk, called a second Dalat conference for August 1, to which he invited delegates from the French appointed Government of Cochin China, the status of which the Vietnamese had gone to Paris to discuss, and from a non-existent entity, "South Annam," but none from Vietnam.

Ho Chi Min stayed on in Paris, reluctant to leave with "empty hands." To Sainteny he said: "Don't let me leave this way. Give me some weapon against the extremists. You will not regret it." Eventually he signed a *modus vivendi* confined to cultural and economic questions and providing for a cease-fire, saying "I have just signed my death warrant," a foreboding which could have come true since he had had great difficulty in convincing his followers that the original March agreement calling for a free state would lead to independence. Now he was very far from such a consummation. The French insisted on

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 128-47.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 142, 145.

³⁷ Lanniston Sharp, *The Far Eastern Survey*, December 18, 1946, p. 196; George Sheldon, *Ibid.*, p. 374.

controlling the army and diplomacy of Vietnam, as well as its currency and economy.³⁸

The French Give a Lesson. Back in Haiphong fighting broke out over the French seizure of a Chinese junk which was running their blockade. The fighting was ended by a French agreement, on November 22, to respect Vietnamese sovereignty. But Admiral d'Argenlieu, then in Paris, had other ideas. He proposed to Premier Bidault that the opportunity be seized to teach the Vietnamese a lesson and received permission to do so, using artillery if he desired. The French in Haiphong demurred, pointing out that the grave situation required the settlement of incidents, not their exploitation. Then an order from Saigon to the military commander directed him to "give a severe lesson" by using all means at his disposal to make himself "complete master of Haiphong and so bring the Vietnamese army around to a better understanding of the situation."³⁹

This was done on November 23, 1946, by bombarding and bombing the Vietnamese quarter, after a two-hour ultimatum, completely destroying it and killing 6000 people. Then in Hanoi the Vietnamese raised barricades and prepared for a siege. In the cabinet Ho strove for peace and pleaded for it in Paris, but when the French demanded the disarmament of the Vietminh militia, on December 19, the Vietnamese attacked the French in Hanoi with all means at their command. French forces then captured Hanoi and their repression cost several thousand Vietnamese lives. Like the Dutch with their "police operations" in Indonesia the French had made peace impossible, and their own exit from the colony inevitable by a sheer assertion of force at Haiphong. Intended to teach the Vietnamese the lesson of submission, it had instead steeled them to everlasting resistance.

When the Ho Chi Min Government left Hanoi "it was at the head of a nationwide resistance movement." It was months before the French could get together any kind of opposition "government," and then it was headed by the ever opportunistic playboy, Emperor Bao Dai.

"Neutralizing" the Republic. Politically the French had also pursued exactly the same policy that the Dutch were to use later in Indonesia.

It was accurately described by a French Catholic priest who surveyed the events of 1946 and concluded that they revealed "a fairly clear general plan: to concede to Viet Nam a theoretical independence which no one is any longer in a position to refuse, but to reduce its territory as much as possible and to surround it with a belt of rival states in order to neutralize it." He added that "It cannot be denied that French policy after March 6 was marked by Machiavellianism and that it ran counter to the most natural and most legitimate aspirations of the élite of the country."⁴⁰

Responsibility for the Indo-China tragedy was shared also by all of the French political parties, as well as the prime ministers and cabinets who allowed the colonialists and d'Argenlieu to mould policy on the spot in Indo-China. The Radical Socialists had been traditionally involved financially in the profits of colonialism in Indo-China. The anti-colonial Socialists were

³⁸ Hammer, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

so "involved in retaining nominal political power" in the government that they invariably voted "in the end in favor of the very policies they had criticized in debate." Even the French Communists, then key members of the government, were responsible for d'Argenlieu and did not lift a hand in defense of the Vietnamese until 1950, after they were out of the government and after the Vietminh were moving openly into the communist camp. Finally, the Catholic MRP, which exercised the real power, went along with the tough policies of Georges Bidault and Jean Letourneau, which allowed the war profiteers and foreign exchange speculators to continue their gains indefinitely. All of these errors of omission and commission finally convinced an influential French editor, J. J. Servan-Schreiber, that "the truth is that the facts now known seem to add up to a lucid plan worked out step by step to eliminate any possibility of negotiations in Indo-China in order to assure the prolongation without limit of the hostilities and of the military occupation."⁴¹

The French imperialists could reason that after all France is a great power and could prevail where the small Dutch people could not. They overlooked the techniques developed so successfully in North China by the Communists throughout World War II, which the Vietminh now used to the full.

Still controlling large areas in North Central and South Vietnam, and the majority of its population, they moved whole factories into the forests, extemporized an arms industry, greatly diversified the crops for both foods and textiles, combated illiteracy incessantly, reduced rents, and mobilized the energies of each individual to help in some way, succeeding so well that they collected taxes in the French-controlled cities. As in North China the invaders had a few cities and fortified strong points. The Vietminh held the rest. French sway might be extended a little by day but ended at dusk.⁴²

As the war dragged on, efforts were made on the French side to construct a Vietnamese government as a foil to the vigorous Republic headed by Ho Chi Min, one which would enlist popular support in the French-controlled areas without removing them from French control. For this purpose the former Emperor Bao Dai was brought back as Chief of State, after lengthy negotiations in Paris which produced the Elysee Agreements of March 8, 1949, and he proclaimed a new state of Vietnam, within the French Union, on June 14, 1949.

An "interstate" conference between France, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam was to be held in January 1950, but it did not meet until June at Paris and then dragged on until December when accords were signed on postal-telephone-telegraph control, immigration, and a customs union. Then as specific conventions were drawn to implement the agreements, French officials withdrew in practice much that they had conceded in principle.⁴³ These tactics were facilitated by the extremely complicated situation in South Indo-China, where one careful observer thought that "nowhere else in the world is there such a diversity of races, religions, purposes, arms and tactical organizations."⁴⁴

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 297-300.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 223-4.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 280-1.

⁴⁴ Hanson W. Baldwin, the *New York Times*, February 14, 1951.

General de Lattre's War. The armed forces on the French side were almost as variegated. Of a total of 150,000 in 1951 about half were natives of uncertain loyalty and effectiveness. The other half was composed of Foreign Legionnaires, mostly Germans and Dutch; Algerians, Moroccans, Senegalese and other Africans; enlisted men of the Navy and Air Force; all led by French Army officers and *sous-officiers*.⁴⁵ The French Constitution forbade sending conscripts from France.

Ho Chi Min's army was thought to contain about 70,000 lightly armed men, about 20 per cent of them Communists and the remainder strong nationalists. By this time Ho's government was predominantly Communist.⁴⁶

Vietminh whittling down operations along the China border captured 4000 trucks and many of France's best troops, creating a situation so serious that in December 1950 General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny was made both high commissioner and supreme commander. He evacuated many isolated forts, concentrating most of his strength in the Red River Delta and engaged in a strenuous morale building campaign, appearing everywhere and making speeches to the troops with dash and verve. He shook up the entire military and civil administrations, just as the Vietminh, now receiving Chinese war material, passed from guerrilla war over to the organization of brigades containing about 14,000 men each.

However, this shift was premature and in April 1951 Ho's forces reverted to guerrilla operations, especially in the delta, and the French clearly had the best of the fighting in 1951.⁴⁷

This result was partly due to the large-scale American aid which began to go to the French forces late in 1950, as soon as the Communist Chinese began to help the Vietminh. This aid included everything from artillery and tanks to river craft, planes, trucks and jeeps. By January 1952 100,000 tons of supplies carried in 100 ships had arrived in Saigon.⁴⁸

Attrition War in 1952. In January 1952 "General de Lattre's war," as it came to be known, ended with his death in a Paris clinic and a steep drop in French morale led to a widespread desire to evacuate Indo-China. By this time, General Juin told the Pentagon, more French officers were being killed than Saint Cyr, the French military academy, was turning out. France was also spending a billion dollars a year on Indo-China, not to keep it a colony, said Juin, but only to turn the country over to anti-communists.⁴⁹

To reassure France against open Chinese intervention there was talk of asking the UN for assistance in that event, but Jean Letourneau, French Minister for the Associated States, maintained that the war was still an internal revolt and therefore only French union troops should be used. U.S. manned ships and planes would be welcomed. American war material continued to pour into Indo-China.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Hanson W. Baldwin, the *New York Times*, February 14, 1951.

⁴⁶ The *New York Times*, February 12, 1951.

⁴⁷ Tillman Durdan, the *New York Times*, January 13, 1952.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, January 13, 29, 1952.

⁴⁹ James Reston, the *New York Times*, January 14, 1952.

⁵⁰ The *New York Times*, January 26, 29, 1952.

From China the Vietminh received light infantry weapons, but not much artillery or many vehicles and no aircraft. However, some 7000 Chinese advisers and technicians helped Ho's forces and he had ample manpower, whereas his opponents did not.⁵¹

French effort was concentrated in the spring of 1952 on pushing the Vietminh guerrillas out of the Red River Valley, an effort which failed, though the Vietminh casualties were estimated as 78,000. By December 1952 Tillman Durdin felt that the defeat of the Vietminh was "as remote and uncertain a possibility as ever. They had been able to replace their heavy losses in men and material and were as strong as ever. Even more important, their recruits fought with the spirit of veterans, trying to knock out French tanks with hand grenades and heedless of death from the flaming napalm bombs. The amount of equipment they received from the Communist world was not massive, but it kept them supplied with light weapons, including heavier mortars. On December 6, 1952, they captured Dienbienphu, a French stronghold in the interior, which was recaptured later by a massive French air strike.⁵²

Vietnam Held in Tutelage. On the political front the American Government looked forward to greater Vietnamese participation in Bao Dai's Government, but until June 3, 1952 the cabinet was headed by Tran Van Huu, an aged financier, and composed of wealthy men quite assimilated by France. There was "overcentralization, corruption and inefficiency," together with failure even to create the consultative assembly which Bao Dai had talked about appointing, much less an elective one.⁵³

Huu was succeeded by Nguyen Van Tam, a tough head of the secret police system who was unpopular and strongly pro-French. He was "well known as a French patriot."⁵⁴ Shortly before he was installed the French Government appointed Jean Letourneau High Commissioner for Indo-China, April 1, 1952, and he remained as Minister for the Associated States. His redoubled powers had little effect for some months since he spent most of his time commuting between Saigon and Paris, but after January 1953 he remained in Saigon, "an unprecedented arrangement for the government of a supposedly independent country," which left the Vietnamese Government little freedom of action.⁵⁵

France Exhausted. In July 1952 there was a quiet movement in the French parliament to stop the war by dividing Indo-China on the Korea model. During the negotiation to obtain \$625,000,000 of additional American aid, Ambassador Bonnet suggested that France might have to emulate Britain and withdraw, as the British did in Greece. The death of the French officer corps continued apace and France was unable to ratify the proposed European Defense Community, so much desired in Washington, or to think of competing with Germany in Europe on anything like equal terms so long as the Indo-China drain continued.⁵⁶

⁵¹ Tillman Durdin, the *New York Times*, January 13, March 2, 1952.

⁵² The *New York Times*, December 1, 7, 1952.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, June 8, 22, 1952.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, June 4, 22, 1952; Hammer, p. 281.

⁵⁵ Hammer, *op. cit.*, pp. 281-2.

⁵⁶ The *New York Times*, July 2, 31, 1952.

These considerations weighed heavier and heavier. Vincent Auriol said on October 25, 1952, that France had spent twice as much on the Indo-China war as she had received in Marshall plan aid.⁵⁷ Since it had amounted to \$2,285,000,000, this meant that France had spent nearly five billion dollars on the war, a sum probably footed entirely by American taxpayers, since direct American aid for the war was running about a billion a year.

However, the French taxpayer felt that he was paying the bill. At the end of 1952 Hanson W. Baldwin wrote that "the people of France are becoming more and more weary of a conflict which brings them no perceptible returns, at a cost evident to every taxpayer and to the family of every regular officer."⁵⁸

In March 1953 serious moves were made to induce the United States to increase its already great military aid. French Premier Mayer reported in Washington that the Vietminh had lately received heavy cannon and anti-aircraft guns from the Chinese. However, he still resisted the sending of American instructors to train the Vietnamese army. President Eisenhower explained that the United States did not consider the war as a colonial war, but rather as a part of the general struggle against communism.⁵⁹

Restless "Associated States." On April 12 the Vietminh sent 40,000 men into Laos and its government appealed directly to the United Nations, an action embarrassing to the French who still controlled the military and foreign relations of Laos. At the same time the King of Cambodia went to Paris to tell French officials that Cambodia must have independence, already theoretically granted to her, in order to retain the loyalty of her people. Finding deaf ears he went to New York and warned that there was real danger of his people joining "the communist-led Vietminh movement" if Cambodia did not get independence. For independence she was "ready to sacrifice even her existence."⁶⁰ Returning to his country he boycotted his capital for months, as a further gesture of protest.

Endeavoring to stop the scandalous profiteering in the overvalued Indo-Chinese piastre, the French suddenly devalued it, unilaterally and without warning, on May 10, 1953, creating panic in business circles and disgusting Premier Tam, who reminded the French that this action violated the Franco-Vietnamese independence agreement of March 8, 1949. On June 7 he made a radio speech demanding independence on the British pattern. Vietnam did not want to be "the tenant of a house built without us."⁶¹

These evidences that France could not remember that the Associated States were independent forced another shuffle, in which Jean Letourneau was removed from his double role as High Commissioner and Minister for the Associated States, the latter office being abolished as Premier Laniel took over direct responsibility for Indo-China. Various additional degrees of independence were considered and the new French High Commissioner, Maurice Dejean, actually did give up the Norodan Palace in Saigon, long an emotional

⁵⁷ Harold Callender, *the New York Times*, October 26, 1952.

⁵⁸ *The New York Times*, November 25, 1952.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, March 27, 1953.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, April 19, 1953.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, May 17, June 8, 1953.

symbol to the Vietnamese. These moves were taken to "help keep the Indo-chinese states within the French Union."⁶²

Simultaneous but separate meetings were then held during October between France and the three Associated States, in which Laos and Cambodia were pacified with a new "recognition" that they were "fully independent and sovereign" states, "within the French Union." These events led to two congresses meeting in Vietnam, one unofficial and one official. The second congress refused to appoint any representatives to talk with France, demanding instead a constitution and a national assembly elected by universal suffrage. It distressed the French deeply by refusing to participate in the "French Union in its present form," a refusal underlined by the appointment of a new cabinet in Vietnam headed by Prince Buu Loc and composed mostly of sincere nationalists.⁶³

The Navarre Plan. As 1954 opened, each side had about 500,000 men in its Indo-China forces and the Navarre plan for ending the war was ready. The United States had specified on March 26, as a condition of increased aid, that a definite plan for victory must be made. But now that General Navarre's plan was ready Americans felt that it put the cart before the horse. Cochin China, the citadel of French wealth, would be pacified first. Then the new Vietnamese forces would replace the French forces in the static positions and free them—the Europeans and Africans—for attack northward. They would advance up the peninsula, cleaning out the Vietminh as they went and pacifying virtually all of Vietnam before reaching the Chinese border, over which the Vietminh were being supplied.⁶⁴

Soon after the plan began to operate, in February 1954, the new First Vietnamese Division, left in a static position, turned against Bao Dai and the French. Then Navarre executed his master stroke by parachuting 20,000 of his best troops into Dienbienphu, a "hedgehog" position, in a broad valley deep in the enemy's country. This move was variously justified as defending Laos and setting up a mincing machine for the destruction of the Vietminh armies. The Vietminh invasion of Laos went ahead anyway and so did the mincing operation, but in reverse, since the Vietminh accepted the challenge, mounted artillery on the hills around the Dienbienphu hedgehog, shelling it by day and digging zig-zag trenches toward it by night while Navarre poured men and supplies into the constantly shrinking perimeter of the fortress.

This long dramatic battle did not end until May 7 with the surrender of the fortress, the loss of the best of Navarre's troops and a prestige defeat from which the French could not recover in North Indo-China.

Anticipation of this result made the spring of 1954 a time of even greater strain in Washington than in Paris, where the great majority of Frenchmen longed only to escape from the huge trap which the Indo-China war had become.

"*Massive Retaliation.*" The year had begun in the United States with the famous speech by Secretary of State Dulles, on January 12, in which he

⁶² Harold Callender, the *New York Times*, July 2, 1953.

⁶³ Hammer, *op. cit.*, pp. 302, 305, 321.

⁶⁴ Hanson W. Baldwin, the *New York Times*, February 7, 1954.

propounded the doctrine of "massive retaliation". Quoting Lenin and Stalin to show that the Soviets planned first to overextend the free nations and then destroy them with one blow, Dulles held that we should counter this alleged strategy by maintaining a great strategic reserve in the United States and that the free community should be "willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing." This strategy had been considered by the National Security Council and a decision had been made "to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing."

Then he warned again that if there were "open aggression" by the Chinese Red Army that would have "grave consequences which might not be confined to Indo-china."

This address combined the two favorite threads of Mr. Dulles' diplomacy, the making of threats and "keeping them guessing." The "massive retaliation" doctrine implied "unlimited atomic war," which, said the military expert of the *New York Times*, "would surely 'bleed us white' far more rapidly than mass land warfare."⁶⁵ The new doctrine also put all of our allies upon notice that a decision suddenly made in Washington might unleash an atomic war which would destroy them all, deepening their already strong desire to save themselves by making peace, first in Indo-China and then in the Cold War itself.

The Berlin Conference. This desire had already forced the calling of a meeting of the Big Four Council of Foreign Ministers, to see if the many professions of peaceful intent made by the new Soviet leaders after Stalin's death, on March 6, 1953, might lead to progress toward a German settlement. It was a commentary on the heat of the Cold War that the Council had not met for nearly five years.

The conference opened in Berlin on January 26, 1954, and did not lead to any agreement. Molotov seemed to have more freedom of action, able to change tactics on his own initiative, but he still proposed that Germany be evacuated, the West's bases there razed and the country neutralized, as he had on March 10, 1952. In reply the West proposed German unity first, by free elections, rejecting any role for the East German Democratic Republic, after which a peace treaty would be made. The usual deadlock ensued and the conference adjourned on February 18 with no agreement on European affairs except that they would hold an exchange of views to promote disarmament.

The Western delegates had held together perfectly. Anne O'Hare McCormick, the *New York Times* foreign analyst, wrote that the West's teamwork had been heartening to watch. Dulles, Eden and Bidault "played together like well-drilled members of a single cast, as if they had rehearsed their lines."⁶⁶

There was no doubt that Dulles had held his team together perfectly. French Foreign Minister Bidault had stayed in line, often in the forefront, but he was compelled to specify one thing, that a conference about Indo-China be held. He was obliged to do this because of the great war weariness in

⁶⁵ Hanson W. Baldwin, the *New York Times*, February 24, 1954.

⁶⁶ The *New York Times*, February 20, 1954.

France and in the hope of prolonging the life of the Laniel Government, behind which loomed the shadow of Mendès-France, the advocate of peace in Indo-China. Dulles, too, was obliged to concede this to maintain the unity of his team at Berlin.

The announcement that another conference would meet at Geneva on April 26 to discuss Korea and Indo-China was accordingly the sole, but very important result of the Berlin Conference, aside from some lessening of tension and a more polite willingness to disagree.

The American Government Opposed to Peace. At Berlin Bidault had argued that at the Geneva Conference the Communists might be persuaded to accept an armistice by the long-implied threat of United States intervention.⁶⁷ Already during the weekend of February 1, President Eisenhower, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other agencies of Government and a special committee under the chairmanship of General Walter Bedell Smith had studied the Indo-China situation and discussed what course the United States should follow. They had considered the use of United States ground, air and naval forces in Indo-China, but had also taken a new look at the old theory that Indo-China was the key to South East Asia, weighing alternative plans such as the strengthening of Thailand. The immediate task of the conferences was to devise means of strengthening France militarily and politically so as "to prevent a negotiated peace."⁶⁸

The United States thus found itself in the strange position of opposing the making of peace by the French in Indo-China, after she had herself tired of the Korean war and made peace there. Nevertheless, James Reston now reported, on February 4, that our Government thought it would be a disaster for France to negotiate on Indo-China.⁶⁹

This news led Reston to observe that the State Department was practising too much sudden diplomacy all around the globe. It had announced the policy of "massive retaliation" without consulting our allies. The British read in the papers that we were negotiating a military agreement with one member of the Commonwealth, Pakistan, to the extreme annoyance of another, India. Israel was also alarmed. Spain was suddenly brought into the alliance and the result was an immediate outcry for Gibraltar. Italy and Yugoslavia were confronted with a sudden "solution" of the Trieste issue, and France was told to get into EDC or face U.S. withdrawal from Europe.

The prospect of direct American participation in the war, raised by the sending of 200 Air Force technicians to Indo-China, was quieted on February 10 by President Eisenhower when he said he could conceive of no greater tragedy than for the United States to become involved in all-out war in Indo-China. No one could be more bitterly opposed to such a development than he was.⁷⁰

Canadian Dissent. Another calming utterance was made by Prime Minister St. Laurent of Canada in backing Nehru's proposal for a truce in Indo-China,

⁶⁷ Harold Callender, the *New York Times*, June 16, 1954.

⁶⁸ Hanson W. Baldwin, the *New York Times*, February 7, 1954.

⁶⁹ The *New York Times*, February 4, 1954.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, February 11, 1954.

"without any hesitation or reservation whatsoever." Speaking of Russian aggression, he said: "I do not think I will ever live to see aggression, and I expect to live many years longer." This denial of our Soviet world conquest dogma came one day after Soviet Marshal Sokolovsky had published an article alleging that United States imperialists had "set up a goal of establishing world rule" and were "preparing a new war against the U.S.S.R."⁷¹

On March 15 Canada's Minister for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, said at the National Press Club in Washington that the United States would have to consult with its allies now if it expected support for its massive retaliation policy. "To put it bluntly," he said, "agreements on 'policies and tactics and timing' were essential 'if this policy of preventing aggression by the threat of immediate and overwhelming devastation is to work collectively'."

Pearson wanted to know what the words "instantly," "means" and "our" meant in the new American formula of depending primarily "upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing." The reporter added that "similar questions have been raised in recent months in all the free world countries affected by United States defense policy."

Pearson went on to explain the Canadian "feeling that our destiny . . . may be decided not by ourselves but across our border 'by means and at places not of our choosing'." The uneasiness of Canadians as they looked south and realized that they were "quite unable to escape the consequences of what you do or don't do" induced "an agonizing reappraisal" of the glory and the grandeur of independence."⁷²

This was a revealing picture of the deep alarm and sense of helplessness created in the minds of our allies by the threat that an atomic world war might be unleashed by Washington at any time it was sufficiently irked by some communist activity in Asia or elsewhere.

Massive Retaliation Softened. Perhaps realizing that the gigantic threat contained in "massive retaliation" had frightened his friends more than it had his enemies, Dulles wrote an article for *Foreign Affairs* which was published on March 17, 1954. In it he argued that there must be no more sanctuaries, like Manchuria during the Korean war, but, he added, "that does not mean turning every local war into a world war. It does not mean that if there is a communist attack somewhere in Asia, atom or hydrogen bombs will necessarily be dropped on the great industries of China or Russia."

This was a dilution of the ominous implications of massive retaliation sufficient to indicate that small wars might be tolerated, though "in relation to Indo-China" he reiterated his threat that if there were open Red Chinese Army aggression there, that would have "grave consequences which might not be confined to Indo-China."

As if in reply to St. Laurent, he insisted that the death of Stalin had not changed anything. "The Soviet menace" did not "reflect the ambitions of a single ruler." There were "vast" assets behind "this threat," a vast central

⁷¹ The *New York Times*, February 24, 25, 1954.

⁷² Dana Adams Schmidt, the *New York Times*, March 16, 1954.

land mass with a population of 800,000,000, which could strike "along a perimeter of some 20,000 miles." The threat was not merely military either. The Soviet rulers disposed throughout the world "the apparatus of international communism," operating "with trained agitators and a powerful propaganda organization," as "a new form of imperialist colonialism."⁷³

"Massive retaliation" was undoubtedly a natural reaction to the frustrations of containment, which had apparently produced a Soviet-controlled monolith of gigantic proportions. But the new policy did not appear to be the answer either, since its threat of setting off the final annihilation of the world could not be carried out in practice. Moreover, the threat worked to weaken the American coalition, instead of holding it firm for a long cold war as Mr. Dulles desired to do. On March 16, Lord Hore-Belisha referred in the British House of Lords to the "basic decision" for massive retaliation and he wanted to know "whose basic decision is it?" "Britain should not be a party to any decision to use the atomic bomb," he asserted.⁷⁴

Keeping the Enemy Guessing. In Washington Dulles asserted that Congress need not be consulted first if the enemy struck at the United States or Europe. "He wanted to make clear beyond possibility of doubt, the Secretary added, that the key to the success of this policy was to keep a potential enemy guessing about the kind of action the United States might take in any particular case."⁷⁵

Thus another key element in Dulles' policy emerged—the guessing contest, a game he pursued with such vigor that in the Formosa-Quemoy-Matsu war scare of early 1955 he had the American people and all of their allies as much confused and bewildered as Dulles' opponents could have been.

The initial difficulty of what to do about the right of Congress to declare war was resolved by President Eisenhower on March 17 when he said that if a message came in that "coming from the South somewhere were a great fleet of airplanes, and we had positive evidence that they were intent upon spreading destruction in the United States" he would instantly order retaliation. However, he still stood on his statement of the previous week concerning Indo-China that there would be "no involvement in war unless it is a result of the Constitutional process that is placed upon Congress to declare it."⁷⁶

Obviously there was a dilemma in the Dulles-Eisenhower policy—how to keep "the enemy" guessing and yet permit Congress to declare war. This dilemma was resolved a year later in the Formosa affair by getting the Congress to issue a blank check giving the President full power to use it as he saw fit—an advance declaration of war.

What the Russians were thinking about all this public preparation for the final atomic Armageddon was reported on March 18 by Harry Schwartz, Russian expert of the *New York Times*. His summary was that during the week "four top Soviet leaders told their people in guarded language that nuclear weapons had increased Soviet strength, implying that Russia could reply in kind to any nuclear attack." Schwartz's further report of the speeches fully justified his use of the phrase "guarded language." Two of the speakers had praised Soviet scientists and their key role in maintaining the international

⁷³ The *New York Times*, March 17, 1954. ⁷⁴ *Ibid.* ⁷⁵ *Ibid.* ⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, March 18, 1954.

authority of the Soviet State. Marshal Bulganin warned that "we may not count on the imperialists having spent great material means and billions in money for armaments only to scare us" nor upon "the humanity of the imperialists who are capable, as life has shown, of applying any means of mass destruction. . . . We must be prepared crushingly to reply." Finally Premier Malenkov had said that any new world war "under contemporary conditions of war means the death of world civilization." Later dispatches reported that Malenkov said that as if he meant every word. President Eisenhower did not say the same thing until seven months later, on October 20, 1954.

Our H-Bomb Tests Politically Explosive. While these moderate replies were being made to the Dulles policy of keeping tension high and the future mysterious, explosive hints began to leak out about the 1954 series of atomic test explosions. The No. 2 hydrogen blast, two weeks before, had jarred Kwajallin island 176 miles away and "apparently pushed radioactive debris and moisture out beyond the safety zone boundary of the test area." A Japanese fishing vessel 80 miles away had been showered with the deadly fallout and 23 men badly burned. Their boat was "only one of a hundred such craft known to be fishing near the banned area." There was a frantic hunt for 1,000 pounds of tuna believed radioactive and already in the markets. Japanese officials were in urgent consultation with American officials to avoid a repetition.⁷⁷

The Japanese people did not like being the first to burn from both American A-bombs and H-bombs.

On March 24 the President said that it was quite clear that the explosion had surprised and astonished the scientists. Earlier Representative Chet Holifield had said that it was "so far beyond what was predicted that you might say it was out of control."⁷⁸

The repercussions of the H-bomb tests were so profound that it is essential to survey them at this point.

On March 31, Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, revealed that the March 1 blast was in the megaton range, that is, above the equivalent of 1,000,000 tons of TNT. (Another high authority had said it had an explosive force of 12 to 14 megatons.) We could make a bomb big enough to destroy any city, Strauss said, hinting that it could also be carried in a plane. This development had "added enormous potential to our military posture." Then to reassure those who feared that the Americans might blow up the world itself, Strauss assured them emphatically that it was "impossible for any such test or series of tests to get out of control."⁷⁹

⁷⁷ *The New York Times*, March 18, 1954; the *Nashville Tennessean*, AP, March 17, 1954.

⁷⁸ Two days earlier the FBI had alerted all U.S. police to two kinds of small atomic bombs which could be smuggled into the country by enemy agents. The column-long official statement approved by President Eisenhower, the National Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission, began by saying that "it is impossible to describe exactly what a foreign atomic bomb would look like," but it might be a sphere the size of a soft ball or a gun-barrel type, in either case extremely heavy.—*The New York Times*, March 23, 1954.

Thus it appeared that atomic bombs might travel through subterranean channels, as well as descend from the skies.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, April 1, 1954.

That being settled, the world had only to fear the destruction of its cities by single bombs, even American cities, for Hanson W. Baldwin assured us on April 1 that at the best we could not expect to shoot down more than 65 to 80 per cent of an enemy's piloted bombers—somewhat elastic comfort for our city dwellers.

A few saw at once that the H-bomb had dwarfed the 12 German divisions we had sought so long, and Attlee appealed for top level talks, on April 5, lest an act of aggression "say on the Burmese border" might lead to the destruction of capital cities. Fear of atomic destruction was now world-wide. On the same day President Eisenhower sought in a formal address to calm the "multiplicity of fears" in the United States, among them fear of the men in the Kremlin, who had H-bombs but also knew what would happen to Russia "if they were to attack any of our nations or any part of our vital interests aggressively in order to conquer us." This promise of massive retaliation may have reassured Americans but hardly our allies who lie in between. On the 9th Drew Middleton reported that the national debate in Britain on the H-bomb neared the end of its third week and showed "no signs of slackening, either in the press or in the House of Commons." It would hardly be dampened down either by the announcement made on the same day that the United States planned to spend \$427,400,000 more in the next year to push ahead with "greatly increased production of thermonuclear weapons."

On April 19, Pope Pius XII reminded the two H-bomb antagonists "that peace cannot consist of an exasperating and costly relationship of reciprocal terror." As he spoke, an epidemic of mysteriously pock-marked automobile windshields spread across the United States and similar marks appeared on the cockpit glass of an airplane and on eye glasses, but the danger from H-bomb "fall-out" was not officially admitted until almost a year later. On June 30 the Alsops revealed that the February 17 speech of Representative Sterling Cole, telling how our H-bomb test obliterated the test island and "tore a hole in the floor of the ocean a full mile in diameter" and 175 feet deep had alerted Churchill to the future and to the fact that the British Isles are "a bull's-eye target," in Churchill's words, for Soviet attack. Britain was forced, accordingly, to ask herself whether to risk destruction for the sake of Indo-China.⁸⁰

On September 21 a book was published which asserted that the United States had an H-bomb with an estimated explosive force of 45 megatons—at least three times that of the one exploded in March. The super-super bomb was ready then, but after seeing what the first one did it was decided to look for a bigger ocean space in which to explode it, a search which led to indignant protests in New Zealand, on November 11, 1954, when it was reported that we would conduct bomb tests in the Antarctic. The New Zealanders were hardly reassured when the next day U.S. Air Secretary Talbot said that "our weapons can now destroy a whole civilization in a single night," laying "waste to an entire continent—men, women and children, even the beasts and the vegetation." A week later the Alsops wondered whether the super-super bomb

⁸⁰ *New York Herald Tribune*, June 30, 1954.

would be fired and noted that perhaps the fate of the world was being decided behind closed doors.⁸¹

It was a month before these events, on October 20, that Eisenhower made an address saying that an atomic war would bring the world near ruin. He declared: "We have arrived at that point, my friends, when war does not present the possibility of victory or defeat. War would present to us only the alternative in degrees of destruction. There could be no truly successful outcome."⁸²

This impressive statement of an obvious truth was followed three days later by an admonition from Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, who condemned the alarmists who were "rattling the atomic bomb and trying to scare our people, and indirectly the peoples of other nations." That the other peoples were being strongly affected was attested by NATO chief Alfred M. Gruenther when he said that "we are going to have more and more trouble with the European folks who are under the gun."⁸³

Fear of an American War to Exterminate the Reds. This appeared to be an understatement. In a survey for the Associated Press on November 21, John Hightower wrote that "United States' prestige and popularity have been on the skids all over the globe for about a year and a half." This trend was now alleviated by the new partnership idea voiced by Eisenhower on August 4 and Dulles on the 25th. Europeans had been frightened, for one thing, by McCarthyism, "because they thought it showed an internal hatred and fear of communism which might cause the United States to plunge the world into war with Russia through an overwhelming urge to crush communism everywhere."⁸⁴

This candid description of the pathological state of mind which the American public opinion manufacturers in the United States, including the Government, had produced, was verified the next day by the moderate, friendly Sir Oliver Franks, recently British Ambassador to the United States. McCarthy, he said, had made millions of people in Europe and Asia change their minds about the United States, lumping "the Soviet Union and the United States together as the two great threats to the peaceful progress of mankind." The greatest source of difficulty between the United States and Britain was a widespread fear that the Americans would get the world into a third world war. However, he reassured his millions of British radio listeners with the reminder that though distinguished members of the United States Government and armed forces had talked very aggressively, action itself had been cautious and responsible.⁸⁵ Simultaneously, the *Manchester Guardian* expressed its relief that explosive American action had not occurred. In the spring when Dulles, Nixon and Radford had seemed on the verge of laying

⁸¹ James R. Shepley and Clay Blair, Jr., *The Hydrogen Bomb*, New York, 1954; London, Jarrolds, 1955, also digested in *U.S. News and World Report* on September 20; the *New York Times*, November 11, 12; the *Nashville Tennessean*, November 23, 1954.

⁸² *The New York Times*, October 21, 1954.

⁸³ *The Nashville Tennessean*, October 3, 1954.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, November 21, 1954.

⁸⁵ *The New York Times*, November 22, 1954.

down a massive retaliation line "almost along the fighting front in Indo-China" the United States had been "a nightmare to America's allies."⁸⁶

Thus far the leading American Cold War warriors had been restrained, but as it began to be said generally that the Soviets would reach "absolute atomic power" in 1956 their temperatures rose to an alarming point. In 1956 it was believed that Russia would have enough nuclear bombs, and the means to deliver them, to wipe out our cities. Then our vastly larger stockpile of atom bombs would be worth no more than the Russians' smaller stockpile. What then?

Atomic Stalemate Rejected. This prospect seemed to call for coexistence and peace, in preference to universal and mutual oblivion, but the thought of coexistence with the Reds had become intolerable to many of those who had long nurtured themselves and others on the strong meat of the Cold War. On November 15, in a set speech demanding a complete review of the Administration's foreign policy, Senator Knowland, the majority leader of the Senate, looked ahead and asked if "atomic stalemate" didn't mean "inevitable Communist nibbling aggression." Time, Knowland said ominously, was "running out."⁸⁷

Words could hardly say more plainly that the Soviet Union, and Knowland's favorite enemy China, should be destroyed by our superior stock of H-bombs before the paralyzing time of atomic stalemate arrived. The idea of living in the same world with the communists was so repulsive to the powerful right-wing elements for whom Knowland spoke that they would disregard even the Pope's injunction that weapons of mass destruction could be used only in self defense, and in no case if their use results in the "pure and simple annihilation of all human life within the range of action. This is not permitted for any reason whatsoever."⁸⁸

The Fall-Out Peril Admitted. The American side of the Cold War had come to its full macabre fruition in the minds of many besides Senator Knowland, but popular comprehension of the full effects of nuclear war lagged. The March 1954 tests and the burning of the Japanese fishermen had alerted all of the nations, especially the in-between ones, to the fall-out danger, but it was not until February 16, 1955 that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission issued a report stating that the H-bomb had polluted a 7,000 square mile area with lethal radioactive fall-out. Five days earlier the atomic scientist Dr. R. E. Lapp had estimated the fall-out area of one bomb to be 10,000 square miles, and later estimates by other scientists put it much higher. Lapp thought that a "small-scale" attack of 28 H-bombs on our industrial centers could place 50,000,000 Americans under the lethal fall-out, if they survived the blasts, and that the ruins of the cities could never be inhabited again. They would have to be levelled and covered with dirt, except that cities lying low near water, like Detroit, New Orleans, New York, and Chicago, would become lakes.⁸⁹

Hanson Baldwin noted that the AEC's "belated admission" about the

⁸⁶ *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, November 25, 1954.

⁸⁷ *The New York Times*, November 17, 1954.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, February 11, 16, 1955.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, October 1, 1954.

fall-out peril coincided with a new series of tests in Nevada. It was followed two days later by a statement saying that Britain would make H-bombs. On the 25th Dr. Edward Teller, a leading government scientist, forecast a cobalt bomb which could produce the equivalent of 5,000,000 pounds of radium and destroy all life, plant and animal, over thousands of square miles.⁹⁰

Why British H-Bombs? On March 1, 1955, Prime Minister Churchill made a prepared address on the British H-bomb program. He thought the advent of radioactive fall-out subjected the vast areas of the Soviet Union to danger, as well as small islands. He added the ominous information that fall-out carried an indirect danger from the eating of animals, grass and vegetables which had been subjected to it, so that many who escaped the direct effects of the explosion would still be confronted "with poisoning or starvation or both." He estimated that the Soviets would be able to deliver their H-bombs on American targets in two to four years.

Aside from adding to the American deterrent, he gave two reasons for building British H-bombs. One was that if war came Britain would have a target priority list of her own, such as submarine bases. The other reason came late in the address when, after referring "to our friends across the ocean," he said: "Personally, I cannot feel that we should have much influence over their policy or actions, wise or unwise, while we are largely dependent, as we are today, upon their protection. We too must possess substantial deterrent power of our own."

In other words, Britain would build H-bombs to influence American policy, "wise or unwise," in the hope of preventing war, and if war did come, to increase her slim chances of survival.

The next day President Eisenhower said, in replying to a question about Churchill's speech, that "there comes a time, possibly, when a lead is not significant. . . . If you have enough of a particular weapon I doubt that it is particularly important to have a lot more of it."

The Crest of McCarthyism. The nuclear stalemate which Senator Knowland dreaded, with its enforced coexistence with the Reds, was close at hand. Yet no move came out of the United States to try to end the Cold War. Instead, the main attention of the nation was focused on the great feud between Senator McCarthy and the United States Army. The Senator, who had zoomed to fame early in 1950 on ever-larger charges of Communists in the State Department, was now at war with the Pentagon itself for allegedly promoting a "pink" dentist. After holding the headlines for months, this strange contest erupted into an inquiry by McCarthy's Senate Committee, with Senator Mundt in the chair, which began on April 22, 1954 and ended on June 17, after 2,000,000 words of testimony and after 187 hours of being televised to the entire nation.

In the sequel the Senate created a Select Committee in August which held hearings and recommended on September 27 that the Senate censure McCarthy, which it did on December 2, 1954, for abusing the Senate and the

⁹⁰ *The New York Times*, February 18, 20, 25, 1955.

Select Committee. The vote was 67 to 22, the Republicans splitting evenly, 22 for and 22 against.⁹¹

The Oppenheimer Case. Before his fall McCarthy helped to trigger one of the most deplorable of our cold war aberrations, the designation of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer as "a security risk," after the same tribunal had found him loyal and possessing "a high degree" of discretion. Oppenheimer was the nation's leading nuclear scientist, the man who had presided over the great Los Alamos project which produced the first atom bomb. In those years of his prodigious labor the Government had full knowledge that two of his relatives had for a time been communists and that he had contributed money to the cause of the Spanish Republic through communist front organizations.

Later he had done three things which made for him powerful enemies. He had opposed a crash H-bomb program, along with many others; he had exposed the absurdity of Admiral Lewis Strauss' opposition on security grounds to sending microscopic radio isotopes abroad for medicinal purposes; and he had incurred the wrath of the U.S. Strategic Air Command for sparking a program of home defense against atomic attack when the SAC wanted all funds poured into its offensive preparations.

Late in 1953 a series of McCarthy intimations of an Oppenheimer investigation enabled Admiral Strauss to get an order from the President raising a "blank wall" between Oppenheimer and all secret atomic data. Then on April 13 a personnel security board headed by Gordon Gray, President of the University of North Carolina, opened hearings and Oppenheimer was prosecuted by Atomic Energy Counsel Robb for many days, without benefit of judicial restraint, after which the Board, by a two to one vote, gave the strange verdict that Oppenheimer was loyal, discreet and a public servant whose contributions could never be repaid, but still "a security risk," mainly because he had opposed the H-bomb crash program.

Then Admiral Strauss published the 992 page record of the hearings of the Gray Board, which were supposed to remain secret, and brushed aside the ground upon which it had disqualified Oppenheimer, substituting in the final Atomic Energy Commission action against Oppenheimer, on June 29, 1954, a new charge that he suffered from "substantial defects of character." These boiled down to charges that he had lied six times during the multitude of security investigations to which he had been subjected over many years. When analyzed five of these cases were trivial and the sixth was a case of making up a story to protect a friend, a story which had done no harm and had long been known. The AEC vote against Oppenheimer was 4 to 1.⁹²

In this fashion the nation's "Mr. Atom" was pilloried and condemned, chiefly because of his opinions and judgments, but finally on the ground of inconsequential statements made years before his great service to the country. This was not done, either, in a communist police state, but in the leader of the

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, December 3, 1954.

⁹² For the Gray Board hearings see: *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer*, Government Printing Office, 1954. The best analysis of the Oppenheimer case, upon which this account is mainly based, is the article (later expanded into a book under the same title) "We Accuse," by Joseph and Stewart Alsop, *Harpers Magazine*, October 1954, pp. 25-45.

"free" world, demonstrating how far we had gone in adopting the methods of the system we so abhorred. By this time our hysterias were devouring the best we had, corroding also our own sense of balance and fair play.

The Oppenheimer verdicts deeply antagonized almost the entire scientific community, making the scientists reluctant to serve a government which would treat one of them in this manner. The case also led many bright and wise young men to decide not to be scientists. Nobel prize chemist Harold C. Urey labelled the investigation "the most unjust and also the most foolish thing that has occurred in all the current hysteria over spies, etc., which seems to be the dominant preoccupation of the most powerful country in the world."⁹³

This was an arresting description of a supposedly adult nation, but it was as accurately descriptive as the comment of the great physicist Leo Szilard, who said simply that "Unfortunately for all of us," Gordon Gray and Thomas Morgan, the majority on the Gray Board, "are as good men as they come, and if they are affected by the general insanity which is more and more creeping on us, who can be counted on to be immune?"⁹⁴

Who indeed? By this time the hysterias of fear and hate which unwise leaders and molders of public opinion had turned loose among us had made us a truly sick nation, feared everywhere for what we might do.

Soviet Nightmare. Cognizant of the national state of mind, President Eisenhower made an address in March, 1954, in which he tried to analyze the fears that beset us, which he listed as: "the men in the Kremlin;" what they will do to our friends around them; fear of what unwise investigators will do to us here at home; and fear of depression. Since none of these dangers was overwhelming, Lippmann wondered why there was "so much hysterical fear" and concluded that it was "because there is an increasing anxiety that there may be a failure of the leadership, the command, the authority which can alone rally the nation to deal with these dangers."⁹⁵

But by this time the Soviet nightmare had so possessed our leaders that there were none to free us from our greatest fear, "the men in the Kremlin." In a lecture at Princeton University George F. Kennan noted that since World War II we had been living much of the time in a nightmarish world in which we lived "like a hunted beast, oblivious of everything but survival, straining every muscle in the effort to remain alive."

This was a striking description by the former head of the State Department's policy planning staff of the extent to which we had let our fears run away with us, until we could think of nothing but power to use against the communists. Many Americans, said Kennan, have now become "wholly absorbed with power values to a point where they are impatient of any discussion of international affairs that tries to take account of anything else."⁹⁶

"*Communist Aggression.*" These fears of the Soviet-dominated colossus were stirred in us again by an outbreak, on March 14, of savage fighting at

⁹³ *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May, 1954, p. 188.

⁹⁴ *The Alsops*, "We Accuse," *supra*, p. 37.

⁹⁵ *The Nashville Tennessean*, March 22, 1954.

⁹⁶ *The New York Times*, March 24, 1954.

Dienbienphu when 25,000 to 45,000 Vietminh troops assaulted the valley, suffering 5000 casualties but breaking the defenses in several places.⁹⁷

It seemed that no one in Washington saw in this event thousands of brave men fighting and dying for their country's independence, and to rid it of hated foreign rule, but only a threatened advance of communism.

On March 22 Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared that "the French are going to win this war," and on the 24th the President praised the heroism of the French forces and declared that "communist aggression" was being fought in Indo-China. "Communist aggression" was the stock phrase used in Washington to describe the Indo-China war.

The President did not go on to say that the "aggression" consisted of military aid from China many times smaller than the floods of American war material going to the side of the French colonialists. It was never suggested that there was any element of aggression in this great stream of American weapons pouring into Indo-China, though George Kennan did recognize that many Asians have "a pathological fear of American domination," and that in Asia the difficulty was not Communist aggression but "profound and wholly legitimate indigenous conditions, involving great emotional and not rational forces."

Instead of deluging them with words he suggested that we stop making fools of ourselves internally and treating the world to the spectacle of millions of our citizens trotting around "faithfully and anxiously, like victims of some totalitarian brainwashing, to snoop and check up on their fellow citizens, to purge the libraries and the lecture platforms, to protect us all from the impact of ideas."⁹⁸

The Dulles-Radford Campaign To Prevent Peace. These considerations of indigenous revolt in Asia and hysterical Red-hunting at home did not deter Mr. Dulles from leading official Washington in a crusade for "united action" to block "communist aggression" in Asia. On March 29 he made a speech, approved by the President in advance, declaring that Communist domination of Indo-China and South East Asia "*by whatever means* would be a grave threat to the whole free community" (italics added) and should not be passively accepted. In these words he ruled out even a free election as a means of legitimizing the Communist Government of Ho Chi Min in Indo-China, stressing instead the riches of the area and its great strategic importance.⁹⁹

In India the Dulles speech was regarded as "a disguised attempt to reimpose foreign influence on newly free countries and on nations such as Indo-China which are struggling for independence," and even in Saigon our official observers agreed that there had been a marked increase in anti-American feeling. Five different groups of non-communists were listed as uniting against growing American interference.¹⁰⁰

In Washington a secret conference was held on the morning of April 3,

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, March 21, 1954.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, March 30, 1954.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, April 1, 1954.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, April 4, 1954.

in which Dulles and Radford tried to persuade eight leaders of Congress to agree to support a congressional resolution authorizing our entry into the Indo-China war. The meeting was called by authority of the President. The legislators present were: Senators William F. Knowland and Eugene Millikin, Republicans; Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard B. Russell and Earl C. Clements, Democrats; G.O.P. House Speaker Joseph Martin; and Representatives John W. McCormack and J. Percy Priest, Democrats.

Radford wanted to send 200 planes from the carriers *Essex* and *Boxer*, which he had ready in the South China Sea, plus other planes from the Philippines, to save Dienbienphu. Questioning brought out that none of the other three Joint Chiefs of Staff approved of the idea. This was because, said Radford: "I have spent more time in the Far East than any of them and I understand the situation better."

Unlike the military leaders of the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations, who did not seek to control policy—MacArthur excepted—Radford was proving himself a genuine militarist. Like MacArthur, he was determined to make policy and to extend the war.

Dulles indicated that Moscow didn't want a general war now and would handle the Chinese, adding that if the Communists felt that we meant business they would not "go any further down there." He admitted that he had not consulted other nations and was advised by all eight legislators to go shopping for allies.¹⁰¹

The plan of a congressional resolution committing the nation to war failed of adoption because in 1954 the Democrats were cold to it, remembering "the useless war" in Korea, "Truman's war" and the fresh G.O.P. charges that the Democrats were "the party of treason," and because Dulles failed to enlist any allies.

Indo-China was already lost, but Dulles and Radford could not accept the "loss." It was their "rock-like insistence" which won the debate among our policy makers for resistance, after French General Ely had reported in Washington on March 20 that France could not win with the means at hand and must therefore seek a negotiated peace. But this could not be accepted, the Alsop's report continued, because there was no fighting line in Indo-China, as in Korea. The enemy was "everywhere," so if the French withdrew, any negotiated settlement must lead rapidly to total communist control. Our best hope lay in the very "solemn warning" on Indo-China which Dulles had given Molotov at Berlin.¹⁰²

On the same day Dulles recalled that last September he had warned the Chinese Communists about "grave consequences" if they sent armies into Indo-China. Perhaps they had not done precisely the thing he had warned them against, but they were "coming awfully close to it." He explained to the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the Chinese Communists were out "to dominate all of South East Asia, not merely Indo-China, thus menacing

¹⁰¹ Chalmers M. Roberts, "The Day We Didn't Go to War," *the Reporter*, September 14, 1954. Drew Pearson reported the same secret conference in the *Nashville Tennessean*, April 12, 1955.

¹⁰² *The Nashville Tennessean*, April 5, 1954.

"Malaya, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand."¹⁰³ The lust of the Chinese Reds for domination was now apparently as boundless as we had been saying the world conquest mania of the Soviets was.

On April 6 the State Department was urging Britain, France, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines to join in "united action" in Indo-China, as bipartisan support shaped up in the Senate. However, in France opinion was "startled" by the sudden shift in the United States. The official French position was that there was no proof of Chinese combatants in Indo-China, as Dulles had alleged, and that there should be no request for U.S. troops, thus extending the war and probably losing Indo-China for France.¹⁰⁴

The next day the President reiterated the chain reaction thesis upon which we had intervened in Korea. All South East Asia was like a row of dominoes. If you knocked over the first one what would happen to the last one was "the certainty that it would go over very quickly." Besides, this was the area of tin and tungsten and rubber and Japan needed South East Asia as a trading area. Otherwise she would have to turn to China. But from London Drew Middleton reported that it would be impossible to win British or French public opinion over to a policy of drawing lines in Asia over which the Communists would be forbidden to step. Nor could a defensive alliance for South East Asia be improvised before the approaching Geneva conference.¹⁰⁵

It was clear by now that Dulles was driving to prevent a negotiated peace in the Geneva Conference by organizing, before it could meet on April 26, a combination of powers which would take over the Indo-China war, then in its eighth year, and "save" Indo-China from Communism, whether the Indo-Chinese peoples wanted to be saved in this fashion or not. On April 10 he left for Europe, as one editor said, "speeding by air as if a four alarm fire were about to break out."¹⁰⁶

In another article on the art of sudden diplomacy as practised by Dulles, James Reston reported the resentment Dulles would find in Europe "because the British and French feel that he has put undue public pressure on them to choose between a policy they do not like or repudiating the United States which they do not want to do." In Washington there was "an uneasy feeling even among many of Mr. Dulles' supporters in the State Department, that he is gambling an awful lot on his own instinct. They don't know whether he is bluffing the Reds or getting the United States ready for military action in Indo-China, and after all the casual talk about 'massive retaliation,' they don't particularly like either course."¹⁰⁷

In Paris and London Dulles found that it would be very difficult to keep the eight year old fire in Indo-China burning. Instead of keeping it alive and extending it, our allies wanted to put the fire out, even as the Americans had in Korea. Then Dulles and Radford both went to Paris and did their best to

¹⁰³ *The New York Times*, April 6, 1954.

¹⁰⁴ *Id.*, April 7, 1954. Tillman Durdan also wrote from Saigon that the French had not killed or captured a Chinese combatant.

¹⁰⁵ *Id.*, April 8, 1954.

¹⁰⁶ *The Nashville Tennessean*, April 11, 1954.

¹⁰⁷ *The New York Times*, April 11, 1954.

persuade Eden to join in war for Dienbienphu, but he would not agree to this means of frustrating the Geneva Conference. The best he would do was to lay the proposal before the British Cabinet, which turned it down on April 24, permitting the Geneva Conference to open on the 26th.¹⁰⁸

On April 14 Anne O'Hare McCormick summed up the results of Dulles' first trip by saying that he had found strong resistance to his policy of threatening China before negotiations began.¹⁰⁹ Our allies refused to share the sense of emergency which had been whipped up in the United States, though Dulles returned still talking about compelling "the Communists to renounce their extravagant ambitions to dominate yet another major portion of the globe."¹¹⁰

Nixon for Sending Troops. Then on April 16 "a high Administration source" said that if France stopped fighting in Indo-China and the situation demanded it the United States would send troops to fight the communists in that area. The "source" was quickly revealed to be Vice President Nixon in an address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. He had ruled out negotiations with the Communists to divide the territory.

At first it seemed that a calculated trial balloon had been sent up, but later it appeared that the exuberant young Vice President had only been repeating what he had been hearing. In any event, the public reaction was so adverse that Dulles was compelled to say on the 20th that the sending of troops was "unlikely." On the same day Thomas L. Stokes, a top Washington columnist, stated flatly that the Administration's "objective is to prevent the negotiation of a peace at Geneva." The Alsops also reported that Dulles was "absolutely immovable" on agreeing to "a settlement which would or could lead to Communist victory in Indo-China."¹¹¹

The gravity of the plans proposed for intervention in the war was underlined by Fred Sparks, NEA staff correspondent in Tokyo in a dispatch saying that the United States had considered using "baby" A-bombs twice, at Quemoy when the Reds first began to shell this small off-shore Chinese island and at Dienbienphu for which a plan had been developed to ring the fortress with "baby" A-bombs. The "advocates of radioactive muscle" had argued that they could "knock out Red Chinese war potential in a matter of days without causing great numbers of civilian casualties." In both cases the President rejected the plan, although he was "opposing a very large number of his military advisers." His fear of the popular reaction against using A-bombs, especially in Japan, led the A-bomb advocates to urge thinking up a new name for them. Moreover, said Sparks, after talking with the men who made the plans and would have executed them, "the A-bombs are still

¹⁰⁸ Chalmers, *supra*, pp. 34-5. In his memoirs Sir Anthony Eden says that Dulles and Radford had given up saving Dienbienphu, but were ready to promise the use of U.S. armed forces in Indo-China. Churchill's conclusion was that the British were being asked "to assist in misleading Congress into approving a military operation, which would in itself be ineffective, and might well bring the world to the verge of a major war."—*The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle*, London, Cassell, 1960, pp. 102-5.

¹⁰⁹ *The New York Times*, April 14, 1954.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, April 16, 1954.

¹¹¹ *The Nashville Tennessean*, April 20, 22, 1954.

conveniently stored, the planes are available, and the heartland of Red China is mapped down to the last traffic sign."¹¹²

Looking behind the categorical warning that we would not permit the communists to get control of Indo-China, Anne O'Hare McCormick thought that "the means of carrying out this threat have probably not been thought out, much less worked out." We were "gambling a great deal, in short, on the belief that our position will not be challenged."¹¹³ She did not add that bluffing and gambling hardly add up to statesmanship, but Lippmann did say that the troops we talked of sending were "far away, comparatively few in numbers and have a long way to come."¹¹⁴

The Geneva Conference. Throughout the two months of the Geneva conference, which met on April 26, 1954, the military position of the French worsened. On May 7 Dienbienphu fell, with shattering impact upon French morale and upon the conference. On June 13 Vietminh troops destroyed 200 miles of railway and parallel highway between Haiphong and Hanoi, over which all U.S. military aid was carried. In reply the French launched a bombing offensive against 100 enemy bases in the Red River delta, but on June 30 they evacuated 1600 square miles of the delta, without consulting the Vietnamese premier.

On June 1, General Navarre was removed as military commander and Maurice Dejean as High Commissioner. Their functions were again combined in the person of General Paul Ely.¹¹⁵

On June 4 France had initialled treaties which gave the French-recognized Vietnamese government "complete independence," Vietnam agreeing to "free association" with France within the French Union.¹¹⁶

However, on June 16, a significant shift of power took place in South Vietnam, after a still more important one in France. Bao Dai's cousin, Prince Buu Loc, was dismissed as Premier and Bao Dai's opponent, Ngo Dinh Diem, was appointed by Bao Dai, apparently on American insistence. Diem, a leading Catholic Nationalist, was in retreat in a Belgian monastery at the time. It was reported that Bao Dai had promised to stay away from the government.¹¹⁷

On June 10 the Laniel cabinet fell and Mendès-France, the advocate of peace, became Prime Minister on June 18, under a pledge to resign if he did not get peace by July 20. He at once met Chinese Premier Chou En-lai privately at Berne, a few days before Churchill came to Washington and told a select group of high leaders that "to jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war." Then Churchill spoke to more than a thousand reporters in marked "contrast to the themes developed by United States officials," insisting that a policy of firmness and friendliness with Russia might succeed. "I am of the opinion," he said, "that we ought to have a try for peaceful coexistence, a real good try." He was "violently anti-Communist" but, he continued, "I do beg

¹¹² *Ibid.*, November 30, 1954.—On January 21, 1955, the *New York Times* reported a Congressional appropriation for a world-wide chain of atomic bomb storage places.

¹¹³ *The New York Times*, April 21, 1954. ¹¹⁴ *The Nashville Tennessean*, April 23, 1954.

¹¹⁵ *The New York Times*, June 4, 1954.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, June 5, 14, 31, 1954.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, July 21, 1954.

strong irridentist claim of China to Formosa, and by the American determination to maintain a grip on that island.

The reality of the Chinese fear was attested by Premier U Nu, of Burma, who described the Chinese Communists as passionately fearful of "encirclement by American bases." They were firmly convinced that we intended finally to attack their regime and so were ready to fight in order to avoid this encirclement.¹²¹

American Control in South Vietnam. After the Indo-China truce the struggle between the United States and France, which had already been running under cover, was intensified. The desire of the United States to create a strong anti-communist nationalist government in Vietnam was now intensified for South Vietnam—a regime strong enough to prevent the Vietminh from taking over the entire country in the 1956 elections. On the other hand the French hoped that by coming to terms with Ho Chi Minh they could retain a large cultural, technical and economic influence in the whole of Indo-China. To be sure they had overstayed their time by eight years and had to be driven out, but they thought that since the Communists were practical people they could still save a good deal from the wreckage by accepting the inevitable and making the best of it. This was a realistic and probably constructive attitude, but it clashed head-on with the intense conviction of our rulers, headed by Dulles and Radford, that the only thing that mattered was stopping communism. The logical result of this determination was that the French, who had failed, should get out and let us build another South Korea before the decision time in 1956.

The essential step was taken on January 20 when the United States, French and Vietnamese officials agreed in Saigon that the United States would assume full responsibility for assisting the Vietnamese Government in the organization and training of its armed forces, under the overall authority of General Paul Ely, French Commander in Chief, and in cooperation with the French mission.

This accord, "reached after three months of difficult negotiations," saved French sensibilities somewhat, but transferred effective power to the United States, represented by General Lawton Collins, U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam. General "Iron Mike" O'Daniel was appointed to head the U.S. training mission, which aimed at a 140,000 man army, well trained and politically indoctrinated, to combat "Communist aggression" from the North.¹²²

The magnitude of the job which the United States undertook in South Vietnam was explained by Joseph Alsop in a dispatch from Haiphong. In the South he had found nothing but "an obscene basket of eels." There the latest "solution" for internal warfare parodied "the worst solutions of Chiang Kai-shek's last year on the mainland." The army was demoralized; civil administration, where it existed, was corrupt. Private armies of "sects," which resembled a Capone mob more than any normal religious organizations, abounded. General Lawton Collins had thus far "failed to straighten out a single eel in the basket full."

¹²¹ Joseph Alsop, from Rangoon, the *Nashville Tennessean*, January 27, 1955.

¹²² *The New York Times*, January 21, 1955.

Opposed to this "squalid, aimless chaos" was "the passionate conviction, the frightening dynamism, the remarkable power to do much with little which this reporter saw at first hand in the main southern base of the Viet Minh," and behind the Viet Minh of the South was the strong military power which they were building up in the North.¹²³

Alsop also depicted the fate of the great mass of Catholic Vietnamese who had been encouraged to flee from the North during the year permitted by the Geneva treaty. In the end some 700,000 people were transported south in American naval vessels. Writing in January 1955, Alsop described "the hideous fate" of these poor people "who now crouch in squalid camps in the south." Our government had not only assisted and encouraged the mass flight of these people; "In a huckstering way, the authorities in Washington even presented the tragedy as a triumph over the Communists—a first installment, as it were, of the dynamic foreign policy we used to hear so much about."

This dispatch raised some question about the ability of the American Government to play God with distant foreign peoples in the name of anti-Communism.

Franco-American Conflict. In the meantime, C. L. Sulzberger reported from Paris the first stages of the Franco-American conflict over Indo-China. The French made no secret of their dislike of Premier Diem, "the little Catholic statesman who was extricated from a Belgian monastery and flown to Saigon." Foreign observers also agreed with them that he was "not yet of apparent use to the cause we advocate." Nevertheless, the United States had decided to go down the line with him, on the reasoning that if one chance in fifty remained it must be seized.

To prevent the mass of refugees from causing chaos and collapse in the south, resettlement experts were being flown in and dollars were being pumped into an independent Vietnamese bank, not under French control. The sum of \$200,000,000 was to be paid into this bank as a starter, to finance the American trained army.

The United States was trying to seal off North Vietnam from the South, to boycott the economy of the North and was threatening to blacklist French businesses pursuing a contrary policy.

French policy was "directly opposite." Paris had secretly concluded an agreement with Ho's Government granting the equivalent of recognition. Jean Sainteny, in Hanoi, was "working for good political and economic relations with the Communist regime," which would send a permanent delegation to Paris. The French wished "to keep a big foot in the door which we seek to slam." They believed that the South would be taken over by the Communists in 1956, but that the Russians and Chinese could not supply much economic aid and a good market for France could be preserved.¹²⁴

If something were not done to correct this situation it would "damage our relationships on a global scale." Sulzberger added, somewhat ominously, that neither the United States nor the Diem Government had signed the Geneva

¹²³ Joseph Alsop, the *Nashville Tennessean*, January 3, 1955.

¹²⁴ C. L. Sulzberger, from Paris, the *New York Times*, January 17 and 22, 1955.

agreements and therefore, "if they so desire," they may declare they are not bound when the time for all-Vietnam elections rolls around.

This was close to saying that the United States would forbid the elections, doubtless on the ground that they could not be free, believing that they would be lost even if a free expression could be arranged. As a stroke in the Cold War the United States seemed ready to deny the Vietnamese people the right to unify their country under a government of their own choice, and to keep it divided for our purposes. Of course Washington hoped to clean up the mess in the South, while denying Ho Chi Minh the right to do so.

On March 12 Sulzberger wrote that "it is no secret that we are intervening at almost every level on behalf of the existing government in the South," but he thought Diem's dictatorship was barren because ineffective. Concerning the elections, "these really will never be held. The Communist North cannot meet the standards of free balloting stipulated."

Civil Conflict in the South. At the end of March fighting broke out in Saigon between the Vietnamese forces and the gangster Binh Xuyen organization of river pirates who controlled the brothels, gambling dens and most of the Saigon police. Bitter charges were hurled by Diem's Government against the French for hampering its efforts to crush the rebels, by controlling gasoline and ammunition and by cordoning off large parts of the city. Hostilities were extended later with some of the sect armies.

By April 20 the American officials in Saigon were reported to have come around to the French view that fighting in Saigon would probably spread to the whole of South Vietnam and turn the country over to the Reds. Many Vietnamese politicians were deserting Diem and the administrative machinery, such as it was, was "grinding slower and slower." Army officers were going over his head to Bao Dai, while French circles made it plainer and plainer that they thought Diem should go. Even American officials agreed that he was "too stubborn, too inelastic politically, too given to one-man decisions which antagonized members of his cabinet."¹²⁵

At his press conference on April 27 President Eisenhower said "it is a strange and almost inexplicable situation" in Vietnam, adding: "what the exact terms of our future policy will be I can't say." On the same day Diem precipitated a showdown with the Binh Xuyen by dismissing their police chief. Diem's palace was shelled, the fighting spread and soon a square mile of the city was in flames. Shells exploded among the huts of the Catholic refugees from the North and soon "a fire was raging through the shacks occupied by the refugees. Nobody knew how many died in the flames."

On the political front Bao Dai ordered Diem to come to Cannes and gave the military power to his opponent General Van Vy. Diem refused to go and the United States backed him. In Paris Premier Faure said that Diem was unequal to his task. In Saigon a revolutionary committee announced the ouster of Bao Dai and forced General Van Vy to read a statement over the radio saying he was going over to Diem, who was winning his fight militarily with the Binh Xuyen. Diem vowed to expel the French. General Collins had

¹²⁵ *The New York Times*, April 3, 21, 1955.

agreed with the French to replace Diem with Phan Huy Quat, but Quat soon applied to General Ely for protective custody.¹²⁶

From Paris Sulzberger commented on May 4 about the mounting bitterness between the United States and France. On the 8th Dulles was in Paris, at odds with Premier Faure after a two-hour talk. On the 13th, after an all night session, their aides produced a "total agreement" on policy for Vietnam, which was sent to their representatives in Saigon in parallel directives. They agreed to back Diem, "with differences of emphasis." Most important, Faure was reported to have obtained from Dulles assurance that the United States would loyally back France in seeking to prepare for the 1956 all-Vietnam elections.¹²⁷

Diem Opposed to the Elections. On June 8 Sulzberger confirmed this accord but reported that Diem would not agree, feeling that the vote would go against him. Diem objected "even to the very thought of such a vote," "no matter what we say." He was "adamant." Thus "having obtained our backing, he uses his strength to oppose our policy."

More probably Dulles knew that Diem would never agree. It began to look as if the United States had found its Syngman Rhee for South Vietnam. Jean Sainteny had just returned to Paris from Hanoi with the news that Ho Chi Minh insisted that "Vietnam is a single country and nothing can prevent the firm will of its people from achieving its unity."

Quite to the contrary, Saigon was taking the position, on June 9, that it was not up to it to reply to the North Vietnamese proposal for consultations about the election. It was up to the powers which signed the Geneva treaty to provide the safeguards for free elections, not Saigon. By the 15th Diem said he was willing to discuss the question with North Vietnam, but everything depended on the conditions under which elections would be held in the North. His aides said that extensive third party supervision of the elections there would be demanded, along with the withdrawal of all Vietminh troops to concentration areas. Nothing was said about guarantees for free voting in the South, but on June 19 Diem was demanding guarantees "even eliminating the possibility of post-elections pressure on individuals who voted against the Viet Minh."

At the end of the first year after the Geneva Conference the pattern was becoming clear. Diem was accumulating demands for "guarantees" of an immaculately pure election in the North, which would almost certainly be rejected, and which could hardly be supervised and carried out if accepted. Then he would refuse to permit the elections in the South, where no preparations whatever were being made to prepare a people divided many ways for the strange experience of voting, which they had never had.

On June 3, 1955, Joseph Alsop drew upon his recent months in the Far East to warn that Diem did not appear to have either the military resources or the administrative capacity to bring the countryside under control by July 1956. It was still governed by the Vietminh underground, and if the elections were blocked the peasants would rise. General "Iron Mike" O'Daniel had already told Washington officially that in this event Diem's army would be able to

¹²⁶ *IBL*, April 29, 30, May 1, 4, 1955.

¹²⁷ *IBL*, May 14, 1955.

hold only the big cities and the chief lines of communication, and then for a few weeks only. The French would never help him. If there was a rescue party it would have to be composed of American ground troops, and if they were sent Ho Chi Minh could claim that the Geneva treaty was violated and send his twenty well equipped and trained divisions south.

Writing from Saigon, Robert Guillain, correspondent of the Paris *Le Monde*, charged that the Americans did not want the elections because they wanted to keep the country divided. Guillain described the refugees from the North as "in unparalleled dirt and destitution," lining the pavements in the rain. He maintained that General Ely was right in trying to prevent the outbreak of civil war in the South and that Ely's truce had been breached with the complicity of a part of the American mission, a part, he repeated, for "there are not one but several American missions at Saigon, and not one but several American policies fighting one another—just as in the darkest days of the Chinese tragedy."

He noted also that the first of the American dollars poured into Saigon's treasury had been spent, not for equipment to put the refugees to work but for luxury products, refrigerators, Chryslers and Buicks. This is a serious charge, because it indicates that we cannot avoid an unintentional imperialism in such operations. The millions siphoned into South Vietnam were intended only to fight communism, but the dollars found their way back to the United States in orders for goods, while Americans profited also from the fleets of ships loaded with arms for the Vietnamese.¹²⁸

Continuing Issues. We should review some of our premises about Indo-China.

1. *Are the resources of Indo-China essential to our safety and well being?*

There is no doubt that the tungsten, tin, rubber, rice and other products of the area are valuable. Some of them might also be diverted into the communist countries and not be available at all. But a new Indo-China would be eager to industrialize and it would need to trade for this purpose. Industrialized countries also make good customers for each other. Indo-Chinese products might cost more, but it is surely not certain that they could not be obtained.

If war time considerations are urged, it is to be remembered that during World War II we got along without the products of this entire region and "it would only be a minor inconvenience to us if we were denied the economic production of this area" again.¹²⁹

2. *Is the territory of South Vietnam essential to our security?*

Recalling that it was used by Japan as a springboard in 1940 for the conquest of all South East Asia, it is easy to argue that a revitalized China would

¹²⁸ *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, May 26, June 2, 1955. By August 1959 Diem was in unchallenged control of South Vietnam. In the second general election his supporters elected 120 of the 123 members of the National Assembly, or about 98%. The two members who were said to constitute the Opposition promised to confine themselves to "constructive criticism." Though a multiplicity of speeches, slogans and manifestoes had given a greater appearance of free choice than in 1956, "rigid control" had been exercised "over every detail" of the election.—*The Times*, London, September 1, 1959.

¹²⁹ Edwin O. Reischauer, *Wanted An Asian Policy*, New York, 1955, p. 34.

so use it. However, this assumes that the Vietnamese, who resisted Chinese overlordship for a thousand years, and who fought a long bitter war to throw off French rule, would now welcome the role of tool and staging ground for China—surely a large assumption for a proud new government.

It remains to be proved, also, that China intends to emulate Japan's disastrous conquest mania, which she felt most grievously on her own body. If sufficiently encircled and hemmed in she may do so, but otherwise decades of hard work are laid out for the Chinese Reds at home.

3. *Is it necessary for the West to hold South East Asia as a trading ground for Japan?*

This is a natural cold war argument—lest the Japanese be forced to trade with China—but must we now fight wars to give to Japan what we fought a great war to deny her? The Japanese are resourceful and they have much that South East Asia needs. They will also trade with both areas in spite of anything we can do, since they must trade everywhere to live.

4. *Is it our duty to be the guardians of the other peoples of South East Asia?*

In the heyday of our power, and of our fear of communism, it is easy to think so. It is quite possible also that a rich, corrupt oligarchy in Thailand might encounter a communist-assisted revolution. But there is no reason why a healthy small state should fear such an event. Prime Minister U Nu of Burma is on record as believing that "unless there is full-scale invasion, I do not think that a small country like ours can be absorbed. Provided, of course, that its leaders are honest and have a good program for the masses."

U Nu conceded that Laos and Cambodia might need a United Nations guarantee against invasion until they became stronger, and he joined with Nehru in taking a lively interest in all the countries East of the Great Divide in Indo-China—all of which are non-Chinese racially and look to India culturally.

Is it not probable that if we leave to these countries a real responsibility for preventing a Chinese eruption into their lands, by a policy of good neighborliness, that they can accomplish more than we can at a great distance by threats of using armed force?¹³⁰

Late in 1954 Frederick Kuhn, a very reliable newsman, made a trip around the rim of China through South East Asia and returned with the conviction that the area could not be defended militarily. Nothing could prevent the Chinese from pushing out, if they were determined to do so. We could not "save" Asia. But we could do such things as: stop dumping our rice surplus in Asia, badly depressing Burmese markets; continue our preferential tariff for Philippine sugar; put our dollars into self-help projects that will continue; and encourage the neutralists like U Nu in their efforts to keep on good terms with China.¹³¹

Prosaic things like these, and many others of a similar nature, will do nothing to relieve our belligerent emotions about the new China, or the new

¹³⁰ Philip Deane, the *London Observer*, July 18, 1954; Joseph Alsop, the *Nashville Tennessean*, January 27, 1955. Both dispatches from Rangoon.

¹³¹ From a lecture in Nashville.

Indo-China, but they could go far to compose the situation in South East Asia, if combined with less threats and encirclement. Where vast masses of people are concerned the use of force has very definite limits—as indeed it does where small, vigorous ones are involved.

MALAYA

Before World War II Malaya was a placid peaceful colony, fabulously rich in tin and rubber. The Malayan Communist Party, directed from China, was an illegal organization which also served as the center of Communist agitation for South East Asia. It helped to organize unions and call strikes, especially after 1937, but these were only minor irritations.¹³²

The country was governed through nine Moslem Malay sultans and their aristocracies, all under British control. The Chinese population was as numerous as the Malay, about 44 per cent each, far richer and more active, but with little or no political power. A large Indian minority of 10 per cent was in the same situation.

This was one reason for the astonishing fall of both Malaya and Singapore to Japanese land assault from the rear through the jungle. The three peoples of Malaya were not prepared either psychologically or physically to defend the country themselves and took a negative attitude toward the war, only to discover soon that the Japanese were much rougher masters than the British.¹³³

Though the Chinese had not originally been trusted with arms by the British the Chinese Communists had fought so well in the underground that for a time after the war they were recognized as a legal party. They had a hand, along with non-Communist Chinese, in a very active period of labor organization and strikes, from 1945 through 1947, which sought both economic and political objectives, such as support for the nationalists of Indonesia and Indo-China.¹³⁴

These activities merged into "The Emergency," officially declared in June 1948, a Communist guerrilla war which began with savage and indiscriminate violence throughout Malaya. Some 5000 guerrilla fighters of the war period went back to the jungle, dug up caches of arms and started a campaign of terror to wrest control from the British.

For two years they disembowelled the Asiatic servants and employees of the whites, along with their employers, slashing rubber trees and destroying their living, until it was realized that they had compromised themselves very heavily. In this period the High Commissioner was Sir Henry Gurney, an idealist and a liberal, who had to impose collective punishment on villages and put 500,000 villagers behind barbed wire before he was killed by the "bandits" on October 6, 1951—a month after a Communist directive had gone out to make the killing and slashing selective.

He was succeeded by General Gerald Templer, who enjoyed credit for a sharp drop in violence until it was realized that it took about a year for the

¹³² Patricia G. Barnett, *The Development of Self Rule and Independence in Burma, Malaya and the Philippines*, New York, 1948, p. 67.

¹³³ Virginia Thompson, *Postmortem on Malaya*, New York, 1943, p. ix.

¹³⁴ Barnett, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-6.

new Red directive to percolate through the deep jungles into which the rebels had retreated, planting food and enlisting the aid of 100,000 aborigines who helped frustrate Templer's Operation Termite aimed at destroying the jungle hideouts. His method was to give rewards to his troops for "jungle-bushing," the killing of bandits, though a battalion of 600 Ghurkas only managed 208 kills in six years, justifying the official figure that it cost \$180,000 to kill one terrorist.

When Templer was recalled on May 31, 1954, to the relief of most of Malaya, the number of terrorists in the jungle was the same and they still obtained all the recruits they needed. To contain the 5000 terrorists he was employing 30,000 British and 10,000 other troops, 100,000 police and 200,000 home guards. Having both military and civil power, he had been charged to "lead Malaya to nationhood." Instead he revived in full strength the old policy of nine sultanates and gave nationality to each of them. Instead of uniting Malaya he "had riven it with nine splinter nationalities, surrounding each with a fence of legal barbed wire," a patent example of divide and rule strategy. Far from attacking the main problem of healing the differences between Chinese and Malays he further alienated the Chinese. He left a legislature entirely nominated by himself and in local affairs he "conceded to a section of the people a restricted share in cranking their own parish pump."¹³⁵

The next High Commissioner, Sir Donald McGillivray, was a diplomat who worked to repair Templer's excesses. His directive was still to prepare Malaya for nationhood and independence.

Negotiations for independence proceeded steadily until it was attained on August 31, 1957. By that time the Communist guerrillas in the jungle had been reduced from 12,000 to about 1800. Some 50,000 British and Malay troops strove to eliminate the remnant. The war was still costing Britain \$120,000,000 a year, but she had achieved a friendly government at Kuala Lumpur which continued British institutions willingly and was glad to become a member of the Commonwealth. There was representation in the government for the Chinese, as well as the Malays.

The rulers of the Malay States elected one of their number to be Supreme Head of the Federation of Malaya. The central problem still was to unify the Malaysians, the Chinese, and the Indians. The other main problem was to gain a large degree of cooperation or unity with the adjacent state of Singapore, which attained control of its internal affairs in 1959.

This completed the British transfers of power in thickly populated South East Asia.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

From the post-war events in South East Asia three conclusions seem abundantly demonstrated.

¹³⁵ Victor Purcell, "Lessons from Malaya," *The Nation*, June 19, 1954, pp. 522-4. "His technique in moulding a likely instrument to his will was to obliterate his personality in an overpowering onslaught . . . until Malaya was full of human beings who had been broken like horses." In these operations *Time* magazine described his upper teeth bared to the gums in rage, and his "thin lipped tigerish sneer" (p. 524).

Evidently not all brainwashing tactics were invented by the Communists.

1. *The day of the white man as master in Asia is over.*

It was World War II which determined that. White dominance would have continued for a considerable period in some Asiatic countries had not the war destroyed the white man's prestige, by showing his incompetence to preserve order and peace in his own European center and by revealing his inability to defend his colonies in Asia against the local Japanese entry into the business of colonial domination.

Hereafter the white man is at best a guest in Asia. In the words of a long time observer of the Far East, he is "on trial, or at least on probation."¹³⁶

2. *Our support of colonialism has promoted communism.*

As noted above, it was perfectly obvious to Roosevelt that imperialism in Asia was finished, and should be. Here, as in other theaters of the Cold War, his death was a great misfortune. He would have fought the return of French and Dutch colonialism, if not British, to South East Asia. In his absence the Combined Chiefs of Staff honored a request by General MacArthur that Indonesia be transferred from his command for peace making purposes to Lord Louis Mountbatten's South East Asia Command. This decision was ratified at Potsdam, though Mountbatten opposed it.¹³⁷

The United States accordingly turned over the entire area to the British, who assisted the Dutch and the French in taking over again. This was more the work of imperial minded British generals than of the British Labor Government, but it opened the way for the Dutch and French to begin their tragic efforts to whittle away and then suppress the republics they found in operation when they returned. Of course American generals would probably have done the same thing, in the absence of a strong hand over them, as General Hodge did in South Korea, suppressing the Republic outright.

In Korea as in South East Asia the result was war, and in the latter area we escaped from support of the Dutch war just in time and from the French war too late, whatever the future. The result is that by supporting colonialism we permitted the communists to capture and lead the tremendous force of nationalism.

A leading authority on the Far East notes that the "whole history of the Communist Vietminh revolt . . . indicates that it rested more heavily on nationalism for its mass support than on Communist dialectics."¹³⁸ Thus by failing to throw our influence decisively on the side of freedom, and then by fighting actively against communist-led nationalism in Indo-China, we yielded the field to the communists.

This is a pity, since it was our Revolution which was the model for all suppressed nations even down to World War II, until we abandoned our own authentic past and put ourselves too often on the side of reaction and against the future.

This is one of the giant traps into which the Cold War has led us. Letting

¹³⁶ Peggy Durdin, "On Trial—The White Man in Asia," *the New York Times Magazine*, June 5, 1955, p. 76.

¹³⁷ Ronald S. Kahn, "The Netherlands and Indonesia," *Yale Review*, Winter 1947, p. 290.

¹³⁸ Edwim O. Reischauer, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

our fear of communism expand indefinitely in our minds, we embraced reaction as an ally, and we also reasoned that we could not oppose in the colonial field the imperialist powers in West Europe which were so vital in shielding us from the Reds.

This argument was always weak in the case of the Dutch, since they had nowhere else to go, and with respect to the French our fervid support of their colonial war in Indo-China only frustrated our main aims in Europe, while it used up an important fraction of our military potential. As in Korea, we also provided to all Asia "the emotion-charged picture of white soldiers with superior weapons killing Asian soldiers on Asian soil."¹³⁹

The conclusion would seem to be obvious that in every part of the world it would be wise for us to get on the side of the rising young nationalisms before others accept Communist leadership.

3. *We cannot permanently control the fringes of Asia.*

Nationalism is an old, tenacious force in both Indo-China and Korea, both divided because of our fear of communism. Neither the Annamites nor the Koreans are likely to accept their division as permanent.

Nor is it probable that we can perpetuate their division against the rapidly growing power of the new China, which seems destined to be one of the strongest powers in the world, and almost certainly the most powerful in Asia, before the end of this century.¹⁴⁰

4. *We must accept neutralism in Asia and avoid an American imperialism.*

The Cold War has led us into the trap of arguing that everybody must line up on our side or be considered at least a semi-enemy.

This will not do, because in much of Asia "Americans are more suspect" than other white men. We have the greatest power and we "often give the impression of wanting to use money and techniques to establish some new kind of white domination or imperialism." And in supporting colonialism we have committed "the one really unforgivable sin."¹⁴¹

We are also more feared than any other Western nation because we are young and vigorous, in contrast to the decrepitude of the European imperialists, and because "the more subtle Americans invest money in mines and plantations, make a profit out of them, and have the local government under their thumb before the inhabitants realize what has happened." It was fear of this process, so often practised in Latin America, that caused the fall of an Indonesian government which accepted American economic aid in 1952, and which led Burma to terminate the American aid program, "of which it was very greatly in need."¹⁴²

We can succeed in this important region only by convincing the native nationalists that we are not another imperialism, an objective which would be

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

¹⁴⁰ It should be noted that in Europe the predominant power of the Soviet Union works against the reunification of Germany, not for it.

¹⁴¹ Peggy Durdan, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

¹⁴² Lennox Mills, *American Policy Regarding South East Asia*, a bulletin published by the Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, 1954, p. 9.

greatly advanced by channelling our economic aid and technical aid through the internationally administered channels of the United Nations. At the same time we should stop looking for Cold War partners among the colonial powers and be grateful for each non-communist country which manages its own affairs, perhaps awkwardly and precariously, but nevertheless develops non-communist nationalism.

Even in Japan there is less and less reason to believe that we can force the Japanese to arm for our purposes and pursue them. As Reischauer suggests, it would be far better to encourage them to maintain an armed neutrality, directed at no one, "but capable of defending their own neutralism both externally from conquest and internally from subversion . . ."143

The peoples of Asia are all determined to have a better life, which means industrialization either by the communist forced draft method or by the slower Western method. In either case no white control will be accepted. Even in China the white "coreligionists of the Communist Chinese, the Russians, are kept out of sight as much as possible."144

Since we cannot alter this dominating Asian emotion, one which is natural and well founded, it would be better to conform to it.

143 Reischauer, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

144 Peggy Durdin, *supra*, p. 66.

THE FIRST FORMOSA CRISIS

JANUARY-JULY 1955

ON January 24, 1955, President Eisenhower delivered a message to a joint session of Congress in which he declared that "the United States must remove any doubt regarding our willingness to fight, if necessary, to preserve the vital stake of the free world in a free Formosa, and to engage in whatever operations may be required for that purpose."

Formosa was of such great importance, said the President, that "we must be alert to any concentration or employment of Chinese Communist forces obviously undertaken to facilitate attack upon Formosa, and be prepared to take appropriate military action." In other words, we must be ready at any time to bomb Chinese forces on the mainland if they were "obviously" preparing to attack Formosa.

Nor was Formosa the only position off the Chinese coast for which the United States would fight a world war if necessary. There were also Quemoy and the Matsus, held by the Chinese Nationalists, islands near the harbours of Amoy and Foochow. The joint resolution submitted to the Congress by the President asked for authority not only "to employ the armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack," but this authority was "to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and of the Pescadores."

This blank check authorizing the President to make war at any time for Formosa, the Pescadores (a group of islands about 25 miles from Formosa in the Strait), Quemoy or Matsu was approved by the House of Representatives the next day by a vote of 409 to 3 and by the Senate on January 28, by a vote of 85 to 3.

This action appeared to make war over Formosa unavoidable, since Communist China considered Formosa to be a part of its territory, was loudly demanding its recovery and preparing to take it. Two great powers had taken irreconcilable positions publicly and the situation was further envenomed by the presence on Formosa of counter-revolution—always a flash point for any revolution.

Formosa is an island about 120 miles long and half as wide lying one hundred miles off the coast of China. For centuries Formosa was on the fringes of life in China, affected most when a fallen dynasty occasionally fled to it. Taken by Japan in 1895, it had had a fifty year period of stern

but efficient rule, during which the standard of living of its 7,000,000 people rose.

Then the allied heads of state agreed at both the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences that Formosa should be returned to China. After 1945 it was occupied by Chiang's troops, who robbed the natives and often killed them to avoid discovery. Chiang's civilian officials ousted people from their jobs, drove many natives out of trade and generally acted as carpetbaggers. "Every branch of Formosan life began to collapse," while "the profits piled up by Chiang's officials knew no bounds," until in the spring of 1947 efforts at resistance led to a great massacre of an unarmed people, the casualties being "variously estimated from 5000 to 20,000."¹

The terror worked and Formosa became the haven of the Chiang regime when it was forced off the mainland in 1949, after which the Truman Administration decided to maintain a hands-off attitude. As detailed above,² neither Formosa nor Korea was held by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be within the strategic perimeter which we must defend, and on January 5, 1950, President Truman issued a firm statement refusing to defend Chiang and reaffirming our pledges to give the island back to China.

This policy was never accepted by General MacArthur or the Republicans, and when the Korean war broke out it was promptly modified by a presidential order on June 27, 1950, which threw the protection of the Seventh Fleet around Formosa and at the same time forbade Chiang to attack the mainland.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISIS

Unleashing Chiang. This enforced neutralization lasted until the Republicans returned to power in January 1953, when Chiang was promptly "unleashed." Ten days after President Eisenhower's inauguration it was announced, on January 30, 1953, that he had decided to permit the Nationalists to attack the mainland, as their improved capabilities permitted, but that the fleet would still prevent any Chinese Communist attacks upon Formosa.³

This action was first recommended to Eisenhower by Admiral Arthur Radford, then exiled to the Pacific, who intercepted Eisenhower at Iwo Jima during the latter's trip to Korea in December 1952 and convinced him of the virtue of unleashing Chiang.⁴

The order freeing him to attack China under the protection of the U.S. Navy accomplished several things: it was a move in the effort to force a truce in the Korean war; it gave satisfaction to the large number of Americans who thought that if we would only let him Chiang would soon reconquer China; and it opened a pin-prick war which if persisted in would end in a new conflict with China. Thereafter, Chiang's American-supplied planes and ships bombed Chinese shipping, ports and other mainland points, making a fairly effective blockade of the Chinese coast opposite Formosa—just enough to keep the Chinese dragon enraged without injuring it seriously, a situation which the Peking Government was certain to end as soon as it could.

¹ Jack Belden, *China Shakes the World*, pp. 385-97.

² See pp. 592-4.

³ *The New York Times*, January 31, 1953.

⁴ Drew Pearson, *the Nashville Tennessean*, January 31, 1955.

The "unleashing" of Chiang was hailed by Admiral William D. Leahy as "a bright idea." James Reston described the policy as one of "stern alternatives," but there was instant alarm in France and Britain and strong reservations were expressed in Asian countries, where the idea of enlisting Asians to fight Asians, and to prolong the Chinese civil war, was not viewed with favor.⁵

In order to make the unleashing of Chiang appear somewhat formidable, our policy makers "strongly pressed the generalissimo to occupy the off-shore islands in force." Until this pressure was applied in 1953 "even Quemoy was rather lightly held."⁶

Then the Chinese Reds began to build up strength and mount cannon opposite Quemoy, which is an almost flat island with excellent beaches quite near the mainland, and in September 1954 there was a policy crisis in Washington. Three of the four Joint Chiefs of Staff, Radford, Carney and Twining, favored fighting for Quemoy. Only Ridgway opposed, but the President took his side and vetoed the plan at a meeting of the National Security Council in Denver.⁷

Yikiang Captured. This was the situation when the Communists began obvious preparations for the capture of the Tachen islands, just off the Chinese coast about 230 miles north of Formosa, which were held by a full division of Nationalist troops. These islands were bombed on January 10, 1955, by the Communists, and the Nationalists bombed the mainland on January 14.⁸ On the 18th the Communists assaulted and captured Yikiang, a small island just north of the Tachens, crushing its force of 2000 guerrilla defenders.

At first Secretary of State Dulles said the loss of the island was "of no particular importance," but the next day the Communists bombed the Tachens heavily and the President said he would like to see the United Nations try to work out a cease-fire in the Formosa Strait. On the 21st "a profound change in Far Eastern policy appeared in prospect," and on the 24th the dramatic message with which this chapter opened was read in person to the Congress.⁹

The President's action and the overwhelming approval it received in Congress created a strong national feeling of closing ranks for war, a feeling which was led by Senator George, Democratic Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who took the floor and in a stern speech reprimanded the few Democrats who had questioned the President's action in coming to the Congress. On the same day, January 27, the President announced that he alone would make the decision for any action in the Formosa Strait. This was taken "to exclude the United States high command, and particularly . . . Admiral Arthur W. Radford, from any decisions involving war and peace." The statement was also intended to end charges on Capitol Hill that a preventive war was intended.¹⁰

These moves made it impossible to muster more than eleven votes in the Senate for excluding Quemoy and Matsu from the authority granted, but the

⁵ The *New York Times*, February 1, 1953.

⁶ Joseph Alsop, writing from Formosa, the *Nashville Tennessean*, April 18, 1955.

⁷ Joseph Alsop, the *Nashville Tennessean*, February 17, 1955.

⁸ AP—the *Nashville Tennessean*, January 16, 1955, the *New York Times*, January 19, 1955.

⁹ The *New York Times*, January 19, 20, 21, 22, 1955. ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, January 28, 1955.

small adverse vote did not reflect the deep anxiety with which many Senators had voted. The argument "what else is there to do except give him our backing" had swayed many, along with the contention that even a delayed vote would weaken the United States in the expected cease-fire debate in the UN Security Council, which invited China on February 1 to come to the Council for that purpose, only to receive a tart rejection on the 3rd.¹¹

On the same day a significant event took place in Moscow when the Malenkov defense budget cut of 12 per cent was reversed in the new Soviet budget. On February 8 Malenkov resigned and was succeeded by Marshal Bulganin as Molotov made a tough speech to the Supreme Soviet saying that "the United States must withdraw from Taiwan (Formosa) and the Strait of Taiwan all its armed forces, including its forces in the air and at sea." He maintained that Formosa was "an internal affair of China, while the aggressive actions of the United States and its threats of war we consider as an aggression which must be unconditionally condemned by the United Nations, if it values its authority . . ." ¹²

Toward War Over China's "Doormat." These developments appeared to set the stage for a world war over the Chinese islands. The Communist powers seemed to be firmly committed to the view that only an internal Chinese question was involved. The United States was publicly committed to prevent China from occupying Formosa and the Pescadores, and maybe the other off-shore islands. The Peking Government was angry and the Soviet Government was reorganized, stiffening its armaments and preparing for the worst—or to negotiate from strength.

In this situation most Americans felt helpless at first. They found themselves in a state of affairs which had never existed before, with all power voted to the President in advance to make war anywhere along the China coast that he might see fit. Everything depended on who could capture the mind and will of one man, and a Machiavellian Secretary of State had the President's ear and the direct administration of the new policy.

Dulles had at last secured a position from which he could keep everybody guessing—"the enemy", our allies, the neutrals and the American people—a position he was able to maintain for about two months until American and world opinion finally crystallized against a war over Quemoy and Matsu, leaving the question of Formosa for the future.

As so often in the past, the honor of being the first to question a mistaken policy fell to Walter Lippmann, who pointed out instantly that the new policy was based on militarism, not law. It took "for granted that we have a unilateral right to intervene in foreign territory for strategic reasons." We had staked a great deal on the reliability of Chiang's regime. Yet in deciding against supporting his return to the mainland we had done what was "likely to sow fatal doubts within his regime." Then to offset these doubts we had "felt compelled to become entangled in the Chinese civil war in the off-shore

¹¹ Max Freedman, the *Manchester Guardian*, February 3, the *New York Times*, February 4, 1955.

¹² The *New York Times*, February 4, 9, 1955.

islands." So we found ourselves "unable to take an intelligible position that can command the support of world opinion."¹³

Lippmann had made clear the folly of the Radford-Dulles policy of "unleashing" Chiang which the President had unwisely accepted. Now we had to disengage Chiang and had trapped ourselves in the process. On February 25 Joseph Alsop wrote from Formosa that the Administration's policies had "pointed the United States into an almost inescapable corner in Asia." For two years Washington had paid no attention to the strong feelings of our European Allies about Formosa. Now if we got into a world war and our allies denied us the use of their air bases our main weapon would be substantially abolished.¹⁴

On February 20th James Reston came to the same conclusion. "Unleashing" Chiang had encouraged the world to believe we were going to roll back communism in Asia when we did not have the power to do so. Now we were trapped in "a very dangerous gamble." After several reverses, we had "taken a moral commitment to defend the doormat on China's front stoop."¹⁵

Tension Kept High. A few days earlier, on February 16, Secretary Dulles delivered a formal address in which he avowed his desire to keep tension high. "We dare not relax," he said, "because the moment of relaxation is the moment of peril." He repeated previous warnings by implication that the United States would use its armed forces to resist any attack on the coastal islands which it considered might endanger Formosa. Then he ranged over the globe describing the "despotic disarray" in Moscow, denouncing communism and stressing the danger in Asia, where "words are not enough. It is necessary to infuse these words with the breath of life." This he hoped to do a few hours hence at the first meeting of the SEATO Council in Bangkok, Thailand.

It was a fighting, cold war speech, which dampened British hopes for a tacit cease-fire in the Formosa area. Commenting on Dulles' purpose not to defend the off-shore islands "as such," the London *Times* could find no practical meaning in the qualification. It observed: "As such, or not as such, the islands remain islands, the guns remain guns and the dangers remain dangers." There was disquietude in Paris also about the continuing obscurity of our intentions about evacuating Quemoy and Matsu.¹⁶

It was during this period that Dulles made a sustained effort behind the scenes to commit Eisenhower to guarantee Quemoy and Matsu.

Dulles' Attempt to Pledge Quemoy-Matsu Defense. In a dispatch from Formosa on February 17 Joseph Alsop stated that "while the Formosa resolution was pending," that is, before January 28 when it passed the Senate, Dulles told Chiang's Foreign Minister, George Yeh, "without qualification or equivocation that President Eisenhower would issue a statement in effect guaranteeing Quemoy and the Matsus as soon as the Formosa resolution had passed the Congress."

In other words, Dulles intended to cash the blank check the moment the

¹³ *The Nashville Tennessean*, January 25, February 8, 1955.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, February 20, 1955.

¹⁵ *The New York Times*, February 20, 1955.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, February 17, 18, 1955.

Congress had signed it. However, it developed that the President had hedged his position, to undercut the Senate opposition, and would not keep the promise Dulles had made, though this was unknown to our Ambassador to Formosa, Carl Rankin, who stated publicly "a week ago Friday"—apparently February 11—that Quemoy and Matsu were now guaranteed.

Then "at this late date" Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson was compelled to tell Yeh that the President would not keep Dulles' promise. Yeh produced the minutes of his meeting with Dulles and these were sent to the White House, but to no avail. Chiang accordingly refused to keep his part of the bargain, the evacuation of the Tachens, creating an impasse lasting several days which was not ended until the President sent Chiang a less binding private statement about Quemoy and Matsu.¹⁷

Virtually the same explanation for the delay in evacuating the Tachens was cabled by Henry R. Lieberman to the *New York Times* on January 31. Nationalist officials had expected President Eisenhower to "make a specific statement on the defense of the Quemoy and Matsu islands once Congress endorsed his 'Defend Formosa' message," in which he would say that Quemoy and Matsu would be defended as "closely related localities." There was to be a simultaneous or follow-up order by Chiang for evacuating the Tachens.

On Thursday, February 10, Mr. Yeh paid farewell calls on Dulles and Robertson, before returning to Formosa, and afterward told the waiting reporters that the United States would "defend all the related positions and localities which are deemed important to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores." The reporters compared notes the next day and agreed that this is what he had said, and when they asked if the pledge included Quemoy and Matsu he replied: "Of course," adding that it covered "all the offshore islands."

This news reached the Senate the day after it had ratified the treaty guaranteeing Formosa and the Pescadores by a vote of 64 to 6, after stating an "understanding," concurred in by Dulles, that the United States would not be obliged to take military action beyond Formosa and the Pescadores unless the treaty were specifically amended.

Naturally a storm arose on Capitol Hill. Senator George knew "nothing whatever about any such pledge, agreement or understanding," and there was much angry talk from the few opponents of the treaty which led the State Department to request Yeh to correct his statement. He did so, disavowing most of what he had said.¹⁸

Confusion in Washington. On March 30 Reston described a half dozen remarkable contradictions which the Administration's war of nerves over Quemoy and Matsu had caused. Whatever else the policy had accomplished it had confused Washington. The Administration was "split from top to bottom" and each side was "lobbying behind the scenes for either intervention or withdrawal." The legislative leaders were not only divided but disarmed. Summing up the two months of struggle he said that the Administration had

¹⁷ *The Nashville Tennessean*, February 17, 1955.

¹⁸ *The New York Times*, February 11, 12, 1955.

seemed "to move closer to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, widening the gap with the Allies. And now it is in trouble at home as a result of the tug of war within its own ranks."

This was the period during which the American war party, led by the Republican right wing, had its greatest opportunity. It was also most probably the high point in Dulles' policy of hurling threats and keeping everybody guessing. After his grievous failure to prevent the making of peace in Indo-China, he now had full scope for an effort to recoup against China and to pay off some of the old scores of our defeat by China in North Korea.

The result of the ascendancy of these forces was the darkest period of the Cold War, two months when it seemed that the more sober Americans could find no way to prevent war from finally coming out of the foggiest of situations.

Dulles' Far Eastern Tour. During this period Dulles used everything in his arsenal of threats. At the first meeting of the SEATO Council in Bangkok, Thailand, on February 23, he rejected any doubts that the United States was ready to go to war for South East Asia, against "the expansionist aims and ambitions of China." He indicated strongly that China faced a triple threat, if war came, from South Korea-Japan, the Formosa area and South East Asia.¹⁹

On February 28 Dulles visited Cambodia, telling the King that SEATO would protect his country against aggression, and bringing up "the delicate matter" of American training for Cambodian troops, still in the hands of the French. In Saigon the next day he assured Premier Diem that all the Allied Governments would support him against Communism. However, French fear of American "economic encroachment" was "binding United States efforts to take over the training program of the Cambodian army." In Manila, on March 2, Dulles told the assembled U.S. Ambassadors in the Far East that there would be no more retreats in Asia. He spoke again of a three front war against China, though Communist aggression was to be avoided by a policy of unswerving firmness. In Formosa the next day he warned China to drop all plans for invading Formosa. The United States would make an all-out defense, including attack on mainland points which appeared to be the start of any action interpreted as a direct thrust against Formosa or the Pescadores. There would be no "negotiations dealing with the territories or rights of the Republic of China except in cooperation with the Republic of China."²⁰

In Manila Dulles signed the ratification instruments of the mutual defense treaty with the Chinese Nationalists, ratified by the Senate in the middle of February, which fully guaranteed the defense of Formosa by the United States. On March 6 Admiral Robert B. Carney, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, said in Formosa that a joint command might be set up.²¹

"Tactical" A-bombing Threatened. Back in Washington Dulles said that the Chinese Communists sought "desperately" to take "the forward positions of freedom in Asia." He did not add that most of the world thought they were merely trying to take possession of their own islands. Instead, he told the President that he must be firmer in the Far East and spoke again of the unity of three fronts against China. On nation-wide radio and television he warned

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, February 24, 1955. ²⁰ *Ibid.*, March 2, 3, 4, 1955. ²¹ *Ibid.*, March 4, 6, 1955.

the Chinese that the United States was no "paper tiger" and threatened to use against them "new and powerful weapons of precision, which can utterly destroy military targets without endangering unrelated civilian centers," that is, tactical atomic bombs.²²

This threat brought to all Asia and the world the vision of American A-bombs being dropped again on Asians. Dulles softened the impact a little on March 15 by saying that the city destroying A-bombs would not be used, and the next day the President made baby A-bombs "regular issue" by maintaining that he could see no reason why they should be not used "just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else" on "strictly military targets."

On the same day the South Koreans asked for a supply of atomic cannon, and military critic Hanson W. Baldwin explained in detail that precision bombing with A-bombs was a delusion. Our "least powerful atomic weapon" had an explosive force equal to 3,000 tons of TNT and the chief advantage of any atom bomb was that its tremendous force compensated for aiming error. Besides, military targets were usually near cities and towns. With such weapons we might destroy an enemy physically "while losing on the ideological battlefield."²³

This casual acceptance of "tactical" atomic bombing by the President marked the top of the period of threats, though Dulles was still "pounding tables in Washington," maintaining that the United States would not back down again.²⁴ Simultaneously, John Carter Vincent, one of the State Department's purged China diplomats, had his revenge in a letter to the *New York Times* of March 15, in which he pointed out that the tigerish roars of Mr. Dulles about "liberation," "agonizing reappraisal," "massive retaliation" and "unleashing" Chiang had earned him, not the United States, the title of "paper tiger." The rapid build-up of Chiang's forces in the off-shore islands had been intended to prevent the Chinese from sending troops into Indo-China. It was a threat to the mainland, not a defense measure for Formosa, and no one would think us a paper tiger for withdrawing from an exposed position which no longer served its original purpose.

By this time our allies, the neutrals and the American people were all alarmed about the flexible crisis which seemed to grow more rigid all the time. Behind the talk of baby A-bombs that wouldn't hurt "unrelated civilian centers," peoples everywhere saw themselves under the shadow of H-bomb mushrooms, with their deadly fall-out. Only the American war party was for heating the crisis still further. The war party was perhaps not large in numbers but it included many powerful China-lobbyists with loss-of-China grudges; China-haters resenting the stalemated Korean war; and legions of cold warriors who had come to believe their own propaganda that one Red colossus or the other was intent upon destroying us and must therefore be destroyed first. Latterly it had been the Red Chinese dragon which must be smashed before it had time to industrialize and become a really great power, capable of arranging matters in its own neighbourhood beyond the ability of distant powers to interfere.

²² The *New York Times*, March 7, 8, 9, 1955.

²³ *Ibid.*, March 16, 17, 1955.

²⁴ Drew Pearson, the *Nashville Tennessean*, March 17, 1955.

All of these groups were "for that war against mainland China which so many admirals and retired generals have preached," to quote Walter Lippmann.²⁵ The Formosa crisis was the opportunity for which they had long been waiting. Led by Admiral Radford, the top military man in the Government, and with the indefatigable assistance of Secretary Dulles, they carried all before them for two months.

THE CREST OF THE CRISIS

Then the tide began to turn. On March 13 Prime Minister Menzies of Australia arrived in Washington letting it be known that Australia did not want any defense of Quemoy and Matsu to grow into a big war. On the 17th Dulles took his "grim sense of foreboding" that the Chinese Communists were "emotionally determined to drive the West out of Asia" to Ottawa, and learned that Canada would not support a war over Quemoy and Matsu. Lippmann had observed that Dulles, back from the Far East, had acted like a man who had seen a ghost, a part which Dulles bore out in Ottawa, maintaining that China was determined to take Formosa and this could not be tolerated because Japan would be the next target. However, Japan let it be known that she would not permit the use of Japanese bases to fight Red China. Since our European allies had long since bowed out of a Quemoy-Matsu war, this left only the Philippines and Thailand as probable allies in such a war.²⁶

By the end of March the spectacular menace of the January 24 Presidential message and its accompanying Congressional resolution had succeeded in alarming all of our friends and almost totally isolating the United States. No enemy could possibly have done this half so effectively, and the Chinese had not been scared into a cease-fire. This, said James Reston, had been Dulles' expectation. It was "a favorite tactic of his," but "that tactic failed."²⁷

Two months of Dullesian thunder had had no visible effect on the Chinese. They went right on building airfields opposite Formosa and mounting heavy guns opposite Quemoy. They might attack the off-shore islands any day and if they did the United States would have to yield to force or fight a war of which nearly all of the world disapproved.

Negotiations Proposed by George. It was diplomatic folly not to negotiate our way out of the dilemma, said C. L. Sulzberger on March 19, and the next day Senator George broke the dismal impasse into which the scare diplomacy of Mr. Dulles had carried us by making the revolutionary suggestion that the moment had come "when the real hope of avoiding war is through some high-level conferences between the leading powers." This almost treasonable suggestion, from any less august figure, was countered the next day by a speech from Dulles "in the grim, warning tone he has employed since returning from South East Asia March 6." The entire speech was of a kind to inflame the public mind against the Communist Chinese. They were "an acute and imminent threat," "dizzy with success." A list of their conquests ended with their

²⁵ *The Nashville Tennessean*, June 9, 1955.

²⁶ *The New York Times*, March 14, 18; Drew Pearson, *The Nashville Tennessean*, April 14, 1955.

²⁷ *The New York Times*, April 24, 1955.

taking "by force" one of the Nationalist held islands. The remainder of the speech catalogued other grievances and compared the "aggressive fanaticism" of the Chinese Reds to Hitler. Listing the coldly calculating conquests of the Soviets, he thought the Chinese Reds still "more dangerous and provocative of war." But there was still time to bring them "to a more sober mood."²⁸

Walter Lippmann put it accurately when he said that Dulles had been "talking much and in ominous language." He had been "exhorting the country with the heady generalities which—before and during wars—are employed to heat up popular emotion." He gave the impression at home and abroad that war with China "had better be fought now when we can destroy Red China's war potential." This appeared to be the result of shock after seeing how weak our string of client states in Asia was, Lippmann thought, but he questioned whether war-like speeches "accented with the threat of atomic bombs" really rallied anybody to our side.²⁹

Crushing China Advocated by Carney. It was clear that there would be no negotiations and lessening of tension if Dulles could help it, but at his news conference the next day the President backed the idea of a high level conference, if exploratory talks came first. A trend away from war over Quemoy and Matsu was plainly under way, and on March 25 a catalytic agent was applied to the softening situation. Large headlines in the *New York Times* told of an expected Chinese attack on Quemoy and Matsu in mid-April. Military advisers were urging the President to act militarily on an all-out basis "to destroy Red China's military potential and thus end its expansionist tendencies," using atomic weapons. The Soviet Union was expected to provide Red China with arms "but not to intervene directly."

Here was a blunt, clear statement of the right wing war party's objective in the Formosa affair, the crushing of Red China, with Russia expected to stand by while it was done. It was some days, however, before the source of the plan and the prediction of war in mid-April was revealed to be Admiral Carney, U.S. Chief of Staff for the Navy. He had briefed a number of correspondents at a private dinner.³⁰

In the meantime Soviet Premier Bulganin promptly expressed "a positive attitude" toward a Big Four Conference on March 26, and on the 28th Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson at last openly accused the G.O.P. right wing of talking war. On the 30th Senator Estes Kefauver charged that persons high in the Administration were "plotting and planning" what should be an unthinkable war over Quemoy and Matsu, forces so powerful that they were "becoming almost impossible to resist."³¹

The War Party Attacked. For the first time the American war party had been called by its real name, publicly and responsibly. For years it had worked for a preventive war with Russia, then with China, always under the patriotic cover of "winning" the Cold War. Now at last, after nearly ten years of Cold War,

²⁸ The *New York Times*, March 19, 22, 1955.

²⁹ The *Nashville Tennessean*, April 17, 1955.

³⁰ The *New York Times*, March 26, 1955.

³¹ *Ibid.*, March 27, 29; the *Nashville Tennessean*, March 31, 1955.

it had finally over-reached itself and brought the nation to the brink of war over islands almost in China's harbors, to which we could have no shadow of claim, making the preventive war purpose clear for all to see.

Three months later Lippmann noted "the effacement of the war party" and thought that "the threat of war over such an absurdity as Quemoy and Matsu was the trigger which set off the American revulsion against a Third World War."³²

On March 31 Eisenhower strongly disavowed Admiral Carney's war prediction, though he talked at length about the necessity of doing nothing to destroy the morale of the Chinese Nationalist troops.³³ The morale of these ageing homesick men, far from home, forbidden to marry and condemned to perpetual drill and barracks life was indeed a problem, one which was not alleviated by the 850 generals whom Chiang carried on his payroll, ready to rule China again.³⁴

It was the Carney briefing which finally alerted the American people to the danger of giving the President a pre-dated declaration of war which the most belligerent of his advisers could cash. This unprecedented device had had the effect of suppressing the normal channels of democratic action. Few had the courage to raise their voices in protest against a policy endorsed by nearly unanimous votes of both houses of Congress and fewer still had the temerity to advise a President who was known to read little what to do with his extraordinary, very elastically defined power. So for weeks there was little thinking out loud, and what there was was largely confined to the letter columns of the newspapers.

Strong Individual Protests. Fortunately the *New York Times*, though a strong supporter of all Cold War measures, did publish a striking series of letters by secondary but influential leaders of public opinion, mostly professors.

Frederick Osborn, former deputy to the U.S. Representative on the UN Atomic Energy Commission, led off promptly on January 28 with a warning that "if we use atom bombs on Chinese cities we write finis to our position of leadership in the free world," while the Chinese-Russian alliance would be strengthened. He cautioned that "the group who have publicly shown a real desire to go to war with China" would now be likely to create incidents to secure that result.

The next day John Gange, of the University of Virginia, had the courage to point out with regard to Formosa and the Pescadores that "whatever anyone else says, the Chinese know the islands as Chinese. Our legalisms will not faze either side." Moreover, the war with China that we faced would drain away our strength, alienate Asia and probably all non-white peoples, putting us "on a basis of permanent enmity with 600 million Chinese," even if we could "win it single handed and survive a healthy country."

On February 2 President Case, of Colgate University, said that we should beware of assuming too glibly that the doctrine of Formosa's indispensability

³² The *Nashville Tennessean*, July 29, 1955. ³³ The *New York Times*, April 1, 1955.

³⁴ C. L. Sulzberger, the *New York Times*, March 23, 1955.

to our security was self evident to others, and he asked whether we were "to deny to Peking the right to be concerned about its own security, simply because it is Communist and revolutionary?" The habit of taking a look at the other fellow's point of view was "essentially democratic and Christian"—an obvious truth which sounded strange in the climate of the time, "which tended to equate any objective analysis of Communist China's case with softness toward Communism."

Attacking the preventive war advocates, the atomic scientist Leo Szilard, of the University of Chicago, warned on February 6 that the day we bombed the Chinese mainland was likely to be the first day of a Third World War, during which both the United States and Russia might be so devastated that government would cease to exist. Yet the public discussion of the issues between the United States and Russia "moved at a level of political thinking at which no solution is possible at all." A "far-reaching agreement" was imperative. The right answers must be found soon or war would come "because there is too much patriotism in the United States and too few patriots."

On February 18 Nathaniel Peffer, Far East specialist at Columbia University, wrote that our defense of Quemoy would mean war with China and Russia which we would have to fight with no allies. The war would drag on for years and we would probably not win it, a foreboding shared by Derk Bodde, China expert at the University of Pennsylvania, who on February 3 asked us to remember what happened the last time we called the bluff of the Chinese Communists, in Korea. The conflict between them and the Nationalists was a civil war in 1949 and since it remained a civil war, "by what conceivable moral right, then, do we, from our side of the globe, presume to tell this Government, Communist though it be, what it may or may not do about areas which we ourselves have declared to be a part of China?"

On the whole periphery of world communism, said Edgar Snow on February 26, there was no other point where the United States would stand more alone in an armed conflict. We would be pitted against the resources of a billion people armed with atomic weapons. This was a gamble which we could win only if the other side was "willing to pay a bigger price for peace, in terms of lost face and prestige," than we were, a result which he did not expect because a stalemate in the Formosa Strait or on Formosa itself was out of the question. Yet the decision "to use force to keep the Peking Government from establishing its sovereignty within its own territorial waters" assumed that we could enforce a stalemate indefinitely. We were in a "diplomatic dead-end" from which we could be extricated only by our allies.

Putting his finger on the key diplomatic piece on the Dulles checker board, Brigadier-General Hugh B. Hester, U.S.A., Retired, predicted on March 11 that the Dulles-Chiang treaty, guaranteeing the regime of the latter on Formosa for ever, was likely to be proved "worse than a crime; it was a blunder." Though Dulles said our only purpose was peace, he had left China with "no alternative to war." How could "Red China be at peace as long as any major

power supports Chiang Kai-shek as the proper representative of China in the United Nations or elsewhere?"³⁵

These letters constitute a record that during the black period under review some of the most perceptive minds in the nation did speak out courageously against the incredible diplomacy of John Foster Dulles, the diplomacy of menace and confusion which had brought the United States to the very brink of complete isolation and world war on the other side of the earth, over Chinese islands some of which we had no shadow of claim to and none of which could be defended indefinitely, as Dulles solemnly bound us to do. The idea of American warships cruising around Formosa for ever strains credulity.

To hold his ground momentarily Dulles had actually resorted to the ultimate threat of dropping atomic bombs on China, and it was a mark of the sad state of American mentality that the President followed him in regarding these weapons as so many bullets.

The Conservatives Oppose War "to Teach Them a Lesson." During this time when it appeared that all reason and restraint had taken flight from our diplomacy, armed as it was with a pre-dated declaration for an atomic world war which all but silenced dissent, there were influential forces working quietly in the background against a suicidal end of the great Dulles-Radford Cold War drama.

Two significant articles by James Reston told what happened. Up until the Carney briefing the nation appeared to be unconscious of the plight it was in. The talk of using "tactical" atomic weapons on China "sent a shudder through almost every Ambassador in the capital and the diplomatic cables were full of it," but in this country there was little public or newspaper reaction. The main pressure on the President was still to defend Quemoy-Matsu, "because the Chinese Communists have to be taught a lesson, otherwise Asia will really think that America is a paper tiger."

The fatal "teach the Asiatics a lesson" idea which had lost Indonesia for the Dutch and Indo-China for the French was "the predominant theme here" until the Carney dinner, which was followed by defend-Quemoy statements by right wing Republican Senators Knowland, of California, and Bridges, of New Hampshire. Then "suddenly the country began to pay attention" and "the overwhelming reaction from press and pulpit was loudly opposed to intervention." Soon the President was being warned "by many powerful politicians and institutions" against carrying a divided nation into "the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time."

Evidently advice came to the President privately from powerful conservative institutions to call a halt, and the strength of the advice, said Reston, "focused the President's attention on the problem" in a way that nothing else had done since January 18. In other words, the American people were finally stirred to

³⁵ One of the deeper forces animating the war party was identified by Vernon L. Ferwerde, of Trinity College, on April 1, when he recalled the frequently expressed frustration of American military leaders over the outcome of the Korean war. This explained "the admirals leading the belligerent forces seeking to clobber Red China regardless of cost," but "this delayed action vindication will hardly serve as an excuse for the launching of a wholesale attack upon the Chinese mainland."—*The New York Times*, April 1, 1955.

break through the belligerent circles and atmosphere surrounding the President and make him realize that his blank check must not be cashed on Quemoy-Matsu.

This was the situation on April 7. On April 27 Reston again recorded that ever since the Carney alert the pressure on the Administration to avoid war was "terrific", in the press, but "even more apparent in the flood of communications that has descended on the White House from powerful institutions all over the country."³⁶

Fortunately for the world the real American conservatives finally over-ruled the right wing preventive-war element, who thought they had within their grasp at last the atomic destruction of China. There was still, of course, one essential element lacking, before this school overplayed its hand at the Carney dinner—the cooperation of the Chinese in attacking Quemoy—but it was fairly certain that Chiang's goading attacks on the mainland and its shipping would eventually accomplish that.

All of our allies realized this keenly and their pressure on President Eisenhower contributed to his decision to turn away from war in China. He also understood for himself, with rather "reluctant conviction," that a new system of competing alliances threatened to turn any local war into "the collective martyrdom of atomic war."³⁷

TOWARD NEGOTIATION

The Carney briefing was the turning point of the Formosa Straits war scare. It spurred the American people to decide that there would be no war over Quemoy-Matsu. It also enabled the more conservative army leaders to point out that Quemoy was as dangerous as Dienbienphu, and that Dulles' Number Two threat of a war on three fronts against China could work both ways. If we A-bombed China we would have to be prepared for the A-bombing of Formosa, Okinawa and our bases in Japan, plus another Korean land war and one in Indo-China.³⁸

All this might be hard on China's primitive economy, but it could be harder on American morale—which had been promised peace in Korea by the Republicans, and no more "Truman's wars"—to endure a long hard war entailing the use of large numbers of American troops.

Outstanding among the candid statements about what was involved in a Formosa Straits war was a broadcast by Edward R. Murrow over the Columbia Broadcasting System on March 28. He questioned the confidence of Knowland and Bridges that the Soviet Union would not honor its alliance with China. These Senators could not guarantee how the Kremlin would act. On the other hand, if war came we would "receive no help whatever from any Western ally, not a gun, plane or warship. Even Canada had served notice that it would not help." Before the question was decided the state of mind of

³⁶ The *New York Times*, April 7, 29, 1955.

³⁷ Max Freedman, the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, August 4, 1955. He adds: "No one who heard the conviction with which he repudiated Senator Knowland's proposal for a blockade of China can easily forget the impact of these events on the President."

³⁸ Stewart Alsop, the *Nashville Tennessean*, April 7, 1955.

most Americans should be considered and their ignorance about Quemoy and Matsu was "no less than appalling." Since a Gallup poll had just revealed that only 10 per cent of us knew who held the islands and only 14 per cent knew they were within 30 miles of the China mainland, "a war for Quemoy and Matsu would express the conviction of a tiny fragment of the American public."

So it would, but that tiny fragment dominated the American and world scene for two months during the Formosa war scare.

Nor did the ebbing of the Formosa crisis pass without an admonition from Dulles, in a speech to a large gathering of Jesuits, against "craven purchases of peace at the expense of principle," which could "result in destroying much of the human spirit on this planet."³⁹

The difficulty with saving the human spirit through an atomic war, or an anti-Communist crusade, seemed to be that such negative endeavours emptied the American spirit of substance. Two days before Dulles spoke, Reston commented that it was the tragedy of official Washington that it was "no longer nourished by the ancient faith on which it was founded." It was "engaged in an ideological war without being able to define its own ideology." It condemned the materialism of an atheistic enemy, but glorified its own materialism. Even Eisenhower had fallen into the habit of talking about the use of the tactical atomic bomb as if it were merely another conventional weapon, and Dulles had been discussing it "almost as if it were an instrument of mercy." In the end "the conflict of moral, political and military considerations within the minds of these two men may very well influence the whole course of history."⁴⁰

Here was a vivid glimpse of the extent to which history is made by a very few of our top leaders.

The Bandung Conference. In late April 1955 history was made at the Bandung Conference in Indonesia. This was a gathering the like of which had never been seen since time began. It was a meeting of the official representatives of 29 colored nations, Asiatic and Arab, practically all of which had escaped from Western imperial control during recent decades. Such a meeting of the former subjects of the West cast a shadow before it for some weeks, at the same time that it ensured the absence of a Chinese attack on the off-shore isles until after the conference.

China was among the invited, though the Soviet Union was not. Formosa and South Korea were not invited. Only the colored peoples who had or were clearly emerging from colonialism came, and as they gathered on April 18, there was much foreboding in Washington about what would come out of this meeting, at which no one of the great white powers would sit.

Presently there was relief that some of our allies and one of the inviting Colombo powers, Ceylon, raised the question of Communist imperialism in the conference, though the issue was not pursued, partly because Chou En-lai's attitude was so conciliatory and partly because the conquest of one Asiatic power by another did not seem like imperialism to the delegates. One

³⁹ *The New York Times*, April 12, 1955.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, April 10, 1955.

of the most competent observers at the conference noted that this feeling was so strong that even the strongly anti-communist delegates named no case of Communist or Asiatic aggression. It was against subjection by the West that the full force of the conference was concentrated.⁴¹

Colonialism was still the "burning issue and glaring wrong." It made no difference whether the peoples subjected were primitive or anciently civilized; all colonial controls were "equally wrong, all must equally and speedily disappear," along with racial discrimination. Thus the Africans, Arabs and Asiatics united in focusing their strongest feelings upon the fast ebbing Western imperialism, when we wanted them to hate communism.

In line with this predisposition which history has burned into these peoples, Red China did not seem to the Bandung delegates to be the aggressive monster which Dulles and others had constantly been describing. Chou was "all friendliness and conciliation," said Fitzgerald. "He had not come to quarrel but to seek points of agreement." Thus some of our clients found that in their orations against "communist aggression" they were "beating the air." On the spot he concluded a treaty with Indonesia which settled the old vexatious problem of dual nationality among the Chinese in Indonesia by providing for a plebiscite in which they would choose Chinese or Indonesian citizenship.

The Philippines and Thailand could also have such treaties, Chou suggested, and he did not underline the necessity of their prior recognition of his government. If the Thailand representatives were also worried about China harboring dissident movements, they could come to China and see for themselves. The delegates of Laos and Cambodia held long talks with Chou and professed themselves satisfied. To the conference Chou said that China was a big power and it was easy for big powers to disregard small nations and have no respect for them. China's leaders had "stressed this point among our people." They were constantly examining their behavior toward small nations and if any delegation felt that China did not respect their country "please bring this point out" and he would be "glad to accept criticism and rectify mistakes."⁴²

To the Dulles picture of a raging Red Chinese dragon, thrashing about in Asia determined to obliterate all its neighbors, Chou opposed the portrait of a good neighbor willing to settle all outstanding problems with her neighbors. Instead of preaching conflict he took the mature attitude of a man seeking to lessen tensions and all accounts agreed on his success. As the outstanding British writer Vernon Bartlett cabled from Bandung: "It has been Chou En-lai's conference." As an American colleague said, "he came, he smiled, he conquered," and any Western attempt to prejudge his sincerity would have "disastrous consequences in Asia."⁴³

Negotiations Proposed by Chou. This broad setback to the belligerent diplomacy of Secretary Dulles was also accompanied by a specific one. On April 23, after discussion of the subject with eight of the conference

⁴¹ C. P. Fitzgerald, "What Bandung Achieved," *The Nation*, June 11, pp. 502-4.

⁴² *The New York Times*, April 28, 1955.

⁴³ *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, April 28, 1955.

leaders, Chou issued a statement saying: "The Chinese people are friendly to the American people. The Chinese people do not want to have a war with the United States of America. The Chinese Government is willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States Government to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan (Formosa) area."

Many of the conference delegates at once supported Chou's proposal, including the Prime Ministers of Indonesia and Burma, who said the United States should accept it. A member of the Syrian delegation said: "He seems a man of very good character." The Turkish and Lebanon delegates took a wait-and-see attitude, but even Premier Ali of Pakistan, our strongest friend, was mollified and sent a four page cable to Washington saying that he thought Chou sincerely wanted to end the Formosa crisis.⁴⁴

In the absence of Secretary Dulles, who was vacationing on Duck Island in Ontario, the first American response was framed by Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., in consultation with the President at his farm in Pennsylvania. The statement said that Chiang's Government would have to participate "as an equal in any discussion concerning the area." Then followed the usual demand for evidences of sincerity. Three steps were laid down which Communist China must take, if she was "sincere," that would "give evidence before the world of its good intentions."

The next day the Bandung Conference adjourned in harmony, after efforts to insert condemnation of Communist colonialism in the final communique had failed. Before adjournment Chou added to his previous statement the qualification that negotiations with the United States "should not in the slightest degree affect the just demand of the Chinese people to exercise their sovereign rights in liberating Taiwan."

For his part the Chinese Nationalist Foreign Minister denounced Peking as a "Soviet Puppet" and declared that he would "never sit at the same table" with its representatives. The State Department said on the 24th that it was up to Chou to make his proposal officially "through the diplomatic channels of a third country that has relations with the United States and Communist China." The Department was not going to be inveigled into speaking to China.⁴⁵

However, the powerful Senator George expressed the opinion that the United States should be willing to sit down and talk with Red China, even though Nationalist China might not be present. Since this opinion was general, a change of position on the part of the Department was necessary and at his press conference on the 26th Dulles was ready with a prepared statement representing the Bandung Conference as exercising a salutary influence on Red China, perhaps deterring her "from pursuing the course of violence" which had characterized her actions heretofore. He intended to try to find out now whether they were "sincere" or "merely playing a propaganda game." On three different occasions during the hour he indicated that we might talk to the Reds about a cease-fire, but about nothing else. The cease-fire was "the indispensable prerequisite to anything further." Since

⁴⁴ The *New York Times*, April 24; Drew Pearson, the *Nashville Tennessean*, May 4, 1955.

⁴⁵ The *New York Times*, April 25, 1955.

a cease-fire enabling Chiang to keep what he had was what we had wanted all along, this was equivalent to saying that Chinese surrender on the main point would be accepted.

The Dominance of the War Party Ended. The next day the President backed strongly the idea of talks with Peking and granted that the original rebuff had been an error. This brought "an immediate and blistering protest" from Senator Knowland, declaring that there was nothing in history to demonstrate that a communist pledge was "worth the paper it was written on." He let the inference stand that if the negotiations were carried out he would resign as majority leader in the Senate.

This was the exact moment when the strangle-hold of the Republican right wing on our foreign policy was broken. Ever since the issuance of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 the violence of this faction had largely dominated our policy, always driving it toward conflict with China, whether the President was Truman or Eisenhower. Now at last its grip on our policy was openly challenged. Due to the fact that the war party had badly over-reached itself in the Formosa Strait affair, and to the presence of a Democratic Congress and Senator George's leadership, the breaking point had come. Senator Knowland realized it as soon as he heard of the Department's reversal on negotiating with Chou. Showing himself "hard hit," Knowland absented himself "from most of his normal contacts overnight" and when the President backed negotiating with China the next day it was plain that there had been struck "a body blow to the whole Knowland school on foreign policy."⁴⁶

Predicting that this meant the surrender first of Quemoy and Matsu and then ultimately of Formosa and the Pescadores, Knowland complained that "they don't need a conference to bring about a cease-fire. All they need is to stop shooting and building up their aggressive forces in that area of the Formosa Straits."

This plaint epitomizes the state of mind which had dominated our policy for some eight years. Now just at the apex of its power, when it had driven the United States to the brink of a world war, Knowland saw that the game was up. China was not going to be forced by us to surrender control of her own harbors and coasts.

At last the President's natural desire to make peace in Europe, instead of war in Asia, was asserting itself. In his press conference on the 28th, at the very moment when he was turning his back on crushing China, he revealed that he had been in correspondence lately with his old wartime friend Soviet Marshal Zhukov, but he didn't say what was in the letters. Here was the President calmly revealing a fact that would have brought both the FBI and all the *witch-hunting agencies* down on any lesser citizen. And, worse still, he had the temerity to say that he had a "sixth-sense" feeling that the outlook for peace had brightened. This was treason to the Cold War itself, since its very life depended on keeping tension high, denying every evidence that the Communists could be "sincere" about anything.

⁴⁶ William S. White, the *New York Times*, April 23, 1955.

Seeing the drift, General Frank L. Howley assailed Eisenhower at once. One didn't "sit down with murderers" to negotiate. Talking of a future surprise H-bomb attack on us, Howley urged preventive war and "active steps" to overthrow the Communist regimes. We could "start right across the Formosa Strait at the appropriate time."⁴⁷

But this was not to be. The United States was not going to war to preserve centers for subversion and sabotage on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, at least not then. On May 7 the Chinese Nationalists were still sowing mines in Chinese waters to choke off shipping going to Foochow, but Chiang no longer had the war power of the United States close behind his snipings at the dragon. Dulles was still trying for a cease-fire by an exchange of diplomatic notes instead of direct talks with Peking, but Chou renewed his bid for direct talks, though rejecting the pre-requisite of a cease-fire.⁴⁸

By this time the Summit meeting of the Big Four heads of State was rapidly drawing attention away from war over Quemoy and Matsu in Asia to a major effort to begin the liquidation of the Cold War at Geneva in July.

Initiatives for Negotiation. Before the conference India's top negotiator, V. K. Krishna Menon, who travelled to Peking after the Bandung Conference, went on to Washington and had talks with Eisenhower and Dulles. Then on July 21, 1955, in the middle of the Summit Conference at Geneva, a dispatch from New Delhi said that Nehru and Eisenhower were exchanging messages on the possibility of American-Chinese negotiation, on the initiative of the former. It was understood that the President held that Chiang Kai-shek would have to be represented in any negotiations having to do with the disposition of territory. The President suggested that discussions between the Chinese and American Consuls General be held in Geneva and if these progressed they might be raised to a higher level.⁴⁹

However, from Washington, Thomas J. Hamilton reported that "there simply have not been any developments in United States' policy toward Peiping during all the months of the *de facto* cease-fire in the Formosa area," which was broken at that point by a heavy bombardment of Quemoy. The watchword of the State Department was "to let sleeping dogs lie." It was thought that if the United States decided to "tough it out" the seating of Red China in the UN could be prevented one more year, but probably not longer. If the UN did cease to recognize any connection between Chiang and China, "our legal and moral position would be seriously compromised."⁵⁰

On the same day, July 24, Senator George renewed his call for "face to face" negotiations. On a radio forum he declared his expectation of an acute flare-up in the Formosa Strait unless the United States indicated promptly its willingness to negotiate. However, he emphasized his disapproval of a UN seat for Peking.

Negotiations Accepted. On July 25, 1955, it was announced in Washington that talks on the ambassadorial level would begin in Geneva on August 1 to

⁴⁷ *The New York Times*, April 29, 1955.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, May 4, 17, June 11, 1955.

⁴⁹ A. M. Rosenthal, *the New York Times*, July 22, 23, 1955.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, July 24, 1955. The *Times* continued for many years to use Chiang's designation of Peking as Peiping.

discuss the release of the fliers held prisoner in China "and other practical matters." After talking with the President and Secretary Dulles, Senator Knowland announced that the agreement to talk did not mean "in the slightest" any change in our announced policy that we would not "negotiate on any questions affecting the Republic of China without their presence." In China the official news agency was saying that there was now "every reason to demand" that the questions of Formosa and Peiping's entry into the UN be settled by consultations "in accordance with the spirit of Geneva." In Washington, Senator George emerged from the same conference which Knowland attended confident that talks on the Foreign Minister level were on the way, though his thought "clearly went well beyond anything the State Department has in mind at present."⁵¹

The next day Dulles indicated in a highly qualified manner that he was prepared to meet with Chou. Dulles issued a statement recalling his demand for sincerity on April 23 and his intention announced on April 26 to find out whether the Chinese were "sincere" or "playing a propaganda game." Since then the "war-like activities" they had displayed "in relation to Yikiang" had not been resumed, and "the former belligerent Communist propaganda about Taiwan and against the United States had been somewhat subdued." So perhaps there could be some talks.

"No-force" Advocated by Dulles. In the same statement he elaborated a "no-force" doctrine. All of our military assistance agreements specified that there was to be no aggression. We did not intend to recover North Korea by force, or North Vietnam. In Germany, Chancellor Adenauer had abjured force for the recovery of East Germany. He hoped now to find out whether the Chinese Communists would agree to accept a cease-fire "in accordance with the United Nations principle of avoiding any use or threat of force which could disturb the peace of nations."⁵²

Obviously this "no-force" doctrine would leave Formosa, if not Quemoy and Matsu, safely in Chiang's hands, and in Indo-China it would enable Diem to refuse the 1956 election without having to fight Ho's superior army.

This sudden addiction to pacific measures was a far cry from the Dullesian thunders of February and March. In his statement of April 26 there was only one implied threat of war and it was mildly put. The good feeling generated at the Summit Conference, the worsened military situation in the Formosa area and the pressure of the conservative Senate Democrats all combined to push Mr. Dulles reluctantly to negotiate instead of threaten, though Dulles was understood to have been "more hesitant than the President," who on July 27 seemed to accept a foreign ministers' meeting as a logical development.⁵³

On July 28 Joseph Alsop reported that during his visit to Washington Krishna Menon had given a flat notice that an all-out attack on Quemoy and Matsu would begin a few days after the Summit meeting, if agreement to negotiate had not been reached in the meantime. There had been a great deal

⁵¹ *The New York Times*, July 26, 1955.

⁵² *Ibid.*, July 27, 1955.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, July 27, 28, 1955.

of debate about whether to accept the warning, but "the plain truth is, of course, that after many months of bluffing and big bold talk, the administration has had to choose between a surrender that is all the more humiliating because of its background, or a very serious risk of war which the administration is altogether unprepared to fight."

In the months of apparent lull, said Alsop, the balance of forces in the Pacific had deteriorated very greatly. The main body of the extremely strong Chinese air force had been deployed southward and the air fields were all ready, either to take Quemoy-Matsu or to starve them out by an air blockade.

It seemed too bad, concluded Alsop, that a little more thought was not given to the future before Chiang was unleashed and pressured to occupy the off-shore islands in heavy force.⁵⁴

The negotiations which began in Geneva on August 1 went very slowly and reached an impasse on the subject of Formosa.

On January 18, 1956, the Chinese delegation in Geneva released a long statement about the deadlocked talks, in which the Chinese position was firmly maintained that the disposition of Formosa was an internal matter. Any suggestion that China "give up its sovereign right to liberate Taiwan" was "absolutely unacceptable to China."

Several texts of "no-force" pledges submitted by the two sides were included in the statement, the American drafts centering on no force for the capture of Formosa by China and the Chinese drafts concentrating on settling disputes between the United States and China by peaceful means, in accord with paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 2 in the UN Charter. China refused "absolutely" to accept the American position that the United States has an "inherent right of individual and collective self-defense" in the Formosa area.

Referring to the famous article in *Life* about Secretary Dulles' "brink of war" diplomacy, the statement affirmed that threats of atomic war would never "frighten the Chinese people into giving up their own sovereign rights."⁵⁵

The United States' version of the deadlocked talks, issued on January 21, insisted that the United States was "not occupying Taiwan, and Taiwan has never been a part of Communist China." However, "the United States has rights and responsibilities in the Taiwan area; also it has a mutual defense treaty. Accordingly it is present in the Taiwan area."

State Department officials summarized Peking's goals as: the abandonment of the Chinese Nationalists by the United States and nullification of its mutual defense treaty with Chiang Kai-shek; the withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet and the military assistance mission from Taiwan.⁵⁶

This interpretation was fully sustained in a statement by an official of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking on January 24, 1956, that his

⁵⁴ The *Nashville Tennessean*, July 28, 1955. In Saigon, a mass demonstration against the Geneva truce accords pillaged and wrecked two leading hotels occupied by Americans, injuring sixty people. In Bangkok, meetings of the SEATO military advisers were characterized by apathy, an unwillingness to mention Communism or China and a feeling of relaxation.—The *New York Times*, July 9, 12, 21, 1955.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, January 19, 1956.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, January 22, 1956.

government had "succeeded to China's entire territory and sovereignty." The relations of "the new China with the Chiang Kai-shek clique" were a domestic matter which China would strive to settle by peaceful means when it was possible, but the United States had "no right whatsoever to interfere." The U.S.-Nationalist defense treaty was an infringement on "China's sovereignty."⁵⁷

In January 1956 the basic situation in the Formosa Strait was accordingly what it was in January 1955, when the United States went to the extreme length of vesting in the President a blank check for war in the Formosa area, even for Quemoy, at any time he saw fit.

SOME CONTINUING QUESTIONS

In looking back over the Formosa Strait war scare, with its sudden emergency action of the most solemn and drastic character, and its acute crisis and total deadlock nature leading to world-wide alarm of imminent war, several questions rise strongly.

1. *Why was crisis action decided upon between January 19 and 21, 1955?*

The capture of Yikiang on January 18 was dismissed by Dulles as "without any particular importance." At his press conference on the 19th the President wrote off the Tachen Islands altogether. But two days later, on the 21st, Congressional leaders were summoned to the White House to be briefed by Dulles and Radford on a world war if necessary to halt the advancing Red Chinese. What caused this dramatic and highly combustible shift within 48 hours?

No Military Emergency. It was not due to any military emergency. The Chinese Reds captured the Kao Tao Islands in May 1954 and Toumen Island, north of the Tachens, in June. Then it was seven months before they were ready to take Yikiang, January 18, 1955. This put them in position to attack Upper Tachen Island, perhaps months later. At this rate it would be a long time before the major operation of an attack on Formosa could be undertaken.⁵⁸

Correspondents who covered the Pentagon reported that there was no evidence of any immediate assault on the Tachens or any Nationalist-held island. Senator George also said in a radio interview early in February that "it may be several years" before the Chinese would "actually begin an operation" looking to the capture of Formosa.⁵⁹

However, on January 2, 1955, the *New York Times* "Week in Review" reported "a week of multiplying signs that the Chinese Communist regime was making progress toward playing the large role in Asia toward which it aspires."

One of several developments pointing in this direction was the visit to

⁵⁷ The *New York Times*, January 25, 1956.

⁵⁸ Walter Simmons, from Formosa, the *Chicago Tribune*, February 2, 1955.

⁵⁹ John G. Norris, the *Washington Post*, January 26; Greg MacGregor, the *New York Times*, January 27; *Washington Evening Star*, January 30, 1955. These citations are from a keen article in *I. F. Stone's Weekly*, February 14, 1955, "The Inner Politics of a False Alarm."

Peking of Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General of the United Nations, who was in Peking on a mission to obtain the release of eleven American airmen who had fallen into Chinese hands during the Korean war and were being held as hostages in China under charges of espionage. This was the kind of incident which stirs heat, but since war could not be made about it in the nuclear age the United Nations had been asked to obtain their release. Then, to Washington's surprise and disappointment, the Secretary General decided to go to Peking himself and see what he could do.

This decision offended all the cold warriors, since it was an effective kind of recognition of the unrecognized China which was still being denied its seat in the United Nations Security Council. Nevertheless he went, consulting UN leaders around the globe on the way, and held several conferences with Chou En-lai in Peking. While he was en route, Soviet Premier Malenkov proposed, on January 1, a conference to negotiate solutions of problems in the Far East, which was "brushed off" by Washington with "a chilling reply." A Japanese election was also in progress, with the resumption of relations with China a hot issue.⁶⁰

The Formosa Treaty Questioned. On January 12 two developments occurred, both unfavorable to the Dulles-Radford school in the Cold War. A United Nations spokesman said that Hammarskjold had "made progress" in bringing about the release of the airmen, and a memorandum by the Democratic National Committee was circulated to Democratic Senators questioning the wisdom of the Dulles-Chiang treaty which had been signed on December 2, 1954, guaranteeing Formosa against China. The memo supported keeping Formosa and the Pescadores in friendly hands and defending them, but it did take the line that the treaty would constitute formal recognition that these islands were territories of the Republic of China and so subject to conquest as a part of the Chinese Civil war. Therefore United Nations action was urged to separate the islands from the mainland legally, through a UN cease-fire arrangement. What we recognized as part of Chiang's China, the memo warned, was likely to be recognized by other governments as part of Mao's China.

This document, the work of several foreign affairs experts, pointed out that we might well want to consider an independent status for Formosa, which would be foreclosed by the proposed treaty. It also questioned the value or legality of any restraints upon Chiang not to attack the mainland. It "would be very awkward by treaty to impose restraints on the exercise of sovereign rights in China proper by any government claiming to be the lawful government of all China."

This analysis made it clear that the legal basis for the Dulles-Chiang treaty was very muddy indeed, from the standpoint of keeping Formosa out of China's hands. Though the treaty had been cleared by Senator George before it was signed, this new development surprised and alarmed the State Department, foreshadowing trouble in the Senate on ratification, at the same time that peaceful progress was being made toward the liberation of the airmen.

⁶⁰ Walter H. Waggoner, *the New York Times*, January 2, 1955.

The treaty guaranteeing Formosa to the Republic of China, that is, Chiang's exiled regime, was one of the products of right wing Republican dominance of our foreign policy. No basic American interest demanded such a risky commitment, but, said a writer in *The Reporter*, the Eisenhower Administration needed "a treaty with the fire-eating wing of the Republican Party," which had the power to compel its signature. The same observer correctly predicted early in January, 1955, that if the treaty were ratified we would have "sealed ourselves in a puzzle box and thrown away the key." If there was war in the Formosa Strait, the treaty would block us from getting any help from our Allies through the UN. If there was peace it would give the Reds a better claim to Formosa than they could have thought up themselves.⁶¹

These criticisms of the treaty were so valid that it was a serious thing for the Dulles-Radford team to have the same points raised by the Democratic memo, at the moment when the matter of the imprisoned airmen was moving toward solution. To offset these developments Admiral Radford issued a statement on the same day, January 12, reviving his idea of an Allied blockade of the Chinese coast if milder measures failed to bring about the release of the airmen, and Dulles made a war-like speech on peace at a Y.W.C.A. dinner. The first half of the speech was a long attack upon the "fanatical" Communists, practitioners of coercion, "propaganda, subversion and menaces," who had "so tarnished and so besmirched" the word peace that "in their mouths, and in the mouths who parrot them" the word had become "scarcely recognizable."⁶²

Visits to the Imprisoned Airmen? Back from Peking, Hammarskjold brought really alarming news, from the standpoint of keeping tension high. Chou stressed the threat of an American inspired invasion of China and wanted to negotiate directly with the United States. But worse still, on January 21 it was announced simultaneously at UN headquarters in New York and in Peking that China was inviting the families of the imprisoned fliers to visit the men in China. This was in accord with a "positive, cut and dried commitment" made by Chou to the Secretary General that if the families came the airmen would be released to go home with them.⁶³

Such an ending to an emotional crisis was instantly frowned upon by the State Department. Though "clearly reluctant to deny the interested families passports," the Department first sought to dissuade the relatives from going and then when the American Red Cross offered to provide them with supplemental financial assistance and some of them wanted to go, on January 21, the gathering sentiment for their going was squelched by the President's war powers message, the decision for which was made in the two days during which the proposal for the visit of relatives to China was made, with Hammarskjold quoted as having no doubt of the visitors' safety.⁶⁴

Letters were sent off by Mr. Dulles to the relatives explaining that because of the "increasingly belligerent attitude of China," passports would be

⁶¹ Harlan Cleveland, "Troubled Waters: The Formosa Strait," *The Reporter*, January 13, 1955, p. 10.

⁶² *The New York Times*, January 12, 1955.

⁶³ Joseph Alsop, the *Nashville Tennessean*, August 5, 1955.

⁶⁴ *The New York Times*, January 22, 1955.

denied. Suggesting that the relatives too might be seized, Dulles wrote to them that "in the best interests of peace, we do not think it prudent to afford the Chinese Communists further opportunities to provoke our nation and strain its patience further."⁶⁵

Hammarkjold had indicated on January 14 that the eleven fliers would be released if tension lessened, and after an hour's talk with him Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the UN, was confident they would be released. Lodge briefed Dulles on the situation on the evening of the 13th. The Secretary General observed that "all problems of this type are much more easily solved in a less frozen atmosphere than the present one."⁶⁶

Massive Retaliation Preview. For his part Secretary Dulles was determined to keep the atmosphere frozen. The trend of his thinking was revealed by a sudden announcement on the same day, the 14th, that he was on his way to Omaha, Nebraska, for a briefing at the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command, the nerve center of our world-wide network of atomic bomb bases. The trip had been projected, with the date indefinite, some weeks before and Mr. Dulles decided that now was the time to go, but others thought differently. Just after hopeful announcements had been made easing the prisoner of war situation it did not seem to be the time to study "massive retaliation" intensively. Even "some Department officials up to the last minute sought to dissuade the Secretary from going at this time, lest the trip be misunderstood," but he went nevertheless, knowing full well that he would be frustrating the lessening of tension for which the Secretary General asked.

The news of his trip "bewildered much of Washington for hours." The "foreign press especially seemed aghast." To some it looked like a deliberate "affront to the United Nations," and Department press officers and the White House were "bombarded with questions."

Then to calm the furore President Eisenhower conferred with Dulles in Omaha by telephone and issued a statement saying that calmness must be maintained about the imprisoned airmen. Refraining from the expression of feelings and thoughts of reprisal would not be easy, but it must be done. The nation owed it to its airmen to maintain discipline. "We must have faith in the community of nations and in the tremendous influence of world opinion."⁶⁷

This statement corrected the impression of an intended affront to the UN and it kept the obstinate and provocative flight of Dulles to Omaha from inflaming American public opinion, but no pacifically inclined president should be compelled to issue statements like that behind a belligerent secretary of state, one who was willing to rattle the H-bombs on any occasion, as casually as his predecessors might have contemplated sending a warship to some obstreperous port. There is something appallingly immature about threats to turn loose the city and nation killers to accomplish some minor diplomatic objective, such as the holding of an island in one of China's harbors.

Holding Formosa. The staging of a great war crisis early in 1955 accomplished two things which were important to the right wing war party: China was

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, January 28, 1955; I. F. Stone, *supra*.

⁶⁶ *The New York Times*, January 15, 1955.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

prevented from releasing the fliers under conditions which would have eased tension, and what could have been a serious revolt against the Dulles-Chiang guarantee treaty was forestalled. These were important by-products of an intense, sudden heightening of tension.

However, it is difficult to believe that President Eisenhower would have permitted himself to be mobilized for a grave war crisis to attain either of these objectives, or both. It is more probable that by January 19 the Pentagon had persuaded the President that the workmanlike amphibious assault of the Chinese Reds on Yikiang clearly indicated a continued conquest of all of the off-shore islands, one by one, after which the turn of the Pescadores and Formosa would come—years later, but in very unfavorable psychological circumstances. Since Formosa was a very attractive position to virtually all navy, air and army men, it was therefore better to make a firm stand at the very beginning and leave no doubts in any mind that Formosa was a part of the Pacific island chain of American defenses and would be held as such.

Thomas J. Hamilton wrote in the *New York Times* on December 5, 1954, before the crisis, that the Pentagon's conviction was firm "that whatever happens the Communists must not gain control of Formosa."

This was an argument which Eisenhower as a military man could accept, especially since it might get him off the embarrassing hook of the off-shore islands, where he had allowed Radford to persuade him to "unleash" Chiang and then to pressure him to occupy the isles in heavy force. Obviously Chiang now had to be leashed again from the "conquest" of China, but the Generalissimo is a very stubborn man, quite capable of sacrificing the cream of his forces on the off-shore islands in an effort to draw the United States emotionally into a full-scale war with China. It was well known that he had no future unless the United States would smash China, if possible, in another world war, returning him to the mainland. If his forces were being decimated on the isles American war fever, fanned by the war party, might rise to his aid.

These were considerations which could appeal to Eisenhower, when strongly pressed both by his military associates and by his determined Secretary of State. It is difficult to think of any other rational processes which could have persuaded him to embark on such a great and cloudy gamble in Chinese waters.

2. *Is Formosa essential to the defense of the United States?*

Nor was it strange that Eisenhower should be persuaded that Formosa was really essential to our defense. The most remarkable feature of the entire crisis was the near-unanimity with which all Americans agreed that of course Formosa and the Pescadores must be held. Virtually all of the liberal Senators who tried to oppose the Formosa resolution united in saying that Formosa must be defended. The liberal Americans for Democratic Action said the same. There was at first muted and then rising protest against the absurdity of fighting for Quemoy and Matsu, and doubtless many Americans privately held the same opinion about war for Formosa, but only a very few private citizens ventured to question the national dogma that Formosa must be retained.

By this time the MacArthur dictum that if Formosa were lost everything back to the California coast would be lost had become national policy. Yet obviously such an oceanic Red sweep was most unlikely. Island stepping is not a one-way street. There are many islands in the Pacific and the burdens of logistics would not all fall on the defending Americans. It would be strange indeed if with our tremendous naval and air power we could not hold our share of the islands in the Pacific in any foreseeable war.

This was not really feared. What was desired was to perpetuate American control of the entire Pacific Ocean, even into the mouths of Chinese harbors. It was a very comfortable situation for us to have the world's greatest ocean an American lake, but it was also an unrealistic one. As Russia and China grew in strength, and Japan in independence, they would inevitably assert their fair share in the control of the Pacific, from their side of the ocean.

This is apparent when our strategic claims to Formosa are examined more closely. It is said that it is a very important island, that it controls passage up and down East Asia, and that the Philippines were attacked from it in 1940 and could be again. That China would exercise some control over her own coastal waters from Formosa is evident, a control which would injure no one in time of peace. If war came, Formosa in Chinese hands would be a "threat" to the Philippines, 230 miles away, just as the great American air base at Clark Field, near Manila, with its new town of 7000 is now the main defense of Formosa, and would be a threat to it in Chinese hands.⁶⁸ Yet Formosa was by-passed by us in winning World War II and the Philippines could be attacked from the China mainland as well as from Formosa. Nor would the seizure of the Philippines be a practical proposition for China for decades, even if she could amass the great naval strength essential for an island hopping war.

After his months of observation in the Far East, Joseph Alsop came to the conclusion that "it may be heresy to say so, but this country and the free world could well afford to lose Formosa if we could be sure of losing nothing further." Earlier, at the start of the crisis, Hanson W. Baldwin had concluded that "in a military sense the island is important but not vital to the United States and to our position in the Western Pacific and Eastern Asia." Its real importance was political and psychological.⁶⁹

Any other conclusion about the essentiality of Formosa to our defense would seem untenable. If it were essential to our defense then Cuba would be essential to the defense of the Soviet Union, and Catalina Island, off Los Angeles, to the defense of China.

3. *Did the United States have important and legitimate interests in Formosa?*

Our emotional interest is obvious. We went to war with Japan to prevent her domination of China. We sought all during the war to build up China into a great friendly power. We backed Chiang against the Chinese Communists. They humiliated us deeply in the Korean war and in backing Ho Chi Minh to victory in North Indo-China.

⁶⁸ The *New York Times*, July 31, 1955.

⁶⁹ The *Nashville Tennessean*, June 10; the *New York Times*, February 1, 1955.

Legally and morally we had a right to a voice in the disposition of Formosa. It was our military power which freed it from Japan. She had renounced title to it in the Japanese peace treaty. We had no right to use it as a springboard for the reconquest of China for Chiang, but we did have a right to insist that, after our war with China in Korea the island should not at once fall into her hostile hands. The temporary neutralization of Formosa was justifiable.

On the practical side, about a million upper class refugees from Red China and a half million mainland troops were on Formosa. In the climate of the time it was easy for us to believe that they would be massacred if the Reds took the island, though it was more probable that only a small part of the leaders would be dealt with drastically. In any event no country was prepared to evacuate and receive any considerable part of this great body of refugees. After unleashing Chiang to bait China, under our protection, honor would hardly permit his forcible suppression.

There was also the usual fear of galloping Communism, the fear that if Formosa fell to Communism the Chinese in South East Asia would go over to Peking, carrying that region with them. Then India, the Middle East, Africa and Europe—all would go. There is also some danger in any increase in Communist held territory. The older generations of the overseas Chinese were already rich, having no love for Communism, but their sons were already flocking through Hong Kong to Red China for education and jobs.

The idea that a second China could be maintained was an illusion. Joseph Alsop saw the drift when he wrote: "Two Chinas, one small and in the process of withering away, the other vast and growing stronger month by month, are thus to be recognized."⁷⁰

There is only one China and since most of the world believed Formosa to be a part of it there was no built-in disaster involved in recognizing the inevitable and standing aside from the Chinese civil war, as Truman did steadfastly in the first half of 1950, until the Korean war led him to neutralize Formosa.

After the rash and abortive "unleashing" of Chiang, this could not be done again. After the Communist victory in North Indo-China, which we were powerless to prevent, the problem became one of disengagement, a process which would have to proceed gradually.

As it proceeds it is well to remember that the interests of China in Formosa are far deeper than ours. Its people are unquestionably Chinese. To all Chinese—on both sides of the civil war—it is a part of China. It is also essential to the "defense" of China, if she is to have any independence in her home waters. In 1955 and thereafter its bombing and blockading of the mother country was an intolerable humiliation such as no people could accept permanently. But, above all, Formosa was also the fortress of counter-revolution, bent on the destruction of a great and proud revolution, and backed by the world's strongest foreign power.

These interests make it impossible for China to cease striving to recover Formosa. No amount of "no-force" argument will seem valid to the Chinese, and no cease-fire can be accepted unless it provides for the return of Formosa to China within a reasonable time. Otherwise China will industrialize and

⁷⁰ *The Nashville Tennessean*, February 8, 1955.

arm until she is surely capable of overwhelming the island. She might have to wait a considerable period, but she could not continue to grow in strength as a great power and fail to assert her sovereignty over Formosa.

Since China had all the advantages of geography, and also the basic sympathy of the vast bulk of the Asians, the American position on Formosa was untenable from the close of the war for North Indo-China. This was so clear that the war party was fully justified, from the standpoint of its deep frustrations, in seeking to bring about the crushing of China in 1955 or 1956, while there was still time.

That effort failed, leaving the problem of disengagement from Formosa more acute than ever.

4. *Is a pacific solution possible?*

In early 1955 the answer would have had to be no. After the opening of negotiations on August 1, the possibility emerged. The Chinese cannot take Formosa for several years, at least, during which time it should be possible to give the Formosans self-government temporarily under a United Nations trusteeship. Such a solution would involve the elimination of Chiang Kai-shek from power, along with his ruthless son, Chiang Ching Kuo, who is believed to be his unconditional heir, and who rules with an iron hand through the secret police. It was he who was responsible for the resignation and flight to this country in 1952 of K. C. Wu, one of the few incorruptible Nationalists, who won praise from every observer as civil governor of Formosa. From Evanston, Illinois, Wu charged that all the worst features of Kuomintang misrule had been established in a Formosan police state operated by the Chiangs.⁷¹

Obviously we cannot afford to defend a dynasty of this character, nor can we do so indefinitely. As Walter Lippmann indicated on August 7, 1955, the Formosa crisis eliminated Chiang as a contender for power on the mainland, "after the President had over-ruled and put down Chiang's American supporters," removing from his homesick followers all hope of returning to China by force, and leaving only the possibility of going home by accepting the regime in China and making deals with it.⁷²

The probable withering of the Chiang regime, or its collapse, would therefore leave us with the choice of taking over Formosa directly or seeing it pass into China's "unfriendly hands." To prevent this the United States should propose a ten-year trusteeship by the United Nations during which Formosa would be neutralized and demilitarized, and after which the island would revert to China.

This solution would preserve all legitimate American interests in the island, allowing time for Chiang and his aging courtiers to be gathered to their

⁷¹ Dorothy Thompson, the *Toronto Globe and Mail*, February 21, 1955; "What's Happening on Formosa?" the *Christian Century*, March 31, 1954. A reporter on Formosa observed that the native Formosans join in singing with great fervor the song "Back to the Mainland," which is sung daily in the central square in Taipei, "because they can hardly wait to see their unwanted guests returning whence they came."—Richard Scott, the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, April 7, 1955.

⁷² The *Nashville Tennessean*, August 7, 1955.

fathers or to seek asylum elsewhere. If accompanied by the recognition of the Peking Government by the United States and her seating in the United Nations Security Council, steps which cannot be long delayed if there is to be any peace in the Orient, China might well accept that transitional solution.

As Nathaniel Peffer observed late in 1954, no Chinese government, of any color, will ever agree to the permanent alienation of Formosa. To insist upon it would mean that peace would never be made. Also, he continued, "there is something incongruous if not preposterous in a nation numbering one-fifth of the population of the world being represented in the world organization by an evicted rump taking shelter behind American warships on an island off the continent inhabited by that nation."⁷³

In mid-1955 the United States was in an untenable and incongruous position on Formosa, and wisdom required both realistic negotiations and the help of the United Nations to extricate us from that position. A UN trusteeship, administered by neutral states, would not only liquidate the Chiang regime, but offer an excellent chance of agreed autonomy for Formosa in the new China.

Some way had to be found to break our shackles to the remnant of a dead past in Formosa. How shackled we were was pungently described by Peffer as follows:

"Never was a great power bound by shackles of its own making as this country is at present in its relations with the Far East. We cannot go forward; we cannot go back; it is uncomfortable and dangerous to stay where we are. We get relief in petulance, in recrimination, in wild but futile threats, and in self-flagellation in the form of proscription of any American who does not believe that Communist China is the principle of evil and Chiang Kai-shek the avatar of liberty. As a result American dignity has been lowered in the eyes of the world, and we are as much isolated as we were in 1920."⁷⁴

These words, written before the great Formosa crisis, all became more deeply and sadly true during it. We emerged from it more alone and more distrusted and feared, the world over, than we had ever been before.

Fortunately we did break the grip of the war party on our policy in March 1955. Then the Bandung Conference broke the dangerous tension and the exigencies of the British election in May necessitated the holding at last of the Big Four Summit Conference in July, which opened the way for us to negotiate ourselves out of the Cold War itself, including our Formosan Dienbienphu.

⁷³ Nathaniel Peffer, "Our Asian Policy: Part Blunder, Part Thunder," *The Nation*, December 11, 1954, p. 505.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 404.

THE FIRST SUMMIT CONFERENCE

JULY 1955

THE United States was impelled to go to the July 1955 Summit Conference of the Heads of State by two long range considerations and two short time needs.

1. *To escape from the Formosa crisis.*

The need to get away from balancing on the brink of atomic war in the Formosa Strait was urgent and immediate. Tension over Formosa could not be maintained at fever pitch without going over into war, and fortunately the Carney briefing on March 25 precipitated a decision against war. Then the idea of a four power conference supplied a means of moving away from the brink and toward peace.

Senator George had already proposed a Big Four parley to prevent war, on March 20, and on the 23rd, at his news conference, the President endorsed preparatory talks for such a conference, to see if the Russians meant business. The way was already prepared, therefore, before the Carney affair climaxed the Formosa crisis. Arthur Krock wrote later that it was George's "public endorsement of the Churchill proposal for a Four Power conference by the heads of states that broke down the President's opposition to a meeting at the summit."¹

2. *To win the British election.*

The second short term reason for the conference was the necessity of winning an election for the British Conservatives. Prime Minister Winston Churchill was the first among the Western leaders to see that the Cold War had reached an impasse and must be called off. He made this clear in his famous address of May 11, 1953, calling for a meeting of the leaders "at the summit."

For two full years he continued intermittently to advocate such a meeting, but the opposition of Washington and of his own foreign office, coupled with a serious illness and advancing age, defeated him. He convinced Britain and most of West Europe that the meeting should be held, but he was not allowed to call it. Finally, on April 5, 1955, he resigned in favor of Anthony Eden and the conference became imperative, since Eden desired an immediate election, while the economic situation was favorable. On May 6 the election was set for May 26.

¹ The *New York Times*, June 19, 1955.

Chalmers M. Roberts, diplomatic correspondent of the *Washington Post*, stated, on November 18, 1955, that "a major factor behind Eisenhower's approach to the Soviets last July had been the nearness of atomic war with China."

The one thing which could easily defeat Eden was popular frustration over the long delay in meeting the Russians "at the summit." For two years the Labor opposition had been loudly supporting Churchill's call. Now if it were further delayed they could win the election on that one point, since all Britons knew that avoiding a nuclear war was a matter of life and death to them. Eden was respected but he did not have Churchill's stature, the parliamentary division was very close, and Churchill himself was the leading advocate of a summit meeting.

This was the situation when Dulles went to the Paris meeting which ushered West Germany into NATO, on May 6, bringing a decision by the Soviet Union, on May 8, to denounce her treaties of mutual assistance with France and Britain. Dulles had authority from the President to decide either for a foreign ministers conference, which Dulles favored, or a summit meeting, which he did not want. However, the prospect of a Socialist government in London, with a strong neutralist left wing, was still worse. Accordingly, Harold Callender reported from Paris on May 10 that "the United States appeared to be moving, slowly and reluctantly but inevitably, toward the British-French proposal for a conference with the Soviet Union." Analyzing our reluctance, James Reston noted our preference for a foreign ministers meeting, but found Washington officials reasoning that we had now arrived at those "positions of strength" that had been our objective for years.²

On the same day the Western powers sent the Soviet Union an invitation to summit talks, and President Eisenhower said that he would go anywhere to promote peace.

The British election was held on May 26 and it revealed a swing to the Conservatives of about 2 per cent, giving them 49.8 per cent of the popular vote and 346 seats in the Commons to Labor's 277. In his last appeal to the nation Eden stressed the coming negotiations, saying that he would be ready to attend a second parley if necessary and was looking forward to talks "at every level."

In its review of the results, the *New York Times* noted that the Conservatives had managed to establish their claim as the most effective instrument of peace, citing Eden's active role in settling the Indo-China war. "But they got their biggest help on this issue from Washington when the Eisenhower Administration at the outset of the campaign suddenly agreed to the summit meeting which Sir Anthony had been urging."³

3. *To end the world-wide fear of atomic death in a war for which the United States might be responsible.*

The British electoral time-table forced a decision to hold the summit conference, but our long-term need to prove to the world that we were not bent on an atomic world war was insistent, and it was cumulative.

The danger that the Truman Administration would expand the Korean war into a world war had kept the world on tenterhooks for many months, and

² *The New York Times*, May 10, 1955.

³ "The News of the Week in Review," May 29, 1955. Drew Pearson said that the conference was "sold" to Dulles "only because Eden was worried sick that he might lose the British elections."—*The Nashville Tennessean*, July 17, 1955.

made neutralism grow by leaps and bounds. After a long tour through Europe, Hanson W. Baldwin reported that "Europe simply does not take the threat of imminent war as seriously as the United States does," and there was "also some deep worry about what the Europeans think of our United States political immaturity and hastiness." He had found short term optimism but long term pessimism about NATO's military effectiveness.⁴

Then the Eisenhower Administration came in, early in 1953, talking about "liberating" East Europe, and for several months there was talk of blockading China which alarmed our allies. The *Washington Star* reported, on March 1, 1953, "a widespread feeling that our position vis-à-vis Red China is really an engagement in World War III."

The year 1954 opened with ominous announcement of a new policy of instant and massive retaliation at times and places of our own choosing, without any prior consultation with our allies. The deep disquiet thus created was increased by the official admission on April 1, that our H-bomb explosion of March 1 could have wiped out any city, however large. No defense was possible. Nor did there appear to be any defense against the deadly mushrooming of McCarthyism, that "most frightening" readiness to sacrifice traditional values to fears of communism, as George Kennan defined it. To our allies it seemed that our fears and hates might "plunge the world into war with Russia through an overwhelming urge to crush communism everywhere."⁵ This urge, said Sir Oliver Franks, recently British Ambassador to the United States, contributed to "a widespread fear that the Americans would get the United Kingdom and others into a third world war."⁶

Then, as both the atomic horror and the dread of McCarthyism spread around the world, Mr. Dulles filled the news for several weeks with threats of intervention in Indo-China and the firmest efforts of our allies were required to prevent him from blocking the making of peace.

The first half of 1955 was filled with the "brink of war" Formosa crisis, in which all American bridges were burned and the world held in Dullesian suspense for months with threats of A-bombing China for Formosa, and maybe for Quemoy. By that time Drew Middleton could report from Europe that "many Europeans feel some Americans would be willing to see Europe destroyed if Russia fell in the process." There were "few signs that they recognize any American spiritual leadership."⁷

By May 1955 the prospect of living always under the threat of being burned to death, in one way or another, in a hydrogen war which might erupt over a Chinese island, or anything else, had become intolerable to the vast bulk of the world's peoples. By this time, also, it had become urgently necessary for us to purge ourselves of the deep suspicion of the world's peoples that our impetuosity, if not our hates, would plunge the world into its last death throes.

This was the third and insistent reason for inviting the Russians to the summit conference.

⁴ The *New York Times*, January 12, 13, 1953.

⁵ John M. Hightower, the *Nashville Tennessean*, November 21, 1954.

⁶ The *New York Times*, November 22, 1954. ⁷ *Ibid*, May 8, 1955.

4. *The development of a stalemate in the atomic arms race.*

This was the final compulsion which made it imperative for the President to meet Bulganin at Geneva.

The atomic deadlock was slow in developing and the urge of our cold warriors for a preventive war had to be worn down before a summit conference could succeed. The two processes proceeded simultaneously until the balance of forces swung over to negotiation in April and May 1955.

The active policy makers in the Eisenhower Administration started out as committed as their predecessors were to "winning" the Cold War. Ferdinand Kuhn reported in the *Washington Post* on January 20, 1953, that the Republicans were no more willing "to let Soviet power stay where it is, in Europe or in Asia."

"Roll back" was the aim. Dulles demanded positive fealty from his aides "to win the cold war." Reversing the Truman Doctrine principle, he aimed at defeating the "encirclement" of the United States by the Reds. What the Democrats had not been able to do would now be done by the Republicans under a new nomenclature. Dorothy Thompson commented that apparently our opponents were expected to "assume the role of a defeated nation, without our having to impose that role on them by force."⁸

Pressure for Peace. Stalin died on March 6 and Malenkov won "strong and stormy applause" from the Supreme Soviet by offering to settle all tensions with the United States by peaceful means. President Eisenhower declared that no effort at conciliation would be met less than half way, but UN delegates feared that the tough speeches of Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., might convince people that the United States was "spoiling for a fight." Reston commented on our fear of peace in Korea. Pentagon officials thought the communists would gain more by ending hostilities.⁹

On May 11, 1953, Churchill made his famous call to the summit, to work out an East-West accord—surely a strategic moment if there ever was one, while the new Soviet leaders were highly uncertain and anxious to negotiate—but Americans had not "accustomed themselves to the fact that a nation of the size and power of the Soviet Union constitutes a problem with which they will have to live for centuries."¹⁰ The golden moment was lost. If the Soviets were uncertain, that was thought to be the very time to press on with the Cold War. On May 20 Vice President Nixon was advocating a roll back of Soviet power before the Business Advisory Council, to prevent the Kremlin from paralyzing our policy two or three years later, when they had attained the power to destroy us. American policy makers turned "publicly pale" whenever someone, like Churchill, proposed negotiations with the Russians about Germany, so that we looked to many Europeans "like the apostles of a divided Germany and a continued cold war."¹¹

⁸ The *New York Times*, January 23, 28; *Washington Star*, March 3, 1953.

⁹ The *New York Times*, March 15, 16, 17, 20, April 1, 3; the *Nashville Tennessean* April 15, 1953.

¹⁰ Thomas J. Hamilton, the *New York Times*, April 12, 1953.

¹¹ The *Abops*, the *Nashville Tennessean*, May 20, August 31, 1953.

When a conference about Germany finally met on January 26, 1954, it had been preceded two weeks earlier by the announcement of our massive retaliation policy and it accomplished nothing, except to demonstrate that the Russians had stiffened and that a balance of armed power had arrived.¹² Then the deep frustration of the Indo-China war gave rise to more preventive war talk. Pentagon strategists calculated also that the strategic balance was turning against us, in long range bombers and guided missiles.¹³ Admiral Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, declared that the United States would soon have to face "a fight to the finish with Russia."¹⁴

The fact that an armed stalemate was at hand could not be accepted. American belief in the inefficiency of the communist system, along with its wickedness, was ingrained. Our belief that anything which is desirable is also possible was even more strongly held. We wanted to win "positions of strength" from which to negotiate the Russians out of Germany and East Europe, so of course we would do it.

But the rapid growth of neutralism was now being reinforced by a strong domestic force, the Republican desire to balance the budget and enjoy the fruits of capitalism. This desire was embodied in the personalities of Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey, the strongest man in the Administration, and in Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson. Both understood that we either had to reduce our world commitments, and ambitions, or go all-out into a war economy—and war. Both preferred to move, if only gradually, in the direction of retrenchment and peace. Wilson consistently restrained the bellicosity of the military men. He was the first Secretary of Defense in many years who was not awed by them. "War," he said, on June 8, 1954, "is no solution." Only truth could prevail over the Reds. His utterances were always on the side of soberness and seeing the opponent's viewpoint.

President Eisenhower's instincts were also on the side of peace and accepting the results of World War II, but he was handicapped for two years by a right wing Republican Congress headed by Senators Taft, Knowland, Bridges and McCarthy. After General Mark W. Clark had advised the United States to reshape the United Nations to fight the Russians and to sever relations with them, the President rejected such a course the next day, August 11, 1954, and barred a preventive war. But on September 5, Senator Knowland was urging a break with Russia. However, Eisenhower had the courage to say, on October 20, that an atomic war would nearly ruin the world. There could be no "possibility of victory or defeat," only different degrees of destruction.

This meant that the Cold War could not be won. Trying to rationalize the situation, C. L. Sulzberger rejected the Radford theory that the communists would seek a "military solution" when they could no longer conquer the world by "cold war" means and argued, on October 31, that the fact of "competitive coexistence" had to be recognized. "Since the beginning of the Cold War," he said, "we have girded ourselves with more success physically than spiritually." Suspicion and mistrust had been "sown among ourselves and

¹² Anne O'Hare McCormick, the *New York Times*, February 20, 1954.

¹³ The Alsops, the *Nashville Tennessean*, May 28, 1954.

¹⁴ UP dispatch, the *Nashville Tennessean*, May 29, 1954.

within our institutions sufficiently to cause not only a shrinkage in our own self respect but in that of other nations for us."¹⁵

Last Efforts for a Preventive War. This recognition of the great damage we had done to ourselves in concentrating too heavily on the Cold War was too much for Knowland, who interrupted the Senate debate on the censure of Senator McCarthy, on November 15, 1954, to ask if the acceptance of "atomic stalemate" didn't mean inevitable Communist "nibbling aggression." All civilizations passed a point of no return and we were apparently at ours, since he predicted flatly that "coexistence and atomic stalemate will result in ultimate Communist victory." "Operation Nibbling" by the Reds and our fear of atomic war would prevent us from fighting for a long string of countries, which he named, all to be gobbled up at discreet intervals, until finally we ourselves would be "a continental Dienbienphu in a Communist totalitarian world."

Before we went further on this dolorous road, Knowland demanded that the Congress summon "the State and Defense officials and the Joint Chiefs" and see if "a basic change in the direction of our foreign policy" couldn't be made.¹⁶

This appeal to our well rooted fears of the kind of appeasement which made Hitler great could hardly mean anything except an atomic world war now, while we still had the edge. A grand assize could hardly produce any other "basic change in direction of our foreign policy," which was clearly toward acceptance of the "atomic stalemate" which Knowland found so offensive.

It was a bitter outcome to all cold warriors after four years of building "positions of strength." Knowland saw correctly that this game was nearly lost and he rebelled against the outcome. However, Reston recorded two weeks later that "perhaps the most important single fact in world politics today is that Mr. Eisenhower has thrown the immense authority of the American Presidency against risking a military solution of the cold war."¹⁷

This was indeed a momentous fact, since it signified the definite and probably final failure of our preventive warriors to get "a military solution of the cold war." They would go on trying to find some way to bring it about. The great dramatic convulsion over Quemoy and Matsu was only two months ahead, but in that do-or-die crisis they were not able to stampede Eisenhower into casting the die.

Instead, the Alsops reported, he had said publicly that he flatly ruled out preventive war and he would not discuss it even in private. "He finds the mass killing required in a knock-out blow against the Soviet Union profoundly morally abhorrent."¹⁸

The fact that such a statement could be made indicates the intensity of the efforts to bring about a "preventive" atomic war, efforts which had been proceeding for years and would continue for many months. On December 1,

¹⁵ *The New York Times*, November 1, 1954.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, November 16, 1954.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, November 28, 1954. As if to indicate that the competitive coexistence struggle was already under way, Reston reported that the National Security Council had lately identified three major problems: (1) Red China's capital development proceeding much faster than India's; (2) Moscow offering credits, machinery and technicians all over Asia; and (3) the West failing to match these things.

¹⁸ *The Nashville Tennessean*, November 28, 1954.

Eisenhower rejected Knowland's demands for a blockade of China and the new Democratic leaders of Congress backed him, while McCarthy was censured by the Senate, 67 to 22. As the man who had profited most from the hates and fears of the cold war went down for the count, the President refused to be pushed emotionally into an act of war because of Chinese imprisonment of our thirteen airmen.¹⁹

When 1954 ended there was increasing confidence in our emotional stability in London, where "some of the more provocative statements made by American generals, admirals and politicians have been regarded with horror."²⁰ As the year closed it seemed during the Christmas season, as often before, that the post-war struggle between East and West was really subsiding. However, there was Formosa, and the Pentagon's conviction was firm "that, whatever happens, the Communists must not gain control of Formosa."²¹ Early in 1955, on January 18, the Chinese Reds took a small step toward the ultimate conquest of Formosa and within a week the United States' Congress was formally mobilized for war.

That hurricane eventually passed, after hovering over us for two months, when a final effort of military advisers of the President "to destroy Red China's military potential" failed and we turned toward the summit meeting, in May 1955.²²

Nuclear Stalemate. By then time had decisively run out in the atomic arms race, as Senator Knowland correctly foresaw that it would. But the time for a preventive war had passed long ago, in 1950 or 1951 when the Soviets accumulated enough A-bombs to destroy West Europe and Britain. After that another world war was unthinkable to the Europeans and impractical even for us. By May 1955 the Soviets not only had a stockpile of H-bombs, but intercontinental planes to deliver them to our cities. In 1945 they had no offensive air force, but the Cold War forced them to develop one, expensive as it was to a devastated nation. Survival decreed the building first of a great defensive air force and a long range bomber force. Some Soviet intercontinental bombers were seen by foreigners around Moscow and elsewhere many times "both before and after May Day 1954," along with tankers and many other types. By May 1955 they were all coming out in quantity, making it certain that if war came some American cities would die.²³

On June 10, Stewart Alsop reported from Moscow an air show which he had seen, one "to make Westerners shake in their boots." There were so many types of planes going over that he lost count, but he did count twelve huge intercontinental jet bombers as they passed over "with a shattering roar."²⁴

It would be two or three years yet before the Russians had fully caught up,

¹⁹ *The New York Times*, December 3, 1954. On the same day an American Legion official, Major-General James Saliba, told a Legion meeting that we could erase the Communist threat "overnight," if we were determined to do so.—*The Nashville Tennessean*, December 3, 1954.

²⁰ C. L. Sulzberger, *the New York Times*, December 6, 1954.

²¹ Thomas J. Hamilton, *the New York Times*, December 5, 1954.

²² *The New York Times*, March 26, 1955.

²³ Hanson W. Baldwin, *the New York Times*, May 19, 1955.

²⁴ *The Nashville Tennessean*, June 10, 1955.

as Churchill said in his last speech as Prime Minister, meaning that it would be that long before the Soviets had enough H-bombs to be certain of blanketing all of the West with tickets to eternity. Then the great warrior who had turned peace maker added: "Thus we have only a short time in which to make peace with one another—or to make our peace with God."²⁵

This was the situation exactly, as we moved toward the summit conference. The Cold War had ended in a stalemate which made it impossible to go on practising atomic diplomacy and conducting the Cold War, with the spoken or unspoken threat of using atomic force over Quemoy, or over whatever the bone of contention was. First our atomic monopoly had gone, then our decisive superiority, and finally our own home-land could no longer be defended.

To all the other compulsions for ending the Cold War, fully sufficient in themselves, there was now added the brutal necessity of our own self-preservation. That is a difficult argument to ignore or to talk down. One more arms race had run its deadly, dangerous circle—or it soon would when the intercontinental ballistic missiles were lined up on both sides—but this time there was no margin for error, since the usual gambler's ending would erase Western civilization, after which the communist-capitalist quarrel would not matter at all.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONFERENCE

After the middle of April both sides pushed forward preparations for the long delayed meeting at the summit.

On April 20 Marshal Zhukov indirectly invited Eisenhower to negotiate, but his outline of peace terms sounded strange to American ears—the cessation of alleged American war-like actions such as brandishing the atomic bomb, and raising an imaginary enemy; the liquidation of foreign military bases and silencing of the advocates of war. On the 27th Eisenhower acknowledged messages from Zhukov, but did not reveal their content.²⁶

On May 1, Zhukov again stressed the need for parleys to settle discord, and Reston reported three days later that the United States had entered "a period of intense diplomatic activity to test the sincerity of the communist world's call for relaxation of tension." On the 9th, David Sarnoff, head of the NBC radio-TV system, one of the main agencies for mobilizing cold war sentiment, demanded the winning of the Cold War. He regarded it as a decisive contest. Any hope of real compromise was "a dangerous self-delusion." He urged the spending of three billions a year on propaganda war, "geared for total victory," and wanted the nation to be willing to accept the same "costs and casualties as a hot war would involve."²⁷

However, the Western powers formally invited the Soviet Union "to join with us in an effort to remove sources of conflict between us" by a conference of the heads of state, to be followed by others at a lower level. The message was friendly and as it was issued, on May 11, President Eisenhower declared that he was ready to meet "with anyone anywhere" in the hope of advancing

²⁵ The *London Daily Mail*, quoted in the *Nashville Tennessean*, April 9, 1955.

²⁶ The *New York Times*, April 20, 28, 1955.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, May 2, 10, 1955

world peace, though he cautioned repeatedly against expecting any quick results. United States and British officials thought an elaborate new Soviet arms control plan defective, as usual, in the international control of nuclear weapons, and Senator Bridges admonished the President to beware of "appeasement, compromise or weakness."

Soviet Counter to NATO. In Warsaw the Soviet Union was putting the finishing touches on a military union with the communist states of East Europe, to formalize a counter to NATO which had long existed in fact. West Germany was welcomed into NATO, creating, said Bulganin, "a bridgehead for the employment of large, aggressive forces," while the United States was continuing to expand the network of its military bases around the communist countries.

The Warsaw treaty, which was justified in this manner, was signed by eight communist states on May 14, 1955. They also formed a political consultative committee in which the Soviet Union was apparently only the first among equals, a development which might have revolutionary consequences on the role of the non-Soviet communist parties.²⁸

Independence for Austria. Simultaneously, the Big Four were agreeing to Austria's independence. The Austrian treaty had been nearly ready for signature for years, but the Kremlin delayed final acceptance until it could achieve positive credit for Austria's liberation, and also for advancing the summit meeting. Invited to Moscow, the Austrian leaders were glad to agree to accept a status of permanent neutrality, with a ban on foreign bases on their soil, in return for independence, a bargain which evoked great demonstrations of public rejoicing in Austria.

The resulting treaty, signed May 15, 1955, forbade union with Germany and the service of various Nazi-connected categories in the Austrian army. Russia surrendered all the Nazi-owned assets in Austria, except the Danube Shipping Company and the right to exploit 60 per cent of the oil fields in East Austria for 30 years. She was also to receive \$150,000,000 in U.S. currency within six years.

Aside from these advantages to the Soviet Union, the treaty created a military vacuum on NATO's flank and offered to Germany a model for the attainment of her independence.²⁹

On May 16 Churchill observed that new men were masters in the Kremlin but "it is by no means certain that there is not another 'new look' on other faces with more powerful forces behind them." In successive utterances during the next two days Eisenhower rejected appeasement but declared that "we're not going to extinguish the hope that a new day may be coming, even if the sun rises very slowly." Chancellor Adenauer was deeply shocked by the President's acceptance with equanimity, during his May 18 press conference, of the idea of "a series of neutralized states from north to south through Europe."

²⁸ M. S. Handler, the *New York Times*, June 5, 1955.

²⁹ For the texts of the Warsaw and Austrian treaties, see the *New York Times*, May 15, 16, 1955.

On the 22nd Hanson W. Baldwin listed six reasons for the growth of neutralism and Thomas J. Hamilton thought it so strong that large groups of peoples would be likely to blame the United States for deadlock in the coming conference, in the absence of conclusive proof to the contrary. In Paris the next day Harold Callender noted disquiet about the Soviet moves, since in a sense the conviction of a Soviet menace was necessary to NATO. Its meetings had invariably found Soviet trends disturbing.

Russian Canossa in Belgrade. On May 27 the most spectacular of the Soviet moves to prepare for the summit conference occurred. The new top Soviet leaders, Khrushchev and Bulganin, went to Yugoslavia to beg Marshal Tito's pardon for his excommunication by Stalin in 1948, and for the years of enmity which had intervened. At the airport Khrushchev made a speech in true Canossa style, apologizing for the break.

The swift sequence of ameliorating developments convinced Harold E. Stassen, the President's special adviser on disarmament, that the Cold War was ending, but a few days later John Foster Dulles expressed himself as "frankly doubtful" about the "relaxing" aspect of the coming conference. He thought we should continue "to live as a nation that is imperilled."³⁰

In Moscow, on June 21, a vast rally was held in honor of visiting Prime Minister Nehru of India, at which he said: "We must extirpate hatred in the whole world. Peace cannot be created out of war or the threat of war." He commented on "the love of work displayed by the whole Soviet people, and this enormous drive which it has on its march forward on the way to improving its own fate." In his reply Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin pledged that his Government would make every effort to reduce tension and increase confidence between nations.

In San Francisco, at a tenth anniversary meeting of the UN General Assembly, Molotov urged that only the termination of the Cold War could remove tensions and remove the increasing threat of another world war. He ascribed this threat to the "large-scale construction of military bases" going on in foreign countries and to new military blocs and alliances "constantly being formed in Europe, in Asia, and in other parts of the world." If these "military groupings directed against other states" continued, this would mean driving headlong for another war.

In his address to the Assembly on June 24, Dulles portrayed communism as the defeated aggressor in Korea, and as stopped by his firmness in Indo-China. Yugoslavia was no longer a target of abuse, having been helped by the West; Austria had been liberated from exploitation with the help of the West, and the Soviet Union was seeking relations with West Germany, but East Europe still remained under the rule of a despotism and international communism still remained "a world-wide conspiracy."

From London Drew Middleton wrote on June 26 that Molotov's speech had reinforced the conviction of diplomats abroad that the Geneva conference would be a severe test for the West. Soviet tactics in Europe should also dispel any lingering illusions that the Soviet leaders would "arrive at the meeting in

³⁰ *The New York Times*, May 30, June 7, 1955.

the role of supplicants terrified by Western armament or awed by the moral grandeur of the Western leaders' statements."

On the same day, debate began in Bonn on a brief "blitz law," prepared by Chancellor Adenauer, to get the new German army legalized before the Geneva conference met. It was "soundly denounced" throughout West Germany and its passage blocked indefinitely on June 28 in the Reichstag.³¹

Liberation not Pressed. In Washington the Senate crushed an effort by Senator McCarthy to torpedo the conference before it began, or tie the President's hands in it, by a resolution to declare that the United States could have no permanent hope of peace or safety so long as "certain areas of the world," including the Soviet Union itself, remained under communist control. Therefore the agreement of the Soviet Union should be secured, before the conference, to discuss "the present and future status of the nations of Eastern Europe and Asia now under communist control."

Defeated by a vote of 77 to 4, McCarthy and his friends finally achieved, on July 14, a mild resolution, passed exactly as approved by the President, declaring it to be the sense of the Senate that "the peoples who have been subjected to the captivity of alien despotisms shall again enjoy the right of self-determination within a framework which will sustain peace." They should "again have the right to choose the form of self-government under which they live."

There was some reluctance on the part of right-wing Republican senators to use the word "self-government," out of deference to Spain, Portugal and Saudi Arabia.³²

As American liberationism found this harmless outlet, Stewart Alsop bridged "the gulf of fear and hate which divides the world" enough to report from Moscow that the city was not "a miserable collection of mud huts" but "essentially a city like other big cities, with buses that run on schedule, and big buildings, and a good many automobiles and a great many people of all sorts and kinds." He was apparently surprised that these things could be, and to find that "this alien system works. . . . It represents a greater challenge than this reporter had realized before."³³

No Negotiation from Strength. On July 4, Khrushchev said that if the United States will "talk to us honestly and sincerely as equals something will come of it" and two days later Eisenhower, at his press conference, pledged honest, conciliatory presentation of our case. He barred prejudice or truculence and denied that any official of his Administration had said the Soviets would have to negotiate from a position of weakness at Geneva.

The next day a House sub-committee released testimony by Dulles that Russia's economy was "on the point of collapse," which led the White House to issue a statement on July 8, 1955, saying that Dulles "was not speaking of any immediate crisis confronting the Soviet Government or forecasting that their posture at the Geneva conference would be one of weakness." Press

³¹ M. S. Handler, *the New York Times*, June 26, 29, 1955.

³² *The New York Times*, June 22, July 15, 1955.

³³ *The Nashville Tennessean*, June 30, July 6, 1955.

Secretary Hagerty denied that there was any conflict with the President's views.³⁴

In reviewing the week, the *New York Times* thought, on July 10, that the soft words in Moscow and Washington "reflected the tremendous pressure of public opinion on the Powers." Neither side wanted to be charged with blocking agreement "by prior intransigence." On the same date a statement signed by nine famous scientists, including Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell, warned of the utter devastation of another world war and begged the peoples everywhere to "remember your humanity and forget the rest."

Also, on July 10, a survey of West European opinion reported by Drew Middleton said that "the concept of the Soviet Union as a tiger on the prowl never was as widely accepted in Europe as it was in the United States." After having just had 171 A-bombs "dropped" on them in NATO maneuvers, even the West Germans were in a mood to say "it's all very well for you to scream about the Russians, but they are our next door neighbors and we are going to have to find some way of living with them." Dispatches from German reporters recently admitted to Russia did "not fit the dark and dangerous picture of the Soviet Union built up in West Germany since 1949."³⁵

Simultaneously, on July 13 a joint statement by Premier Nehru, of India, and Premier Nasser, of Egypt, warned that peace is not strengthened by anything "which causes apprehension to another country, including military pacts and alliances." Dulles left for Paris, after lunching with Knowland, saying that the West saw eye to eye on the issues to be discussed. Eisenhower arrived in Geneva on the 16th, proclaiming our great hopes for peace and urging all Americans to pray for it in their churches the next day. Bulganin came saying that the argument between capitalism and communism could not be "settled by force, through war. Let everyone prove in peaceful economic competition that he is right."

THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

The long deferred conference was opened on July 18 by President Eisenhower in a speech which began with the statement that "we are here in response to a universal urge" to "find a basis for accommodation which will make life safer and happier." Our problems seemed "insoluble under conditions of fear, distrust, and even hostility, where every move is weighed in terms of whether it will help or weaken a potential enemy," and it was "not always necessary that people should think and believe alike before they can work together."

The American people wanted to be friends with the Soviet peoples. There were "no natural differences" between them, no territorial conflicts or commercial rivalries. Historically "our two countries have always been at peace."

³⁴ The *New York Times*, July 7-10, 1955.

³⁵ After talks with U.S. strategists in Washington Adelfert Weinstein, military editor of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, concluded that the U.S. air force could never give up its bases in West Germany and that this meant the permanent partition of Germany. He thought the projected 12 German divisions had lost their significance in the world balance of power.—M. S. Handler, the *New York Times*, July 13, 1955.

If this lack of basic reasons for hostility had been remembered in the years after 1945, when the Cold War was getting under way, how much loss and waste of human energy might have been avoided. Premier Edgar Faure of France seemed to feel something like this in his opening speech when he called for an end of the Cold War, saying: "If we can now end the period of tension and return to our starting point, we will recover the general prospect that we were considering in 1945, both as an essential and accessible thing."

To get back to where we started from in 1945 Faure did not ask for the Westernization of East Europe, but only of East Germany and its union with West Germany. He placed the unification of Germany as the most urgent problem before the conference and the world, as did Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden.

Starting with the "stern facts" that war would now bring "utter annihilation" to both sides, "at the same time destroying neutrals," Eden proposed a security pact in which all, including Germany, would join, and the creation of a demilitarized area between East and West.

Premier Bulganin stressed the Soviet Union's acceptance of the Western plan for the control of conventional armaments. He suggested that the armed forces of the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and China be limited to 1,000,000-1,500,000 men, Britain and France to 650,000 and all others to 200,000. He proposed a new collective security system, to include all European nations and the United States, which would replace both NATO and the Warsaw alliance.

No German Unity. He was cautious about German unity in this address, but the next day he rejected any immediate solution of the German question. He declared that the problem would be solved differently, step by step, and that it would take a long time. The comparative flexibility of Russia's position about Germany in the Moscow and London conferences of 1947, and in the Berlin conference of 1954, was gone. He rejected the British security proposals, saying that the Soviet Union could not depend on the guarantees of others, and added, almost indifferently some thought, that the reunification of Germany would begin with West Germany and East Germany drawing closer together.

This plainly meant that the Soviet Union was no longer willing to consider any unification of Germany which did not preserve the essentials of the communist structure in East Germany, and it suggested that Russia was not interested in German unity at all.

This was bitter news for Chancellor Adenauer, who watched the conference from a nearby Swiss mountain. He had warned Dulles ten days earlier that failure to advance unification would imperil his cabinet. "It is now known," reported M. S. Handler, on May 18, "that many essential points in the Allies' brief in the Geneva Conference were contributed by Dr. Adenauer and adopted at his insistence." They were based on the theory that internal difficulties were obliging the Soviets to seek settlement, and that if prodded sufficiently hard they would make the necessary concessions. "The Chancellor's theory about the Soviet Union's internal weakness was accepted in Washington and explains some of the recent statements by United States officials."³⁶

³⁶ *The New York Times*, July 19, 1955.

Bulganin's rebuff was an equally severe setback for Secretary of State Dulles, who as an attorney for New York bankers in the 1920's had worked diligently to rebuild Germany into a strong state and was equally intent on doing so again.³⁷

The failure of the entire American effort to unify an armed Germany within NATO was also indicated. Nor was the prospect improved by the directive given to the Foreign Ministers that the heads of government had "agreed that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security."

This was another Yalta-type formula which left the Kremlin free to maintain its position that "the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security" do not require free all-German elections. This was underlined by Bulganin, who made it a point to stop in East Berlin on his way home to explain that both zones must have a voice in the unification of Germany, and that a reunified Germany must be free of all alliances.³⁸

The Status Quo Tacitly Accepted. Inevitably the conference had the effect of recognizing the status quo in Europe. Stewart Alsop wrote from Geneva that this was why Dulles had "long and bitterly opposed" Churchill's proposal for the conference. In those days Dulles "always pointed out that photographs of the American and Russian leaders smiling together were sure to be taken. Then these pictures would be distributed throughout the Soviet satellite countries," signifying "that all hope of liberation was lost and that resistance to communist rule was henceforth hopeless."³⁹

The deepest significance of the conference did lie in the fact that after nine years of hating and fearing and snarling at each other the heads of state did meet, shake hands, smile at each other and discuss the liquidation of the Cold War amicably. This was evidence plain for all the world to see that each side, and especially the West, had decided that the Cold War could not be won, that a thermonuclear stalemate had developed, and that the new world status quo would have to be substantially accepted.

The registering of this decision was a bitter event for the cold warriors of the West. Starting with a monopoly of atomic power they had consistently refused to accept the new status quo. It is greatly to the credit of President Eisenhower that he had the courage and good sense to go to Geneva and give the world leave to live and breathe again.

Eisenhower's Leadership. All accounts agree that he was the outstanding leader of the conference. Coming into the conference chamber for the first

³⁷ Drew Pearson, *the Nashville Tennessean*, July 20, 1955.

³⁸ *The New York Times*, July 25, 1955. In 1958-9 Mr. Dulles propagated the legend that the Russians had agreed at this conference "that Germany should be reunified by free all-German elections" and that they afterwards repudiated their agreement. This falsification appeared repeatedly, not only in Dulles' speeches but in the President's.—"The German Crisis in Perspective," by James P. Warburg, Current Affairs Press, New York, May 20, 1959, pp. 7-8.

³⁹ *The Nashville Tennessean*, July 26, 1955.

time, he found the Russians standing apart, somewhat awkwardly awaiting his arrival, and he cordially drew them to the conference table.

All during the conference he had private talks with the Russians, convincing them firmly that he was a man to be trusted and that there would be no war while he was President. He already had the respect and affection of Marshal Zhukov with whom he dined privately, and he added Bulganin and Khrushchev to the circle of those who believed in him.

C. L. Sulzberger wrote from Geneva that the mood for negotiations was greatly favored by Eisenhower's presence. "Even the Russians, who mistrust Secretary Dulles, Admiral Radford and other United States leaders, recognize the special qualities in the President." The Russians, said James Reston, "are immensely pleased with Eisenhower. They still mutter ominously about Dulles and Nixon, but the President has obviously impressed them and this probably justifies all the fuss during the past six days." It was not in the field of specifics but of imponderables that progress had been made.⁴⁰

Stewart Alsop reported concerning the President's role: "It was a remarkable performance and very greatly in the national interest. From beginning to end the President triumphantly acted himself." The Russians were evidently intent on capturing Eisenhower, but instead found him capturing them. Then Alsop added a comment, which should sink deeply into our minds, saying: "Simply by being himself, he has smashed into smithereens the deeply rooted image of America as inflexible and bent on war."⁴¹

Drew Pearson thought that Eisenhower had deprived Britain of the central position which Churchill had seized for her in his Fulton address, and had held as "the attacker and provocateur" against Russia until he turned peace-maker. The President's proposal for mutual air inspection between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. had "scared the British half out of their wits" and "horrified the German observers here," since it indicated in effect American-Russian cooperation. Getting away from Washington, "Eisenhower was able finally in Geneva to handle our foreign policy in a way to shape the peace of the world," and he did it "superbly."⁴²

Roscoe Drummond wrote that "there is no doubt in the mind of anyone who observed at first hand that Mr. Eisenhower made a deep impression on the Soviets as the most powerful, the most trustworthy and at the same time the most formidable leader the world has today." The result, concluded Walter Lippmann, was "a big change of feeling in the Soviet Union and in the United States." The downgrading of the specific issues and the upgrading of the danger of war had occurred in Western Europe more than two years earlier. Then in the United States "the collapse of McCarthyism and the effacement of the war party" had been due to "the realization that modern war is intolerable." Yet the real feeling of the American people had been suppressed until Eisenhower expressed it at Geneva. He was "able to build a bridge across the chasm to our great adversary, and to knock away the worst of the barriers and stumbling blocks that separate us from our friends. We are as a result much less alone."⁴³

⁴⁰ *The New York Times*, July 20, 24, 1955.

⁴² *Ibid.*, July 26, 27, 1955.

⁴¹ *The Nashville Tennessean*, July 25, 1955.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, July 29, 31, 1955.

What the nation's ablest columnists were all saying from Geneva was that when Eisenhower was finally able to escape from the grip of the cold warriors in Washington, both among his advisers and in Congress, he called off the Cold War, temporarily at least, and relieved us of the deadly incubus of being its chief promoter, in the minds of the world's peoples.

Moreover, the great public opinion makers had created so many dedicated cold warriors among us that it is doubtful whether any other American leader could have led us out of the 1955 cold war impasse. Any Democratic President who attempted it would have been hammered mercilessly with "twenty years of treason" charges, and only a Republican President who was also the nation's beloved war hero could have done it with impunity from his beleaguered right wing.

A New Start for Humanity. The greatness of spirit in which Eisenhower performed this immense service to us, and to all mankind, was reflected in his July 25th report on the conference to the nation. We must not allow "our own pessimism and lack of faith to defeat the noblest purposes that we can pursue." There were great difficulties ahead but, he emphasized, "I do know that the people of the world want peace." Every other individual at Geneva had felt this longing of mankind. So there was "great pressure to advance constructively, not merely to re-enact the dreary performances—the negative performances—of the past." All of us, he insisted, "individually and as a people, now have possibly the most difficult assignment of our nation's history. Likewise we have the most shining opportunity ever possessed by Americans. May these truths inspire, never dismay us."

These were words straight from the President's heart, such as no speech writer indoctrinated in the Cold War could compose. They were reflected also in the news from abroad. From London reports came that the Geneva Conference was being hailed throughout Europe. Many commentators said that it had thawed out the Cold War. The right psychological atmosphere had been established. It was evident that President Eisenhower had scored a personal triumph and had succeeded in persuading people that the United States was opposed to war.

In Moscow, *Izvestia* headed its first post-Geneva editorial: "A New Era in International Relations Has Begun." Eisenhower was presented as a man who seeks peace and the Soviet people were being given as much information about the conference as Western readers were, including Western positions. It was now clear that the Soviet leaders went to Geneva "seriously desirous of improving the international atmosphere."⁴⁴

THE ATOMS FOR PEACE CONFERENCE

Early in August another near-miracle happened in Geneva, in the same fine building built to be the home of the League of Nations. On August 8 there began a vast international scientific congress on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

A long chain of events which eventuated in the conference was triggered in

⁴⁴ The *New York Times*, July 25, 31, 1955. Censorship curbs were also eased in Russia.

President Eisenhower's mind by the explosion of the first Russian H-bomb on August 9, 1953. He remembered from his NATO days how fearful our Allies had been of our atomic intentions, and how the neutrals shared their fear. To counter this grave threat to our world standing he dictated a memorandum proposing that, along with others, we give a certain amount of uranium, small at first to avoid alarming our own people, to some international agency to distribute for peaceful uses.

His proposal of an international atomic bank had hard sledding indeed. It was opposed by his Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, who was so impregably security minded that he had conducted a one man fight against giving a few microscopic radioisotopes to foreigners for medicinal experimentation. When asked in 1954 to relax the Atomic Energy Act a little to permit the atom bank, the Congress confined the idea to bilateral deals, instead of an international pool, and seized the occasion to strengthen its hold on security by requiring that each bilateral agreement lie before Congress thirty days before taking effect.

The Soviets also withheld agreement to the atom bank idea for many months, until they could put into operation the world's first atom powered electric plant. Meanwhile, it had been considered necessary to hold the Bermuda conference with Churchill, in order to say "no" to his idea of a summit conference without doing it too abruptly. This meeting, postponed from June to December 1953 was held shortly before the end of the UN General Assembly session, just in time to enable the President to try to get Churchill's mind on atoms for peace and then fly back to the Assembly to make the proposal public, leaving Churchill in tears of frustration.⁴⁵

During the Bermuda conference Admiral Strauss proposed the idea of an international scientific congress, perhaps as a substitute for doing anything else about the peaceful atom. He wanted it to meet in Washington, where he could sit personally on the security lid, until he learned that the McCarran Act would prevent any communist delegates from attending. He was firm, also, that atomic energy for power could not be considered, only general scientific ideas, already discussed to exhaustion, and he pledged the British Government to this stand.

The 1954 UN Assembly issued the invitation to a conference in Geneva for July 1955. Then Lord Cherwell, Britain's chief atomic energy adviser, joined the European Atomic Energy Society in urging that atoms for power be discussed, and to prevent the collapse of the whole idea Strauss agreed.

This made the conference a vital world event, instead of a sterile one, and had the unexpected result of so impressing Strauss himself with its great success that he "came home a changed man" on the subject of atoms for peace—no small miracle in itself.⁴⁶

In its own way the August conference was as important as its illustrious predecessor in July. Some 1260 scientists and officials were present from 73 countries. The Americans were the most numerous, and they demonstrated our atomic primacy in their share of the scores of papers read and in the

⁴⁵ John Lear, "Ike and the Peaceful Atom," *The Reporter*, January 12, 1956, pp. 11-22.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

models of reactors and other atomic equipment displayed. But the Russian and satellite scientists were there in force also, starved for the international exchanges which so fructify science. They were shy about mixing at first and language was a difficulty, but soon the older Russian and American scientists were conversing in German, while the younger ones talked in English.

American, British, Soviet, French and Dutch scientists all outlined designs of reactors. All were impressed with the strong runner-up position of the Russians and with the weight of their exposition. At one point an American defended the integrity of Soviet research. Later a Russian chemist was pleading for more recognition of chemists everywhere, in relation to the physicists.⁴⁷

About 90 per cent of all atomic secrecy was swept away in the deluge of addresses and exchanges, though there was evident awkwardness on both sides about talking of such sacrosanct matters. Afterwards a general impression lingered among American scientists that the large amount of declassified information could not be discussed with foreign scientists without specific clearance with the AEC.⁴⁸ But the main effect was to clear the air, establish a large amount of fellowship and let each of the scores of delegations know where it stood in relation to the growth of atomic science.

In his report on the conference the scientist R. E. Lapp found that the bilateral agreements we had signed with many countries that year were too restrictive and already obsolete. All they allowed was token cooperation. The United States could not afford to handicap itself with the "remnants of what had been an obviously futile policy of A-power secrecy." He concluded that nuclear science should be freed from every type of security restriction.⁴⁹

All of the delegates to the conference learned that the tight control of the world's uranium resources by a few governments would soon end; that a world market for uranium, equipment and information will soon exist and there can be no turning back. Soon, also, "lesser" nations would be making atomic bombs and the only question left was whether men would rule the atom instead of it destroying them.⁵⁰

All of the delegates learned, too, that "atomic energy was the only hope of a long term continuation of our industrial civilization," since other sources of electrical power are so rapidly being used up. This sobering knowledge was added to the realization of doom in the atom's improper use, but there was hope in this "first significant step toward a return to free and open communication between scientists and other men of learning in all parts of the globe." There was hope, said physicist I. I. Rabi, when we could meet with the Russians, learn of the "vast scope of their atomic energy enterprise," second only to ours, find their scientists extremely capable and with the same attitudes toward science as our own.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Lear, *supra*, p. 21; Hoffman, the *New York Times*, August 14, 1955.

⁴⁸ Gunnar Randers, "The Roads from Geneva," the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December 1955, p. 358.

⁴⁹ R. E. Lapp, "The Lesson of Geneva," the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, October 1955, pp. 275 and 308.

⁵⁰ Oliver Townshend, "The Atom Can Be Peaceful If —," *The Reporter*, October 20, 1955.

⁵¹ I. I. Rabi, "To Preserve the Scientific Spirit," the *New York Times Magazine*, February 12, 1956.

The pity of it was that ten years of the most dangerous kind of rivalry had to elapse before the Geneva atomic conference—ten years of hate and mounting terror before men from all the nations could sit down together as human beings and discuss many of the problems of the atomic age.

It hardly needs to be added that President Eisenhower gave his warmest sponsorship to this conference, since his long campaign for the peaceful use of atomic energy was the nearest thing to a crusade during his first Administration.

models of reactors and other atomic equipment displayed. But the Russian and satellite scientists were there in force also, starved for the international exchanges which so fructify science. They were shy about mixing at first and language was a difficulty, but soon the older Russian and American scientists were conversing in German, while the younger ones talked in English.

American, British, Soviet, French and Dutch scientists all outlined designs of reactors. All were impressed with the strong runner-up position of the Russians and with the weight of their exposition. At one point an American defended the integrity of Soviet research. Later a Russian chemist was pleading for more recognition of chemists everywhere, in relation to the physicists.⁴⁷

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PART IV
THE SECOND COLD WAR
1955-1959

THE FAILURE TO MAKE PEACE

JULY 1955-OCTOBER 1956

By the time the Geneva atoms for peace congress ended, in mid-August 1955, the President's cold war advisers had recovered control.

Immediately after the Summit Conference, Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America were stumped. Then they resumed the Cold War, but in tones "less strident, more relaxed, less given to demanding and more to chiding and suggesting."¹ In turn the Moscow radio no longer hurled charges of "war monger" at "American ruling circles." There was a sharp drop in the blood pressure of Soviet commentators. "Moscow Revels in New Peaceful Coexistence," said a headline. The Soviets were planning new hotels to care for a big rise in the tourist trade.

In Russia, the U.S. farm delegation thought the Soviet farmers contented, because they were living better than ever before, though they still had only necessities. The delegation's criticisms of Soviet agriculture were published in all the leading Soviet papers, while in Washington the Soviet Minister of Agriculture won an ovation from a capacity crowd at the National Press Club. "The audience, at least temporarily liberated from the hostile clichés of the cold war," responded warmly.² Then he broadcast to Russia over the Voice of America. But George Meany, President of the American Federation of Labor, demanded that the exchanges of all delegations between the United States and the Soviet Union be stopped, lest "we give respectability to people who are not respectable."³

On August 12 the Soviet Union announced that its armed forces would be reduced soon by 640,000 men, but this brought no joy to United States officers in NATO who foresaw demands for similar reductions in the West. Benjamin Welles wrote from London that the European governments were now resisting the requisition of valuable farm land for additional U.S. air bases, to enable us to spread out costly aircraft. French authorities had rejected proposals for U.S. naval air bases in North Africa. Italy, France and Spain were unwilling to absorb dependents of the Navy.⁴ More serious trouble for our air base in Iceland had been brewing for some time. A softening of all our cold war positions around the world seemed inevitable.⁵

¹ Dana Adams Schmidt, the *New York Times*, August 7, 1955.

² *Chicago Daily News*, August 25, 1955.

³ *The Progressive*, October 1955, p. 4.

⁴ *The New York Times*, August 14, 1955.

⁵ This effect of the Geneva conference naturally made it anathema to all cold-war leaders, both at the time and thereafter. Thus in 1959 Dean Acheson referred to it as "the tragic experience of Geneva in 1955," which brought "a sense of relaxation, good will and security" before the energetic Soviet intervention in the Middle East. However, Geneva did

Our Old Demands Renewed. Worst of all, from the cold war standpoint, the pictures of the fraternizing Big Four leaders were being circulated in East Europe, exactly as Dulles had predicted. So on August 24 the President delivered a speech to the American Bar Association at Philadelphia which barred peace at the cost of freedom. There could be no true peace which involved "acceptance of a status quo in which we find injustice to many nations, repressions of human beings on a gigantic scale. . . ." Eagerness to avoid war could "produce outright or implicit agreement that injustices and wrongs of the present shall be perpetuated into the future." The domination of captive countries could no longer "be justified by any claim that this is needed for purposes of security."

Apparently we had to resume the Cold War and carry it on until East Europe, at least, was liberated. If there was any doubt, Vice President Nixon removed it in a still tougher speech to the same body the next day in which he called upon the Russians to "prove their sincerity" by: (1) agreeing to free elections and the unification of Germany and Korea; (2) accepting President Eisenhower's aerial inspection plan; (3) dismantling the iron curtain; (4) freeing the East European satellites; and (5) curtailing the activities of the Moscow controlled organizations in other countries.

This was just as tough a set of demands as Secretary of State Acheson had made upon the Soviets in Berkeley on March 16, 1950, and essentially similar. Apparently the Summit Conference had changed nothing after all.

One editor was puzzled by the President's "bleak reflections" so soon after the glow of Geneva, when he had lately spoken of the great "triumph" at the Summit and had foreseen an "era of peace." Now "stage managed gloom" showed up in a "spate of speeches, editorials and officially inspired commentaries that re-analyze and re-interpret the Geneva conference in a way to emphasize that nothing specific and nothing of substance emerged" from Geneva.⁶

James Reston explained in the *New York Times*, on August 28, the sudden switch from one extreme to another as an old Washington habit. All top officials in Washington were now "saying that Moscow had not done nearly enough to produce the basis for a general settlement." The two specific causes of the abrupt switch were the use of the smiling Geneva photos behind the iron curtain and Adenauer's urging that the American Government insist again on German reunification. The Adenauer Government, said Reston, "is a creature of the cold war. Its power and independence have increased with the tensions between East and West, and its officials wonder, naturally enough, what is going to happen to them if the West takes the atmosphere of Geneva at face value."

Since the Adenauer-Dulles Axis was an exceptionally strong one, it was not difficult to invoke it. Marquis Childs had already reported that Dulles had "several times remarked to his colleagues, with almost a wishful sigh for the

not seem so tragic to Sir Winston Churchill, who wrote about it in 1958 that "for a time a gentler breeze seemed to blow upon our affairs" and he found no security or peace of mind in a nuclear arms race—*The New York Times Magazine*, April 12, 1959; *Look*, April 29, 1958.

⁶ *The Progressive*, October 1955, p. 3.

good old days, that it was much easier to slug it out toe-to-toe in the cold war."⁷

Moscow was nonplussed by Washington's swift descent from the Summit. Soviet papers printed enough of Eisenhower's address to make it plain that he was still talking about liberating Eastern Europe, but the commentators were silent. It took the Soviet authorities more than ten days to decide whether to make any comment. Finally, on September 5, *Pravda* protested the role of Nixon and Dulles in resuming the Cold War, but made no complaint against the President."⁸

Early in September Chancellor Adenauer went to Moscow to negotiate the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, proclaiming the stiff terms he would exact. A few days later he signed terms which were almost identical with those laid down by Premier Bulganin at the beginning of the negotiations.⁹ This denouement led the State Department to issue, on September 14, a statement claiming a triumph. It recalled previous Soviet intransigence about Germany, celebrated the wisdom of the West in establishing the West German state and hailed Moscow's confession of its "bankrupt German policies."

Adenauer himself came home explaining that Soviet strength prompted him to sign the accord. He reminded his press conference that the Soviet Union extends over one-sixth of the world and is one of the most powerful states. "This cannot be doubted," he said, "this cannot be ignored, and it would have been unwise for us to have turned down the offer to establish diplomatic relations." Then he added the surprising statement that the Soviet Union "would like to devote its entire power" to the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural tasks and to reduce its arms expenditures for this reason. This was a long term objective and he believed "one would judge the entire situation in a completely wrong light if one did not consider this desire of the Soviet Union as a reality."¹⁰

This remarkable declaration contained no suggestion of Soviet world conquest. It was quite opposite to the State Department's reaction, which Lippmann described as "massive silliness, inspired by the most wishful kind of thinking" and Reston wrote "Of truth and fantasy," recalling similar celebrations about the alleged failure of the Bandung and Soviet-Tito conferences. Such propaganda victories rang hollow. The diplomats of the past never claimed victories even when they had won them. Reston was disturbed also by the President's long absence on his Colorado vacation. He had never been more popular, or more absent or more badly needed to strike the right note in our diplomatic affairs. We moved with an unsteady hand.¹¹

On September 22, Dulles addressed the UN Assembly, declaring that the Geneva spirit would not lull the United States into any acceptance of the current state of world affairs. Divided Germany was "a crime against nature,"

⁷ *Ibid.* ⁸ Clifton Daniel, the *New York Times*, August 27, September 6, 1955.

⁹ *Ibid.*, September 14, 1955.

¹⁰ M. S. Handler, the *New York Times*, September 17, 1955.

¹¹ The *New York Times*, September 16, 18; *New York Herald Tribune*, September 20, 1955.

and what Russia did about loosening its grip on East Europe would be "a barometer of the Soviets real intentions."

The very conservative columnist David Lawrence applauded the spate of utterances of this kind, but he feared "the Western powers are accepting in a defeatist mood the status of things as they are," and that the gains made by the Soviets and Chinese "through aggression" were never going to be challenged. He deplored the lack of pressure on Moscow to reunite Germany, "because no military or economic force will be used by the West to obtain that objective." However, Louis J. Halle, recently a key official in the State Department, maintained that our side insisted on an eventual retraction of Russian power.¹²

On September 25 the *New York Times* carried a one column headline saying: "Eisenhower Has a Heart Attack."¹³ This meant that for several months our foreign policy would be almost completely under the control of Dulles and the President's other cold war advisers.

Already our allies were restive and worried by Washington's effort to turn the Cold War on again. As the President was stricken, Drew Middleton cabled that neutralism was growing. All along, a great many strong anti-communists had "thought the destruction of European civilization too high a price to pay for acceptance of what they considered to be an ill-conceived and aggressive United States leadership," and a great many had "not believed that the Soviet leaders wanted war." It had been an article of faith with us that we could negotiate with the Soviets only from positions of strength, and now it was "doubtful how long a position of military strength can be maintained."

Communist Arms for Egypt. Three days later it was announced that negotiations had been concluded for the sale of Czech arms to Egypt. Moscow was moving into an exclusive Western preserve, openly and with traditional methods. Sulzberger wrote from Paris that it was said Dulles had "a conniption fit" when he heard this news, yet he need not have been surprised. Soviet interest in the Arab world, and its fabulous oil reserves, had little to do with ideology. Geneva had frozen Europe's prevailing political frontiers (where Dulles was still hammering away) and now Russia was moving to neutralize the Middle East and secure recognition as a power there.¹⁴

It was apparent to most observers that the Soviets held the post-Geneva initiative. They had adapted their policy to the fact of military stalemate, said Lippmann, while we seemed to have "remained frozen in the pre-Geneva mold." We were bound to "a German policy which is not negotiable." Our assets were "frozen by rigid and highly emotional commitments." "Now Moscow plays under Geneva rules," said Joseph C. Harsch. "We don't and

¹² *New York Herald Tribune*, September 21; *Pittsburgh Post-Dispatch*, September 23; the *New York Times Magazine*, September 25, 1955.

¹³ On September 27 W. H. Lawrence reported to the same newspaper that the President had arrived at the golf course earlier and earlier for two weeks, after a minimum of time on official papers. He was playing—"just like a little boy, and enjoying it thoroughly." Finally, after four days' fishing in the mountains he played 27 holes of golf, alleviated somewhat by riding on a cart, and before the last nine holes had a hamburger for lunch, without bread, but with two slices of onion. On the 26th hole he complained of "a little heart burn"

¹⁴ *The New York Times*, October 15, 1955.

we are losing one round after another." Reston referred to "a serious slippage in the Western position." The new Communist tactic of dramatized friendliness was promoting the idea of coexistence and winning support for the notion of a world settlement along present lines. On the colonial issue, said Hamilton, the United States was following "a policy of masterful zigging and zagging," and a *New York Times*' survey revealed a conviction among troubled Frenchmen that Dulles and Nixon were "both better cold warriors than partisans of peace."¹⁵

Yet all of this concern about our deteriorating position did not prevent Dulles from winning a standing ovation from the annual American Legion Convention by picturing the Soviets as inconstant, steering an unsteady course. Their doctrine had persistently taught retreats and zigzags as tactics of conquest. So we couldn't tell whether what was going on was just a maneuver or not. Meanwhile, the United States did not believe in practising neutrality. He thought world opinion would act to compel the Soviet Union to relax its grip on East Germany and East Europe. Following Dulles, George Meany made a blistering attack on Soviet duplicity which drew thunderous acclaim from the Legionnaires. Nothing had happened in recent months, he said, to evidence any real change in the Soviet plan for world domination.¹⁶

Containment Cork. Then, as the cold warriors thundered in the old familiar keys, our diplomacy forged the last possible link in the ring of containment. On October 12 Iran adhered to the Baghdad Pact which Dulles had been forming since 1953. Iran now joined Turkey, Iraq, Britain and Pakistan, already members, to seal the Soviet Union in on the South, after she had already jumped over this fragile barrier into Egypt. "Iran Closes the Gap," said a *New York Times* editorial the next day. Iran now puts "the cork in the bottle and permits concerted defense planning from the Mediterranean to the Bay of Bengal, in order to safeguard the independence of the whole area and protect its vast oil resources."

Some readers must have wondered whether Iran was not a feeble cork in the bottle of containment, and at the realism of trying to push containment to its final conclusion after the Summit Conference had registered a power stalemate.

Lippmann was not cheered by this development. He thought that in the last analysis these pacts were designed to hold in check the supposed march of the Red infantry, but the containing pacts did not stop the Soviets and when countries like Iran were included they invited reprisals. Why had Mr. Dulles "rushed around the world making these pacts?" Perhaps the answer was that he was unwilling to ask Congress for the money to compete with the Soviets in Egypt and elsewhere. But we must not fool ourselves about the determination of the poor nations to develop quickly, or about Russia's ability to talk their language.

A week later Lippmann had concluded that we must either contest Russian expansion in the Mediterranean or recognize their new power. If we competed

¹⁵ The *Nashville Tennessean*, October 1, 7; the *New York Times*, October 2, 9, 10, 1955.

¹⁶ The *New York Times*, October 11, 1955.

it was a truly agonizing decision, requiring massive expenditures. In any event, we would have to revise our practice of containment, whereby "all nations must join our alliances or be considered as fellow travellers on their way to becoming communist satellites." This dangerous dogma had lost us friends all the way from Morocco to Indonesia. Our "combination of military pacts, which are extremely unpopular in all countries, and the withdrawal of economic aid" had left us "wide open and vulnerable to the Soviet campaign."¹⁷

In Leningrad, on October 14, one million people turned out to welcome ships of the British fleet. "It's as if we were men from Mars," said an officer. "The attitude of these people toward us is the best I've ever seen," said a stoker. But this fraternization did not affect the plan of the U.S. Air Force for "thousands of intercontinentals guided missiles armed with H-bomb warheads, to be poised at the heart of Russia." They will, continued Drew Pearson, "be installed in secret launching sites, carefully cocked and aimed ready to strike at pre-set Soviet targets." They would be fired simultaneously, at a secret signal from the President, from an air force brain center deep underground.¹⁸

The Foreign Ministers Conference. In the meantime, there was the problem of uniting the two Germans. At the end of October the Big Four Foreign Ministers Conference, provided for by the Summit Conference, met at Geneva to try to carry out the directive quoted above.

To Drew Middleton it seemed a lifeless revival in an atmosphere of dull repetition. Some diplomats suggested that after the Summit meeting the pressure for changes in Europe had vanished. The exchanges in the conference were more polite than before the Summit gathering, for one reason because the Western delegates understood the deep desire of their own peoples and all others for peace. "They know how tired people are of the cold war."¹⁹

Neither side came to the conference willing to negotiate. The West had always demanded unconditional surrender of the Soviets—"give us East Germany, by way of free elections, to be united with West Germany in NATO against you, as a prelude to the further contraction of your zone." Now the Soviets had a matching position—neutralize Germany, disband NATO, ease U.S. troops out of Europe, i.e. total diplomatic victory. Now, also, time appeared to favor Molotov.²⁰

Thus all the conference could do was to stage a propaganda battle. By November 3 the West thought it had won and U.S. reporters were advised to indicate success for us. On the 8th Molotov rejected any "mechanical merger" of the two Germans and insisted that none could occur which would abolish the socialist structure in East Germany. He declared that the West German Government was dominated by monopolists, Junkers and blossoming militarists, and charged that the West had betrayed, in a document which he quoted, that its real desire was not German unity but the strengthening of NATO. The Paris agreements for bringing West Germany into NATO had changed the

¹⁷ *The Nashville Tennessean*, November 4, 10, 1955.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, October 23, 1955.

¹⁹ *The New York Times*, October 6, 28, 1955.

²⁰ C. L. Sulzberger, *the New York Times*, October 31, 1955.

situation radically and now reunification could proceed only step by step, by slow accommodation and agreement between the two German Governments.

This, said the three Foreign Ministers of the West, would mean the communization of all Germany. Handler thought that the German people would accept this explanation in the short run, but their delayed reaction might be quite different. *The Manchester Guardian Weekly* (November 10) also thought something would have to give and proposed that the West offer to exclude German forces from NATO on these conditions: (1) that Germany be unified through free elections; (2) that Germany freely associate with the West in all but military matters; and (3) that Russia and the West jointly guarantee Germany's frontiers.

These terms did not constitute appeasement, if Thomas J. Hamilton judged the situation rightly, since in his opinion the long range prospect for keeping any of the Germans on our side was increasingly bad.²¹

This appeared to be Lippmann's view also. He wrote that we chose to go to Geneva with the old Adenauer terms, which every correspondent knew were not negotiable, apparently for fear of weakening Adenauer's position. The result would be "in Germany a growing loss of confidence in our good sense and even in our sincerity." If anyone doubted that the Germans would eventually negotiate with Moscow, let him compare the proposals of the German Socialists with Molotov's. By taking unconditional surrender terms to Geneva Mr. Dulles had ignored the significance of the Summit conference, which was that neither side could impose terms. This "miscalculated absolutism had played right into the hands of the Soviets, leaving us frozen while they retained plenty of room to maneuver in West Germany."²²

In reply the *Washington Evening Star* argued, on November 18, that to accept the Soviet terms would be a guarantee of their ultimate mastery of the continent. The Allies must hold fast "as a matter of self-preservation. To do less than that would be to invite the onset of a terrible common disaster." This, however, was not a real reply, since it left the game entirely in the hands of the Soviets.

This seemed unwise to Canadian Minister of External Affairs Lester B. Pearson, who had just returned from a tour of Russia. He gained the impression that the Soviets were genuinely afraid of United States' bases abroad, and of the rearming of Germany within the Atlantic alliance. He did not believe that Khrushchev was the type of man who would or could plan aggression, but he thought he might react violently to what he might consider a dangerous provocation from the United States. He advised the West to restudy its policy on Germany.²³

Middleton thought there was no need for Russia to negotiate about Germany, since common economic problems would draw the two Germanies together. The Western argument that the division is a threat to peace was sound, but the mass of the Europeans "won't buy it." Having experienced two German wars lately, they were "not downcast at the prospect of a divided

²¹ *The New York Times*, November 13, 1955.

²² *The Nashville Tennessean*, November 14; *Washington Post*, November 15, 1955.

²³ Raymond Daniell, *The New York Times*, November 20, 1955.

Germany." Handler noted also a remarkable increase in the number of people moving between the two Germanies, without any official sanction, and Pastor Martin Niemöller warned that if the powers did not unite Germany the new armies of the two Germanies would oust the governments and unite Germany under a military government.²⁴

Soviet Indian Tour. On November 19 Bulganin and Khrushchev were greeted by a million cheering Indians in New Delhi, at the top of their triumphal tour of India, Burma and Afghanistan, in which they attacked colonialism, past and present. Neutralism was rising in Thailand, along with fears that she might be left alone in opposition to Communist China. Touring Poland, correspondent Jack Raymond found people working proudly and devotedly. Conditions in industrial Lodz were bad, but much better than before the war. A key Greek political party, spurred by the bitter Greek-British-Turkish quarrel over Cyprus, opted for neutrality and amity with Russia.

Analyst Harry Schwarz had "a feeling that we are losing the cold war," and James P. Warburg held that Dulles' report to the nation on the conference about Germany showed "that our policy of military containment had now reached the end of a dead end street." Chester Bowles urged that the crisis facing us would not wait. The Russians had seized the initiative. We must meet the challenge on the economic as well as the military front. Meanwhile, American policy appeared "rigidly committed to tactics which had already proved too narrow during the Cold War."²⁵

UN MEMBERSHIP DEFEAT

This was the situation just before the most spectacular diplomatic defeat in our history, a reverse suffered because of clinging rigidly to cold war positions far too long. The stage was the New York headquarters of the United Nations, and the occasion the admission of four East European communist states over our opposition.

Since the Cold War began in East Europe it was natural for us to hold that the Soviet satellites in that area did not meet the membership tests of the Charter, that an applicant must be: (1) a state, (2) "peace loving"; and (3) "able and willing" to carry out the obligations of the Charter. Poland and Yugoslavia were admitted early, before the Cold War was really under way, but thereafter the United States maintained that Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania were not states, being Soviet puppets, and not respectable international persons. Outer Mongolia was also included in this category.

Washington did not veto these applicants outright, but they never could obtain the necessary seven votes essential in the Security Council for proposal to the General Assembly. They sometimes received several votes but were defeated by abstentions. Thus at the 206th Council meeting Hungary received five votes and there were six abstentions. On other occasions there were Western "No" votes.²⁶

²⁴ *The New York Times*, November 20, 24; the *Nashville Tennessean*, November 24, 1955.

²⁵ *The New York Times*, November 19-23; *Louisville Courier Journal* (Warburg) November 23; *New York Times Magazine* (Bowles), November 27, 1955.

²⁶ *Official Records, Security Council*, 2nd year, No. 78, pp. 2037, 2039, 2042, 2045.

This procedure led to outright Soviet vetoes of our friends and to many fruitless efforts to admit them, one at a time. In 1946 the United States proposed that all of the eight waiting applicants be admitted, and the U.S.S.R. refused. Then on June 16, 1949, the Soviet Union proposed the admission of the twelve then waiting and the U.S.A. refused, insisting upon individual scrutiny of applications.²⁷

This position was maintained until the autumn of 1955, when there were eighteen applicants piled up against the door of the UN, most of them importuning friends on the inside to help open the door. They included Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Austria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, Laos, Japan and Spain. Spain, long excluded by UN resolutions, was sponsored by the United States in September 1955.

Outside Washington it became increasingly apparent that the deadlock could be broken only by en bloc admissions. More and more people realized that the requirements for admission were being applied subjectively by each side. As one observer put it, when a cold war is raging "one side's peace lover is the other side's poison." Nor could the other delegates see any issue of principle in excluding the communist states when most of them already belonged to the subsidiary organs of UN.

Beyond these considerations the vision of a universal United Nations, attempting to mirror the opinion of all mankind for the first time in history, became stronger and stronger.

This is a great vision, but Washington was estopped from sharing it by the still warm resentments left by the second phase of the Korean war, and by the tight alliance of its Republican right wing with Chiang Kai-shek. Behind the admission of the eighteen there loomed the seating of Communist China, and the question of whether Chiang should continue to occupy China's permanent seat on the Security Council.

Canadian Formula. To provide a way out of the impasse, Lester B. Pearson of Canada had worked out a formula for the admission of all countries about which no issue of unification was involved. This would leave aside the two Germanies, Koreas and Viet Nams. Feeling that some package deal was inevitable, in spite of anything the United States could do, he wanted to control its size and shape.²⁸

The popularity of the Canadian proposal in the Assembly was so great that on October 4 Dulles told his press conference that the United States would not use its veto against any of the Soviet satellites. This would have settled the issue had there not been a threat by Chiang to veto Outer Mongolia and it developed that he meant business, a fact which led UN Ambassador Lodge to try first to persuade Paul Martin of Canada to drop Outer Mongolia from his list and to prevent her from getting the necessary seven affirmative votes in the Security Council.²⁹

²⁷ *Official Records, Security Council, No. 4, August 28, 1946, pp. 42, 47; No. 41, September 13, 1949, pp. 6-7.*

²⁸ See the excellent account of the struggle by William R. Frye, the UN correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor* in *The Reporter*, January 26, 1956, pp. 12-13.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

Since Martin refused to support either move, believing they would fail, "the long smoldering undeclared war between Canada and the United States" now became official. Then the Soviet delegate told Martin that the Soviet Union would add Japan and Spain to Molotov's package of 16, and frantic efforts by the United States to persuade Chiang not to veto Outer Mongolia failed.

Chiang's Veto. Two cables from Eisenhower and one from Dulles went to Chiang in rapid succession. They were "as strong as they could be made short of an explicit threat to take retaliatory action," but they did not move the ruler of Formosa. Having that defense treaty with the United States which made him immune from pressure, he took high ground about not violating the UN Charter or defying the World Court.³⁰

Many delegates could not believe that the United States was not able to control the protégé in which it had invested so much of its wealth and reputation and when his delegate vetoed Outer Mongolia on December 13 the Soviet delegate accused the United States of using Chiang for its purposes, as he vetoed the Western applicants.

When Chiang's delegate lifted his hand in veto "a corporate moan of despair rose from the crowded Security Council Chamber" and the delegates left "numbed and crushed."³¹ By this time many resentful Asian delegates seemed to regard Nationalist China as a figment of the imagination. When the Political Committee voted on December 7 for the Canadian resolution, 52 to 2, only Cuba joined Formosa in opposition. The United States abstained, as it did in the decisive votes later, leaving the chief U.S. delegate in almost palpable isolation.

This was the reward which the United States reaped for that tremendous theater earlier in the year when the Eisenhower Administration stood on Formosa with a pre-dated declaration of war and atomic bombs poised in Chiang's behalf.

Soviet Package Accepted. The end of the December fiasco came a day after the vetoing session, when the Soviet delegate asked for an emergency meeting of the Security Council on the membership question. It was quickly assembled and he proposed the admission of a package of 16, omitting Outer Mongolia and Japan. After a frenzied half hour for caucuses the Soviet Union vetoed an effort of the United States to restore Japan to the list and then the 16 were recommended to the Assembly, which met quickly and joyously accepted them all.

"The United States has been out-manuevered, out-played, and left in a most unhappy position," said the *New York Herald Tribune*. "The Kremlin masterminded one of the most spectacular victories ever won in the United Nations," added Edward R. Murrow, on December 15.

The result did leave the United States with the worst of all worlds. Dulles and Lodge had not dared to use our veto, after all of their condemnation of the Soviets for doing so, and in the face of an overwhelming world public opinion. This meant that the five communist states came in and the Soviet

³⁰ *The Reporter*, January 26, 1956, pp. 15-17.

³¹ *Ibid.*, December 29, 1955.

Union got credit for admitting all the rest. That was bad enough, but Japan was left out and Chiang had antagonized most of the delegations.

A New UN. Against the best efforts of the United States a new United Nations had been created. The Soviet bloc was increased from 5 to 9. The Arab-Asian bloc, already strong, grew by six votes. Of the six "Western" entrants, two, Austria and Finland, were too effectively neutralized to be counted on. Most important, the Latin-American bloc of 20 votes lost its power to bloc two-thirds votes in the large Assembly. The Assembly would probably have an anti-colonial majority and the assumption that the wishes of the United States would nearly always prevail in it no longer held.

Washington Lag. This debacle in the UN was the sharpest penalty suffered by the United States for attempting to continue and to restore the Cold War after the Summit Conference, when it had actually changed the nature of the entire East-West struggle. With the H-bombs ruled out, the conflict had to seek new channels, a fundamental shift of which the Soviets took immediate advantage while Washington plodded on down the familiar track of the Cold War. This was natural since the great organs of public opinion formation had done such a massive job of indoctrination that the Cold War had become the breath of life to legions of our leading citizens.

Certainly men like Radford, Nixon and Dulles could not change their direction because of one conference which they did not want, however momentous its nature.

If our leaders could not quit the Cold War, the rest of the world was doing so. The same UN Assembly which warmly welcomed the 16 new members refused to elect our own candidate, the Philippines, to the Security Council. The Assembly was much more neutralist after the Summit Conference. We were successfully converting NATO forces for tactical A-bomb war, but Hanson Baldwin suspected, on December 18, that when the smaller countries grasped what it would mean to them they might not be "so enthusiastic about either nuclear strategy or NATO."

Three days later Mendès-France denied the NATO Council's charge that Soviet acts in the Middle East and Asia constituted a new threat. The Soviet Union was using its growing productive capacity for economic expansion of the kind the West had long practised. To reply with more armaments would be "to turn our backs on reality." He condemned the Baghdad Pact. On January 8 Tito also denounced it, saying: "I do not think it represents a wall against anyone," but it is a source of disunity.

As 1955 ended there was one welcome change in Washington from 1954, when the hatreds turned loose by the Cold War were at their worst and heresy hunting was the order of the day. In 1954, said Reston on December 25, Washington was "a mean city." It was divided, party from party, on "the irreconcilable issues of loyalty and treason to the republic." This was not all gone yet, "but the roar of 1954 was a whisper in 1955."

Here was a glimpse of the extent to which the effort to "contain" Russia and China and communism had poisoned our political life and the very well

springs of our personal liberties. Now the violence of our cold war fevers had subsided, but they had left a deep mark on the minds of other peoples.

Asia Suspicious. On December 26 Marquis Childs reported from Hong Kong that "the suspicion and distrust of Mr. Dulles in this part of the world seems well nigh universal." It was "a fact that cannot be ignored."³² His pactomania had alienated most of non-Communist Asia. After NATO had begun to disintegrate under the warmth of the more flexible tactics of Stalin's successors, Dulles insisted on putting together SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, in 1954 and 1955, to complete the ring of containment around both Russia and China. This looked like "defense" to Mr. Dulles, but not to non-Communist Asia. At year's end the Indian Institute of Public Opinion took a carefully prepared poll of 1500 people in West Bengal, India, and 32 per cent thought the United States was "wilfully preparing for a war of aggression." Only 2 per cent thought the Soviet Union guilty of the same plans. Only 15 per cent wanted to take sides in an American-Soviet war, and of these nearly all would help the Soviet side.³³

Cold War Positions Maintained. On Christmas day the usual White House message was sent to Eastern Europe to "recognize the trials under which you are suffering" and to "share your faith that right in the end will prevail to bring you again among the free nations of the world." When Khrushchev denounced this as "crude interference," not in accord with the spirit of Geneva, the White House rejoined that our liberation goal was permanent. The statement said: "The peaceful liberation of the captive peoples is, and, until success is achieved, will continue to be a major goal of United States foreign policy." Most quarters in Washington regarded this as normal.³⁴

At a meeting of the American Historical Association one speaker declared that the Soviet Government continued to wage war on its own people to remake them according to its blueprint, and on all other peoples to win the world for its system. Another speaker asserted that the Soviet peace offensive was motivated first by the urgency of avoiding a thermonuclear war and second by the hope of lulling Western nations into disarmament, permitting "an atomic Pearl Harbor."³⁵

Permanent Air Cover and Balloon Offensives. This was a "danger" difficult to counter, but measures were being taken. Columnist Roscoe Drummond asserted his belief in the accuracy of a description of our intercontinental bombers "droning constantly through the thin cold air" 40,000 feet or more aloft, "manned by hand-picked, well briefed crews, provided with pre-assigned targets and loaded with atomic bombs." If one of these hydrogen laden bombers crashed the bomb wouldn't go off.³⁶

On the offensive front, two kinds of balloons were sent floating over the Red lands. One was the propaganda balloons of Radio Free Europe, a

³² *The Nashville Tennessean*, December 26, 1955.

³³ A. M. Rosenthal, from New Delhi, the *New York Times*, January 10, 1956.

³⁴ *The New York Times*, December 31, 1955.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, December 29, 1955.

³⁶ *The Nashville Tennessean*, January 13, 1956. The *New York Times* carried a similar story by Anthony Leviero, a keen newsman, on January 12.

in this casual way," and "the shudders of self-styled neutrals could be heard from New Delhi to Belgrade." But in the midst of the storm Dulles was remote and detached from it. He had not "read" it, had not "seen" it, had no "precise recollection" of what he had said to the authors and didn't think it was "an exclusive interview."⁴¹

However, the tape recordings and his friendship with *Life's* publisher, Henry R. Luce, precluded total detachment from the article. On January 13 Dulles said that the statements specifically attributed to him did "not require correction from the standpoint of their substance."⁴²

This verified the two key paragraphs, which said: "You have to take chances for peace, just as you must take chances in war. Some say that we were brought to the verge of war. Of course we were brought to the verge of war. The ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art. If you cannot master it, you inevitably get into war. If you try to run away from it, if you are scared to go to the brink, you are lost. We've had to look it square in the face—on the question of enlarging the Korean war, on the question of getting into the Indo-China war, on the question of Formosa. We walked to the brink and we looked it in the face. We took strong action."

"It took a lot more courage for the President than for me," Dulles added. "His was the ultimate decision. I did not have to make the decision myself, only to recognize it. The President never flinched for a minute on any of these situations. He came up taut."

To Dulles this was axiomatic atomic diplomacy, but the *London Times*, on January 13, urged steps to end hydrogen bomb tests, to show the world that "far from relishing walking along the brink, the free powers still desire to free the world of its sickness and its madness."

On January 15, James Reston thought that Dulles had added "something new to the art of diplomatic blundering. This is the planned mistake. He doesn't stumble into booby traps; he digs them to size, studies them carefully, and then jumps."

As previous examples of Dulles' deliberate blunders Reston cited the "unleashing" of Chiang Kai-shek; the repeated "liberation" of the Russian satellites; the threat of "agonizing reappraisal" if France did not join EDC; the threat of "massive retaliation," which required a 2000 word clarification; and his statement in December 1955 describing Goa as a "province" of Portugal, just as he was planning to go to India.

As Democratic attacks on Dulles mounted, Vice President Nixon on January 16 dismissed the criticism as "all this yackety-yak," and on the 19th the President declared his complete faith in Dulles as "the best Secretary of State he had ever known."

On the other hand, Max Freedman wrote in the *Manchester Guardian* that by consenting to be blown up into a hero Dulles had done three serious injuries to American policy: (1) he had nearly destroyed the image of Eisenhower as the man of moderation able to veto "the headstrong excesses of American foreign policy," painting the President as "the resolute colleague of Mr. Dulles in flourishing the atomic bomb;" (2) he went far in confirming the accuracy of

⁴¹ The *New York Times*, January 13, 1956.

⁴² *Ibid.*, January 14, 1956.

Russia's descriptions of our diplomacy; and (3) there was a "deliberate and grievous absence of emphasis on the communion of ideas that alone can sustain the free world alliance."⁴³

"*Selective*" *Retaliation*. In addition to these heavy damages to our repute—at home, in the communist world, and among our allies as well as the neutrals—Dulles set down a highly dangerous formula for atomic war in his *Life* article. It reads: "Retaliation must be on a selective basis. The important thing is that the aggressor knows in advance that he is going to lose more than he can win. He doesn't have to lose much more. It just has to be *something* more. If the equation is such that the outcome is clearly going to be against him, he won't go in."

This is a mathematical formula for dealing with an inferior and poorly armed people, such as China was evidently thought still to be. But the Chinese are the most numerous people on the globe. They have great resources. They have the oldest civilization in the world and they have a strong, proud government for the first time in more than a century. It is directing their very great energies into industrializing and arming the country, forced draft.

The Dulles formula for applying exactly the right amount of atomic force is perfect if applied by only one side, but it is fatal if two sides use it.⁴⁴

Soviet Overtures Rejected. During January and February 1956 the Soviet peace offensive was featured by repeated efforts to secure a twenty year treaty of peace and cooperation with the United States. On January 25 Premier Bulganin proposed to President Eisenhower a draft of a treaty to develop "sincere cooperation and mutual understanding" on the basis of "mutual respect for state sovereignty and non interference in internal affairs," to settle all disputes by peaceful means, and to strengthen "economic, cultural and scientific cooperation."

Bulganin's cordial three column letter arguing for the treaty draft was answered by Eisenhower on January 28 in a friendly spirit. The President rejected the treaty on the ground that its objectives were all covered in detail in the UN Charter, that no progress had been made since the Summit Conference on the unification of Germany, his open skies proposal or increased contacts. Russia had also "in various areas of the world embarked upon a course which increases tensions by intensifying hatreds and animosities," a reference to Russia's intervention in the Middle East.⁴⁵

Bulganin replied cordially on February 2 in a long letter which said that the United States had signed a great many bilateral agreements since the war; that agreement between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. was essential to the proper functioning of the UN; that the U.S.S.R. had reduced its armed forces notably since Geneva, while others had not; that mutual aerophotography would increase the building of air fields if either side found that the other side had

⁴³ Reprinted in the *Nashville Tennessean*, January 21, 1956.

⁴⁴ Contemporaneously, General Ridgway attacked the stress on atomic bombs, saying that neither Russia nor China had yet developed into a complex industrial society which would be vulnerable to nuclear weapons. Also, mass destruction is "repugnant to the ideals of a Christian nation."—*The New York Times*, January 24, 1956.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, January 29, 1956.

more; that the West's intent to militarize all Germany and include it in NATO had made unification by agreement between East and West Germany essential; and that working together the two countries could create "conditions for a wide development of personal contacts between the citizens of our countries."

Adverse Drifts in Japan and Germany. In these first months of 1956 a succession of things undermined confidence in our military containment policy. On February 2 Foster Hailey reported to the *New York Times* that Japanese economists saw the United States losing the cold war battle of economic aid. A study made for the Japanese Economic Planning Board found that the Soviet Union was offering easier terms, taking payment in surplus commodities, not dictating how the money should be spent and not linking its aid to military commitments.

Six months later, on July 10, 1956, Hailey reported sweeping gains for the Socialists in an election for the Japanese upper house. They had increased their poll from 29.2 to 37.5 per cent and won enough seats to block the repeal of Japan's constitutional prohibition of war and armed forces, which General MacArthur had put into the constitution during the occupation. The returns appeared to bar the government from embarking on any full-scale build-up of armed forces, an interpretation in which the *London Daily Telegraph* of July 10 concurred. It said that any idea of "Japan balancing China's preponderance of power in Asia must be put back into the Pentagon's deep freeze." Japanese rearmament, like its counterpart in Western Germany, was "clearly going to be a much longer term project than Washington had hoped."

As the Japanese people evinced growing distaste for rearmament the West German Government refused to continue the upkeep of American and British troops in Germany after May 5. This would force Britain to find \$196,000,000 a year, which was not available, and the United States a larger sum. Moreover, Bonn expected us also to foot at least 30 per cent of Germany's new armament bill in the next three years. Finance Minister Fritz Schaeffer was remarkably clear about it. Washington and London had pushed West Germany into arming and should be willing to assume their share of the burden of the West German build-up. At the same time West Germany was reinvesting a higher proportion of its gross national product than any other capitalist nation—23 per cent.⁴⁶

On February 20 Adenauer's party lost control of the state of Rhine-Westphalia, costing him the two-thirds majority needed in the upper house at Bonn for constitutional arms legislation. On the same day the pro-Western government in Greece won a bare majority in a national election.

FROZEN AMERICAN POLICY

During the last half of February, the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party in Russia created such an atmosphere of confidence and strength that it led to a severe stock-taking in the West.

Salisbury wrote, on the 23rd, that the Soviet leaders were now striking at the

⁴⁶ M. S. Handler, the *New York Times*, February 9, 1956.

Stalinist system root and branch, boldly and resolutely. They were destroying the prestige of the secret police, by detailing its past misdeeds, and they were limiting its present functions. The Alsops agreed that they were "now genuinely and absolutely confident of their position."

In the West Reston found the exact opposite. There was a crisis of leadership, with Churchill out, Eden occupied with another economic squeeze and France paralyzed. There had been "a revolution of modern weapons which upset all the strategic calculations of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers," and it was now agreed that the new phase of the East-West struggle would be "fought out in the fields of political, economic and psychological warfare," but there was no effective strategy for this new phase.

To counter the general feeling of uneasiness and alarm, Dulles appeared before a hostile Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 24 and boldly denied that the West's position was worsening. One thing was certain: the unity of the free world had caused the Soviet policy to fail. This audacity led George Kennan to say that he did not recognize the world Mr. Dulles was talking about. On the same day, the 26th, Salisbury wrote that the Soviet Union now posed an awesome challenge. The storm signals were up and flying for all to see. The Russians had broken with the clichés of the Stalinist regime and they would now reopen the long barricaded avenues toward rapprochement with socialist and left wing movements everywhere. Their self confidence was startling, and with good reason in Hamilton's judgment. He added that the democratic cause had lost ground everywhere in recent months, but especially in Asia, which would rather pay its own way than accept aid with strings. Our keeping China out of the UN also damaged us heavily, along with the Soviet claim that they were not trying to force everybody or anybody to join their side. Anyone who had spent an afternoon in the delegates' lounge at the UN would attest the effectiveness of these arguments.

On the same day Lippmann also gave his usual long range appraisal of the changed situation. The Soviets had become fully competitive economically and could no longer be "contained." All the nations within the reach of Soviet power were now reacting by moving into some kind of neutralist position, which meant "the progressive dissolution of the ring of containing states which was put together by Mr. Acheson and following him by Mr. Dulles." In these circumstances the United States could not get political pledges, military agreements or even its own financial terms, in return for economic aid. A "radical re-examination, a deep rethinking, of all our current conceptions of foreign aid" was required.

A Shift Advised By Our Allies. As March opened the evidence of discontent with our deeply frozen policy accumulated. On the 1st, President Giovanni Gronchi of Italy told a joint session of Congress that military cooperation "should be supplemented with new and imaginative forms of cooperation." On the 4th, Washington was "Shaken by French Doubt on West's Policy." French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau had questioned the adequacy of Washington's leadership in economic and psychological competition between

the East and West more bluntly than Gronchi. Pineau believed that neutralism was growing in France, West Europe, the Middle East and Far East, and observers conceded that this was true even in Thailand.⁴⁷

On March 2, Philip E. Mosely, one of the best experts on Russia in the United States, summed up the situation by observing that Moscow's foreign policy appeared to be growing in flexibility while Washington's appeared to be increasingly rigid. The United States could not depend on military ties alone.

Change Urged by the President. The uneasiness over our weakening position was so great in Washington that some reporters compared it to the period when the Marshall Plan was being launched in 1947. Finally, at his press conference on March 7, President Eisenhower candidly stated his own belief that we were in a new phase of the East-West conflict. He reiterated his conviction that "global war is getting well nigh unthinkable." He thought the question of relaxing trade controls against China should be "studied every day" to avoid "getting rigidly fixed" about it. He thought the uneasy peace was going to take "a different direction." We were "going to get a very great broadening of the contest," one which "doesn't carry always the inherent threat of major war." We were "just in a very great campaign." We had to be "alert to every threat to us, to counter it more by positive measures that people throughout the world will trust, than just by trying to answer specific thrusts."

This was very close to saying that the policy of military containment had failed, and that the policy of "trying to answer specific thrusts" had "carried always the threat of major war." There was clear and explicit admission that "people throughout the world" did not trust our policies, and that we should get some that they would trust.

This was honest Eisenhower thinking, made on a public platform, away from his cold war advisers. Then he receded into their bosom again. Soon he was to spend a month in the hospital, following surgery, after which the approach of the 1956 election inhibited any important changes of policy, since the Republican right wing had to be kept in line.

Peripatetic Diplomacy. As the drift continued there was no longer any doubt that the Communists' export capacity had passed the show window stage. A *New York Times* editorial, on March 11, thought "we might have to forget about Russia for an hour or so at a time and put our minds on the constructive work of helping people who need help." Russia did not devise the evils we were trying to cure.

On the 15th Reston wrote about "the world's most powerful unguided missile," Secretary Dulles, who rushed about the world acting as negotiator and propagandist. When he was at home he was overwhelmed with accumulated problems, while the world changed and the free world cried for leadership. The President was "not forcing the necessary changes." He identified all the problems but did not deal with them. He operated the chief of staff system, but had no chief of staff for the Cold War. Both the French and the British, wrote Hamilton on the 18th, had been concerned about Dulles for

⁴⁷ Dana Adams Schmidt, the *New York Times*, March 5, 1956.

a long time, feeling that their senior partner had not matched the Soviet initiative in the Cold War. The "plain fact" was that the West was in danger of losing it—a judgment in which Lippmann concurred on the 19th. He wrote that Mr. Dulles should come home, stay there a while, stop making so many speeches, stop trying to be the voice of America and to produce a campaign platform for the Republicans.

Writing on our loquacious diplomacy, Arthur Krock explained two damaging effects of the ceaseless world tours of Dulles. They reduced to small proportions the responsibility and prestige of our career diplomats abroad, and at home his frequent long absences often broke the chain of decision in the department, leaving groups following different concepts and getting into conflict.⁴⁸

The same criticism was carried further by Dr. Henry M. Wriston, President-Emeritus of Brown University and a high adviser to the State Department on administrative problems.

After detailing the new considerations which lead all foreign ministers to travel, and noting that Dulles did not originate the practice, he concluded that frequent absences by the Secretary of State hampered the department in securing appropriations, in its highly essential contacts with Congress, and in its relations with foreign ambassadors stationed in Washington. Even more important, frequent absences by the Secretary deprived the President of needed advice, and the Secretary of needed influence with him, while causing the Secretary himself to lose broad understanding of the problems he must solve. The vital requisites for the discharge of his duties are "perspective and wisdom," qualities which find their most effective employment "when there is at least a modicum of leisure for quiet reflection."⁴⁹

Rigidity vs. Flexibility. As March ended, Nehru denounced our pacts to a cheering parliament as encircling India. Referring to the guided missile race, the Pope warned the nations to end "this homicidal, this suicidal madness." Moscow University wanted to exchange a professor and a few students with Harvard, but some of our officials feared fingerprinting trouble and conceding respectability to the Soviets. On April 3, French Premier Guy Mollet sharply criticized United States' tactics. It was a wrong approach to German unification to refuse to put disarmament first. He had never believed there was a menace of Soviet aggression. To which Harold Callender added, on the 4th, that the French leaders were convinced that Frenchmen for the most part thought Moscow had made great efforts for an understanding with the West, but that the West had made none.

From Hong Kong, Keyes Beech cabled to the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* that for a year our policy in Asia had "stood still, frozen stiff, inflexible, in the military mold of the post-Korean war." By contrast, Soviet Russia, especially in South East Asia, had been "relaxed, yielding, flexible, moving ahead." Embarrassing though it was to report, it was America that appeared to want

⁴⁸ *The New York Times*, April 10, 1956.

⁴⁹ Henry M. Wriston, "The Secretary of State Abroad," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1956, pp. 523-67; the *Nashville Tennessean*, July 13, 1956.

to maintain East-West tension and the Communists who seemed to want to relax it.

This was borne out by the Administration's request for a two billion dollar increase in *military* aid, which drew sharp comments from a House Committee on March 22. On April 10 the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade in Geneva invited West Europeans to look to Moscow for their needs where dollar aid ran out, and the economists on the spot took him seriously. On the 22nd, George Kennan observed that since 1949 we had suffered from "over militarization of our thinking about the cold war," and unless we could change soon, and drastically, "our whole approach to foreign affairs," including "the attitude of our people generally," we must "expect a continued tendency toward the reduction of our prestige and influence throughout the world."

On the same day two important groups of leaders were polled at a breakfast meeting in Washington. Of 81 editors, 68 thought that recent developments made war less likely and they voted 54 to 27 that the United States was losing the Cold War. Of an equivalent number of important guests at the meeting—members of the Supreme Court, Congress, the Cabinet, White House staff and executive officials—there was similar agreement that war was less likely and a 43 to 26 vote that we were losing the Cold War.⁵⁰

These polls reflected accurately the mounting evidence that we had lost the Cold War. Kennan, one of the chief architects of the containment policy, was right in saying that our prestige and influence would continue to decline throughout the world until we could "change the attitude of our people generally." This was just the trouble, for the people could not be heated up for years by all the agencies of opinion formation, led by the Government, and then quickly cooled off when the Cold War failed. After ten years, hates and fears and habits of thinking were deeply grooved.

The process of ending the Cold War was very painful, especially to the Government, which had powered the whole struggle. It could take place only by slow degrees, as deep-seated belligerent drives yielded imperceptibly to the imperative necessity of making peace. Yet on April 27 Reston detected a clear change in the tone of the Administration's foreign policy. A new note was being sounded on neutralism, pacts, NATO, atomic energy and disarmament, but as yet there was no change in *actions*, there was no reduction in arms spending. However, it was progress when the President could tell the assembled editors that "the world changes and in these days it changes rapidly. A policy that was good six months ago is not necessarily now of any validity. It is necessary that we find better, more effective ways of keeping ourselves in tune with the world's needs."

Thus for the second time in two months the President revealed his understanding that we were out of step with the rest of the world.

World-Wide Criticism. During April the *New York Times*, which editorially was one of our strongest cold war organs, made a major effort to find out what other peoples thought about our foreign policy, and what might be done about it. In all parts of the world its unexcelled staff of newsmen interviewed both

⁵⁰ *The New York Times*, April 22, 1956.

foreign and American officials, and other observers. The results were published in six articles, from April 8 to 15 inclusive, 1956.

"Europe Finds U.S. Policy Too Rigid," said the first headline. Europeans, summarized Harold Callender, applauded the Marshall Plan and NATO, but they thought the United States had become the prisoner of its cold war slogans, and that the professional diplomats should have more independence in shaping policy. There was "a virtually universal disposition to blame Secretary of State Dulles for taking too rigid positions; for speaking too often, too extemporaneously and without due regard for the ideas and interests of the other allies; for confusing his own reflections or impulses with settled Western policy." Much of our rigidity was attributed to a moralistic and semi-religious coloration given to the United States' policy by Mr. Dulles. The makers of our foreign policy were "widely suspected of failing fully to recognize that Stalin is dead" and that the strategy of at least the tactics of Moscow had changed.

From the Middle East, Sam Pope Brewer reported that the United States had "unquestionably lost heavily in prestige and friendship in the last few years," and the trend was continuing. In all these countries a criticism frequently heard was "that the United States focuses all its attention on the fight against communism, and opposes even commercial relations with the Soviet Union and its satellites." These countries believed that "the United States exaggerates the Red menace and they suspect mercenary motives behind the objections to their trade with the Soviet bloc."

A. M. Rosenthal wrote from Ceylon, where a national election had just resulted in a crushing defeat of the openly pro-Western Government. (The new Cabinet took over control of the great British bases there, though it eventually permitted a limited call use by the British.) Asians did not believe that Americans realized "that good will toward the United States is ebbing." The main trouble was that the Russians had grasped the enormous emotional and political drive behind nationalism, while the United States was largely immobilized by its desire not to offend imperialist allies. Its penchant for bolstering dictatorial governments, just because they are in power and anti-communist, was also a continuing drag. Continuously rising wages and profits in the United States threatened to wreck our ability to compete with the Soviet Union in the economic struggle for Asia. The Soviets were willing to make sacrifices, and all discussions of the problem led to the conclusion that "the United States will have to spend still more money and share still more of its wealth with Asia." Doing so generously in India would enable her to compete with China's totalitarian economy.

From Singapore, Robert Alden concurred in recognizing that colonialism is dead and that the United States must denounce it in clear terms. Throughout South East Asia the hatred of war was "a dominant force," so much so that "an end should be made to the continual United States' talk about its armed might, its military alliances and its atomic striking power." Our "saber-rattling" contrasted sharply with the constantly expressed communist desire for peace. Also, "the United States should cut down sharply on the talk about communism." Our "harping" on it gave Asians the "impression that the

United States is a narrow minded and undemocratic nation." Communism was not yet a bad word in Asia. South East Asians were afraid that SEATO might cause rather than prevent a war.

From Tokyo, Robert Trumbull, speaking from North East Asia, said there was too much American talk of war and not enough of peace, too much accent on military strength and not enough on the economic and social advancement of the area, a lack of tact in administering aid programs and anxiety about the Formosa question.

In his summary article, James Reston reported that government officials rejected and resented these criticisms, but that non-government observers in Washington generally agreed with them. He estimated that in the four years of the Eisenhower Administration it would spend 146 billion dollars on armaments, 11 billions on military aid to allies and 7 billions on economic aid.

Reston found that the Administration had been the prisoner of its own slogans in the 1952 campaign, and afterwards. The Republicans had exploited heavily the fact that China was taken over by the communists during Truman's last term, and "the fierce antipathy among the people to the bloodshed in Korea." Success attending these efforts, they had placed pro-Chiang figures high in the Administration and continued to talk belligerently, thus becoming frozen between these right-wing Republicans and our allies, who wanted to recognize Communist China. From Morocco to Malaya there had been much "muddling through," not much of it successful. For these results Dulles was responsible, except when an issue of peace or war arose and the President took charge. The rest of the time Dulles' "weakness for trying to please the side he is talking to at the moment" had operated along with his "fatal flaw of talking and moralizing too much."

NEUTRALITY APPROVED, CONDEMNED AND ACCEPTED

How hard it was to move the President's assistants out of their cold war trenches was illustrated by a run-around on the subject of neutrality in June and July 1956.

It was one of our leading cold war tenets that all those governments which failed to join our alliances were morally guilty of failing to take part in the war on sin. Moreover, they were probably on the way to supping with the Red devil himself. This was a somewhat surprising doctrine from a nation which had fought two wars to defend its right to be neutral, retreating into a self-righteous isolation after World War I in denial of the principle of collective security. But for ideological-power reasons we had gone the whole way in repudiating the right of neutrality.

Neutrality Accepted by the President. This extreme position was also working against us, enabling the Soviet Union to include everybody not in our alliances in the "camp of peace," and making the non-aligned tend to accept membership in that camp. So at his press conference on June 7 the President tried to soften our fixation about the un-committed by an opening speech on neutrality, in which he recalled our long history of neutrality and observed

that the current neutrals were not necessarily neutral between "right and wrong or decency and indecency." Then he said:

"If a nation is truly a neutral, if it is attacked by anybody—and we are not going to attack them—public opinion of the world is outraged.

"If it has announced its military association with another great power, things could happen to it, difficulties along its borders, and people would say, 'good enough for it.' They asked for it.

"So let us not translate this meaning of the word 'neutral' as between contending military forces, even though the conflict is latent, and neutral as between right and wrong."

Continuing, he said that Dulles was "going to deliver a talk to try to bring all of these details out, etch them clearly in simple form for us." It would be "a definite attempt to bring this down to realities, to specifics, so we can all understand it."

This exposition delighted the neutrals, but alarmed many of our 42 allies, and the White House soon explained that the President had not meant to frighten anyone out of alliance with us, much less to repudiate the collective security principle embodied in NATO and SEATO. "In other words," said Edward R. Murrow on June 8, "the President was represented as meaning that while our military allies are safer because of their alliance with us, the allies of the Soviet Union and Red China are not."

Neutrality "Immoral" to Dulles. Then on June 9 Dulles delivered his speech at Ames, Iowa, to bring the whole thing down "to specifics." The chief practitioner of "pactomania" declared that our mutual assistance treaties

"with forty-two countries of America, Europe and Asia . . . abolish as between the parties, the principle of neutrality, which pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others. This has increasingly become an obsolete conception and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and shortsighted conception."

After this denunciation of neutrality as "obsolete" and "immoral," which came early in the speech, Dulles spent the remainder of the time extolling the principle of mutual security, justifying the need for "forces in being" and their huge cost. Was the "cost to go on for ever . . . totalling about \$40,000,000,000 a year"? Yes, "so long as the danger persists." The time when the danger would become less might come, but, said his closing line, "until that time is here, the clear patriotic duty is to hold fast that which has proved good."

This was the speech which the President had expected would explain to our people that neutrality was not necessarily obsolete and immoral. Naturally the Dulles speech "offended those countries, chief among them India, who (were) trying to chart a neutral course for themselves."³¹ There

³¹ Charles Collingwood, CBS Radio, 7:45 P.M., CDT, July 11, 1956.

were also Sweden, Ireland, Austria, Finland, Burma, Indonesia, nearly all the Arab states, and even a few in South America.

When asked to reconcile the total difference between his statement and the President's, at his press conference on June 12, Dulles maintained "that there is no difference whatever between the President and myself on this subject. I had a long discussion with him in the course of other matters on Thursday afternoon and I can assure you that there is no difference whatever in our points of view"—upon which Murrow commented, on June 12, that there was "a whale of a difference in their art of showing sympathy for the views of others."

Pressed further, Dulles would exclude only Switzerland from the category of immoral neutrals and he refused directly to add India and Indonesia to the category of moral neutrals.

Condemned by Nixon. Then, on July 3, Vice President Nixon took up the cudgels in Manila, as he opened a tour of the Far East, warning of the perils of neutralism and explaining at length how we had learned through two world wars to abandon it. He granted the right of each nation to chart its own course, but warned against the "brand of neutralism that makes no moral distinction between the Communist world and the free world. With this viewpoint, we have no sympathy." How could one feel the same "toward those who treat alike nations that believe in God and honor, religion and morality, and nations that boast of atheism and the rule of force and terror alone?"

On June 7 the President had urged us not to "translate" the meaning of the word "neutral . . . as between right and wrong." On July 3 Nixon insisted on doing just that, with a vengeance.

His Manila statement drew from Nehru the comment that the views of Nixon and Dulles "are not wise and they do little good." We do not believe, said Nehru, that "the world can be divided up into good and evil To say that we should all think alike is not at all possible. It is not democratic, either, to want all people to think the same as you do." Since this was what Dulles and Nixon meant, "they are saying something opposed to the democratic way of life." Their views "limit our thoughts and prevent us from seeing things we should see and understand." He objected both to communist regimentation and non-communist regimentation, and to the use of the word "neutralism" because "it is a word normally used in wartime."⁵²

Two days later, in Pakistan, Nixon warned all countries against accepting any form of economic or military assistance from the Soviet Union. The purpose of such aid was to make satellites, whereas our purpose in giving military and economic aid was to maintain freedom. Referring to the frequent complaint that our aid is given with strings, he said: "Soviet aid is not given with strings, but with a rope. Any country taking assistance from the Soviet runs almost certain risk of having that rope tied around its neck."⁵³

⁵² AP from London, the *Nashville Tennessean*, July 8, 1956.

⁵³ *The New York Times*, July 10, 1956. This was a variation of Dulles' statement on March 23 that "Communist economic lures generally go with a hook and line that leads to Moscow or Peking."

No Immoral Neutrals. By this time Dulles and Nixon had done all that they could to defeat the President's desire to lessen our self-defeating hostility to the neutrals. Actually they had over-reached themselves and demonstrated fully the futility of continuing this line of attack.

Dulles realized this when he faced the questioning newsmen on July 11. He did not think that Nixon had actually made that rope around the neck statement in Karachi. When told that the State Department text said that he did, Dulles still "didn't understand it that way."

Asked if he still believed that neutralism is immoral, he thought the kind that was indifferent to the fate of others was. To the query how a nation expressed its concern for others, he replied that it did so through membership in the United Nations. Then the question was twice pressed upon him—didn't this mean "that hardly any country would be considered to be immoral in its neutral policy?" To this he replied: "I think there are very few, if any . . ."

Favorable International Evolution. This press conference was of considerable historical significance on two other counts. Discussing the changes going on in the Soviet orbit, Dulles said: "I believe the forces that are now working are going to prove irresistible . . . I believe this second post-war decade in which we are will see these new forces take charge of the situation and that we can really hopefully look forward to a transformation of the international scene."

Leading by Example. This was almost equivalent to calling off the ten-year cold war crusade for dealing with the dangerous Red bear. Gone also was all thought of liberating the communist peoples. He "finished watering down" the principle of liberation which he had stressed so heavily in his early days in office.⁵⁴

Asked what, if anything, we could do to help along the new forces at work in Russia he replied, after discussing the Poznan revolt in Poland:

"I believe that the most we can do is to adhere to the old historic American tradition of setting an example of the good fruits of freedom . . . I believe that the best thing we can do is to show by our conduct and example how good are the fruits of this kind of society, and that it is just that example which will be most influential."

For a decade we had been engaged almost constantly in efforts to frustrate the purposes of others, to "liberate" the communist realms, and to line up everybody on our side. In this decade we had also used extreme measures of investigation, prosecution and social ostracism to suppress domestic dissenters in every realm—the entertainment world, press, education and other occupations—and to force all into a mold of cold-war conformity. In this process the mightiest democracy ever to exist on this planet had convinced most of the world—enemies, allies and neutrals alike—that we did not believe in freedom, and we had consequently greatly expanded the number of neutrals who refused to line up on our side.

Finally, on July 12, 1956, after ten years of strain and strife, nuclear arms race and ideological war, our chief leader in the conflict admitted that there

⁵⁴ Collingwood, *supra*.

were no immoral neutrals, that "irresistible" changes were moving in the abhorred part of the world which should transform the international scene, and that our best and only course was to "adhere to the old historic American tradition of setting an example of the good fruits of freedom."

Of course, Mr. Dulles would stoutly have maintained that this happy ending of the gigantic conflict was the result of the intense pressures, or counter pressures, which he had led us in exerting against the "enemy." But the fact remained that all of the saving results which he recorded had come about *after* the Communists had achieved balancing "positions of strength" with us in nuclear armed strength, in industrial power and diplomatic initiative. The pity remained that after 1945 we could not have depended more on the mighty power of "the old historic American tradition of setting an example of the good fruits of freedom." It was this example which for a century and a half had drawn all men unto us—until we developed a great fear of another way of life, and of the "conspiratorial," "subversive" power of its ideas.

RAPID CHANGE IN RUSSIA AND THE SATELLITES

The acceptance by the Secretary of State of neutralism and the fact of irresistible evolutionary change in the communist lands helped to remove the United States from what Clifton Daniel, Assistant Foreign Editor of the *New York Times*, termed our "unyielding policy" toward what might be a Soviet Union changing for the better. When Russia gave Austria a more generous peace treaty than expected, we seemed taken aback and dubious. After demanding reduction of Soviet armed forces for years, we stood back and said "We don't believe it!" when they finally announced heavy cuts. We were uncertain about permitting our citizens to visit Russia after they started lifting the iron curtain, and about letting General Nathan Twining go to view the Russian air force, after many complaints about Soviet refusals to let us see what they had. We complained also about Soviet aid to underdeveloped countries, after terming them "niggardly" for years for their refusal to aid.

Daniel quoted a British friend who said about our policy, "You seem to have lost your best enemy."⁵⁵

This appeared to be our predicament when the Soviet Twentieth Party Congress in February denounced Stalinism and speeded its dissolution.

After an extensive visit to Russia and many talks with Soviet officials, Professor Harold J. Berman of the Harvard Law School described a steady campaign to strengthen both law and legal procedure ever since Stalin's death. He listed six important reforms, all directed toward the curtailment and control of the secret police, and to improving Soviet justice—"profound changes," he called them. The Soviet Government was trying "to create a working totalitarianism which will satisfy the needs of the Russian people for justice in their personal and social relations, without altering the leadership's monopoly of political and ideological power."⁵⁶

The Russian police apparatus, said Salisbury, "has been subjected to such

⁵⁵ *The Nashville Tennessean*, June 10, 1956.

⁵⁶ Harrison Salisbury, the *New York Times*, December 16, 1955; Harold J. Berman, "Soviet Legal Reforms; Steps Toward Justice," *The Nation*, June 30, 1956.

a going-over as it hasn't had since Alexander II replaced Nicholas I as Czar of Russia about one hundred years ago." This was essential to further Soviet progress, since the Stalinist system was stifling initiative and growth. It was not only a matter of one Stalin dead, but of thousands of little Stalins holding everything in a rigid mold. This was why the Soviets were "shifting away from compulsion towards persuasion and rewards," an enormous task which required much high explosive to blast away hardened habits.⁵⁷

Anti-Communists not Reassured. This process of liberalization did not reassure the strongest American opponents of communism. In May, thirty-nine of them held a symposium in which they concluded: (1) that the new Soviet tactics represented the gravest danger ever to confront the West; (2) that they reflected strength and confidence in Russia rather than weakness; and (3) that they did not "denote any abandonment of the messianic Soviet program for universal conquest."

This symposium report was headed "The Great Pretense" and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover summed it up by warning that "Behind those changing spots, the same bad blood flows through the leopard's veins." The House Un-American Activities Committee issued the report.⁵⁸

Khrushchev's Denunciation of Stalin Published. On June 4, 1956, the State Department published the text of the two-day speech denouncing Stalin which Khrushchev had delivered in mid-February. In it he described Stalin as a man who had killed 5000 loyal military officers in the great purges before World War II and bungled Russian defense in its early stages. In his last years he had been guilty of every kind of crime against human liberty, using the secret police to torture confessions out of good communists, killing and imprisoning countless innocents, filling slave labor camps with people suspected of a few thoughts of their own, and preparing to destroy the last of his old associates in a new blood bath. He had spent his last years in a miasma of fears about treachery and disloyalty.⁵⁹

Soviet Reforms Insufficient. Three years earlier such a wholesale denunciation of Stalin's police state methods by his successors would have seemed an unbelievable miracle, to be joyously welcomed. When it actually happened there was a strong tendency to say that nothing had really changed, since the Soviets had not come all the way over to our system. On June 6, the *New York Times* observed editorially that Khrushchev's speech "rejects democracy" and that one man or a group still "have the power to impose their will upon a people, regardless of the people's will." On June 8, Columnist Roscoe Drummond wrote that the Communist dictatorship had spawned Stalin and that his crimes "can happen all over again." In London, on June 21, former President Truman cautioned "that the common danger has rarely been greater." He doubted that the new Soviet leaders had "really cast out the old Adam."

In Moscow Jack Raymond found "an outpouring of new decrees and promises to improve working conditions of the people and to relax police

⁵⁷ *The New York Times*, June 10, 1956.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, May 20, 1956.

⁵⁹ The Khrushchev speech occupies four pages in the *New York Times* for July 5, 1956, including some illustrative material.

controls." There was hardly a person to be met who did not feel, "in sight and sound, the break with the Stalin era, the new mood of tolerance for the individual, the freer and more original repartee in conversation."⁶⁰

Liberalization in East Europe. On the same day, May 20, Sydney Gruson reported from Warsaw that among the satellites Poland was first in the rush to liberalize the regimes. Some leaders felt they might be moving too fast. Poland had "undergone a stirring upheaval" in the last few months. There was a spectacular change in the press, a most significant restriction of the secret police and the first steps toward an independent judiciary. He saw no alternative to communist rule.

In Hungary, on May 7, John MacCormac could find no faith in U.S. liberation, but much criticism of the unrealistic Western radio, especially Radio Free Europe, an evaluation in which Sulzberger concurred on the 14th. Our radio broadcasts put out information that was "entirely inaccurate or ridiculously late." He concluded that "much that we broadcast no longer has any bearing on reality. Many political émigrés make good money compiling useless material." On the 30th he noted that the Voice of America was often confused in the minds of listeners with Radio Free Europe, which practised "differing forms of exhortatory propaganda, political subversion, or mere reflection of émigré views."

Earlier, on December 5, 1955, Jack Raymond had reported that many diplomats in East Europe sharply criticized our radio propaganda, both official and unofficial. They said that "some material broadcast was ridiculous as well as tendentious and that it only served to undermine the peoples' opinion of the United States."

On April 18, 1956, the communists had abolished their propaganda organization, the Cominform, designed to unify and guide the activities of the communist parties in the Soviet orbit, Italy and France, acknowledging tacitly that it was no longer effective or useful.

On June 3, Flora Lewis found that the Czechs had no thought of revolt, or of a return to a big business system. They wanted personal freedoms, but welcomed the welfare state aspects of communism and its socially fluid features. The peasants were clinging to their land. On the 24th, from Warsaw, she described "a second revolution" in progress. This was "no idle phrase." Its implications were so tremendous that it could endure only if it swept the other communist countries.⁶¹

Revolt in Poznan. On June 28 there was a revolt of the workers in Poznan, Poland, which was put down only at the cost of several hundred casualties. Officially only 60 were killed, but Western eyewitnesses put the number much higher. The original source of the revolt was too high work norms in an auto factory, together with too little food and other consumers' goods. It began with strikes and parades and ended in armed efforts to take over the city, as thousands of Western visitors to the Poznan fair fled homeward.

On July 1 the *New York Times* described the sinister empire of Stalin as

⁶⁰ *The New York Times*, May 20, 1956.

⁶¹ *The New York Times Magazine*, June 3, 24, 1956.

now "convulsed by the shock of profound change." The Poznan revolt was "clear notice of the difficulties to be faced in attempting to release the enormous popular pressures so long pent-up under Stalin."

Some 300 Poznan rioters were arrested for trial, with promises that there would be justice, but not vengeance. On July 6 the first of four refunds for excessive income taxes collected over the past three years was made to the workers of Poznan. The Minister of the Motor Industry was ousted. From Poznan, Gruson reported that the over-emphasis on heavy industry had been so great that the job of easing the economic plight of the people was a vast problem. It would require both economic and political changes. The *Manchester Guardian Weekly* correspondent concluded, on July 19, that the industrialization of Poland and Hungary had been at the expense of the workers, not the peasants, who were better off than before the war. Now they would have to be bribed to produce more food, or resources must be diverted to import it. In the cities real wages had risen little since 1949.

This was admitted by Edward Ochab, the Polish Communist party leader, on July 20, in a speech which declared that the Poznan riots could not "serve as justification of any attempt to turn aside the process of democratization." Confessing important faults in the execution of the Six Year Plan, he also blamed "many billions" of arms expenditure due to the Korean war situation, "the war preparations in West Germany and the anti-Polish revisionary hue and cry."

The validity of this factor is also not questionable. The Cold War must have pressed upon Poland with especial weight, since any German armed resurgence, or any European war, would put her in mortal peril.

Autonomy for the Satellites? There seemed to be no question about a much larger degree of independence for the communist satellite governments. This was ensured by Tito's dramatic and complete reconciliation with Moscow. Courted first in Belgrade and then given a triumph in Russia, Tito's independent brand of communism, already evolved sharply away from Stalin's mold, was fully approved and made legitimate. After that there was no way to avoid a freer evolution in the other satellites. They could be counselled, restrained, helped, but not closely controlled. For that matter the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Justice was abolished on June 2 and its functions devolved upon the ministries of justice of the sixteen Soviet republics. Other ministries were to be decentralized in the same way.

By this time there could not be any doubt that evolution throughout the Soviet orbit was moving rapidly in the direction of more freedom for the individual, less police control, with the object of releasing "the enormous reservoirs of natural incentives and creative talents which had for so long been dammed up by Stalin's iron controls."⁶²

More Independent Western Red Parties? Nor did this favorable evolution stop at the iron curtain. Following the acceptance of Tito's independence, the publication of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin threw the communist parties of the West into a profound crisis. They all issued statements expressing

⁶² Harrison Salisbury, the *New York Times*, July 1, 1956.

their chagrin and disillusionment, questioning also where the current Soviet leaders had been during Stalin's crimes. In his statement the Italian Red leader, Togliatti, coined the word "polycentrism" to describe the future status of the communist parties, and the left wing Socialist leader Nenni, long allied with the Reds, came out flatly for democratic socialism.⁶³

It would be many a year before the people of the West would trust their communist parties to be really national, after their long record of attempting to carry out orders from Moscow. Nevertheless, it did not seem likely that these parties could return entirely to their old subservience, or even that Moscow would wish to try to use them for its purpose in the same way. In the days of Soviet communism's weakness, when the "capitalist encirclement" was real and dangerous, there was a reason for trying to use the foreign parties as a defensive tool for the "Socialist motherland," one which did not continue to exist where the Soviet Union was secure, growing in power and surrounded by communist allies.

UNILATERAL ARMS REDUCTION

It was from this vastly changed position that the Soviet Government announced, on May 14, 1956, that it would reduce its armed forces by 1,200,000 men within a year, "in addition to the reduction of 640,000 men carried out in 1955." The Russian statement catalogued many steps in recent disarmament negotiations in which it was alleged that the West always reversed itself whenever the Soviet Union accepted its position. It had often been claimed also that the arms race had to go on until the German problem and others were settled. Thus there was always a vicious circle, ending in what was called "the fruitless mess" in the UN Disarmament Subcommittee.

On the other hand, the statement said that "a wide zone of peace, including . . . the majority of the earth's population had been formed." "Today everybody acknowledges that of late an easing of tension in international relations has been achieved. The fires of war which quite recently threatened to develop into a new world conflict have been extinguished." Nevertheless, "monstrously inflated militarism" remained, taking funds from peaceful construction, economic development, the needs of education and health and aid for the underdeveloped countries.

Accordingly the Soviet Union proposed to disarm unilaterally to the extent of disbanding 1,200,000 men, dissolving three air divisions, putting 375 warships into reserve, closing several military schools and reducing both its military equipment and its military budget.

For the future the Soviet Union would strive persistently to achieve agreement on the reduction of armed forces and the banning of atomic weapons, for "the abolition of all kinds of artificial barriers" between states, for "a thoroughgoing extension of trade relations," and to "live in peace and friendship" with all neighbors.

Would They Make A-Bombs? This move, though anticipated in Washington since April 24, was met with a skeptical attitude. "The United States Government took a 'show me' attitude," reported Dana Adams Schmidt. Dulles saw

⁶³ *The New York Times*, June 24, 26, 1956.

some gain, but feared the released men might go into war industries. Asked at his press conference if he would not prefer to have the Soviet Union keep these men in their armed forces, he replied: "Well its a fair conclusion that I would rather have these men standing around doing guard duty than making atomic bombs."⁶⁴

It was at once pointed out that Soviet military strength would not be reduced, since so much now depended on H-bombers and missiles. To the contrary, Soviet overall strength would be markedly increased, by getting these men off the budget and putting them to productive work. No one could find any cause for rejoicing in the development, though Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson did say it was a step in the right direction. However, he hastened to add that there must be no defense lag here.

Could Our Containment Ring Be Maintained? The move was acutely embarrassing to the United States, since its existing level of 2,814,632 men in the armed forces⁶⁵ was thought to be the minimum necessary to man the world-wide system of foreign bases around the communist world. This global network embraced 900 foreign stations and required 1,000,000 men to man them.⁶⁶

How then could the United States respond with a substantial cut in its armed forces and budget? Far from doing that, the Congress was deeply engrossed with charges and fears that the Soviets were outstripping us in the air, and it was in the process of forcing an increase of almost a billion dollars more in the Air Force budget than had been asked for. The armament trend in Washington was up sharply, not down.

In these circumstances Washington did not welcome the Soviet move but began preparing a similar one. For years we had been demanding "deeds, not words" and trying to match the huge Soviet ground forces in Europe. That effort had failed long ago, but now that the Soviet forces were being cut in response to NATO's failure, new weapons and lessened tension, snowballing effects were foreseen in Europe.

Western Europe, which had never held our stringent view of the Soviet menace, would insist on cutting conscription terms and saving money. West Germany, which did not want to rearm, might have diminishing faith in Adenauer's policy of arming to push the Reds East. France was already fully immobilized in Algeria. Even Britain, which had strained herself heroically to be our junior partner in arms, was caught in an inflation squeeze and could find any considerable relief only in bringing some of her divisions home from Germany and putting them to work.

American Arms Cuts Proposed. It was feared also that the impact of the Soviet example would eventually cross the ocean and make itself felt in the United States. It would be asked why we should continue to conscript our sons to send overseas to defend people who didn't want to be defended, and who increasingly invited us to go home. How could we maintain so many

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, May 15, 20, 1956. ⁶⁵ Anthony Levero, the *New York Times*, July 15, 1956.

⁶⁶ Benjamin Welles, the *New York Times*, August 14, 1955; Hanson W. Baldwin, *ibid.*, February 15, 1957.

bases around the Soviets when the base countries were increasingly nervous about our presence? Why should we continue to tax ourselves so heavily when everyone else was relaxing? Would we not convict ourselves finally of preserving tension and retarding peace?

These were inexorable questions. Yet we had girded ourselves "for the duration." The Cold War had not been won, and we had taught ourselves that if the Soviets had the power they would kill most of us in a sneak attack at any time. Now they substantially had that power.

When the strength of these emotional drives was considered it seemed certain that the lag before we began to reduce our forces would be stubborn and long. Yet on July 13 and 15, 1956, Anthony Leviero of the *New York Times* broke a story from the Pentagon that Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was seeking an 800,000 man cut in our forces by 1960. The other three chiefs were opposed, and the political implications were so great that a stop order had been imposed until after the 1956 election in November.

The implications were grave indeed, since such a move would mean a sharp down-grading of our alliance system and an almost total reliance on nuclear weapons. This, it was argued, would mean that the side which had kept conventional forces would win, on the assumption that neither side would dare to begin using nuclear weapons in a small war. On the other hand, there was a growing belief that maintaining both nuclear and conventional forces would mean "defense budgets so high as to be astronomical." Some estimates held that a boost of the defense budget from 36 billions to 48 would be necessary. This would mean tax increases instead of cuts. Therefore, "cautiously but inexorably United States policy appears to be moving toward fewer ground forces in Europe."⁶⁷

There would be much argument and great resistance before American power began to retract from the global mission which the Truman Doctrine gave it, but the forces compelling it were indeed relentless.

The American elements with deep vested interests in the Cold War, ideological or material, had done their best to revive it after the Summit Conference. But a year later it was plain that they had failed. The deep aversion of the world to the Cold War was increased sharply by the Dulles "brink of war" article in January, and the desire for peace and relaxation was further fortified by the liberalization campaigns in the Soviet orbit and by the Soviet example in reducing its armed forces.

No Retreat From the Summit. At the end of the first post-Summit year the basic decision taken in July 1955, to put nuclear war aside and compete by other means, had been put increasingly into effect, but mainly on the initiative of the Soviet Union. Aside from our fine enterprise in sponsoring the atoms for peace conference in August, American policy had drifted in ineffective resistance to the main stream.

The United States still had to work out policies for the long pull of increasingly competitive coexistence with a new and abhorred way of life, one powerfully entrenched in the vast bulk of Eurasia.

⁶⁷ Edward L. Dale, Jr., the *New York Times*, July 17, 1956.

THE REVOLUTIONS IN POLAND AND HUNGARY

OCTOBER 1956

THE year which followed the close of the Summit Conference, in July 25, 1955, was an infinitely precious one. For the first time in nearly ten years people all over the world lifted their heads and breathed freely again, not of pure air, for it was all radioactive by this time, but in the belief that it would not become fatally poisoned by continued and finally cataclysmic nuclear explosions.

It was an immense relief to live again without being in constant dread that the power struggle would end in the dropping of the bombs and the ascension of the deadly mushrooms. The danger was not gone, but the promise of Geneva gave all men reason to hope that sanity would prevail and that there would be a surcease from high tension and fear. It seemed that humanity might mature fast enough to survive the nuclear age.

Almost exactly a year later the Poznan riots and the Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal signalled explosions inside both of the grand alliances. The two blow-ups came simultaneously at the end of October, bringing strain and danger again and leading to the onset of a new cold war in January 1957.

This grave blow to mankind's hopes was due to the shattering effects of de-Stalinization in East Europe, and to the inability of American diplomacy to leave its cold war grooves.

The year after the Summit meeting was a golden moment which should have been seized to push the making of peace strongly, while the Geneva irons were hot, or at least warm. Instead of that, the President at once turned the direction of affairs over to Mr. Dulles again and on August 24 and 25 all of our cold war demands were vigorously reasserted. Unconditional surrender on the question of German unity was demanded. Ignominious defeat was suffered on the UN membership issue in December, just before Mr. Dulles celebrated his record in the "necessary art" of advancing to the brink of war.

Thereafter the politics of the presidential election took the stage in 1956 until Dulles' spasmodic handling of President Nasser of Egypt precipitated the seizure of the Suez Canal in July 1956, the event which triggered the twin explosions.

REVOLUTION IN POLAND

The Poznan revolt on June 28, 1956, had revealed clearly that the Polish people were overstrained, starved for consumers' goods and underfed.

This was due to over-rapid industrialization, too much bureaucracy and

a crushing load of militarization on top. It was the latter factor which wore down the endurance and patience of all the satellite peoples. The rapid industrialization was painful and frequently ill planned, without reference to raw materials. Each country had some of Stalin's quite useless white elephants, all of which depressed living standards severely. But this might have been borne had not a heavy load of military industry and troop recruiting been added, until 1,600,000 troops had been assembled in East Europe, to be fed and supplied with most of their expensive equipment.

This was beyond the capacity of the satellites to bear. They were small states and needed every bit of their resources for the industrialization program. Stalin had been right in believing that Russia, with her vast resources and population, could do anything. But the satellites could not, especially since they were proud peoples with traditions of independence and only briefly under communist rule.

From this standpoint the Cold War succeeded, since it led Stalin to decide that the threat of a world war which was long inherent in the Korean War, plus massive Western rearmament accompanied by constant American pressure for a new German army, required the militarization of East Europe. This was one of his greatest mistakes, since it asked of the satellites more than they could do. If he had been willing to trust the defense of East Europe to the Red Army, the relaxation after his death would have been much less dangerous. As it was, Poland's arms program, begun in 1951, had brought her to the verge of bankruptcy by 1953, where she lingered until the Gomulka revolution.¹

However, like Washington, Moscow insisted that everybody on its side must do his share of arming, and in both cases the burden bore much more heavily on the little partners than on the big one.

Poznan Portent. The suffering of the Polish people was tacitly recognized in the Poznan trials, which began on September 28, 1956. The court allowed the accused to testify freely, essentially turning the trials into a political affair, as visiting reporters found housing conditions appalling, goods shoddy and scarce, prices high and everybody "fed up." Then the court permitted the description of the hatred built up by years of repressive police measures and gave very light sentences to the accused, on October 8. Four and a half years in prison was the highest sentence and Jules Wolf of Brussels, one of the three Western legal observers present, declared that the trials were an example for other countries. The judges had "integrity, independence and honesty."²

Bloodless Revolution. Simultaneously, on October 8, it was announced that Wladyslaw Gomulka, Polish Communist leader expelled from the party and jailed for four years on charges of Titoism, would be restored to it, and at once there was a strong movement to disband the old Politburo and make him the party leader. The movement developed so fast that on the night of October

¹ Mark Gayn, "Ten Days that Shook the World," *The Nation*, November 10, 1956, p. 381; Edward Ochab, Communist leader, the *New York Times*, July 20, 1956.

² *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, October 4; the *New York Times*, September 29, October 3, 7, 9, 1956.

19 Khrushchev flew into Warsaw at the head of most of the Soviet Politburo. Zhukov, Molotov and others accompanied him, only two of the top Russians remaining in Moscow.

However, the Polish Politburo dissolved in Gomulka's favor as the Russians arrived and all-night conferences failed to budge the new government. An ultimatum from Khrushchev and threats to use the Russian troops in Poland, which seemed to be on the march, were of no avail because the Polish workers had rallied to Gomulka. Seeing a chance to get a large voice in the control of the factories and of their conditions of labor, on the Yugoslav model, they were prepared to defend the new regime. For two or three nights they stayed quietly in their factories, ready to fill the streets if they were needed, and a little later when students demonstrating against the Russians threatened to get out of hand Gomulka sent the workers to disperse them, not the army or the police.

Faced with the evidence that Gomulka had the Polish people behind him, that he was still a Communist, though a highly nationalistic one, and that he was loyal to the Warsaw Pact and to the Russian alliance, the Russian chiefs had to conclude that the Polish revolution was acceptable and fly back to Moscow. The Poles were able to win substantial independence, in spite of their disdain and hatred of the Russians, because their feelings were "outdone only by their fear of Germany."³

The Poles remembered their German bondage even more keenly than their Stalinist ordeal, along with the futility of trying to balance Germany and Russia during the time between the two world wars. Lippmann appraised their situation accurately when he said that we can not afford to forget that "no Russian Government will tolerate, if it can prevent it, the existence of an unfriendly Poland which had become a part of the military system of the West." He saw that unless the Polish crisis could be stabilized a far-reaching crisis would ensue, for there would be "no power and authority—be it Soviet, Western or local to organize Central Europe." The relaxation of the fear of a world war was loosening the Soviet grip, but it was "not in our own interest that the movement in Eastern Europe should go so far that no accommodation with Russia is possible," for "that could lead to bloody deeds in which we would be called upon to intervene, our honor being involved, though we could not intervene knowing that the risks were incalculable."⁴

Entente with the Church. Similar restraint was urged by Polish Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, as he returned to Warsaw on October 30 after three years of enforced stay in a monastery. A few days later Gomulka asked iron discipline of his people, to avoid the "terrible fate" that had befallen Hungary and the Cardinal backed him in his first public sermon.

A month later, on December 7, the Government and the Church came to a far-reaching agreement. The Government ended its curbs on the Church, revoking a 1953 decree giving it veto power over all church appointments and issuing a new law agreeable to the Church. Secular control of the schools

³ Jack Raymond, the *New York Times*, October 21, 1956.

⁴ Lippmann, the *Nashville Tennessean*, October 24, 28, 1956. Within a week his foresight was verified completely in the bloody Soviet suppression of Hungary.

was maintained, but religious instruction was to be permitted in them for those requesting it. In return the Church gave its support to the new regime, establishing the first reconciliation between Communism and the Church, at least on a temporary basis. In the election of January 21, 1947, the Church gave its support strongly to the Government slates, the priests voting early. Some of them led their flocks to the polling places after early mass.⁵

Concessions from Russia. Gomulka also won two far-reaching accords with the Soviet Union. In mid-November he went to Moscow and secured the cancellation of Poland's entire debt to the Soviets, amounting to \$600,000,000, and obtained a loan of 700,000,000 roubles, part of it to cover 1,400,000 tons of Russian wheat.⁶

On December 18 the Soviet Union signed another pact regulating in detail the Russian forces "temporarily" in Poland, giving Warsaw a veto power over their movement and establishing civilian jurisdiction over the Russian troops. Meanwhile, Russian citizen Marshal Rokossovsky, born a Pole, had been dismissed from the Politburo, deprived of the Ministry of Defense and command of Poland's armed forces and after an interval sent back to Moscow, though the Polish leaders believed him to be a better Pole than the Polish people did.

Internal Reforms. At home the Gomulka regime slashed the party bureaucracy ruthlessly. All but four of the nineteen bureaus that had ruled the nation indirectly were abolished and party buildings were ordered converted to hospitals, community centers and living quarters. The thousands of party men who lost their jobs then went into opposition to Gomulka, while the straw government officials through whom they had ruled fumbled under real responsibility.

This made the election of January 21 critical for Gomulka, since the voting lists provided a slight degree of choice. There was also danger that abstention might weaken the regime. However, a strenuous campaign, plus Gomulka's popularity, brought out 98.4 per cent of the voters and gave him the verdict he needed, this time without any sign of coercion of voters.⁷ He still had to face the implacable hostility of his Stalinists and of the non-Communist nationalists. He still needed economic aid from the West to help restore Poland's shattered economy, and on January 7, 1957, the United States agreed to open wide economic parleys.

For the future, the new regime cut some \$1,750,000,000 from the investment program, abandoning some long term projects and slowing others. There was a firm resolution to limit capital investment to 20 per cent and to provide more consumers' goods. Small private businesses were encouraged and incentives were offered to the peasants.⁸

The Drift Toward Titoism Checked by China. Inside the Communist world Gomulka was obliged to yield a little in the direction of Moscow's leadership. His desire was to approximate Tito's independence as closely as possible, and after ten days of talks with a visiting Yugoslav delegation it appeared that he

⁵ *The New York Times*, October 30, November 5, December 8, 1956, January 21, 1957.

⁶ *Ibid.*, November 19, 20, 1956.

⁷ *Ibid.*, January 21, 22, 1957.

⁸ M. S. Handler from Warsaw, *The New York Times*, December 21, 1956.

had succeeded. Several authoritative statements laid down Titoist principles, including the agreement that the most suitable relationship between Communist parties was to be found in bilateral discussions. It appeared that a cordial Tito-Gomulka axis had been formed.⁹

For several weeks the Poles also believed that they had the firm support of the Chinese Communists, who had strongly opposed using force against Poland in October. However, at the turn of the year a 14,000 word statement of the Chinese Politburo was reprinted in *Pravda* which aligned China strongly behind the Soviet Union as the leader of the Communist world. The statement declared that "Communist parties of all countries must be united, but at the same time must maintain their independence." Solidarity was strengthened by "relations on a real basis of equality and when they attain unity of views and of action by means of real, and not formal consultation." The forcible imposition of views, such as Stalin had been guilty of, was harmful. Then the statement went on to rebuke Tito as a divisive element and to support Soviet policy in suppressing the Hungarian revolt.¹⁰

On January 11, 1957, Premier Chou En-lai arrived in Warsaw from Moscow. Before he arrived the Polish leaders had concluded that geography forbade them from matching Tito's independence internationally and that they should now give more attention to maintaining the solidarity of the Communist camp. Their discussions with Chou strongly furthered this trend. He frequently stressed the primacy of the Soviet Union as the leader and publicly condemned the Hungarian rebellion as "a crazy subversive movement." On the other hand, he continued to support the Polish efforts to evolve a more democratic form of socialism.

The joint policy statement published on January 17 condemned the Western imperialists for their activities in Egypt and affirmed strong support for the Kadar Government in Hungary, thus signalling a stop to the flood of articles in the Polish press sympathetic to the Hungarian rebels.¹¹

Chou had served as the mediator between Moscow and Warsaw, to bring them to a warmer relationship, and to reassert strongly Moscow's leadership of the Communist world.

This was not a difficult choice for China to make since she was wholly dependent on the Soviet Union for the immense technical and economic aid involved in lifting China quickly to the status of a great industrial power, a goal which depended entirely upon the continuance of massive Russian aid. There was no alternative because the United States implacably maintained both an economic and a military blockade of the coasts of China, as well as a bar to China at the door of the United Nations.

TRAGEDY IN HUNGARY

Like the Polish revolution, the Hungarian revolt began in peoples' minds during the relaxation following Stalin's death and accelerated rapidly after Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech in February 1956.

⁹ The *New York Times*, January 1, 1957.

¹⁰ Harry Schwartz, the *New York Times*, January 4; M. S. Handler, *ibid.*, January 11, 1957.

¹¹ The *New York Times*, January 11-17, 1957.

The grounds for revolt by the university students who touched off the October revolution were many. They had seen the outrageous conduct of the Russian troops who first occupied Budapest in 1945, the endless raping and looting, and they remembered how the regime had punished anyone who did not deny that such things had taken place.¹²

George Mikes, the author just cited, found himself admiring the communist-trained students, sons of workers and peasants, in contrast with the aristocratic, dueling, dilettante student generation of his day. Constant communist indoctrination had not obscured from them the perennial food shortages due to shipments from agricultural Hungary to other Red lands, or the misery of the workers because of the incessant pressure of piece work, high work "norms" and frequent forced loans to the state. The students knew, too, that Hungary had more than her share of Stalin's white elephants, new heavy industries that were largely uneconomic; for example, a large steel and iron industry in an inland country which had no iron or coke. The students read the Russian revolutionary and humanitarian authors of the 19th Century and the "vast educational expansion in Eastern Europe woke the young people to strange ideas."¹³ They had learned about Tsarist tyranny and observed the terror and tortures of the AVO, their own omnipresent secret police, who by threats and bribes forced people everywhere to be their informers. They remembered also the great deportations from Budapest in 1951 and 1952, and the other horrors of the Rakosi regime.

Without these factors the economic misery and discontent of October 1956 would not have produced the revolution.¹⁴ Events would probably have taken a very different turn also if Khrushchev had not made the monumental mistake of restoring Rakosi to power after his first fall in 1953. After "a good start" in 1945 the regime had degenerated into a smaller edition of Stalinist tyranny at its worst, partly under the pressures of the Cold War. Between the summer of 1947 and the end of 1948 "the entire nation found itself in the grip of paralyzing police terror and under relentless pressure to work."¹⁵ Rakosi was an efficient tyrant, but when in 1953 he proposed another back breaking five year plan the new Soviet premier, Malenkov, called him to Moscow, in June 1953, along with Imre Nagy and Erno Gero, and forced Rakosi to turn the premiership over to Nagy. Rakosi's downgrading was precipitated by the East Berlin uprising on June 15 but a prior investigation of his regime by a team of Soviet specialists formed the basis for his expulsion from the post of premier. Among other things he was "sharply reprimanded for having allocated too much of the national resources to the armed forces."¹⁶

¹² See the excellent account of *The Hungarian Revolution*, by George Mikes, London, 1957. Mikes was a Hungarian journalist who opted for freedom from fascism in 1938 in London. He was sent back to report the 1956 revolution by the B.B.C.

¹³ Harry Schwartz, the *New York Times*, October 27, 1957. ¹⁴ Mikes, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

¹⁵ Paul E. Zinner, "Revolution in Hungary," *The Journal of Politics*, February, 1959, p. 9.

¹⁶ Tibor Meray, *Thirteen Days that Shook the Kremlin*, New York, 1959, pp. 3-7. This excellent account of the revolution of 1956 was written by an able writer who broke with the Communist Party during the revolution and fled to Paris. It is in large part a labor of love for Imre Nagy, but it also has a high degree of objectivity.

It may be that events in Hungary would have followed a similar course without the Cold War. However, it is well to remember that the terror in Hungary did come in the period between the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and the end of the Korean War, when the pressures of the Cold War were most intense.

After his deposition as Premier, Rakosi still remained head of the Party, a powerful post from which to intrigue against Nagy's much more humane policy. Then Khrushchev replaced Malenkov and soon reinstated Rakosi, in February 1955, apparently in the belief that only he could prevent the collapse of "the whole structure" in Hungary.¹⁷

In July 1956 Rakosi was ousted again, but not until a fatal contrast had been made between the milder methods of Nagy and Rakosi's rigors, which in June 1956 produced another writers' revolt led by Gyula Hay. Then the successful Polish revolution on October 19 stirred the writers and students into almost continuous meetings to draw up their demands for change.

Revolutionary Demonstrations. This was the situation when John MacCormac, the veteran Central European correspondent of the *New York Times*, reported on October 19, 1956, from Budapest that "the thaw continues." It seemed to parallel that in Poland. Terror had almost ceased and some of the terrorists had been arrested. The Government evidently wanted to restore relations with the United States.

Two days later, on October 21, the students in three Hungarian universities held large meetings to express their solidarity with the Gomulka revolution in Poland and stayed to draw up lists of demands for a better life for themselves, including complete freedom of the press and every other kind of liberty. On the 22nd a meeting in Gyor demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the release of Cardinal Mindszenty.¹⁸

The next day great crowds in Budapest assailed the regime and demanded Imre Nagy as Premier. After the radio station had refused to broadcast some of the 16 student demands, many typists worked through the night making copies, which soon appeared everywhere as all work stopped and "Budapest became an ant hill."¹⁹

In the afternoon of the 23rd a great crowd assembled at the statue of Bem, a hero of 1848. "It consisted mostly of young people, boys and girls, in high spirits," including some 800 cadets in uniform. After singing the national anthem, 50,000 people burst into tears and soon the soldiers in a nearby barracks tore the Red stars from their caps and threw them down into the delighted crowd.²⁰

Then most of the crowd went to the Parliament building and by 6:00 P.M. the streets there were packed with some 250,000 people shouting for Imre

¹⁷ Mikes, *op. cit.*, pp. 48, 62.

¹⁸ John MacCormac, the *New York Times*, October 23, 1956.

¹⁹ United Nations, *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary*, New York, 1957, p. 79. A General Assembly Committee consisting of representatives from Denmark, Australia, Ceylon, Tunisia and Uruguay interviewed more than 100 refugees and otherwise collected evidence obtainable outside Hungary, from which it was barred.

²⁰ Mikes, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-6. Meray thinks that the accident of a long detour enabled most of the marchers to perfect their slogans and generate revolutionary ardor.—Meray, pp. 73-4.

Nagy, who finally appeared briefly, but who was heard by few in the crowd. At 8:00 P.M. Party Secretary Gero made a harsh, truculent speech over the radio which inflamed his listeners. It was "the fuse that set off the explosion."²¹

This speech had also aroused the crowds of young people massed around the radio building and incidents began to occur there. First the demonstrators set off fireworks. Then a rumor spread that one of the 16 delegates seeking to have the 16 student demands broadcast had been shot inside the building. Apparently demonstrators then tried to get inside. Mikes says that a Hungarian tank officer kicked the door furiously demanding entrance and was shot dead. At this point, after using tear gas, AVO secret police rushed from the building firing and there were several casualties.

This news brought thousands of workers in from the suburbs, men who knew where arms were stored, and revolt spread rapidly, aided, passively or actively, by the police and nearly all the armed forces, which promptly disintegrated.

Soviet Troops Called In. In this emergency Gero made two fatal errors. During the night of October 23-24 he appointed Nagy prime minister, but without announcing the fact, and called in the Russian troops, after consulting Soviet General Thikonov, but without consulting Moscow. Then after the Soviet troops appeared in the city, the radio began the next morning to refer casually to Nagy as prime minister.

The result was that during a crucial day Nagy was ostensibly the man who had called in the Soviet troops and was thus deprived of his authority with the people. At dawn on the 24th Suslov and Mikoyan, members of the Soviet Presidium, arrived from Moscow, the latter "beside himself with anger" at Thikonov and Gero for calling in the Soviet troops. Mikoyan and Suslov roughly kicked Gero out of his office as party boss and sent him off to seclusion in Russia, along with Hegedus, the figure-head prime minister whom Nagy replaced, but they would not permit Nagy to announce that he had not called in the Russian troops—another blunder. Two Russian officers in plain clothes stood behind Nagy and forced him to avoid this announcement during his first broadcast to the nation as premier.²²

Mikoyan and Suslov had already departed for Moscow, confident that the Soviet tanks would quickly restore order. This expectation proved unfounded, partly because the Soviet troops, long quartered in Hungary, had no desire to fight the Hungarian students and workers who were obviously making the revolution. Mikes reported that, with exceptions, the Russian troops "behaved decently and with reserve. They did not start any shooting." Even after they were attacked they behaved with restraint.²³

It was the AVO, the hated secret police, bent upon proving themselves the suppressors of the revolution, who on the morning of the 25th precipitated the massacre in Parliament square where 100,000 people waited patiently, as several Russian tanks which had joined the demonstrators arrived bearing Hungarian flags. Some fifty other Russian tanks were in the square, their turrets open and their crews talking and joking with the people, when suddenly

²¹ Mervy, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

²² Mikes, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-2.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

strong AVO detachments on the roofs started firing into the square with machine guns. The Soviet tanks thinking they were attacked by counter-revolutionists fired at the roof tops and quickly silenced the AVO, but several hundred people lay dead on the square and resentment was aflame in Budapest.²⁴

The choice now before the Soviets, said the Alsops, was "truly horrible." Resort to force would do cruel damage to their position in the uncommitted countries, but if force were not used they "must prepare to lose the great protective belt insulating them from the West," erasing much of their World War II gains.²⁵

Inflamed by the killing which had already taken place, the revolt spread rapidly, as Nagy appealed and threatened by turns. Thousands of Hungarian troops fought the Soviet troops, a large proportion of which suffered severe crises of conscience. Some refused to fire and others deserted, but the Hungarian youth was relentless in its anger at the Russians. Children destroyed scores, if not hundreds, of tanks in the streets with bottles of gasoline.

Russian Troops Withdrawn from Budapest. On October 29 it was announced that the Soviet troops would withdraw from Budapest and agonized appeals were made to the rebels to stop the killing, because they had won. The next day the end of Red rule seemed assured. There was delirious joy in Budapest when the Kremlin issued a statement indicating a willingness to reconsider its position on troops in the satellites.²⁶

A New Socialist Commonwealth? The Soviet statement on October 30 set up the goal of a "great commonwealth of Socialist nations" which could be built "only on the principle of full equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of one another."

The statement admitted that "downright mistakes" infringing upon the principles of equality among Socialist states had been made and professed readiness to discuss them, especially "whether a further stay of U.S.S.R. advisers in these countries is expedient."

Acknowledging that the working people of Hungary were rightly raising "the necessity of eliminating serious shortcomings in the field of economic building," and of more consumers' goods and less bureaucracy, the Kremlin had ordered the withdrawal of Soviet army units from Budapest and was ready to enter into negotiations with the Hungarian Government "and other participants of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary."²⁷

Tibor Meray prints this document in full. He regards it as of "capital

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 110-11; the UN *Report on Hungary*, pp. 80-3.

²⁵ The *Nashville Tennessean*, October 25, 1956.

²⁶ The *New York Times*, October 28, 29, 31, 1956.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, October 31, 1956.

Ferenc Nagy, the last non-Communist premier of Hungary, arrived in Vienna hoping to get in touch with the resistance leaders in the frontier, but the Austrian Government ordered him to leave. The national committee in the frontier town of Magyarovar rejected all thought of accepting an *émigré* government.—Homer Bigart, *ibid.*

importance," especially because Mikoyan and Suslov had just returned from Moscow bringing it with them to Nagy.

It was bound to give him a feeling of triumph, since it accepted the same theory of the independent relationship between socialist states which he had propounded in a careful statement ten months before. It conceded that no member of the Warsaw Pact should have the troops of another member stationed on its territory without its consent and twice invited negotiations for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. Only one condition was made, Meray says, "the protection of the socialist gains in a Democratic People's Hungary." Furthermore, "Mikoyan and Suslov were showing great cordiality" and were encouraging Nagy to proceed calmly and firmly. Radio reports from the provinces told of Russian troops withdrawing over the frontier as Mikoyan and Suslov departed for Moscow again.²⁸

Meray does not doubt their sincerity or that of Khrushchev and the Kremlin leaders when the "Socialist Commonwealth" document was drawn up on October 30, and Mikes agrees about the agonizing nature of the debate which gripped the Kremlin in the next day or two. At this stage it had been won by the Khrushchev group, which wanted to accept the revolution as communist-led and which prevailed at this point over the old Stalinists. Khrushchev was aided by some waverers and by Marshals Zhukov and Koniev, the latter Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact. The Army did not think its military position in East Europe seriously endangered.²⁹

Then events in Hungary gave strength to those in Moscow who wanted to crush the revolution.

Free Elections Decried. Already on October 30 internal friction had begun to develop in the Nagy Government, the Army leaders demanding the evacuation of all Hungary by the Russians as swiftly as possible. This made Janos Kadar and a few others restive. It was Nagy's dilemma that to keep his position he had to have the confidence of the Russians and at the same time show hostility toward them.

Moving with the tide, Nagy broadened his Cabinet to include some representatives of the old political parties, choosing some good men. He abolished the one-party system and announced that free elections would follow. In Mikes' judgment it was this step which caused Moscow to decide to crush the revolution, since free elections would reveal to the world that there were no Communists left in Hungary.

Nagy announced the abolition of the one-party system at 1:28 P.M. on October 30, after which the Politburo in Moscow met for two hours, receiving at 4:30 P.M. the news of the Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt. The next day an influx of new Russian troops began, as the old troops continued to withdraw from Budapest, and early on November 1 Mikoyan arrived in Budapest once more, this time to overthrow Nagy and install Janos Kadar as premier.³⁰

Full Independence Demanded. However, before he acted Nagy informed the Soviet Ambassador that the new entries of Soviet troops violated the

²⁸ Meray, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-50. ²⁹ Mikes, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-7. ³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 135-40.

Warsaw Treaty, which was wholly true, and that it would be denounced unless they were withdrawn. Instead, other Soviet troops poured in and that afternoon the Treaty was denounced and a declaration of neutrality published, as a last gesture of defiance.

On November 2 Cardinal Mindszenty appealed to the West for political support,³¹ as deceptive negotiations continued for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, but the free elections decree had ended all debate in Moscow, before the denunciation of the Warsaw Pact removed any lingering doubts in the Kremlin.

The UN Committee was inclined to doubt that there had ever been much debate, citing reports that the Soviet authorities had taken steps as early as October 20 to make armed intervention in Hungary possible.³² However, the *New York Times*' correspondent in Moscow, William J. Jordan, was certain about the reality of groping and debate in the Kremlin. On November 3 he described Moscow's "socialist commonwealth" statement of October 30 as "an amazing document," containing admissions which could only have been made "with a tremendous effort in facing the necessity of plotting an entirely new course." On November 4 he wrote that the "great debate" on policy toward satellite states had ended. Actions were now replacing "the vacillation and indecision of only a few days ago." It had been decided that the Soviet Union could not permit Hungary to leave the Communist bloc.

The Soviet Reversal. The Hungarian decision for neutrality, withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and a multi-party system had led to a reversal on October 31, while Mikoyan and Suslov were in Budapest. Meray thinks there are few cases in history in which a greater number of factors converged toward the same result. The communist parties in the other East European lands were "in the grip of an unprecedented panic," bombarding the Soviet Presidium with predictions of their own doom. This body was confronted by the dominoes of disaster principle which had so often been used to justify American cold war decisions. The falling dominoes might soon lead even to demands for independence in the Soviet Baltic states.

The Red marshals and generals indignantly demanded action and the Stalinists charged Khrushchev with responsibility for the threatened break-up of the Soviet empire, because of his heretical theses and liberal tactics. His position was so precarious, Meray believes, that "he had to outdo Molotov. . . . His own future, his own life depended on this, and he did not hesitate." At the same time, the Suez crisis and the imminent American presidential election made a reversal safe from the standpoint of Western reaction, especially since the West knew that Hungary lay within the Soviet sphere of interests. The Kremlin acted decisively to prevent, at the best, the opening of another "window to the West," comparable to West Berlin.³³

The Soviet reversal was soon rationalized into a rescue of Hungary from rightist, fascist reaction, instead of a revolution led by the sons of communism themselves, as was actually the case. Nevertheless, Meray observed

³¹ John MacCormac, the *New York Times*, November 3, 1956.

³² See the *Report*, p. 137.

³³ Meray, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-203.

that it "was impossible to deny that fascism had roots in Hungary," where it had been born.³⁴ Having begun on the left, the revolution inevitably moved toward the right, as it developed.

Cardinal Mindszenty's Role. This was symbolized by Cardinal Mindszenty's role in it. He had been released and made a triumphal entry into Budapest, as all the church bells rang out over the radio. Unlike his more astute Polish colleague, he "withheld his support from the Nagy Government at its most critical moment and even helped to undermine it by encouraging untimely demands" for a new Christian Peoples Party.³⁵

Mindszenty's first words when released were: "My sons, I shall carry on where I left off eight years ago." After long conferences with members of the new government he made a statement on November 1 saying: "I am now gathering information and in two days time I shall broadcast to the nation on the means of ensuring this (fruitful) development." Some of his hearers thought two days was too short a time to absorb the developments of eight years.

His promised broadcast at 8:00 P.M. on November 3 did not bring back the Soviet troops. That had already been decided. But it did raise some doubts about his future role in the still expected new free Hungary. The Church did not oppose progress, past and future, he said. It did "have to care for our institutions, which have a great value and a great past (and) within the framework of the Church we will wipe out all traces of violence and the legal processes that characterized the fallen regime." The Church also favored "private property within just and equitable limits of our society's best interests."

What did these enigmatic words mean? He did not openly demand the restoration of the vast estates of the Church, but "Was he alluding to the eventual reestablishment of the Church's broad domains, which had been broken up and distributed to the peasants without indemnity to the Church in 1945? Did he regard indemnity as a right?"³⁶

Meray says that internally "the import of the speech was largely discounted, even by the faithful. It diminished, rather than augmented the popularity of the prelate. . . ." On the other hand, he did nothing to help the struggling Nagy Government. "He emphasized insistently that he placed himself above the parties, but the scornful—and even a little menacing—tones with which he spoke of the coalition Government clashed with his words. He called the Government leaders 'heirs to the deposed regime', each fragment of which was stamped "with the seal of loathing, disgust and condemnation." He demanded free elections under international supervision.³⁷

A week later Mindszenty was a long-term refugee in the American legation. At Győr, the principal headquarters of the revolt in the provinces, the

³⁴ Meray, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

³⁵ Edmond Taylor, "The Lessons of Hungary," *The Reporter*, December 27, 1956, p. 18.

³⁶ Meray, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 231; Miles, pp. 120-2; John O'Kearney, "Hungary: Myth and Reality," *The Nation*, February 2, 1957, p. 93. He wrote from Belgrade after interviews with Hungarian refugees.

anti-Communists, among whom the clergy were prominent, gained control. The religious peasantry rose against Communism, as it had not in Poland, and in town and country the revolution was anti-Communist. Nagy's appeals to lay down arms were in vain.³⁸

The Revolution Crushed. Early on the morning of November 4 Russian artillery opened fire on Budapest and Soviet tanks roared into the city and filled the streets with rubble again. The new troops behaved very differently from their predecessors, some of whom had joined the guerrillas in the mountains. Many others had had to be disarmed and sent back to Russia in sealed wagons.³⁹ Most of the new troops had been on the verge of demobilization and they were angry at having to come at all. Many of them were Asiatics and they were all terrified at the burned out tanks they saw everywhere, knowing that the tank is very vulnerable in street warfare.

These troops acted with a savagery that surpassed the outrages of 1945, often firing on breadlines and razing a building from which a single shot had come. Looting and raping were frequent, especially after wine shops had been emptied. "Khrushchev had achieved exactly the opposite of what he wanted." All of his efforts to appear as no tyrant or colonizer were falsified by the conquest of Hungary.⁴⁰

Previously, Stalin's successors had given up most of Stalin's methods, disbanded the Russo-Hungarian and other joint stock companies and repeatedly revised the terms of trade in favor of East Europe. Yet they had now "burdened themselves with a moral and political liability far worse than any bequeathed to them by Stalin."⁴¹

The fighting lasted several days, in the midst of a general strike, and more than 30,000 Hungarians and 7000 Russians were killed. Then a hundred thousand of the revolutionists quickly flooded across the Austrian border, to be followed soon by as many more.

THE MARTYRDOM OF IMRE NAGY

As the revolution was crushed, Nagy and some fifteen of his associates, together with fifteen of their women and seventeen children were accorded refuge in the Yugoslav embassy on November 4, where they presently became uncomfortable not only because of the size of the group but because Tito publicly criticized Nagy's failure to control the revolution and expressed support for the new Kadar regime. The Kadar Government gave written assurances to the Yugoslavs that Nagy and his friends were free to return to their homes, but when they tried to do so the Russians forcibly arrested them and carried them off to Rumania on November 23, 1956.

Yugoslavia protested against this treachery but to no avail and in early 1957 Nagy began to be denounced as a traitor in the communist world, including China, where initial support of the revolution and of the idea of various roads to socialism soon gave way to fear of further Hungary and detestation of Tito

³⁸ Isaac Deutscher, "October Revolutions, New Style," *The Reporter*, November 15, 1956, p. 16.

³⁹ Mikes, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 148-58.

⁴¹ Deutscher, *supra*.

as the source of communist deviation. This feeling became much stronger after the Yugoslav refusal to sign a joint statement of Communist principles at Moscow in November 1957. By this time the Chinese leaders were deeply alarmed by the fundamental opposition to their regime which the "hundred flowers" invitation to criticism had elicited. Nevertheless a final effort to woo Tito back into the fold was made by Kadar in a visit to Belgrade and Meray thinks that its failure doomed Nagy. Early in June 1958 Khrushchev several times denounced the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest as the headquarters of the revolution and the refuge of the defeated leaders.

On June 16 the execution of Nagy and several of his associates was announced. It had been preceded by a 12 day trial, a published record of which showed Nagy fighting doggedly to the end, in contrast to several others who broke and recanted.⁴²

Isaac Deutscher agreed that the execution was for political reasons, but described them somewhat differently. He was convinced that the executions were decided upon "in Peking and Moscow over the objections of Janos Kadar." He ascribed the initiative to Mao and thought the outcome a facet of a long complicated struggle in the Soviet Union between three factions—the Stalinists; the anti-Stalinists of the Left, who also favored heavy industry and farm collectivization; and the anti-Stalinists of the Right, who opted for consumers' goods. Deutscher believed that the Hungarian revolt broke the ascendancy of the Right de-Stalinizers and led Khrushchev to agree to Nagy's execution. He was then able to end all compulsory deliveries of food in the Soviet Union, a radical step away from Stalin's policies.

Deutscher added that Khrushchev had been under attack in both Moscow and Peking for the failure of his peace offensives, because all his overtures to the West had been met "with rebuffs from Washington," failing to reduce tension and only softening the Soviet bloc. Khrushchev had now "given way and has resolved to demonstrate that he is not pursuing the *détente* with too much zeal."⁴³ The crushing of the revolution in Hungary "had demonstrably paid off: all of his rivals—Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovitch and Zhukov—had been eliminated."⁴⁴ Then the icy silence of the crowds when he visited Hungary in April 1958 may have led him to decide that further measures were necessary.

Whatever the complex of reasons which led the Red leaders to make a sacrifice and scapegoat of Imre Nagy for the Hungarian revolution the effect upon the rest of the world was profound. Throughout the West it was taken by all advocates of the Cold War as conclusive evidence of the savagery and barbarity of the enemy, and those who wished to lessen tensions could only join in condemning the deed. It was denounced by leading communists in the West, where all of the communist parties were shaken. In Copenhagen the windows of the Soviet Embassy were broken. In the neutral nations the shock was even deeper. Nehru called it "sad and tragic in itself as well as in its consequences."

⁴² Meray, *op. cit.*, pp. 243-81.

⁴³ Isaac Deutscher, "Act Two of Hungary's Tragedy," *The Reporter*, July 10, 1958, pp. 17-18.

⁴⁴ Meray, p. 259.

Imre Nagy was not the man to ride a revolution that had to be controlled. He was a good man. He was essentially an agricultural scientist and a thinker. He could make decisions and he could rule, but in the rush of the revolution his decisions tended always to be too late. It must be remembered, however, that he was put in power under the cloud of the bid for Russian troops and was not a free agent in time. Then, as the situation got more and more out of hand, he was virtually a prisoner in the Parliament building, besieged by many delegations of rebels, each one with its set of demands. Nor did he get any help from abroad. Instead, the cries of the American radios undermined his efforts to restore order and spurred the revolution on to attempt more than it could accomplish.

Behind the disaster lay Khrushchev's responsibility for permitting Rakosi's two-year campaign against Nagy to succeed during the latter's 1953-55 premiership. Then Nagy was ruling well and if Rakosi had not been restored to power the revolution would, in all probability, have been forestalled. It should have been appreciated in Moscow and Peking that making a martyr of him for his last minute failure in 1956 would only make matters worse. It could not cover the fact that communism had been decisively defeated in Hungary by the excesses and brutalities of police state rule.

What of the Future? Yet it may be that what Nagy stood for may still have its day in Hungary. "Nagy's dream was of a humanist socialism—a socialism which would respect human freedom as well as national independence."⁴⁵

There is reason to believe that this is what the youth of Hungary and other East European countries still want. If Hungary had been allowed her freedom, reactionary forces would surely have tried to push the clock back, but could they have done so? There were many indications that the Hungarians were ready to keep much of the socialization of industry and most of the equalitarianism established by the communists. The peasants had defended their land against the communists and were in no mood to return it to their former feudal masters.

After interviewing some 250 refugees from the revolution, Professor Zinner concluded that the revolt did "not testify to a general crisis of Communist totalitarianism." It had been due to a unique set of conditions, including "the comparative mildness of Communist tactics prior to 1948 contrasted with the excessive cruelty of the following years, and finally, the leavening effect of the thaw following 1953. . . ."⁴⁶

Three years after the revolution Joseph Alsop wrote from Budapest that economic conditions had greatly improved, collectivization of the land was proceeding by persuasion and inducements—for which the state was paying heavily—and "above all the tremendous burden of defense expenditures that Hungary was formerly required to carry" had been reduced "about four fifths."

The lifting of this cold war burden from the backs of the Hungarians helped, but it did not alter their desire to manage their own affairs. In 1959 they still wanted freedom to build their own society, and after November

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁴⁶ Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

1956 it was clear that Soviet troops could not always remain to prevent that. On the other hand they could not leave without strong assurances of that military security in East Europe which three devastating invasions through this region since 1914 had burned indelibly into the Soviet mind.

The way was wide open for the obvious solution of a negotiated settlement through which a united Germany and East Europe, or most of it, would be neutralized and all foreign troops removed from Europe. But this avenue to a sweeping settlement was closed by the deep commitment of Secretary of State Dulles to Germany and to Chancellor Adenauer.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE HUNGARIAN TRAGEDY

The Dulles-Eisenhower Liberation Campaign. For the United States also there was tragedy in this denouement to the long American campaign for the "liberation" of East Europe. This was one of Secretary of State Dulles' leading policies. In the presidential campaign of 1952 he replaced containment with liberation, declaring after a long conference with presidential nominee Eisenhower that the policy of containment was a "ticket for World War III." He decried containment as relying on a hope that the "Communist dictators would become so gorged with 800,000,000 people that they would stay where they were." This would not do, said Dulles. The United States must try to split the satellites away from Russia. "The only way to stop a head-on collision with the Soviet Union is to break it up from within," he declared.⁴⁷

Two days earlier, General Eisenhower had virtually gone the limit in this direction before the American Legion Convention. After calling the roll of all of the captive peoples "now suffering under this Russian pall," he declared that "The American conscience can never know peace until these people are restored again to being masters of their own fate." Then after an alarming picture of the Soviet aim to accomplish "the economic containment and gradual strangulation of America" and of Stalin's plans to attack America, he reiterated that "We can never rest—and we must so inform all the world, including the Kremlin—until the enslaved nations of the world have in the fullness of freedom the right to choose their own path." We must tell the Kremlin that "never shall we desist in our aid to every man and woman of those shackled lands . . . any man who keeps burning among his own people the flame of freedom or who is dedicated to the liberation of his fellows."⁴⁸

Rollback. Short of an outright pledge to send armed aid, this major campaign speech went about as far as words could go in encouraging rebellion in Eastern Europe and in promising to support it. The slogan "Rollback!" reverberated around the world, causing grave uneasiness. Harold Callender reported from Paris that Europeans were "amazed and alarmed" by this development. They had joined up to contain Soviet power

⁴⁷ *The New York Times, Buffalo Courier Express*, August 27, 1952. Contemporaneously the writer heard Mr. Dulles expound this thesis to the American Political Science Association in Buffalo, where the Polish vote is large.

⁴⁸ *The New York Times*, August 26, 1952.

and had no desire to go beyond it. Dulles and Eisenhower were "offering a new American policy that no European statesman could follow."⁴⁹

Nor did the assurances that rollback was to be accomplished peacefully carry conviction. However, this uneasiness only abated the rollback campaign momentarily. In a major foreign policy address in Cincinnati, on September 21, Eisenhower reiterated that our principles "do not permit our acquiescing in the perpetual enslavement of any peoples. These principles demand that we use every political, every economic, every psychological tactic to see that the liberating spirit, in the nations conquered by communism, shall never perish."

"Thus, we shall help each captive nation to maintain an outward strain against its Moscow bond. The lands closed in behind the Iron Curtain will seethe with discontent: their peoples, not servants docile under a Soviet master, but ardent patriots yearning to be free again."

He added that "This position—I stress it to destroy all doubt—is the farthest thing from an act of war."

This was a strange idea, carrying as it did the implication that we would never have to do any fighting and that perhaps, in some miraculous manner, the satellite peoples would not need to fight either. Dulles could never be pinned down on this point. He simply insisted that in some fashion peoples like "the noble Poles" would accomplish it.⁵⁰

This technique was very effective in gaining votes from the many Americans who stemmed from Eastern Europe, but it carried with it a towering moral obligation to do something in case the American liberation crusade got the satellites into serious trouble.

After the Eisenhower Administration began in January 1953, the liberation campaign fell more and more into the background in official utterances, until in the summer of 1956 Dulles was welcoming national communism on the Yugoslav model.

Then in the Presidential campaign of 1956 the liberation theme was again used heavily, though more quietly. A special minorities division of the Republican National Committee developed the technique of taunting the Democrats with Yalta and simultaneously pledging liberation. One of its booklets was captioned: "Republican Policy of Liberation to Turn the Tide Against Communism." Another promised that NATO (a military organization) would coordinate policies on "the liberation of the satellites." This campaign was again successful in winning many voters of East European origin.⁵¹

In the intervening four years the liberation campaign was carried on constantly by means of propaganda balloons, but especially through the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe. These agencies, particularly the latter, constantly filled the satellite countries, day and night, with propaganda against their communist governments, fanning the flames of discontent and the spirit of revolt. It was often alleged that they never openly encouraged violent revolt and that they frequently warned against it, but week by week for four years it was constantly stressed that the communist governments were wicked and that

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, September 7, 1952.

⁵⁰ Discussion after his Buffalo address cited above.

⁵¹ *The Nashville Tennessean*, December 13, 1956.

something should be done about them. Inevitably, also, the impression gradually deepened in millions of Eastern European minds that if a crisis developed, these powerful friends of the air waves would do something to help; they would not stand idly by and see their protégés slaughtered.

The U.S. Impotent in the Crisis. When the crisis came early in November 1956 the American Government was largely immobilized by the Egyptian crisis, but aside from that it was powerless to do anything to aid the Hungarian revolutionists. As Vice President Nixon put it, in an important foreign policy address on December 6, 1956, "The United Nations has no armies that it could send to rescue the heroic freedom fighters of Hungary. There were no treaties which could invoke the armed assistance of the free nations. Our only weapon here was moral condemnation, since the alternative was action on our part which might initiate the third and ultimate war."

Mr. Nixon spoke of the United Nations, but all of his words applied equally to the United States. They were just as true in 1952 also as they were in 1956. The United States dared not begin "the third and ultimate war" in order to liberate the Hungarians. It could only stand by and see them crushed.

On the morning of November 4, 1956, frantic appeals for help poured from the Hungarian radio. "Any news about help? Quickly, quickly, quickly!" "Associated Press, Vienna, if you have something please pass it on to me. The Government waits for your answer! We have no time to lose, we have no time to lose!"

Again at 5:45 A.M., "If you have any answer, pass it on. Any answer, pass it on. Imre Nagy personally asks help. And diplomatic steps, diplomatic steps."

Then a series of teletype messages to the Associated Press: "Help!—help!—help!—SOS!—SOS!—SOS! They just brought us a rumor that the American troops will be here within one or two hours . . . We are well and fighting at 9:20 A.M."⁵²

Radio Free Europe's Responsibility. For several months thereafter the heads of Radio Free Europe issued denials that their broadcasts had incited anyone in Hungary to violence.⁵³

These denials were due to a spate of charges in West German and French newspapers that RFE stirred Hungarians to revolt and by promising help from outside kept the fight going after all was lost. Michael Gordey, of the Paris *France Soir*, just back from Budapest, wrote: "We heard a lot of false news about what was going on inside Budapest. We also heard on Radio Free Europe, broadcasting from Munich toward the satellite countries, programs whose impassioned tone and desperate calls to revolt certainly did a lot of wrong. During those last days, numerous Hungarians told us: 'These broadcasts have provoked bloodshed.'⁵⁴

In West Germany the Government was reviewing the charges and the scripts of RFE with a view to cancelling the German license of this great propaganda machine. Officials said that "some pretty awful things" were said by RFE's

⁵² *The New York Times*, November 5, 1956.

⁵³ *The Washington Post and Times Herald*, November 13, 1956; Arthur J. Olsen, the *New York Times*, December 9, 1956.

⁵⁴ *The Washington Post and Times Herald*, AP, Munich, November 13, 1956.

Hungarian broadcasters at the height of the rebellion. One script obtained by West German reporters said: "Western military aid could not be expected before 2:00 A.M. tomorrow." RFE officials said this had been edited out, but they did not rule out the possibility that some exile broadcasters might have let their emotions get the better of them. They admitted that up to thirty emigres on each country desk actually prepared the scripts and broadcast them up to twenty hours a day, in each of five languages that few persons not born in East Europe know. It was therefore not practical for RFE's political staff to monitor all broadcasts "live."⁵⁵

When it is recalled that McCarthyism led us "to look with jaundiced eye on European liberals, progressives and socialists,"⁵⁶ nothing is more probable than the reactionary character of many of the RFE emigres from East Europe employed by our RFE. Embittered by the loss of their former positions, they would certainly not be reliable people to employ for any peaceful purpose. What they would do in a crisis was easily predictable.

The UN Report (pp. 17-18) dealt very mildly with RFE. Noting that "all sources" from which the views of the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and Kadar had been obtained stressed "the alleged role played by Radio Free Europe in stimulating and prolonging the insurrection," the report concluded that "It would appear that certain broadcasts by Radio Free Europe helped to create an impression that support might be forthcoming for the Hungarians. The Committee feels that in such circumstances the greatest restraint and circumspection are called for."

The report adds that at his press conference on January 25, 1957, Chancellor Adenauer said that investigation had shown that the charges that RFE had promised "armed assistance" by the West were not consistent with the facts. "However," he continued, "remarks were also made which were liable to cause misinterpretations. But a discussion, an exchange of views, took place which also resulted in personnel changes and I believe that the matter can be considered settled for the time being."

Thus both the UN Committee and the Chancellor admitted, in the gentlest possible manner, that RFE had committed excesses of an incendiary nature in connection with the insurrection.

Leslie B. Bain, a reporter who speaks Hungarian, listened in Budapest to the RFE broadcasts during the rebellion and recorded "that Radio Free Europe and to some extent the Voice of America greatly embarrassed the Nagy revolutionary government with their broadcasts by insisting on goals which by no stretch of the imagination that government could have reached." In the same days he collected "a great pile of newspapers, leaflets and placards issued by the revolutionary group begging the handful of extremists to stop all fighting, return to work and give the Nagy government a chance to consolidate the gains of the victorious revolution. Meanwhile RFE kept on broadcasting increasingly extreme and impossible demands from what it called 'revolutionary groups'."⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Arthur J. Olsen from Munich, the *New York Times*, December 9, 1956.

⁵⁶ Leslie B. Bain, "Have We Failed In Hungary?" *The Reporter*, January 24, 1957.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

In his eye-witness account of the revolution Tibor Meray describes in detail the damage which RFE did to Premier Nagy's attempt to ride the Hungarian storm. At noon on October 24 Nagy broadcast a speech calling for "Order, calm, discipline" and an end of the fighting. He indicated mercy for those who laid down their arms soon and was silent about the calling of Soviet troops, hoping that his silence would be understood. But "It was from this moment on that a vehement radio campaign was launched from abroad against Nagy—a campaign that had a fatal effect on all that followed."⁵⁸

Thereafter, "Encouraging news from abroad was beamed to the Hungarian people by Western radio stations by day and by night." Saluting editorials were liberally quoted, along with President Eisenhower's message "The heart of America goes out to the people of Hungary." On October 29 the military expert of Radio Free Europe "said of the cease-fire order of the Nagy Government: 'Imre Nagy and his supporters want to revise and modernize the Trojan horse episode. They need a cease-fire so that the present Government in power in Budapest can maintain its position as long as possible. Those who are fighting for liberty must not lose sight even for a minute of the plans of the government opposing them. Otherwise there will be a repetition of the Trojan horse tragedy.'" On the 31st RFE proclaimed: "The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior are still in Communist hands. Do not let this continue, Freedom Fighters. Do not hang your weapons on the wall. Not a lump of coal, not a drop of gasoline for the Budapest Government, until Interior and Defense are in your control." Then, after the U.S. elections, President Eisenhower said "We have never encouraged the captive peoples to rise up in armed revolt" and in Hungary "The conviction that the West could not let them down had now, after all the words of praise that had poured out over the radios, to be abandoned."⁵⁹

RFE's responsibility in deepening the Hungarian tragedy is clear. For years it had been discredited among the workers and the intelligentsia by the "palpable falsities" which it broadcast, but in the excitement of the revolution it had a baleful effect upon "the kids," as the Hungarians affectionately called the boys who would not stop fighting. "RFE egged the battle on with almost hysterical enthusiasm," not only holding out the expectation of aid, but giving advice about tactics which led to the slaughter of many of the youths, and to the needless massacre of young secret police troops who happened to be doing their term of service with the AVO instead of the regular army.⁶⁰

The failure of the revolt with no American hand being raised in aid of the rebels was bound to leave them embittered. Edmond Taylor wrote from Vienna that shortly after he crossed the Austrian frontier a haggard, muddy Hungarian freedom fighter said: "For eight years the United States has been telling us through Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America to resist communism but when resistance finally leads to revolution, you stand by and watch Soviet tanks shoot us down without lifting a finger to help."⁶¹

A former resident Associated Press correspondent in Hungary, Endre

⁵⁸ Meray, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 115, 140, 169, 250.

⁶⁰ O'Kearney, *supra*, p. 94.

⁶¹ *The Washington Post and Times Herald*, November 18, 1956.

Marton, told an AP meeting in New York that VOA and RFE, particularly the latter, had led the rebels to "expect something—and nothing happened." Only a few expected armed intervention, but "far more expected arms shipments." Therefore the average Hungarian "feels let-down."⁶²

John MacCormac wrote that to his knowledge at least four young rebel leaders came to Vienna to implore American authorities for aid. When turned away they asked "officials of Radio Free Europe for help which they said the West had led them to expect." He was in no doubt that VOA and RFE had led the Hungarians to believe the West would aid them if they revolted. In the nineteen days he spent in Budapest covering the revolution he "saw ample evidence that the Hungarians were thoroughly convinced the United States would help them against the Soviet Union. Why don't you help us?" was the standard query of the rebels when they saw the U.S. flag on a car. Two non-communist government leaders had also told him that the U.S. broadcasts were harmful "because they incited the Hungarians to further revolt and strikes."⁶³

Bloody Boomerang. This result of the liberation crusade led the *Nashville Tennessean*, on December 8, 1956, to review the situation under the caption: "Bloody Boomerang," noting that "the Hungarians have learned in tears, blood and death that words which can inflame are not necessarily the words which help, as they so passionately hoped." Dean James A. Pike of the Episcopal Cathedral in New York City also said that "it is immoral to encourage people and then, when they rise, have no policy except to say 'God bless you, we'll pray for you'."⁶⁴ In one of its last editorials, on January 4, 1957, *Colliers* unwittingly summarized the liberation campaign as follows: "The United States was accused of encouraging the patriots to strike for their freedom and then of standing idly by while the Russians struck back; the American reply was a denial that anything more than a passive, spiritual sort of resistance had been meant."

Washington's Unconvincing Denials. This was fairly close to the defense which President Eisenhower made to his news conference on November 14, 1956. He wanted to "make one thing clear: the United States doesn't now, and never has, advocated open rebellion by an undefended populace against force over which they could not possibly prevail. We, on the contrary, have always urged that the spirit of freedom be kept alive; that people do not lose hope. But we have never in all the years that I think we have been dealing with problems of this sort urged or argued for any kind of armed revolt which could bring about disaster to our friends."

The defense which Secretary Dulles made to his press conference on December 2, 1956, was equally weak. He said that in all the statements that he and the President made "on the subject of so-called liberation" we "constantly emphasized that liberation would have to be brought about by an evolutionary process," and he thought that the VOA broadcasts "have all adhered to that basic philosophy of an evolutionary process." He did not

⁶² *The New York Times*, April 23, 1957.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, November 18, 25, 1956.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, November 19, December 7, 1956.

mention RFE, which had always served as a less restrained adjunct of State Department policy.

These defenses ignored the extreme urgency of the Dulles-Eisenhower speeches in 1952. They ignored the activist nature of the liberation campaign. Dulles had not been satisfied with containment. He had to have something much stronger. "Rollback" was the answer, a word which was packed with action. In his first speech as Secretary of State in January 1953 he said: "To all those suffering under Communist slavery . . . let us say: you can count on us."⁶⁵

Nor were these utterances made in a harmless vacuum, strictly for home consumption. On the contrary, they were a main resource of VOA and RFE. From 1952 on, these agencies quoted and re-quoted all rollback statements of candidates and officials verbatim, as news. In the final hour they quoted the speech of Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., before the United Nations on November 2, in which he recalled pledges given by the United States to assist "the brave Hungarian people in their struggle for freedom." The Hungarians, said John MacCormac, "could scarcely be blamed for regarding Mr. Lodge's words as a pledge of help, nor could U.S. propaganda media be reprehended for recording them."⁶⁶

The responsibility lay higher. As Reston noted, on November 19, 1956, it was Dulles who rejected the containment policy as immoral and replaced it with the policy of "peaceful liberation."

But there is no such thing. "Peaceful liberation" is a contradiction in terms. There could be "peaceful evolution" behind the iron curtain, and it was increasingly rapid after Stalin's death, but a peaceful outcome was made very unlikely by two things: the constant campaign of the American propaganda agencies to stir the spirit of revolt; and after-effects of the tremendous pressure of the Cold War upon the satellite peoples, leading to their militarization and the enforcement of tight police controls. Both of these forces made for violent explosion, not peaceful evolution or "peaceful liberation."

The result was that the Hungarian youth went too fast and too far, goaded by the climactic efforts of the American propaganda, and Hungary "paid a terrible price in blood." We were then unable to aid, said Sulzberger on November 7, 1956, or even to offer sound advice. Hints by Dulles and Eisenhower that we are now prepared to be friendly with national communist regimes "came too late to prevent Hungary's disaster."

VOA and RFE had been permitted to operate too long, until the Hungarians believed "that the West would stand by them," because they were "trying to establish the kind of system advocated so constantly by Western propaganda." The result was at first incredulous astonishment when no aid came and then a bitter sense of betrayal.⁶⁷

Recalling how we had "lavished so much encouragement to freedom" upon the satellite peoples, Cabell Phillips noted that Hungary had revolted and called on us for help, "which we were incapable of giving." Then he asked: "How

⁶⁵ *The New York Times*, *Week in Review*, December 9, 1956.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, November 25, 1956.

⁶⁷ The Budapest correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, November 15, 1956.

do we maintain our integrity with the other captive nations when, by our propaganda and diplomacy, we have constantly fanned the flames of freedom?"⁶⁸

This is a difficult question to answer. Instead of trusting to peaceful evolution to improve the lot of the East European peoples, or of giving the Communist experiment a chance to do so, we kept a constant pressure upon them which made the lot of the peoples worse. In November 1956, Anna Kethly, President of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party, came out of Hungary as a refugee, testifying that in 1952 RFE had falsely reported that she, in prison, was the leader of a great liberation movement. Then she was taken out of jail and confronted by hundreds of former militants of her party, all tortured "to confess their participation in the non-existent anti-communist plot." There was "absolutely no truth in the RFE report," she said, adding that RFE "has gravely sinned by making the Hungarian people believe that Western aid was coming when no such aid was planned."⁶⁹

Our Responsibility Secondary. The record of our liberation crusaders does not prove that they were primarily responsible for the Hungarian revolt. No outside propaganda could have produced such a spontaneous national rebellion. The main responsibility is clearly upon the Stalinists who ruled with force and terror and who greatly overburdened the Hungarian people.

Nevertheless, our share of the responsibility is still heavy. We failed to recognize Russia's crucial interests in East Europe, and our cold war pressures helped to make the Communist experiment in Hungary abortive, economically and politically. Without the eight years of incitement to revolt by us, the Hungarians might well have kept their heads in 1956 and gained a large degree of independence, as the Poles did.

Instead, their young people lost their heads, in every sense of the word, under the final lash of our propaganda, and not only missed their chance but set the clock back tragically.

In turn, their heroic, heart breaking failure aroused again all the passions of the Cold War and set it going once more in hundreds of millions of minds both West and East, but with a difference.

Belated Wisdom. It was realized at last that feeding the spirit of revolt in East Europe involved the imminent risk of everybody's destruction.

David Schoenbrun, covering a NATO Council meeting just concluded, reported on the Columbia Broadcasting System radio on December 14, 1956, that "one of the clearest decisions of this NATO meeting was a common agreement not to encourage rebellion, not to hold out any hope of armed intervention." Mr. Dulles was "now urging the peoples of Eastern Europe to be patient, urging them not to strike for freedom lest they destroy the world and all hope of freedom."

Further Drifting. Mr. Dulles had been driven this far by the tragic failure of his policy in East Europe, but he was still unable to accept negotiation as a means of gaining more freedom for East Europe, and greater safety for all

⁶⁸ *The New York Times*, November 11, 1956.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, November 30, 1956.

peoples. At his press conference on December 19 he did say that we did not want to revive the Cold War or to create a belt of anti-Soviet states in East Europe, but he implied that we would review the situation only after Germany had been reunited and the satellites had achieved independence. He was not ready to consider the withdrawal of forces or the neutralization of Central and East Europe by stages. This conception ran "far beyond anything United States officials are even dreaming about."⁷⁰

Mr. Dulles was still expecting the retraction of Soviet power from Central and East Europe without compensating action or concessions on our part. Or, as Lippmann put it, Dulles' conduct of the crisis seemed to operate on the theory that the alternative for force is propaganda—"arousing public opinion by putting forth declarations and speeches and resolutions condemning, deploring and denouncing." But, he continued, the real alternative to force is negotiation and the decision not to intervene in Hungary carried with it a moral responsibility to negotiate for a settlement that would improve Hungary's position.⁷¹

This was indeed "urgent business." Propaganda had failed to liberate Hungary. On the contrary, it had helped strongly to make her revolution abortive. Now there was a heavy moral compulsion to try for such a broad European settlement as the Soviet note of November 17 had suggested. A great new factor had entered the situation—the demonstration that the 60 satellite divisions were no offensive threat to the West and no reliance to the Soviet Union for offense. But there was still no prospect that Soviet power would permit Germany to be united in our orbit and there could be no political stability in Europe until the issue of German unity was settled, either by unification or by acceptance of her long-term division.

⁷⁰ James Reston, the *New York Times*, December 19, 1956.

⁷¹ *The Nashville Tennessean*, December 14, 1956.

EXPLOSIONS AT SUEZ

OCTOBER 1956

THE most remarkable thing about the explosions of 1956 was their simultaneity.

On October 29 and 31, 1956—after the Soviets had accepted a nationalist revolution in Poland, and appeared to have done so in Hungary—Israel, France and Britain suddenly defied the United States and attacked Egypt, after months of restraint, and behind Washington's back. From the standpoint of the Eisenhower Administration the offense was doubly acute because the presidential election was only a few days away, a circumstance which practically paralyzed restraining or disciplinary action, though there was some rash talk of using the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean for this purpose.¹

Thus the two great alliances were wracked with revolt at exactly the same time, though the convulsions in the Soviet camp were far more serious than those on the American side.

THE BAGHDAD PACT

The attack upon Egypt by three of our best friends, without our knowledge, signaled the collapse of the policy, or rather the lack of policy, of Secretary of State Dulles for the Middle East.

Mr. Dulles inherited the Acheson plan for a Middle East Defense Command, which would organize the region against Soviet attack. This proposal centered on Egypt, for geographic reasons and because Egypt contained the vast British base along the West bank of the Suez Canal, an enormous complex of foundries, warehouses and every kind of arsenal, 65 miles long and three miles wide. It had been erected over the years at a cost above a billion and a half dollars and was the greatest military base in the world.

However, the Mid-East Defense Command could not be organized around this giant base because the Egyptians would not agree. Instead they insistently demanded that the British abandon it entirely and leave the Canal zone, where British troops had been quartered for many decades.

To aid Egypt and perhaps advance the MEDC concept our Ambassador to Cairo, Jefferson Caffery, strongly pressured the British in February 1953 to settle the dispute with Egypt over the Sudan and in October 1954 to evacuate Suez, which they finally agreed to do. Soon after this long diplomatic duel was ended "we discovered that our principal ally had lost its key military base in the Middle East, on which rested the entire structure of any regional

¹ The Alsops, the *Nashville Tennessean*, November 2, 1956.

defense system, so central to overall Western defense plans for Europe, Asia and Africa."²

Nor was this the worst of the matter, since "Britain, under some pressure from the United States, agreed to evacuate the Canal zone without asking for an agreement on the policy of the operation of the canal which was due to revert to Egypt in a few years."³ C. L. Sulzberger puts it more strongly, saying that "we induced the British not to insist on protective guarantees when evacuating the canal zone."⁴

Long before Nasser suddenly seized the Canal in July 1956 Dulles had turned to the "northern tier" alternative. Turkey was staunchly anti-Soviet. Then Pakistan was wooed with offers of military aid contingent upon the construction of air bases, from which our bombers could reach some hitherto inaccessible areas of the Soviet Union. By the end of 1953 a leading chronicler could write that "there was no longer much doubt that Pakistan would be relied on henceforth as one of the keystones of the 'northern tier'."⁵

Building from the Turkish-Pakistan anchor posts the Baghdad Pact alliance was put together during 1955 with a Turkish-Iraq pact and Great Britain's entry in February, Pakistan's formal entry in July and Iran's adhesion on October 12. On October 24, 1955, *Time* magazine celebrated the closing of the ring around the Communist world in a map showing a big iron chain running from the Manila Pact (SEATO) through Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and Turkey to NATO, calling this chain a "collective security" system which "with the U.S. as its center now stretches around the earth."

If there is any history a few decades after 1955, one of its mysteries will be the sense of total rectitude with which American cold warriors encircled with a great iron chain the two largest foreign peoples in the world, on the other side of the globe, after they had risen from abysmal weakness in 1945 to a nuclear stand-off in 1955 and were ready to push on rapidly to equality of power with the West in every respect. The mystery will deepen also for all those who know how enraged the same cold warriors would be by any armed encirclement of themselves, close around their borders.

Professor Geoffrey Barraclough, of the British Royal Institute of International Affairs, thought it extraordinary that the State Department could forget Russia's geographic position. It would be as logical to expect her to be uninterested in what goes on in Egypt or Iran as to expect the United States to ignore what goes on in Mexico or Panama. "To treat every Russian move in this area with suspicion as part of a deep-laid plot for imperialist expansion not only implies misjudgement of plain geo-political facts but creates an atmosphere of conflict. . . ." The most charitable explanation of this myopic conduct

² J. C. Hurewitz, "Our Mistakes in the Middle East," the *Atlantic*, December 1956, p. 50.

At one critical point in the Suez negotiations Dulles arrived in Cairo "bearing a pistol given him by President Eisenhower for presentation to the Egyptian Chief of State."—Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1953*, New York, Harper, 1955, p. 295.

³ Walter Lippmann, the *Nashville Tennessean*, September 2, 1956.

⁴ The *New York Times*, October 1, 1956.

⁵ Stebbins, *op. cit.*, pp. 317-18.

that he could give was that American official thought "is befogged by thick layers of ideological presupposition."⁶

The moment it was consummated the Baghdad Pact had the following effects. It deeply offended India which believed that war with Pakistan over Kashmir was brought much nearer by our armament of Pakistan, necessitating further Indian armament, and that the danger of India being involved in a world war was greatly increased. India therefore began to divert money from her sorely needed development plans to buy arms. In 1956 alone she took \$100 million to buy war planes in Britain and France, thus gravely imperilling her rivalry with China to see whether free methods or communist ones are the best way to develop a country.⁷ The outcome of this race is likely to determine the fate of the whole of Asia. It is crucial as few things are in mid-century world politics.

Our arming of Pakistan also pushed Afghanistan over into the arms of the Soviet Union, for arms and developmental loans. The pact invited Soviet retaliation upon Iran, in some future time if not at once. The antagonism of nearly all Arab nationalists was aroused, because of Britain's presence in the alliance. Dynastic rivalries between Iraq and Saudi Arabia were embittered and Nasser's Egypt was angered along with his other allies, Syria and Yemen. The pact alarmed Israel deeply because it involved the heavy arming of Iraq by the United States, which refused compensatory arms to Israel. Iraq was one of the Arab states swearing to destroy Israel.

The pact offended Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, who declared that it "does not serve the interests of the people and it disunites them." He added that "I do not think it represents a wall against anyone."⁸ *The New York Times* "Week in Review" editor concurred substantially in this verdict on February 5, 1956, saying that "thus far the northern tier alliance has been overshadowed by the trouble it has caused." A few weeks earlier an effort by Britain to pressure her protégé Jordan into the pact caused her ejection from that synthetic kingdom, which she had created and had financed for a decade. Hurewitz summed up the results of the pact, as of December 1956, as follows: "the alliance has proved to be a colossus with feet of clay. . . . On all sides it has stirred up hornet's nests and heightened local tensions."⁹

This was bound to be the case because the primary consideration was not the welfare of the peoples concerned. Mr. Dulles doubtless believed that he was saving these lambs from the Red bear, but the prime objective was the closing of the iron ring of containment around the Soviet Union, between her and the world's greatest oil reserves, lying just under her and all in Western hands.

PERMANENT ARAB-ISRAEL WAR

Looking at the enormous riches in oil, the strategic value of the region and the mathematics of 40,000,000 people vs. 2,000,000, Mr. Dulles altered sharply the essentially pro-Israeli policy of the Truman Administration and on June 1,

⁶ *The Nation*, February 9, 1957, p. 120.

⁷ Chester Bowles, "America's Role in the Mideast," *The New York Times Magazine*, June 30, 1957, p. 33.

⁸ *The New York Times*, January 8, 1956.

⁹ Hurewitz, *supra*, p. 49.

1953, declared a policy of impartiality between Israel and the Arabs, one which sought "to allay the deep resentment . . . that has resulted from the creation of Israel," which "should become a part of the Near East community and cease to look upon itself or to be looked upon by others, as an alien community."¹⁰

This was a sound principle. However, it was impossible to apply because the Arab states refused to recognize the existence of Israel. The Jewish state had been thrust into their midst by Hitler's immeasurable barbarities. As soon as it was proclaimed in 1948 they had all—Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia—marched their armies to destroy it and had been ignominiously defeated, except for the British-trained Jordan legion. Thereafter hurt pride burned in an unquenchable flame for revenge.

Afterwards some 800,000 Arab refugees lived around Israel, some in their homes in Jordan but mostly in camps, fed by the United Nations, somewhat better than their Arab neighbors, but multiplying rapidly and maintained in idleness for the day of Israel's destruction.

The responsibility for their exit during the 1948 Arab invasions was mixed: many of the Arabs had fled away in anticipation of the fighting; others had fled in terror after the Jewish Irgunists had massacred 100 Arabs—men, women and children—in a suburb of Jerusalem; and the Arab League leaders had urged them all to get out of the way temporarily and return with the triumphant Arab forces.¹¹

When this did not materialize their resettlement was refused by the Arab Governments when the United Nations appropriated \$200,000,000 for the purpose, and these homeless hordes were deliberately maintained "as a vested interest in the Arab cause against Israel." This wasting and warping of a million lives was "due to the calculated exploitation of their plight for political purposes."¹²

The Arab states also refused to convert the 1948 armistices into treaties of peace and maintained that they were still at war with Israel. Their leaders proclaimed constantly their passion to destroy Israel and their intent to do so just as soon as they could. The theme of the Cairo radio was: "Prepare yourselves, Oh Israel . . . for the day of your destruction is near. . . . We want revenge and our revenge is Israel's death."¹³

Similar sentiments flowed from the highest Arab officials. On January 9, 1956, the Prime Minister of Iraq noted that Iraq was "receiving the latest types of military equipment" from her allies and added that "every gun,

¹⁰ *Department of State Bulletin*, June 15, 1953, pp. 831-5.

¹¹ Norman Bentwich, *Israel*, New York, 1952, pp. 146-55; London, Benn, 1952; J. C. Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, New York, 1950, pp. 313-14, 319-21; Jeremiah Ben-Jacob, *The Rise of Israel*, New York, 1949, pp. 158-9; Carl Herman Voss, *The Palestine Problem Today*, Boston, 1953, pp. 36-9; Joseph B. Schechtman, *The Arab Refugee Problem*, New York, 1952, pp. 3013; Hal Lehtman, *Israel, The Beginning and Tomorrow*, New York, 1951, pp. 224-8, 252-8.

The Israelis probably erred in not readmitting soon a large part of the Arab refugees who had done no fighting against them. On the other hand, the decisive reason for their plight was the Arab attack, and the fear of what such a huge potential fifth column would do was understandable.

¹² *The London Daily Telegraph*, January 4, 1957.

¹³ *The New York Times*, November 11, 1956.

plane or tank received by Iraq will contribute to solving the Palestine problem." A few days later the King of Jordan declared that "Jordan will fulfil its mission of vengeance in Palestine to the very end." On May 28, President Nasser of Egypt said that the Palestine army "will be responsible for taking revenge for their homeland and people." On June 11, the Egyptian Minister of War boasted that the Egyptian army now had "enough strength to wipe Israel off the map."¹⁴

Pending the day of vengeance this policy of total hatred was implemented by daily and nightly attacks into Israel, from Jordan and Egypt, especially from the six mile wide Gaza Strip between Israel and the sea which Egypt had held during the 1948 war and which now contained a quarter of a million refugees, many of which were trained to systematically raid Israel, killing, burning, bombing and leaving land mines. During the three days beginning on April 7, 1956, there were 26 Fedayeen attacks upon Israeli territory.¹⁵

These constant attacks made life unsafe around most of the tiny state's 495 mile boundary and foreshadowed a constant depletion of Israeli nerves and resources for the final blow, a state of affairs which no people could endure indefinitely. The Israeli reaction was to reply occasionally with big raids, designed to punish and discourage the little ones. Sometimes these retaliations seemed shockingly severe, and they always resulted in strong moral spankings by the United Nations, following minor chidings of the Arabs for the small raids.

Over a period of time the total effect of the constant fedayeen raids from Egypt was as devastating as the big Israeli raids, and even more enervating. After the Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, they ceased for about three months, until Nasser was convinced that Washington had successfully restrained Britain and France from using force to recover the Canal.

ISRAEL'S ATTACK UPON EGYPT

In early October 1956 the raids were resumed, convincing the Israelis that they were doomed to slow decimation, about which the world would do nothing. On October 23 Egypt, Jordan and Syria signed a military alliance placing their armies under unified command in case of war with Israel, which was unable to buy arms from the United States, though the U.S. shipped 18 tanks to Saudi Arabia.

This was the situation on October 29, when Hanson W. Baldwin, military critic of the *New York Times*, reported from Cairo that Egypt's new Russian munitioned army was strong and morale high. The tank force had been doubled. Training was intensive. Soviet arms worth 300 millions had been received and some were being funnelled out to Egypt's allies and to the Algerian rebels, as communist arms continued to pour in—fifteen Red flag ships discharging cargoes during September.

¹⁴ These are samples of some 25 "eliminate Israel" statements by Arab leaders quoted in the *Israel Digest*, September 14, 1956, along with a large number of Arab forays into Israel.

¹⁵ Claire Sterling, "Israel: The Moment of Decision Goes By," *The Reporter*, May 17, 1956, pp. 11-12. On April 11 a synagogue at Shafrin was machine-gunned. Three children and their teacher were killed at evening prayers.

On the same day the Israeli Government mobilized its reserves, in reply to the new Arab military alliance, and President Eisenhower sent a strong warning to Israeli Premier Ben Gurion not to undertake any "forceful initiative."

The next day the Israeli Army invaded Egypt and on October 31 British bombers raided Egyptian airfields, as Britain and France moved to repossess the Suez Canal.

Ninety-three hours after the Israeli attack began their forces were in control of the entire Sinai peninsula, the Gaza Strip and the coast of the Gulf of Aquaba, from which Egypt had blockaded the Tiran Strait up to the Israeli port of Elath. When the campaign started Nasser had had one division and six armored battalions poised for battle, to which was added his best infantry division and an armored brigade, all heavily armed and supported by an air force far larger than Israel's. Yet some 7000 Egyptians were captured and the rest retreated so hastily that they left vast military stores, including ten MIG planes and a huge gasoline dump which was not set on fire. Enough supplies were captured to equip 60 to 80 thousand men, as the Egyptian troops who survived death from the desert and thirst limped back into their mud village homes without bothering even to report to army authorities.¹⁶

Explanations can be made for the Egyptian dictator. He was taken by surprise. The Israelis had feinted convincingly toward Jordan. He was soon distracted by the Anglo-French ultimatum and attack, which probably kept his newly sworn allies from moving to his aid. Nevertheless, these factors do not account for the defeat of his best troops by Israeli reservists with a loss of only 150 Israeli dead, nor for the headlong flight of his officers and men.

Three conclusions are evident from this momentary war. (1) If history affords an example of a true preventive war, this was it. (2) All Arabs may hate Israel, but the destruction of Israel is not a cause for which they are willing to die personally. (3) The British and the French need not have attacked Egypt. Israel would have taken the Suez Canal quickly, probably before the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. could decide what to do about it, and quite probably before the Egyptians could fill it from end to end with sunken ships. Then real international control of the waterway could have been established for the first time. (4) The Anglo-French intervention saved Nasser, making a martyr of him and enabling him to deceive his people with stories of airfields filled with dummy wooden MIG's for the British to destroy, and of French battleships sunk off Alexandria. Defeated by Israel alone he could not have stayed in office and the main allied objective would have been achieved.

THE BRITISH-FRENCH ATTACK ON EGYPT

The great Suez debacle of 1956 is one of the strangest episodes of this turbulent century.

At first Nasser had been welcomed by Washington as a native revolutionist who would provide the antidote to communism. However, he soon wrote a book, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution*, in which, like Hitler, he discussed Egypt's need to discover "what constitutes its living space."

¹⁶ Claire Sterling from Tel Aviv, "The Middle East: When Policy Fails," *The Reporter*, November 15, 1956; the *New York Times*, December 17, 1956.

It appeared to lie in three zones: the Arab zone, united in one great state with Egypt as its capital; the African zone, in which he saw "a terrible and sanguinary struggle going on" between "five million whites and two hundred million Africans;" and an Islamic zone sweeping "across continents and oceans," embracing Indonesia, the fifty million Moslems of China and even the forty million in the U.S.S.R. "When I conjure up those hundreds of millions of men united by the same belief," he wrote, "my certitude in the solidarity which unites all these Moslems grows even greater. That solidarity will without doubt be the gigantic scaffolding of our power. . . . This region is waiting for its hero," and he left little doubt as to the identity of the hero.¹⁷

In 1956 Nasser's primary aims were: "to create a new world power 'from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf'," one which would end British and French influence in this region; turn the emerging black African nationalisms from orderly progress toward independence into violent and premature revolution, instigated from Cairo; forge "a stranglehold around the Israelis" which, even without war, would "cause their beleaguered state to 'wither away';" and wrest "the vital oil resources of Arabia from the hands of the United States and Britain."¹⁸

In pursuit of these grand objectives Nasser financed, armed and directed the Algerian revolt, gained control of the Jordan Parliament, dominated all of the southern tier of Arab states and promoted subversive activities throughout the vast area of his dreams. For example, Radio Cairo carried four different lines of propaganda attack upon Ethiopia to promote the separation of as many different regions, thus attempting to break up an African state long and fiercely independent of Western control.¹⁹

Soviet Arms. For his imperial purposes, for the destruction of Israel and to assuage the wounded esteem of his Army Nasser required arms, but he would not take them under our Mutual Security system, because the strings attached to ensure the devotion of the arms to cold war purposes seemed to him like new imperialist controls. So in September 1955 he got the arms from the Soviet bloc, in great quantities. In return he mortgaged the cotton crop of his desperately poor country for at least three years.

Aswan Dam Fiasco. Then Mr. Dulles sent Assistant Secretary of State George V. Allen on an "utterly useless mission" to argue with Nasser, and Washington, with London in tow, began "pleading with Cairo to accept Western financial aid for the construction of the Aswan High Dam, to forestall a possible Soviet offer."²⁰ In December 1955 an offer was made to help build the dam, with one condition, that Egypt would have to forego any Communist assistance.²¹

¹⁷ *The Atlantic*, "Report on the World Today," October 1956, p. 12; Edmond Taylor, "The Real Case Against Nasser," an undated pamphlet published in 1956. Taylor is the author of *Richer by Asia*.

¹⁸ Osgood Caruthers, Cairo correspondent, the *New York Times*, March 11; *Magazine*, August 19, 1956, p. 54.

¹⁹ Taylor, *supra*, p. 26.

²⁰ Hurewitz, "Our Mistakes in the Middle East," p. 51.

²¹ *The New York Times*, "Week in Review," July 22, 1956.

A few months later it became clear that Russia did not intend to build the dam and Egypt recognized Red China, a step which Dulles thought was an attempt "to needle United States diplomacy in an election year."²²

Finally U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Henry Byroade had an interview in Cairo with Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S. Dr. Ahmed Hussein, on July 5, 1956, in which he told Hussein that he was being transferred and that the policy he had pursued for several years was to be abandoned.²³ Thus forewarned, Nasser sent Hussein to Washington to get the anticipated refusal to build the dam, or an offer with unacceptable conditions.

On July 19 Hussein went to Dulles' office to accept the American offer and soon emerged with a rejection which was promptly published, and which was generally regarded as "brusque" and unnecessarily "brutal."²⁴ The next day London also withdrew from the dam project, as "a gasp of surprise and anger" swept through Cairo. The phrase in the Dulles rejection which caused most resentment cast doubt on Egypt's ability to back the project economically.

The Canal Nationalized. Six days later, on July 26, Nasser addressed a crowd of several hundred thousand people in true Hitlerian style. In Ambassador Byroade's presence he told how Byroade had warned him in the preceding October that George V. Allen would have an unpleasant message. I replied, Nasser said, that "if your emissary utters one word I will kick him out of my office" and "when Mr. Allen came he never opened his mouth. Nor did he deliver any message. The whole thing was a bluff." Then after a long review of the dam negotiations: "They were addressing themselves to the Egyptian people to overthrow me. That is why I answered back. 'Let your hate choke you to death!'"

At the end of his three and a half hour oration Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, saying that he would use the revenue to build the dam. The vast assembly "roared, shouted, kissed each other, threw their fezzes into the air, laughed and cried."²⁵

Actually no wrong had been done to Britain and France, since their shares in the canal company were to be paid for at the current exchange rate. The provisions of the Treaty of Constantinople looking toward its continued use by all nations in wartime had been disregarded by Britain during both world wars.²⁶

Britain and France Restrained. Nevertheless in France and Britain there was anger and a quick decision that Nasser's control of the Canal would be intolerable. Doubtless imperialistic elements resented deeply the loss of the

²² Simon Malley, from Cairo, "And the Answer was Suez," *The Reporter*, September 6, 1956, p. 32. This article was based on interviews with numerous American and Egyptian officials in Cairo.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-2.

²⁴ On September 17 the Alsops wrote that with one eye on the election Dulles had been "trying frantically to dissuade the British and French from resorting to force," but his position was complicated "by the fact that his own kick in the teeth for Nasser inspired Nasser's counter kick."—*The Toronto Telegram*, September 17, 1956.

²⁵ Malley, *supra*.

²⁶ Kruarow Motostoti, *The Western Political Quarterly*, March, 1957, pp. 23-58.

lucrative canal company, though it was already rich in non-Egyptian assets and the Canal was due to revert to Egypt in 1968. Much more important was the prospect of West Europe's oil lifeline existing at Nasser's mercy. London and Paris suddenly remembered that for eight years Nasser had illegally closed the Canal to Israel's ships and to any cargo bound for her ports, in defiance of United Nations orders. They knew, too, that he could discriminate against their ships by claiming lack of pilots or by juggling passage fees. The men in power in London and Paris remembered with deep remorse also how their predecessors had appeased Hitler in his early years, until he was an unmanageable monster. Nasser did not have resources comparable to Germany's behind him, but his coup reminded them strongly of Hitler's militarization of the Rhineland in 1936. Furthermore, they knew that large sums would be required to dredge the Canal in the shifting sands of the desert and to deepen it for larger tankers. If Nasser also tried to build the Aswan dam out of Canal revenues, shipping fees would have to rise very steeply.

In Dulles' absence the President sent Robert Murphy to London on July 28 and a plan for international control of the Canal was outlined the next day. On August 1 Britain mobilized some reservists and called a 24 nation conference to meet on August 16, as Secretary Dulles arrived in London. Anger rose in Paris, where there was near unanimity that the United States should lead a stop-Nasser movement. However, the next day the moderating influence of the United States had "prevailed over British and French demands for immediate action."²⁷ On August 3 Dulles said as much over a television hook-up, but he maintained that it was "inadvisable that a waterway internationalized by treaty which is required for the livelihood of a score or more of nations should be exploited by one country for purely selfish purposes," and he believed that the coming conference would provide for international operation of the Canal. On the same day Premier Mollet of France warned that force would be used if necessary, and Prime Minister Eden made the same statement on August 8. On August 11 Sulzberger reported that President Eisenhower had put his foot down on any military action.

The next day the President stressed peaceful solution of the dispute at an extraordinary meeting with leaders of Congress, giving Nasser notice that he need not fear a forcible settlement, and on the 13th the British Labor Party broke with the Government on the use of force.

The First Canal Users' Conference. At the Canal Users' Conference in London on August 16 Dulles made a strong speech telling how Egypt had seized "a sword with which it could cut into the economic vitals of many nations." But at the same time, according to a report by Edmond Taylor from Paris, Dulles had an interview with Foreign Minister Shepilov of the Soviet Union in which he assured Shepilov that the British and French had promised not to use force, unless Nasser committed a flagrant act of aggression. Taylor continued that at the start of the conference the Soviets believed the contrary to be true and dreading any conflict were ready to make sweeping concessions—even to a neutralization of the entire Middle East.²⁸

²⁷ Dana Adams Schmidt, the *New York Times*, August 3, 1956.

²⁸ *The Reporter*, October 18, 1956, pp. 17-18.

Simon Malley also wrote from Cairo that during his visit there in June 1956 Shepilov had told Nasser that Russia did not at all favor an Arab-Israeli war, which would gain nothing for the Arabs. It would, however, give the West a chance to regain a foothold in the area, since the war could not remain limited. He asserted that Russia sought only to strengthen the Arabs' hand for the conference table, not to destroy Israel. Later, on October 15, Soviet Minister A. I. Mikoyan said that the Canal should be open to the ships of all nations, including Israel.²⁹

Russian willingness to exercise restraint upon the Arabs was also attested to by J. C. Hurewitz, who noted in April 1956 that "the Russians gave unmistakable signs of being prepared to soft-pedal their support of the Arabs," being "manifestly afraid" of Western military forces coming back into the region, something the Soviets were "anxious to avoid at all costs."³⁰

Reassured by Dulles that this would not happen, Shepilov was able to take a strong line in the conference, as indeed Dulles did. Dulles came out strongly for "effective sanctions for any violation of the convention" and under his leadership the conference voted for "a Suez Canal Board (responsible) for operating, maintaining and developing the canal."³¹

Then a committee was sent to Cairo to explain the plan to Nasser, who rejected it firmly, as President Eisenhower continued to stand "for a peaceful settlement—nothing else." After Nasser had rejected the conference proposal on September 10, the President still maintained that the United States could approve military action only against Egyptian aggression "under present circumstances."³²

A Second Users' Conference. To prevent our frustrated allies from taking forcible action, Dulles promptly proposed that the Canal users form an association to operate the Canal traffic, but he was not happy about the way Eden presented it to Parliament, as an agency which would employ its own pilots and coordinate traffic. Some diplomatic sources regarded the plan as "a smart lawyer's play," but the Egyptians seemed stunned. Two days later, on September 14, Dulles said that the United States would detour its shipping around Africa rather than "shoot its way" through the Canal. He shied away from the word "boycott" of the Canal, but three days afterwards was reported to be willing to advance half a billion dollars of credit to our allies to help cover the longer haul.

On September 25 Haason W. Baldwin wrote that from the first Mr. Dulles had "indicated by his actions that he did not believe vital interests were involved," and that Nasser had learned "that the United States would not use force and would oppose its use by others."

After the second Users' Conference, on September 20-3, 1956, the *London Times* said that Mr. Dulles soon deflated the tires of the new vehicle, that "the

²⁹ *The Reporter*, September 6, 1956, p. 33; the *New York Times*, October 16, 1956.

³⁰ *The Atlantic*, December 1956, p. 51.

³¹ *The New York Times*, August 22, 26, 1956. In his press conference on August 29 Dulles denounced Russia as the one country at the conference which was not trying to find a fair solution.

³² *Ibid.*, "Week in Review," September 9; September 12, 1956.

plan has been changed and weakened out of all recognition," but on the same day Dulles declared that the conference had "expanded greatly" the prospective functions of the new Users' Association.

Dulles Pursues an "Independent" Course. From Mr. Dulles' standpoint doubtless no "vital interest" was involved at Suez. The real stake was the control of the Middle East oil fields. Michael L. Hoffman commented on August 19 that it was not so much the possible loss of the Canal which perturbed the oil trade, but the loss of the oil itself. Pipelines and installations might be blown up and company personnel massacred.

By September 29 C. L. Sulzberger discerned an oddly wavering attitude on Dulles' part. He could have blocked the International Monetary Fund Loan to Cairo. He permitted American sea captains to fly to Suez to accept pilot jobs—a sharp contrast with the "threats of disciplinary action against American newspapermen hoping to visit Communist China." The *New York Herald Tribune* noted that payment of ship fees to Egypt was not banned and that Dulles had backwatered on using the Cape route. It summarized our activity as "a series of improvisations and inconsistencies, motivated by the high purpose of preventing violence but feeble in execution and confusing in effect." The immediate result was a progressive thinning out of Western resistance to Nasser's action and great bitterness in Britain and France, whose interests were "in grave jeopardy."³³

In late September a high policy decision was made in Cairo to ask the U.S. oil companies and others to take over the development of the Canal. The new Egyptian head of the Canal flew to New York to open the negotiations.³⁴ Noting that the Canal Users' Association had sprung from the "fertile mind" of Dulles, Sulzberger added, on October 6, that "we now seem subtly to be undermining it. . . . We are considering a U.S. consortium to help improve the Canal." The plan was described by the *New York Times* "Week in Review" editor the next day—a group of U.S. oil and shipping companies would operate and develop the Canal under contract with Egypt.

The real state of affairs which had developed by this time was revealed by Mr. Dulles in his press conference on October 2, in which he admitted that there were differences of a fundamental nature with our allies, stemming from the "independent position" of the United States on the colonial issue. Two hours later he took the rare step of amending the official transcript to remove this implication, though after it had reached Europe. In both statements he said that the final Users' Association plan was the same as had been planned two weeks earlier. "There were never any 'teeth' in it, if that means the use of force."³⁵

Others did not evaluate Mr. Dulles' constancy in the same way. Describing his handling of the crisis, the Alsops said: "It was a brilliant operation in its way . . . a series of delaying actions, seeming to promise effective American

³³ Reprinted in the *Nashville Tennessean*, September 29, 1956.

³⁴ Osgood Caruthers, Cairo, the *New York Times*, October 3, 1956.

³⁵ The *New York Times*, October 3, 1956. In giving the second version to the press Dulles said he might have to drop press conferences entirely if they were used to trap him into making blunders.—*The Nation*, November 3, 1956.

support for strong action and then drawing back." Our allies were repeatedly pulled back from using force, but "from the beginning, force, or the threat of force, constituted the only effective sanction in negotiating with the Egyptian dictator."³⁶

Angry Frustration in London and Paris. From London the veteran Drew Middleton reported on October 10 that frustration and anger were at a high pitch. The caption on a front page cartoon in the *Daily Express* read: "Well, even if he is nothing but a crazy, mixed up corporation lawyer, at least he could make up his mind exactly which river he is selling us down." A senior government official described anti-American sentiment as 80 per cent mistrust of Mr. Dulles. Those most offended had been our best friends. They now felt, "almost to a man, that they had been let down by Mr. Dulles and that in the present crisis American leadership has nothing to offer." The *Daily Telegraph* printed a long article, "Keeping up with Mr. Dulles, The Strange Tale of American Attitudes to Suez." Another "source at the highest level, whose friendship for the United States could not be doubted" said bluntly that "some of the Secretary of State's actions come pretty close to double-dealing."³⁷

On October 17 Sulzberger said: "We fostered a negotiation after first seeing to it that our side discarded its most useful trumps." Then he added: "One may legitimately question whether by verging prematurely on the brink of peace, we have not ultimately encouraged tides of political war."

An Appeal to the UN. Before the storm broke, the British finally resorted to the United Nations Security Council on October 5. They had wanted to earlier, but Dulles implored them not to do so and advanced the Users' Association, to bring real economic pressure upon Nasser and force him to negotiate.³⁸ A week later the debates and negotiations in the UN had produced agreement with Egypt on six principles, but the language was so general that one diplomat remarked that they were "as unobjectionable as an endorsement of home and mother or an attack on sin."³⁹ The French and British Foreign Ministers then returned home, having failed to persuade Dulles to order United States ships to pay Suez tolls to the Users' Association.⁴⁰

The Final Decision to Use Force. Prime Minister Eden's Labor critics maintain that the British and French Governments had been resolved to use force to recover control of the Canal all along and that the October 14 notice of Israel to France that she would attack Egypt on the 29th provided the occasion, just when a negotiated solution was in sight on the basis of the six principles. On October 16 Eden flew to Paris and the decision was made to take advantage of the Israeli attack, but under a "juridical fiction" supplied by Eden—armed intervention to "separate the combatants," since the Egyptians would obviously sabotage the Canal.

³⁶ The *Nashville Tennessean*, November 1, 1956.

³⁷ The *New York Times*, October 10, 14, 1956.

³⁸ Drew Middleton, the *New York Times*, October 14, 1956.

³⁹ Thomas J. Hamilton, the *New York Times*, October 13, 1956.

⁴⁰ The *New York Times*, October 8, 1956.

It was this insincere fiction which wrecked the Anglo-French expedition. The fiction was based on the illusion that air and sea attack over an extended period, backed by a massive sea-borne expedition on the way, would bring about Nasser's fall without landing British troops. Since Cyprus was inadequate for the large expedition involved it was to be mounted jointly from London, Marseilles and Algiers, as well as Malta, and the landings would not culminate until D-day plus 15.

Relying on American neutrality, Eden rejected the French plan for a swift descent on the Canal by air, and then the Israelis upset all calculations by their swift rout of Nasser's forces. They had finished the conquest of Sinai—their part of the operation—and had to acknowledge the end of hostilities, involving the acceptance of the UN cease-fire, before the cumbersome British-French operation had been completed. Then the logic of the "juridical fiction," plus the great pressures from Moscow, Washington and New York, compelled an Anglo-French cease-fire with the Canal only partly occupied, but fully sabotaged.⁴¹

This was "the time of the blackest British despair over the inconsistency of American foreign policy."⁴²

When the Franco-British war plans were settled in mid-October the thaw still continued in Hungary and the Polish revolution was a few days away, so it was not known how fully occupied the Soviet Union would be in the first days of November, the time for which the strike at Egypt was planned. The

⁴¹ This is the version of the French military authorities, in a book by Merry and Serge Bromberger, *Les Secrets de L'Expédition d'Egypte*, as reviewed by Paul Johnson in the *London New Statesman and Nation* on April 6, 1957, pp. 429-30. The two allies also lacked certain kinds of equipment and commando troops and were hampered by bad weather which disrupted communications.

⁴² Alastair Buchan from London. *The Reporter*, November 29, 1956, pp. 16-17. In his memoirs Eden tells how Dulles began by asserting flatly, after Nasser seized the canal, that he must be made "to disgorge." He says that the President at first assented to the use of force, if all peaceful means had been exhausted, but changed his mind on September 3. This, he thinks, enabled Nasser to reject the proposals of the first conference. By this time the French ministers suspected that the Users' Club was a device to prevent the Allies from bringing matters to a head with Nasser.

Dulles' idea of sending the oil around the Cape would have injured them more than Nasser. Eden says about Dulles' public deprecation of shooting "their way through the canal" that "it would be hard to imagine a statement more likely to cause maximum allied disunity and disarray." Far from being the instrument to collect canal dues and bring Nasser to accord, as originally planned, he found that "the American conception of the association was evolving so fast that it would end as an agency for collecting dues for Nasser," as it soon did.

Eden deplores that there was no "attempt to snatch opportunity out of trouble, which is the stamp of statesmanship," by getting some real settlements, but only a desire to punish the Allies. He records that it was "not Soviet Russia, nor any Arab state, but the Government of the United States which took the lead in the Assembly against Israel, France and Britain," and believes that if the Allies had occupied all of the canal Washington would have been still more indignant.

He stresses the danger of other Arab states joining in the Israeli-Egypt war, in the absence of Allied intervention, thus bringing the British commitment to Jordan into operation. The Iraq leaders were warning that they would be destroyed unless Nasser was stopped.—*The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle*, London, Cassell, 1960, pp. 463, 469, 478-9, 483, 490, 503, 540.

Americans would be preoccupied with their November 7 presidential election. However, the Israeli mobilization on October 28 brought a quick warning from Eisenhower not to move. Nevertheless an Israeli column drove deep into the Sinai peninsula on the 29th and the next day Britain and France sent a 12 hour ultimatum to Egypt and Israel demanding a cease-fire and the stationing of Anglo-French forces along the Canal temporarily, to enforce a withdrawal ten miles from the Canal. Israel accepted the ultimatum and Egypt rejected it, as President Eisenhower made an urgent appeal to Eden and Mollet to desist, while their bombers raided Egyptian airfields. In the UN Security Council Britain and France vetoed a U.S. resolution calling for a cease-fire.

Rage in Washington. In Washington the rage of top officials was quite uncontrolled. The Alsops wrote that "this city, which has seen a good many extremes in political behavior, has never witnessed such an exhibition of pique and anger as the Anglo-French-Israeli action against Egypt has touched off." The "highest" policy makers had actually played with the astonishing idea of ordering the Sixth Fleet to oppose the allied landings, and Dulles gave the French Ambassador "the kind of lecture that an old fashioned school-master might give to a juvenile delinquent." Yet it was a question "whether the rage in Washington" was really justified, since our allies had kept us in the dark because they believed that our Government "had already behaved towards them with something really like perfidy."⁴³

Nevertheless, Dulles was now "personally affronted," and, continued James Reston, on both occasions when President Eisenhower heard from the press reports about the allied invasions of Egypt "the White House rang with barracks-room language that had not been heard at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue since the days of General Grant." Two days later Walter Lippmann was able to report some second thoughts within the Administration which were wiser than "the first angry and unbalanced reaction in Washington on Monday."⁴⁴

Lippmann warned that by his intrigues in Jordan, Syria, Algeria and against Israel Nasser had created problems the UN had been unable to solve. It would therefore be a mortal blow to the UN if the effect of its operations was to invest "an aggressor like Nasser with immunity." There were two courses open to us. One was to put our whole weight behind UN mediation of the underlying issues, simultaneous with withdrawal. The other was to treat the interventions as "a pure and simple act of aggression" and Nasser's Egypt as the innocent victim which must have its position completely restored. By taking the latter position we acted on a "one-eyed moral basis" and got ourselves into a position "where the whole weight of our influence is against the wrong done by our allies and no serious part is against the wrong done to our allies."⁴⁵

Action in the UN Assembly. The United States was not able to take such a balanced position, partly because of the emotions aroused in Washington by

⁴³ The *Nashville Tennessean*, November 2, 1956.

⁴⁴ The *New York Times*, November 3; the *Nashville Tennessean*, November 5, 1956.

⁴⁵ Walter Lippmann, the *Nashville Tennessean*, November 3, 5, 30; December 2, 1956.

the Anglo-French action behind its back, and partly because League of Nations-United Nations action has been confined traditionally to stopping the fighting and securing withdrawal.

On November 1, Mr. Dulles proposed in the UN General Assembly a cease-fire resolution which, unlike the vetoed Security Council resolution, did not put sole blame on Israel for the invasion of Egypt. Nor did it repeat the demand that all members of the UN deny "any military, economic or financial assistance" to Israel. Britain and France rejected the cease-fire call on November 3.

With the situation as tangled and explosive as it had now become, the United States had the choice of seeing its allies condemned by the UN or of leading the condemnation itself. The latter course involved deep, long-term injury in the minds of many millions of allied citizens, but it had the advantage of putting the United States at the head of the Arab-Asian-neutralist bloc, perhaps also staving off Soviet leadership of an Assembly majority against Britain and France.

If, also, the UN by decisive majorities could bring the fighting to a stop its authority might be preserved for a more dangerous occasion. On balance this consideration justified the vote of the United States for the cease-fire resolution, which was adopted 64 to 5.

Then the situation was ripe for a Soviet proposal that the UN Security Council call for joint Soviet-U.S. military help to Egypt unless the fighting ended within 12 hours, a proposal which was blocked by a vote of 4 to 3.

By this time the Anglo-French forces were ashore in Port Said, at the northern end of the Suez Canal, and the Canal was blocked from end to end with some 50 ships sunk by the Egyptians, some filled with concrete.

Soviet Ultimatum. Seeing that the United States and the UN were both on its side, the Soviet Union took time out from the suppression of freedom in Hungary to extend its November 5 offensive in Egypt's behalf with three strong messages to Eisenhower, Eden and Mollet. The one to the President asked the United States to join with the Soviet Union in suppressing the invasion. The note to Eden asked in what position Britain would have found herself if she had been "attacked by more powerful states possessing every kind of modern destructive weapon," states which could simply have used rockets against her. Doubtless Britain and France would have "called this a barbarous action." The Soviet Government, having already asked the United States to proceed jointly with them, was "fully determined to crush the aggressors and restore peace in the Middle East through the use of force." It hoped that Eden would "display due prudence and draw the corresponding conclusions from this." The note to Mollet was similar. All three notes contained scathing denunciations of the "robbers," condemning the "plundering," "colonial" war in a way calculated to warm the heart of every Arab.

These messages produced a night of extreme tension in Washington. A Washington correspondent reported that "it would be difficult to exaggerate the extreme tension which gripped the United States Government" from six o'clock last night until one o'clock this afternoon, when Britain and France

announced their cease-fire in Egypt. The "Government took the threat with deadly seriousness." The severity of the notes came as a surprise and created immediate alarm. The President immediately issued a statement saying that the United States would oppose Soviet military intervention in the Middle East. Officers and men of the air defense command were called from their homes. "All through the night officials tried to estimate where the Soviet forces might strike and how," while intelligence agencies "were making desperate efforts to evaluate countless rumors of Soviet military movements." Announcement of the British-French cease-fire "had the effect of a sudden discharge of tension. People even began to smile."⁴⁶

If this was the effect of the Soviet notes in Washington, the effect in London and Paris hardly needs to be described. Especially in London the resolution of the Government was already worn thin by the strenuous opposition of approximately half of the British people, by the explosion of rage in Washington, and by the moral condemnation of the United Nations. All of these pressures had probably been discounted in advance, but when the hammer blow of the Russian notes was added the Government caved in and ordered the cease-fire. No time limit was mentioned in the Soviet notes to London and Paris, but Britain surrendered within the twelve hours mentioned in the Kremlin's note to the UN. The Soviet threats had first been broadcast by radio, so that their intended effect had been achieved by the time they were actually delivered.

Some observers ascribe the collapse of the British Government and the calling off of the invasion to extreme pressure from the United States. Drew Pearson stated flatly that the President used barracks-room language over the telephone in talking to Prime Minister Eden and so broke him that he in turn telephoned Premier Mollet in Paris within two minutes and called off the Suez invasion. Beverly Baxter, London correspondent of the Canadian *Maclean's Magazine*, wrote that "one of the best informed men in British politics told me that Eisenhower gave Eden absolute hell" over the telephone.⁴⁷

However, most of the accounts indicate that the Soviet pressure was the final blow which ended Eden's vacillation in surrender. The editor of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* held the contrary explanation to be a myth "abetted, for different reasons, by practically every national leadership in the world—American, Anglo-French, neutralist—and even Soviet."⁴⁸

In Paris, Harold Callender ascribed the softening to the Soviet note, which when it arrived in diplomatic form did not contain the phrase "If rockets were used against France and England you would call it an act of barbarism," which had appeared in the press version. Hans Morgenthau described the "sudden and complete collapse of the Western position under the impact of the Russian ultimatum." Max Harrelson, AP chief correspondent at the UN, attributed the British and French collapse to the fear of Russian intervention. Bascom Timmons told how the lights burned throughout the night in the Pentagon and State Department buildings, adding: "fear of a more disastrous

⁴⁶ Edwin L. Dale, Jr., the *New York Times*, November 7, 1956.

⁴⁷ *The Nashville Tennessean*, March 27, 1957; *Maclean's Magazine*, January 5, 1957, p. 46.

⁴⁸ Eugene Rabinowitch, "The First Year of Deterrence," *B.A.S.*, January 1957, p. 3.

repetition of Pearl Harbor, this time on the U.S. mainland, is much deeper than the country realizes." The U.S. Ambassador to France, Douglas Dillon, indicated also on an American radio program that the Soviet intervention had been decisive.⁴⁹

Fruitless Invasion. For several weeks the British and French tried to obtain some guarantees for the future before withdrawing their troops from Egypt, but they encountered stone walls in both Washington and the UN. There was practically no communication between the American and British Governments. The offended dignitaries in Washington would not see any important British representative. The British and French were guilty aggressors and would get no support from us.

This also was the position in the UN, where in addition to the American-Arab-Asian combination there was the adamant opposition of Secretary Hammarskjöld. A small force of United Nations troops was recruited from among the small nations to ease the British, French and Israeli troops out of Egypt, and perhaps to prevent further clashes. But Hammarskjöld was determined not to permit it to be used as leverage for a settlement. He felt that the attacks on Egypt were indefensible violations of the UN Charter and that they had also undone the amelioration of the Arab-Israeli tension which he had achieved in his visit to the region in the Spring. Therefore, nothing could be done with the UN force except by Nasser's consent, and its tenure in Egypt was only at his sufferance. Consequently everything moved toward "a return to the same conditions that produced these tragic events," a result which Thomas J. Hamilton predicted would weaken the UN as much as its complete failure in Hungary.⁵⁰

The effect of this policy was to save Nasser from the ignominy of defeat and deposition which awaited him as a result of the swift Israeli victory over his forces. Instead of that, the U.S. and the UN had saved Nasser and enabled him to become a hero to the Arab world. The Alsops thought that "our policy seemed to be chiefly designed to punish the British, French and Israelis for their disobedience to Big Brother State Department," making a bad business much worse. After our two chief allies had subsided, "the State Department then turned on Israel, angrily threatening to expel the Israelis from the United Nations if Prime Minister Ben Gurion refused to withdraw his troops from Egypt. So the Israelis caved in too; and Humpty Dumpty Nasser was triumphantly put back on the wall again."⁵¹

The result was not only miraculous salvation for Nasser, but a shattering triumph for the Soviets in the Middle East, where the Soviet near-ultimatum was universally believed to have been the decisive event. For the British and French peoples the results were tragic enough. Nasser seized the occasion to confiscate British and French banks and businesses of every kind, worth perhaps a billion dollars, and to expel thousands of their citizens with only fifty dollars a piece, after arrests and imprisonment. The same fate met the

⁴⁹ *The New York Times*, November 7, 8, 11, 13; the *Washington Post and Times Herald*, November 11, 14, 16; the *Nashville Tennessean*, November 12, 20, 1956; January 7, 1957.

⁵⁰ *The New York Times*, December 23, 1956.

⁵¹ *The Washington Post and Times Herald*, November 14, 1956.

Egyptian Jews, beginning with the richest millionaire. Then Nasser devoted himself to erasing every vestige of French and British culture or history from Egypt. (Later some compensation was made.)

Even more important, he now felt himself free to use the Canal as an instrument of coercion to achieve his objectives, as the Allies had feared he would.

They had believed that at best he would use the Canal to club them into making further concessions to Arab nationalism and that he would go on to engineer palace revolutions throughout the Arab countries before cutting off their oil sources and taking over their bases.⁵²

These were strong reasons, but the British Government had been weak in permitting itself to be deflected from action by Dulles's endless stratagems, and when it did attempt to use force it did so in a manner which led to frustration and disaster. The already shaky economy of Britain was seriously injured and all Western Europe had to reduce its tempo of economic activity because of a shortage of oil, which was aggravated by a price gouge on the part of American oil companies, who not only raised their prices sharply, for everybody, but forced the Europeans to take large amounts of gasoline which they could ill afford.

Worse still, there was a grievous blow to the pride and self confidence of both the British and French peoples. It was proved that even acting together they could not act to safeguard what they believed to be their most vital interests, without being cracked down upon by both of the two great powers, by friend and foe alike. Evidently no nation could assert itself in the world without the aid of either the U.S.S.R. or the U.S.A. The evidence that Britain and France were finished as great powers appeared to be conclusive, and it fell upon Britain with such crushing weight that the Immigration offices of Canada, Australia and other countries were jammed for months by long lines of people wishing to emigrate. Public opinion polls revealed that 40 per cent of the British people would leave if they could.

Others sought refuge in a closer union of European countries, which began to make headway immediately.

The American Role. During the crisis Eisenhower and Dulles had labored mightily to prevent an outbreak of fighting, and they had not succeeded. They had managed to postpone the crisis, but had not found any solution. Dulles had once again proved his cleverness and agility, but he ended up with the mistrust of virtually all of his allies, added to that of the neutrals and the Communist world. In the Middle East his policy lay in ruins.

This did not prevent President Eisenhower's re-election by an increased majority, one made larger by the waves of uncertainty loosed by the October crises. As his second term began, it had become evident that his gifts lay in preventing war by vetoing his domestic warmakers and trying to be friends with everyone, even the Soviets occasionally. His talents for constructive statesmanship had not been demonstrated.

His methods forbade that. "What he does," said Lippmann, "is to judge

⁵² *The New York Times*, "Week in Review," November 4, 11, 1956.

and choose among alternatives brought to him by his staff officers." This left the responsibility for initiative upon Dulles, whose "peculiar conception" of his office required him to both direct and administer foreign policy, so that no one devoted all of his time to making it. So, added Reston, Washington's un-failing procedure was "to play the role of mediator," going along with "no long range plans anywhere" and "being constantly surprised by events."⁵³

On the other hand, the British-French attack on Egypt was a mistake. France had the deeper grievance, since Nasser was fighting her in Algeria, but neither had as good a case for war as Israel, which had no other remedy against constant attrition attacks. The Anglo-French pretext that they were intervening to protect the Canal was hollow, because their intervention would lead the Egyptians to block it for months. Their real purpose, to recover control, was revealed by the terms of the ultimatum which provided for Anglo-French occupation of the Canal in any event. Thus the Israeli seizure of the Canal was spoiled and the wrath of the entire anti-colonial world brought down on the heads of the three allies in the UN.

By holding the fort in the UN against sanctions on Israel, and perhaps by giving notice that they would go to her aid if others intervened, the British and French could have accomplished their objective without raising an anti-colonial storm or putting themselves in the doubtful position of going to war for something less than clear national peril.

The defense of the UN Charter in the crisis will mean much to humanity, if the United States is prepared to back the precedent of defending UN law and working through the UN consistently.

Yet the next day, after leading the UN in condemning our allies, Mr. Dulles went to a hospital bed and conceived the Eisenhower Doctrine, which despite its UN verbiage was a plan for ordering the affairs of the vast Middle East region through secret diplomacy, secret use of money, power politics and unilateral action.

From eloquently defending the law of the United Nations Mr. Dulles turned immediately to repair a badly damaged gap in the encirclement of the Communist world and to complete the extension of the *Pax Americana* over all the earth.

ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL

By mid-December 1956 the last British and French troops were out of Egypt, without getting any assurances about a Canal settlement, and in early January the bulk of the UN police force quit Suez. Then UN pressure upon Israel to withdraw from Sinai increased.

The Strip and the Strait. Israel still occupied two key spots: the Gaza Strip, a sliver of the Palestine seacoast which Egypt had managed to hold after her

⁵³ The *Nashville Tennessean*, December 31; the *New York Times*, November 20, 1956. Reston did offer one justification for our strenuous efforts to block the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt. Our Government, he said, was having great difficulty in restraining Rhee and Chiang "from taking military action in defiance of their agreements with the United States."
—The *New York Times*, December 30, 1956.

So our European allies had to be stopped to keep our Asiatic protégés from breaking loose—the one to attack China and the other North Korea.

invasion of Palestine in 1948; and Sharm El Sheikh, the Egyptian side of the narrow strait of Tiran which leads to the long, slender Gulf of Aquaba, at the end of which lies the Israeli port of Elath.

Both positions were of crucial importance to Israel. The Strait had been closed to Israeli shipping by a battery of Egyptian guns mounted on the high shore just above the navigable channel, which runs along the bank in Egyptian territorial waters. This was done, together with the closing of the Suez Canal to Israeli ships, on the ground that Egypt was still at war with Israel, a justification which would seem to go far toward legalizing Israel's attack on Egypt.

For the modern industries of Israel it was a grave thing to be shut out of the markets of both Africa and Asia, unless her commerce went the length of the Mediterranean and all the way around Africa. Similarly, the Gaza Strip, 25 miles long and 6 wide, made life almost untenable in Israel, since it was used constantly as a base of attack by guerrillas on the tiny country. In Egyptian hands the Strip had no value except as a base for war, waged through hundreds of attacks by guerrillas recruited from the 200,000 Arab refugees in the Strip, maintained there for the day of Israel's destruction.⁵⁴

These considerations underline the initial error of the Eisenhower Administration in agreeing with the Arab-Asian bloc and the Soviet Union that Egypt was the innocent victim of Israeli aggression. This stand accorded with Secretary General Hammarskjöld's position that the status quo ante had to be completely restored and that the UN police force could act only with Egypt's consent. Therefore, said the United States, there would be time to talk about settlements after the invaders had pulled out.⁵⁵

Withdrawal Demanded by the UN. Being extremely loath to part from its new Arab-Asian friends, the United States voted for the UN resolution of January 19, 1957, calling upon Israel to withdraw within five days. The vote was 74 to 2, only France and Israel opposing. Israel demurring, the Secretary General guardedly supported the American suggestion that the UN force be used to police the two trouble spots, if Egypt approved.

Egypt did not agree, and on February 1 the United States and six other governments presented two resolutions in the UN General Assembly. The first called upon Israel to complete its withdrawal "without any further delays," and the second recognized that withdrawal should be followed by "progress toward creation of peaceful conditions," by consultation. With growing insistence the real questions were asserting themselves.⁵⁶

Since the proposed UN occupation of the danger spots would be on Cairo's sufferance, Israel still refused to withdraw without adequate guarantees, though noting with appreciation the growing understanding in the UN "that the status quo ante of violence and blockade on the part of Egypt may not be restored." Israel would continue to occupy the Strip and be responsible for it.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ See the article by Hanson W. Baldwin describing the geography of the Strip.—*The New York Times*, March 5, 1957.

⁵⁵ *The New York Times*, "Week in Review," January 27, 1957.

⁵⁶ *The New York Times*, February 3, 1957.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, February 4, 1957.

The Arab-Asian bloc then began to prepare a resolution for the levying of economic sanctions against Israel, a move which would not mean much unless the United States participated in it, but which would be disastrous to Israel if she did.

Washington Frustrated. This prospect induced a feeling of pessimism in the U.S. State Department. Premier Ben Gurion of Israel had rejected a plea by President Eisenhower for withdrawal. By this time the U.S. Government was "both angry and frustrated," fearing damage to the UN's role in the Mid-East and seeing the opening of the Canal postponed by Egypt. Also, by forcing a showdown with the United Nations Israel had "put the United States in the awkward position of having to choose sides between the two." The "best informed opinion" was that the United States would support sanctions against Israel, but it was "deeply unhappy about the prospect that Israel would force it to make the choice."⁵⁸

Revolt Against Sanctions. This unhappiness was at once deepened by a revolt of practically all the leaders of the Senate, of both parties. Seeing a chance to strike at the United Nation's lack of action against Russia in Hungary, Republican leader Knowland and Senator Bridges promptly declared that they would oppose sanctions against Israel unless they were also levied against the Soviet Union. Senator Wiley, ranking Republican senator on the Foreign Affairs Committee, and Senator Saltonstall also opposed sanctions against Israel, as did Senators Ives and Javits.

Simultaneously, both the conservative and liberal wings of the Democratic majority in the Senate came out strongly against sanctions for Israel, creating "something like the tension that gripped Washington on the October Sunday before Israel invaded the Sinai peninsula."⁵⁹

Assurances Offered Israel. Though the President had the power to impose sanctions, the rising opposition of the Senate and the nation led Secretary of State Dulles to present to Israel, on February 11, an aide-memoire stating that the U.S. would use its influence in the Assembly to keep UN troops in Gaza and that it would assert on behalf of U.S. ships the principle of free passage in the Gulf of Aquaba.

On February 15 Israel rejected the offer as not definite enough, still asking for guarantees. The Israeli document was reported to propose "a comprehensive plan that far transcended the relatively nebulous proposal" put forward by Secretary Dulles, who boarded a plane for Georgia where the President had gone for a couple weeks of quail shooting and golfing.⁶⁰

Returning to Washington, Dulles asked Israel to modify its stand, insisting that he could not meet the Israeli conditions. The Arab position left the United States "little diplomatic room." The United States was now telling the Israelis it would take a strong stand on Aquaba, while reassuring the Egyptians that it would not use force. However, the proposal to send a ship through the Tiran Strait, peacefully, was definite.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Russell Baker, the *New York Times*, February 10, 1957.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, February 16, 1957.

⁶¹ The *New York Times*, February 17, 1957.

The President's Demand for Evacuation. The deadlock continuing, the President issued a statement on February 17 again calling for the evacuation of Gaza and Aquaba, maintaining that UN Charter obligations seemed "to preclude using the forcible seizure and occupation of other lands as bargaining power in the settlement of international disputes." Israel should withdraw unconditionally.

As the President maintained his position that Israel was guilty of aggression and could not profit from it, the leaders of Congress desired a conference with the President and rejected a suggestion that Dulles conduct the meeting. At the same time the United States heard that Israel would fight rather than risk the loss of free passage into Aquaba. The deadlock appeared to be complete.

The impasse also remained between the Congress and the President after his return to the White House and conference with the Congressional leaders, who made it clear that the President "would never get the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East through the Senate if he relied on one-sided coercion of Israel." A four-hour seminar in the White House by a battery of Administration officials failed to convince the legislators.⁶²

The President then made a nation-wide radio and television address in which he said that the United Nations had no choice but to force Israel out of Egypt.

Deadlock. However, Ben Gurion rejected the President's verdict. In an impassioned speech he still demanded that there be security at Aquaba and that Egypt should not return to the Strip, either directly or indirectly.

In the United States Mr. Eisenhower's address failed to convince either the Congress, the newspaper editors or public opinion. It was remarkable that a President so newly re-elected by an overwhelming majority should find his leadership rejected so soon. William S. White wrote that "the collision with the White House is direct and basic—and punishing. Not in many years has Senate leadership in both parties so directly and so massively challenged a President on a world issue."⁶³

On the same day, Reston asked why it was that the President could not get the support of Congress, the Canadians, the British, French, Danes and many other sympathetic Governments for his proposals? "There was, to put it bluntly, a crisis of confidence in United States' leadership of the world." In an Administration that had "talked more of confidence and good faith than any other in the world" this was "not only a paradox but a tragedy." The President's speech had failed to remove the issue of confidence, especially since in November he had refused to subscribe "to one law for the weak; another for the strong," but now he said that the failure of the UN to put pressure on the Russians about Hungary was no argument. It did not help, either, that earlier he had revealed that he didn't know there was any UN resolution against closing the Suez to Israel.

The "Assumptions" of Israel's Withdrawal. Eventually, after further conferences between Israeli Ambassador Eban, Mr. Dulles and French Foreign

⁶² James Reston, *The New York Times*, March 3, 1957.

⁶³ *The New York Times*, February 24, 1957.

Minister Pineau, Mrs. Golda Meir, Israeli Foreign Minister, spoke to the UN General Assembly on March 1, agreeing to withdraw from the two disputed areas on three assumptions: (1) that UN forces exclusively would take over the Strip and would have responsibility for police protection, civilian administration and economic development; (2) that the UN force would be maintained until there is a peace settlement or a definitive agreement about the future of the Strip; and (3) that if there were signs of a return to the "conditions which existed" before the occupation, Israel would have "freedom to act to defend its rights."

On Aquaba Mrs. Meir also postulated withdrawal on the assumption that (1) the U.S. and other leading maritime powers intend to establish rights of free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aquaba; (2) that the UN force would move in and prevent a blockade; and (3) that any future blockade would be "regarded by Israel as an attack entitling her to exercise her inherent right of self defense under Article 51 of the Charter."

She closed with an extempore plea for cooperation in the Middle East which won an ovation from the Assembly, and was followed by U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, who chilled the Israeli assumptions considerably.

He began by reiterating that no member of the UN could seek "political" gains by the use of force, or "use as a bargaining point a gain achieved by means of force." The United States did not consider that Israel's declarations made her withdrawal "conditional." Her "hopes and expectations" seemed to us "not unreasonable in the light of prior action of this Assembly"—not a very broad base for hopes and expectations.

Lodge went on to quote the Secretary General to the effect that Egypt desired the UN police force to take over military and civilian control in Gaza "in the first instance." It was our view that the future of the Strip must "be worked out within the framework of the armistice agreement." We thought, however, that we could "properly entertain the hope" that the UN, including the UNEF, "could usefully continue until there is a definitive settlement respecting the Gaza Strip."

Concerning Aquaba, he was more specific. It was "essential" that UNEF forces be stationed there to separate the "Egyptian and Israeli land and sea forces . . . until it is clear that the non-exercise of any claimed belligerent rights has established the peaceful conditions which must govern navigation in waters having such an international interest." He then quoted the U.S. statement of February 11 as follows: "In the absence of some over-riding decision to the contrary, as by the International Court of Justice, the United States, on behalf of vessels of United States registry, is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join others to secure general recognition of this right."

About the duration of UNEF deployment on the Strait he merely "noted" the suggestion of the Secretary General on February 26 that "an indicated procedure" would be for him "to inform the Advisory Committee of the UNEF, which would determine whether the matter should be brought to the attention of the Assembly."

The assumption that this procedure would be followed was one of the most

important ones to Israel, since she had been persuaded that the Advisory Committee, composed of Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway and Pakistan, could be relied on to bring the issue before the Assembly, thus transferring to Egypt, it was hoped, the onus of seeking to create a situation that could upset the peace.⁶⁴

Once Israel had completed its withdrawal, Lodge said in the latter part of his address, there would be "no basis for either party to the armistice agreement to assert or exercise any belligerent rights."

This statement cut both ways, but it facilitated the resumption of attrition war by Egypt. If there was one small raid into Israel, would the Assembly meet and pass a resolution? And what would it do if the raids gradually increased according to plan?

Renewed Debate in Israel. It was considerations like these which led to four days of agonized debate in Jerusalem, during which the issue still hung in the balance. The decision to withdraw had been made after a month of the most intense negotiations with Secretary Dulles, negotiations which had finally convinced the Israelis that their assumptions would be justified. Then Lodge's speech had pointed toward renewed Egyptian control of the Strip. They thought his negative approach was illustrated by his statement that their assumptions were "not unreasonable."

Before Mrs. Meir's address Dulles had welcomed French mediation gladly and after studying the Israeli assumptions in writing he had promised that Lodge would say that they were "reasonable."⁶⁵ Israeli Ambassador Eban reminded Mr. Dulles that there could not have been any surprises in what Israel asked the United States to endorse in Mrs. Meir's address. Then in place of the expected public endorsement by the United States, Lodge had emphasized Egypt's legal rights in the Strip, instead of the value of practical, de facto arrangements for the UNEF to run the Strip.⁶⁶

The shock in Israel led to a letter from President Eisenhower to President Ben Gurion, drafted by Dulles, which did make quite specific the moral commitment of the United States to see that Israel did not have to go back to living under attrition war and blockade. Eisenhower believed "that Israel will have no cause to regret having thus conformed to the strong sentiment of the world community." It had always been our view that "after the withdrawal there should be a united effort by all nations to bring about conditions in the area more stable, more tranquil, and conducive to the general welfare than those which existed heretofore." He thought that the "hopes and expectations" voiced by your Foreign Minister were "reasonable to entertain," and, he concluded "I want you to know that the United States, as a friend of all the countries of the area and as a loyal member of the United Nations, will seek that such hopes prove not to be in vain."

After receiving this letter on March 2 the Israeli Government finally decided to order withdrawal, beginning on March 4. After the order had been given,

⁶⁴ Dana Adams Schmidt, the *New York Times*, March 7, 1957. This is a very informative review of the entire negotiations leading to Israel's withdrawal.

⁶⁵ Drew Pearson, the *Nashville Tennessean*, March 20, 1957.

⁶⁶ Schmidt, the *New York Times*, March 7, 1957.

Mr. Dulles was asked at his press conference on March 5 whether the President's letter covered "that part of Mrs. Meir's speech where she expressed the hope that the Egyptian troops would not return to Gaza?"

He replied: "I do not think that the President's letter should be read as endorsing every detail of everything that was said," indicating that the letter had not covered Gaza after all. He thought it "referred generally to the hopes and expectations for a better future for the area. . . ." He had said a few minutes earlier that he wanted "to stick just exactly to what Ambassador Lodge said, because that was a very carefully considered statement."

These statements appeared to put the United States back behind the President's letter and to leave us standing on the Lodge statement—after the letter had led to Israel's withdrawal.

As Dana Adams Schmidt put it, the United States had spelled out a case for Israel's withdrawal. After hoping to avoid some painful decisions Washington had risked Arab wrath. The Israelis had been persuaded by the State Department that there was a good chance that the UN would succeed in establishing a de facto trusteeship in the Strip. It was believed that Egypt "may tolerate indefinitely a situation in which UN forces and military police are responsible . . . and Egypt stays out of the picture." In any event, "by basing her action on the United States aide memoire the Israelis put the United States under a special moral obligation."⁶⁷

Israel's Gain. This much was very clear. The Israelis had enough reason to believe that Nasser's Egypt would resume attrition war and blockade upon them, but their tenacious hold on the Egyptian attack spots had dramatized to the world what they had been through. They convinced the American people and virtually every other Western nation that Nasser had been the real aggressor and that Israel's attack upon Egypt had been a desperate act of self defense, when all other means had failed.

Israel's plucky stand had also reversed the moral basis for the UN's condemnation of her. Her enemies, and some UN legalists, were left to defend what the Israelis called "sheer legalism." Moreover, by courageously defending her rights for four months Israel had escaped from a position of almost total isolation into a great company of friends, who would look kindly thereafter on her struggle to live in a hostile world. She had also compelled the U.S. Government to go on record in support of her legitimate rights and aspirations when it would greatly have preferred not to do so.

A Visit from King Saud. If a government's heart is where its treasure is, the Eisenhower Administration was much more concerned about the huge stake of the American oil companies in Arabian oil than in Israel's viability.

When King Saud, of Saudi Arabia, came to Washington for a state visit late in January 1957 our policy makers decided that the President should break all precedents, due to New York Mayor Wagner's refusal to greet the King, and go down to the airport to meet him.

Saud was the absolute monarch of 7,000,000 poor tribesmen and many slaves, who used his \$300 million annual oil revenues to provide a \$70 million

⁶⁷ *The New York Times*, March 3, 1957.

palace for himself, and other palaces for the huge royal family, as well as to support Nasserism and promote the extermination of Israel. For this purpose he once urged his fellow Arabs to "sacrifice 10 million of our number."⁶⁸

King Saud came to secure 250 million dollars worth of arms to protect himself against Israeli aggression, along with cash grants for military purposes and a huge annual rent for the American air base at Dhahran in his realm. He wanted \$300 million rental for a six year period and 90 sabre jet aircraft.⁶⁹

In return for these favors, probably scaled down somewhat, he was willing to approve the Eisenhower Doctrine against communism as "a good one which is entitled to consideration and appreciation" by Arab Governments.

This was a welcome dividend to oil-minded diplomats intent on preventing further Russian advances in the Middle East by bargaining with the various Arab rulers. However, the spectacle of the lavish entertainment of Saud and his entourage of more than sixty courtiers dramatized to us the feudal splendor in which a few Arab potentates live in wealth and luxury, ruling their destitute subjects.

The object lesson was not lost on the American people and it contributed heavily to the almost unanimous opposition of Congress to levying sanctions against a tiny nation struggling to live democratically in such surroundings.⁷⁰

Egypt's Authority Reasserted. On March 6 Israeli officials left the Gaza Strip and 2600 UN troops entered. Another contingent of UN troops took over the Sharm El Sheikh Strait two days later. On the 11th Nasser named a governor of Gaza and on the 15th announced his continued refusal to permit Israeli ships to use the Canal. As Nasser took over the administration of Gaza, Mrs. Meir flew to Washington and after talks with Secretary Dulles a joint statement was issued, on March 19, saying that the United States still "stood firmly by the hopes and expectations it had expressed" regarding the disputed questions. Early in April UN Secretary General Hammarskjold announced that Egyptian troops would be stationed in the Gaza Strip, to cooperate with UN troops in preventing "infiltration across the demarcation line."

On March 29 the Canal was finally cleared of sunken ships and Nasser moved to assert his full and undisputed control over it. Washington, London and Paris warned their shipping not to use the Canal pending negotiations between the United States and Egypt, which continued until the end of April when Egypt sent to the UN her own rules and regulations for operating the Canal. After a debate on the question in the Security Council, on April 26, Western shipping resumed passage of the Canal on Egypt's terms.

In the first week of April an Israeli-chartered American ship sailed the Gulf of Aquaba and discharged a cargo of Iranian oil at the Israeli port of Elath. Then Iran barred further oil shipments to Israel and the U.S. State Department complained that the American ship had sailed to Elath without notifying it. The Israelis insisted that this was precisely the technique agreed upon.⁷¹

⁶⁸ *The New York Times*, February 3, 1957.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, January 3, February 10, 17, 1957.

⁷⁰ Thomas L. Stokes, *the Nashville Tennessean*, February 27, 1957.

⁷¹ Russell Baker, *the New York Times*, April 14, 1957.

However, on June 23, the State Department circulated a firm statement asserting the right of free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aquaba.

The Israelis had been warned previously by both Mr. Dulles and the President not to use force in testing their right to use the Suez Canal. They had repeatedly stated that they would use force in the Gulf of Aquaba. At the Canal the Israelis appeared to be helpless, as any other country would be if discriminated against.

Under a heading, "Mideastern Munich," the *New York Times* greeted Nasser's Suez victory editorially, on April 27, as complete, since he had defeated all of Mr. Dulles' proposals for international control of the Canal. The price of appeasement was "still to be revealed."

THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

The Sinai and Suez wars represented a crisis of the first magnitude in the policy of Secretary Dulles to close the ring of encirclement with the Baghdad Pact.

When Egypt and Syria became convinced that we were splitting the Arab bloc by arming Iraq, and seducing her away from the sacred objective of the annihilation of Israel, they turned increasingly to Moscow and accepted arms from her. Then Egypt's growing military power and hostility set off Israel's invasion of Egypt, which provided the occasion for the Anglo-French invasion.⁷²

Worse still, this violent climax appeared to have been triggered directly by the "abrupt," "brutal," public withdrawal by Mr. Dulles, on July 19, 1956, of his offer to build the Aswan Dam. Though Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal Company on July 26 had long been intended, there was general agreement that Dulles had unnecessarily provided him with the ideal occasion.

For six months this almost universal conclusion was not questioned. Then in the Spring the Dulles defense appeared, again through *Time* and *Life* men. First C. D. Jackson was quoted as having said in a speech in Toronto that Dulles had precipitated the Mid-East crisis to counter the Soviet Union. Mr. Dulles denied this before a Senate committee on March 18, 1957, but a letter from Wilson Woodside, a leading Canadian commentator on foreign affairs, said that Jackson "did say that the United States sought an occasion to call the Soviet bluff."⁷³

Dulles the Hero of Aswan. A few days later another *Time* and *Life* man, John Robinson Beal, published a highly laudatory biography of Dulles, after "personal interviews with him which provided additional facts about his career and insight into his official actions." On the Aswan Dam issue Beal wrote that "For Dulles, a moment of cold-war climax had come. It was necessary to call Russia's hand in the game of economic competition" and to demonstrate to neutral nations, "by act rather than oral explanation," that those who stayed outside our alliances could not insult us—apparently a

⁷² Chester Bowles, "America's Role in the Middle East," the *New York Times Magazine*, June 20, 1957, p. 33.

⁷³ The *New York Times*, March 19, 1957.

reference to Nasser's recognition of Red China. "It was necessary," continued Beal, "to make the demonstrations on a grand scale" and "Nasser combined the right timing, the right geography and the right order of magnitude for a truly major gambit in the cold war."

Therefore Nasser could not be let down easily "through protracted negotiation." "It had to be forthright, carrying its own built-in moral for neutrals. . . ." It was a calculated risk "on a grand scale," comparable to Korea and Formosa.⁷⁴

Now, said Stewart Alsop, "there can be no reasonable doubt that this is the Dulles version," since it paralleled almost word for word C. D. Jackson's statement. But Alsop did not think Beal had succeeded in proving that "a brilliantly successful diplomatic coup," which was "moral," "consistent and purposeful," had been spoiled by the stupid and dishonest policies of our allies.⁷⁵

Instead of committing an egregious blunder, with swift and disastrous consequences, and falling into a trap set by Nasser, Dulles had been the hero of Aswan, the master mover, here as always. Once more he had deliberately advanced to the brink, for the weightiest of reasons—to make the Soviet Union lose face and teach all the nations who were not our allies a lesson.

At his news conference on April 3 Dulles sought to modify this picture somewhat, but Sulzberger thought he had not changed it much. Among our distressed allies Dulles was still considered to be "not only an exponent of the dangerous art of brinkmanship but of maladroit Middle Eastern gambling." Our purpose to split the Arab world through the Baghdad Pact, isolating Egypt, had greatly advanced Soviet influence in Egypt, Syria and Jordan.⁷⁶

Immediately after his Aswan Dam gambit had ended in the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt, Dulles was stricken with intestinal cancer. He had to have a serious operation on November 3 and was confined to a hospital for some two weeks.

Decision to Extend the Truman Doctrine. In this interval he surveyed the wreckage of his Middle East diplomacy and came out with a decision to extend the Truman Doctrine to cover specifically the entire Middle East. At the end of December the plan was leaked to the press, before being presented to Congressional leaders. Mr. Dulles celebrated the end of the disastrous year of 1956 with a strong cold war statement. The rulers of the Soviet Union still sought "success" and it was a major American responsibility to check the spread of their imperialism to the Middle East, where were to be found the holy shrines, vital resources and channels of communication. "We must live by the golden rule. By so serving others we serve ourselves."

Having thus sanctified the extension of an American protectorate over 14 countries, with an area of 4,691,418 squares miles and a population of 125,622,397, without any prior consultation of their wishes, Dulles moved

⁷⁴ John Robinson Beal, *John Foster Dulles*, New York, Harper, 1957, pp. 258-60.

⁷⁵ *The Nashville Tennessean*, April 3, 1957.

⁷⁶ *The New York Times*, April 8, 1957.

The *Christian Science Monitor* agreed editorially on April 8 that Dulles had done little "to squelch his biographer's statement."

forward to counter in Moscow the "mischievous and dangerous" impression created in the autumn that the President was a pacifist, to stifle Congressional discussion about what happened, to share the blame for the disaster with the Democratic Congress, and to attempt to lay down a positive but flexible policy for the area.⁷⁷

The Doctrine Presented. On January 5, 1957, the President delivered an address to the Congress saying that there was "no nation, great or small, with which we would refuse to negotiate, in mutual good faith, with patience and in the determination to secure a better understanding between us."

However, Russia's rulers had "long sought to dominate the Middle East," though their security was not involved, since never for a moment had the United States entertained the thought of using the Middle East as a base for aggression against Russia. Nor did Russia's desire for domination rest on economic interest, because her traffic through Suez was less than one per cent and she didn't need any of the Arab oil. It was a case of international Communism, seeking to "mask its purposes of domination by expressions of good will and by superficially attractive offers of political, economic and military aid."

Then, after tearing away the Soviet mask in the cases of Latvia, Esthonia, Lithuania and Hungary, he asked for authority: (1) to assist any nation or group of nations in the area "in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence"; (2) to undertake "programs of military assistance" where desired; and (3) to use our armed forces, when requested, "against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international Communism." He would seek authority to spend \$200,000,000 a year for three years "for discretionary use in the area."

James Reston verified in discussions with officials afterward that the long paragraphs in the message deferring to the United Nations did not mean that the Security Council would have any veto over the use of our armed forces in an emergency, and the likelihood of any resolution of the General Assembly opposing the use of our armed forces was said to be ruled out by our Latin American and European strength in the Assembly.⁷⁸

In other words, having used the UN fully in the November crisis we now veered away from it and would act independently of it for the long pull in the Middle East. The policy of non-involvement, so firmly proclaimed, was also reversed.

Reactions Abroad. The President's address had been interrupted by "perfunctory applause" five times and it received a chilly reception abroad. The British did not see any immediate danger of Soviet armed attack and wondered if an arms race by proxies was beginning in the Middle East. There was "a widely held view that the new Eisenhower policy represents a piece of hypocritical opportunism seeking to take advantage of a power vacuum that some feel the United States did its utmost to create by demanding the withdrawal

⁷⁷ Walter Lippmann, *the Nashville Tennessean*, January 3; Doris Fleeson, *ibid.*, January 1, 1957.

⁷⁸ *The New York Times*, January 6, 1957.

of the British and French forces from Egypt." One European diplomat described the new doctrine as "a final step toward a kind of United States hegemony."⁷⁹

In friendly Lebanon the press resented the vacuum idea and discussed the situation as if a U.S. occupation were imminent. (Actually the occupation did not occur until two years later, when the new attempt to shore up a bankrupt policy collapsed.) Resentment throughout the Middle East was reported, including fear in Israel. Yugoslavia was opposed. Dutch comment was skeptical and some Swedes feared there would be no protection for Israel. Nehru commented that "when a foreign power tries to step into another country, it disturbs the peace of that country and creates conflicts. It gives rise to tension and a race among foreign powers."⁸⁰

Where Would It End? At home Lippmann thought it unwise to appear to force the Mid-East countries to make a public choice as to who would be their protector. It was mischievous to keep talking about filling a vacuum of power. The role no longer existed. Thinking of the Middle East as a stake in the U.S.-S.U. struggle implied choice, whereas unalignment reflected the military realities and the true interests of the Arabs. Since no outside authority could establish and maintain order, he concluded, "the time may come when we shall have to have some talks with the Russians about the possibility of arranging a stabilization by neutralization in the Middle East."⁸¹

This eminently sensible suggestion aroused no answering echoes, in spite of the fervid affirmation in the President's address of our intense willingness to negotiate, "with patience and in determination to secure a better understanding." Negotiation with Russia to neutralize the Middle East, or Middle Europe, was the last thing in the minds of the cold warriors who controlled our policy. Their whole desire was for more containment and more armed pressure on the Communist world. The Communists were in trouble. Maybe we could win the Cold War after all.

Lippmann estimated the situation accurately, on January 10, when he observed that the hot rhetoric of the doctrine, with its vagueness and ambiguity, was meant to impress mankind and give the Secretary of State a free hand. Stewart Alsop described it as neither a doctrine, nor a policy, nor a program, but "a request for Congress to sign in advance a very large, very blank check." No one in the Eisenhower Administration had "any concrete or specific idea of how or when or to what end the check will be cashed."⁸²

The only thing that was clear was that the doctrine constituted a major intensification of the Cold War. By January 20 the Soviet propaganda machine was gradually turning its attention back to the United States.⁸³ In his second inaugural address President Eisenhower struck the cold war note strongly, warning that "rarely has this earth known such peril as today." International communism and the power it controlled was "a great divisive force." In Moscow "a brilliant Soviet expert on foreign affairs" said, referring to the

⁷⁹ Drew Middleton, *the New York Times*, January 7; Harold Callender, January 10, 1957.

⁸⁰ *The New York Times*, January 7, 1957.

⁸¹ *The Nashville Tennessean*, January 7, 1957.

⁸² *Ibid.*, January 8, 1957.

⁸³ *The New York Times*, January 20, 27, 1957.

doctrine: "We think that this is a pretext for putting the buckle on the chain of American bases which surrounds the Soviet Union."⁸⁴

On January 23 Hanson W. Baldwin thought that a great strengthening of our armed forces in the Middle East was implicit in the new doctrine. We were not well equipped to fight a limited land war there, the kind most likely to occur. Air bases were needed to accommodate an air task force from Europe. On the other hand, King Saud was demanding far more than the Dhahran base cost "in terms of annual rental." A major Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf command was now more necessary than before. The Middle East loomed large "in uneasy Congressional minds."

No such uneasiness troubled the master minds in the State Department and the Pentagon. James Reston reported, on the 27th, that the U.S. Government was rather pleased with its new independence of France and Britain. It had been going its own way in the Far East for a long time. Now it was doing so in the Middle East. Simultaneously the British were cutting their forces, France had few troops in NATO, Germany and Japan were refusing to meet the defense levels we urged, and even Canada was planning reductions. In short, while we were making vast pronouncements the strength of the alliance was slipping away and the burdens of defense were being "slowly but surely transferred to Uncle Sam."

Similar conclusions led Geoffrey Barraclough to believe that the United States was headed for a dead end in its global encirclement policy. The new doctrine was a logical extension of American policy since 1945, but, he asked, "where is the business of filling alleged power vacuums to stop," short of over-extension and exhaustion, "particularly against an enemy operating with the advantage of interior lines?" Now also for the first time the United States was assuming an unlimited commitment and becoming "entangled in virulent nationalisms which are none of its concern." Surely United States' policy had come to the end of the road.⁸⁵

The Final Brink Envisaged. Doubts of this kind contributed to the unusual hammering which Mr. Dulles received in the Senate. Senator W. Scott Kerr (Democrat of N. C.) termed the President's proposal an undated declaration of war and called for the resignation of Dulles "because of his unique talent to confuse things."

Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Dulles really balanced on the final brink. He "did not envisage the possibility that there would be, for example, an all-out attack upon the Soviet Union unless it was quite apparent that what was happening was deliberately intended to be the beginning of *the* third world war. In that event we might have to act differently. Those are matters which inevitably have to be left to the judgment of the Commanding Chief." (*Italics added.*)

This, said former Secretary of State Dean Acheson on January 10, was "far too hazardous a course even to be hinted at." It suggested a decision by the President's advisers for an all-out attack on the Soviet Union. This was

⁸⁴ Joseph Alsop, the *Nashville Tennessean*, January 27, 1957.

⁸⁵ *The Nation*, February 9, March 2, 1957.

"reckless talk. Vague phrases which suggest that we might respond to any but the most vital danger by nuclear retaliation carry a vicious risk, whether believed or not believed, and may cause a fatal miscalculation. There can be no bluff here."

Before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, sitting together, Dulles underwent "the most critical and searching Senatorial cross examination of his career." As the sage of humor, Frederic C. Othman put it: Dulles "seemed to strike most of those Senators like the boy who cried wolf once too often. He'd kept 'em scared for years about our touchy relations with the Russians. And here he was back again, saying the danger of war now was the greatest in ten years . . ." The lawmakers "for the most part seemed inured to Dulles' gloomy ideas."⁸⁶

Dulles at Bay. On the 24th Dulles spent another long day before the Committees, at times red-faced and crying out his replies, as both his ability and his good faith were questioned. Senator J. William Fulbright served notice of a coming formal demand that Dulles justify his past conduct in the Middle East. Three days later criticism implying that he should resign mounted. All shades of Democrats indicated their lack of confidence in him. By February 1 Senators' mail was running 8 to 1 against the President's Mid-East bid, with criticism centered on Dulles. Two days later William S. White reported that Dulles had spent six days on the Committee stand, "at times lounging wearily, at times rigid with anger—a dogged and skilful man at last at bay . . ." He was accused deliberately of breaking up the alliance "and, indirectly, of a lack of candor closely approaching deliberate falsehood."⁸⁷

The extreme dangers involved in the headstrong, impulsive diplomacy of Dulles were foremost in the minds of other students of our foreign policy. C. L. Sulzberger quoted the private observation of one of Dulles' closest advisers as follows: "The Secretary had absolutely no policy in the Middle East prior to the Suez invasion. His trouble is that although he is a brilliant acrobat—totally self-contained and flexible in the way he operates—he neither heeds the advice of others nor reads the telegrams from his Ambassadors." It was this brink of war diplomatic acrobat who now asked for blanket approval in advance for whatever he decided to do around half the earth. Walter Lippmann could find no precedent in the past for such a sweeping delegation of authority. Moreover, the role Dulles proposed for himself required a kind of secret diplomacy which was "outside the American tradition," and it asked the Congress to vote away its right to hold the President to account.⁸⁸

It was not to be wondered at that the Senate was reluctant to give a globe-girdling free hand to this kind of diplomacy.

Strong Dissenting Votes. On February 13 a Fulbright motion in the joint committee to substitute a declaration having no force as law was defeated 17 to 10, and a Byrd motion to deny the President authority to spend the first

⁸⁶ *The Nashville Tennessean*, January 17, 1957.

⁸⁷ *The New York Times*, January 24, 27, February 1, 3, 1957. See still stronger statements in White's dispatch of February 12.

⁸⁸ *The New York Times*, January 9; *the Nashville Tennessean*, February 4, 1957.

200 millions lost 11 to 17. On the latter vote every senior Democrat voted against the Administration except Johnson, including both Chairmen, Green and Russell. The Administration was saved by four comparatively junior Democrats.⁸⁹

The Doctrine Revised and Affirmed. These votes were followed by another the next day which endeavored to reduce somewhat the free wheeling nature of the resolution. The Joint Committee struck out the clause in which the President was "authorized to employ the armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary . . ." It was felt that he already had such authority constitutionally and should not seek to share this responsibility with the Congress. Instead, the amended resolution "authorized" him to undertake military assistance programs and said that the United States was "prepared" to use armed forces to assist nations "requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism."

Then in its formal report to the Senate on February 14 the Joint Committee, alarmed by the thought that they might have softened the cold war impact of the doctrine a little, hastened to say with great firmness that the agreed language did not "indicate any weakening of United States determination." On this point "let there be no doubt." The committee "was not divided at all as to the substantive policy involved." It "strongly supports the policy" and had not the slightest doubt that if American help were requested it "would be forthcoming promptly and forcefully."

In the Senate, debate on the measure was poorly attended. On March 2, a motion to strip the resolution of its military-economic aid features was defeated 58 to 28. The resolution was approved on March 5 by a vote of 72 to 19, with a provision that it could be terminated at any time "by a concurrent resolution of the two houses of Congress." The House concurred by a vote of 350 to 60 and the President signed it on March 9, 1957.

The contrast between the Congressional handling of the resolution and its speed in granting the Formosa blank check early in 1955 was marked. Then the check went through in a very few days by near-unanimous votes. In 1957 the consideration was prolonged and acrimonious and the dissenting votes were large. The proceedings revealed a deep distrust and lack of confidence in Mr. Dulles and the new doctrine would not have been approved had he and the President tried to levy sanctions against Israel. Nevertheless, the Congress had approved an extension and tightening of the ring of

⁸⁹ An attempt by Senator Fulbright to bring about a Senate investigation of Dulles' handling of the Suez crisis was broadened by the Republicans to cover the Truman years also, and so became unmanageable. However, it did lead to a study of the Aswan Dam documents by Fulbright and to a Senate speech by him which charged that the project was sound from both the engineering and financial standpoints; that its repudiation was a personal decision by Dulles taken against the advice of his Ambassador in Cairo and of the International Bank, and without consulting the President; that Dulles misjudged both Nasser's attitude toward the Soviet Union and the importance of the dam to Egypt; that he confused Egyptian nationalism and neutralism with communism; and that he never made any serious effort to persuade the few Congressional opponents of the project. Our policy had been "influenced too much by emotion and not enough by hard headed realities."
—The *New York Times*, August 15, 1957.

containment which could easily lead either to our impoverishment or to a third world war.

Close Nuclear Encirclement. At the Bermuda Conference, March 21-23, between the President and Prime Minister Macmillan of Great Britain, which was held to heal some of the Suez wounds, it was announced that the United States would supply guided missiles to Britain, but the nuclear warheads would be kept under the President's control, according to law. The United States also joined the military committee of the Baghdad Pact, enabling the United States to deploy its air power in the Middle East to help hold certain mountain passes, and to give definite commitments on the scope and character of military assistance in the event of war.⁹⁰

Late in January the Soviet Government began to issue warnings to virtually all of its neighbors promising nuclear destruction for them should they permit an atomic attack from their soil on the Soviet Union. There was, however, no hint of a preventive war. Lippmann thought there was no use underestimating the force of these warnings against allowing bases for nuclear weapons, addressed as it was "to the key countries in the great semi-circle which extends from Japan and Okinawa through Iran and Turkey to Western Europe." The warnings were a powerful argument for neutralism and it was "not easy to see how the Administration proposes to deal with that argument."⁹¹

The Soviets could hardly help being alarmed by Dulles' intent to tighten their atomic encirclement, and their alarm was increased by a famous British White Paper issued on April 4, 1957. It frankly admitted that Britain could not be defended from atomic attack and proposed greatly to reduce her conventional armed forces, relying solely on nuclear deterrent for defense. The American promise of guided missiles, plus the forthcoming tests of British H-bombs, implied the spread of the nuclear deterrent first to West Europe and then around the encirclement ring. In the event of war the Soviets would then have the double task of knocking out both the ring and the United States, a grave disadvantage under which the United States would not lie.

The danger for the Soviet Union in the Eisenhower Doctrine was accentuated by a five-year extension of the Dhahran air base in Saudi Arabia early in April, which kept American bombers and missiles within 1,000 miles of the Southern Soviet Union, while the Soviets had no compensating base in South America. As Baldwin pointed out on May 9 and 10, the Eisenhower Doctrine now required greater military strength to fill "the virtual vacuum of military strength in the whole vast arc of strategic ocean stretching from Aden to Singapore." Also our defense line "now lay along the Caucasus and Elburz and Zagros ranges," a development "probably not understood by the American people." But it would be understood by the Soviet peoples. Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen, our top Russian expert, who was being exiled by Dulles from Moscow to the Philippines, apparently because he thought serious negotiation with the Russians was feasible, was authoritatively represented as

⁹⁰ Drew Middleton, from Bermuda. From Beirut, Sam Pope Brewer reported adverse comment from two friendly newspapers. They thought the Eisenhower doctrine was "a monstrous economic-military strategy."—*The New York Times*, March 25, 1957.

⁹¹ *The Nashville Tennessean*, January 28, 1957.

believing there was real fear in the Soviet Union because of recent events—our atomic support groups on their borders, the rearming of Germany and our decision to back the Baghdad Pact.⁹²

Writing from Europe on April 20, Walter Lippmann did not find anyone who thought that the Soviets were preparing for a general war. For this reason the resounding declarations of the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine were "received with puzzled incredulity." Some thought that the President and Mr. Dulles were "living in an unreal world, emphasizing dangers that will not come and not dealing with dangers that do in fact exist." But others thought that they must mean something "so deep that nobody understands it."

The world's greatest exponent of keeping them guessing had achieved supreme success. He had his cherished enemies deeply alarmed for their security and everyone else confused. To escape from the disaster which he had precipitated in the Middle East he went on to achieve the ultimate encirclement of the vast communist world and involved the United States in the task of policing the entire globe, in the nuclear age.

The Doctrine Applied in Jordan. In the first test he was also dramatically successful. Eisenhower's wooing of King Saud had been costly in terms of American principles, as well as money, since it was agreed that no Jew could serve in the American armed forces in Saudi Arabia. But the President was successful in weaning Saud from Nasser, partially at least, and in selling him the Eisenhower Doctrine as an antidote to Communism. He also fostered a meeting with the King of Iraq, in Baghdad, thus healing the bitter rivalry between the two dynasties and preparing the way for a common front of these two monarchs with King Hussein of Jordan in his approaching hour of peril.

Hussein had the loyalty of 400,000 Bedouins, the original Jordanians, but the 900,000 Palestinian Arabs, half of them refugees from Israel, were violently anti-Western and pro-Nasser. In October they had won an election and one of their number, Nabulsi, was premier.

Early in April he moved to establish closer relations with Russia and to purge the civil service of Hussein loyalists. Then the Bedouin officers of the British-trained Arab legion rallied to the King and crushed an attempt to take over the Army. On April 23 a general strike and a large protest demonstration was weathered, but the cabinet resigned. That evening Hussein called in the Western correspondents and implicitly asked to come under the Eisenhower Doctrine by saying that the crisis was due to "international communism and its followers."

This brought a prompt response from Washington, couched in the phraseology of the Congressional resolution, and the next morning, April 25, the U.S. Sixth Fleet was suddenly dispatched from the French Riviera to the Eastern Mediterranean, several thousand marines being given shore leave in Beirut. Then Hussein established martial law and a tight curfew, dissolved all

⁹² William J. Jordan, *the New York Times*, April 19, 1957.

On negotiating with Moscow, Bohlen believed that "quiet strength, determination and patience might over a period of time produce consequences of benefit to all mankind. It would at least be worth a try."

political parties and installed a cabinet of unquestioned loyalty, after which he flew to consult with Saud.

At the end of the month he received a first instalment of \$10,000,000 from the United States, not from Eisenhower Doctrine funds, and this was followed by a like grant on June 30 to pay the King's troops and otherwise support his throne.

Strictly speaking, the action in support of Hussein did not come within the scope of the Doctrine. Dulles had emphasized many times that the United States was not assuming any obligation to act militarily against indirect aggression or subversion, much less against internal revolts. He said in substance that it would require a clear and open act of aggression.⁹³ Nevertheless, there was widespread acclaim for his contribution to saving Hussein. There were sardonic references in Britain and France about unilateral action and gunboat diplomacy, but also admiration for the success of the old fashioned remedy.⁹⁴

Yet second thoughts were many. On May 5 Dana Adams Schmidt observed that now the first step had been taken, "no one can know how many more steps the United States would have to take, now that it has involved itself, or where they will lead." Others remembered that Jordan is the sick man of the Arab world, a purely artificial creation of British imperialism which can only survive by permanent outside subsidies and support, and that parts of its territory are coveted by all of its neighbors. Even with permanent props from the outside, could Hussein rule indefinitely by force the educated majority of his people? Where, too, did this leave us in condemning Russia for maintaining an unpopular dictatorship in Hungary?

Alliance With Feudalism. The United States was now squarely on the side of the three feudal Arab monarchies, in rebellious Jordan; in slave ridden, plutocratic Saudi Arabia, where rising middle and labor classes were looking to Egypt and revolution; and in Iraq, where a half-wise policy of spending oil wealth on public works was not touching the monopoly of a handful of rich landlords over the land and the lives of their miserable tenants.

On April 30, 1957, the *London News Chronicle* said that King Hussein's temporary success in Jordan was unlikely to have checked permanently the anti-Western and revolutionary forces in the Middle-East. "King Hussein represents a system of government which is dying." The United States, like Britain, was identifying itself with a feudalism which could not long survive. If it wanted any continuing influence in the Middle East, the West should follow its own liberal tradition and support the reformers.

Looking back to Metternich for a parallel, a British historian thought that Mr. Dulles might bottle up Middle East nationalism for some years yet, as Metternich had in Europe from 1815 to 1848, but American industrialization was sapping the foundations of the reactionary monarchies which Dulles shored up. Like Czar Alexander I, who shared the chameleon-like qualities of

⁹³ William S. White, the *New York Times*, April 26, 1957.

⁹⁴ Four months later a communist military officer apparently took control of Syria and Soviet battleships were showing the flag in Albania's ports, Yugoslav waters and other parts of the Mediterranean, amid general gloom in Western quarters.

Mr. Dulles, the new Metternich was "settling down to a line of frank reaction." His initial success would probably lead to others of the same kind, but "if Mr. Dulles' system waits to be overtaken by the dialectic of events," the upheaval following the collapse of Metternich's system would be as nothing when compared to "the catastrophe that will ensue, on a global plane, for our twentieth century world."⁹⁵

By this time all of the Arab countries, those in the American bloc and those oriented toward the Soviets, were beginning to wonder if they were not being made "simple pawns" in the U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. struggle. King Saud uttered cautionary words to Washington, flew to Lebanon and reaffirmed his defense treaty with Egypt. The United States had "definitely lost ground among the Arabs through its reaction to the leftward trend in Syria." The theatrical air lift to Jordan, so characteristic of Dullesian "brinkmanship," had aroused fear that the United States was trying to provoke a showdown, and the reported statement of U.S. Ambassador Lester D. Mallory that the American anti-tank rifles sent to Jordan could knock out the heaviest "Russian-made" tanks did not reassure them. Lebanese editors thought Dulles had attempted unsuccessfully a frontal attack on communism in order to dodge the Palestine question.⁹⁶

This may have come close to the mark. In any event, the Eisenhower Doctrine was now frequently spoken of as a substitute for a policy. Events had demonstrated already that the Soviet Union could not be dislodged from the Middle East by Congressional resolutions. If, too, our diplomacy continued to center on monopolizing the Arab oil, control of it might be lost. Something more far-sighted was required.

The Imperative Need for Reform. In the Middle East health conditions are probably the worst in the world. Intestinal and eye diseases are "all but universal." Malaria, tuberculosis, and venereal disease, are widespread. Typhus, typhoid and cholera are always around the corner. Hookworm and kindred afflictions debilitate two-thirds of the people in Iraq and Egypt. The life expectation is only 35 years and the infant death rate is six times as high as in the United States.⁹⁷ Nevertheless, the population is growing so fast that the annual savings of the region would barely suffice to maintain the present wretched life, if invested productively.

This is decidedly not the case. A large part of the savings goes into luxurious living for a few and into hoards of gold and precious stones, which are imported instead of capital goods. Another big block of savings is invested abroad by the wealthy classes, who pay little taxes.⁹⁸ Even more than in West European countries like France "unprogressive tax systems fall on those least

⁹⁵ Geoffrey Barraclough, "The Sixth Fleet Sails," *The Nation*, May 18, 1957, pp. 431-3.

⁹⁶ Sam Pope Brewer, from Beirut, the *New York Times*, September 19, 1957. In the UN General Assembly also Mr. Dulles' denunciation of Soviet moves in Syria "got a poor reception from the delegates of other Arab countries."—Thomas J. Hamilton, *ibid.*, September 22.

⁹⁷ W. Wendell Cleland, "Social Conditions and Social Change," *Columbia Journal of International Affairs*, Winter, 1952, p. 9.

⁹⁸ H. W. Singer, "Capital Requirements for the Economic Development of the Middle East," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, February 1952, pp. 35-40.

able to pay," the upper classes largely escaping taxation.⁹⁹ Nor can any real progress be made without breaking the grip of the oppressive landlords on the land.¹⁰⁰

Chester Bowles put our central problem in the Middle East as follows: "If we are to build more soundly for the long haul, concern for the welfare of underprivileged peoples must become a central premise of American diplomacy. Every statement we make, every move we take should be designed to establish our identification with the welfare of peasants, workers, bazaar keepers and students."¹⁰¹

This is essential for human reasons, but also because the Asian "has by his traditions been predisposed to totalitarianism." Charles Malik, a widely acclaimed friend of the West, adds that there is "nothing shocking to the Asiatic mind in the message of Communism."¹⁰² Nor is Islam a real bar to Communism. Only free people with a stake in their own country and something to hope for can be that.

Control vs. Neutralization. In late 1957 it was clearer than ever that if the United States is to cast its lot with Middle East feudalism, the future is likely to lie with revolutionary nationalism or communism. And if we are to have a long term struggle with the Soviet Union for the control of the Middle East, the main forces will work on her side. She can promote the social and economic revolution which is already under way. The deep hatreds of the past do not bear against her. She is already in the area, in which she has legitimate interests, and she has all the advantages of proximity in staying there. During June 1957 she delivered three submarines to Egypt and sent her warships from the Black Sea into the Red Sea. Two can play at the game of showing the flag and bolstering allies.

Since neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can permit the other to dominate the Middle East, the advantages of an agreement to neutralize it and provide for its development through UN agencies should be pondered long. Gunboat diplomacy and arms shipments will not solve any of the inflammable issues in the Middle East, especially the dominant Arab-Israeli question.

⁹⁹ Sherwin A. Crowe, "Technical Assistance and Economical Aid," *Journal of International Affairs*, Winter, 1952, p. 58.

¹⁰⁰ "Expert's Report on Requirements for Economic Development," *United Nations Bulletin*, Vol. X, No. 11, June 1, 1951, p. 513.

¹⁰¹ *The New York Times Magazine*, June 30, 1957, p. 39.

¹⁰² "From a Friend of the West," *Life*, March 31, 1952, pp. 53-64.

LESSENING TENSION

APRIL-AUGUST 1957

As the worst passions generated by the November crises subsided in the Spring of 1957, the long term need of all humanity for a lessening of tensions and peace began to reassert itself, complicated by the stubborn dragging back of the dedicated cold warriors and by an uncontrolled military technology which threatened to negate all the efforts of the peacemakers, leaving mankind to await the single order which would end Western civilization, if not all life upon earth.

RUNAWAY ARMS MACHINE

Could Nuclear Tests Be Halted? World opinion focused most sharply upon the peril of radioactivity released by the bomb tests. Adlai Stevenson had raised the issue in the 1956 presidential campaign, only to be met with resentful replies from the Eisenhower forces that the tests were necessary to national defense. The long-conditioned reflexes of patriotism rallied to its most ancient cry, the public opinion polls showing only 24 per cent as favoring a cessation of the tests. Yet six months later, on May 19, a similar poll showed 63 per cent in favor of a world-wide agreement to have the tests suspended and 27 per cent opposed.

This sharp reversal was partly due to a series of setbacks to the official "all is well" attitude.

On April 12, eighteen German physicists, led by Otto Hahn, the first man ever to split the atom, notified the West German Government that they would have nothing to do with the production, testing or use of atomic weapons. The impact in Germany was great, especially when the scientists rejected Adenauer's suggestion that atomic weapons were his business and accused him of deceiving the German people when he talked about tactical atomic weapons as a modern development of artillery.

Then on May 23 a still greater voice was heard. Dr. Albert Schweitzer, perhaps the greatest living man, whose unselfishness and largeness of spirit had made him a commanding world figure, spoke out against poisoning the air and maiming future generations. He warned that our adding of radioactive elements to those found in nature is "an astounding event" in the history of the earth and of the human race. To fail to consider its consequences would be "a folly for which humanity would have to pay a terrible price."

On May 16 *The Reporter* carried a 19 page article by Paul Jacobs, "Clouds from Nevada," based on a personal investigation of the test region, in which he found that warnings before explosions and monitorings afterwards had

been inadequate. The winds, too, had misbehaved, reversing their predicted course and carrying test clouds over a town of 5000 people.

Then on May 28 a weather bureau expert testified that radioactive debris from the bomb tests circulated around the North Temperate Zone and over the world's heavily populated centers, instead of spreading evenly over the entire earth as the Atomic Energy Commission's experts had comfortably calculated.

On June 3 Dr. Linus Pauling published a petition to Congress, signed by 2000 scientists, urging an international agreement to stop the tests. It asserted that each test explosion caused damage to the health of many living people and added to the number of defective children to be born in the future. Other scientists minimized the danger, and no one could measure it exactly, but one of them pointed out that "when the question at issue vitally concerns the whole human race, namely the cumulative, long-term genetic effects of radiation, seemingly small errors due to incompleteness of current knowledge may well have enormous and tragic consequences for future generations."¹

These considerations did not seem persuasive to those who were absorbed in the arms race and the patriotic necessity of winning it.

We already had stockpiled enough bombs to end all life on this planet, including whole families of smaller bombs, but infinite refinements of these might be worked out and there was the vast field of nuclear warheads for missiles and rockets, all of which made further testing seem essential to the great complex of political, military and economic interests involved.

Lush Arms Spending. By this time the missile industry was itself an enormous, sprawling economic mushroom. It involved 16 principal contractors in 19 locations, supported by more than 200 major subcontractors. Population growth around the missile-test centers was "fantastic."² The Army, Navy and Air Force were all competing in the business of developing missiles, supported by a growing number of billions of dollars each year. The three services were "still fighting for the development and control of similar weapons, and still duplicating supplies and services that General Eisenhower thought were extravagant and unnecessary over a decade ago."³

A glimpse of the extravagance in the military manufacturing business was afforded by the report of a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee headed by Representative Mahon of Texas, a conservative Democrat. It found that a very high percentage of all military procurement was spent under cost-plus contracts, rather than competitive bidding, and under chaotic auditing practices. In the missile field evaluations "consisted of briefings by directly interested groups." The big bomber program of 1956 had been obtained by the use of inflated and alarmist estimates of Soviet power.

¹ T. M. Gregory, the *Nashville Tennessean*, June 13, 1957.

On June 8, Representative Emanuel Celler wrote in the *New York Herald Tribune* that there had been about 100 nuclear explosions altogether, 46 on this continent with 14 more planned for 1957. He quoted Dr. Thomas Parson, former Surgeon General of the U.S. Public Health Service, as saying that atomic radiation is the greatest single public health problem of the future.

² Vern Haughland, "Bull Market for Missiles," *The Nation*, June 1, 1957, p. 473.

³ James Reston, the *New York Times*, May 16, 1957.

The rivalry among the three services over missiles was "getting completely out of control."⁴

One member of the committee, Representative James L. Whitten of Mississippi, went further. He believed "that about 30 per cent of defense spending is excessive, is causing inflation, provides no real defense, and by being built into our economy constitutes a real threat to our nation." Testimony taken by the committee over three years showed "great waste," "great duplication" and huge profits, with the Government providing most of the plants. Some 80 billions of war orders to 50 leading corporations had tripled the value of their stocks in five years.

But this was not the worst of it, Whitten continued, since the records showed that we were "rapidly tying our domestic economy to the military" which had always been a threat to the safety of any nation. He recalled "that in Germany and Japan and every other major country, whenever the domestic economy got tied to the military, it had led to war." If 30 per cent extra effort made in defense preparations was "the basis of our material prosperity," he asked why we could not make it in such things as building new power dams, forest and soil conservation to "make our country richer and better," instead of leaving it poorer.⁵

A few days later Ralph J. Cordiner, President of the General Electric Company, made a defense committee report in which he declared that there was "waste," "false reasoning," and "politics" in our defense program. He emphasized: (1) that defense expenditures are a loss and not a contribution to the economy, unnecessary to support prosperity; (2) that 40 billion dollars is so much money to take from the taxpayers that everyone responsible should feel perpetually obligated to save some of it; and that inflation caused by defense spending causes the people to pay twice.⁶

Increasing Inflation. By this time inflation appeared to be an inexorably advancing disease throughout the West, with a few exceptions. It caused increasing anger in Britain and growing resentment in the United States, where the cost of living index reached a new all-time high every month. This, too, was in the second term of a Republican Administration which came in pledged to retrenchment and sound money.

Yet on May 30, 1957, Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey resigned, after blasting the new \$72 billion budget he had not been able to hold down as the kind of spending likely to produce a depression which would "curl your hair." One of the towering figures in the business world, a man of commanding personality and of the most orthodox economic views, Humphrey was retiring defeated from the field after four years of vain efforts to cut military spending and stop the creeping inflation.

Another great industrial tycoon, Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson, former head of General Motors Company, our largest corporation, was also about ready to retreat to Detroit. Also a man of great prestige, with a reputation for plain speaking and no awe of generals and admirals, he had been chosen to ride herd on them and he had tried hard. Yet he finally confessed that

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he felt "like a frog trying to jump out of a well." On May 18, 1957, James Reston thought that this was "a vivid and accurate image" of his constant fight against inflation at the defense department.

The retreat of the biggest businessmen from Washington raised the question: "Who could control the runaway arms machine and stop the inflation?" There were other reasons for the inflation. Wage increases tied to the cost of living index provided a built-in inflationary force, and a constant excuse for management to raise prices frequently, to cover the new wage costs and increase profits still further. Yet a still greater source of inflation appeared to be the new habit of the corporations to finance vast expansion out of profits. Thereby they evaded the tax collector, kept the boom going and accumulated assets at a fabulous rate, while keeping prices constantly rising.

In addition to being highly inflationary a part of this spending appeared to be uneconomic in the sense of producing excess capacity. Then piled on top of that was the huge military manufacturing—all of it uneconomic, producing goods which could serve no economic purpose but which ensured the continuance of boom and inflation.

ATTEMPTS AT ARMS LIMITATION

These were some of the giant forces with which the Disarmament Subcommittee of the United Nations struggled in mid-1957 in London.

President Eisenhower wanted to make arms limitation and peace the chief accomplishment of his second term. When the subject of limiting arms came up in his press conferences he repeatedly spoke with sincerity and real feeling. His chief negotiator, Harold E. Stassen, also wanted an arms agreement, from long time conviction and because his own fortunes were at a low ebb following his abortive effort to prevent the renomination of Vice President Nixon. However, in the Spring he was demoted from his place in the White House as special assistant to the President on disarmament and placed under the control of the State Department, an ominous portent for progress.

At his press conference on May 29 Mr. Dulles "left no doubt that the United States Government went into the London negotiations on disarmament with great misgivings and deep pessimism."⁷ As Arthur Krock, dean of the Washington press corps, put it: "On every side the President heard from counselors that negotiations with the Russians on this subject were futile, that their purpose at such conferences was merely to gain another forum for destructive propaganda against the West, particularly the United States."⁸

Soviet Proposal. On April 30 the Soviet delegate, Valerian A. Zorin, proposed aerial inspection of most of Europe, including a fringe of European Russia, and the eastern half of Siberia, along with Alaska and a large segment of Western U.S.A. Other parts of his plan included a ban on nuclear weapons, reduction of armed forces in two stages and a system of inspection posts at large ports, railway junctions and main motor highways. He insisted that the "implementation of a minimum range of disarmament measures" was "necessary, feasible and urgent."

⁷ Russell Baker, the *New York Times*, May 30, 1957.

⁸ The *New York Times*, June 16, 1957.

At his press conference a week later the President said the Soviet proposals would be studied very sympathetically and very earnestly. This interest in the old Eden plan for aerial inspection, rejected at the Summit Conference in 1955, brought Chancellor Adenauer to Washington in fear that some arms limitation agreement would prejudice the unification of Germany on his terms, or that the prospect of it would affect the coming election in West Germany. "Dulles Assuages Adenauer Fears on Arms Accord," said the *New York Times* headline on May 28.

Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced that "we can't trust the Russians on this or anything. The Communists have broken their word with every country with which they ever had an agreement."⁹

Total Destruction Promised the U.S.S.R. This opinion was underlined firmly by General Lauris Norstad, American head of NATO's armed forces, in testimony released on June 13. He told a Senate unit how the Soviet Union was completely and effectively encircled. The West could with "relative impunity" now open air-atomic attack on the Soviet Union from a 360 degree perimeter, dotted by more than 250 NATO bases. It would not be possible for the Soviets to knock out all of these bases and whether one assumed that the Russian had 50 per cent, 100 per cent or even 200 per cent of the Allied striking capability "he will still be destroyed." It was essential also to maintain this certainty of destruction for the Russian. We must "be very certain we always keep him faced with" the certainty of it. "That is absolutely essential."

This sentiment was shared firmly by Admiral Felix B. Stump, the new American Commander in the Pacific, who stated on July 1 that "ever since 1903 when Lenin gathered a small group around him and laid his plans, the aim of the Communists has been to conquer the world and impose communism. I believe that so long as the Communists know that if they do attack they will get a licking we will have peace."

In all these pronouncements by our military chiefs there was no hint of salvation through arms limitation and peace. We could be safe only by maintaining the absolute certainty of total destruction over the Russians. This was faultless and timeless military logic, except that it compelled the Soviets to get the same capability to destroy us totally, at whatever cost.

The evidence indicated that the Soviet leaders were reluctant to undertake the all-out effort necessary to make our total destruction certain. They were beset with insistent demands throughout their orbit for more consumers' goods, both agricultural and industrial. Their highly centralized controls of all industry from Moscow were strangling efficiency, as well as being completely vulnerable to H-bomb attack, and on May 7 a plan was announced to decentralize the control of industry down to 92 districts—an enormous undertaking which indicated no desire for external trouble.

On May 10, 1957, Khrushchev gave an interview to Turner Catledge, Managing Editor of the *New York Times*, in which he urged the easing of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. He held it to be an "indisputable fact" that the United States and its allies contemplated an

⁹ Schmidt, the *New York Times*, May 20, 1957.

aggressive war on the Soviet Union and its allies. In the United States there were "selfish people carrying on a policy of balancing on the brink of war. Even an experienced acrobat makes a slip and falls now and then. When this happens we are sorry but an acrobat is only one person. But if a political leader slips and falls he might bring death for millions of people." He would like to visit the United States and sit down with President Eisenhower, but had not been invited and would not be welcome as a tourist.

Writing from Finland on May 14, Catledge reported that the Russian public was infused with a feeling of fear of the Americans and the Germans, especially the latter. Even ten and twelve year old children were frightened by the prospect of war.

On the same day the Supreme Soviet appealed to the U.S. Congress and the British Parliament to have representatives meet with Soviet legislators to discuss the banning of nuclear bomb tests, and on June 2 Khrushchev asked for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from West Europe and Soviet troops from East Europe in a televised interview with C.B.S. He implied that our troops might withdraw to Britain, instead of across the Atlantic.

On June 5, Premier Bulganin sent an unprecedented message to an International Labor Organization meeting in Geneva, saying that the U.S.S.R. was "ready to conclude an appropriate agreement on the whole program of disarmament, as well as on the particular aspects, including an agreement on immediate cessation of nuclear weapons tests."

Clean Bombs? By this time it was being said that we had learned how to make "clean" bombs, apparently by skipping the fission process or leaving off the uranium jacket. On June 5 the President said that we had reduced the fall-out by nine-tenths and that our tests during the past two years had been largely in making defensive weapons, "to defend against attack from the air," and "to see how clean we can make them." Prime Minister Macmillan announced also that the fall-out from Britain's first H-bomb test in mid-May was "negligible."

This suggested that after all hydrogen bombs could be made into a military weapon, i.e. something conceivably directed toward a result that could be estimated. This was felt to be an achievement. On July 3 the President announced that he meant to invite foreign countries to come and make their own measurements of the percentage of radioactivity on the site of the next H-bomb test.

However, the Congress was wary about passing on this reformatory discovery to the Russians. Even Senator Mansfield said on July 4 that he would be careful about giving our formula away and Representative Hollifield said "this is a complete reversal of our national policy on security." Apparently we could not bring ourselves to tell the Russians how to make bombs which would poison fewer of us.

Instead some Congressmen at once suggested that the fall-out might be a desirable feature for military purposes, and on the same day, May 27, the Defense Department published a book warning that radioactive contamination had become a new offensive weapon. The use of radioactive material to

contaminate large areas had become "an automatic extension of the offensive use of nuclear weapons of high yield."¹⁰

Negotiations Bogged. It was in this atmosphere of planning for total destruction that Stassen attempted to negotiate in London. On May 13 Dana Adams Schmidt reported that the President had given special authority to offer his own inspection plan to Zorin informally. On May 26 Stassen flew to London, after a long White House conference "attended by all of the principals in the muted behind-the-curtain debate" that had been going on for weeks. When it became known that the decision was for an arms limitation plan the stock market dropped a couple of billions.

By June 9 Stassen was back in Washington in at least semi-disgrace. He was accused by our Allies of talking privately with Zorin. The West Germans were nervous lest peace be made before Germany was united. The French didn't want the H-bomb club closed before they got into it, unless there were ironclad assurances of disarmament. The British had exploded only three test bombs and really wanted to go on refining the uses of their new found power. The Americans, in the main, wanted to do the same indefinitely.

Mr. Dulles promptly used the forum of the House Foreign Affairs Committee "to express skepticism of Soviet good faith in disarmament discussions." He assured the Committee, "in effect, that the United States had not the slightest intention of being caught in any 'folly' of overtrustfulness."¹¹

On the 14th Schmidt reported that Stassen was returning to London, his role curbed. "Some high officials said privately that this probably would be Mr. Stassen's last mission for President Eisenhower." When he talked with Zorin on June 1, Stassen had perceived at once that he would not accept an aerial zone limited in the beginning to the Arctic (to calm Adenauer's fears) so he had discussed a European zone. This disturbed Adenauer greatly and began the crisis. For three days the State Department press officer had denied reports that Stassen had been reprimanded by Dulles, but the impression took hold in the diplomatic community that Stassen was returning "for a short time and with sharply curtailed freedom of action and prestige." A career diplomat, Julius Holmes, would follow at once to assist him.¹²

This furore led James Reston to compare the statesmen in Washington with the boy in Buffalo who was terrified of unaccustomed stairs. His fear had "a more serious parallel in Washington, for officials here have lived so many years on the dead-level of the cold war that they too seem uncertain about descending into the unfamiliar arena of serious negotiation with the Russians, or ascending to the roof for a longer view of the future."

Testing Halt Proposed. The inter-Allied difficulties gave the Russians plenty of time to propose, on June 14, an immediate halt in bomb tests for two or three years, with inspection posts established in the Soviet Union and

¹⁰ *The New York Times*, May 28, 1957.

¹¹ William S. White, *The New York Times*, June 11, 1957.

¹² "Not in years has an American diplomatic negotiator been subjected to so many leaks," said Drew Pearson. "Every move that might discredit Stassen is leaked." In a 90-minute session Stassen had shown Dulles that he had not said an unauthorized word to the Russians.—*The Nashville Tennessean*, June 19, 1957.

elsewhere to check compliance. Zorin added that he hoped the West would not keep on linking one proposal with another.

However, this was precisely what the West intended. It was felt that the United States had the lead in testing missiles and smaller bombs and thus could afford to have a short suspension of tests, but this would still enable the Soviets to go on building up their smaller stockpiles of weapons. Therefore tests should be suspended only if there was an agreement to stop production during the same interval, a proviso which would get into the unlimited inspection which the Soviets had always rejected. They had proposed a simple step toward arms limitation which could be policed with a few control posts containing men and instruments. It also met the urgent desires of nearly all people everywhere. Could it be squelched with a demand for production stoppage and total inspection?

Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the British Labor Party thought not. "The trouble is," he said on June 16, "if everything has to be dependent on everything else, there is endless scope for obstruction, delay and confusion." Wouldn't it be better to stop the tests first, and then try for production control?

On the 18th Stassen indicated informally that the U.S. reply would be "positive" and on the 19th President Eisenhower said that he would be "perfectly delighted" to accept a temporary suspension of tests under certain conditions, which he did not specify. In the past it had been the American position that a cessation of production should come first.

The apparent seriousness of the negotiations led the *New York Times* to print a long warning editorial, on June 22, recalling that the free world was "still confronted by a predatory, aggressive and conspiratorial communist bloc." The Soviet record was one of "a thousand broken treaties and promises." Neither peace nor disarmament could be "built on trust in any Soviet word," but only on "self enforcing agreements." We must "continue to guard against being overwhelmed or trapped by dishonest offers." We were now discussing in London in a very flexible manner "steps which could take us beyond the point of safety." We were "discussing suspension of nuclear arms tests."¹³

Testing Held Essential. Things having come to this pass, some members of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy arranged for three University of California physicists, including Dr. Edward Teller, "the father of the H-bomb," to see the President on June 24 and explain to him that they had already eliminated 95 per cent of the fall-out and that "with further development" it would become "essentially negligible"—97 per cent already said Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, A. E. C. Chairman, who accompanied them.

The President was told also that it was possible to reduce the size of the H-bomb to that of a "nominal" A-bomb, so that in addition to the city busters we could have bombs that could be used against other targets "without fear that tens of millions of innocent persons might be killed in a far ranging fall-out of radioactive debris."

The A.E.C. scientists told the President how our troops could follow in

¹³ The "Week in Review" editor of the *Times* wrote the next day that "the unproductive all-or-nothing approach of past years has been steadily whittled down to an approach toward limited agreement."

right behind the explosion of small "clean" H-bombs, if they could only continue testing until this relatively humane and really military weapon could be developed. They did not explain to him how long either side would content itself with using these mercifully small and clean bombs, when it could do so much more damage with the big dirty ones. But they made clear to him what a calamity an agreement to stop their beneficent work now would be.

Explaining the purpose of the meeting to the press afterward, Dr. Teller said that it was to tell the President "what we are accomplishing in the current weeks and what we hope to and plan to accomplish in the coming years, if we can continue our work." Dr. Teller would not spell out the inference, but Dr. E. O. Lawrence did. Asked if he thought the tests should continue he replied, "Yes, of course I do," and went on to explain how the projected clean baby H-bombs would be "in a sense just like TNT, except tremendously more powerful." He seemed to think that if he could just relate these tidy weapons back to World War II TNT bombs everybody would see the advantage of a single bomb that could destroy a city without the need of using hundreds of bombs. The eliminating of the fall-out over the surrounding area, of which he was wholly confident, seemed to be a scientific marvel which would make the new city killers respectable after all.¹⁴

A few hours before the three scientists and Admiral Strauss explained the humane future of the bomb to the President, one of their products was tested in Nevada, one that "surprised scientists with its force." It ripped off doors and cracked the walls of a thick concrete blockhouse fourteen miles away, but as a massive double mushroom cloud soared some eight miles high "commission officials indicated confidence that it would not produce any fall-out problems," and it was only "somewhat larger" than the bomb which destroyed Hiroshima. Then on July 5 a device four times as explosive was set off, the most powerful explosion ever loosed upon this continent. It woke up people in Las Vegas, 65 miles away, and was seen in Los Angeles, 300 miles away. Shock waves were felt hundreds of miles further.¹⁵

To counter a little the beneficent work of the clean bomb makers, one atomic scientist, David R. Inglis, wrote a letter to the *New York Times* on July 2, pointing out that the cleanliness secrets would be carefully guarded, while dirty tests continued to pollute the air in a growing list of countries. Then he warned: "Let it not be thought that a war with clean bombs will be a tolerable war. Let us remind ourselves that it would mean carnage such as man has never known, obliteration of the institutions on which civilization depends, and tens or hundreds of millions killed or horribly maimed."

The next day after the scientific advocates of uninterrupted testing visited the White House, Secretary Dulles told his press conference that the suspension of tests would be coupled with at least four other things. He emphasized that the test suspension period would have to be short enough to avoid breaking up the scientific and technical testing staffs.

¹⁴ The *New York Times*, June 25, 1957. Here was a far cry from the firm determination of the eighteen German physicists not to have anything whatever to do with A- or H-bomb production.

¹⁵ Gladwin Hill from Yucca Flat, the *New York Times*, July 6, 1957.

Deadlock on Germany. On the same day, June 25, in London, the United States firmly tied its proposals for arms reduction to a reunification of Germany that would satisfy West Germany. This emphasis on an issue that was "outside the competence" of the disarmament subcommittee seemed to account for the equivocal attitude of the American delegation, which saw a first-step disarmament agreement in sight and was at the same time "not optimistic."¹⁶

The firm link with German unification also established total deadlock on that subject. On June 17 Khrushchev in Finland said flatly that the Soviet Union would not discuss the German problem with anyone. It could not be settled by the Soviet Union and the United States. The solution depended "solely upon the German people" and he was "certain that the Germans will find an adequate solution." But "there are two Governments and every realist must recognize this fact." The Soviets were "not ready to go anywhere to settle the problem or to receive anyone to discuss it."¹⁷

Ten Months Suspension Offered. At his press conference on the 26th the President's attitude toward suspending bomb tests had changed sharply. His seminar with the clean-bomb physicists had had its effect. He was no longer "perfectly delighted" about accepting a suspension of tests under certain conditions. On the contrary, he said "they tell me that they are already producing bombs that have 96 per cent less fall-out," and "they say: 'Give us four or five years to test each step of our development and we will produce an absolutely clean bomb.' Moreover, they go on to say this: 'If you are going to get the full value out of the atomic science for peaceful development . . . these tests must go on.'"

He repeated that we were not backing out of our offer to suspend tests for a short period, provided that four conditions were met: (1) a simultaneous agreement on ending the production of nuclear materials for military purposes; (2) arrangements for transferring nuclear stockpiles to peaceful purposes; (3) designation of some aerial inspection zones; and (4) some reduction in conventional weapons and manpower.

Perhaps to compensate for the somewhat dim prospect that all this would be worked out, he repeated again his deep conviction that there would be "no such thing as a victorious side in any global war of the future" and that we must not think of war as inescapable.

He acknowledged the power of world opinion demanding suspension of the tests as follows: "But for the moment it would appear that the psychological factors and the fears of the world were such that we should go right ahead . . . with the offers that we have made, and we have no intention of pulling back from them for a minute."

However, it was fairly clear that world opinion was due to be disappointed by our determination to keep on with weapon development. Even Thomas E. Murray, retiring Democratic member of the A.E.C., said on June 27 that it would be "indefensibly reckless" to enter into any disarmament agreement

¹⁶ Drew Middleton, the *New York Times*, June 26, 1957.

¹⁷ *The New York Times*, June 18, 1957.

to ban the testing or production of small nuclear weapons. He would halt testing on the big ones and accelerate the making of the little ones.

On July 2, the United States proposed a suspension of tests for ten months and on the 11th Stassen told the Disarmament Committee bluntly that the proposal for a short suspension period was not negotiable. The ten months might be varied a little, but not much. He advanced several reasons for this stand centering on the necessity of maintaining a sense of urgency about getting the other points in the American package worked out and accepted. The most important reason, Drew Middleton thought, was American doubts about the good faith of the Soviet negotiators.

These doubts were heartily reciprocated on the same day, July 11, by Khrushchev in a speech at Prague. President Eisenhower was a man of "talent and great principles," but one who "talks stupidities." He was "sorry to use that word," Khrushchev said, but what else could you call it when Eisenhower talked about a clean bomb? How could you have "a clean bomb to do dirty things"? He was jovial about other matters but on this point "his voice shook with intense emotion."¹⁸

On August 21, 1957, the four Western powers in the disarmament subcommittee of five proposed a 12 month suspension of tests, provided agreement could be reached on control posts, and a further 12 month suspension, dependent on satisfactory progress in constructing an inspection system for the cessation of production for weapons purposes. This highly conditional proposal was spoken of as "a two year suspension of nuclear tests" offer. Our officials thought that in the event of trouble in the General Assembly it would give the United States "a sound, defensible case."¹⁹

On the 27th Zorin rejected the West's proposal for aerial inspection of the entire Soviet Union, alleging that information was desired about the location of Soviet industries and communication centers. When there was "a deep chasm of mistrust and suspicion between the great powers," strained relations and an arms race, no country could consent to such a proposal. He called for a broadening of the talks to include the large powers not represented and representatives of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

A Soviet ICBM. On the same day, the Soviet Union announced a successful test of the dreaded intercontinental ballistic missile. "The results obtained," said the small announcement which appeared on back pages of Soviet newspapers, "show that it is possible to direct rockets into any part of the world." On August 30 Defense Department officials revealed that four Soviet ICBM's had been detected, "and probably six," the last one in June.²⁰ The Soviet announcement had therefore apparently been delayed for use at the time the West's aerial inspection proposals were rejected.²¹

In this unfavorable moment the West finally assembled the disarmament proposals it had been making piecemeal for some weeks and presented them

¹⁸ Sydney Gruson, from Prague, the *New York Times*, July 11, 1957.

¹⁹ The *New York Times*, August 23, 1957.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, August 31, 1957.

²¹ After it was made Nehru made the most opposite comment. He observed on September 1 that the ICBM seemed to be the ultimate weapon but there was apparently no limit to the ultimate folly of human beings.

all to the Soviets in one document on August 29. It was as foolproof as it could be in proposals for carefully graded steps with full and free inspection of everything the Soviets had at every stage. Inspection was mentioned some 20 times. The areas open to ground inspection would "not be less than the areas of aerial inspection," however vast or limited. Every obligation would be "conditional upon the continued operation of an effective international control and inspection system to verify compliance with its terms by all parties."

The package proposal stated that it was "offered for negotiation on the understanding that its provisions are inseparable," and that it "now awaits the acceptance of the Soviet Union."²²

It was promptly and sharply rejected by Zorin and the Subcommittee talks were adjourned on September 6, 1957, with no agreement on a date for resumption.

Our chief purpose in the negotiations had been some insurance against surprise attack, some small warning that it was about to occur. We had told ourselves so often that the Soviets were out to conquer the world, and by any means; and we were so aware that we had encircled them, that we had to have some surcease for our fear that they would suddenly strike at us. Nor could we accept a little reassurance; we had to have total certainty or nothing. In this respect nothing had been learned since the abortive efforts to get agreement for the control of atomic energy in 1946.

We still had to have absolute inspection at a time when it was already of doubtful value. Could our inspectors in Russia be sure that a big "training flight" of Soviet intercontinental bombers would not cross the border and head for the U.S.A.? Would they be allowed to report their suspicions? And would their suspicions touch off massive retaliation on our part?

Then, as we prepared a massive inspection package proposal, the Soviets achieved the lead in the race for the ICBM, and when these weapons were seeded in their northern forests, looking much like trees perhaps, would our inspector be permitted to send word that the button had been pushed? If so, we would have about twenty minutes' warning, perhaps enough to touch the buttons in our northern forests.

A leading effect of the Soviet ICBM was to deprive our open skies plan of substantial value and leave us with little to counter their "ban the bomb" propaganda.

Stassen had tried hard to freeze the nuclear arms race before the Soviets got the ICBM and before other powers entered it. There was need for speed, but it was not possible to leap from total distrust to total inspection. The ambitious Western plan appeared to blanket the modest Soviet proposal to stop tests for a couple of years, but it had not done so. Nor were we willing to yield to the Soviets a comparatively slight gain in stockpiling during a simple cessation of tests. We wanted to preserve our lead in the fabrication of whole families of "little" nuclear bombs, the ones which if ever used would almost certainly lead to the use of the biggest and fastest ones.

Thus the atomic arms race which began when the West devised a fool-proof formula in 1945 for the control of atomic arms, one which would prevent the

²² Text, the *New York Times*, August 30, 1957.

Soviets from ever having an A-bomb, steadily turned against us. We had begun with total distrust, and no progress could ever be made on that basis. Then we had gone on to complete encirclement, a game which was to work both ways.

The game of seeking to disarm the enemy also worked as in the past, each side trying to take from its opponents its best means of defense. We asked the Russians to give up the secrecy of their vast realm; they asked us to dismantle the ring of our bases around them. These factors lent weight to the forecast of Major Frank P. Zeidler, of Milwaukee, that the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. would be unable to make peace and that the indicated result would be the "devastation by nuclear bombs of the principal cities of the United States and Russia" within the next twenty years.²³

Neither side would be able to disarm the other, and high statemanship was essential to the making of peace. But the great complex of cold war leaders in Washington and elsewhere were not ready to make peace on the basis of the status quo, trusting to peaceful evolution, speeded up by the withdrawal of foreign armies from Europe, and greatly lessened tensions. They had been arming since 1950 to negotiate "from positions of strength," a posture which they still sought, though their chances of achieving it grew progressively worse.

In explaining that high Administration leaders did not want a disarmament treaty, Lippmann wrote on June 29 that they were formally correct in not challenging the President's policy, "but their real feelings ooze out in every direction, and are exerting a powerful influence in congress and in the press." These leaders "think an agreement to limit armaments, even though enforceable would be undesirable."

Kingsley Martin, editor of the *New Statesman* in London, came to the same conclusion on July 6, 1957. Behind the failure of the Summit Conference of 1955 to lead to peace lay "a fundamental reluctance in Washington to dismantle the Cold War fortress, which it took so much money and effort to construct, and on whose preservation so many vested interests depend." Moscow was anxious to enter a contest in which production surpluses would count more than stockpiles, "but for Washington, an agreement on nuclear tests, even with effective controls, would mean a venture into an unknown world, in which the rituals of the Cold War no longer make sense; in which cherished dogmas—on China, Germany, NATO—would become heresies, and from which patron saints—Adenauer, Chiang Kai-shek, Syngman Rhee—would have to be ejected." These possibilities created a frightening prospect for many people in American policy making, but, asked Martin, "can it seem more fearful than a world dominated by the nuclear certainties of the arms race?"

Yet the keen C.B.S. commentator Eric Sevareid did discern currently in Washington "an attempt by some experts within our government to break the hard mold of thinking about Russia." Even the "automatic assumptions that Russia seriously intends to conquer the world" were being challenged.

No greater heresy than this could conceivably be imagined. Its long delayed existence gave ground for hope, but it could not go far in Washington against the massive weight of the men in command.

²³ *The New York Times*, September 8, 1957.

ALL CONTACT WITH CHINA REJECTED

During the same weeks Secretary of State Dulles used his great authority to the full in opposition to any relaxation of our hostility to China.

On June 1, 1955, the British had announced that they would no longer follow us in embargoing goods to China that were sold to other communist nations. This left all communist states subject to embargo on a more restricted list of "strategic" items, but shortened it for China by some 200 items. Japan and other great trading nations soon followed Britain's example, but not the United States.

However, a formidable Senate group began moving cautiously to create a climate in which we could follow our allies on this point, though they had no idea of fostering recognition. Southern interests were active, hoping to turn Japanese textiles toward China.²⁴

This trend brought Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson, embattled defender of Chiang Kai-shek, out in a speaking campaign in opposition to any relaxation. As James Reston put it, on June 4, Mr. Robertson was "speaking a great deal in public and in private and repeating statements that emphasize the unchanging attitude of the United States toward Peiping." There was strong resentment in the State Department against Britain's action and against the press for failing to give adequate display to the Department's statement on the question.

The Door Opened by the President. This being the case the feeling in the State Department may be imagined when the President himself opened the door to a renewal of trade with China in his press conference on June 5. "In the long run," said the President, trade "cannot be stopped." We were going to have trade, either authorized or clandestine, and "frankly" he didn't "see as much advantage in maintaining the differential as some people do," though he had "never advocated its complete elimination."

Contacts Rejected by Dulles. Here was *lèse majesté* indeed, in a very high quarter, and it was compounded by news on June 10 that "the 730 foreign traders in San Francisco" were pressing the Administration for an end to the embargo, or at least its relaxation. At this point, wrote Reston on July 3, Mr. Dulles, with the strong urging of Robertson, "began moving to block this trend."

He went out to San Francisco, the center of the new heresy, on June 28, 1957, and made a speech as hostile to any kind of intercourse with China as could be penned. He accused the Chinese Government of coming to power by violence, ruling by "massive forcible repressions" and fomenting all of the wars and rebellions which had occurred in East Asia since World War II.

To combat the argument that we had recognized the Soviet Union, he listed five reasons for believing that in 1933 the Soviet Government was better behaved. If we recognized the Communist Government of China we would discourage immensely all the mainland Chinese who were discontented; turn the millions of overseas Chinese away from their filial allegiance to Taiwan,

²⁴ William S. White, *the New York Times*, June 4, 1957.

"reluctantly to accept the guiding direction of the communist regime;" and facilitate the seating of the Communist regime in the United Nations. But the United Nations was "not a reformatory for bad governments." To admit another Communist "permanent veto-wielding member of the Security Council" would, he feared, "implant in the United Nations the seeds of its own destruction." He did not explain how two Red vetoes could do more damage than one, or a tenth Communist member add a fatal seed of destruction to the nine already in the UN.

On the matter of trade and cultural relations, he maintained that trade with Communist China was "not normal trade." It was "wholly controlled by an official apparatus"—again something not unique in the Red world. In his opinion China's "primary desire" in trading with the world was "to produce tanks, trucks, planes, ammunition and military items."

He denied that diplomatic recognition was a right; it was only a privilege. He repudiated the basic test of ability to govern, citing the fact that nations often maintained diplomatic relations with governments-in-exile, and no "mere lapse of time" compelled recognition. Apparently we could refuse for ever to recognize a government we did not like.

He said "emphatically" that the United States need never succumb to the argument of "inevitability." Of all the arguments this was the "least cogent," since we could "confidently assume that international Communists' rule of strict conformity is, in China or elsewhere, a passing and not a perpetual phase."

This was a somewhat equivocal utterance. It assumed our fixed idea of the international Communist conspiracy, directed from one center, instead of the wide variations which were already developing in the Communist countries. It assumed the "passing" of "the rule of strict conformity," a not very startling assumption if the progress of evolution toward freer forms was meant, since that was visibly happening. If he meant the ending of the Chinese Communist regime, he might have to wait generations for that.

The general impression created by the address was that we would wait, however long it might be. Apparently Mr. Dulles looked at what seemed to the rest of the world the most massive and solidly based fact in Asia and thought it ephemeral. Therefore we owed it to everybody concerned to "contribute" to its passing. We should accept cultural and trade relations with China, recognition, and her seating in the UN only if, he repeated three times, these things would contribute to "this passing" of the Communist regime.

Of course we must be constantly testing our policies in the light of new conditions, he conceded, but these were "occasions when not we, but others should provide the change." We must reject the theory "that if hostile and evil forces do not quickly and readily change then it is we who must change to meet them."

Dulles in Control. The door which the President had sensibly opened to accommodation with the 600,000,000 Chinese people on June 5 was slammed shut by his Secretary of State on June 28. If one wondered how this could be,

the answer was given in Mr. Dulles' press conference on July 2. Early in the conference he volunteered that "the President and I thought it was appropriate that there should be such a statement, because there seemed to be in some quarters the implication that silence on the subject indicated that our basic views were changing, which was not, in fact, the case."

On June 5 the President had indeed left this implication, strongly, but evidently he had spoken out of turn.

Near the end of the conference a questioner reminded Mr. Dulles that the President had said that he didn't feel nearly as strongly as some other people about the value of a total trade embargo against Red China. "Were the various interpretations of this statement one of the factors that led you and the President to decide that a new statement on this subject was advisable at this time?" How did Mr. Dulles reconcile the President's statement with "the policy of the Administration?"

In reply Dulles said, with a straight face, that the President's remarks were "not the occasion for this speech. And I might say, which I think can always be assumed in a speech of that character, that it was thoroughly approved by the President before I made it."

The June 28 and July 2, 1957, statements by Dulles revealed the real locus of power in the conduct of our foreign affairs. It was not in the presidency; it was in Mr. Dulles, and because it was, President Eisenhower would not be able to make peace during Dulles' tenure.²⁵ He yearned to do so. His instincts were right. He could summon the courage to pull us back from the brinks which Dulles sought to create—and celebrated—in Korea, Indo-China and the Formosa Strait, but he could not prevail over Dulles in positive moves to lessen tensions and make peace. In this direction Dulles was the master mind before whose opposition and directive Eisenhower bowed. Dulles wrote the speeches and public statements, his own and usually the President's and the President approved them, even when they completely reversed him. Momentarily at the Summit Conference in 1955 he escaped from Dullesian control and relaxed tension, but once back in Washington he went dutifully to New York to resume the Cold War before the American Bar Association, as if nothing had happened at Geneva.

Dulles' triumph in his latest assertion of authority over the President in policy making was evident in his July 2 press conference. James Reston observed that he developed his theme "with more vigor and spirit than he has used on any subject in recent months." Noting that a debate of some consequence had been going on about our China policy, in executive, legislative and business circles, and that "all this had come to a head in a recent Presidential news conference," Reston wrote that Dulles seemed to be saying that though others might accept Peiping into the family of nations, "he, and he alone, if necessary, was going to judge and direct China policy from the viewpoint of what he thought was morally right."

In his capacity as diplomatic King Canute, Dulles was performing a popular role. The Lions Convention in San Francisco applauded him frequently. As the *London Times* put it on April 22, 1957, "To Americans

²⁵ These lines were written in late 1957.

China has long been a matter of profound emotion, and where emotion is found reason has less room to play its part."

If the fact of the new China was to be argued away emotion was needed, for Dulles faced a difficult problem in Asia. To his picture of the aggressive Red Dragon out to devour its neighbors, a regime which "does not conform to the practices of civilized nations," Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai opposed the face of the affable good neighbor. C. L. Sulzberger wrote on April 1, 1957, that in his recent tour of free Asia, where Sulzberger had followed him, Chou had achieved a personal triumph. There was no question about his success in Ceylon, Burma, Nepal, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the various capitals he was accepted as brilliant, tolerant, moderate and conservative, humble and eager to learn.

No Press Passports to China. Impressions like these were hardly cancelled out by the inflexible self-righteousness of Dulles. Furthermore, if Americans could get to China they would see many things which would soften the Dullesian picture of the dragon. But this was not the reason Mr. Dulles gave for his adamant refusal to let them go. Privately he said that we could stand the contamination of cultural exchanges and contacts with the Red Chinese, but the weak people of non-Communist Asia could not. At San Francisco he put it this way: "They want this relationship with the United States primarily because, once that example were given, it would be difficult for China's close neighbors not to follow it. These free nations, already exposed to intense Communist subversive activities, could not have the cultural exchanges that the Communists want without adding to their peril."

Therefore Americans must deny themselves the right to see a great transformation in process in China, in order that their weaker brothers be not offended.

In February 1957 American newspapers had been trying for more than two years to get reporters to China, and on the 6th Mr. Dulles advanced a new reason for denying permission. He alleged that the Chinese were offering to release ten Americans held in Chinese prisons if he would let certain American correspondents go to China. When asked point blank if the Chinese had made any recent representations to this effect at Geneva (where there was perpetual deadlock in the American-Chinese negotiations going on there), he replied, "No, not directly."

Earlier he had said that it was the "fact that the Chinese Communists are trying to use Americans to accomplish that end, which makes us reluctant to do it." Asked if he believed the reports of bona fide American correspondents would be inevitably beneficial to the Chinese Communists, he denied that his policy was "dictated by a desire to withhold from the American people any information."

James Reston thought Mr. Dulles had "offered no evidence in support" of his claim that the Reds were trying to blackmail us with the American prisoners. The State Department refused to say when and where the offer was made. Neither the Pentagon nor the Central Intelligence Agency had ever heard of it, but if the offer were true it was "the best offer from the Communists since the invention of vodka."

Reston thought also that the argument that the Chinese Reds were wicked people was the best reason for going to see what they were doing. The argument that our reporters could not go into a country not recognized was new, since they had gone into the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1933, without passports, and "produced some of the most brilliant and useful newspaper correspondence ever written in the English language." They had not been protected by the State Department then, nor did they ask it in China now, and denying them permission to go was "foreign to the American tradition."

Finally, in reply to Dulles' charge of handpicking, Reston revealed that the list of newsmen invited to go to China included C. L. Sulzberger and four other *New York Times* men, Edward R. Murrow of the Columbia Broadcasting System, Marquis Childs of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* and A. T. Steele of the *New York Herald Tribune*.²⁶

It was this distinguished company whose invitation to come to China Dulles resented. He knew that when the Chinese lifted their ban on American reporters they had something to show, and our press knew that this was true from the reports brought out by foreign newsmen. By this time Arthur Krock was able to record, on the 12th, that "press and the public, with increasing awareness that this ban amounts to peacetime news censorship and Government employment of the press as an instrument of foreign policy, are in a nationwide protest."

As a part of the protest three American reporters defied the ban and went to China. One of them, William Worthy of the Baltimore *Afro-American*, testified on March 29, 1957, that the State Department had put pressure on his editor to order him home, besides refusing to renew his passport. Five other newsmen, including the Secretary of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, testified that freedom of the press was being violated by the State Department in the handling of passports. The State Department, they said, had overlooked or by-passed the constitutional right to travel and was controlling travel by caprice or at international politics levels. Some charged with being Communists had obtained relief in the courts, but those not so charged had not.

Look's Report on China. On April 16, *Look* magazine published a long, well illustrated report by Edmund Stevens and Phillip Harrington on their trip to China, in defiance of the Department. Their first impression had been a series of surprises. The people were friendlier than expected; the officials far more relaxed and agreeable than the Russians; the shops better stocked than anticipated and the streets cleaner; and the hotel service better than good. Honesty was taken for granted; "most guests did not even bother to lock their doors." This was a little different from Mr. Dulles' picture of the Red outlaw regime, which was also preparing to wither away.

They concluded: (1) that it was firmly in the saddle and there to stay. Nothing short of a major war of conquest could overthrow it. "The country is more stable than it has been for centuries." (2) China is not a Soviet satellite and thus far its Communist Government had "a far broader base of popular support than any other Communist government." This gave it "flexibility and

²⁶ *The New York Times*, February 6, 10, 1957.

independence." (3) The opposition had been liquidated or was over. (4) Living standards were rising; and (5) much of the system was hateful.

They surveyed the statistics of China's industrial growth, and coupling these with China's burgeoning population they were "forced to conclude that this awakening giant of a country has not been getting the attention it deserves in the West." They thought that "Red China's challenge may yet be the greatest ever faced by Western civilization."

So it might, if the United States continued its attempt perpetually to keep this aroused and disciplined giant in the dog-house.

Continued Impasse. On April 23 the Associated Press, one of whose reporters had been invited to China, met and received an annual report of its board which was critical of the China ban. The next day there was extended discussion of the subject at Dulles' press conference, in which he shifted ground and was willing for the news industry to select a few correspondents to go to China. He had objected to China's handpicking a dozen of our leading newsmen (none of them reactionaries); now he wanted the trade to handpick a small delegation.

As the newsgathering organizations refused to accept this substitute for free reporting, regarding it as bargaining over a constitutional right, Dulles held a long and "sometimes heated" interchange on the subject at his press conference on May 14. The newsmen were nettled by his insistence that constitutional freedom of the press related to the *publication* of news, not to its gathering. He was asked if he could control the sources of news of what value is the right of publication? Wasn't that the classic way to stop the publication of news? He thought not. Our papers could send the nationals of other countries to China.

The New Republic's Report. The day before, on May 13, *The New Republic* had published an entire issue on Communist China, containing ten articles by competent experts on China, including some foreign citizens who had been there. They portrayed a half billion peasants suddenly collectivized within two years, not by force but by endless talk, accompanied by the promise of greater production and a better life; a fair prospect that the Reds would be able to industrialize China rapidly and also increase farm output; the peasant a person, instead of "a passive sub-political animal," but in great travail over collectivization; urban masses apparently "well-fed, contented and happy"—no longer diseased beggars, child prostitutes, short lived rickshaw coolies and death by starvation in the streets; a system of rule by persuasion, "brute reason" instead of force, so effective that few could resist it; tremendous mass organization reaching every person in the land; a government "unprecedentedly flexible and realistic;" "a stable, firmly established regime," suffering "no internal schisms," with venerated, unchallenged leaders and the probability of a collective leadership when Mao passes—a regime apparently established for a century at least.

There was here none of Mr. Dulles' confidence that absolute refusal to look at it would cause the regime to disappear. On the contrary, there was evidence of a great land army, growing stronger relatively as the West weakened its

conventional forces; a regime which required peace for years; one which might govern a billion and a half people by the year 2000; strong intention to maintain close alliance with the Soviet Union; firm belief that "American imperialism" is the enemy and that it must be isolated and defeated.

Would Mr. Dulles' determined wishes cause this aroused giant to go away? Would his haughty public spankings of it for not being respectable safeguard the future of the American people thirty years hence, when China would be a really great power? Would adamant enmity cause Mao to abandon or soften his dictum that "Liberated China and a liberated world are inseparable"?

Or did we still toy with the idea of atomizing China? On May 25 a reputable columnist reported that the author Philip Wylie had been called to Washington and asked to sound out Oriental opinion on the use of American atomic bombs on China. After questioning the Americans and Europeans he met in the Orient, he reported that "all but one agreed that any such assault by this nation would cost the free world the last shred of a diminishing sympathy in the Orient and all Asia."²⁷

Control of the Activities of all Americans Abroad Asserted. On July 13 the American Society of Newspaper Editors declared it to be the right of citizens to gather information at home and abroad, "except where military necessity plainly prevents." To placate them a little, the State Department invited a representative to call and on the 18th Dulles repeated his old offer to let a limited number of newsmen go to China, but this time he added a trial period of six months. The five-man group representing national news and radio-television organizations objected to his limitations, but Mr. Dulles did not think he could let all newsmen go without facing enormous pressures to do the same for other persons who feel that they have justifiable professional reasons for visiting China.

He was not going to permit Americans to see what was happening in China. He knew that if a few went others would have to go and that if many Americans went to China his China policy would be confounded. So he arrogated to himself the right to control the external activities of all Americans and asked them to leave everything abroad to him. In his letter to Arthur Hays Sulzberger, publisher of *The New York Times*, he said: "Foreign policy cannot succeed unless it channels the activities of our people, and in this respect newspapers also have their loyalty and patriotic duty."²⁸

This statement, commented the *New Republic*, made it our patriotic duty not to know what was happening. Then we could not criticize Mr. Dulles, but "nothing so endangers U.S. foreign policy as an uninformed and therefore irresponsible public opinion."

Commenting on the same Dulles statement, and on his policy of interfering with the circulation abroad of American plays and playwrights, music and musicians, books and authors, Arthur Miller, the playwright, told the National Assembly of the Authors League of America, on May 7, that "once we assent to the idea that high policy alone is sacred, and that every other

²⁷ Peter Edson, *the Nashville Tennessean*, May 25, 1957.

²⁸ *The New Republic*, May 13, 1957, p. 5. See the text of Dulles' letter in the *New York Times*, May 2, 1957. In it he referred casually to the Chinese Communists as "the Chicoms."

value can be sacrificed to it, we shall have abdicated our independence as writers and citizens."

Deceptive Retreat. Under strong national pressure Mr. Dulles appeared to retreat, on August 22, 1957, enough to permit representatives of 24 news organizations to send a man each to China for a trial period of seven months. Yet a cursory reading of the State Department's announcement showed that it was composed to ensure rejection by China.

The first paragraph charged that the "Chinese Communist regime" had broken a promise to permit the jailed Americans to leave and was therefore refusing "to follow the practices of civilized governments." It was hoped that the reporters would be "able to report on the Americans illegally held in Chinese prisons." (By now reduced to eight people.)

Lest this not give sufficient offense to the Peking Government, the statement continued that "new factors have come into the picture, making it desirable that additional information be made available to the American people respecting current conditions within China." If the use of the word "China" was a slip of the tongue it was soon repaired by the permission granted to the 24 reporters to report to our people "about conditions under the area of Chinese Communist control."

Then, to make doubly sure of rejection, the "abnormal personal risks" of going to China were stressed and the charge that the Chinese Communists were uncivilized was repeated. The newly discovered need of the American people to be informed "about actual conditions in areas under Chinese Communist control" was also stressed a second time.

The inference was driven home that there were now bad doings in China to be reported, that bad news was expected from the reporters, and it was firmly stated that no reciprocal visas would be granted to the Red Chinese.

On August 26 the inevitable return blast came from Peking. The "insufferable arrogance" of the State Department was denounced and it was accused of "hypocritical concern" for the "American criminals," about whose condition it had repeatedly refused to permit their relatives to come and see. Now the United States only wanted "to collect intelligence in China, carry out subversive activities and exacerbate feelings." The principle of reciprocity was firmly asserted and two days later Dulles retreated enough to say that he was "studying" admitting Peking reporters.

"A storm of criticism" had been touched off among American commentators about the refusal of reciprocity, the critics charging that Dulles and Robertson intended to make the proposal automatically unacceptable. In reply, Dulles placed his back firmly against the wall of the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, under which he said the communist reporters would have to show that they were not coming to this country to engage in subversive activities or espionage. Moreover, they could not be excused from fingerprinting, like Soviet reporters, because we could not "accept as officials the representatives of a regime we do not recognize."²⁹

These developments led Arthur Krock to make one of the strongest

²⁹ *The New York Times*, August 28, 1957.

castigations of official policy which that conservative commentator had ever written. Mr. Dulles had now made it even plainer, Krock said, that he opposed or failed to comprehend the function of a free press. In first refusing visas and then "setting limits" to the activities of the reporters granted visas he revealed a concept of government authority over the free press which was "precisely that of the totalitarian regimes." Whenever in Mr. Dulles' judgment his policy was served by imposing censorship it would be imposed, totally or partially. In his grudging surrender on total censorship he had left the impression that only when the news was bad in unfriendly countries could it be reported and read. This was "the classic rule of governments which control the press in the interest of their policies."³⁰

Rebellion on Formosa. Of the long list of reasons which Mr. Dulles gave for ostracizing Red China, one must have been ever in his mind—the protection of his brink of war position in the Formosa Strait. It was for this Chinese island group, and for Chiang Kai-shek, that he had mobilized the Congress in 1955, established a protectorate and threatened to bomb the mainland.

Yet on May 25, 1957, mobs in Taipei stoned and stormed the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Information Office and gutted both buildings, smashing furnishings and scattering documents, filling the grounds with debris. They pulled down a United States flag, tore it to shreds and trampled it in the dust. Nine American officials were wounded, an equal number of Chinese were hurt, and two killed, in an attack on police headquarters. The mob snowballed to about 30,000 and controlled the streets for several hours until finally dispersed by troops, an eruption which could hardly occur in a rigidly controlled society without official approval.

This unprecedented smashing of a U.S. Embassy was touched off by a U.S. court martial acquittal of an American Sergeant, Robert R. Reynolds, who had shot a Chinese peeping-Tom. The intensity of the feeling and frustration which was expressed during the incident took Washington by surprise and suggested that our political base for holding Formosa on a long-term basis was flimsy indeed. All the money and diplomatic devotion showered upon the exiles from China had not made them willing to put up with us, or to tolerate a new form of extra-territoriality. Yet Mr. Dulles hastened to announce that there would be no change in our policy toward Formosa. Though the bottom had just dropped out of that policy, he stood firm.

However, on June 4, to avoid another explosion of hostile feeling in Japan our Government decided to permit the Japanese to try Army Specialist William S. Girard, who had killed a Japanese woman. In this case an armed forces agreement appeared to give the Japanese jurisdiction.

This decision aroused a wave of nationalistic feeling and protest in the

³⁰ The *New York Times*, August 27, 1957. Having asserted the right of censorship he "inevitably proceeded from one unsound position to the next," each reason being "inconsistent with the next to the last."

It was this kind of diplomatic footwork which had by this time made Mr. Dulles almost universally distrusted. A week earlier Joseph Alsop had reported from Paris "the almost universal personal detestation of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles," who was "the most disliked man in Europe since Joseph Stalin."—The *Nashville Tennessean*, August 20, 1957.

United States and the case was carried up to the Supreme Court, which overruled a lower court and turned Girard over to the Japanese for trial, thereby probably saving many American bases abroad. Then, on June 22, it was announced that all combat ground forces, totalling some 25,000, would be promptly withdrawn from Japan and that other service men would be reduced in numbers.

A shrinkage in the forces manning the ring of containment appeared to have begun, and "there was scarcely an audible murmur of dissent" from Congress. One school of thought in Washington thought that the old pattern of the Cold War was beginning to crumble.³¹

ATTEMPTED LIBERALIZATION IN CHINA

In the Communist world, tides of change were unmistakably evident. On February 27, 1957, Mao Tse-tung made a four hour address to the Supreme State Conference which was published in revised form on June 19. It seemed to establish Mao as "the world's chief Communist theoretician."³²

Forsaking the Soviet thesis that there could be no contradictions (conflicts) within a Communist state, he distinguished between antagonistic conflicts with the enemies of the people, internal or external, and non-antagonistic conflicts which could be resolved peacefully by discussion—upon which he insisted throughout the address—to solve the contradictions even between the government and the masses. He insisted upon "democracy in the widest sense" for all those not actively hostile to the regime. Within the ranks of the people there must be both freedom and discipline, democracy and centralism. Coercive measures should not be taken to settle ideological matters. People could not be forced to disbelieve in religion or idealism. Communists "must on no account resort to commandism or coercion" in ideological matters. It was a fundamental law of the Universe that "opposites in contradiction unite as well as struggle with each other, and thus impel all things to move and change."

In suppressing the counter-revolution many mistakes had been made. "Wrongs must be righted when they are discovered." This must be the attitude of all agencies concerned and "decisions on exoneration and rehabilitation should receive the same measure of publicity as the original mistaken decisions."

Discussing the contradictions between Communist officials, the great majority of whom were rural in origin, and the people, he observed that many of the comrades were not good at getting along with the intellectuals. They were stiff with them, lacked respect for their work and interfered in scientific and cultural matters. A thorough change in world outlook takes a long time, "and we should go about it patiently and not be impetuous." Suitable work should be given even to the intellectuals who were reluctant to accept Marxism-Leninism.

Discussing the maxims "Let a hundred flowers blossom," and "Let a hundred schools of thought contend," Mao asserted that no particular style of art or school of thought should be imposed or banned. Everything developed

³¹ Russell Baker, *the New York Times*, June 23, 1957.

³² Harry Schwartz, *the New York Times*, June 19, 1957.

through struggle, and in ideological matters "crude, coercive methods should not be used," but only the method of painstaking reasoning. Only in this way "can we really foster correct ideas, overcome wrong ideas, and really settle issues."

Developing the theme "long-term coexistence and mutual supervision," he insisted that "the democratic parties of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie be allowed to exist side by side with the party of the working class" in long-term coexistence, all of the parties criticizing and supervising each other. This was "because as much for a party as for an individual there is great need to hear opinions different from its own."

This announcement, said Schwartz, could "provide the ideological foundation for a multi-party Communist state in which voters would have some choice."

With reference to the national minorities, who inhabit half of the country's total area, it was "imperative to foster good relations between the Han (Chinese) people and the minorities." The main problem lay "in overcoming Great-Han chauvinism," but local nationalism must also be overcome. Conditions in Tibet were not yet ripe for "democratic reforms."

On the key issue of rapid industrialization, Mao modified this drive very considerably, insisting that "we should set up a far greater number of small and medium enterprises and make full use of the industries inherited from the old society." Evidently he wished to avoid the reproduction of Stalin's white elephants.

On the crucial agricultural front, ways must be found to reconcile the interests of the state, the cooperative farm and the individual. Accumulation was essential for both the state and the cooperative, but it should not be overdone. "We should do everything possible to enable the peasants in normal years to raise their personal incomes year by year on the basis of increased production." The goal should be reserves of grain in all peasant households, so that there would be no more poor peasants. The grain tax and state purchases would be stabilized over a number of years and every peasant household could "make its own plans in regard to land reserved for private use and other economic undertakings left to private management."

In various parts of the address he stressed that China was a poor country and that "several decades of intensive effort," with much hard work and thrift, would be required to make her rich and strong. In the meantime, China "as a poor country" was denied her rights in international affairs. But this would be changed. Also, "the present situation in which the United States controls a majority in the United Nations and dominates many parts of the world is a transient one which will eventually be changed."

"If the imperialists insist on unleashing" a third world war, he declared, "we should not be afraid of it." Recalling that the first two world wars had created a "Socialist camp with a combined population of 900 million," he predicted that in the event of another world war "it is certain that several hundred million more will turn to socialism. Then there will not be much room left in the world for the imperialists, while it is quite likely that the whole structure of imperialism will utterly collapse."

No one could deny his point about the relation between world wars and the growth of Communism, and if for his "imperialists" we substitute "democratic capitalism" there was every probability that his prediction about its decline in another world war was accurate. Yet the stage was rapidly being set for a final nuclear holocaust which might well permit Chinese Communism to inherit the earth, if any life survived upon it.

If the war could be avoided, Mao had given Chinese Communism statesmanlike directions for success. Turning away from Stalin's formula of rule by terror and complete conformity, he had moved towards the opposite course of rapid evolution into freer ways, always within the framework of "democratic centralism," in which discussion from below might greatly influence the making of decisions at the top, but not alter them afterwards.

Explosive Reaction. This effort by Chairman Mao to liberalize Chinese Communism and to move it in the direction of "democracy in the widest sense" encountered strong opposition among his colleagues and it was only in May 1957, after a whole year of discussions, that the campaign to "rectify the style of party work" was officially launched.

Then those who had opposed it were quickly vindicated. Such a flood of criticism of basic communist theories and of demands for fundamental change broke loose that the regime itself was somewhat shaken.

Innumerable large posters appeared on the walls overnight "demanding the withdrawal of the Party from the universities, challenging its interference in the fields of art and literature," questioning the right of the Government to withhold news like Khrushchev's speech on Stalin or to imprison authors. There were even some demands that the Party hand over power to the Democratic League. Parades and demonstrations were staged and there were minor riots.

This account of the way the hundred flowers exploded was brought out of China by an Indian student who had been in China more than two years, and who spoke Chinese, and published in the *Delhi Statesman* on October 20, 1959. The observer wrote that the great flood of criticism took the Party by surprise. A week was required to quell the torrent. Then the Party labored a year to overcome its effects.

It was not until June that Mao's February speech, quoted above, was published, with a distinction made between desirable flowers and poisonous weeds. The latter were called "rightists" and weeded out of all institutions for public trial and sentenced to labor on the roads, or even to work in distant provinces. Professors, editors, writers and other intellectuals bore the brunt of the purge, often having to become janitors or sweepers. Then after the "bloomers and contenders" had been sternly dealt with, party control and direction of the lives of the people became more strict and rigid than ever. So the campaign which was "intended to rectify the party" ended by rectifying its critics and the people.

The failure of Mao's effort to bring about a broad loosening of thought control and a release of the peoples energies democratically at least partly explains China's emergence as the bitterest opponent of Titoism and an

advocate of the executions of Nagy and his aides. The Chinese leaders were thereafter keenly conscious of the danger of new Hungaries.³³

DECENTRALIZATION IN RUSSIA

While the blooming of the flowers was being too optimistically planned in China, the need for relaxing Stalinist controls brought a sweeping reform of industrial management in Russia. On March 30, 1957, Khrushchev proposed a radical decentralization of control from Moscow, where Stalin had piled up some thirty economic ministries—one for electric power stations, for example—each one a huge bureaucracy attempting to manage a segment of industry throughout the vast reaches of the Soviet Union. This had inevitably produced great insensitivity to local needs, and very wasteful duplication of efforts, such as the building of a 5000 ton iron casting plant in Leningrad by one ministry while another ministry had one there already shipping 8000 surplus tons out at great cost. The transportation costs of such self contained national empires were enormous.

Accordingly the new plan proposed the abolition of all the national economic ministries and the creation of 92 economic regions, each controlled by a regional council, which would manage all industry in its area. The Leningrad complex would be one and the Donets basin another.

After the plan was announced the theme was incessantly repeated that "All these problems must be comprehensively and exhaustively discussed." Apparently they were, since Khrushchev announced to the Supreme Soviet, when it met on May 7 to approve the revised plan, that over 514,000 meetings were attended by some 40 million people, of whom more than 2 million had contributed to the discussion.³⁴

By this time debate had won a reprieve for eight of the national ministries. However, these were to be reorganized drastically. The entire operation was an

³³ A similar account of the rectification campaign was given by Edgar Faure, a former Prime Minister of France, who spent five weeks in China during its height. He put it in a broader perspective as beginning in one of Mao's speeches in 1942, and as one of a never-ending series of campaigns.

Nevertheless, he observed that this one became "a disaster" within forty-five days, turning the life of China upside down and playing havoc with all time-tables. Intended to be confined to small discussion groups, it led to everyone quitting work to discuss and criticize. Even the official press carried pages of miscellaneous complaints.

This continued in June 1957 until the 13th, when 1000 students at Hanyang damaged party property severely, kidnapped three officials and took the law into their own hands. Three other acts of violence signalled the turn from discussion to repression.

Thereafter there was a large-scale exile of communist cadres from the cities. Faure concluded "that surprise and disappointment was experienced by the leaders is certain." Their ten-year effort to assimilate the bourgeois and intellectual elements had had disappointing results.

After his experience in China, Faure was "firmly in favor of a fresh policy, more open, more assured and bolder" toward China, including a renewal of every kind of relations and contacts with her. He believed in the evolution of communism "towards a non-communist system, or at least toward a communist system of a new type," and felt that we should aid this evolution instead of hindering it.—Edgar Faure, *The Serpent and the Tortoise, China Today*, London, 1958, Chapters X-XIII inclusive, pp. xv, 201.

³⁴ *The New York Times*, May 12, 1957.

enormous one, involving as it did the migration of great numbers of well placed families in Moscow out into the vast reaches of the land where, incidentally, one H-bomb could not destroy them all and paralyze the whole national industrial structure. Nevertheless, by July 2 the control of the regional councils was virtually complete in some areas.

The objectives of the reform were economic. It had become impossible to manage 200,000 industrial units from Moscow, with another 100,000 under construction.³⁵ At the same time a very large degree of democratization in Soviet life was involved, which would tend to spread to political processes. With the sinews of power largely in the hands of the hinterlands, they would necessarily be heard from more in the future.³⁶

Khrushchev's Opponents Ousted. This was dramatically evidenced in July when Khrushchev's enemies in the Presidium attained a majority during his absence from Moscow and proposed to depose him. He thereupon called a meeting of the Central Committee, which elects the Presidium, and when his friends from the provinces poured into Moscow, his opponents were ousted, after several days of debate.

On July 4 and 5, 1957, it was announced that the old bolsheviks Molotov and Kaganovich had been removed from the Presidium, along with Malenkov, and from their government posts. Shepilov, lately Foreign Minister, was sharply demoted. Malenkov was sent to manage a large power dam in Siberia and the others were assigned to comparable posts in that region. The Presidium was filled with Khrushchev supporters, including Marshal Zhukov, whose support had been a big element in Khrushchev's victory.

The struggle had centered largely on opposition to the decentralization plan, but included opposition to the new incentives to the peasants, to Khrushchev's soft handling of Poland, and other factors. The Army was thought to have blamed Stalinist methods for the Hungarian eruption.

The outcome was a victory for the Communist Party over both the old guard conservatives and the technocrats, led by Malenkov. Soon after Stalin's death the Party, assisted by the Army, had prevailed over the secret police, which Stalin had elevated into the ruling power of the state. Now "the dead hand of the central bureaucracy" had been lifted in very large measure from industry and agriculture and the supremacy of the Party restored.³⁷

THE HERESY HUNT HALTED IN THE UNITED STATES

As these events shook up the Communist world, and moved it in the direction of greater freedom of expression and action for the peoples involved, a liberalizing wind also struck the United States, on June 17, 1957, almost with the force of a thunderbolt. On that day the Supreme Court handed down four decisions which virtually ended the great cold war American heresy hunt.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, March 31, 1957.

³⁶ On July 1, Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce, lately U.S. Ambassador to Italy said in the *New York Times*: "Yugoslav communism is giving marked signs of developing in the direction of a peoples democracy and a peoples economy. Decentralization is democratization."

³⁷ *New Statesman*, July 13, 1957.

Senator McCarthy's Passing. The death of Senator McCarthy on May 2 had symbolized the passing of that incredible period when the mighty Republic had quaked in fear, anger and agitation over its alleged mortal peril from the Red virus and other unorthodox ideas. As the chief pursuer of the unorthodox, McCarthy, to quote Eric Sevareid of CBS, "won the support of millions, broke distinguished careers, had whole departments of government almost at his mercy. Never once did he uncover a person in government proved to be a Communist. Yet millions believed with him that 'Where there's smoke there's fire.'"

After his censure by the Senate, for disrespect to it, McCarthy the man had receded rapidly, until oblivion, aided by his efforts to escape it, killed him. In his last years he had roamed the corridors of the Capitol with a sheaf of press releases under his arm for any newsman he met, statements which were seldom printed.

Yet when he went on, McCarthyism stirred strongly. To the *New York Daily News* he was "absolutely top drawer," a "great man," and to the *New York Daily Mirror* "a young giant of our times." In the same city the *World-Telegram and Sun* lamented that "the fury of his attack finally distracted attention from the main issue," so that "McCarthyism rather than communism became the center of controversy;" and the *Journal-American* excused the few times when his "sabre swings were misdirected." The *Chicago Tribune* held that McCarthy was "made the target of the greatest organized smear campaign of our day" and that no man in public life was ever so "persecuted and maligned for his beliefs."

Only a few liberal newspapers referred to the national sickness which had afflicted us during McCarthy's hour. In his home state the Madison *Capital-Times* and the Milwaukee *Journal* stuck to their guns, the latter affirming that future generations would find the period of McCarthyism "as fantastic and harmful to the American spirit as that of the Salem witch hunts, the post-Civil War Reconstruction or the Ku Klux Klan." The *New York Herald Tribune* added accurately that "shotgun blasts without regard to the fundamental rights of individuals in the line of fire were ineffective, unfair and constituted a massive assault on the civil liberties of the American people as a whole."¹⁸

Almost simultaneously with McCarthy's death the Supreme Court handed down two decisions which foreshadowed the end of the great American inquisition, legally at least.

Red Taint Not Perpetual. In the *Schwartz* and *Konigsberg* cases it reversed the decision of New Mexico and California courts that leftist persons could not practise law. The justices held that the fact of Communist Party membership from 1932 to 1940 did not make a person a questionable character for life. This struck at a dogma practised by the Congressional committees and the State Department to the effect that if a man was once a Communist he

¹⁸ "Where were you when this happened?" the columnist Doris Fleeson asked her readers when she wrote that "men and women will be judged for a long time by the courage and character they displayed or failed to display when McCarthyism seemed triumphant."

was always a Communist, or at least a suspect, unless he purged himself by naming others who had shared his infamy. The Court flatly refused to convict a bar applicant of bad moral character because he had refused to tell the examiners whether he was a Communist.

On May 14 the Court ordered a new trial for three people sentenced to prison in California for hiding a fugitive Communist leader. The fugitive had been convicted of conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the Government by force and violence, the formula devised in the Smith Act for the destruction of the Communist Party and the imprisonment of its leaders. The Court held that the FBI had used illegal methods in arresting those who harbored the fugitive.

FBI Witnesses Curbed. Then on June 3 the Court challenged the most sacred tenet of the witch hunters, their right to convict people by the use of FBI files kept secret from the accused. In the *Jencks* case the Court ruled that a defendant had a right to see the reports filed by FBI witnesses in his case. Otherwise, criminal action must be dismissed. The decision was 7 to 1, with Justice Clark, a former Truman Attorney General, complaining that it opened a Pandora's box of troubles.

This decision struck at one of the key practices of the heresy hunt, and it raised a loud outcry from its defenders and practitioners. The decision did not say that defense attorneys could rummage at will through FBI files, but this was at once widely charged. Attorney General Brownell hastened to introduce a bill in the Congress to prevent the alleged danger and it was passed in late August very considerably modified.

Last Heresy Victim? In mid-June the House Committee on Un-American Activities sent a sub-committee to San Francisco to harass a few leftists, completely unaware that this might be its last roving expedition. It was the announced purpose of the West Coast inquiry to investigate "intellectual infiltration"—a self-announced intent to continue purging the American mind of any lingering Red or Pink taint.

For this purpose the committee subpoenaed William K. Sherwood, "a promising and capable scientist," 41 years of age, working under a grant from the American Cancer Society, who killed himself by swallowing chemicals the day before the inquiry opened. He had learned that the proceedings were to be televised, in flat defiance of a House rule to the contrary. He had "a fierce resentment" against being televised. So he wrote a farewell note saying: "My life and my livelihood are now threatened by the House committee . . . I will be in two days assassinated by publicity."

Sherwood died on June 17 and as the committee opened its televised hunt for "intellectual infiltration" anyway, the Supreme Court in Washington was handing down a series of four momentous decisions which should have put the heresy hunting committees out of business. Perhaps never before had the slow mills of justice ground the thought police of a great people exceeding small at a more fitting moment.

As that redoubtable opponent of the heretic hunt, I. F. Stone, observed: "If Torquemada had received a Papal edict ordering him to cease burning

heretics unless actually caught defacing Church property, he would have been no more appalled" than the staffs of our two chief heretic hunting committees. A deep gloom settled on both, and an unwonted and subdued politeness, "as is natural in men threatened by technological unemployment."

Thought Policing Committees Illegal. A reading of the decision in the *Watkins* case fully justified the sudden postponement by the two committees of further hearings. The decision made it clear that the power of investigation is not unlimited, that the inquiry must have a plain legislative purpose, explicitly defined and explained clearly to witnesses. None of these safeguards applied to the case under review.

The Court questioned the very name of the committee, asking: "Who can define the meaning of the term Un-American?" Who indeed? This was the question which had cried out for judicial asking for many years. It is the very essence of freedom that no group has any right to set itself up as a Sanhedrin to enforce its idea of freedom. No American can brand another as Un-American. Each free man has to define that term for himself.

"*Suppression by Intimidation.*" While ostensibly pursuing "subversion," these committees themselves crossed the bridge to subversion when they upset the presuppositions of our legal system, by-passed the functions which the courts were set up to carry out and proceeded to try people in the blazing arenas of public opinion, made angry and alarmed by the Cold War. As Walter Lippman put it, these committees sought "to suppress by intimidation what cannot be suppressed by due process of law."³⁹

The *Watkins* decision said that "investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to 'punish' those investigated are indefensible." The mere summoning of a witness and compelling him to testify is "a measure of governmental interference." These forced revelations about matters that are "unorthodox, unpopular, even hateful to the general public" may be disastrous, especially when things past are judged by present standards. Those, also, who are identified by witnesses ("named") are "equally subject to public stigma, scorn and obloquy."

In these words the Court finally challenged the roving heresy and publicity hunts of the Congressional committees. On the same day, in the *Sweezy* case, the Court disallowed the right of the 48 states to interfere with political and academic freedom. State legislatures also could not set up committees to expose for the sake of exposure.

The Smith Act Largely Invalidated. These two related decisions were enough to shatter the heresy hunt, but in a third epochal case the Court set limits to what can be done under the Smith Act. In the case of the *West Coast Communist Party Leaders* the Court upset the conviction of 14 communists, holding that advocacy of overthrow of the government must be definitely related to action. General, abstract advocacy was not enough. It also construed narrowly the prohibition against "organizing," and there were strong hints that mere "membership" was not enough to convict. Since advocacy, organizing and

³⁹ *The Nashville Tennessean*, June 27, 1957.

membership are the three pillars of the Smith Act, the law appeared to be for all practical purposes dead.

If so, an era had indeed closed, one in which men were prosecuted and imprisoned, not for any *act* they had committed but for alleged acts which they were believed to intend, or simply for bad ideas they were thought to have in their heads. We had indeed closely approached the intolerance and ideas of the totalitarianism which was assumed to be at the gates.

John Stewart Service Restored. Finally, in its fourth decision on that historic June 17 the Court reversed the expulsion of John Stewart Service from the State Department by Secretary of State Acheson in 1951, after he had been cleared eight times: once by a grand jury, once by a Senate investigating committee and six times by loyalty security boards. It is a measure of our national sickness that he was investigated still a ninth time and that this time a weak loyalty board recommended his dismissal and a strong Secretary of State fired him—in violation of his own regulations, as the Court pointed out.

The firing of Service was McCarthy's first triumph, so it was fitting that his restoration to job, rank, security and back pay should come on the day that the witch hunt was liquidated.

TOWARD COEXISTENCE

In July 1957 freedom was regaining lost ground rapidly around the world, in both communist and capitalist lands, as the Cold War waned again.

The two things were closely related. The heresy hunts in Moscow, Peking and Washington fed the Cold War, and vice versa. Only if the Cold War were further liquidated could the gains on the freedom front be held and increased. Unless, too, the final arms race could be halted, and by degrees ended, all progress would depend on days of reprieve gained from civilization's end.

Some not only continued to take for granted the final nuclear war but our victory in it. On June 4 the influential columnist David Lawrence wrote that "the next war will have to be fought quickly, and retaliatory action will have to be taken instantly." He did not refer to a possible next war, but to *the* coming one.⁴⁰ Nor did Colonel Jasper J. Wilson of the U.S. Army Armor Board at Fort Knox, Kentucky, specify a hypothetical war when he said that "more people will be required in World War III than in World War II to accomplish the same objective, primarily because of the dispersion required."⁴¹

Others fell back upon the absolutely foolproof maxim that the Communists are very dangerous when they are hostile, but most dangerous when they are conciliatory.

On July 5 a Washington analyst reported that Khrushchev's victory over Molotov meant "to U.S. officials that Russia will now develop with cunning and determination the soft policies toward the outside world which threaten the West with grave danger." These policies "as analyzed here, are designed to

⁴⁰ Washington, *Evening Star*, June 4, 1957.

⁴¹ Hanson Baldwin, the *New York Times*, July 2, 1957.

strengthen Russia economically and militarily while lulling the fears of foreign countries about the Soviet's aggressive aim."⁴²

Yet the trend was toward amelioration. On July 7 James Reston wrote that the extremists had been losing lately in Russia and China and that "a comparable and more reliable trend toward moderation is evident in Washington. The extremists are still talking about 'massive retaliation' occasionally, but there hasn't been any gabble about 'preventive war' for months here, and the Government is now following a policy of moderate accommodation all over the world."

⁴² John M. Hightower, AP, the *Nashville Tennessean*, July 5, 1957.

AFTER THE SPUTNIKS

OCTOBER 1957—APRIL 1958

ON October 4, 1957, an event occurred which registered the end of "The American Century" that Henry R. Luce inaugurated in 1941, asking us "to accept whole-heartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in the world and in consequence to exert upon the world the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see fit."¹

On that day the Soviet Union announced the successful launching of Sputnik I, an earth satellite weighing 184 pounds, which was circling around the earth at an altitude of 560 miles and a speed of 18,000 miles an hour.

It was the weight of the satellite which astonished American scientists, since it was six times heavier than those we planned. The chairman of the U.S. program for the International Geophysical Year described it as "fantastic," and Senator Lyndon B. Johnson said that "We have got to admit frankly that the Soviets have beaten us at our own game—daring, scientific advances in the atomic age."²

The obvious effect of the achievement was to verify the claim of the Soviets that they had an ICBM. It would take tremendous rocket power to lift as heavy a ball so high. Moreover, the aim had to be good. The Columbia University physicist, Dr. I. I. Rabi, observed that "With a one per cent error in speed of this 18,000 mile an hour device—or a one per cent error in aiming direction—their satellites would have failed." He added that "We have to face the problem of living together on this planet or we won't live. The end of our national existence is in sight unless we solve this problem."³

Sputnik II. Dr. Rabi said "satellites" because on November 2 the Soviets had hoisted Sputnik II up 937 miles, a ball weighing 1120 pounds. This was the accepted figure until the satellite disintegrated in early April 1958, at which time several scientists estimated its total weight at about 7000 pounds. On April 13, Walter Sullivan stated in the *New York Times* that the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, which was in charge of American visual tracking, placed the weight at "several tons." The Russians had announced the "payload" of Sputnik II at 1120 pounds, but had not given the total figure. The 1120 pound weight had been "widely misinterpreted as the total."

On the basis of 1120 pounds, which was believed to be the correct weight,

¹ Henry R. Luce, "The American Century," *Life*, February 17, 1941, p. 63. Our task, the article concluded, was "to create the first great American Century." See also William A. Williams, "American Century: 1941-1957," *The Nation*, November 2, 1957, pp. 297-301.

² *The New York Times*, October 5, 13, 19, 1957.

³ *Ibid.*, January 1, 1958.

people everywhere concluded that the Russians could lay down ICBM warheads substantially where they wished, or that they would soon be able to do so, and that they had definitely outdistanced the Americans, not only in nuclear fighting power but in science and technology.

Though both of these developments were related, it was the latter which hurt most. On October 15 Joseph Alsop wrote that our allies had long held our political leadership in low esteem, Secretary Dulles being "both distrusted and detested," but we still retained one asset. They still trusted our military and technological supremacy. Now this last asset had been "depreciated to the vanishing point."⁴

The result at home was a trauma such as our people had not experienced since Pearl Harbor. If the initial shock was not quite as severe it went deeper and lasted longer, because what to do about it was not nearly so obvious.

General Alfred Gruenther recalled his embarrassment in India on reading the reports of reaction in the United States. The effect appeared to be "one of shock bordering on panic." After our first attempt to launch the Navy's Vanguard satellite had failed on December 6, the national mood was one of deep humiliation. The attempt had taken place after an official "build-up that would have done credit to Barnum and Bailey" and it made us the "laughing stock and the butt of pointed quips" around the world. The result at home was even worse. Americans were "at once forlorn and hysterical."⁵

After the Army had successfully launched its Explorer satellite, on February 1, 1958, Edward P. Morgan recalled that "The spectacular rise of two Red moons caused us Americans to behave, you might say, like a bunch of old grads screaming for a winning team regardless of what happened to the rest of the curriculum." Commenting on the same events, Edward R. Murrow remembered the "deep trough of humiliation" that we had passed through. Now Explorer had raised us to "a corresponding height of exhilaration." But, he suggested, both reactions were irrational, and "acute depression and elation are symptoms not usually associated with normal health, in individuals or nations."⁶

Our Paramountcy Elusive. These evidences of bad national mental health were the natural result of the failure of our leaders to accept the fact that World War II had created another world power in the Soviet Union.

This was due in part to the pugnacious personalities of Truman and Acheson, who directed our destinies in the early years of the Cold War. But it was due more fundamentally to the great national superiority complex which Americans enjoyed. James Reston defined it, on November 10, as "a disease of the mind common in the United States in the middle of the 20th Century,

⁴ *The Nashville Tennessean*, October 15, 1957.

⁵ *The New York Times*, March 5, 1958; December 8, 10, 1947; *the Manchester Guardian Weekly*, February 6, 1958. On March 17 national morale was raised to a high point when the Navy successfully lifted a Vanguard into orbit, to a record height of 1700 miles.

⁶ ABC and CBS broadcasts, February 3, 1958. Murrow added that aside from its superior height, 1700 miles, Explorer had little to compare with Sputnik II. Dr. Werner von Braun regarded it as a rival of the Sputniks "only in spirit" and stuck to his estimate that the Russians were five years ahead.

not unlike sleeping sickness." Never defeated in war, or in anything else, World Wars I and II convinced us of our paramouncy in the world. It was easy for our leaders to foresee an American Century and to reject the idea of any rival government sharing power in it. The one power which showed signs of doing so would simply be encircled and contained. As Harry Schwartz put it, our leaders had—down to 1957—continued to act on the assumptions that the Russians were basically ignorant, illiterate peasants and that the United States must always be first and best in everything. Then antipathy to communism led them to substitute wishes for facts, for example that science cannot function under totalitarian control. Therefore "when presented with conflicting intelligence estimates they took the one which corresponded to their own preconceptions."⁷

The Failure of Secrecy. The Sputniks compelled us to begin a reassessment of our paramouncy, and the first thing that became evident was that our passion for scientific secrecy had not kept military superiority in our hands.

It was a galaxy of immigrant scientists from Europe which had created the atomic bomb on our soil—Einstein, Fermi, Von Neumann, Teller, Szilard and Bohr. We were also aided powerfully by the British and Canadians, but we promptly cut our scientific affiliation with these most loyal allies and forced them to go it alone in their atomic development. Laws were passed to hoard the "secrets." The cross fertilization of ideas throughout the West was stopped by our security blanket, which shut out more than it kept in, as our allies went ahead of us in many respects.⁸

Clutching the black magic to our bosoms gave us the illusion that what we already had, by grace of the foreign scientists, was more important than anything else. It was a big factor in generating the hysteria of McCarthyism, during which we believed that every scientific advance of the Russians was due to the work of seven spies and scientists who had either defected from the West or sent secrets to the East. Even after the first Sputnik the *U.S. News and World Report* for October 18, 1957, published pictures of the seven under the caption "Did Russia Steal Satellite Secrets from the U.S.?" However, most people were quick to see that no spies could have given away what we did not possess. "You have no way in which you can blame spies and saboteurs for their advance. Their rate of progress is greater than ours," said Dr. Fred L. Whipple, Director of the Smithsonian Astrophysical Laboratory.⁹

⁷ The *New York Times*, October 7, 1957. Another observer evaluated the Eisenhower Administration as paralyzed by contempt for Soviet power, appeasement of Right Wing Republicans, the pressures of refugee politicians and lack of imagination. He thought "We should cast a long look at the alternatives to coming to an agreement now," before the scales weighed more heavily against us.—Morton H. Cowden, of Columbia University, the *New York Times*, January 3, 1958.

⁸ Cyrus S. Eaton, "Let's Meet the Soviets Half Way," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, December 15, 1957; C. L. Sulzberger, the *New York Times*, November 2, 1957.

⁹ The *Nashville Tennessean*, November 24, 1957.

The claim that the Russians had carried off German rocket scientists did not explain it either, since the United States received the cream of the group, men like Werner von Braun and his team of thirty Germans at the Huntsville arsenal who produced the Jupiter rocket.—Harry Schwartz, the *New York Times*, October 6, 1957.

Soviet Educational Leadership. This evident truth then compelled us to look at the Soviet educational system, and it was found superior to ours in all the basic subjects that would equip scientists and mathematicians. These subjects were started low in the grades, along with specialization, both of which were pushed intensively. The teaching of English to a majority of pupils, and many other languages to some, not only prepared them for the world-wide acquisition of knowledge but for the effective travel and work of Soviet citizens in many lands. A vast pool of trained young people had already been created, from which the scientists and technicians are drawn. This rapidly increasing reservoir already existed. It was an advantage which could not soon be overcome, if ever.

By contrast the American schools taught a multiplicity of useful subjects which contributed little to national power and which the encircled Soviets could not have afforded even if they had desired. Also the Russians had a vast organization of some 2300 people for accumulating, translating and digesting technical periodicals from all parts of the world, while uncounted tons of Russian scientific journals piled up in the Library of Congress, with only small samples of them read. What Americans read Russian, and why should they if they could? If we had bothered to learn to read Russian it would have been known that they had been talking in their periodicals for months about launching a satellite. It was no secret.

Scientists Honored. It was discovered also that the Russian slave state had managed to give its scientists great freedom to work, high salaries, splendid equipment and top prestige in the state, a little above school teachers, who were similarly valued and accorded great social prestige. Lester Pearson said on November 3 that the Soviet Union had put her scientists and engineers "on a level of prestige and privilege which in our society is reserved for heroes of sport or entertainment." By contrast we had made our scientists feel like second class citizens, suspected, walled-off from each other by fantastic "security" regulations, and perpetually investigated. It was recalled now that the greatest native-born American scientist, Oppenheimer, had been thrown bodily out of government because of some youthful associations long before.

Even the five branches of our armed services that were competing in the missile business had erected secrecy walls against each other. Each invested "large sums in duplicative research and experiment."¹⁰

THE SYRIAN CRISIS

Almost simultaneously with the arrival of the sputniks the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East collapsed.

The occasion was the rapid growth of Soviet influence in Syria. After the Suez crisis Soviet arms poured into Syria steadily, in pursuance of an offer made in the autumn of 1955 of both arms and economic aid. Then in August 1957 Moscow agreed to provide Syria with \$500,000,000 worth of long-term military and economic aid. This was soon followed by a coup in Syria in which left-wing, pro-Soviet officers appeared to be the controlling power.

¹⁰ C. L. Sulzberger, *the New York Times*, December 14, 1957.

From Damascus Drew Pearson cabled the terms of the Soviet-Syrian treaty. The United States had offered Syria \$60,000,000 through the world bank at 5 per cent interest, but the Soviet Union offered between \$350 and \$400 million at 2 per cent interest. We offered \$5,000,000 in arms, the Soviets around \$150 million. We also dumped surplus wheat in Italy, lowering the price and taking a Syrian market. Then Bulgaria took Syria's wheat.

The Soviet economic aid was to build a new port at Latakia, with roads and a railroad into the interior, finance irrigation works and power plants, construct six new airports, etc.

Pearson reported also that our diplomats, three of whom had just been expelled from Syria, had failed to cultivate the rising young officers who were rebelling against ancient feudal rule. Once again it was indicated that, as elsewhere, we upheld the past against the upsurge of the new generations, in this case largely educated in the American colleges in the Near East and finding themselves frustrated in Syria by the old order and by lack of opportunity.

As Dana Adams Schmidt put it, "while American experts were still discoursing about Syria's incurable instability, the Soviet Union had sneaked across a cure in the form of massive doses of military and economic aid."^{*}

These developments threatened to put the oil pipelines under Soviet influence, if not control, and to leave Turkey squeezed between Soviet power on both her northern and southern frontiers. The Eisenhower Doctrine, which Dulles had created without any discussion in the National Security Council, did not apply directly.

Accordingly, Loy Henderson was sent to the region and it was announced on September 5, after his return, that arms would be flown to Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. Russell Baker reported from Washington that the United States "prepared today for a week-end of intensive diplomatic and military activity directed against the new ruling group in Syria."¹¹ Turkey also mobilized considerable forces and conducted maneuvers on the Syrian frontier, in an effort to influence the course of events in Syria.¹²

These moves brought the Soviet Government strongly upon the scene, fearful that another of its protégés in the Middle East was about to suffer the humiliating military fate that befell Nasser hardly a year earlier. On September 19, Mr. Dulles told the UN General Assembly that "Turkey now faces growing military danger from the major build-up of Soviet arms in Syria." The Soviet Union, he said, had tried to intimidate Turkey from moving its own forces in its own territory.

The next day Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko replied that the Soviet Union would not be an impassive observer while an area close to its frontiers was "being turned into a permanent hot bed of military conflicts."

By this time Washington's dramatic moves had had the opposite effect to

^{*} The *Nashville Tennessean*, September 23, 1957; the *New York Times*, September 15 1957.

¹¹ The *New York Times*, September 5, 6, 1957.

¹² Dana Adams Schmidt, the *New York Times*, October 15, 1957.

that intended. The spectacle of Jordanian and American officials sitting on specially prepared bleachers to see the air-lifted American arms arrive had been high lighted reportedly by the remark of the American Ambassador that the recoilless rifles delivered could knock out the heaviest "Russian-made" tanks. All Arabs saw arms being delivered for use against Arabs and this display of "brinkmanship" led many of them to wonder if "Washington was trying to provoke a showdown that could end in World War III, with the Middle East as a battleground."¹³

Soviet Offers Rejected. On September 24 the United States rejected a Soviet note of September 3 which had proposed for the third time a four power declaration renouncing the use of force in the Middle East. The two earlier proposals, also rejected by the Western powers, had been made on February 11 and April 29, 1957. The first of the notes "even went into detail with a proposal for an embargo on shipment of arms to the area."¹⁴

Experts had interpreted the Soviet notes as an effort to gain negotiations which would recognize Russia's interests in the region. But the illusion persisted in Washington that Russia had no legitimate interests in the Middle East and that somehow she could be excluded from it.

This was true even after Khrushchev had used an interview with James Reston "clearly and studiously" to proclaim "that the Soviet Union was not only concerned about the Middle East, but was prepared to use military force if necessary to defend its interests in that area." He accused Dulles of enticing Turkey to start a war by attacking Syria and he warned Turkey that she would not last a single day, saying: "If war breaks out we are near Turkey and you are not. When the guns begin to fire, the rockets will begin flying and then it will be too late to think about it."¹⁵

This drew an immediate warning from the State Department that Turkey was our NATO ally and that we were determined to carry out the Eisenhower Doctrine. The danger of hostilities spreading "should be prayerfully and constantly contemplated by every responsible official in every country."

This warning was sharpened by Dulles on October 16. He declared that a Soviet attack on Turkey would bring American retaliation against the territory of the Soviet Union. He cautioned that there would be no "privileged sanctuary" in such a conflict, forgetting that there would be none for the United States either.

Well before this the entire Arab world was in full flight from the Eisenhower Doctrine. In addition to the dramatic sending of arms to Arabs for use against Arabs, Mr. Dulles had issued a statement from the White House on September 7 committing the President to uphold the Eisenhower Doctrine, and to the "hope" that "the people of Syria would act to allay the anxiety caused by recent events."

This "hope" was interpreted in Washington as "an appeal to Syrian elements hostile to the present regime to 'act'."¹⁶ It carried also the implication

¹³ Sam Pope Brewer, from Beirut to the *New York Times*, September 19, 1957.

¹⁴ Schmidt, the *New York Times*, September 25, 1957.

¹⁵ The *New York Times*, October 10, 1957.

¹⁶ Schmidt, the *New York Times*, September 8, 1957.

"that the United States might use force to unseat the pro-Soviet regime in Syria," a point which struck home in the Middle East.¹⁷

One purpose of these moves was to reassure the Turks, who were rebelling against the idea of being encircled by Soviet power and threatening to take matters into their own hands.¹⁸ This created jitters in Syria and alarm in Moscow. Then Mr. Dulles' counter measures brought all Arabs to the side of the Syrians. Jordan, which had steered clear from any association with the Eisenhower Doctrine from the start, was embarrassed by the highly publicized rain of American weapons from the skies. King Hussein was driven to avow that Arab arms would be used against Israel but never against Arabs. Iraq studiously avoided all mention of association with the Doctrine. King Saud permitted reports denying that he had ever had anything to do with it to circulate. Even Lebanon announced that any aggression against Syria would be considered as aggression against herself.¹⁹

The Henderson mission to the area also backfired for the same reasons. When Syria let it be known that she was thinking of asking her neighbors whether they had told Henderson they were concerned about events in Syria, "the governments concerned tumbled over each other to deny the imputation. Syria's internal developments, they chorused, were entirely her own concern." They all pointed to Israel.²⁰

Then while Washington and Moscow glared at each other President Kuwatly and the more conservative Syrian leaders negotiated a series of agreements joining Syria to Egypt. An economic union, on September 4, 1957, and a military accord on the 12th led to an agreement for full constitutional union on February 1, 1958, and the creation of the United Arab Republic.

This development quieted fears of a communist Syria, internally and externally, and greatly lessened the danger of a Soviet-American war in the Middle East, sparked by Turkey's fears. It indicated also a strong tendency of the Arabs to draw together under big power pressure.

On October 20, 1957, Schmidt wrote that "Somehow, to the fascinated horror of the officials most concerned, a series of acts and statements by the United States Government has so offended Arab sensibilities that the Arab peoples and governments seem, for the moment, united against the United States."

We had sworn to combat any Soviet military assault in the Middle East, but the Soviet threat was not military. It was economic and political. We had assiduously pointed away from Israel toward "international communism" as the great threat, but the Arabs thought exactly the opposite. Above all, "Our Middle Eastern policy is based on the extraordinary notion that Russia, the greatest power bordering on the Middle East, can like Czarist Russia in the

¹⁷ Wallace Carroil, the *Nashville Tennessean*, October 17, 1957.

¹⁸ Sulzberger, the *New York Times*, August 21; Drew Pearson, the *Nashville Tennessean*, October 10, 1957. After a trip to the Middle East, Pearson stated twice that the Russians had a fleet in the Black Sea three times the size of our Mediterranean fleet, which contained seventy-five ships. Presumably he did not mean that the Red fleet was three times as powerful.

¹⁹ Schmidt, the *New York Times*, October 15. See also October 12 and December 29, 1957.

²⁰ Michael Adams, the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, October 10, 1957.

days of the supremacy of Britain, be excluded."²¹ If there was to be any fresh start, continued Lippmann two weeks later, Mr. Dulles would have to overcome his obsession that the Arab countries could be, "or at least should be, aligned in a common military front" against the Soviets. "Mr. Dulles has no chance to succeed in the Middle East if he refuses to accept the fact that the Soviet Union is a principal power—a power which cannot be expelled and excluded, which must be balanced and negotiated with."²²

Containment After Ten Years. This is the fundamental situation which Truman and Acheson should have foreseen in 1947, when they proclaimed the doctrine of containment and began the encirclement of the Soviet Union, out of resentment and outrage that the Russians pursued their age-old objective of trying to secure access to warm water, through Iran or by means of a base on the Turkish Straits. The old, weak Russia had gone and a strong new one had obviously arrived, through four years of thunderous struggle against our common foe. The new Russia could not be "contained" as the old had been. Nor could the British monopoly of the Middle East be taken over by the United States to the exclusion of Russia. This was no more possible than the restoration of the political and ideological status quo in East Europe.

This may be termed "hindsight," but it was as true in 1947 as in 1957, and ten years of foresight is not too much to ask of statesmen. However, it was far more than our leaders of 1957 could manage. They had their eyes fixed steadfastly on 1947 and before. Mr. Dulles was still trying to enforce containment everywhere, righteously confident of the total rectitude of his course. "The official view here is," wrote James Reston on November 17, 1957, "that the United States has a right to send all the arms it likes to an area that borders on the Soviet Union, but that the Soviet Union has no right to arm Syria. In fact, Washington does not recognize Moscow's right to participate in any Middle Eastern settlement. But the hard fact is that the Soviet Union is in Middle East politics up to its eyes, and will either have to be brought into a settlement there or forced out." Washington could not bring itself either to take the latter risk or to "accept Moscow's offer of a general ban on all arms shipments to countries of the Middle East."

It was, of course, impossible for Mr. Dulles to admit that Russia was a Middle Eastern power, because he had constructed the Baghdad Pact to keep her from being one. Yet, said Sulzberger, on November 25, "It took no genial prescience to foresee that the northern tier alliance we promoted would irk India unnecessarily and inspire closer ties between Moscow, Cairo and Damascus."

Thus our entire Middle East position came to rest on the fiction, as Lippmann put it on April 6, 1958, "that the Arab states will remain with the West if only we can prevent the Soviet forces from invading them."

Behind this was the parent fiction that it is the duty of the United States to fill all military vacuums around the communist world. In the Syrian debate in the UN, said Thomas J. Hamilton, Gromyko "made it clear that if there

²¹ Walter Lippmann, the *Nashville Tennessean*, October 16, 1957.

²² *Ibid.*, November 1, 1957.

is to be any vacuum-filling" in the Middle East, the Soviet Union will do it itself.²³ Of course we would take the same attitude should the Soviet Union attempt to fill the yawning military void in Mexico and Central America.

OUR DRIVE FOR IRBM BASES IN EUROPE

However, it is not the nature of power politicians to see any logic in their opponents' positions, or to admit that any setback in an arms race is more than temporary.

So on November 5, 1957, three days after the launching of the second Sputnik, Mr. Dulles hinted that the United States would seek to equip its system of overseas bases with intermediate-range missiles. These weapons, already promised to Britain in March, had been requested by France and he thought it "would be desirable to have them elsewhere." He accepted Soviet "capability" of launching an ICBM, but "felt assured that we can catch up" in the arms race.

He did not point out that the indicated advent of Soviet operational ICBM's several years before the United States possessed them would constitute a technological break-through. In this interval the Soviets would have the capability to destroy the United States from its own territory, while the U.S.A. could devastate the Soviet Union only with bombers. They, too, might be checkmated by other indicated Soviet advances.

Indeed, Joseph Alsop reported from Paris, on February 7, 1958, that the Soviets were building a new defense system including better radar and anti-aircraft missiles with nuclear warheads which would make our Strategic Air Command obsolete within five years—long before we had operational ICBM's. This estimate had been made by our Government to NATO, but since there was no case on record in which any similar American estimate had not been decidedly over-optimistic, Alsop thought we should be prepared for the virtual death of SAC in two or three years.

In that case the United States would for an interval be defenseless against the much feared "atomic blackmail" of the Russians, especially since the Russians were credited with a good lead in the perfection of IRBM's, believed to be trained on our overseas bases and those of our allies.²⁴ Would the Soviets not demand that we evacuate these oversea bases? It was no wonder that Thomas Stokes reported from Washington on November 19 that "We've got missiles on the brain, morning, noon, and night."

The only counter to defeat in the arms race was to arm the containment ring with American IRBM's, just as soon as they could be perfected, and of course to refuse resolutely to negotiate with the Reds during our period of weakness in missile muscle. The old reliable remedy of Tirpitz and Acheson—steady nerves—was taken down from the shelf and prescribed full strength.

Then the problem was to persuade our allies in Europe to accept the remedy. This was a delicate operation, since the Soviet lead in missiles opened up to

²³ The *New York Times*, November 3, 1957.

²⁴ See a special survey by Richard Witkin, the *New York Times*, November 18, 1957.

them for the first time the possibility of escape from nuclear death by being neutral and letting the two nuclear giants destroy each other over the heads of the Europeans, or over the North Pole. Probably the fall-out would kill them anyway, but at least there was a chance of escape, whereas heretofore there had been none. Doomed people are always prone to grasp at straws.

The Soviets Ask for Another Summit Conference. On their side the Russians moved to negotiate from strength and to persuade the United States to accept the results of World War II. In his address to the Supreme Soviet on November 6, the day after Dulles' suggestion about American missile bases in Europe, Khrushchev issued a call for a new summit meeting "to reach an agreement based on the consideration of true and mutual understanding" about stopping "the cold war and the armaments race," and settling ideological disputes by peaceful competition "in the best satisfaction of human requirements and needs." Accusing the United States and Britain of having reached an agreement on "further intensification of the cold war" and preparations for war, he used a column of print to urge the United States to give up the "position of strength" policy and "initiate collaboration in a businesslike manner." He disavowed any desire to improve Soviet-American relations at the expense of other countries.

In Washington the United States responded "with chilly disinterest, though careful not to reject the proposal openly and out of hand."²⁵ Only one voice was raised in favor of accepting Russia's offer. Senator Allen J. Ellender, of Louisiana, back from a month's tour in the Soviet Union, said he really believed "we ought to make a new approach and see if we can't coexist for a while and let the people of the East and West decide whether they want communism or democracy." He did not see why the Soviet leaders could not be "trusted." Why refuse a summit conference, he asked? "If both sides would stop all this sword rattling and try to restore confidence and dispel fear" we would get somewhere.²⁶

On November 16, 1957, Khrushchev again urged an East-West top-level meeting, adding that Russia had the power to smash NATO bases the world over and to strike at vital centers anywhere in the United States. Some Washington officials reasoned that when Americans realized this "on a mass scale

²⁵ Russell Baker, the *New York Times*, November 8, 1957.

²⁶ In his official report on his travels, Ellender said: "The Soviet Union today is undergoing a process of evolution—not revolution, but evolution. There is a great surge of decentralization taking place. The people are demanding more and more autonomy in the hope of attaining more voice in their local affairs. Sparked by increased emphasis upon universal education—an emphasis which carries with it a growing desire for individual leadership, an eagerness for information, and an abundant curiosity regarding events, developments, and peoples outside the Soviet borders—the present Russian leadership is taking a calculated, but evidently necessary, risk."

He repeated the recommendation he had made after similar journeys for three years that a new look at our foreign policy be taken. He believed that "Given a continued or heightened cold war of indefinite duration, the pursuance of our present policies must eventually result in the strangulation of our free enterprise system," perhaps ending in "the eventual collapse of our total economy under the pressures of constantly-growing Government spending and a swelling debt load."—Allen J. Ellender, *A Review of U.S. Foreign Policy and Operations*, Senate Document No. 78, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 228, 231.

... new attitudes in favor of negotiating with Moscow will develop," but others refused to "negotiate from weakness."²⁷

Lester Pearson's Call for Negotiations and Peace. At this juncture two of the ablest North American diplomats, both out of office, spoke up powerfully for ending the Cold War and making peace.

Former Minister of External Affairs in Canada Lester Pearson made two lectures which had a sharp impact upon the minds of people everywhere. In his University of Minnesota lecture on November 1 he reflected that "Certainly we got lost somewhere along the way during the last fifty years." Now it was clear that if we didn't go forward towards genuine peace and cooperation between all peoples one of two things would happen: "nuclear war with intercontinental rockets against which no present defense would save us from total destruction"; or uneasy suspension between peace and global war on the knife edge of terror. All history showed, too, that the second alternative "will ultimately lead to the first."

The vicious circle of the arms race, Pearson continued, could not be cut through by assuming that all the right is on our side and wrong on the other, or by wrapping ourselves "in a cloak of impeccable rectitude and diplomatic rigidity." Our most important duty was "to bring about a state of affairs in the world where no one will wish to attack us at all—or we, them."

This simple, obvious truth struck at the very heart of the Cold War, with its armed walls of containment, now beginning to crumble, and its assumptions of unlimited aggressive intent on both sides.

Then on December 11 Pearson gave his Nobel Peace Prize lecture in Oslo. Again he faced the "stark inescapable fact that we cannot defend our society by war." Therefore "the best defense of peace is not power," but the removal of the causes of war. If we could display on this front some of the imagination and sacrifice that we devoted to defense planning the outlook would be more hopeful. But the grim fact "is that we prepare for war like precocious giants and for peace like retarded pigmies."

Perhaps never before had anyone described so vividly the childishness of all arms races, including the final one in which we are engaged. Then he added another telling description of "our policy and diplomacy," that it "is becoming as rigid and defensive as the trench warfare of forty years ago, when the two sides dug in, deeper and deeper and lived in their ditches."

Nothing described the policy of Secretary Dulles so accurately, unless it be the contemporary Herblock cartoon of the massive figure of Mr. Dulles sitting on the lid of a big square box with Uncle Sam pushing up the lid a little from the inside inquiring "How did I get in this box?" One side of the box bore the letters "When we're strong we don't need to negotiate," and the other side the words "And when we're weak we're afraid to."

"What is needed," said Pearson at Oslo, "is a new and vigorous determination to use every technique of discussion and negotiation that may be available; or, more important, that can be made available, for the solution of the tangled, frightening problems that divide today, in fear and hostility, the

²⁷ Schmidt, the *New York Times*, November 17, 1957.

two power blocs and thereby endanger peace. We must keep on trying to solve problems, one by one, stage by stage, if not on the basis of confidence and cooperation, at least on that of mutual toleration and self-interest."

George Kennan's Reith Lectures Advocate Disengagement. Still greater repercussions followed the six Reith lectures over the BBC by George F. Kennan, who was currently a visiting professor at Oxford. These talks began on November 14, and concluded on December 19, 1957.²⁸

In his lecture on November 28 Kennan laid bare the unreality of the Acheson-Dulles-Adenauer position that German rearmament could bring about free elections for a united Germany.

He reminded us that the situation in both Eastern Europe and Germany is very explosive, that the West is in a highly vulnerable position in West Berlin, and that the most dangerous crises are to be expected if nothing is done to resolve the situation. Then he went on to point out the obvious but usually ignored fact that "It is plain that there can be no Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe unless this area can in some way be removed as an object in the military rivalry of the great powers."

This could not be done while we continued to ask the Russians to withdraw from Germany "without any compensatory withdrawal of American power from the heart of the Continent." Since this was bound to seem to the Soviet leaders to be "a demand for something in the nature of an unconditional capitulation of the Soviet interest in the German question," he questioned whether we should continue to insist upon Germany as a full-fledged member of NATO. Saying that we should stop pushing Moscow against a closed door, he faced squarely a mutual evacuation of the heart of the Continent by both sides and proposed for Germany armed forces on the Swiss model.

Kennan said nothing new, but when he urged a neutralized Germany, outside of NATO, and pointed out that missile bases in West Germany would probably close the door to German unity with finality—as well as lead to missile bases in East Germany—the response was unexpected and emphatic.

It is difficult to remember the voice of any private citizen having stirred so many people to think and to urge a change of frozen policies. Especially in Britain and West Europe the impact was astonishing. On December 29, M. S. Handler described his lectures as "a veritable journalistic and ideological triumph in West Germany."

A selection of nine national German newspapers showed a letter from Bulganin to Adenauer to be the lead story on front pages and in editorials. They all advised the Bonn Government not to do the usual thing and dismiss it as propaganda. As Harold Callender put it from Paris, few Europeans "are ready to believe that diplomacy mingled with propaganda is therefore not diplomacy."

In Hamburg the editor of *Die Welt* wrote that Bulganin "should be taken at his word" and in Munich Lester Pearson was quoted as saying: "to do nothing and to answer one missile with another . . . would be a statement of complete bankruptcy of politics and diplomacy." In Frankfurt the leading

²⁸ See the BBC *Listener* on the Thursdays indicated.

editor said: "The official policy of the Western powers has got into a blind alley of military thinking," but military diplomacy means threats and eventually war.

The Paris NATO Conference Calls for Negotiation Before Missiles. The Kennan talks had an adverse effect also upon the NATO conference of heads of governments summoned to meet in Paris on December 16, 1957, to make arrangements for the installation of American IRBM's in Europe. Secretary Dulles did his best to counteract Kennan by making a recorded broadcast over the BBC, a few days before the conference met, opposing negotiations with the Russians. As the conference opened he made the same point in an article in *Life*, warning against any world-wide armistice agreement "except as we can enforce it."

The Kremlin did its best to blanket the Paris meeting by delivering to the NATO governments' heads on December 10 a long note urging a "wide zone" in Central Europe to be free of nuclear weapons, and East-West talks. The note was promptly dismissed by the State Department as a mischief maker, before the President had seen it.

In Paris, on December 16, Mr. Dulles offered our allies nuclear missiles and instant, forceful support in the event of war with the Soviet Union, but said Drew Middleton, "the response was tepid and inconclusive." The AP report added that the U.S. ran into make-peace pleas.

Everyone knew that this time the United States was on the firing line, not the donor but the seeker, and that Europe was being asked to continue to stand in the front line. The first shock came from Premier Gerhardsen of Norway, who bluntly declared that Norway had no plans "to let atomic stockpiles be established . . . or launching sites" for IRBM's. He thought the right course would be to postpone the decision about missile sites and negotiate.

The Norwegian Premier shook his colleagues at the round table by reading his speech in "a harsh, passionate voice." As one of his hearers reported, "He put into words what millions of plain people are thinking all over Europe and made the heads of government feel the breath of public opinion."²⁹

Gerhardsen's stirring revolt led Prime Minister Macmillan to put aside his prepared manuscript and guardedly support negotiations. Then the Canadian and Dutch Premiers gave the Norwegian still stronger backing and even Chancellor Adenauer, impelled by the impact of Kennan's talks on German opinion, executed a tactical retreat and for the moment urged "very thorough study" of recent Soviet approaches. By nightfall, said Middleton, "the atmosphere was charged with differences between the United States and its allies." Six of our allies had urged that Bulganin's letter be not dismissed as propaganda.

By the end of the next day "a general feeling of uncertainty appeared to have overcome both the U.S. and British delegations." The British had tried out Churchill's old slogan "We aim to parley" and the Americans variations of Acheson's "Position of strength" argument, but there was "not much

²⁹ Edmond Taylor, *The Reporter*, January 9, 1958, pp. 14-17.

response to either."³⁰ After all, both of these arguments were old and tired, and neither had brought peace.³¹

The outcome was a compromise in which the United States yielded to the European desire for negotiations first, in return for an agreement in principle that missile bases would be accepted eventually. Since the missiles would not be ready for two or three years, this left time for a good deal of negotiation.

With his customary perspicacity, Joseph Alsop pointed out two other tentative features of the conference. The compromise about the use of the proposed missiles was one. Our military officers would "retain custody of the nuclear warheads until doomsday" (i.e. the day when a great nuclear war begins). The warheads "could not be married to the missiles without authorization by the President and the NATO Commander could not fire them without authorization from the governments that choose to have missile emplacements on their soil." What would happen in the event of a surprise attack?

But a still deeper question hung over the conference. Every government represented, including the United States, insisted upon consultation before any nuclear riposte was delivered from its soil. That implied "a strong, unavowed tendency not to risk London or Paris or Rome or Bonn for the sake of Washington and New York," and vice versa.³²

Two currents had met head-on in the conference. One was the Dulles demand to transform NATO from the defensive alliance of its early years into one armed heavily for offense; the other was a strong tendency for Europe to pull together, find its own voice and begin to be a strong counter-weight to the American-British leaders—perhaps the beginning of a continental grouping that would both make its own nuclear arms and negotiate its way out of certain extinction at the end of an indefinitely prolonged Cold War.³³

³⁰ Middleton, December 17, 1957.

³¹ Currently the idea of a preventive war on the Soviet Union was revived. William C. Foster, a member of the Gauthier Committee which had submitted an alarming national security report to the President, made a speech which a conservative newspaper man interpreted as advocating "striking an enemy before an assault he obviously is about to make on this country," or to inaugurate "a conflict that in the highest official judgment has become inevitable." This policy had also been advocated by Captain W. D. Puleston, U.S.N., Ret., in *U.S. News and World Report*.—Arthur Krock, the *New York Times*, December 20, 1957.

³² *The Nashville Tennessean*, December 24, 1957.

³³ One lamentable by-product of the NATO Conference was a statement by Mr. Dulles that at Geneva in 1955 the Soviet Union had agreed to German unification by free elections. This misstatement, to say the least, was first made by Dulles at a press conference, then repeated deliberately in a speech at Chicago and in his BBC speech. Then it appeared in the President's second address at the Paris Conference and finally in the official communique.

However, the frequent repetition of this statement did not make it true. If we had in the Geneva communique the phrase about free elections "in conformity with the interests of the German people," the Russians had their phrase "and the interests of European security." Everyone at Geneva knew that these phrases merely masked the disagreement over Germany, and the Soviet leaders had made it amply clear that reunification would have to come through negotiation by the two Germanies.—Chalmers Roberts, *The Reporter*, January 23, 1958, p. 22. See above, Chapter XXIV.

Mr. Dulles was apparently responsible also for the insertion into the communique of his fixation about "international communism." The first draft, written by NATO Director

Embattled Containment. President Eisenhower had won much acclaim for his gallantry in attending the conference, after having had a stroke on November 25. However, he created a "dismal impression" by serving as a shadowy background for Dulles' TV report to the nation on December 23. The report itself was "no triumph for Mr. Dulles."³⁴ There was "the usual confident pride in his own achievement but somehow his optimism seemed hollow and artificial." Max Freedman thought him "a rather forlorn figure," "mistrusted by many of his allies who believe that he was driven against his will to consent to renewed negotiations with the Russians," who were unwilling to negotiate with him personally. He again found himself "exposed to the hostile judgment of mankind as a master of wretched and provocative diplomacy." He would "lift up no hearts, open no doors to peace, by preaching a message of timidity from a text of despair."³⁵

In the same vein the *Milwaukee Journal* said: "The United States missed a great opportunity at the NATO conference. Here was the place to show leadership in the search for peace. Here was the time to lift the hopes of mankind." But "we offered little but more and more devastating weapons of war. We must talk seriously with the Russians—again, and again, and again."³⁶

Though the foundation stone of Dulles' system, close alliance with West Germany, was disintegrating, it still seemed to Schmidt, on December 29, that nothing Dulles heard at the NATO conference had shaken "his conviction that he was just about right in the use of the instruments of foreign policy in all spheres," but "the clinical truth was that the West was suffering a breakdown of confidence in itself generally and in the United States in particular." Our allies, said Joseph Alsop, on December 31, would never permit Dulles to negotiate for them with the Russians. The lack of confidence in him was "too great and too profound."

An article by Chalmers W. Roberts, of the *Washington Post and Times-Herald*, in *The Reporter* for January 23, 1958, was headed "The Pious Truculence of John Foster Dulles." The article portrayed the obstinate refusal of Dulles to negotiate or associate with the Reds. After the President had expressed at his press conference on July 17, 1957, a willingness to receive his old friend Marshal Zhukov in Washington, Dulles had intervened and blocked the visit, deeply offending the Soviet leaders. Roberts summarized the results of Dulles' intransigence as follows: "Never in recent decades has there been so much gloom compounded by confusion in Washington over American foreign policy."

Travelling in Britain, Middleton found, on December 30, "a deep, formless, troubling fear that the Western world's policies and leaders have failed to cope with the problem presented by the enmity of East and West, each armed with the weapons of incalculable destruction."

General Spaak, did not contain this phrase but the final one did, in two places. Sulzberger thought that Dulles' detestation of communism was no reason for trying "to turn NATO into either a Holy Alliance or another Anti-Comintern Pact."—*The New York Times*, December 23, 1958.

³⁴ Arthur Krock, the *New York Times*, December 29, 1957.

³⁵ *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, December 26, 1957.

³⁶ Reprinted in the *Nashville Tennessean*, December 22, 1957.

It was small wonder that deep foreboding flowed through the West about the success of our cold war containment and encirclement policy. As 1957 closed, Brigadier General Thomas R. Phillips, U.S.A. (Ret.) summed up the military situation as follows. Since World War II "the Russians have caught up in quality and become vastly superior in quantity of defensive aircraft, have matched the quality and are rapidly catching up in quantity of medium and heavy bombers, have atomic and hydrogen weapons in great numbers and good quality, have gone far toward neutralizing the United States Navy with their great submarine fleet, and are probably five years ahead in the development of long-range missiles."³⁷

Barbara Ward also asked somewhat incredulously, "Who could have prophesied in 1945 that Russia, flattened by war, ruled by iron dictatorship, would in little more than a decade catch up with Western technology and surpass certain standards of Western education?"³⁸ She ascribed this marvellous rise to single minded devotion to expansion and ultimate world leadership, overlooking the drive and compulsion which the West had furnished for ten years by its close armed encirclement, accompanied by all too frequent talk of preventive war and by constant public description of what our bases and weapons could do to the Soviet Union, illustrated by graphic maps.

The incentives for a miraculous Russian recovery and forward surge which the West supplied were always urgent and omnipresent.

Our leaders easily convinced themselves that "the Russians understand nothing but force." That force we would supply, forgetting that they would get counter force. The deadly upward spiral of an arms race was easy to start, but who now could stop it? In one decade also the Russians had forged ahead. The American exponents of force now found themselves outclassed in their chosen field. It was small wonder that the Associated Press writer on religion found that "As the year drew to its close, a wave of grim rebuke was rising in the churches," rebuke of the feverish pursuit of ever more dreadful weapons.

Both the American and World Councils of Churches had issued statements warning that the end of civilization might be ahead, and calling for "massive reconciliation" instead of "massive retaliation."³⁹

However, the master of "massive retaliation" was still in power, with no thought of surrendering it.

COULD H-BOMB TESTS BE HIDDEN?

There were so many demands for Mr. Dulles' resignation that the President was asked about it at his press conference on January 15, 1958. He angrily cut his questioner short to declare the report "trash." Dulles was "the last person he would want to see resign," the "wisest and most dedicated man" he knew, and had "a greater knowledge in his field than any other man" he knew.

The same presidential favor did not apply to Harold E. Stassen, our chief disarmament negotiator, who resigned on February 15. In an article in the

³⁷ *The Nashville Tennessean*, December 26, 1957.

³⁸ *The New York Times Magazine*, December 29, 1957.

³⁹ George W. Cornell, *the Nashville Tennessean*, December 28, 1957.

Nation on March 15, 1958, Frederic W. Collins, Washington correspondent of the *Providence Journal-Bulletin*, evaluated Stassen as a first-class bureaucrat and negotiator, one whose departure could be legitimately regarded as affecting the national interest. Collins thought that "it is perfectly clear that Mr. Stassen was forced out unseen by the President. . . . Everywhere he looked he saw a dead-end contrived by Mr. Dulles. There was no place to go but out."

Under these circumstances Mr. Stassen could do more to advance arms limitation outside of the government than in it, and he did so promptly. On February 28 he testified before Senator Hubert Humphrey's Subcommittee on Disarmament that a cessation of bomb tests could be negotiated with the Soviets and that it would be an important, enforceable first step toward further arms control.

His testimony was effective because it counteracted the effort of Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, head of the Atomic Energy Commission, and Dr. Edward Teller, his chief scientific adviser, to cloud further the issue of monitoring bomb-test violations.

In the January issue of *Foreign Affairs* Dr. Teller wrote that it had been "claimed" that a nuclear test can be noticed around the world but actually, he said, "There can be no doubt that if a nation wants to carry out tests in secrecy, observation will become difficult and uncertain. . . . Of course, it will cost some money and effort. . . . But the Soviet Union has never been stingy where a military advantage has been at stake."

Then he went on to state flatly that a ban on bomb tests "could not be enforced" and that it "would be beneficial only to that party which could and would violate the ban by secret testing."

The September Underground Test. This questioning of what had been universally regarded as a settled and obvious fact was supported by a small underground atomic explosion in an abandoned mine in Nevada, September 19, 1957, which it was said was not detected very far away.

Then, on February 28, 1958 Stassen testified that this very small underground shot "was recorded in every seismic instrument within a thousand miles." He was certain, accordingly, that 11 or 12 United Nations monitoring stations in the U.S.S.R. could do the job, equipped as they would be with very delicate "seismic, acoustic, electromagnetic and radiation" instruments.

He thought that the monitors would have to have the right to leave their stations and go out to see whether any explosion was a hidden test or an earthquake. However, a non-government scientist who has been working on such problems wrote in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* for March 28, 1958, that the signals from bomb tests can be distinguished from earthquakes, since they register "a sharp pulse, while the signal from a natural earthquake is of much longer duration."

This distinction would eliminate the need for travelling to locate natural earthquakes. The author of the B.A.S. article, Professor Jay Orear, conceded that a nuclear "bomb" can be made to have a yield as small as a firecracker, and so be undetectable from afar. It was therefore "technically correct but

highly misleading for a public official to state that we can't be sure of detecting all tests."

There should be an agreement also, Orear added, that UN observers would be invited to witness any large chemical explosions.

Test Cessation Enforceable. In two articles in the *New York Times*, February 26-27, Mr. Stassen reiterated his conviction that a two-year cessation of tests would provide a practical, workable first step, giving both sides the opportunity to see how the other would behave under limited inspection.

In his testimony he had emphasized that inspection to enforce a cut-off on bomb production—which was tied to stopping tests in the standing Western "package" proposal—would require virtually the most comprehensive inspection system that could be imagined. "You would need the right to look for other plants that were not reported, in other words, to inspect the whole of the Soviet Union from end to end, and you would need the right to keep track of the nuclear material that is produced, account for it, follow it from the time it was produced on through its uses in the various power plants or ships and so forth."

Stassen's insistence that significant bomb tests could not be concealed, either in the bowels of the earth or high above the atmosphere, moved us toward bomb test suspension.

Already, on January 21, an A.E.C. scientist had testified before the Joint Congressional A.E.C., in executive session, that the seismic waves from the underground shot on September 19, 1957, had been picked up at College, Alaska, 2300 miles away, but the absence of the chairman had postponed demands for a public hearing on this important point.⁴⁰

Then on March 6, 1958, after Stassen's testimony that the test was felt for 1000 miles, the A.E.C. issued its first formal account of the September 19 test, saying: "When the device was detonated, only a few persons of many who witnessed the event from the forward control area, 2½ miles from the ground zero, felt any earth shock, and off-site the earth movement was so slight that it could be recorded only on extremely sensitive seismological instruments. The earth waves were recorded at seismological stations at Los Angeles, about 250 miles, air line, from the shot mesa. *This was the maximum distance at which the shot was recorded.*" [Italics added.]

A Retraction by the A.E.C. This contradiction of Stassen's testimony led I. F. Stone⁴¹ to query the A.E.C. on the morning of March 7. He was promised an answer on Monday, March 10. On that day he found that the A.E.C. was reluctant to issue a correction, but late in the afternoon it issued a "note to editors and correspondents" asking them to delete the last two sentences quoted above and substitute the following sentence: "Seismological stations of the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey as far away as College (near Fairbanks) Alaska, about 2320 miles from the shot mesa recorded the earth waves."

This bulletin attracted little attention until Senator Humphrey issued a press release calling attention to it. Then it was widely printed, and coming

⁴⁰ Doris Fleeson, *the Nashville Tennessean*, March 14, 1958.

⁴¹ See *his Weekly*, March 17, 1958.

two weeks after Dr. Teller had told a panel of reporters that "disarmament is a lost cause" it led to demands in Congress for an explanation of the A.E.C. release. Dr. Teller had said that "there were very serious, very effective possibilities of hiding nuclear tests," implying that the United States could be cheated into a secondary position by the Soviet Union.

On March 15 four members of the A.E.C., but not Chairman Strauss, appeared before the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee and testified that the error was unintentional. The Executive A.E.C. now laid heavy emphasis on the purpose of the test being to explore the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The earlier stress on proving that the test would not be detectable very far away was not mentioned. On the morning after the test the *New York Times* dispatch had said that A.E.C. scientists "predicted that the explosion would not be detectable more than a few hundred miles away."

The A.E.C. Absolved. The March 15 meeting of the Joint Congressional A.E.C. was held on a Saturday morning, with only 24 hours' notice, and only four of the eighteen members attended. They consisted of Chairman Durham, a Democrat, and three of the least active Republican members. The absentees included the three most militant Democratic critics of the A.E.C., who were away at the funeral of a Congressman.

Consequently, after less than an hour the committee accepted the explanation that the error had been an honest one and absolved the A.E.C. of intent to deceive the public.

However, in the course of this brief session a new document was offered in evidence, the report of the Livermore Laboratory, which recorded the fact that the test had first been proposed by Dr. Teller and Dr. David T. Griggs. Dr. Griggs testified against Dr. Oppenheimer at the latter's loyalty hearing.

The new document also contained a statement that the underground shot was detected by "stations located from 110 to 350 miles from the test detonation," failing once more to mention that there were any more distant recordings and implying that there were none.⁴²

Nevertheless, it would hardly be possible now to continue to assert that meaningful explosions can be conducted in secret, thus vitiating the vigilance of monitoring stations.

"Secret" H-bomb testing thus turned out to be a no better reason for postponing bomb test cessation than the "clean-bomb" hypothesis which Strauss and Teller persuaded the President to accept on June 25, 1957, after Mr. Eisenhower had publicly agreed with Stassen on June 19 that bomb test suspension could well be separated from more difficult problems.

THE SOVIET DRIVE FOR ANOTHER SUMMIT MEETING

Throughout the first quarter of 1958 the Soviet Government continued its drive for another summit conference.

Khrushchev's reasons for seeking to ease or end the Cold War were obvious. Daniel Schorr, Moscow CBS representative, said in Des Moines on

⁴² See *I. F. Stone's Weekly*, March 24, 1958.

January 8 that the Soviets wanted an arms slash because Russia was over-committed to Eastern Europe and to her own consumers. The arms burden was too great for her to bear.⁴³

In addition there were very heavy Soviet commitments for aid to China, and for foreign aid to the Arab states and other adjacent lands. By this time Soviet bloc economic aid to non-communist underdeveloped countries had grown to \$1,500,000,000 over a two and a half year period, as compared to about \$900,000,000 for the United States. A State Department report found also that Soviet aid was prompt and ably managed.⁴⁴

All of these pressures for development funds and consumers' goods were so heavy and insistent that it would have been strange if the Soviets had not wanted relief in the arms race, as did the peoples everywhere. A Gallup summary of polls in 12 Western capitals showed an average of 62 per cent of the peoples for another summit conference. Only 17 per cent were opposed and 21 per cent had no opinion. In the Washington-Chicago poll the vote was 54-29-17. In Bonn it was 81-8-11.

Our Reasons for Continuing the Arms Race. On the other hand, the American Government did not want "to stop the arms race at a point highly favorable to Moscow," said Reston on January 5, 1958. The problem, he said, was to avoid doing that and keep the promise to negotiate with the Russians just made at the NATO conference. This was indeed a problem, since Washington wanted to continue atomic testing until some kind of balance was achieved between offensive and defensive weapons. Developing a missile killer, he added, was vital.

This involved achieving the supreme miracle of being able to plot the path of an ICBM as it left the Soviet Union and then in the few minutes available meeting it out over the Atlantic, or Canada, with an anti-missile aimed at just the right angle to cross the path of the ICBM travelling at 18,000 miles an hour. On this basis of striving always for the miraculous defense there could never be any end to the arms race, short of the ultimate catastrophe toward which we speed.

On the same day Hanson W. Baldwin was explaining again how the NATO shield must be able to protect Europe from being overrun while its "sword is being unsheathed and is striking at the vitals of the enemy . . . hacking at the Soviet heart."

On January 4 the Rockefeller Brothers Fund issued a report by a distinguished panel, including Dr. Edward Teller, which urged an immediate increase of three billions in arms spending "for the next several years." Since these increases would be cumulative, our arms budget would be up eighteen billions in three years. The report, which was prepared by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, hinted at intervention wherever "nonovert aggression" threatened internal communist take-overs.⁴⁵

⁴³ *Des Moines Tribune*, January 9, 1958. ⁴⁴ *The New York Times*, January 4, 5, 1958.

⁴⁵ On the same day Harvard Law Professor Louis B. Sohn suggested that the time had come to recognize that we could not continue to outvote the Russians on negotiating committees. Was there any actual gain in having hostile voting majorities when the great need was for procedure leading to unanimous agreement?—*Ibid.*, January 6, 1958.

Two days later Senator Lyndon Johnson called for a policy of winning control of outer space. Whoever did so, he said, "gains control, total control, over the earth."

The next day Mr. Dulles was "most forceful" in stressing to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs the "futility" of a top level conference with the Russians.⁴⁶

Rebellion in Britain. On the other hand, the British Government was compelled to move toward the summit. On January 4, 1958, Prime Minister Macmillan proposed "a solemn pact of non-aggression" with the Soviet Union as a first step toward relieving tension. He thought the West "must" seek a disarmament agreement. Two days later Middleton reported that "a virulent strain of anti-Americanism" had entered into the British debate on foreign policy. Public opinion in West Europe and Britain believed that the Soviet challenge was political and economic and that huge military expenditures insisted on by the United States would weaken the ability of the West to reply to the real challenge.

A New Russian Note. On January 9 a new note from Bulganin arrived in Washington, and in all the other NATO capitals, asking again for a summit conference. Its list of proposed topics included stopping bomb tests, a nuclear free zone in Central Europe, and negotiations between the two Germanies. The note argued that the ending of the Cold War and the expansion of international cooperation would advance "a rapprochement between the two sovereign German states." It was accompanied by a 19 page re-statement of other Soviet proposals.⁴⁷

On January 13, 1958 President Eisenhower replied to Bulganin's note of December 10, saying that he was ready to meet him, if preparation at lower levels offered "good hope" of advancing "peace and justice." He called for free elections in Germany, self-determination in East Europe, a limitation of the veto in the United Nations and pointed to its Charter as an existing non-aggression pact. The heart of the arms problem was the "production" of nuclear weapons.

9000 Scientists for a Halt. The next day a petition signed by more than 9000 scientists from 43 lands was presented to the UN Secretary General urging the stopping of bomb tests. The document recorded the conviction of this vast legion of scientists that "Each added amount of radiation causes damage to the health of human beings all over the world and causes damage to the pool of human germ plasm such as to lead to an increase in the number of seriously defective children that will be born in future generations."

The petition warned that the spread of nuclear weapons to other powers

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, January 9, 1958.

⁴⁷ On January 12 J. C. Bradford, a leading Nashville business man, returned from a trip to Germany, Austria and Switzerland reporting a marked change in six months in the attitude of European business leaders and diplomats. "They feel that the U.S. and S.U. are going to shoot it out and they don't want to get caught in the middle. Furthermore, they think that it's possible for them to stay out. They feel much more independent of us than they did even a year ago and they don't want our missiles."—*The Nashville Tennessean*, January 12, 1958.

would increase "the danger of the outbreak of a cataclysmic nuclear war and pleaded for the stopping of tests now, as a first step toward a larger disarmament agreement. (Later, on June 21, 1960, Dr. Linus C. Pauling was haled before a Subcommittee of the Senate Internal Security Committee, which demanded that he give it the names of the scientists who had helped him collect the signatures. He refused, contending that they might be subjected to reprisals.)

The danger of an accidental world war was increasingly in the minds of many people. On January 16 the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* thought that H-bombs aloft, ready to devastate Moscow and Leningrad, carried "an appalling risk of inadvertent world war—the more so because misreading of wireless code signals by one air crew, or a lapse into madness on their part, could start a total conflagration." The *Guardian* believed that the Russians have a real fear of the West, "bred by the last German invasion and by the millions of casualties that followed it."

On January 15 Chancellor Adenauer questioned Soviet sincerity in a radio talk to the German people, in which he called the Soviet notes a "large-scale maneuver of distraction," meaning, of course, distraction from German armament.

Dulles for Outer Space Control. The next day Secretary Dulles executed a maneuver of distraction of his own in an address to the National Press Club. Pointing away from all the troublesome questions on earth waiting to be settled, he issued a ringing call for the international control of outer space, where the Soviets were ahead, for peaceful purposes. This was his "first step" proposal. "From the depths" of his heart he hoped the emphasis on this matter in the President's letter to Bulganin would "find a response." If the Soviet Premier was sincere, he would "jump at the chance."

James Reston observed on January 17 that in this address Mr. Dulles was trying to extricate himself from the widely believed charge that he was "stone-walling for time in order to close the missile gap" and that he gave only lip-service to negotiation. Yet "he did not wholly dispel the image of the reluctant negotiator." He "left the same old impression that his confidence in the people's judgment was really not very deep." The *Manchester Guardian Weekly* thought also, on the 23rd, that Dulles seemed to take back with one hand what he gave with the other. His own attitude was the chief source of the public impatience which he now used as an argument in favor of going slowly. There were "no arguments at all for sluggishness—and for being driven out of it in the end."

Moscow Rebuffed. On January 21 a *New York Times* headline said: "44-word note rebuffs Moscow on summit talks. President says his January 12 letter . . . covers the situation." In his article beneath, Schmidt described the confusion into which the first round of Bulganin letters on December 10 had thrown Western diplomacy. There had been the United States' "closed door" attitude, the British "open door" welcome and the attitudes of various European governments eager to sound out the Soviet Union.

On January 26, 1958, Khrushchev said that a top level parley was urgent and

called for both an end of the bomb tests and a liquidation of overseas bases. Two days later he again asked for talks, and accord on simple items first. For his part, Mr. Dulles was flying East to vitalize the Baghdad Pact.

Accidental War? As January ended John Lofton, a citizen of Pittsburgh, asked on January 28 whether our policy makers had stopped to consider "how long a period of high tension and reciprocal provocation can continue without setting off a holocaust?" With the authority to retaliate, perhaps because of radar indications of a missile attack produced by sun spots, soon to be decentralized down to battery commanders, he thought someone "must find the courage to propose a way to break America's and Russia's preoccupation with national suicide." But our Naval Chief of Staff, Admiral A. A. Burke, did not see much hope of such a break-through for peace. He told a Senate committee that each side would soon be able to destroy the other, and that this "will involve the possibility which we have got to learn to live with, of some madman pressing the button, and he will wipe out the Northern Hemisphere."⁴⁸

On January 31 the Army advised Congress that the Soviet Union might have operational ICBM's by July. The capital was surprised. It had counted on a year or two longer.

On February 2, 1957, Hanson W. Baldwin began a series of four articles surveying our defense situation in which he found that "the power and speed of modern weapons have destroyed forever America's geographical invulnerability." At the moment we had the theoretical capacity to wipe out all important targets in the Soviet Union 40 to 50 times—with our bombers. However, the days of piloted aircraft appeared to be numbered. The missiles were coming in, as well as nuclear powered submarines firing missiles at sea. Soon our defense would be confronted with "a terrible question." Were those blips on the radar screen merely electronic ghosts, as so often in the past? Heretofore we had sent up our bomb laden war planes when the screens indicated falsely "large numbers of unidentified planes approaching our bases." But missiles once launched could not be recalled to base.

As February opened, some voices began to be raised in an effort to find an alternative leading away from the fate for humanity involved in the fallible or irresponsible reading of radar screens. Mr. John S. Knight, publisher of a chain of leading Republican newspapers, rebelled against the fate which the deadlock in the Cold War decreed. "As I see it," he said, "we have the choice of negotiating with Russia or going to war . . . I am against the Dulles policies because they have proved sterile and unworkable. When Mr. Dulles thought we held all of the cards, he was a 'bluff and bluster' man. But nobody, including our allies and Russia, was bluffed worth a damn . . . Mr. Dulles has become a liability to peace."⁴⁹

Senate Democrats Challenge Dulles Policies. On February 4 an important and long overdue debate took place in the Senate when Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, of Minnesota, challenged the deep freeze policies of Mr. Dulles.

⁴⁸ *The New York Times*, January 28, 30, 1958.

⁴⁹ Reprinted from the *Chicago Daily News in the Nashville Tennessean*, February 4, 1958.

He questioned two of his assumptions: (1) that the U.S.A. has "such political, military, and economic superiority that it can force the U.S.S.R. to accept our terms in any series of negotiations"; and (2) "that the internal domestic difficulties of the Soviet regime are so great that all we need to do is to continue to apply pressure and the collapse of the system will automatically follow."

Having cleared the ground of these two immobilizing illusions, he warned the Soviets that they also must accept the reality of the balance of power, not being too buoyed up by their rocket strength, and that any agreements must serve the national interests of both powers and their allies. With these understandings "we need not tremble at the thought of sitting face to face with the Soviets at the conference table."

Then Humphrey attacked directly the allegation of the Administration that its elaborate nine-point package disarmament proposal of last summer was "a first step disarmament treaty." What would be left after these nine steps?

Coming to the crux of the long and abortive arms negotiations with the Soviets, Humphrey said flatly that "we have handled very badly the proposal of the Soviet Union to ban nuclear-weapons tests."

He firmly believed "that we must keep trying to negotiate as long as there is a faint hope of success . . . The nation which by its dedication, persistence, boldness and imagination persuades people that it is the champion of peace will merit and obtain support."

So it would. The only wonder was that important leadership in the Democratic Party had been so long in seeing that there was no future, even politically, in gliding constantly along toward another world war, in the illusive hope of finally winning the Cold War.

Humphrey was strongly supported in his speech by both Senators Johnson and Mansfield, the majority leaders, and by a dozen other liberal Democratic senators, who joined in deploring the way the Administration had hopelessly complicated the disarmament negotiations.⁵⁰

On February 6, 1958, Lippmann warned that "time is passing, and time will tell, and the realities of the structure of power in the world are forcing Mr. Dulles to go where he does not want to go, to meetings which he does not want on questions to which our obsolescent policies provide us with no safe and satisfactory answers." Starting devastated at the end of World War II, and with a far more primitive technology, Lippmann said, the Russians had achieved a rate of development faster than our own. We are "now only an equal among the great societies of the globe."

From Bonn Handler reported on February 9 that "battle fatigue" in the Cold War was setting in. The Paris decision to install missiles in Europe had served as a catalyst for those who had been drifting along with our cold war policies.

Acheson Against Disengagement or Negotiation. This trend brought former Secretary of State Dean Acheson into the field to prevent any yielding on our part and any negotiation from weakness. On January 12, 1958, he issued a statement combating strongly George Kennan's Reith Lecture proposals for

⁵⁰ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 104, No. 18, pp. 1382-1407.

disengagement in Central Europe. Commenting caustically on Kennan's inability to grasp "the realities of power relationships," he virtually said that if American and British troops were withdrawn from Germany the Communists would take over Germany from within, and apparently all other West Europe states. He harked back strongly to Czechoslovakia in 1948, indicating that, like Dulles, he had not budged an inch in the succeeding decade.

In what Reston called "a murderous haymaker," Acheson gave his opinion "that Mr. Kennan's opinion is not shared by any responsible leader of the Democratic party in the United States." However, Adlai Stevenson and a number of leading Democrats in the Senate declined to endorse Acheson's statement, and the Humphrey debate on February 4 indicated that Democratic opinion was moving.⁵¹

Nevertheless, Acheson remained immovable. The "position of strength" he had so confidently awaited in 1950 had never materialized. On the contrary, the Russians were now the stronger—on land, in the coming weapons of the air and in the depths of the sea. But this failure of the strength policy, a failure which it had invited, did not change Acheson's position. He firmly opposed negotiations, contending on February 18 that our position had deteriorated too much. In prestige and in military power there had been a shift in favor of the Soviet Union. With this change had faded "the possibility of mutually desirable results from negotiations with the Russians. They must make conditions that will be unacceptable to us."

In this statement was revealed starkly the hopelessness of the position-of-strength policy, of which Acheson was the father and a master practitioner. Its fatal weakness lies in ever finding a moment for negotiations when each side is superior in strength to the other. A momentary stalemate in an arms race, even a nuclear one, can of course occur. Such a moment came at the Summit Conference in 1955. Neither side was then able to impose its will on the other, but neither would yield what the other wanted, especially in Germany. There the stalemate dictated a recognition of the status quo, but Mr. Dulles would not do that; he continued to demand unconditional surrender from the Soviets. He would make peace on no other terms. In 1958 our position was so much weaker that Acheson was afraid for Dulles to negotiate at all.

American-British Divergence. On the same day that Acheson spoke, the President's reply to Bulganin's note of February 1 was published. It replied sharply to the note, and to Khrushchev's Minsk speech in which he had used all the old phrases about war-minded American imperialists. The President was "really amazed" at the charge that there were those in the United States who "utter the dangerous call for preventive war."

There could not be progress, the note said, by "continuing to write speeches at each other," or by the Soviet Government insisting on its own list of subjects and vetoing those we desired to discuss. Stopping the production of nuclear materials, the control of outer space, East Germany and East Europe were insisted upon as proper subjects for discussion, and it was made clear

⁵¹ The *New York Times*, January 19, 1958.

that whatever preparatory procedures for a conference there might be they would "require the participation of our Secretary of State."

Two days later, on February 20, Prime Minister Macmillan again expressed his desire for a successful summit conference and hoped that it would lead to a series of meetings between the leaders of the East and West. This did not satisfy the Labor opposition leader, Mr. Gaitskell, who demanded long-term negotiations with the Soviets independent of the United States, and the unilateral suspension of tests by Britain. By this time these demands were being voiced in widening circles. In addition to the left-wing politicians the clamor was maintained by clergymen, educators and publicists.⁵²

Communist Confidence and Apprehension. At this juncture Lippmann concluded, after reading the speeches and letters from Russia and China, that the Reds were certain the tide was running in their favor. What they wanted was not to settle specific issues but to relax tensions and let events take their course. His mention of China called to mind an enormous factor in future world equations which was being left out of account by the American side of the summit debate. But could it be? Reuters editor, Walton A. Cole, reported on February 27 that in that ancient land "Learning is no longer the prerogative of the limited few. Universities are crammed to their limits. They turn out young men and women burning to place China on an equal technological footing with the West."

Here were enormous forces in the East rising in anger against our policy of refusing to recognize the existence of the new China and of closely blockading her coasts from Chinese islands. Some day Chinese sputniks, in one form or another, would burst into our consciousness, announcing another unfavorable shift in the world balance of power, again probably a permanent one. Then many Americans would wonder why they did not speak out against the policy of ostracizing 600,000,000 people.

On March 1 the Soviet Government put aside its aversion to meeting with Dulles and proposed a foreign ministers conference to arrange a summit meeting. However, the new note still indicated opposition to the discussion of substantive issues by the ministers. The United States was disappointed by this new proposal. The qualifications for the meeting were said to bar progress.

Harry Schwartz thought Moscow had yielded on a foreign ministers meeting because "Strange as it may seem to Westerners, there is much evidence to suggest that the Soviet leaders are genuinely afraid the West may unleash a preventive war against them." They appeared to be surprised and alarmed by the depth of the Western reaction to their ICBM and sputnik successes.⁵³

Strong British Pressure. Joseph Alsop's report from London on March 4 lamented that the West was "bumbling to the summit in a way which almost ensures disaster." Everyone agreed that the meeting had to be held and nuclear disarmament discussed. This was unavoidable because Britain was "increasingly gripped by a blind, instinctive, overwhelming longing for any kind of

⁵² Middleton, February 20, 23, 1958.

⁵³ *The New York Times*, March 2, 1958.

escape whatever from the nuclear nightmare in which the whole world now lives." He might have added that this was also a highly rational response to an impossible situation.⁵⁴

On March 6 Washington was strongly vexed by Khrushchev's offer to come to any place in the United States that would suit President Eisenhower's convenience for the summit meeting. Mr. Dulles was vigorously opposed to giving the Kremlin "gangsters" any social recognition.⁵⁵ It was feared that granting the Soviet leaders social amenities would contribute to the "fiction that the cold war has come to an end" which Mr. Dulles had decried only the day before. Wherever the conference met it would be a triumph for Khrushchev, and if he also got an invitation to the United States his propaganda success would be complete.⁵⁶

New Soviet Overtures. On March 6 also a new 16 page note from Bulganin arrived, several hours before the State Department formally rejected the Soviet version of a foreign ministers meeting. The new Soviet Ambassador Mikhail A. Menshikov, an extremely personable man, renewed pleas for harmony in a speech at the Washington Press Club. The new Soviet note dropped its proposal of a firm summit date and agreed to the President's proposal that more Soviet leaders should visit the United States, and vice versa. It repeated all the arguments for the kind of meeting the Soviets desired, though it was added that the Soviet list of subjects was not final or conclusive.

By March 16 Schmidt thought that Washington had succumbed to the pressures for a summit conference. Key officials said privately that there would be one because world opinion predominantly favored it. Officials were even discussing the probable diminished importance of overseas bases, due to missile carrying submarines.⁵⁷

Russia Dominates Washington. As March drew to a close all Washington was preoccupied with what the Russians were doing. James Reston found this to be true everywhere he went, in both Congress and the Executive. Never since the war had there been such a concentration on what the Russians were doing. For several months Soviet moves, power, proposals, education, threats

⁵⁴ On the same day Hugh C. Wolfe, Acting Chairman of the Federation of American Scientists, wrote to the *Times* refuting an article by Teller and Latter in *Life* to the effect that violations of a nuclear test ban would be undetectable. Good faith on inspection had never been put to the test, "because the disarmament packages proposed by the United States have been so complex that it was certain in advance that the U.S.S.R. would not agree to them."

⁵⁵ Drew Pearson, the *Nashville Tennessean*, March 16, 1958.

⁵⁶ Schmidt, the *New York Times*, March 6, 20, 1958. On March 6 the Madrid correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* reported mounting antagonism against the United States among anti-Communist opponents of the Franco regime. They held the U.S. responsible for prolonging the life of a regime that had lost whatever popular support it had ever had, and feared that the Communists would gain control of the mounting dissidence.

⁵⁷ Rear Admiral W. F. Rayborn explained that the Polaris missile-carrying submarine could reach "almost all enemy targets, no matter where located," without adding that Soviet missile subs could reach every city in the U.S.A.—The *Nashville Tennessean*, March 20, 1958.

and achievements had dominated the news. The main thing was that the Soviet Union was moving and the Administration was not. The Communists were busy building their world and shouting about it. The West was not. It seemed to be "sterile of ideas, frozen in old policies it concedes privately are outmoded . . . and loath to explain."⁵⁸

This was the penalty we suffered from having deliberately and determinedly marched through the Soviet looking glass in 1946 and 1947, bent on "containing" the Soviet Union and frustrating its purposes internationally, whatever form they might take. We chose negation, checkmating, building vast new Maginot lines to sit behind. Did we not have the bomb? Then we promptly found ourselves encircling and confining the vast Chinese people, while maintaining that internationally they do not exist.

Even our most constructive endeavor, the Marshall Plan, was at bottom a shoring-up operation against the feared Communist tide, until the Korean war turned our "foreign aid" overwhelmingly into military channels. Thus in the first years after 1945 we largely abandoned the business of creation and turned it over to the devastated and almost destitute Communists, devoting ourselves to opposition to the main results of World War II. By 1958 negativism had bitten so deeply that Mr. Dulles could testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Russian Bolshoi ballet was being used "primarily" to strengthen the efforts of "international communism." We feared even the Russian dancing girls.⁵⁹

Obsolete Policies. But the consequences of World War II could not be avoided and reversed. This came home to Lippmann with great force when he toured Britain, Scandinavia, Poland and France in the Spring of 1958. He had known that a united Germany could not rival Russia again, but he hadn't realized fully that it would dominate West Europe and be likely to hold the balance of power, by being the ally of either the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R. So it was hard to find anyone in West Europe who wanted German union. Even the ruling elements in West Germany feared the high probability of a socialist Germany.

Therefore we were going to see, he predicted, what only the Russians had had the wit to suggest, negotiations between the two German governments, already beginning on a technical level, to obtain the practical advantages of union without the political disadvantages. This accommodation of the two sovereign Germanies was facilitated by "growing knowledge that there is also a remarkable revival in East Germany." The German settlement would be accompanied by a gradual thinning out of military forces and it would "acquire great momentum in about three years," when new governments were indicated for West Germany, Britain, France and the United States.

Meanwhile, Lippmann concluded, our influence in Europe would continue to decline as long as our conceptions of the future of Europe consisted of "the illusions and stereotypes which the Eisenhower Administration inherited from the Truman Administration, for they belong to another era."⁶⁰

⁵⁸ *The New York Times*, March 25, 1958.

⁵⁹ *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, March 27, 1958.

⁶⁰ *The Nashville Tennessean*, April 2, 1958.

Soviet Test Suspension. On March 27, 1958, Khrushchev assumed the post of prime minister, in anticipation, many believed, of an approaching summit conference. On the 31st, the Soviet Union announced the unilateral suspension of bomb tests. They would be resumed if the Soviet example was ignored.

Since the Soviets had just concluded a long series of tests and the Americans were just about to begin one, Mr. Dulles called the Soviet announcement "nothing but propaganda" and the President dismissed it as "a gimmick." Then, as world-wide approval for the step rolled in, it became apparent that the United States had suffered another serious propaganda defeat. The Administration had had ample warning that the Soviet move was in prospect and it had had several good opportunities to make the same move, beginning with Adlai Stevenson's bid for test suspension in the campaign of 1956. It could also have said that after completing our scheduled tests we would suspend, but nothing was done to counter the Soviet initiative.

American Refusal. Fundamentally, this was because Strauss and Teller and most of the Pentagon wanted to test the nuclear warheads for their missiles and to keep on testing small nuclear weapons indefinitely, until they had developed a great variety and wealth of lesser bombs. They wished also to experiment indefinitely in pursuit of that super miracle, a successful anti-missile missile.

On this basis there could never be an end to the nuclear arms race, short of the accidental outbreak of nuclear world war which every day became more likely, or the outbreak of some little war which would rapidly spread into the big and final one. The President revealed at his press conference on April 9 that he was completely in the hands of the advocates of indefinite bomb testing. He said: "The scientists would have to tell me what they thought it necessary to find out, and whether they had largely or almost completely found out things they wanted to know." They would have to be satisfied not "largely," but "almost completely."

Unless, therefore, something could cause an exceptionally well-sheltered President to change his mind there could be no halt in the arms race in his time. It was true enough that the Russians were most probably satisfied from their latest tests that they could deliver nuclear warheads to our territory. We would be negotiating from weakness, but, as Lippmann noted, there was "no built-in guarantee" that Teller and Strauss could get ahead of the Russians again, "for when the Russians concentrate their efforts on a particular military objective they are a formidable nation."⁶¹

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, April 11, 1958. Dr. Harrison Brown, Professor of Geochemistry at the California Institute of Technology, said in a lecture at the University of Minnesota on March 9, 1958, about the Hungarian-born Dr. Edward Teller: "It is amply clear that he is convinced that any agreement on our part aimed at achieving some degree of arms limitation would be suicidal. It seems clear to me that Dr. Teller is motivated by a deep-rooted hatred of the Soviet Union which borders upon the fanatic. From this hatred there stems the belief that no agreement with the Soviet Union can be relied upon. I believe this blind fear can in the long run lead to disaster."

Forecasting that about fifteen nations would have all sizes of nuclear weapons within twenty-five years, and be using them in "little" wars, Dr. Brown thought it fantastic that we should be asked to believe that "everybody's ability to retaliate with massive destruction will remain in stabilization."

Thus the United States found itself "reeling from reverse to reverse on the propaganda front" as the Soviet Union was "leading us by the nose to the summit."⁶² With a "flexible, persuasive, versatile and non-doctrinaire" policy, Moscow was "beginning to impose its pattern on the evolution of world affairs" in "propaganda, foreign affairs and technology." This was serious enough, but urgency was added by "the menace of U.S. economic cut-backs and their spiral effects on the world economy."⁶³ In the United States some 5,500,000 men were unemployed, opening up the grave threat that the Kremlin would be able to point also to the superiority of its economic system.

A policy, and to a large extent a prosperity based on arming ourselves and the world against the Soviets had not worked. The titles of two magazine articles suggested the gravity of the plight in which an excessively negative and military policy had left us: "Walking the Plank to Nowhere" and "Arms Race: Countdown for Disaster."⁶⁴

General Bradley's Plea for a Halt and Peace. The irrationality of clinging to military "containment" as a way of life, and the futility of surrendering ourselves to the nuclear arms race, letting it carry us onward to doomsday, was stated unforgettably by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley in an address at the St. Alban's School Convocation in Washington on November 5, 1957. Said Bradley:

Our plight is critical and with each effort we have made to relieve it by further scientific advance, we have succeeded only in aggravating our peril.

As a result, we are now speeding inexorably toward a day when even the ingenuity of our scientists may be unable to save us from the consequences of a single rash act or a lone reckless hand upon the switch of an uninterceptible missile. For twelve years now we've sought to stave off this ultimate threat of disaster by devising arms which would be both ultimate and disastrous.

This irony can probably be compounded a few more years, or perhaps even a few decades. Missiles will bring anti-missiles, and anti-missiles will bring anti-anti-missiles. But inevitably, this whole electronic house of cards will reach a point where it can be constructed no higher.

Addressing himself to the problem of "accommodation in a world split by rival ideologies" he admitted that this was more difficult than conquering outer space, but he was discouraged "not by the magnitude of the problem, but by our colossal indifference to it."

How long, General Bradley asked us, "can we put off salvation? When does humanity run out?" If enough of us believed strongly "in the ability of intelligent human beings to get together on some basis of a just accord" we could make a start. But—

⁶² Schmidt, *the New York Times*, March 30, 1958.

⁶³ Harrison E. Salisbury, *the New York Times*, April 6, 1958.

⁶⁴ Eugene Rabinowitch, "Walking the Plank to Nowhere," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, October, 1958, pp. 282-3; Walter Millis, "Arms Race: Countdown for Disaster," *The Nation*, February 15, 1958, pp. 132-5.

Unless we soon get started, it may be too late.

We can't sit about waiting for some felicitous accident of history that may somehow make the world all right. Time is running against us, and it is running against us with the speed of a Sputnik.

If we're going to save ourselves from the instruments of our own intellect, we had better soon get ourselves under control and begin making the world safe for living.

A little later, the Cleveland industrialist Cyrus S. Eaton made the same plea to our intelligence. "Sooner or later," he said, "we must achieve better understanding among nations or perish. Only by understanding can we end distrust and abolish the dreadful specter of nuclear war that could exterminate the human family."⁶⁵

⁶⁵ "The Case for Meeting the Soviets Halfway," the *Progressive*, March 1958, p. 12.

TROUBLE IN ALL DIRECTIONS

APRIL-OCTOBER 1958

THE events of the six months just surveyed demonstrated amply that the peoples of the world were tired of perpetual tension and strife between the two super powers and were longing for an end of the Cold War. A Gallup poll conducted in 12 non-communist lands reported 62 per cent in favor of talks between Eisenhower and Khrushchev and only 17 per cent opposed. Even in the United States those who voted favored the meeting 54 to 17.

Khrushchev expressed publicly his desire to visit the United States and talk to Eisenhower, but Mr. Dulles and the forces which he led would not think of letting him come. The Soviets wanted relief from the arms race, after they had shown by their heavy sputniks that we could not push them out of Europe without being ourselves destroyed, but cold warriors wanted more arms, not less. In January 1958 Paul Hoffman calculated that since World War II our defense efforts had cost us \$443 billion, during which time we had "behaved as if communism were the most contagious of ideas, a disease of the mind against which we must quarantine ourselves" by the most fantastic means. Now he pleaded with the President to come down on the side of peace and pursue it "with boldness, imagination and dedication." The alternative was stalemate and that meant the end of our way of life in the garrison state.¹

After the Soviets had announced their unilateral suspension of bomb tests, on condition that others did, a dispatch from London to the *New York Times* said, on April 6, there was "a belief, more and more widely held," that our leadership was "fumbling, disorganized and self-centered, and speaking in the accents of a decade ago."²

On April 25, 1958, the *Washington Post* found that there were "still evidences here of the sort of thinking that does not accept negotiation on the basis of equality and virtually demands the retreat of the Soviet Union as a prior condition." Yet, the editor warned: "Too much rigidity without any conciliatory gesture could have the effect of persuading the Russians that the

¹ The *Nashville Tennessean*, January 19, 1958, reprinted from *Look*. On the same day the *Tennessean* said editorially: "The great tragedy of today is President Eisenhower's obvious determination to follow the fumbling leadership of this aging man (Dulles) who, after five years in the icy wilderness of cold war problems, has led us nowhere."

² On the same day Lippmann wondered that we still tried to sell our five fictions: (1) that Formosa is China and that the actual government of China ought to disappear; (2) that we were arming Pakistan to defend the Middle East against the Red Army; (3) that the Arab states would remain with the West if we could prevent Soviet forces from invading them; (4) that Adenauer's Germany would absorb East Germany; and (5) that in some unknown way the Red Army would roll itself back out of Eastern Europe.—*Ibid.*, April 6, 1958.

West does not really want negotiation" and that nuclear war was ultimately inevitable. That would be "a catastrophic day for humanity."

Then for some six months a series of violent outbreaks against American policy around the world, and against our cold war protégés, demanded attention. Our Government's response was to hurl its armed forces around the world in all four directions.

Bomb Flights to the North. On April 7, 1958, the President of the United Press wrote from Offutt Air Force base in Nebraska that the great striking force of the SAC had been sped on its way North many times "by alerts created by meteoric flights registered on the DEW Line radar scopes, or by interference of high-frequency transmitters creating artificial 'blips' or by the appearance of foreign objects on the scope flying in seeming formation, which have never been explained."³

This startling revelation led the Soviet Union to charge in the UN Security Council, on April 19, that these SAC flights over the Arctic imperilled the peace. The United States countered by inviting the Soviets to open the Arctic to aerial inspection and the Soviet charge was voted down. However, Max Freedman reported that it was a barren triumph which left peace resting on the uneasy race between hate and fear. He thought Canada's continued agreement to these flights over her territory could not be assumed on this basis. Lippmann reflected on the inflated size of our Pearl Harbor complex. A crisis of trust now paralyzed our diplomacy. Our Arctic bomber flights showed "an absolute mistrust in the intentions of the Soviet Union." He questioned also whether U.S. inspectors in the Soviet Union could prevent an all-out and absolute Pearl Harbor.⁴

This was the pass to which the policy of mistrust into which we plunged in 1945 had brought us. Then elder statesman Henry Stimson had pleaded with Truman and his Cabinet to follow the opposite course and make the Russians trustworthy by trusting them. Now in 1958, having committed ourselves to mistrust we were nervously jabbing our bomb laden planes out over the Arctic wastes, to repel phantom, non-existent invasions. We righteously refused in 1945 to trust our main ally in World War II with any of our atomic "secrets." Now on May 15, 1958, the Soviets again demonstrated their ability to destroy us by launching Sputnik III, a huge satellite weighing 1½ tons. Since the first Sputnik the Russians had increased the weight launched fourteen times and they had doubled the greatest distance reached in orbit. There was little doubt, added the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* prophetically on May 22, that they could have sent a smaller object to the moon. Nevertheless it was possible for a top analyst to say at this moment that "It is still fundamentally United States' policy to maintain pressure upon a supposedly weak Soviet Union, as though the United States maintained a superiority of nuclear power." Mr. Dulles was still preoccupied with the Soviet Union.⁵

Yet he was suddenly compelled to look southward momentarily. On May

³ The *New York Times*, April 20, 1958.

⁴ *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, May 8; the *Nashville Tennessean*, May 5, 1958.

⁵ Dana Adams Schmidt, the *New York Times*, May 18, 1958.

14 U.S. paratroopers were flown to Caribbean bases, somewhat precipitately, because Vice President Nixon was being mobbed in Venezuela.

RESENTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

Trouble had started early on his good will tour of South America, when he met crowds of hostile, stone-throwing students in Peru on May 8. A few days later still more violent mobs attacked his car in Caracas, Venezuela, and only its strength saved his life and that of his wife.

The vile indignities visited upon the Vice President suddenly drew attention to another casualty of the Cold War, our relations with our loyal friends in Latin America. First we had hastily armed all of them with big weapons, as soon as World War II was over, as a part of our policy of containing the Soviets. Then a crop of eight army dictatorships had sprung up, largely created out of the arms caches delivered to the armies by us. Then, recognizing dependable anti-Red allies, President Eisenhower had sent decorations to two of the worst dictators who had held down their peoples and ruled harshly for years.

This was the main reason for the outbreak against Mr. Nixon, but it was sparked also by resentment against being treated as poor relations while a half-trillion dollars was spent on the Cold War. There were unlimited U.S. funds to aid any state in Europe and Asia which might promise to promote our cold war objectives, but precious little economic aid for Latin America. At the Caracas Conference in 1954 the Latins advanced their "long-cherished, carefully thought-out plan for an Inter-American Development Bank," but Mr. Dulles would not so much as read it. A few months later Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey did listen to an outline of the plan in Buenos Aires and coldly advised its backers to stop dreaming. Other officials advised them that they should depend on American investment capital, and that they should remember that it would require greater profits than at home.⁶ Our investments in Latin America had passed the \$9 billion mark, with increasing control of her economies by American corporations. At the same time U.S. import quotas were imposed against certain South American minerals.

APPREHENSION IN CANADA

In the same month also Canada's dissatisfaction with the increasing control of her economy by American capital came to a head. In early April the Conservative Party, led by John Diefenbaker, won a landslide victory on a platform of greater independence of foreign control.

Canadians were reacting against the steady, silent invasion of American industrial capital, mostly in the form of 3750 branch plants established by American corporations and in their buying up of Canadian businesses at fat prices. The offers were attractive but thereafter control was in American hands and Canadians believed that it operated to discourage Canadian exports to third countries, to centralize research and development in the United States.

⁶ Thayer Waldo, "Why Latin America Distrusts Us," *Harpers Magazine*, November 1958, p. 86. It was not until 1959 that we finally helped to finance the proposed bank.

to the purchasing of parts and other materials in the U.S., and to the wholesale extraction of raw materials for processing below the border. Our good neighbors saw also that the U.S. corporations froze Canadian investors out, sent home for experienced men to handle the good jobs, backed away from Canadian fund drives, and supported no political party funds. They wondered, too, what would happen to their American-controlled economy in another depression. Wouldn't the American home offices manage their Canadian subsidiaries for the benefit of the U.S. economy?⁷

These things were deeply disturbing to Canadians, because Americans already owned 51 per cent of Canadian industry. In oil and gas the figure was 74 per cent and in automobiles 96 per cent. Canadians themselves owned only 41 per cent of their industries. They did not charge any conscious American economic imperialism, but nevertheless it was taking them over, quietly, relentlessly and efficiently. The tide of American investment funds drove the Canadian dollar to a premium of three or four cents above the American dollar. This made Canadians feel like buying American products and thus increased their economic weakness. In a decade the part of total Canadian production due to manufacturing had dropped from 31 per cent to 28.6. Yet if the flood of American investments stopped, or slowed markedly, the return flow of dividends from the immense American funds already invested would at once become a very heavy drain on Canada's finances.

One Canadian writer declared the billion dollar deficit suffered by the Canadians in their trade with the United States each year "insupportable for any length of time." Canadians resented the indifference of Americans to what concerned them, said Bruce Hutcheson, but most of all they objected to the dominance of their destiny in the world by Mr. Dulles. It was, he said, "merely factual to say that an overwhelming majority of Canadians, including all of their leading statesmen, regard Mr. Dulles as an unmitigated disaster—a disaster affecting Canada as deeply as it affects the United States. . . . They have awaited his every statement as a mountaineer watches the slip of an avalanche."⁸

The economic invasion also had the effect of extending American law into Canada, as U.S. Government agencies insisted increasingly that what applied to U.S. corporations at home also applied to their subsidiaries in Canada. And increasingly the Canadians felt tied "helplessly to U.S. policy, brinkmanship and all."⁹ Whether the Canadians could still save their national independence was a grave question, but they meant to try.

LEBANON

On July 15, 1958, a vast American armada of ships and planes suddenly appeared off the port of Beirut in tiny Lebanon, at the east end of the

⁷ William H. Hessler, "Canada's Case of the American Jitters," *The Reporter*, February 19, 1959, pp. 18-21. On December 5, 1958, Ian F. McRae, President of the Canadian Manufacturers Association, accused Washington of "contemptuous interference" with the operation of U.S. owned companies in Canada.

⁸ Bruce Hutcheson, "Why Canadians are Turning Anti-American," *Harpers Magazine*, May 1958, pp. 44-8.

⁹ Hessler, *supra*, p. 21.

Mediterranean, and landed several thousand Marines, with more to follow in succeeding days.

This event took place because of the sudden collapse of the Government of Iraq, keystone of the Baghdad Pact, and because our friend President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon was in deep trouble. As the head of a small country almost evenly divided between Moslems and Christians he had upset the balance of forces upon which internal peace had long depended. He rigged the election of June 1957 to secure a parliament that would approve his public acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine. This was a difficult feat, since his act had offended the Moslem half of the people, but he did such a good job of managing the election that "almost every important opposition figure" found himself outside the parliament, which it was generally believed would accede to Chamoun's wish to change the constitution, permitting him to serve another term, if not for life. The Patriarch of the Maronite Christians summed up the result as "forty years work ruined in a month, a country divided against itself."¹⁰

These high-handed acts threw the little country into a strange state of civil war. Armed rebellion erupted in Beirut on May 12. A major pipeline was cut and the U.S. Information Library was burned. The government promptly alleged that foreign agents were behind it and appealed to the United States to save it.

U.S. Troops Promised. This precipitated an immediate decision by Mr. Dulles to send U.S. troops if required. Dulles informed Secretary of Defense McElroy and obtained the President's consent. But, added Joseph Alsop, "the President nowadays almost automatically consents to anything Dulles proposes." Both our mission to the UN and the Pentagon had opposed the commitment, which amounted to a blank check given to a very doubtful risk.¹¹

The Pentagon had urged the sending of a UN force, but was over-ruled by Dulles. On June 26 Hanson W. Baldwin could find no "sound military and political basis for national intervention in Lebanon." But neither could anyone find a way to extricate Chamoun from his self-imposed difficulties. Half of the capital was in hostile hands and fully half of the country, under various rebel leaders. There was some fighting, but not much. The Lebanese Army practised a strange kind of neutrality, not doing much for or against either side. H. A. R. Philby of the London *Sunday Times* reported that it was not a rebellion, scarcely even a civil war, but a "calculated defiance of authority by at least half of the population."

In this predicament, which he was powerless to alter, Chamoun's only hope was to cry foreign intervention and bring the U.S. Marines. There was some foreign meddling. The Cairo radio fulminated constantly against Chamoun and some arms and men filtered across the Syrian border. In response to his pleas the UN sent observers to patrol the border and they reported that the amount of help for the rebels crossing it was small.

¹⁰ Michael Adams, "The Frustrated Civil War," *The Reporter*, August 7, 1958, pp. 17-18; Desmond Stewart, "Three Revolutions Toward Neutrality," *The Nation*, February 14, 1959, pp. 135-7; "U.N. Report on Lebanon and the Maronite Patriarch," *America*, July 19, 1958, p. 422.

¹¹ Joseph Alsop, the *Nashville Tennessean*, July 8, 1958.

Chamoun was accordingly left with a permanent stalemate on his hands and the U.S. blank check which the Americans now urged him not to cash.

Nuri es-Said Endangered. Unfortunately for our policy of backing friendly governments, whatever they might be if only anti-communist, the Lebanon impasse was undermining the power of Nuri es-Said, our lynch pin in Iraq. He too had forsaken Arab neutrality and had cast his lot with the West by joining the Baghdad Pact. Thereafter "all he could do was to push economic development hard." But he presided over "a landlord structure handed down from Babylonian times," which his big development projects did not touch. At the same time the American colleges in the Near East had educated a new middle class for him, which could find little to do and saw only poor prospects ahead. The talented young people were so often in jail that Nuri's radio programs were a dull affair when compared to Nasser's. As the summer wore on Nuri became so uneasy that he took the unusual step of publishing an interview in the *Times* of London in which he quite openly pleaded for military intervention in support of Chamoun.¹²

Finally Nuri's private pleas to his allies to put out the smoldering fire in Lebanon seemed on the point of getting results. The chiefs of the Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact, minus Britain, were due to meet in Istanbul and a salvage operation for Chamoun seemed high on the agenda. The *New York Times* said editorially on July 14: "Today's meeting in Istanbul . . . has support for Lebanon as its first matter of concern." The day before the Beirut correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* had reported that the chances of a compromise settlement, under pressure from the Lebanese business interests, were brighter, but that Chamoun's supporters looked for "a rescue operation" from the Istanbul conference. H. A. R. Phulby wired the London *Sunday Times* on July 13 that Chamoun, disappointed in the West, was looking to Turkey and Iraq for help.¹³

Overturn in Iraq. The rescue of Chamoun, and of Nuri, the clever and aged fox who had ruled Iraq so long, seemed at hand, but Nuri knew not what he did. He ventured to move troops westward through Baghdad, presumably on the way to Lebanon. They were commanded by young Brigadier-General Kassem, and he was one of Iraq's educated sons. The day he graduated from military college, twenty years earlier, he had resolved that Iraq needed a revolution. Now his troops went to the Palace and shot King Feisal as he was leaving for Istanbul, and Nuri, after hiding in woman's clothing for a time, was also killed.

There was universal rejoicing in Iraq and consternation in the West. Prime Minister Macmillan had been less than lukewarm about sending troops to Lebanon, reminding Eisenhower that if the Suez intervention had not been stopped another would not be necessary, but he now agreed to send British

¹² Michael Ionides, a former member of the Iraq Development Board, *The Reporter*, August 7, 1958, pp. 14-15.

¹³ See also *I. F. Stone's Weekly*, July 28, 1958. As early as July 1, Drew Pearson reported in the *Nashville Tennessean* that in an emergency "Turkish-Iraqi troops would be flown in to battle the Arab rebels" in Lebanon.

troops to Jordan while the United States was rushing the Marines to Lebanon. Britain also considered intervention in Iraq, where her Embassy was sacked and burned.¹⁴

U.S. Intervention—for What? President Eisenhower consulted with senior members of Congress privately and assured them "with great positiveness" that the revolts had been "fomented by Arab leaders under the domination of Moscow." Having ascribed all evil to Moscow for so long, Dulles could not doubt that article of faith now. Nor could the Congress leaders deny that some bold stroke was necessary now to prevent the dominoes from falling all over the Middle East.¹⁵

At first there was also "strong consideration" of "military intervention to undo the coup in Iraq," but no one could be found in Iraq to collaborate with. Everybody was for the revolution. The quick success of the rebels was a shock. "The swift and apparently unarmoured downfall of a government allied with our side," said a veteran observer, "illustrated the impossibility for Arab leaders to openly profess friendship to the West."¹⁶

Other basic reasons for the revolt were summarized by a military observer, as follows: "The gulf between rich and poor was a standing incitement to revolt. The cost of living had soared. The students, the clerical and industrial workers, and the miserable sharecroppers on the land were all in dire want. Communism was rife. The hatred of Nuri and of the landowning Arab Sheikhs and Kurdish Aghas who made up his party was pathological. There were two other objects of universal execration: the 50/50 oil agreement made with the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1952; and the Baghdad Pact, signed in 1955 by Iraq, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Pakistan and Iran."¹⁷

The Lebanon landing gave satisfaction to many in Washington as a defiance of the Soviet Union and as evidence that the United States could take forceful action in spite of Russia's lead in long-range missiles. The defiance was plain. The *Nation* observed on August 2 that if Soviet forces had landed in Guatemala at the request of a "pro-Communist" government "to protect the 'independence and integrity' of Guatemala, the righteously hysterical reaction that would have been set off in this country need not be described." Yet Lebanon was no further from Russia than Guatemala was from Texas. We had indeed shown "a high degree of confidence in the calmness and sanity of Soviet leadership."

¹⁴ Drew Pearson, the *Nashville Tennessean*, July 1, 1958.

¹⁵ Arthur Krock, the *New York Times*, July 16, 1958. Two days later Lippmann explained once more the fundamental error of believing that all would be well in the Middle East if only the countries there could be "persuaded to join in a military alliance against the Soviet Union."

¹⁶ Marguerite Higgins, *New York Herald Tribune*, July 21, 1958. Jack Anderson wrote from Baghdad in mid-September that our Ambassador Gallman had received a message from the State Department advising him "that the U.S. Marines, starting to land in Lebanon might be used to aid loyal Iraqi troops to counter-attack." Two days before the revolt Gallman had called on Nuri to ask about sending Iraqi troops to aid the Lebanon Government and had been assured that the people would support such a move.

¹⁷ Lieut.-Gen. H. G. Martin, "A Decade of Cold War," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, March, 1959.

On July 16 Nasser warned the West that any blow at Iraq would be an attack on the UAR and he flew to Moscow, reportedly to urge Khrushchev not to take any precipitate action. Actually there was no reason for Russia to do so, since the U.S.A. had itself surrendered virtually all of the merit it had obtained in Arab and Asian minds during the Suez affair.

Defender of the Status Quo. It had "unmistakably come out against Arab nationalism" and in defense of the status quo in the Arab world.¹⁸ Yet this status quo was too precarious to last. There was growing evidence that the great bulk of the Arabs regarded it, truly, as a patchwork of states put together by the British and French after World War I to serve their own interests, and they regarded Arab unity as natural and meant to achieve it.

Yet the West forbade any Arab state to die. As editor Max Ascoli put it in *The Reporter* on August 7, "No political aggregate that has come to be called a nation can—so it seems—ever get rid of its independence and integrity, nor can it ever be relieved of the burden of sovereignty." Even the fact of having no economic or political viability, as in the case of Jordan, gave a state no exemption from nationhood. Ascoli thought this worship of the status quo amounted to a "maniacal conservatism."¹⁹ He did not add that this was the natural result of the Truman doctrine, which by forbidding any revolutions that might be alleged to be communist inspired had in effect forbidden all revolutions. Thus the United States found itself the austere opponent of all political change, on a planet that was alive with revolutionary change of several kinds.

Congressional Dissent. If the policies of Mr. Dulles, who had become the arch-Metternich of the twentieth century, spasmodically advanced the interests of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, from which it was utopian to try to exclude her, there was no one to say him nay. Representative Reuss, Democrat of Wisconsin, did manage to tell the House of Representatives that Eisenhower had promised to call a special session of Congress if a military application of the Eisenhower Doctrine were required, and he asked how much more was he required to consult Congress in the event of an intervention not required by the Eisenhower Doctrine?

At this point he was cut off by Speaker Rayburn, who thereafter would let members speak only if they supported the intervention.²⁰ In the Senate protest could not be stifled. Senator Fulbright arose promptly on July 16 to point out that we had been relying "on military pacts and doctrines without relation to the question whether the dangers involved were of a military nature or whether their solution was possible by military means." The result was that there were few of the newly independent countries of the world in which we had "an understanding of the motivations of the common man." We "dealt"

¹⁸ Geoffrey Barraclough, "The Anarchy of the Jungle," *The Nation*, August 2, 1958, pp. 44-7.

¹⁹ Ascoli demanded to know what our Marines were doing in Lebanon, "the jumping off place to nowhere." He thought it a case where "a show of strength was determined by impotence."

²⁰ *The New York Times*, July 16; *J. F. Stone's Weekly*, July 21, 1958.

with princes, potentates, big businessmen, and the entrenched, frequently corrupt representatives of the past." The result was that "People everywhere who aspire to the good life are unable to identify their desires with our policies." He added that unless our long-range policies could be adapted to the opinions of mankind they were doomed to continued failure.

Senator Hubert Humphrey, another penetrating critic of our foreign policy, characterized the Lebanon landing as "an act of desperation capping seven years in which we groped for a policy without ever succeeding in producing one." Since World War II U.S. policy had ignored or underestimated the two great political realities of the Middle East—the desires for neutrality and Arab unity. Toying with military pacts and aid we had "contributed to division rather than to unity and to economic anarchy rather than to economic co-operation." We had had "our eyes fixed not on the Middle East but on the Soviet Union, on whose back doorstep we were playing our dangerous game."²¹

In reality, James Reston noted on July 20, we had neither prevented Soviet penetration nor identified ourselves with the rise of Arab nationalism and unity. We could not save the situation, said Sulzberger on the 23rd, by seeking to preserve a status quo which never in fact existed. The Middle East was well along in the processes of a great ferment we could not stop. For the moment, he concluded, we held up "the remnants of a flimsy house of cards," but it seemed doomed someday to collapse.

Western Oil Empires Safeguarded. It seems likely that this eventuality was delayed by the U.S.-British interventions in 1958, which gave convincing evidence that the two powers were prepared to use force to rescue their great Arab oil holdings. Reston reported on July 21 that Dulles-Lloyd talks in Washington had resulted in an agreement for joint action in defense of Western economic interests in the Middle East. It would be made clear to Moscow and the Arabs that any action required would be taken to maintain oil supplies from Kuwait, so important to Britain, and from other areas.

This was a long-held Dulles principle. The memo of a private meeting of Dulles and oil executives had become public when Socony records were subpoenaed in which Dulles indicated that "nationalization of this kind of an asset (oil properties) impressed with international interest goes far beyond the compensation of shareholders alone and should call for international intervention." Apparently no Arab state could nationalize its oil and pay off the Western companies, however handsomely.²²

The financial stake was indeed enormous. Senator Hennings, of Missouri, estimated that the Middle-East oil cartel collected excess profits amounting to \$3 billion a year and Charles F. Edmundson thought that the doling out of the

²¹ Hubert H. Humphrey, "A Chronology of Failure," *The Reporter*, August 7, 1958. He proposed a settlement of the Arab-Israeli quarrel on the basis of resettling the million Arab refugees in Arab lands, a dynamic development program and the neutralization of the area.

²² Charles F. Edmundson, a former Assoc. Editor of *Fortune*, "Iraq's Explosive Oil," *The Nation*, August 2, 1958, pp. 50-2. When Dulles had been trying to prevent the United States from entering World War II against the Fascist powers, Germany, Italy and Japan, he had spoken feelingly against the "selfish and possessive attitude" of the Western democracies. Did the Almighty, he asked, "reward with iron, copper, oil and rubber those who adopt the democratic processes?" (pp. 51-2).

world's greatest oil supply at "administered prices" so high as to call for action by the U.S. Department of Justice clearly constituted "an unjustifiable tax on the wealth of the whole world."²³ Inside the Arab lands the Arab share of the oil wealth went into the hands of a few who squandered it in lavish expenditures, refusing to share even with the newly emerging middle classes. Bitterness was created between the oil-rich and oil-hungry Arab states, but this did not prevent most educated Arabs from aspiring to unity, oil and all, and from believing that the Western oil monopoly was the leading force standing in their way.²⁴

A UN Summit Conference. The Lebanon and Jordan landings at once created "a tremendous stir all around the world, a jockeying for positions, a shifting of forces."²⁵ Pakistan, Iran and Turkey approved of the interventions, the latter now finding herself almost entirely encircled by hostile or unfriendly states. This was an eventuality which neither Turkey nor Mr. Truman had envisaged when the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed. In the UN Sweden and other neutrals criticized the interventions and pro-West deputies in Lebanon opposed them. On the 18th the Soviet Union warned that it would not "remain indifferent to acts of unprovoked aggression in a region adjacent to its borders." Khrushchev demanded a summit conference on the Middle East. He proposed again discontinuing arms deliveries to the area and said the oil question should be solved on "an equitable and mutually profitable commercial basis." He proposed July 22 as a meeting date and would go anywhere, including Washington. This proposal received mounting support in Britain, but was received with extreme distaste in Washington, since it would be a recognition of Russia's right to a voice in the Middle East.

Instead, Dulles planned to fly to London to salvage the Baghdad Pact and on July 23 the President sent a harsh note to Khrushchev bidding him to go to the UN if he wanted a summit parley. The President had now agreed, said Reston, "to attend what he and his principal advisers profoundly and unanimously believe to be the wrong meeting at the wrong time and place on the wrong subject." The explanation was simple. "British public and parliamentary opinion forced the President's reluctant acquiescence." However, he noted, it would be possible to hold one brief meeting of the UN Security Council, with the heads of state sitting, and then let them adjourn to the privacy of the 30th floor.

This obvious solution was quickly shunned. "Shoved forward to a UN summit meeting with Premier Khrushchev by forces at home and abroad that it found politically irresistible," in Arthur Krock's words, the State Department made sure that Khrushchev would be cabined and confined by Security

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Two writers summarized our Mid-East policy as follows: "to keep Soviet influence from flowing in and the oil flowing out." This double-barrelled strategy led us into five illusions: that the ferment in the Middle East was caused by Khrushchev and Nasser, that it could be dominated by the old ruling classes, that it was ready for representative government, that it thought authoritarian government evil, and that it agreed with us that Soviet policy threatened personal liberty and independence.—Peggy and Pierre Streit, the *New York Times Magazine*, August 3, 1958.

²⁵ The *New York Times*, editorial, July 17, 1958.

Council procedure and the Western majority.²⁶ Yet the UN meeting already held had "provided a forum for Sweden's damaging attack on the applicability of Article 51 to Lebanon." No support for U.S. intervention could be found in any published UN document and such disapproving allies as Canada, Japan and Norway were now planning ways to "get the United States off the hook."²⁷

On July 28 Khrushchev objected bitterly to our UN summit plan, revealing himself to one editor as "a noisy fraud." Yet on the same day Edward Crankshaw wrote that Khrushchev's demand for a summit meeting was a cry for his own security. It was "as clear as can be that his enemies all but got him after the Polish rebellion and the Hungarian uprising in the autumn of 1956—on condition that he stop the rot." Now his enemies were vigilant at the first sign of Russia's strategic security being infringed, while Khrushchev had "set his heart on pushing through a series of immense projects and reforms at home," to make Russia great and prosperous. Accordingly he desperately wanted peace.²⁸

The Baghdad Pact Underwritten. In London Mr. Dulles put the United States into the Baghdad Pact, all by himself, in every sense except formally. He in effect guaranteed the groups then in power in Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. This seemed to the *New York Post* so basically immoral that recollections of Hungary came to mind. Dulles would consider embargoing arms shipments to all Mid-East states except these three, the ones whose arming by the United States had "caused real and profound fear in Moscow."²⁹ As a *New York Times* writer put it on July 31, Dulles had now made legal and written a tacit, moral commitment to defend a 3000 mile frontier of mountain and desert extending from the Turkish Caucasus to the Khyber Pass against both direct and indirect aggression.

"*Indirect Aggression.*" For the United States the task of containment had indeed become grim business. This was the more true since Mr. Dulles was intent on convicting the Soviet Union of "indirect aggression." This new term puzzled one Canadian radio commentator. What in the world could it mean? He concluded that it must cover the normal way in which any strong power seeks to extend its influence. From our point of view all Russian efforts along this line were sinful and ours looked sinful to them.

Lippmann also warned the President, on August 5, that he could not dominate the projected UN summit meeting with charges of indirect aggression. Panama would be sitting on the Council and he would be told about a successful American coup in Guatemala "to oust an anti-American and fellow-travelling government." He would be reminded further of our CIA coup in Iran, "when Mossadegh was pushed out," and over all of his denunciation

²⁶ *The New York Times*, July 31, 1958.

²⁷ Thomas J. Hamilton, *the New York Times*, July 27, 1958.

²⁸ *The Montreal Star*, July 28, 1958. Such considerations did not deter Mr. Dulles from sleeping with Stalin's books at his bedside, from which he extracted passages for the President's messages to prove the permanence of the Soviet threat.—Chalmers M. Roberts, *the Washington Post and Times-Herald*, July 30, 1958.

²⁹ Marquis Childs, *the New York Post*, July 31, 1958.

would hang the Dulles campaign for the liberation of Eastern Europe. Dulles was now demanding, Lippmann concluded, "that in the weapons of the cold war our adversaries shall disarm, and in effect acquiesce in their own military containment." He was "indulging in a legal daydream."

This phrase aptly described the maze in which our foreign policy had become entangled. Starting out in 1947 to forbid all revolutions that might be communist tainted, and all communist infiltration and meddling anywhere in the world, we now found ourselves justifying our own armed intervention in Lebanon and mourning the loss of Iraq on the ground that somebody must be guilty of "indirect aggression" or our friends could not be overthrown, as Chamoun was, peacefully, after our Marines were patrolling his capital for him. On July 31 General Chehab, the Army Chief who had held the Lebanese Army substantially neutral during the paralysis of Chamoun's rule, was elected President by a vote of 48 to 7, at the same time that the UN observer unit was making its final report saying that smuggling into Lebanon could not be "on anything more than a limited scale." The mission had "unimpeded access" to all of the frontier under command of the opposition leaders and "there was no proven case of persons coming in to fight."

On August 8 the *Wall Street Journal* suggested that the world was more likely to believe the UN version than the American and warned against getting involved too deeply in charges of "indirect aggression." The term was "imprecise and almost limitless" and so could cover almost anything one wished. It could also be "turned against us because it can have such an unlimited meaning to other people."

Nevertheless, President Eisenhower was set to inform Khrushchev at the UN summit sessions "that the Communist campaign of indirect aggression in the Middle East and elsewhere must be stopped if a major war is to be avoided." Reston had it "on the highest authority that this was the major reason" he agreed to meet Khrushchev.³⁰ Dulles had done his work well.

UN Summit Cancelled. However, the confrontation about the troubles in Lebanon and Iraq, with which Khrushchev had had nothing to do, did not take place. On August 4 he ended four days of talks with Mao in Peking during which it became plain that he could not sit in any UN summit meeting with Chiang Kai-shek or his representative in China's seat. Since it was also clear that he would be boxed in at such a meeting he refused to come. His message, received August 6, urged a special meeting of the UN General Assembly. The U.S. swiftly agreed and Washington was greatly relieved.

Yet on August 6 the *Washington Post* was not altogether comfortable about the outcome. It thought it possible that Khrushchev had decided that Dulles did not want to reach any sort of settlement, since he had "indicated in the past that he expected the Soviet regime to collapse and has implied that he was using the cold war to bring this about." His preparations to try the Soviet Union "in respect to Eastern Europe may have proved the point." And yet, "if the episode has led Mr. Khrushchev to believe that this country is unwilling to understand Soviet security concerns along its borders or to take

³⁰ *The New York Times*, August 3, 1958.

reasonable steps to reach a mutual accommodation to minimize the consequences of war, it would be a calamity."³¹

Two days later the means of extending nuclear war were greatly increased by the magnificent feat of the U.S. nuclear submarine *Nautilus* in "sailing" under the North Pole and 1830 miles of Arctic ice cap, emerging in North Russian waters. This fine achievement was thought to open the way to the nuclear missile destruction of Russia's deeply landlocked cities from the Arctic. It was not noted how close Winnipeg, Minneapolis, Chicago, Detroit and Toronto would soon be to Russian missile bombardment from Hudson's Bay—deep in North America.

On August 15 Senator John Kennedy of Massachusetts made an impassioned speech on our missile lag during 1960-1964 in which he saw "a peril more deadly than any war time danger that we have ever known." During the years of the gap our threats of massive retaliation would lose most of their impact and our exercises in brink of war diplomacy would be infinitely less successful. As a fundamental strategy approach he urged working for "a real peace—for a reduction of armaments, a reduction of tensions, and a reduction of the areas of dispute."³²

This statesmanlike proposal did not prevent Mr. Dulles on the 18th from affirming once more the success of his foreign policy. On the 9th he had sent out a 3000 word memorandum to his embassies around the world declaring that "The Administration will not be moved from its policy of non-recognition of the Chinese Communist Government," which was once more pronounced to be ephemeral. The charge of inflexibility was firmly denied. We could change our course if the Chinese changed their conduct. Flexibility, as one editor observed, appeared to be the capacity to remain frozen until someone else thawed.

Evacuation. On August 13 flexibility after the event was illustrated in the President's address to the Special UN General Assembly on the Middle East, proposing an admirable six point program for the Middle East, which soon fell into the background. Marquis Childs reported that many UN delegates said wistfully that if it had been put forward six years ago, or four, or even two, the current crisis might never have occurred. This was another way of saying, he added, that once a crisis is upon us, it is almost, by definition, too late for a program. The deterioration has gone too far, the hatreds have become too bitter.³³

Then on August 21 the Arab states produced a remarkable example of

³¹ On July 30 the *New York Post* reported that Dulles had predicted in London that Nasser might "not be around for long." Dulles' policy of predicting short lives for all regimes which opposed him, whether in the Middle East, the Soviet Union or China, may have been intended to breathe confidence into failing policies, but it is more likely that it reflected his inability to believe that any of his wicked adversaries could endure.

³² The publication of a Rand Corporation study which attempted to think out what the physical and moral results of a nuclear war would be caused an angry debate in the Senate on August 14, after which the Senate voted 80 to 2 a denunciation of the very idea of surrender in such a conflict. The study had not advocated surrender, and as one editor said, nobody could tell what could or should be done after a hundred million American casualties.

³³ *The Washington Post and Times-Herald*, August 20, 1958.

diplomatic agility by all agreeing upon a UN resolution promising to treat each other well and calling on the Secretary General to make practical arrangements to facilitate "early withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan." By November 7, 1958, all U.S. and British forces had been withdrawn.

Justification? A few weeks later Professor Quincy Wright examined the legality of the intervention from the standpoint of international law. He held that the United States, in sending its armed forces into Lebanon, would be "guilty of aggression unless it can prove that it acted or had sufficient reason to believe . . . that it acted in individual or collective self-defense," under authority of the United Nations, or on the invitation of Lebanon.

Wright could not find any justification for the intervention as an act of American self-defense. Under the UN Charter defensive action must be limited to the purpose of defense. It was not claimed that there was any authorization by the United Nations. On the ground of "collective self-defense" our action could be justified "only if the Lebanon was the victim of 'armed attack' from outside and if the *de jure* government, which requested such aid, was not so pressed by internal revolt that it was incapable of representing the state."

Examining the precedents at length, he found them strongly to the effect that a government gravely beset by internal revolt could not legally invoke armed aid from abroad. Uncertainty of the outcome was the test, a principle which the United States had been anxious to maintain through most of its history, from the period of the Monroe Doctrine through its own Civil War and through its insistence upon the right of self-determination of peoples during both world wars and in the United Nations.³⁴

On political grounds the *Wall Street Journal* (October 29, 1958) also found the Lebanon occupation inconsistent with our true rule in the world. It could be argued that the Mid-East had been stabilized and Nasser checkmated. On the other hand, the United States had moved into a situation that had all the earmarks of local political conflict. Communism was not an issue and there was no evidence of any Soviet plot in Iraq. The step had been taken with apparent lack of due reflection, as an on-the-spur-of-the-moment, last resort move. But most important for the future, the editor concluded, is the fact that the intervention was not welcomed by many in Lebanon and certainly not by many others elsewhere in the Mid-East. To have intervened in these circumstances was "hardly required by whatever world responsibilities have devolved upon this country. Indeed it is something out of key with American traditions and with the world's traditional view of America's role."

Eric Johnston, who had labored long to alleviate the Arab-Israeli dispute, identified the trouble as a failure of our leadership to recognize the explosive force of Arab nationalism or the surging revolutionary tide that had been sweeping the world for the last fifty years. Seldom, he said, "have so many men with so much power been so far behind the times. They have failed to recognize

³⁴ Quincy Wright, "United States Intervention in the Lebanon," *the American Journal of International Law*, January, 1959, pp. 112-25.

that any solution in the Middle East must deal squarely with this revolt against imperialism, against feudalism, and against human misery. Those who deal with the Middle East must go with this tide or be overwhelmed by it."³⁵

A year later it appeared that King Hussein's shaky throne in Jordan had been stabilized, on the basis of perpetual subventions from the American treasury. But this was hardly recompense for the shock the world received from the sudden thrust of American forces into an area half way around the world.

QUEMOY II

Two months before the final American evacuation of Lebanon our ships, planes and men were speeding to the Far East to preserve Chiang Kai-shek's blockade of the central coast of China, from the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

This blockade had been established in force mainly because of the determination of Dulles, Robertson, the China Lobby and others to encircle the Red Chinese firmly. It was, however, partly due to a historic hoax arranged by Chiang's troops to force the American signature of our "mutual" security treaty with Chiang in December 1954.

The story was told in 1958 by Brig.-Gen. Thomas R. Phillips (Ret.), the responsible military analyst of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, as follows: After the start of the Communist propaganda drive for the liberation of the off-shore islands two landing ships were set up as a dock on Quemoy by the Nationalists, within sight and easy range of Quemoy. "Naturally they bombarded it." This action was then presented as evidence of impending invasion and "Mr. Dulles, who was at the SEATO Conference in Manila at the time, hastened to Formosa and agreed to the mutual security treaty the Nationalists had long been angling for."³⁶

After the first Quemoy crisis in 1955 Chiang had occupied the off-shore islands in great force. Joseph Alsop and others who had been to Formosa asserted many times that Chiang had been "brutally pressured" by the American Government to move his troops to the islands.³⁷ Dulles denied this at his press conference on September 9, 1958, but he added that "it is a different thing again" from saying "that we did not actively oppose it."

Chiang's Blockade of the Central China Coast. In any event, Chiang made good use of his American support to harass the mainland. From the heavily fortified islands his forces shelled mainland posts and harried mainland shipping, interfered with the use of coastwise sea lanes and bottled up the big ports of Amoy and Foochow to Chinese shipping. This denied China the use of her seaports covering a thousand miles of her central coast. Commando raiders also went from Quemoy and the Matsus to points on the mainland, assisting anti-communists to escape and delivering radio equipment to agents.

³⁵ Eric Johnston, "Formula for a Mid-East Settlement," the *New York Times Magazine*, August 10, 1958.

³⁶ Thomas R. Phillips, "The Military Worth of Quemoy," *The Reporter*, October 2, 1958, p. 15.

³⁷ *The Washington Post*, August 20, 1958.

this would carry the day because to one possessed of the President's high moral conviction the argument that aggression cannot be sanctioned no matter where it occurs would be a clincher."⁴⁰

Chalmers M. Roberts thought that this amounted to psychological warfare on the President. He gained the impression from several key government departments that the President was less willing to go to Chiang's aid than Dulles and his pro-Chiang aides.⁴¹ As the *New York Herald Tribune* put it editorially, on September 8, Dulles got the President's assent to an eight-point statement. Then he orally "closed the loopholes and annulled the escape clauses." The "figure of Foster Dulles clearly dominated and towered above the whole process by which the die was cast."

Rising Protest. There had been remarkable silence and acquiescence on the part of the people and their leaders about the Lebanon brink in which Dulles played the leading role. On August 31 James Reston marvelled at the way Dulles had committed the United States to defend nations right up against the southern border of the Soviet Union "without a word of protest from anybody." Even the sending of the Marines to Lebanon had produced little complaint. Other commentators were impressed by the way the power and influence of the Congress over foreign affairs had declined after it abdicated even its responsibility to declare war in the Formosa and Eisenhower Doctrine resolutions. Virtually all power was now in the hands of the Executive, that is, in Mr. Dulles. He had become the state almost to the same degree that Adenauer had in Germany and de Gaulle in France.

Yet Dulles' meteoric flight from the Mid-East brink to the Far East jumping-off place did lead at last to the beginning of revolt against a policy of brinkmanship and sudden action that apparently had no end and that must finally result in our falling over the edge of some abyss, quite probably

⁴⁰ The *Washington Post*, September 19, 1958. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had all been opposed to Chiang putting so large a part of his forces on the off-shore isles, but their view was largely nullified by Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the JCS, who had expressed the view privately "that the Chinese Communists must be brought down even if this should take a war of fifty years duration."

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, September 5, 1958.

On October 4, 1958, C. L. Sulzberger explained how Walter Robertson, an extreme advocate of Chiang and opponent of Chinese Communism, had been put in charge of Far Eastern affairs in the State Department for six critical years.

In May 1952, when Dulles met Eisenhower for the first time in Paris, he worked to rectify the General's lack of concern about the Orient. "By then Dulles had been convinced by Admiral Radford that our Pacific position should be based on a military posture of massive retaliation."

Dulles had in effect already joined the China Lobby, but when he came to be confirmed by the Senate as Secretary of State "Republican legislators of the Know-Nothing faction" inquired if he still favored Peking's entry into the UN, as he had earlier. To make sure of his confirmation Dulles then "promised to give favorable consideration to any candidate his questioners might recommend as Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Far Eastern Affairs. The choice of Walter Robertson resulted."—*The New York Times*, October 4, 1958.

Since Robertson was practically as strong-minded as Dulles himself, and since Dulles was firmly resolved not to have the opposition of the Republican wild men in the Congress, Dulles was thereafter chained to an intransigent warlike posture in the Far East, even if his own urge had not now been in the same direction.

in defense of an inconsequential outpost to which we had no moral or legal claim.

"Who are we," demanded James P. Warburg on September 5, 1958, "to decide for all humanity that the risk of extinction is preferable to letting the Chinese Communists take over two little groups of islands to which we ourselves have not the shadow of legal or moral right?" On the same day *Pravda* said that any attack on Red China would cause the Soviet Union to provide Peking with "assistance by all available means" and on September 6 Premier Chou En-lai declared China's right to liberate Formosa "sacred and inviolable." He was ready to resume the suspended ambassadorial talks with the U.S.A., but the Sino-American dispute and the liberation of Formosa were two different matters. The United States at once welcomed the idea of resuming the stalemated talks.

On the same day Senator Theodore F. Green, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, denied that there was any link between Quemoy and Formosa, and Senator Fulbright doubted the advisability of retaining the off-shore isles. It was "a great tragedy to be in a position of going to war over Quemoy." Writing of "drifting and dreaming on the Potomac," Reston asked if it was our policy to get involved in war by means and at places of Chiang Kai-shek's choosing? Was U.S. power in balance with its commitments? Was it "reasonable to suppose that the United States can go on, without war, claiming the right under the Monroe Doctrine to keep the Communists out of the whole Western Hemisphere, and at the same time insist that Moscow should keep out of the Middle East and Peiping away from Quemoy?" Did our China policy have to remain a plaything of domestic politics? Or did "we have to fight 600,000,000 Chinese to demonstrate that the Republicans are tougher on the Communists than the Democrats?"⁴²

These searching questions revealed the falsity and absurdity of our cold war effort to play God to the world. The Democrats had begun this cosmic undertaking in the Mediterranean, but the Republicans had insisted on improving the role, all around the globe but especially in the Far East. The Democrats had been unaware of the limitations of our power and complacent about regulating the affairs and influence of other great powers close up to their borders in a way that we would never have dreamed of submitting to. The Republican cold warriors under Dulles had elevated containment and encirclement of the Communist world into a natural right and a self-righteous service to humanity.

Acheson's Demerol. The extent to which our rulers had assumed this omnipotent duty was brought out sharply on September 7 by Dean Acheson, who had helped to inaugurate containment but did want to keep it within

⁴² In the *New York Post* on September 8 Max Lerner wrote that "President Eisenhower has shown again, as in the Middle East, the triple pattern of American foreign policy: the inaction and drift which lead to an impasse; then the swift military moves that carry with them the panic fear of war; and finally the eager clutching for any bush or shrub that will rescue us from tumbling over the brink, and give us the chance to negotiate inside or outside the UN."

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some limits. In a press release analyzing the eight-point statement to which Dulles had secured Eisenhower's assent in Newport, Acheson said that we seemed to be "drifting either dazed or indifferent, toward war with China, a war without friends or allies, and over issues which the Administration has not presented to the people, and which are not worth a single American life." Apparently, too, the President and Secretary Dulles would make the decisions for us, surrounded by secrecy designed to keep everyone guessing.

Acheson then proceeded to demolish the eight points of the Newport statement. It was an irrelevant legal point to say that the Communist Chinese Government had never held the off-shore islands. The cloudy question of whether we had any legal right to defend the islands was also subordinate to a plain question of common sense. The claim that the seizure of the off-shore islands by the Reds would be a seizure of new territory and therefore a violation of the principles on which world order was based was a perversion of simple words. No principles of world order were involved. The decision seemed to be "to defend Quemoy even though it leads to world war."

What justified this horrendous decision, Acheson asked? Congress had been led to say that it was essential to our vital interests to have Formosa in friendly hands, but Congress could not "make something true which is not true. Four times between 1948 and 1950 our highest military authorities had concluded that this proposition was not true and did not justify American military action."

The immediate issue, whether Quemoy was vital to the defense of Formosa, was not frankly faced. Our government had most unwisely maneuvered itself, with the help of Chiang-Kai-shek, into a situation in which it had lost control and its attitude was that "nothing will be done to extricate ourselves from this position during periods of quiet, and that nothing can be done about it in times of crisis. This is an attitude which ought not to be tolerated."

The Wickedness of Communist Force. Acheson's conclusion was unassailable, but it had no effect upon Mr. Dulles, who always invented a high moral pedestal for every emergency. This time it was the wickedness of using force. He had created conditions in the Formosa Strait which left the Chinese no other possible recourse than force, in circumstances that no people could tolerate if it could get hold of the necessary force. Then he talked piously about the impropriety of their using force. It was quite proper for him to use force, or the threat of it, to counter either the use of force by anyone else or "indirect aggression," real or fancied, against any of his protégés. Any use of force with a revolutionary purpose was wrong; any use of force for counter-revolutionary reasons, as in the case of Formosa or Iraq, was right if American forces could get there fast enough.

This, too, was in a time when United States forces were strongly committed to nuclear weapons. Our B-47 bombers were unable to deliver any other kind and the B-57 and B-66 bombers were designed with nuclear weapons almost exclusively in mind, in accord with the President's formal directive to the JCS "subsequently confirmed and elaborated on other occasions authorizing them to fight only nuclear wars." Consequently, said Alsop, "The policy makers

have painted the United States into a fantastic corner, in which we have to choose between joining in the defense of these wretched little off-shore islands, or suffering incalculable further losses all over the world."⁴³

The Righteousness of War for Quemoy. On September 11 the President made an address to the nation to explain why we must remain in this corner. It was built on the appeasement analogy, going into pre-Munich history in great detail and restating the domino doctrine in extreme form. The shelling of the off-shore islands was part of an "ambitious plan of armed conquest" which would "liquidate all of the free world positions in the Western Pacific area and bring them under captive governments which would be hostile to the United States and the free world. Thus the Chinese and Russian Communists would come to dominate at least the Western half of the now friendly Pacific ocean."⁴⁴ It appeared to be a natural right of the United States to control all of the Pacific Ocean, against the great peoples living on the other side.

The editor of the *New York Post* saw the face of Eisenhower on the television screen but heard the voice of Dulles. "As on so many earlier occasions, the President's instinctive warmth of spirit was fatally diluted by the cold legalism of John Foster Dulles," whose point was made strongly that principle compelled the use of the armed might of the United States to frustrate any use of force by Communists.

The *Louisville Courier-Journal* thought, on September 13, that the President's listeners could have gained little enlightenment and less reassurance from the address. It was a biased account of the problem which did not say where these islands were, or how they had been fortified to shell the mainland and harry shipping. He said: "These islands have always belonged to Free China," meaning Formosa which had no claim to them. "After his long statement of a twisted position he finally conceded that negotiation can settle many things, but he was thinking of a resumption of the futile bi-lateral talks, not submitting the issue to the UN," which would probably leave us standing alone in our opposition. Besides, if the islands were links in a chain of defense positions from Japan to Malaya, which we must maintain, as the President insisted, what was there to negotiate about? Doubtless the President had to speak as Dulles' voice, but it was "a tragic pity that we chose this address to spread across the world in forty languages."

The extent to which our policy stood righteously upon its head was illustrated by Reston's comment on August 14 that the President had joined the cry that "if you were in favor of fighting Communist China to keep Quemoy and Matsu out of Communist hands, you were for peace, freedom, justice and world order. But if you were not you were an appeaser."

"Only in an upside down world," an official statement said, "could it be

⁴³ The *Washington Evening Bulletin*, September 10, 1958. A few days later Alsop added that Pentagon thinking about the Quemoy conflict was dominated by the conviction that our nuclear striking power was still superior but that 80 per cent of it would be lost or crippled if our allies denied us the use of their overseas bases. Accordingly, there were strong indications that certain key figures in the armed services were "not averse to having a nuclear showdown now."—The *Nashville Tennessean*, September 14, 1958.

⁴⁴ James Reston, the *New York Times*, September 12, 1958.

argued that it is aggression when the United States cooperated with a friendly foreign government for purposes of its own defense." This statement, said Lewis Mumford, was both hypocritical and false. The friendly government of the so-called Chinese Nationalists was not a government at all, but a displaced army. Meanwhile Formosa served as a base for American nuclear forces openly threatening the Chinese mainland. To back up the fantastic bipartisan policy, the President had taken refuge in the notion that "our position is an innocent—almost a holy—one, committed to law, devoid of possible offense, while that of the Chinese Communists is purely unreasonable and aggressive: so that if a catastrophe results they alone will bear the blame."⁴⁵

On September 19 Lippmann commented on the strange order to our Seventh Fleet to escort Chiang's ships up to the three-mile limit at Quemoy. This implied that the island lay in the territorial waters of China, which we did not mean to invade, and made complete nonsense of our legal position, disclosing an alarming confusion of minds. If Quemoy belonged to Chiang then the waters within the three-mile limit also belonged to him.

At this juncture Khrushchev poured boiling oil on the troubled diplomatic waters by sending a note to the President, released September 19, which was returned as abusive. It said that U.S. forces faced expulsion from Formosa unless withdrawn at once. One of his paragraphs most objected to was the statement that "There is only one government in China. It is the Government of the People's Republic of China. To fail to see this means to base one's actions on illusions which cannot, certainly, serve as a basis for any nation's foreign policy."⁴⁶

Strong Editorial Dissent. At the opening of the UN General Assembly on September 18, Dulles spoke in a subdued tone, but the *Washington Post* thought he was again inviting invidious comparisons by seeking to make the issue solely the use of "force," when he was championing a regime with an avowed purpose of overthrowing by armed force the government on the mainland. He had also repeated "the canard" that the Communists had never exercised control over the off-shore islands. Referring to his success in postponing once more the seating of China in the UN, the *Post* deplored the "ugly and not very subtle pressure" applied to various countries, including members of the Commonwealth, to force them to vote against China's admission. Our allies saw in American policy toward Communist China "a repetition of all the mistakes made in policy toward Russia after World War I." They saw in the martyrization of China "the creation of a false attraction and the strengthening of an unnatural Chinese tie with the Soviet Union."

By this time the belief was general that Quemoy could not be supplied indefinitely against the Chinese bombardment, and Chiang was urging the United States to back him in an air attack on the Red guns, that is, said Lippmann on September 23, he wanted us to finish what he began. In other words, he wanted to begin World War III, which offered his only hope of returning to the mainland.

The enormity of the predicament in which the American people found

⁴⁵ *The New York Times*, September 28, 1958.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, September 21, 1958.

themselves now began to be felt, and the preposterous nature of the entanglement with Chiang in which they were caught. Even the *New York Times* departed from its steadfast support of the Cold War and republished on September 26 an editorial of April 3, 1955, which dismissed the strategic value of the off-shore isles and challenged the sacred domino theory. It was "hard to believe that Communism would immediately sweep still free areas of South East Asia if we told Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that he had better draw in his lines a little." Retention risked a big war fought without allies, bombing attacks on the mainland and the alienation of the multitudinous millions of Asia. The *Wall Street Journal* deplored, on August 20 and 26, 1958, that the United States under both the Republicans and Democrats considered it "our duty to be the fixer for the world." No land was so remote or island so small for us to find ourselves some morning with the responsibility for being its keeper. John S. Knight, publisher of the Knight newspapers, declared on September 12 that the defense of Quemoy and Matsu by United States forces would be "an act of monumental madness."

Democratic Warnings. On October 1, Senator Green, the venerable Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote to the President expressing deep concern about the decision to defend Quemoy and Matsu. The Administration was in an untenable position when "you can count on the fingers of one hand those countries which sincerely supported United States policy regarding China." In reply the President cut him down in true Dullesian style, as no Chairman of the Senate FRC had been treated in decades. Green had apparently committed the unpardonable sin of suggesting that if war came on this issue it would not be well supported by the American people. A little later Dulles invited Green to his home in an effort to repair the break, but did not succeed. No mention was made of the great political capital the Republicans had made out of "Truman's War" in Korea.⁴⁷

Nevertheless, other Democrats began to overcome their reluctance to say anything which might be criticized if war came. On October 12, 1958, the Democratic Advisory Council declared that the party should no longer remain silent. The Administration had "led us to the brink of isolation from our allies and to the brink of having to fight a nuclear war inadequately prepared and alone." All 24 members of the Council approved the statement, which sought to "secure to the people on Formosa the right to determine their own future." Two days later Eleanor Roosevelt said that the United States must "come to terms" with the Soviet Union and China. Otherwise there would be an arms race that could end in the destruction of civilization.

By this time the people were also speaking out. In answer to press questions, an official of the State Department admitted, on September 27, that 80 per cent of the rising flow of letters to the Department criticized the decision to help the Nationalists retain the off-shore islands. About 3000 letters had been received in the week after the President's television speech and this volume still continued. This revelation brought a blast of condemnation of the official from Nixon and public reproval from Dulles, who declared that policy makers

⁴⁷ The *New York Times*, October 1, 12; the *Washington Post*, October 5, 19, 1958.

always had to judge whether public opinion was "sound." Public opinion could not be allowed to dictate foreign policy.⁴⁸

However, other reporters found that Congressional mail was running as heavily against fighting for Quemoy, and the next day a Gallup poll showed that nine out of every ten who expressed familiarity with the problem would like to see the UN take over the off-shore islands. Sixty-one per cent believed Formosa should be neutralized under the UN. Only 19 per cent were opposed to trusteeship.

All of the efforts of the President and Dulles to rally public opinion behind fighting for Quemoy had failed. In the *New York Post*, on October 1, William V. Shannon described the reaction to a final effort which Dulles made late in September as "deadly." Both abroad and at home almost no one approved. Especially important too, were the worries expressed to the President by the high unofficial Republicans who had his ear. This was the main force which had turned him away from war in the Formosa Strait in 1955 and towards the Geneva summit.

The effort to put across a policy of challenging China and the Soviet Union to a nuclear world war over a miniscule island in a Chinese harbor had failed. Nobody could believe that this last Dullesian brink made any sense.

Chiang Released? Some retreat from the final precipice was necessary and on September 30 Dulles publicly disassociated himself in a press conference from Chiang's drive to use Quemoy as a jumping off place for conquering China. It had been "rather foolish" to put such large forces there in the first place. He admitted that he had "acquiesced" in this foolishness, but not that he had directed it. It would "not be wise" to keep them there if a reasonably dependable cease-fire could be arranged. The return of the Nationalists to the mainland was "highly hypothetical." If revolution came it would be "hypothetical and problematical" as to whether Chiang could return. Such a revolution would "probably be primarily under local auspices and local leadership." In any event the United States had "no commitment of any kind" to help the Nationalists return.

This final releasing of Chiang and renunciation of the great myth of the China Lobby produced a stricken cry of disbelief in Taipei. Chiang was "incredulous." What Mr. Dulles "is quoted as saying seems completely incompatible with our stand and does not sound like him." Obviously puzzled, he could not "tell right away whether Mr. Dulles has made the remarks attributed to him for diplomatic reasons or with other purposes in mind," but there would be no troop cut on Quemoy.⁴⁹

The next day Dulles sent Chiang a message assuring him that our policy had not changed and Nixon denied that it had. But Sulzberger saw the acknowledged failure of Dulles' three-pronged strategy first stated in 1955, of aiming South Korea, Formosa and SEATO at China.⁵⁰

Dulles' disavowal of Chiang's return was quickly followed by a Red

⁴⁸ The Church Peace Union financed and distributed a book by Ernest Lefever which argued that the State Department must be free of public opinion pressures, even from the Churches.—*Ethics and Foreign Policy*, New York, 1957.

⁴⁹ The *New York Times*, October 2, 1958.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, October 6, 1958.

Chinese offer of a temporary cease-fire and this merged by degrees into a strange offer to shell Quemoy only on alternate days. This was really an acknowledgement of military defeat in the Quemoy affair. On September 30 Dulles acknowledged that deadly side-winder air-to-air missiles had been supplied to the Nationalists and this was borne out by several humiliating defeats suffered by the Red air force, with losses of planes running as high as 15 to 1 against them. A hundred thousand tons of shells had also done little damage on the main Quemoy island. The beaches had been successfully interdicted for some weeks, and this had led to a general conviction that the island must fall, but American logistical support had overcome that difficulty.

It developed that in the ambassadorial talks with China in Warsaw the Chinese would not even discuss Quemoy, insisting that this was purely a domestic question. Dulles then declared, on October 14, that he saw no use in bargaining over the size of the off-shore garrisons, as of course there was not since reducing them would not solve the problem. He wouldn't urge Chiang to reduce them and the next day the President said that the United States would not force troop cuts at Quemoy. "He seemed to wish to say as little as possible about the question."⁵¹

The Status Quo to Continue. Thus the status quo remained undisturbed. The old cycle of doing nothing between Quemoy crises was re-established. The policy of closely encircling the aroused Chinese giant continued. Quemoy would remain just what President Eisenhower had honestly said it was, "a thorn in the side of peace." The Chinese did not have the modern weapons which were necessary to take Quemoy, let alone Formosa, and throughout the succeeding year Khrushchev steadfastly refused to give them the deadly weapons which were essential to balance those supplied to Chiang by the Americans.⁵² But some day the Chinese would get the weapons, even if they had to develop their own nuclear arsenal. The American "victory" in Quemoy II had bought time, at a very heavy expense in money for the Americans and in nervous strain for most of the world.

Dulles went to Formosa to persuade Chiang to renounce invasion of the mainland and appeared to have succeeded, unless a revolt occurred there, but the Nationalist Ambassador to the United States, George Yeh, declared that as long as the Communists fired at the islands there was no use talking about thinning the forces on them. There was indeed a high probability that the every-other-day cease-fire policy of Peking was expressly designed to keep the United States firmly caught in the Quemoy trap, where virtually all the world regarded her as being obviously in the wrong. It was a total miscalculation, said Peking's Foreign Minister Chen Yi, to think that China would exchange Formosa for a seat in the UN. Trusteeship, de-militarization and UN mediation were all unacceptable.⁵³

It is to be remembered also that all Quemoy crises sharply raise Chinese production.

⁵¹ Dana Adams Schmidt, the *New York Times*, October 16, 1958.

⁵² C. L. Sulzberger, the *New York Times*, November 21, 1959.

⁵³ Gerald Clark, the *Montreal Star*, November 2, 1958.

Republican Debacle. In the early November elections of 1958 the Republicans suffered a smashing defeat. The Democrats, already controlling both houses of Congress, greatly increased their strength, adding 13 seats in the Senate, 45 in the House and taking Republican strongholds everywhere. On November 6 the Republican *Wall Street Journal* declared that there was no use mincing words. This was a debacle on a national scale and it ascribed the responsibility to instability of policies, both domestic and foreign. The *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* thought that "the greatest discontent of 1958 focuses on the conduct of foreign policy by John Foster Dulles." Max Freedman wrote to the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* on October 16 that in the campaign the Republicans "have seen the Quemoy crisis produce a withering arraignment of the wisdom and flexibility of Mr. Dulles' conduct of the crisis." But in the face of political disaster Dulles was calm. He foresaw amity in dealing with the Democrats and was not worried at all. He did not think that any of them who had stature were going to introduce "partisanship" into foreign policy.⁵⁴

Nevertheless, the 1958 election greatly changed the face of the Congress and removed one important impediment to a more workable foreign policy. It virtually completed the elimination from the Senate of the Republican class of 1946, the bitter men who had been elected on platforms charging the Democrats with softness toward Communism and with "Twenty Years of Treason." After November 1958 Senators Knowland, Bricker, Jenner, Malone and McCarthy and others were gone. New men came in who were more interested in living than in dying in an anti-Communist holocaust.

Everywhere the strain of interminable war and of constantly advancing toward some brink of disaster was becoming intolerable. Top public opinion surveyor, Samuel Lubell, canvassed widely during the 1958 campaign and reported that "One finds a deep uneasiness . . . an anxiety over impending disaster, a sense that as a nation we are beset by problems which are slipping beyond our control . . . the deepest concerns are voiced over the trend of events abroad."⁵⁵

Successive Gallup polls, on October 20 and November 16, also showed that keeping the peace was the most important issue in the public mind, above integration, unemployment or any other issue.

National Fear of Impending Disaster. A statement by ten leading members of the Columbia University Faculty on October 12, 1958, warned that "The vigor and development of the Communist states of China and Russia are hard facts of the contemporary world. Before the United States resigns itself to the ultimate necessity of a mutual war of destruction, the Government must exhaust the possibilities of living with them, vigilantly but realistically." Four days later the *New York Times* carried a statement signed by Clarence Pickett, Eleanor Roosevelt, and 43 other leading citizens which declared:

⁵⁴ To this Norman Boardman replied that "The success or failure of a foreign policy is a life-and-death matter for multitudes of people. To say that foreign policy must be bipartisan is only another way of saying that one's vote means nothing, that democracy is gone, that the people are no longer free to determine their own destiny."—*The New York Times*, November 20, 1958.

⁵⁵ *New York World Telegram*, September 30, 1958.

"For twelve years the United States, under administrations of both political parties, has followed a policy of cold war. This policy has carried us time and again to the edge of disaster. . . .

"Communism has not been contained. Democracy has not been extended. A position of strength has not been achieved. . . .

"We are unwilling to remain, along with the Russians and the Chinese, captives of cold war. . . .

"Therefore, we urge that the Government and the people of the United States, through every possible means, enter into a discussion and a re-consideration of our entire foreign policy."

This was the point which Senator Fulbright had made in the Senate on August 8, when he said: "We should put off no longer a complete reconsideration and reorientation of our foreign policy. We have already waited far too long. Time and again we have put things off. Time and again we have drifted until circumstances reached an intolerable state, and then we rushed to the brink."

In a great address in the Senate on June 20, Fulbright contrasted the stubborn and rigid prosecution of the Cold War by Dulles with the realistic flexibility of Soviet policy and with the world's crying need for peace. We seemed to operate on the theory that serious negotiation could take place only if we were safely ahead in the arms race, but would we "ever feel ourselves sufficiently ahead to negotiate?" Our leaders knew "that the world skirts the brink of disaster," indeed some had boasted of carrying it to that point. Administratively we were "organized to brand Soviet proposals as propaganda within the hour," but not "to explore the feasibility of new proposals or to analyze old proposals in the light of the power orientation of recent years which may give them new meaning." The terrible alternative before us required "a vigorous unrelenting search for alternatives to destruction," regardless of who originated or proposed them.

Attacking the central cold war dogma that the Soviet Union planned world domination and that Soviet deeds required us to practise adamancy, Fulbright reminded us:

"that Russian policy is not only what happened in Hungary. If it were only a question of a policy of military oppression, we would have, in my opinion, a much more easily defeated adversary. But Russian policy is also the military withdrawal from Finland; it is the Soviet signature of the Austrian Peace Treaty and subsequent military withdrawal from that country; it is also Russian acquiescence in the recent modifications in Polish communism; it is political support of the non-communist nationalist movements in Asia and Africa and economic aid to the countries of these regions. It is, most of all, an almost continuous propaganda refrain calling for action to reduce the danger of nuclear warfare, coupled with proposals for a great variety of approaches to this fundamental international problem."

Therefore it was "not enough to dismiss these actions simply by saying that the Soviet Union's ultimate aim is the totalitarian domination of the world,

that past Russian actions prove it, and that anything the Russians now do is for the same purpose."

Are we, Fulbright asked, "destined to see the gradual sinking of the prestige of this nation, the steady dimming of its message to mankind because we go round and round in the same policies, because we have not the flexibility, the imagination, or the national determination to break this inertia, move out of this orbit into new directions? Are we to see this nation decline or, perhaps, even the explosion of all civilization in some cataclysmic accident?" The danger of continued drifting from one containment brink to another was stressed also by Lippmann on August 14. Among the leading minds and spirits of the country there existed "a sense of foreboding that much of the post-war structure of our policy is undermined and that we are in grave danger of losing control over our affairs." One more spectacular entanglement and embarrassment could "provoke so serious a public reaction that it might be impossible to correct our errors and agree upon a rational and coherent policy." The attempt to contain the enormous revolutionary movement of the post-war period by military means had led us to make a series of commitments which could not be fulfilled without "inordinate and incalculable risk."

As Schmidt put it, on August 12 and 17, many critics had "a deep seated sense of uneasiness that United States foreign policy is somehow missing the point." Many were alarmed that our negative approach blinded our policy makers to the genuineness of Soviet fears of aggression "and consequently to the real Soviet interest in solving certain problems." Telling how the balance in the UN was shifting against the United States, Thomas J. Hamilton spoke of the general weariness with the Cold War and the growing desire among our allies for settlements with the Soviets. There was, said a Washington observer, "in both Europe and America, among all the peoples of the Allied nations, a deeper yearning and more insistent demand for peace and an end of tension than at any time since 1945."⁵⁶

Oblivious that the leadership of the Soviets in the means of delivering nuclear weapons had made their containment into a constant threat of death to our allies in Europe, official Washington ground on in the old groove, unable to see, as Drew Middleton put it on October 19, that our allies now had to ask themselves whether cooperation in the alliance in a crisis might not "condemn old and famous cities and even states to death. Membership in an alliance that might be able to keep Soviet troops out of the homeland in the event of war is one thing. Membership that invites destruction is another."

Pursuing the mirage of armed containment of half the world after this giant gamble had long been lost, our leaders had so lost touch with reality that one of Washington's best newsmen could say: "It takes only an hour to fly to the United Nations from Washington, but one needs a sort of mental decompression chamber to adjust to the change in atmosphere, it is so great."⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Roger Hilsman, Deputy Director of Research, The Library of Congress, *Social Science*, October 1958, p. 192.

⁵⁷ Chalmers M. Roberts, the *Washington Post*, September 21, 1958.

The Dulles Era Ending. The end of the Dulles era was at hand. He had led the hosts of containment as valiantly as a man could. As a combination Bismarck-Metternich he bestrode the earth like a colossus, making alliances with all and sundry, ringing in the Communists with armed force on every mile of their frontiers. All that they might do was sternly and righteously forbidden—armed aggression, the use of "force," infiltration and every kind of "indirect aggression."

He flew about the world so many times that people lost count, regulating its affairs on the spot, automatically downgrading his diplomats, and as he went a stream of messages flowed back to Washington from his planes directing matters there. When he returned he needed little help from the State Department, and from the President only his acquiescence. He moved majestically through "rollback," "massive retaliation," the unleashing and releasing of Chiang, and a succession of self-celebrated brinks of war, believing firmly that it was indispensable to stand on the brink as often as necessary. He could not fail, for his cause was just, and if his adversaries seemed too difficult he simply predicted their disappearance. Even the Republican disaster of 1958 did not phase him. No one would dare to practise non-cooperation with him.

His massive figure towered so high that in November 1958 few suspected that his resources were about exhausted. Yet in reality the peoples everywhere, including his own, were becoming desperately weary of the war that never ended and that apparently could never end, short of nuclear disaster that would engulf them all, and which could happen at any minute. Mr. Dulles had been defeated by the will of the peoples to live, by the continued upsurge of the communist peoples he sought to confine, by his clinging to obviously untenable outposts at the recurrent risk of a world conflagration, and by his defense of the status quo lest any change in it might be Red. Fearing the dominoes of disaster, he created them in each crisis where they would not have existed, but a world in the grip of great social and technical revolution could no longer be held in the vise of containment.

Toward Recognizing Reality. The beginning of a new period of American adaptation to a changing world was signalled by a notable Fifth World Order Study Conference of 600 delegates from nearly all of the Protestant and Orthodox denominations in the United States. It met in Cleveland, Ohio, in the week beginning November 18 and heard an address from Mr. Dulles on "Principles and Policies in a Changing World." The occasion was notable because Dulles had been the leader of these great conferences before he became Secretary of State. Indeed it was this forum which first presented him to the American people as an outstanding Christian statesman.⁵⁸

In his address Dulles listed five areas of change: from colonialism to independence, the probing of the frozen ends of the earth, the development of atomic energy, the exploration of outer space and the growth of "international communism," which he mentioned several times as though it were an organic entity. He admitted that Soviet Communism was evolving in the direction

⁵⁸ The author was a delegate at the Cleveland conference.

of freedom, but asserted that "international communism" could "commandeer the growing military and economic might of the Soviet Union . . . for its expansionist purposes whenever it chooses to do so." Instead of "international communism" being a tool of Moscow's drive for world domination, as was usually alleged, it was apparently something able to use the Soviet Union as a tool, "whenever it chooses to do so."⁵⁹ It was denounced at length in the main part of his address, which also called the roll of the great battles of the Cold War, all of them testifying "to the dedication of the United States to the principle that force should not be used for aggrandizement or to resolve disputes."

At the conclusion of the address the delegates rose to give him a long, warm ovation. Then they went back to complete a series of strong reports which broke with Dulles' policies and moralisms clearly and effectively. Several papers asked for the recognition of Red China by the United States and her seating in the United Nations.

This demand arose early on the first day of the conference from a Canadian fraternal delegate and became its leading theme. The Commission on International Institutions and Peaceful change urged that "the traditional concept of diplomatic recognition as a means for talking with a government in power is more relevant to today's needs than the newer idea of recognition as a sign of moral or political approbation."

The Chairman of the conference, former Ambassador to the United Nations Ernest A. Gross, issued a directive statement in which he recalled that the preceding conference, five years ago, had urged the U.S. Government to adopt a flexible policy with respect to China and to resist pressures to prejudge future policy. This, he held, the Government had not done. On the contrary, it was in danger of losing its freedom of action. He warned that we would do ourselves a great national disservice if we accepted the idea that the seating of mainland China in the UN would cause it to lose moral stature or impair our relationship with the UN.

No Outlawry. Commission II on "The Power Struggle and Security in a Nuclear-Space Age" debated the China issue and decided that "with respect to China, United States' policy has not been responsive to realities. While we cannot condone many of the things for which communism stands," the report continued, "it is the part of wisdom to recognize that we see no reasonable alternative open to us other than to recognize that Communist China is a nation of tremendous and growing importance with whom we must live. To continue to treat this great power as an outcast can serve only to deepen existing tensions and to further developments in China which we must deplore."

This Commission went further to urge that travel between China and the United States be increased (it was then forbidden); that "the Western world

⁵⁹ Senator J. W. Fulbright brought the "international communism" juggernaut down out of this rarified atmosphere in his remarkable address, on June 20, 1958, as follows: "Khrushchev can no more guarantee the behavior of a North Korean general, or Chinese Communist colonel, a Vietnamese captain than President Eisenhower can at all times . . . restrain their counterparts among nations allied to us."

should not be prevented from liberalizing trade relations with any Far Eastern country;" that Nationalist China be encouraged "to evacuate exposed positions that may be militarily unsound and politically detrimental;" and that the Formosa question be submitted to the UN.

Finally in "The Message to the Churches" the conference itself warned that "the exclusion of the effective government on the mainland of China, currently the Peoples Republic of China, from the international community is in many ways a disadvantage to that community. It helps to preserve a false image of the United States and of other nations in the minds of the Chinese people. It keeps our people in ignorance of what is taking place in China. It hampers negotiations for disarmament. It limits the functioning of international organizations." Diplomatic relations with China should be only one part of "a much wider relationship between our peoples."

This forthright challenge to the rigid non-intercourse position of Secretary Dulles was reinforced by other passages in the Message to the Churches, which condemned the "well worn policy phrases"—"deterrence," "the power to win a war," "massive retaliation" and "limited war"—and warned that these ideas and nuclear technology leave us living "always on the brink of annihilation," where some panic judgment may touch off the war which "no one can hope to survive."

Insisting upon never ending negotiations for disarmament, the conference deplored "the tendency to discredit the motives and proposals for disarmament which are made by anyone but ourselves" and cautioned that "cynicism about the good faith of each other on all counts is a poisonous atmosphere in which to try to conduct negotiations."

The conference was deeply troubled throughout by the peril of nuclear annihilation hanging over our heads. It said: "It will not do to rehearse the promises, cross fingers, and hope for the best. Christians are not fools. They know that all the promises tremble now over one peril. They know that the capacity for destruction possible in war today exceeds the most ominous forebodings of yesterday. They know that should either the United States or the Soviet Union commit its full power to all-out international war mutual destruction would ensue."

It is the immediate task of every Christian, the Message continued, to seize the initiative in preventing war and making peace. "We cannot sit complacently and hopefully behind the moral subterfuge which divides the world into 'good and bad' peoples, waiting for the 'bad' ones to be converted to our position. To do this is to insure the inevitability of war."

These disavowals of his cherished and unchangeable policies, from a source which hurt the most, led Mr. Dulles to go to San Francisco a few days later, on December 4, and declare once more, with "vehemence," as Edward R. Murrow described it the next day, the soundness of his China policy. Developments made it ever more clear, he avowed, "that if we were to grant political recognition to the Chinese Communist regime, that would be a well-nigh mortal blow to the survival of the non-Communist governments in the Far East. Such recognition and the seating of the Chinese Communists in the United Nations would so increase their prestige and influence in the Far East,

and so dishearten our allies there, that the Communists' subversive efforts would almost surely succeed." He denounced the Chinese Communist regime as violating all established principles of international law, and of civilized conduct, and "affirmed with absolute confidence that our policies will succeed if they are steadfastly pursued."⁶⁰

This confession of the very fragile nature of our political Chinese wall around the new China tied in with a statement by Knowland's successor, the Democratic Senator from California, Clair M. Engle. Building a military, economic and psychological wall around China, he said, "is the Maginot Line response, the moat psychology of medieval days. Among most of our allies and the neutrals of Asia it puts the U.S. in the ludicrous position of attempting to escape behind the flimsy curtain we have created, rather than face the reality of Communist China. Our China policy for all practical purposes rules out the use of instruments other than the ultimate recourse to war."

It was this realization which led the Fifth World Order Study Conference to break with Dulles and his policies. Its courage in doing so raised a considerable storm among conservative churchmen, including Dr. Daniel Poling and Dr. Norman Vincent Peale. Protests were both organized and spontaneous, but the Governing Board of the National Council of Churches stood firm and by June 6, 1959, George Cornell, Associated Press religious writer, summarized the outcome as follows: "A few individual donors refused to renew, but there have been no organizational defections and lately, with member denominations weighing the dispute, the official verdict has begun to pile up in favor of the Council."

The churchmen had demonstrated that even the greatest of the cold war taboos could be broken, by honest, courageous, democratic discussion. They had shown that the American people might still save themselves from extinction at the end of the Cold War.

"A decade of unprecedented silence and passivity," enforced by the sanction that questioning would be "tantamount to aiding and comforting the enemy," was ending.⁶¹

⁶⁰ It was the more necessary for Dulles to make such declarations periodically on the Pacific coast because business interests there were watching the ships and salesmen of our allied nations do a growing business with China. For the first time in history a great market was coming into being in China, and everyone else was "getting in on the ground floor."

A Canadian visitor to China described the situation as follows: China's trade "is growing with other Red countries, the Middle East, Switzerland, Britain and all of Scandinavia. In this historic re-routing of trade it is the U.S.A. and Canada which are becoming isolated, not China."—Edward B. Jolliffe, "China May Soon Be The World Power," *Maclean's Magazine*, November 22, 1958.

⁶¹ *Prevent World War III*, Winter-Spring, 1959, p. 3.

CHAPTER XXXI

BERLIN II

NOVEMBER 1958-JULY 1959

ON November 10 the third cold war crisis of 1958 began, one destined to be the most fateful of the three. On that day Premier Khrushchev said in Poland that the Soviet Union was ready to turn over control of Berlin to East Germany. Then the West would have to negotiate rights of access to West Berlin and any attack against East Germany would be considered an attack on the Soviet Union. He did not order the West out of Berlin, but his demands certainly meant another grave crisis there.

It was greeted at first as due simply to "a mean proclivity of the Russians for making trouble." The *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* thought this "a disastrous over simplification," but the *New York Times* was sure that "whatever happens, there is little doubt that after various tests in the Middle East and Far East they have chosen Berlin as the scene of a showdown which must decide whether Communism will continue its march of conquest, with Europe as the next victim, or whether it will be stopped at the former German capital." Even the *Wall Street Journal* was positive "that the Soviets will not make any agreement at all regarding Berlin, Germany or Europe that does not serve their purpose—conquest through appeasement." Even in the highest editorial sanctums our world-conquest fixation was still intact.¹

However, other more complex explanations of the Soviet move soon began to appear. On November 25 Lippmann thought that the object was to make the West Germans more willing to deal with the East Germans, and to show that the West had no solution for the German problem. The Soviet proposal of a very loose confederation of the two Germanies might be a poor proposal but the West could not beat it with no proposal.² Four days later a Soviet spokesman denied that the six months' time limit Khrushchev had spoken of as a suitable time for negotiations was an ultimatum. On November 30 Khrushchev said he was willing to wait if talks started within six months. He added: "We would like to drink toasts again with wartime allies. We want a peaceful solution. We would like to discuss things around a table." By this time some West Berliners were asking themselves whether the United States would really go to war "just because some East German wants to stamp a passport or inspect a train." Our allies in West Europe, added Drew Middleton, were not ruling out the confederation idea at once. There were plenty of signs that it would be a misjudgment to believe that they would "continue to accept a Western policy on Germany whose inflexibility periodically sets

¹ Citation dates, respectively: March 19, January 1, 1959, December 15, 1958.

² *New York Herald Tribune*, November 25, 1958.

alarm bells ringing." This situation would not be changed "by brow-beating or sermons from Washington."³

Why the Berlin Enclave Was Intolerable to the East. Two major reasons for the crisis were obvious. One was the almost unbearable offense which West Berlin was to the communist East. It was a great glittering outpost of capitalism, luxurious by comparison, prosperous, bustling. The United States had poured \$600 million into West Berlin. West Germany had also contributed heavily to make it a shining example of our way of life, as Norman Cousins put it in the *Saturday Review*, on January 3, 1959, "inside a tight, specific, designed world that has no margin for a massive internal challenge."

The economic comparison was damaging enough, but the comparison between the individual liberties in West Berlin and the regimented, tight police controls around it was still worse. The contrast led 300,000 East Germans each year to disappear into West Berlin and be flown out to West Germany. Mostly they were the young, talented, educated and professional people—a drain which could not be endured indefinitely, unless East Germany was to be colonized by Russians and Poles. Since 1949, 3,000,000 people had gone through the Berlin escape hatch and the population was declining. The magnet worked constantly.

West Berlin also contained the greatest combination of espionage agencies ever assembled in one place. It was an almost unbelievable windfall to be able to pursue all the missions of modern "intelligence" agencies, including sabotage, 110 miles deep in "the enemy's" territory. The same advantage accrued to Western radio stations and all other propaganda arms.

For all these reasons West Berlin was a deep running sore to the East, to be excised if at all possible. The only reason for surprise was, as Warburg pointed out, that the second Berlin crisis had been postponed so long. Now, however, the Soviets had demonstrated fully their lead for nuclear war and were in a strong position to move. They could insist also that the division of Germany be accepted.

German Rearmament. These considerations constituted the most obvious motive for the crisis. Yet a second one was even more urgent in Soviet minds. West Germany was now arming in earnest and she was soon to be given nuclear information and materials by the United States.⁴ From the Soviet standpoint nothing could have been worse than the placing of the nuclear missile tip on the German spearhead. Ever since the West first organized West Germany, and then began to talk of arming her after 1949, the terrible memories of what the Germans did in Russia drove every Soviet government to try to delay the arming of Germany. Now it was about to become a fact.

³ Flora Lewis, Drew Middleton, the *New York Times*, November 30, 1958.

⁴ When the vote to confirm this came in the House, in mid-1959, only eight members voted against it. They were William H. Meyer (D., Vermont), Henry S. Reuss (D., Wisconsin), Clem Miller (D., California), George S. McGovern (D., South Dakota), Mrs. Edith Green (D., Oregon), Byron L. Johnson (D., Colorado), Roy W. Wier (D., Minnesota) and Leonard G. Wolf (D., Iowa).

This little band certified that the American memory of what the Germans did with big weapons twice since 1913 was not quite extinct, and that what the Russians suffered in our common war with the Germans was remembered by a few.

If Khrushchev had any levers in his hands he had to use them quickly. He had one in Berlin and its use was certain to force agonizing decisions in the West.

Armed Convoys to Berlin. For several months they ran mainly in the military groove. Sending armed convoys to Berlin was talked of at once and the talk persisted for months. Schmidt reported on November 25 that many Pentagon officials advocated that "a special convoy with ramming equipment should move up, and deliberately, without shooting or other display of force, push into East Germany until it reached Berlin or was turned back by Soviet force." They assumed that the East Germans would not dare to use force against a Western military convoy. This assumption continued even after Foreign Minister Gromyko had said on December 25 that if a big war came over Berlin the American continent would suffer. He again denied issuing an ultimatum, saying that the Soviet Union was ready to consider any proposals that would lead to a solution of the problem.

Another Air-lift? The impracticality of the convoy solution through territory garrisoned by several hundred thousand troops was self evident, especially since it would apparently force the West to begin the shooting. Possibly the East would have to shoot first if we attempted to relieve Berlin by air, as we had done so magnificently in 1949. But thought also ruled out this solution; 1959 was not 1949. Berlin was now ringed with new radar jammers which could probably prevent landings in anything like the necessary number. Besides, the vast air-lift of 1949 would now have to be increased many times.

In the intervening decade the West, especially the United States and West Germany, had boomed West Berlin into the greatest manufacturing city in all Germany. It now turned out \$1,700,000,000 worth of goods annually, two-thirds of which went back to West Germany. Secretary of State Herter testified on June 24, 1959, that West Berlin's population was greater than that of many members of the UN, and that "The value of goods and services produced in West Berlin last year exceeded that of more than half the members of the United Nations." In 1949 a much smaller number of half starved people only needed to be kept alive. In 1959 a far larger number would want a good diet, with their jobs continued, and their expanded needs would be multiplied by the necessity of supplying all the new industries. Another air-lift under these conditions was practically out of the question. One for the 10,000 allied troops in Berlin might be carried on, if it were permitted, but would it be?

In West Berlin the West had overplayed a weak hand, transforming its prized outpost into a rich hostage which could neither be defended nor surrendered. What the *Wall Street Journal* termed this largely artificial economy was also vulnerable to a great variety of pressures. "Repairs" on all the land and water routes could be frequent. Import and export permits, and other papers, might be held up for long periods. Psychological pressures could create and deepen uncertainty about the future—a bad atmosphere for capitalist prosperity. And with declining prosperity could go the weakening of morale. People could be keyed up to dramatic resistance, but hardly to interminable resistance to varied pressures, no one of which could justify a war.

For that matter could the West justify a nuclear war to prevent a change in

the status of Berlin, one involving the destruction of all the West Berliners, the West Germans and far beyond? Yet the military leaders were soon saying, truly, that no other military action would suffice. It had to be nuclear war, from which Khrushchev would, of course, back away. But when and how?

East German Checkers? Since it would hardly do to have the war about who was to check Western transit to Berlin, Mr. Dulles said on November 26 that the United States might allow East Germans to do the checking, as "agents" of the Soviet Union. But we "would certainly not deal with them in any way which involved our acceptance of the East German regime as a substitute for the Soviet Union and the responsibility of the Soviet Union." It all depended on the details, but it couldn't be excluded because to a minor degree it was going on already. He said complacently that he didn't think Moscow's motive was to drive us out of Berlin or to obstruct access, but to try to compel an increased recognition of the German Democratic Republic.

As in the case a few months earlier when he sought to escape a little from the too close embrace of Chiang Kai-shek, his remarks about accepting the East German Reds as Soviet agents caused stupefaction at the scene of the entanglement. "Dulles Staggers Berlin and Allies," said the headlines. "I don't believe it. Dulles would not have said that," declared a member of the French mission in West Berlin. U.S. officials reacted similarly and the office of West Berlin's Mayor Willy T. Brandt said: "This contradicts everything we had heard so far from the Allies."

A Free City? The next day, November 27, the Soviet Union formally proposed that West Berlin become a "free city," guaranteed by all of the wartime allies, but without Western garrisons. Khrushchev held his first news conference since becoming Premier to emphasize the importance of the proposal. The Soviet Union, he said, was "prepared to take a solemn undertaking that the free city of Berlin would be supplied with food and its economy supported by orders from East Germany and the Soviet Union." His tone was calm and he stressed that the Berlin situation was "not one for quick and rapid changes because that would be like pouring two different kinds of liquid in the same vessel. Chemically you are likely to have a stormy reaction and that is not what we want."

These mild words produced no answering response in the West, which wanted only to retain its prize outpost in the East exactly as it was, especially since his words were accompanied by an official statement warning that any future "violations of the borders of East Germany would be regarded as 'aggression' against the Communist camp and would immediately evoke appropriate retaliation." Evidently the free city idea was only a means of gradually merging West Berlin into Communist Germany.

This was a natural reaction. Yet it was possible to conceive of a free city arrangement which would make the transition a long one and which would preserve the essential democratic liberties for an extended period. But the absence of mutual confidence in the good faith of the other side, upon which the Cold War was founded, precluded that. The Cold War and the law of dominoes called for all or nothing decisions.

Impasse. On December 2 Khrushchev had an eight hour talk with Senator Hubert Humphrey, after which the Senator saw no room for compromise. Khrushchev warned that whatever the West might believe to be its legal position in Berlin, "the legal questions will have to be tempered with prudent judgment."

The legal situation was that the three Western powers had a right to be in West Berlin. This was documented, but no document gave them the right to travel to Berlin. Only a verbal agreement between Generals Clay and Zhukov governed that. Sydney Gruson summed up the situation as seen from Bonn in the *New York Times* on December 7, 1958, as follows: The "brutal, unpalatable truth" was that no one knew what to do now, but they did know that the situation was never going to be the same again. However, the next day West German Defense Minister Strauss declared that West Germany would not be deflected from its program to build a modern atomic army within the Atlantic Alliance.

A day later the Democratic Advisory Council in the United States called for a level of deterrent military power which would leave "no doubts in the minds of the Russians and the Communist Chinese that they must not start a war or allow one to start." On December 12 a Tass dispatch said: "The Soviet Union declared last night that any Western attempt to 'break through' a blockade to Berlin by force would be considered an act of war by all the Warsaw Pact nations."

No German Unification. These exchanges of belligerent thinking did not obscure a growing realization that only the people of East Germany and West Berlin still wanted the unification of Germany. Some West Germans talked of unity but few pressed for it. It hardly entered into the thinking of the great mass of the people, who readily conceded "greater concern for their new prosperity." Most did not worry about it because they did not think it possible in the foreseeable future.⁵ The practical difficulties of unification were also now very great. Even in some conservative circles disengagement was now regarded as "preferable to the difficult task of merging with an economically depressed East Germany in which the apparatus of communism is long established."⁶

Such a merger would also carry grave political risks. The East Germans were traditionally Socialist and Protestant, and they might upset the basis of Adenauer's rule. But from his standpoint there was a still greater objection to unification. He was reported often and reliably, though never explicitly, to distrust his own people and to be devoting his life to merging the West Germans into a great new West European state. Certainly this was his overriding objective, as his devotion to the Common Market and his close union with de Gaulle proved. Always he insisted that the Market must lead to closer political union.

⁵ Sydney Gruson, from Bonn, the *New York Times*, February 8, 1959.

⁶ The *New York Times*, "Week in Review," November 30, 1958. By mid-1960 an increasing number of East Germans were becoming convinced that their economic system was the best and that they were on the winning side. See the testimony of a Western intelligence man in "Spying is Big Business in Berlin," by Ian Fleming, the *London Sunday Times Magazine*, August 7, 1960.

In such a union the dynamic West Germans were almost sure to be the leading partner, though de Gaulle with his deep belief in the grandeur of France apparently thought otherwise. But the addition of 20,000,000 East Germans would certainly upset any hopes for balance, in addition to opening the way for a Russo-German deal for the development and control of the Old World.

Apart from that prospect, the imminence of a new armed united Germany would galvanize in all directions the still vivid memories of what the other armed Germanies had twice done to Europe in this century. These were covered by a veneer of cold war alarms about imminent Soviet thrusts to the West which had never materialized. The German thrusts had. Just beneath the surface there was "a strong emotional under-current" and it kept breaking through. "Even in Western Europe concern lest history repeat itself" remained high.⁷

This concern never troubled our cold warriors, intent upon the grand manipulations of power and ideology, but it inevitably troubled the Poles and the Czechs—not to speak of the Russians—the Danes and Norwegians, the Dutch, the French and the British peoples. A united armed Germany would set alight all the legitimate fears of these peoples.

When examined under the stress of the Berlin crisis the mirage of a powerful atomic armed Germany united by free elections and poised toward the East dissolved, as it was always fated to do. Neither side could unite Germany against the other; nor had it any right to do so.

When the test came no single neighbor of Germany wanted her united and armed and the majority of the Germans were not keen about it. Politically speaking, nobody wanted it, except the American cold warriors.

Faced with this massive reality even Mr. Dulles was forced to admit, after much questioning at his press conference on January 13, 1959, that voting was not the only way to unite Germany. At least free elections did not have to be the first step. Bonn was shocked by his words and the next day he said that he knew of no acceptable alternative to free elections. Nevertheless, one of the great central formulas of the Cold War had been abandoned. Nor will history complain if the division of Germany into two states is essential to stabilize the peace of Europe.

MIKOYAN'S MISSION TO THE U.S.A.

On January 10, the Soviet Union proposed the speedy negotiation of a German peace treaty as a step toward settling the West Berlin question. A 25 page draft treaty was distributed and it was suggested that a 28 nation peace conference, to include Red China, be held in Warsaw or Prague. These proposals did not commend themselves to the West.

Yet there was increasing evidence that Khrushchev was in earnest in wanting a settlement. Marquis Childs spoke of "the evidence of the past year

⁷ Sydney Gruson, Bonn, the *New York Times*, February 1, 1959. A year earlier Walter Lippmann had found in a trip among Bonn's neighbors that memories of what the last militarized Germany had done were rapidly reviving.—The *Nashville Tennessean*, April 2 and 27, 1958.

and a half or two years that Mr. Khrushchev does want a settlement and a surcease from the cold war." C. L. Sulzberger spoke of his emergence as a moderate in the Soviet Union, establishing a legal code which placed the burden of proof on the state prosecutor and rejecting both "guilt by association" and "guilt by analogy." U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. Lewellyn Thompson reported to the Foreign Relations Committees of Congress that consumer demands were forcing the Soviet leaders into a position of partial disarmament. He had been reporting that Khrushchev almost certainly had something important to say to Eisenhower. On February 5, 1959, Khrushchev suggested a visit by the President to the Soviet Union and offered to forego a return visit. A few days earlier, on January 26, the Soviet leader "gravely and in virtually pleading tones" called on the West to seize the chance for improving relations. At a diplomatic reception he "brought a roomful of more than 1000 diplomats to hushed silence by lowering his voice to deliberate on the horrors of a new war, saying at the end 'but the clock ticks on. Factories keep working, producing more and more arms.'" Then he asked in a loud voice "for what?"⁸

As a still more tangible evidence of his desire for a *détente* Khrushchev sent Vice Premier Mikoyan on a good will mission to the United States during the first three weeks of January, 1959.

Calling first on Secretary of State Dulles, Mikoyan indicated a desire for East-West talks. In Washington Eric Johnston gave a dinner for him and about 40 others. The Senior Senate Republicans all declined, but Speaker Rayburn, and Senators Johnson, Fulbright and Humphrey went. In both Chicago and San Francisco, reported Harrison Salisbury, the State Department deliberately exposed Mikoyan to hostile Hungarian crowds, choosing "to escort their man right through angry, egg-hurling crowds." In both cities State Department security officers deliberately neglected to employ the usual methods for protecting distinguished visitors. However, Salisbury added, "by his smiling, cool demeanor, Mr. Mikoyan has won the acclaim of citizens in each of the United States cities he has visited thus far."⁹

In New York he addressed overflow meetings at the UN press headquarters and the Council on Foreign Relations, insisting that Moscow was not trying to establish a two power world. On the rivalry between communism and capitalism he declared that "capitalism exists; it is extant, and it has had substantial successes in America—serious ones." Some European countries have taken the road of capitalism, he continued, and have become great as a result. But communism had also made his country great. Competition, he said, was better than war and the danger of it. "We would like to overtake the Americans, but this surely is no threat to you. . . . Therefore, let us compete with and emulate each other."

On his departure Mikoyan sent a farewell note to Dulles, on January 23, demanding an end of the Cold War. On this tour he had spoken to great assemblies of capitalists asking, as the Soviet trade chief, "for the renewal

⁸ The *New York Times*, January 10, 26, February 6; the *Nashville Tennessean*, January 9, 26, March 9, 1959.

⁹ The *New York Times*, January 12, 1959.

of trade between the two countries, reduced to a tiny trickle by the Cold War.

Evaluating the impact of his trip afterwards, Salisbury thought he had succeeded in convincing many American business figures that the reality of the Soviet Communist is not nearly so fearsome as the image they had conjured up. And many of them left their rich and imposing clubs saying, in effect, "well, it certainly will do us no harm to talk things over with this fellow." In his turn he had had to revise his impressions about the warlike intentions of American capitalists. He was also "unprepared for the productivity, the abundance and the extraordinary high level of our economy" and had to discard a whole catalogue of clichés about the decline of the American economy. He made no secret of his amazement at its growth.¹⁰

MR. DULLES' LAST STAND

Though the West did not want to talk about Berlin at all, there was general realization that the Soviets had the whip hand there and that talks must be held. On February 2, 1959, the *Wall Street Journal's* Bonn correspondent reported that Khrushchev's war of nerves was weakening support in Bonn for Adenauer's firm stand on reunification and firm ties with the West. There was the greatest wave of ferment on reunification since West Germany became a member of NATO in 1954. People were now thinking in terms other than free elections. Adenauer himself had received a jolt in November when Dulles hinted that East Germans might act as Soviet agents. "Since then, of course, the Bonn government has been frantically reassured by the State Department. Mr. Dulles, the Chancellor has been told, merely wants to sound flexible without actually giving anything away in order to please the newly elected Democratic Congress and help British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan when the latter runs for re-election, possibly this spring."

Now in early February, as Mr. Dulles saw it, there was no reason for sounding flexible. He went to Europe to rally his allies for an adamant stand on Berlin. He departed on his last mission after telling a Congressional committee that the West must stand firm and that the Allies agreed to risk war rather than abandon Berlin. In Europe, reported Joseph Alsop, Dulles asked our allies "to agree to meet any Soviet challenge at Berlin without temporizing, without equivocation and head on." It was "the Dulles-Pentagon thesis that the Kremlin will not risk a big war for Berlin." Dana Adams Schmidt reported that Dulles was believed to have made it possible for Macmillan to go along on the use of force. Bridges would be repaired, trees and other roadblocks removed from highways. An East German policeman might need to be knocked down and "shooting could be a last resort." The details would be worked out by military experts, and if all this was made perfectly clear to the Russians they would back down.¹¹

A third reliable newsman, E. M. Kenworthy, gave the same account of what Dulles insisted upon. He had been "extremely firm" about "using military force on the ground to force a land convoy into the former German

¹⁰ *The New York Times*, January 18, 1959.

¹¹ *The Nashville Tennessean*, February 9; *the New York Times*, February 11, 1959.

capital." He was "more firm than any other Western official, perhaps even including the President himself."¹²

The last mission of Mr. Dulles was a tragic one for him. In the NATO conference at Copenhagen in May, 1958, he had enjoyed a real triumph. With patience, skill and great consideration for the views of others he had convinced the other ministers that negotiations with the Russians were futile. His success was so marked that, as Marquis Childs reported later, Dulles had a right to be confident. "He had demonstrated once and for all the futility of any negotiation with Moscow. In private to his colleagues he expressed something like a sense of triumph that he had put an end to the nonsense about 'talking with the Russians'."¹³

Then three brinks of war had followed in rapid succession. The first one at Lebanon had been highly ambiguous and difficult to stand upon; the second at Quemoy had involved all the embarrassments of standing obviously on untenable ground. However, in both cases Mr. Dulles had done his best. Then the third brink of war came swiftly, this time on obscure legal terrain and at an outpost so deep in "the enemy's" country as to be clearly indefensible militarily. Nobody had been able to devise any way of saving it militarily without destroying it and much more. Nothing remained except Mr. Dulles' will power, and with his last remnants of strength he used it to the full. As an avowed advocate of going up to the brink of war, as often as necessary, he had come to his last. The ground was shakier than ever, if not hopelessly unstable, but the West would stand firm and the East would retreat.

All that the most determined and dedicated of all the Western cold warriors could do had been done, and a point had been reached where something more than will power was required. Perhaps never had a foreign minister pushed a policy through to its final logical conclusion more completely. For the world it could easily be the final brink, and for Mr. Dulles it was. He returned from Europe and promptly went to the hospital for new surgery on February 9 and on the 14th the White House announced that his cancer had returned. Repeated announcements stressed that the President wanted him to continue in office.

On April 16, 1959, Dulles resigned and the President was so reluctant to think about a successor that he refused to name Under Secretary Christian Herter at once, revealing that others were also being considered.

On this occasion Sulzberger wrote, on April 18, that it had been customary for the President to be the dominating factor in foreign affairs but "The reverse has been true under Mr. Dulles, who, because of his highly assertive personality, brought to his governmental role a higher specific gravity than was ever known before." As an example of the methods he used in order to dominate policy Sulzberger recalled that Dulles had introduced the massive retaliation idea into the Republican platform in 1952, "then personally deleted it to suit Eisenhower, and later made it a tenet of his policy." The day before Reston had told how Dulles' great power had largely nullified the National Security Council. The result was that its work was farmed out to

¹² *The New York Times*, February 10, 1959.

¹³ *The Nashville Tennessean*, December 29, 1958.

committees that warned, over and over again, that we were losing the Cold War and they recommended the policies to improve our situation but the reports were not acted on.

While Mr. Dulles remained in power nothing could be done without him or against him, except on the rare occasions when the President balked at the brink of war.

On May 28 Mr. Dulles was buried with full honors in Arlington cemetery. On that occasion the London *New Statesman* thought that his chief effect upon international politics had been moralistically "to divide the world into the hosts of Light on the one side and those of Darkness on the other." His passion for identifying all Communists with Anti-Christ had never extended to Hitler, but it had made any undemocratic country good and a member of the "free world" if it was armed on his side. This policy had become "terribly dangerous when it meant outlawing China, pushing every issue to the brink, and refusing to see the need for a new policy when Khrushchev came to power in a Soviet Union which was armed with H-bombs."

In a time when the world needed healing and unifying leadership, with a desperation which only the plunge toward nuclear annihilation could supply, Mr. Dulles labored mightily to divide the peoples sharply, belligerently and permanently.

MACMILLAN'S MISSION TO MOSCOW

This was a crusade, though an increasingly defensive and failing one, which continually filled the peoples with dread of one final slip at one brink too many. "This talk of pushing a tank column to Berlin worries our people," said a Scandinavian diplomat.¹⁴ The feeling grew from one cold war alarm to the next, wherever men thought, but especially in West Europe where cataclysmic experience had taught so lately the end toward which arms races and power rivalries lead. In Britain especially there was a rising national determination, shared by all parties and classes, to escape from living under the poised H-bombs which the frozen rigidities of American cold war policy kept suspended over their heads, if it could be done. In Britain, too, democratic opinion could influence the government more directly than anywhere else. Added also was the fortunate circumstance of an urbane statesman in the person of Prime Minister Macmillan, who was not wedded to the Cold War for its own sake.

This combination of forces led Macmillan to decide to go to Moscow and talk with Khrushchev, to explore his thinking and see if the gap between East and West could be narrowed a little. There was opposition in the State Department to his going and Dr. Adenauer was wholly opposed, followed by Paris. Macmillan was accused of appeasement and of undercutting the no-negotiation stand of the West. However, he ignored the storm, listened to his own people and went, maintaining the fiction which soon became ritual; he was not going to negotiate at all, merely to discuss.

In responding to the Soviet welcome, on February 21, he wished with all his heart that competition in arms between the two blocs could cease. This

¹⁴ Drew Middleton, the *New York Times*, January 31, 1959.

was treason indeed to Adenauer, whose main objective was the continuance of West German armament full tilt, in pursuit of his joint aim with Dulles of unifying Germany by strength. To this hardcore school of cold war thought Macmillan's continuing words were no more palatable: "It is not that we fear calculated acts of aggression—and I hope you do not . . . but a war by miscalculation or muddle." (Of course the Cold War had been built on the adamant assumption of "calculated acts of aggression" by Russia.)

The next day Macmillan had an eight hour talk with Khrushchev, in which all the major East-West disputes were discussed in a relaxed atmosphere. This, too, was treason to the Cold War, which demanded the maintenance of high tension. Then Khrushchev used high tension tactics by suddenly making a speech rejecting the Western idea of a foreign ministers' conference and even casting doubt on a summit meeting. This led to an icy meeting between the two on the 26th and to a statement by Eisenhower that the West would not yield an inch on Berlin. He also discounted talks, but the next day Macmillan persisted in asking wide negotiations between East and West. In a speech at Leningrad he warned the Soviet Union to weigh the effect of its acts. Steps taken in ignorance of the result in the West could create a dangerous situation. Only if peoples and governments knew one another better, would they be able to "avoid the dangers and find the right solution." Knowing that he was on the right road Macmillan was not to be deflected, and as if to illustrate his warning Senator Lyndon Johnson said on the same day, "the countdown has begun." We must make it plain to the Russians that we are a united country.¹⁵

As Macmillan left Moscow a British official said that he would carry back the message that Khrushchev meant exactly what he said and that the West must agree on measures to stop him. If he negotiated with anyone it would be Eisenhower. Among foreign diplomats in Moscow the tendency was "to believe that Premier Khrushchev always means exactly what he says and always does exactly what he says he will do."¹⁶

Before the visit Khrushchev had said that Macmillan "comes to us with a clean heart" and afterwards he frequently said that it had broken the ice and contributed to understanding. It would be strange if this were not true, after so many intimate talks, even though Khrushchev had not budged. Though he had often scoffed at the idea of the foreign ministers being able to settle anything, he now proposed, on March 2, a foreign ministers' conference with equal sides, the Czechs and Poles being admitted. This demand for parity was to be pressed with increasing insistence until it was achieved in the ten nation disarmament commission which was set up late in 1959.

¹⁵ The *New York Times*, March 1, 1959.

¹⁶ Drew Middleton, the *New York Times*, March 1, 1959. On February 24 he had noted the great difference between Moscow in 1947 and in 1959. Now, "Pinched, haggard faces are a rarity. No longer do passers-by hunch their shoulders against the cold and plunge forward, heads down, eyes on the pavement."

He did not say that these were the people that we knew to be out to conquer the world in 1947 and so set about containing them, at all places and in all ways, but he did add: "Nowadays they stroll, looking in shop windows, talking, laughing." In the ideology of the Cold War this proved that they were now more dangerous than ever.

The strong position which the Soviets held was illustrated by an article in the West German news weekly *Der Spiegel* which said bluntly that the West must recognize East Germany as a reality and talk to her rather than face a war over Berlin. Sydney Gruson noted that "the idea of any more destruction at all sets Germans to shivering with dread."¹⁷ Only those who had once lived through a rain of fiery death could know what it was like, but the fear of it had spread to the Americans, coupled with a deep awareness of the diabolical intentions of the Russians. At his press conference on March 4 President Eisenhower cautioned against "thinking all the time, every minute, that while we are sitting here, we are going to—we are very apt to get a bombing attack." He stressed the futility of a fully mobilized West, in constant readiness for Soviet attack.

During a tour of East Germany, March 7 to 10, Khrushchev said at Leipzig to an audience of 1500 communist leaders, mainly from West Germany, that the Soviet Union would never permit Communist rule in East Germany to be liquidated through unification. Communism would eventually triumph everywhere, including the whole of Germany, because it was the right system. In Berlin he said that the Big Four (including the U.S.S.R.) could police West Berlin. He did not object to minimum Western units, or the United Nations could have a role, along the lines of the Palestine truce unit.¹⁸

THE PRESIDENT'S RESUMPTION OF LEADERSHIP

The outstanding and immediate result of the passing of Mr. Dulles from power was the emergence of President Eisenhower from the long retirement which began with his heart attack in 1955 and was accentuated by his two succeeding illnesses. Now, unable to rely totally upon Dulles, he began to discharge the responsibilities of his office in both foreign and domestic affairs. As early as March 8 Reston reported that he had taken personal command of the Berlin crisis and had told the leaders of Congress that he needed no additional money for missiles or conventional warfare forces to deal with it. They all said that he was more alert, articulate, confident and better informed than they had seen him since 1955.

He demonstrated this by speaking forcefully and at length about the waste of money put into missiles and missile sites which rapidly became obsolete. He was completely unmoved about the missile gap, but he was jolted by the Government's recent failure to sell long-term government bonds through normal channels. He thought the Soviets might be using the Berlin crisis to lead us to spend ourselves into bankruptcy, but was undisturbed about the military aspects of it.¹⁹

At his press conference on March 11 the President rejected with considerable emotion the current demands that he refrain from carrying out plans to reduce the size of the Army. He didn't think that an army of 870,000 men was a small one. He wanted to know what we would do with more ground forces in Europe. We wouldn't start a ground war that would win in that region.

¹⁷ *The New York Times*, March 1, 1959.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, March 8, 10, 15, 1959.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, March 8; Marquis Childs, *the Nashville Tennessean*, March 11, 1959.

Thumping the table, he declared that "We are certainly not going to fight a ground war in Europe" and demanded to know what good it would do to send a few more thousands or indeed a few divisions of troops to Europe. He reiterated the fears of his earlier years in the presidency that too much defense spending would bring on a garrison state.

The President's common sense refusal to try to duplicate at that late date the great Soviet striking force which had stood still in East Germany all during the Cold War naturally ran counter to the atmosphere created by it and by the crisis. Nearly everyone was for standing absolutely firm in Berlin, though a national spot check of 470 people by the *New York Times*' correspondents (March 23) revealed that 39 per cent did not know that Berlin was an enclave 110 miles inside East Germany. People were ready to fight, even if highly uncertain about where. Samuel Lubell found the same phenomenon. In nearly all of the communities he visited people felt that we should stick in Berlin, by majorities of eight to one, even at the risk of war. Apparently they expected to win the war with the weapons the President rejected as ineffective, for when asked whether nuclear weapons should be used many squirmed physically. Others tried to avoid a reply. Every third person had some reservation about nuclear weapons. But in spite of their patriotic belligerence Lubell concluded that the dominant mood was "one of uneasiness, frustration, and even helplessness."²⁰

THE MAIN ISSUE—A NUCLEAR ARMED GERMANY

In the first half of 1959 it became constantly clearer that the main issue was the nuclear armament of West Germany. Khrushchev meant to change the situation in Berlin, but his primary aim was to forestall missile sites in West Germany, if he could.²¹

It was equally plain also that he was blocked by Chancellor Adenauer. The power of one "strong" man on Western policy had ended, but Adenauer was as totally devoted as Dulles had been to the building of a third armed Germany in this century. He was still committed also to the belief that he could deal with the Russians when nuclear armed. Adenauer meant to supply from his own full resources the strength which Dulles had maintained behind German armament. In September 1957 he told James Reston that Dulles was the only obstacle to appeasement of the Soviet Union and "asserted that President Eisenhower was engaged in a private correspondence with Soviet leaders against the wishes and without the knowledge of Mr. Dulles."²²

Now with Dulles gone the danger must have seemed acute to him and he was ready with opposition on every front: no negotiation about Berlin, let

²⁰ *The Nashville Tennessean*, May 8, 1959. Of course the President's refusal to assume a military posture in West Germany displayed more courage than the ones who wished to do so did. As Lippmann said on April 26: "The extreme position is often regarded by the glibble who do not know the difference between patriotism and patriotism as the bold and firm position. But the extreme position is a phony. It takes much more boldness and firmness and internal courage to be moderate and rational than to be a jingo and a verbal fire-eater."

²¹ *The New York Times*, Schwartz, February 22, Thomas J. Hamilton, March 1, 1959.

²² *The New York Times*, April 8, 1959.

alone any concession; no disengagement of any kind or degree along the highly armed confrontation line through Germany; no arms freeze of any kind, unless a part of a broad disarmament settlement.

These rigidities would let the situation develop until West Germany was heavily armed, and with nuclear weapons. The last formula just mentioned was alone sufficient, and also transparent. Between the two wars Germany had demanded "equality" in arms, but the League of Nations disarmament commissions and finally the great Disarmament Conference of 1932 had debated long and futilely enough to show that general disarmament is the hardest possible thing to achieve in a world of "sovereign" states. Bonn could safely advocate general disarmament, even though the states all lived now under the sufferance of the sovereign H-bomb. Nothing would be done until Germany got it.

On March 24 Sydney Gruson reported that Bonn was alert against any "discrimination" against Germany on nuclear weapons and highly suspicious of British intentions.²³ The German demand for "equality," so fair and so reasonable, was back again. On the 16th Lippmann reported after a trip to Bonn that there was great anxiety there about the outcome of the 1961 election, since there was a powerful tide running against Adenauer's policy, even within his own party and on the right of it.²⁴

Heresy was certainly spreading, from the standpoint of the principle of Western strength and German unity through German power. On April 20, 1959, Sir Winston Churchill addressed his constituents at Woodford, warning that a Berlin battle would lead to nuclear war between East and West. The use of armed force in Berlin would inevitably unleash a general conflict. We must be patient and firm, but also make allowances for justifiable Russian fears. The Western powers "should never seek to make use of Germany as an offensive base" against the Soviet Union. Soviet fears of a resurgent Germany were reasonable. "We must take account of them, we must look through other people's eyes as well as our own." But the Russians must realize that the West could not contemplate "a further increase in the number of countries and peoples they so tyrannically control."

Sir Winston's continued dissent from cold war orthodoxy on political grounds was heavily reinforced on May 7 by a NATO commanding general, on military grounds. General Clyde Edelman, an American, said that Western military forces in Germany would suffer no strategic or tactical disadvantage if they were to withdraw West of the Rhine and the Soviet Army were to withdraw from East Germany. This was worse than heresy; it was military treason to Adenauer's plan to hold American troops check by jowl with the Russians until Germany was rearmed. There would be a little cloud thereafter, to say the least, on the incessantly repeated claim that any disengagement at all would quickly destroy NATO.

On the other hand, George Kennan appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and disavowed the impression that he was advocating the policy of disengagement in Central Europe in his famous Reith Lectures

²³ *The New York Times*, March 24, 1959.

²⁴ *The Nashville Tennessean*, April 16, 1959.

of the preceding year, which had stirred such a vast amount of constructive thinking about disengagement. He began by saying that the time might have passed for the application of his philosophy. Plans for German armament were now far along. It would therefore be extremely difficult to base German defense on conventional weapons alone. NATO also needed the newest weapons there. Kennan continually emphasized how much information could only be known to the men on the inside.²⁵

A little earlier, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson had deplored our failure to stand militarily in Central Europe. He thought that our failure to arm adequately made our shadow at the coming conference table "pallid and emaciated." If, with determined energy, we reversed "these catastrophic tendencies" and increased our military strength in Europe our shadow would become more solid.²⁶ On the surface it seemed that the position of strength in Germany for which Acheson and Dulles had so long striven was about to be achieved in the nuclear armament of West Germany. On May 24 Seymour Topping, Berlin correspondent of the Associated Press, wrote that by 1961 the West German Army would be expanded to twelve rocket-equipped divisions of 200,000 men, backed by an American-equipped air force of 100,000 men.²⁷ When the proposed American missile squadrons were added this seemed to promise a real confrontation of power. Could the West stand firm and refuse to negotiate until this promised land was at last reached?

It did not seem likely, because we had at last been forced to conference over Berlin, as Sulzberger noted on May 12. The conference opened in Geneva on May 11. We had been able to avoid being forced to conference over Quemoy and Lebanon because of sea power, but it did not extend to Berlin. At the same time the West's strategic positions were being made largely irrelevant, especially in Central Europe, by the Soviet leadership in intercontinental missiles. It therefore appeared to be too late for the West to break the existing pattern of armed strength in mid-Europe by supplying Bonn with nuclear weapons. Before they could be available some kind of settlement about Berlin would have to be made, one which recognized that the results of World War II in Europe could not be undone.²⁸

Adenauer Indispensable. In any event, Dr. Adenauer meant to do his best to prevent settlements and keep German rearmament advancing, at least until after the 1961 election. It could be disastrous for the bankruptcy of his policy of union by strength to become apparent before then. Currently, also, his party had difficulty in finding a suitable candidate to run for the presidency against Dr. Carlo Schmidt, a very respected Social Democrat. It

²⁵ Max Freedman, *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, May 21, 1959.

²⁶ *The New York Times Magazine*, April 12, 1959.

²⁷ *The Nashville Tennessean*, May 24, 1959.

²⁸ On June 1 Averell Hartman wrote about his recent trip to the Soviet Union that peace was a national preoccupation. "When farm hands and factory workers whose memories of the unprecedented sufferings of the last war are still vivid express their horror of another war, no one can doubt their sincerity." *The United States was considered the main threat to peace, but almost every Russian he talked with "revealed a nostalgic longing to recapture the friendly relations that existed with the United States during the war years."*—*The New York Times*, June 1, 1959.

unanimously urged Adenauer to be the candidate and after strong and repeated pressure he agreed to do so, on April 8, 1959, under the belief that he could still direct the government, especially foreign policy, on the model of the de Gaulle presidency. The next day he vowed that Bonn policy would not change, even by one iota.

Doubts arose, however, as to whether the largely ceremonial West German presidency could be so warped, and the Christian Democratic Party began to show a marked desire for Dr. Ludwig Erhard, the popular Economics Minister, to succeed Adenauer as Chancellor, instead of a compliant Adenauer appointee. But Erhard was a much more liberal man, who set less store by the Common Market and was naturally somewhat less rigid than Adenauer about uniting Germany by ways which could not succeed.

Accordingly, while Erhard was on a mission to Washington, Adenauer forced his party to agree that he should remain as Chancellor. The party was rebellious, but he won endorsement after a heated debate. The President of the Bundestag, Dr. Eugene Gerstenmayer, expressed his regret but added, "since we live in a free state we must respect Konrad Adenauer's decision"—surely a strange remark for an official of a democracy to make, a democracy which had just been forced to acknowledge that only one man could lead it.²⁹

Erhard pledged a fight to reverse Adenauer's stand and he had much support, particularly after Adenauer had pledged a truce and then gave an interview to the *New York Times* questioning Erhard's capacity to handle the Chancellorship. Nevertheless, Adenauer prevailed, and he announced on June 14th that he was staying to preserve Western unity in the wake of Dulles' death and to meet increasing Soviet threats. On the 17th he said that he planned to stay until 1962 when he hoped the entire international situation would be clearer.

The West still had an indispensable strong man who would hold it to the straight and narrow path of the Cold War. But diplomats of all the Western delegations at the Geneva Conference wondered if the Chancellor had not revealed himself, Middleton reported on June 7, "as less adroit, less far sighted and less objective" than the Adenauer they had known.³⁰

THE FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE FIRST SESSION

The Foreign Ministers Conference on Berlin opened on May 11, as Sulzberger noted that "The sole way out of the impasse is compromise. But every compromise possible would seem to be at our expense." On the 16th he added

²⁹ *The New York Times*, June 6, 1959.

³⁰ On June 8 the *New York Times* carried an article by C. L. Sulzberger about Adenauer's predilection for France. It was based on various elements one of which was Adenauer's aim to build "a newly organized Europe tightly linked to a newly organized Africa. He feels that neither France nor Belgium, for example, can alone develop their African wealth. But as Europeans, together with Germany, he thinks this can and must be done. Otherwise, he is persuaded Africa will go Communist."

It appeared, accordingly, that Adenauer's vision ranged widely. Germany could help her neighbors to hold much of Africa, and to develop it whether emerging Africans liked it or not, all in the name of anti-Communism.

that we considered it impossible to arrange a compromise on Berlin alone. It had to be tied to Germany's future. We would "wrap these problems into an inseparable whole. . . ." In fact our opening offer was "even stiffer than what Adenauer's own Foreign Office was prepared for."

This was the Western plan. It sought a new status for Berlin which would prolong Western control of West Berlin for an extended period until we could get Germany united our way.

Stage 2 of our plan provided for a mixed commission of 25 West Germans and 10 East Germans in which recommendations for many preliminary steps would be taken by "a three quarter majority," that is, by the Western 25. The East could suggest and argue but it could veto nothing. In the final "Stage 4" a peace treaty would be concluded with a government representing a United Germany.³¹ Disarmament was also linked to reunification.

This would satisfy the most intransigent of the Western leaders. The only trouble with it was that it had no relation whatever to reality. It drew from Gromyko an attack which Reston thought was "studded from end to end with imputations of the West's motives." He charged that the West had not come to resolve any problems but to perpetuate and aggravate them. This was so "profoundly disturbing" that Reston hoped President Eisenhower could "make a little progress in removing this fantastically false notion of the West's motives" in a summit conference.³²

On May 20 Secretary of State Herter temperately rejected these imputations and insisted on the reunification of Berlin by free elections.

On June 7, 1959, Sydney Gruson wrote from West Berlin that it was "a living and growing thorn in the Communists' side," cancerous at that. No one attempted to deny "the fact that the West conducts extensive and profitable anti-Communist propaganda and intelligence activities from West Berlin," and as long as this "disruptive" influence upon their empire existed the Communists "could be expected to try for West Berlin's extinction as part of the Western world."

No one could have summed up the situation more accurately.

On June 10, Gromyko said that if agreement were reached to grant West Berlin the status of a free city "the guarantees with regard to unrestricted communication of the free city with the outside world would remain in force pending the unification of Germany." He proposed that the guarantees be supervised by a body composed of representatives of the Big Four (including the U.S.S.R.). In the meantime, the Western occupation of West Berlin could continue for a period of one year only, subject to the reduction of its garrisons to symbolic contingents, to the stoppage of hostile propaganda, to the liquidation of all West Berlin organizations engaged in espionage and subversiveness against the East, and to the non deployment of any missile bases in Berlin.

These were the best terms the West was ever likely to get, but at this stage

³¹ Text, the *New York Times*, May 15, 1959. The conference was delayed by an argument over whether it should sit at a round table or a square table. It ended with the Soviets winning seats for both the West and East German observers just outside one end of the round table.

³² From Geneva, the *New York Times*, May 19, 1959.

Herter could only reject them indignantly, in a fine impromptu speech. He feared the curtailment of legitimate news and free speech as propaganda. He objected rightly to the exclusion of East Berlin from reciprocal obligations, and to Gromyko's refusal even to discuss East Berlin, where there were "massive subversive and terroristic organizations." But most of all he rebuffed the one year time limit, during which "an effort would be made to enforce the confederation of Germany on Soviet terms."

Accordingly, it remained only to find a way of adjourning the conference with the least damage. In the private sessions the West had indicated concessions on garrisons, espionage, propaganda and missile bases, but it feared that the Soviet terms were designed to make West Berlin fatally vulnerable and to ensure the permanent division of Germany. Both of these things may have been true, but in a more relaxed atmosphere which permitted more mutual trust an extended reprieve for Berlin might be won, one which would preserve the essential freedoms in West Berlin for a long time, even if the city ceased to be a wealthy outpost of the West.

The conference recessed on June 20 for three weeks.

THE RETIREMENT OF ADMIRAL STRAUSS

At this juncture there occurred an event in the United States' Senate which in some measure atoned for one of the worst excesses of the Cold War, the expulsion of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer from government clearance on the initiative of Admiral Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, whom Oppenheimer had offended, as recorded in an earlier chapter.

On June 19, 1959, the U.S. Senate rejected the nomination of Strauss as Secretary of Commerce by a vote of 49 to 46, fifteen deep South Democrats voting for him. The opposition in the Senate to his treatment of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, the watch-dog of the AEC, was so intense that he wisely refrained from seeking a new term as AEC chairman. Accordingly the President, who valued him highly, nominated him in January 1959 to be Secretary of Commerce, where his power would still be great.

At first his confirmation was taken for granted, but the hard core of opposition in the Senate grew steadily as his attitude and unresponsiveness in the hearings antagonized Senators. Many understood that the treatment meted out to Oppenheimer had alienated the scientific community. A great many American scientists had suffered along with Oppenheimer, knowing that they might be next. They remembered that Strauss had disclosed a long series of vital secrets in order to convict Oppenheimer of unreliability, including the implicit size of our stockpile of H-bombs and various details about it.³³ Others remembered his part in the Dixon-Yates scandal involving a flank attack on the Tennessee Valley Authority. Then the intense lobbying for him "from the President down," and from powerful interests, completed his undoing. A real factor in it was the vote of Republican Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine, who had already demonstrated calm courage of the highest order by calling on the conscience of the Republican members of the

³³ Drew Pearson, *the Nashville Tennessean*, April 12, 1959.

Senate to rise against the excesses of Senator Joseph H. McCarthy. Now she studied the evidence against Strauss with great care and cast her vote against him, as did one other Republican, Senator William Langer of North Dakota. These two votes defeated Strauss.

Strauss accordingly retired involuntarily from public life, confident that history would vindicate him.³⁴ In reality history had passed its verdict on one of the outstanding American cold warriors, at a moment when our side of the Cold War was in deep trouble.

REVOLT IN LATIN AMERICA

History was catching up not only with the cold warriors, but with the Cold War itself.

One long-term result was increasingly evident. Our neglected Latin American friends, to whom we had given arms and dictatorships instead of bread and economic development, had begun to take matters into their own hands.

Revolution in Cuba. Foreshadowed in the riots against Nixon the revolt began in little Cuba on our doorstep, the island which we had freed from Spain politically and taken over economically. The great cattle ranches and sugar plantations and very much else were American owned. The profits were handsome, but the Cuban people did not share them, especially the sugar workers who were turned out to graze most of the year. But there was Batista, the perennial dictator, who kept order by the most brutal police state methods of gun and torture and corruption. Order was highly valued by the American owners and Batista received U.S. support, even in arms shipments, until some six months before his sudden collapse on January 1, 1959, and consequent flight to that last refuge of fallen dictators, Trujillo's San Domingo.

His flight had been preceded by an epic of courage and persistence, a guerrilla rebellion in the mountains led by a young man named Fidel Castro, the son of a landlord and well educated. For many months he raised the standard of revolt in his high retreat, pulling others into the hills to join him, winning the loyalty of the Cubans and the excited admiration of Latin Americans everywhere.

Then he came into Havana and horrified the Americans by the public "trial" and execution of some 500 of Batista's men, most of whom had participated in the torture and death of countless Cuban opponents of the dictator. But more was to come, when the fiery Castro began to carry out a thoroughgoing revolution, including the expropriation of the great American properties—heedless of the favorable American tariffs to the American owned sugar of Cuba.

It was therefore inevitable that cries of communism should arise in the American press and continue constantly. Nothing angered Castro so much as the charge and most of those who knew him best agreed that his intense personality made him "highly unlikely as an international Communist puppet." Still his revolution was so strongly leftist that it served all the

³⁴ The *New York Times*, "Week in Review," June 21, 1959.

purposes of communists, especially since he ousted them from control of the unions but did not proscribe them from the revolution.³⁵

At the end of 1959 Castro, the fighting lawyer and hunted rebel, had become "the sorest thorn in the United States in the free world, the hero of all the anti-American, ultra nationalistic movements in the hemisphere and an inspiration for all the acts of mischief directed against the United States in that vast region."³⁶ History was fast catching up with the Truman Doctrine, which by proscribing all communist revolution and expansion of every kind had in effect proscribed all revolution, and by identifying all revolution with communism had lost for the West the capacity to welcome any democratic revolution, let alone encourage it. But the revolutions had come—in Colombia, in oil rich Venezuela, and now in our own sugar bowl. Inevitably, too, the revolutions were anti-American, and the end was not yet.

Neutralism Growing. In March Mr. J. Peter Grace, President of the Grace Shipping Line, quoted a public opinion poll taken in six leading Latin American states on the question of taking sides in an East-West conflict. In Caracas 68 per cent were for staying out; in Mexico City 66 per cent; in Buenos Aires 62 per cent; in Montevideo 51 per cent; in Bogota 40 per cent; in Lima 34 per cent. This, thought Grace, was a very rude awakening for us.³⁷

Independent Action in the UN. But it was not so rude as the discovery in the 1959 UN General Assembly that our effort to elect Turkey, our most belligerent ally, to the Security Council over Poland failed. In 50 odd ballots Poland led nearly all by a small majority, to which Latin America contributed 7 votes. In the end Poland got the first year of the term and Turkey received the second. The long deadlock, said Thomas J. Hamilton on December 13, 1959, "inflicted severe damage on the prestige of the United States," which on this issue could not command a majority, let alone two-thirds. On a clear cut issue our Latin neighbors broke away from the United States and the Cold War.

The Limitations of Our Power Exceeded. As a distinguished British historian, Denis W. Brogan, noted for his friendliness to the United States, pointed out in a Nashville lecture, the United States had not been able to recognize the limitations of its power. Geography limited the free exercise of American power in some parts of the world (an obvious truism which had escaped all our cold war leaders). Freedom in many parts of the world meant only "freedom from foreign domination," not freedom for free enterprise capitalism, since in most areas of the world there was "no such thing as a business class on which a system of free enterprise could be based." Nor could social revolution in China and elsewhere be forbidden, because it "involves great forces beyond the power of any government—including the Soviet Government—to control."³⁸

THE FAILING COLD WAR

Time had also moved on inside the Soviet Union. Averell Harriman, again in Russia, marvelled at the 3,500,000 tons of new steel capacity he saw coming

³⁵ Ted Szulc, from Havana, the *New York Times*, December 13, 1959.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ The *Nashville Tennessean*, March 11, 1959.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, July 7, 1959.

into operation. When Stalin had told him at the end of the war of his plans for 60,000,000 tons of steel a year, he had thought this goal could not be reached for many years. Now it had been—12 years later. Now, also, Khrushchev reminded him forcefully, that "We developed the hydrogen bomb before you. We have intercontinental missiles and our rockets carry warheads many times larger than yours." He was determined to force a solution of the Berlin problem, adding: "If you send in tanks they will burn and make no mistake about it. If you want war you can have it, but remember it will be your war. Our rockets will fly automatically. . . ."

To this the tired cold warriors in Washington had no effective reply. A survey among retired U.S. diplomats made by Senator Fulbright reflected "a propensity merely to react to Soviet challenges rather than to put into effect our own comprehensive and positive policies; and, especially in recent years, an inability to come forth with any new creative and diplomatic program."³⁹

The Cold War was progressively bankrupt, even financially. The United States was running a large dollar deficit of some \$3,500,000,000, the bulk of which was due to the never ending expense of paying for the armies of our little outposts in small countries around the rim of the communist world, and to the large annual expense of maintaining American garrisons in hundreds of far-flung American bases abroad. Both of these drains were never ending, so long as the Cold War lasted. Gold flowed steadily out of the United States into the coffers of the wealthy and prosperous states of Western Europe, where the United States had invested great sums in economic aid which had been healing and productive. Now, too, Western Europe was dominated by two intransigent strong men in Bonn and Paris, who aspired to build a great nuclear-armed world power under the further protection of the American armed presence in Europe.

In the meantime the American people were still committed to an arms race which involved their own annihilation. This was because, said publisher William R. Matthews, of the *Arizona Daily Star*, our basic foreign policy still called "for the American people to wage in the name of peace and liberty, another war of annihilation, because our objectives are unattainable and unlimited."⁴⁰

This was the situation when the second session of the Foreign Ministers Conference opened in Geneva on July 12.

Negotiations were renewed "on a totally different basis." Adenauer's "internal ruckus" had weakened West Germany's political dynamism. By taking most of the French Army and Navy out from NATO's command,

³⁹ Washington AP, the *Nashville Tennessean*, June 28, 1959. The next day Governor LeRoy Collins spoke to a packed audience in the Leningrad Baptist church. The theme of the service was that God is Love and Peace. There was not a dry eye in the house, in this city which had lost nearly half of its people during World War II in resisting siege by the Germans and the Finns.

On July 11 the *Chicago Daily News* carried a statement by J. Edward Murray which indicated that the Godless Reds had not quite resigned from civilization. Said he: "It did seem to me that much of the ethical motivation of many educated Russians today is not too different from that of many of the Americans who do flock to liberal Protestant churches in the United States." He saw no evidence of a disintegration of morals.

⁴⁰ *Chicago Daily News*, July 11, 1959.

and by driving its 212 American atomic planes out of France into Britain and West Germany, since he could not command their use or handle the warheads, de Gaulle had brought NATO to a very low estate. Yet it was the demands of these two which had compelled the West to take up an unnegotiable position in the first session, in which Gromyko yielded nothing.⁴¹ Except for Adenauer the concessions made would have been made at the start of the first session and some agreement might have been reached.⁴²

War or Peace? Berlin still lay in a strategic trap, from which it could not be rescued militarily. The belief that Khrushchev would pay something to get to the summit had been proved groundless. Our assumed trump card had "disintegrated like wet blotting paper."⁴³ So the drift to the summit continued in "confusion." In "a confused and rather bad midsummer night's dream," Washington clung to its refusal to negotiate under threats. In this "foggy state of mind" official Washington had fastened on this point "as if it was the core of the subject." In any event, the President had "no stomach for entering the lists with the redoubtable Mr. Khrushchev if he (could) possibly avoid it."⁴⁴

But he could not avoid it. The end of the road had been reached. Either a nuclear world war had to be initiated or a real effort made to make peace.

In this supreme hour of decision President Eisenhower, advised by Mr. Herter, a realistic Secretary of State, had the courage and the wisdom to break the shackles of our cold war past and try for peace, in the making of which the people of West Berlin might be assured of a tolerable, if restricted future.

⁴¹ Sulzberger, the *New York Times*, July 13, 1959.

⁴² Walter Lippmann, *The Nashville Tennessean*, July 19, 1959.

⁴³ Sulzberger, July 20, 1959.

⁴⁴ Dana Adams Schmidt, the *New York Times*, July 19, 1959.

THE TURN TOWARD PEACE

JULY-DECEMBER 1959

THE accounts all agree that it was the impasse over West Berlin which forced the decision to invite Premier Khrushchev to visit the United States.

Robert I. Donovan wrote in the *New York Herald Tribune* on August 9 that the President had invited Khrushchev before Vice President Nixon left for Moscow on July 22, and that Secretary Herter had put pressure on the President to announce the visit before the second session of the Foreign Ministers Conference adjourned. The President had decided that the primary goal of the Russians was to prevent a reunified Germany dominated by the West. He thought they had an almost pathological fear of such a development. He also did not believe that warfare in the future could be limited to non-atomic weapons.

The announcement that Khrushchev was coming in September and that the President would make a return visit was made on August 3.¹ The invitation was an effort to skirt the Geneva impasse, said Reston. The Nixon visit had also removed any remaining doubts. Mr. Herter and some of his top aides had become convinced that the Russians were deadly serious, said William Jordan, that a major war was a distinct possibility and that direct participation by the President was "the only hopeful channel to prevent a catastrophe." We had, said Lippmann, "backed away into a round of popular diplomacy which draws its energy from the popular feeling everywhere that a nuclear war must be avoided."²

The indispensable factor was, of course, the President's willingness to rise to the occasion. He searched his conscience and decided that if there was anything he could do to end the Cold War, or turn it into safer channels, he would do it. As E. W. Kenworthy put it, the President believed "that he owed it to himself, his country and the free world that history should not record that he had stood upon the order of his going and so had neglected to explore any avenue to peace."³

It was this searching of the deep wells of his conscience which enabled

¹ The invitation had been preceded by a statement on July 19 by nine Governors who were touring the Soviet Union calling for a major break-through in the Cold War. On returning to the United States the Governors, who were headed by Governor LeRoy Collins of Florida, urged Eisenhower to visit the Soviet Union and suggested a Khrushchev trip to the United States. They had found "a sincere and spontaneous friendship toward Americans" and an eagerness to visit us among officials all over the Soviet Union.—*The New York Times*, August 1, 1959.

² *The New York Times*, August 4 and November 7; the *Nashville Tennessean*, August 6, 1959.

³ *The New York Times*, September 13, 1959.

Eisenhower to reverse our attitude toward the Cold War. The tragic pity was that no other American leader in a high position had ever faced the whole situation since the Cold War began, in the confident hey-day of our atomic monopoly. "We are talking about the human race and what is going to happen to it," the President said at his news conference on August 25, in response to Truman's fears that he was damaging the prestige of the presidency. Then he described the terrific burden of the arms race upon us and demanded: "If this thing goes on indefinitely, where is the explosion point?"⁴

Where indeed? Yet this simple question never seems to have troubled the men who had controlled our policy from 1945 to 1959. They were confident that "power" and more power would make our will prevail. It will be Eisenhower's chief claim to greatness that when he assumed control of our policy in early 1959 he was able to look beyond power to the fate of the peoples, and to heed their world-wide pleas for a surcease in the final arms race. In his joint broadcast with Macmillan early in September he said spontaneously that one of these times the governments had better get out of the way of the peoples and let them have peace.

So they had, but governments obsessed with power are seldom able to do this. Eisenhower could, even if it meant reversing the basic assumptions of the Cold War. Confronted with the final responsibility of refusing to make peace when nuclear war was the stark alternative, he chose to try the opposite course. As the London *Observer* put it on September 6, 1959, the President had now decided to act upon the opposite of all the Dulles assumptions and to assume "that coexistence is not only possible but inevitable, that the cold war is, at least partly, an artificial conception, which hides a community of interests, that Mr. Khrushchev's Russia is neither expansionist nor militarist, and that the best way to deal with Communism is to break down the barriers between Russia and the West and subject both sides to the bracing winds of political and economic competition."

In the Soviet Union there was an equally keen realization that the making of peace depended on reaching Eisenhower. Henry Brandon, the Washington correspondent of the *Sunday Times* of London, wrote on August 23 that when he was lately in Moscow a high official close to Khrushchev had said to him: "We believe that if there is any chance of reaching an accommodation with the United States it is with Mr. Eisenhower. We think he is a prisoner of his own Administration. That is why Mr. Khrushchev wants to talk to him directly and in person. There is not much time left." With the Democrats advocating more defense spending there would be little chance of dealing with them.

It is a melancholy reflection for Democrats that the Soviet assessment was accurate. They had leaders in Adlai Stevenson, Senators Humphrey, Fulbright and Mansfield who could lead them out of the cold war wilderness, but the influence of the Acheson, Truman, Symington wing of the party largely paralyzed their efforts to enable the Democrats to make peace with the future. The great voices of Wilson and Roosevelt calling for drawing all the nations together were still muffled in the councils of the Democrats by the

⁴ The London *News Chronicle*, August 26, 1959.

strident accents of power. On July 1 Acheson declared that \$7,500,000,000 a year must be added to the military budget for the next four or five years. On October 4 he opposed all discussion about Berlin with Khrushchev, saying: "I would tell Mr. Khrushchev that I would not discuss Berlin. Let's talk about other matters, but there is nothing to talk about there. . . ." The implication was plain that Mr. Khrushchev would back down or he would get a nuclear war. And when the Democratic Advisory Council did issue a statement urging the continuance of the ban on atomic tests Mr. Truman disagreed, on December 20, 1959, saying: "I believe that we should keep right on experimenting to find out what we have and what we can do with it."⁵

NIXON'S MISSION TO MOSCOW

In sharp contrast with this Democratic inflexibility, July 23 found Vice President Nixon in Moscow pledging efforts to ease tension. Nixon had risen to power by associating his opponents with communism, and he had waged succeeding campaigns in the same manner, but this had not obscured from him the great weariness of the people with the Cold War which was revealed by the 1958 elections. Now he was in Moscow telling the Russians on July 24 that "we have reached the point in world history where the biblical injunction 'they that take the sword shall perish with the sword' is literally true today." The last half of the 20th century could be "the darkest or the brightest page in the history of civilization." The decision was in our hands. He welcomed a competition to raise living standards and urged: "Let us compete not in how to take lives but in how to save them."⁶

By July 26 Nixon, the champion Red hunter, was comparing himself to Khrushchev in Moscow. They had some real and honest differences but they "both came from humble families and both have a practice of speaking directly and not beating around the bush." On August 4 Nixon was in Warsaw saying: "To me the concept of two worlds is basically negative and wrong. What we should all work for is *one world* in which each people has the choice of the political and economic system which it wants, and what is most important is that, despite what differences we have, we should find areas to cooperate together in peaceful pursuits." (Italics added.)

⁵ On December 6 the Democratic Advisory Council issued a statement from which some of the sharpest Acheson thrusts were eliminated, but his cold war spirit and his obsession with national "power" were still in it. It talked about the "unalterable" purpose of the Soviet Union, the danger of succumbing "bit by bit" to "the aggressive thrusts of Communism," "the awakening of our purpose and national power," "a mighty association of the free," "no retreat" in Berlin, etc.

⁶ A time bomb had been planted under the Nixon visit to Russia in the form of a resolution adopted in the Senate without debate on July 6 designating the week of Nixon's visit as "Captive Nations Week," a commemoration which was duly proclaimed by the President.

In Moscow, Khrushchev thought it was a deliberate affront. He did not know that the idea had come from the Judiciary Committee "of which the Chairman is that notorious lover of liberty, Mr. Eastland of Mississippi."—Walter Lippmann, the *Nashville Tennessean*, July 29, 1959.

On his side, Khrushchev did not help matters much by announcing to a Polish friendship rally, doubtless with tongue in cheek, that a representative of the "panic stricken American imperialists had arrived."

EISENHOWER IN EUROPE

This plumping for one world may have been flying far into the future, but at least it was in the direction which most people wanted to go. This was demonstrated during Eisenhower's tour of Europe in early September to persuade Adenauer and de Gaulle that a new course must be taken. The London *Daily Telegraph* observed on September 4 that the events of the past few days had been "a truly remarkable demonstration of the new mood of conciliation and compromise that has taken hold of public opinion." In Bonn Adenauer was surprised at the warmth of the welcome given to Eisenhower. He concluded that his people supported the talks with the Soviets. In Paris the crowds gave the President a sympathetic and affectionate welcome. By this time his trip "had gathered a momentum General de Gaulle could not disregard." The French press was carrying warnings about France isolating herself. Everywhere, Henry Brandon concluded, "The fervor with which he has assumed the initiative for the positive, and for peace, has been the chief reason for the warmth of his reception."⁷

A columnist in the *Daily Telegraph*, Peregrine Worsthorne, marvelled that the President's speech in London had contained not a word about the communist menace, but he questioned an apparent expectation that the basic Western policies could be maintained in the new atmosphere, apart from the old mood of "fundamental mistrust and fear of the Soviet Union, coupled with profound ideological antagonism. This is the emotional soil which sustains and strengthens the diplomatic roots of Western policy."

This difficulty was reflected in a dispatch from Rome to the London *Observer* on September 6. A change of method at the highest level in East-West relations was "something which profoundly disturbs the balance of Italian home politics. These have been poised for years on the projection of the cold war onto the domestic front"—everything to defend Italy against the communist menace. It was a painful time for all Western politicians trained in the Cold War. Philip Toynbee commented in the same newspaper on November 15 that "The simplicities of our earlier anti-Communism are no longer available to us, although they are so lovingly clung to in many quarters."

KHRUSHCHEV IN THE UNITED STATES

In the Communist world the shift was equally painful to many, especially the Chinese who could see no evidence that the Western leopard was changing its spots, or any reason for eschewing communist revolutions in Asia. For Khrushchev the change was easy because he had long been angling for a peace treaty which would recognize the existing power realities in Europe.

On August 5, the day after his invitation to visit the United States was confirmed, Khrushchev held one of his rare news conferences in which he declared that the problem of a German peace treaty was "the question of questions." There was no change in the basic premise of his original proposal that there should be a peace treaty with the two existing German states and that West Berlin should be converted into a free city.

⁷ *The Sunday Times*, August 30; *The Times*, September 6, 1959.

He would not, he said, go to the United States with any rockets in his pocket. However, he did not keep this promise. On September 12, as he was ready to leave for the United States, his scientists fired a rocket at the moon, the last stage of which weighed 3324 pounds.⁸ On the 14th the rocket hit the moon after travelling 35 hours, its arrival time having been calculated within 84 seconds. The scientific correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* thought, on September 17, that its accuracy seemed to have been a hundred times better than that achieved in any comparable American launching, and the *Daily Telegraph* concluded that "Khrushchev now commands rocketry that is not only powerful to the nth degree, but also reliable."⁹

The American public had had time to digest this unpleasant fact when Khrushchev arrived in Washington on September 15 bearing for the President a replica of one of the metal pennants carried to the moon.

As he reached Washington the Soviet Union stopped jamming the Voice of America for the first time in ten years. Large, quiet crowds turned out to see him, cheering only after the President had left him at Blair House.

The newspapers had carried advertisements warning about the bad effects of his visit, the Congress had hastened adjournment to avoid having to invite him to address it and the Catholic Archbishop of Washington, Patrick A. O'Boyle, had publicly requested that Catholic priests and members of religious orders stay away from Khrushchev.¹⁰

Cold Reception in the East. At the National Press Club Khrushchev delivered an address in which he emphasized that "we have come to you with the best of intentions and with an open heart" to improve relations and strengthen world peace. It would, he said, be sheer madness to allow a new world war to come to a head.

It was his deeply held conviction that it was impossible to put up with a situation where fourteen years after the end of the war no peace treaty had been concluded and the occupation regime was still preserved in West Berlin. Neither the Soviet Union nor the German Democratic Republic had "any ulterior motives or secret designs" with regard to West Berlin. No one had "any claims to incorporating West Berlin into the German Democratic Republic or changing the social and economic scheme of things there."

"We proposed," he continued, "and we still do, that the independent existence of West Berlin should be ensured by the most reliable of guarantees

⁸ *The Sunday Times*, September 13, 1959.

⁹ The leadership of the Soviets in the conquest of space, and their ability to hurl great payloads accurately over long distances, was heavily underlined again on October 4, 1959, by the launching of an automatic interplanetary space station into a vast elliptical 621,000-mile orbit which took it around the moon, fairly close on the other side and then back within 25,000 miles of the earth.

This wide ranging traveller took pictures of the far side of the moon, never before seen by man, and relayed them back to earth at the proper moment in its circuit. On October 27 one of them appeared on the front page of the *New York Times*, with the principal topographical features named by a panel of Soviet scientists. One of them was called the Moscow sea; another the Joliot-Curie crater.

¹⁰ *I. F. Stone's Weekly*, September 21, 1959.

known in international relations, with or without the participation of the United Nations. This should ensure the freedom and welfare of the people of West Berlin.¹¹

As soon as he had finished his address William H. Lawrence of the *New York Times*, President of the Press Club, chose out of a number of written questions to put to him first the most offensive question that could be asked: "What were you doing when Stalin committed (his) crimes?" This was soon followed by the second most explosive question: "How do you justify Russian armed interference in Hungary?" Then Khrushchev's angry replies served to prove that "he couldn't take it."¹²

In New York, where his welcome by the public was equally cold, his address at the civic luncheon was extempore and relaxed, but he ran into trouble again in the question period at the Economics Club where the crowd thought he was evading the issue of restricting American access to Soviet public opinion. (On the same day the Voice of America carried the President's news conference into Russia for the first time.) At a dinner with 27 leading capitalists given by Averell Harriman he conceded that "when you state you prefer not to engage in an arms race I have no right not to believe you. I must also agree that it is better business all around to produce civilian goods only."¹³

Thus far Khrushchev's trip had not been a success from the public relations standpoint of winning friends. He had talked too much about the excellence of communism, though this may have been good politics in Moscow. One keen observer thought that he had read a cold, boastful and unfriendly speech to the Economics Club, when it was "unfortunately true that the only class which is striving at all against the arms race in America is that section of the capitalist class which is concerned with fiscal solvency and confident of its own ability to produce for peace."¹⁴

At the United Nations General Assembly Khrushchev proposed that all nations disarm down to police units within four years. This sweeping proposal was naturally received with deep skepticism in Washington, which did not wish to give up its overseas bases and wanted the strictest supervision in exchange for any disarmament. However, the Soviet proposal did change the atmosphere remarkably, bringing disarmament out of the limbo and into the realm of practical politics. It was supported by a declaration filling a

¹¹ The *New York Times*, September 17, 1959.

¹² After a discussion with a group of Senators headed by Senator Fulbright those present declared unanimously that Khrushchev was "exceedingly able, adroit in debate, highly intelligent and well briefed." The Senators were impressed with his lack of bluster and belligerency.—E. W. Kenworthy, the *New York Times*, September 17, 1959.

When President Eisenhower went to the Soviet Embassy for dinner he was the first president ever to enter it.

¹³ In London *The Times* thought that Khrushchev had shown remarkable restraint in the face of American heckling. "Cut out the basting," said the *Daily Mirror*. "Give him a break," urged the *Daily Mail*, which thought "the U.S. has gone all out to show its worst side."

The president of the Economics Club in New York sent Mr. Khrushchev a letter of apology for the bad manners of the hecklers there.—The *New York Times*, September 21, 1959.

¹⁴ *I. F. Stone's Weekly*, September 28, 1959.

newspaper page which warned of the dangers of atomic war breaking out accidentally and appeared to face the difficulties of inspection. The statement suggested great possibilities of aid for the underdeveloped countries if arms budgets were eliminated or reduced.

In New York Khrushchev was greeted by the *New York Daily News* as "a hard-bitten, merciless and agile-minded thug," who "scowled, mugged and grimaced."¹⁵ However, the *New York Times* thought, on September 20, that "Mr. Khrushchev's personality came through far more clearly at first hand than it ever could at a distance. Americans saw that he was tough and resourceful. At the same time they saw that he has some engaging human qualities—vitality, an earthy humor, a quick mind."

Harrison Salisbury noted the impression of incredible dynamism which he left on his hearers, a stubborn man, a fighter. "It's a little frightening," said an eminent New York business man after the Economics Club dinner.

In Russia the Soviet press turned the silent reception of the crowds into triumphal progress. Washington has seen nothing of its kind, said *Pravda*: "applause turns into a stormy ovation on the central avenue."¹⁶

In *New York Time* magazine said, on September 28, that "The U.S. found out, as Khrushchev boiled into successive rages in Washington, New York and Los Angeles (twice) before TV crowds of millions, that Khrushchev could also lay out a combination of uncontrolled wilfulness, ignorance and ill temper. Above all, the U.S. found out last week that Khrushchev's New Course of Communism was the same Old Course; that his protestations of peace and friendship cloaked a naked drive for world power no less sustained than that of the late Joseph Stalin."

Trouble in Los Angeles. It was in Los Angeles that the most explosive situation of the tour developed. There Khrushchev was brought into a remote corner of the airport, in front of a yawning hangar. The Mayor, Norris Poulson, gave him a curt one sentence address of welcome. Khrushchev put his prepared reply back in his pocket and went into the city along an unpublished route. At a luncheon given by the Motion Picture Association he was needled by the Chairman until the audience loudly silenced the toastmaster. In the middle of the luncheon Khrushchev was informed that he could not see Disneyland, because the police could not protect him. Soon afterward he exploded, apologizing later that he had been "somewhat hot-headed." However, a bigger explosion matured at the Mayor's dinner that night, after Mayor Poulson had referred to Khrushchev's famous remark "We will bury you," with effects which deeply alarmed correspondent John Osborne, who described the scene in *Life* on October 26, as follows: "When he made the coldest and bluntest statement of the tour—'It is a question of war or peace between our countries, a question of life or death for the peoples'—his audience kept a deathly silence. When he threatened to break off his tour and fly home, the fright in the hall was a tangible and present

¹⁵ *The Economist*, September 26, 1959.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, September 26, 1959.

States and the Soviet Union, and then passed unanimously and delightedly by the Assembly. Nevertheless, the question of Laos produced the old cleavage and a ten to one vote in the Security Council to send a fact-finding panel to Laos to report on the alleged aggression from North Vietnam into Northern Laos.

On September 12 the *Economist* stated that for several days the State Department had been fulminating against this aggression and well informed Washington correspondents were writing about the official view that only an ultimatum could stop the Reds. "The press was privately assured that there was ample evidence of invasion by north Vietnamese troops. When they dutifully wrote about these assurances, Mr. Cabot Lodge was able to point to the newspapers as evidence that the fact of aggression was common knowledge."

When the Security Council met, no one had any real knowledge of events in Laos, so the Council adopted a proposal to send out a team of observers, over a Soviet veto, on the ground that this was not an investigation, but only an observation. The Soviet delegate read repeatedly a declaration signed by the Big Four powers at the San Francisco conference in 1945, which had foreseen exactly a dispute over whether such an investigation was substantive or procedural, and had ruled that such decisions should be regarded as substantive and therefore vetoable. His veto was nevertheless overridden, leading Alistair Cooke to say in the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* on September 10 that this action "left a lot of people wondering what will be not the distant future but the immediate future of an organization that takes arbitrary action in undeniably good causes and clobbers the Soviet Union with the book of rules it pretends to live by."

The veteran UN correspondent, Thomas J. Hamilton, was skeptical about what the observers could find in Laos. He recalled that although the Soviets were known to be backing the Communists in the civil war in Greece the UN investigators could never find evidence that any non-Greeks were doing the fighting. In Indo-China the story had been the same. The French could never produce a single Chinese prisoner before independent witnesses.

In this situation he suggested that "The United States might find it worth while to explore the Communist demand for the re-establishment of the international commission on Laos set up under the Indo-China armistice agreements and the restoration of the semi-neutral status for Laos envisaged when the Indo-China war ended in 1954."¹⁹

When the UN observers returned and made their report to the UN on November 7, 1959, they were not able to report any proof of invasion, though they found some evidence of aid in the form of arms, supplies and other help. Even this "evidence" was so scanty that the conservative *Washington Star* rebuked the State Department on November 9, saying: "This is the flimsy basis which led to the State Department indictment of the 'Communist bloc' in connection with the fighting in Laos—an indictment which implied that the Kremlin was involved. It is also the flimsy basis on which some of our more

¹⁹ *The New York Times*, September 13, 1959.

thing. When he relaxed into a lighter vein, the relief among his hearers was almost as frightening as their fright."¹⁷

Warmer Weather. On the other hand, many Californians seem to have concluded by the time Khrushchev headed north that he was after all the President's guest and entitled to somewhat better treatment than he had had in Los Angeles. At Santa Barbara an enthusiastic crowd headed by the Mayor was waiting for him. In San Francisco he received a hospitable welcome from the Mayor and when a large, cheering crowd greeted him at the entrance to his hotel he seemed hardly able to believe it. He responded at the civic dinner in a speech "glowing with warmth." He invited Mayor Poulson to visit Moscow and assured him that nothing would be said about the recent incidents.

In Iowa he received a warm welcome and in Pittsburgh the hostile placards of the East Europeans waved from throngs which also cheered. By this time there was general speculation as to whether Khrushchev's occasional tantrums has been "genuine or just an act" to promote his purposes.

Back in Washington he had two days of private talks, from September 25 to 27, with President Eisenhower, after which they both emerged "not only smiling but apparently in genuine friendliness."¹⁸

A New Start. At his news conference on September 29 the President was optimistic that any threat to a negotiated settlement of the Berlin problem had been removed. On this vital point he said: "We agreed that these negotiations should not be prolonged indefinitely but there could be no fixed time limit on them." As soon as he reached Moscow Khrushchev held a one question interview with Tass and said: "President Eisenhower has given a correct account of the agreement we reached. We have indeed agreed that negotiations (on Berlin) must be resumed; that no time limit should be set on them, but that they must not be delayed indefinitely." With somewhat different emphasis the two leaders agreed that the Berlin ultimatum had been removed but that there must be a settlement there. In his news conference the President had referred to the situation in Berlin as "abnormal" and he refused to guarantee a perfect settlement from the Western standpoint.

INTERVENTION IN LAOS

In the Far East the United States still assumed its power to determine the political complexion of each bit of territory around the rim of China.

The 1959 session of the UN General Assembly was the most peaceable within memory with respect to East-West fighting. A couple of resolutions on disarmament and related issues were actually negotiated between the United

¹⁷ From South Bend, Indiana, Cardinal Cushing of Boston assailed the Communists as having "seized two continents and set fire to all others by executing the most skilfully executed power-grab in human history." The United States had "baptized" Communism by recognizing it and "canonized" it when we invited the leaders to our shores. He thought Khrushchev's visit was "probably your greatest victory in the cold war."—*New York Herald Tribune*, Paris edition, September 21, 1959.

¹⁸ *I. F. Stone's Weekly*, October 5, 1959.

complexion of each bit of territory on China's frontiers. While moving toward recognition of the geographic and political realities in Europe, Washington was still unable to do so in Asia.

CHINESE INCURSIONS INTO INDIA

Currently, also, China was giving evidence that she might already be the raging dragon, thrashing over the frontiers even of her best friends.

During the autumn of 1959 Asia became painfully aware of serious border incursions from China into India, the country which had always fought for China's rights in the UN, which had played a mediatory role in the Korean war truce, and which had signed with China at Bandung the five principles of peaceful coexistence. If China would reward her best friend with invasion, what would she do to the rest of her neighbors?

The whole affair made no sense to Western observers, except the ones who had known all along that the Red Chinese were predatory. China was already in bad odor in Asia because of her bloody suppression of a revolt in Tibet a few months earlier, during which the Dalai Lama, sacred ruler of Tibet, escaped to India, along with some 15,000 of his followers.

They were given political asylum there and though India forbade any irredentist activity, she did permit a great deal of vocal freedom to the Dalai Lama. He even argued that the validity of India's own frontiers depended on her acknowledgement of the sovereignty of Tibet. All this produced much irritation in China and the Chinese take-over in Tibet brought Chinese troops up to the borders of India for the first time in centuries. There they found frontiers which had been well established by British India on the maps of the world, but which were unmarked on the ground and not so well defined in Chinese minds. They proceeded to convert an old caravan trail across Ladakh, a lobe of Indian territory extending into China on the Chinese side of the Himalayas, into a military road, and there were incursions at several other points along the long frontier.

On September 9 the Soviet News Agency, Tass, termed the frontier dispute "deplorable" and called on China and India to settle it, thus putting her ally China on the same plane as neutral India. This made China's isolation on the border dispute total. No voice was raised anywhere in her behalf. The armed clash of Chinese and Indian patrols at Longju in August had solidified world opinion against China, as had her maps claiming some 50,000 square miles of territory long regarded as Indian.

For Nehru this development was the first challenge, both externally and in Indian politics, to his policy of peaceful coexistence, and he met it in his usual statesmanlike manner. He opposed immediately "the feeling that accompanies a cold war outlook," declaring that "the moment you've got that you have lost your moorings psychologically."²⁶ On the other hand, he told Chou En-lai in a long note that India could not discuss the future of large areas inhabited by hundreds of thousands of Indians while they were occupied by Chinese troops.²⁷

²⁶ *New York Herald Tribune*, Paris edition, September 13, 1959.

²⁷ *The Statesman*, Delhi, October 5, 1959.

China. There the revolution was still young and there was "an abnormal state of mind which is a dangerous thing." He declared flatly that India would defend the large border state of Nepal and smaller Bhutan against outside aggression.³¹

In December the bodies of the slain Ladakh policemen and the surviving prisoners at last reached India, and on the 16th the press carried a full-page statement by their leader, Karam Singh, detailing the interminable interrogations, freezings, torture and threats which had compelled him to sign a statement accepting responsibility for the clash. The revelation of these inhumanities naturally hardened Indian and Asian opinion against the Chinese.

On December 18 a long letter was received from Chou proposing a meeting with Nehru in the next few days. The letter charged Indian aggression at many places and professed great forbearance on China's part in not occupying large areas below the McMahon line allegedly administered by Tibet. Chou referred to the "friendship of our countries in the past and for hundreds of years to come" and offered continued cooperation in the adjustment of all of China's border disputes.

On December 22 Nehru ruled out economic sanctions against China and warned members of parliament against "thinking in anger." He urged India to push her economic development with renewed vigor and "to try our best by friendly and dignified approaches to find a way of settlement." He refused Chou's invitation for a meeting until there was more prospect of a settlement, and in succeeding addresses he warned the people of India that the border difficulties were likely to last a long time.³²

There was no likelihood that a settlement could be reached which did not involve the sacrifice of considerable territory long regarded as Indian, but Nehru had won his contention that India should not be diverted from her economic growth into an arms race, some increase in her military strength being taken for granted.

Nehru's Leadership. After his most severe test Nehru still stood as the most mature statesman of the post-war world. One close observer of the Indian scene wrote on the occasion of his 70th birthday that it was Nehru's vision of the future which had given India world importance. "When Mr. Nehru said at his last press conference that all the world—except China—was going his way, he was neither defending himself nor boasting; he was stating a fact. Mr. Nehru was the first to say that imperialism is dead, that the Afro-Asians had to come into their own, that atomic war would make peace a necessity, that Marx is out of date, that the Iron Curtain must rise, that Russia was militarily and educationally advanced and that technical progress would gradually bring back normalcy in Russia and produce a thaw in the cold war."³³

Aside from his great achievements in setting the new India on her feet, this was a record of clear-sighted vision which no statesman of the cold war period could equal.

In Geneva on December 17 a Russian official told Western newspaper

³¹ *The Statesman*, November 26, 28, 1959.

³² *Ibid.*, December 23, 27, 1959.

³³ Taya Zinkin, *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, October 19, 1959.

men that the Soviet Government hoped the border dispute would not interfere with the improvement of East-West relations. Chinese activity on the Indian border was "more than just untimely. It would be inopportune at any time."

On this issue China was accordingly completely isolated, but that did not necessarily mean that she would be more tractable in the future. China was too big, too proud and too dynamic to be isolated without continuing and increasing danger to the peace of the world.

EISENHOWER'S WORLD CRUSADE

The China-India border trouble lent a distinct piquancy to the visit of President Eisenhower to India from December 9 to 14, 1959, at the height of his grand eleven-nation tour, which included stops in Italy and Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan on the way to India and visits to Iran, Greece, Tunis, Spain and Morocco on the way home.³⁴

Everywhere tremendous crowds greeted the President, culminating in the vast outpouring of humanity which met him in New Delhi. The local newspapers disagreed as to whether a million or a million and half people cheered him along his 12 mile entry route, but all agreed that the crowds exceeded the entire population of India's capital city. The invited ones who tried to get to the airport to meet him were stalled in traffic for hours and in the center of the city even Mr. Nehru dismounting from the presidential car was unable to open a lane for it to get through. By this time the car was covered a foot deep with flowers and all observers agreed that the expressions of popular affection were unprecedented.³⁵

This was proved true again at a civic reception attended by equally great crowds and at a vast garden party for 8000 guests at the presidential mansion. Banners welcomed him as "The Prince of Peace" and his leadership for peace was the theme of the visit. Before the two Houses of Parliament, who had cheered him with great warmth, he won another roar of applause by demanding: "In the name of humanity can we not join in a 5 year or a 50 year plan against mistrust and misgiving and fixation on the wrongs of the past? Can we not apply ourselves to the removal or reduction of the causes of tension that exist in the world?"

Guilty Governments. This was the voice for which the peoples of the world had waited in vain through many years of the Cold War. Now at last it was

³⁴ The President was going to Spain, cabled Patrick O'Donovan from Washington, "because disappointment in Madrid at not being included originally in the Presidential itinerary threatened a crisis that could have affected the four great American bases there," a strategic connection which had already cost "more than a billion dollars in aid." In Turkey, wrote David Hotman from Ankara, he would find coolness about the East-West *détente*. The Turks reasoned that they were "risky nuclear oblivion" by accepting an American IRBM base, yet the \$359 million credit allowed by the West in August 1958 had "hardly done more than plug Turkey's yawning trade gap for one year." If the Cold War subsided, "many Turks were now asking openly why they should not get this help from the Soviets."
—The Observer, London, November 29, 1959.

³⁵ The author served at the time as a Fulbright lecturer at the Indian School of International Studies in New Delhi. He still remembers the deep sigh of one of his students as he said after the President's visit: "He has taken a part of our hearts."

heard, as Mr. Eisenhower emphasized that the tensions and fixations were "the creations of Governments, cherished and nourished by Governments. Nations would never feel them if they were given freedom from propaganda and pressure."

Many hearers and readers of the President's words must have wondered if they could trust their senses, as the President thus frankly placed his finger on the root cause of the Cold War. But there could be no mistaking the direction of his thrust at a sterile past as he put "one blunt question to you and to all everywhere. . . . Must we continue to live with prejudices, practices and policies that will condemn our children, our children's children, to live helplessly in the pattern of the past—awaiting possibly a time of war borne obliteration?"

He ended by expressing his conviction that much of the world's fear, suspicion and prejudice can be obliterated. "Men and women everywhere need only to lift up their eyes to the heights that can be achieved together; and ignoring what has been, push together for what can be."³⁶

The analysts complained that throughout the President's grand tour they could not find in the communiqués issued after each stop a single hard diplomatic fact. Perhaps not, but this did not eliminate the strong probability that the President had fatally injured the spirit of the Cold War and made its renewal very difficult. Sulzberger realized the power of the great imponderables with which the President was dealing in his comment on November 25 that the policy intentions of the State Department might stay the same, "but their national expression has changed so much that the reality of policy is weakened," for "if the mood of public opinion shifts too much policy is forced to change whether it wishes to or not."

Herter's Appeal for Accepting Competitive Co-Survival. However, at the top of the State Department, Secretary of State Herter evinced his own deep awareness of the need for a change in direction in a remarkable speech delivered in New York on November 16, 1959. Today, he said, "we face a test no society has ever fully met: how to make competition the life, not the death of nations." The rivalry of political systems had been uncomfortably close to exploding in thermonuclear war "more than once in recent years, most lately over Berlin." Then President Eisenhower "determined to turn the course of history away from war and toward a lasting peace."

Now, Herter continued, rules had to be worked out for keeping the great competition of our time "within the bounds set by the conditions of co-survival." It was "much simpler when we could think in black and white terms of sheer confrontation." Now to meet the enthusiasm of Soviet competition in peaceful ways the active participation of the people was required. It was not enough to leave it to those in Washington. "The cause of peace and freedom is too important to be left to the few."

This renunciation of the infallibility of officialdom was closed by a plea that as we moved forward into what might become a new era of competitive peace we look back to our own basic principles, to our faith in the eventual

³⁶The *Hindustan Times*, December 11, 1959.

spread of freedom to all of the peoples on this planet. We should go forward realizing that "ours is no perfected system" and that "America is still in the making."

This was the authentic voice of America, which should have been heard from some top American leader much earlier in the Cold War. Instead of encouraging us to mill about in fear and hatred of the ideas of others, looking for heresy in every quarter, Herter called upon us to remember our great heritage as practitioners of freedom and to accept the challenge of competitive living with communism "with courage—yes, with buoyant hope."

An infinite amount of suffering and loss of energy and squandering of resources could have been avoided if leadership like this could have been exerted in Washington after 1945. By 1959 the gap between the rich nations and the poor ones could have been narrowed sharply, to the benefit of all, instead of widening as it did steadily during the cold war decades. Simply by doing what was right the appeal of the communist heaven could have been dimmed by the steady growth of well-being in the vast realms of the underprivileged. Only in 1959 did it fully come home to us that the effort of India to modernize herself was a struggle in which all of us had a stake, and then unfortunately there was too much emphasis on the loss of all Asia to communism that would follow India's failure.

There was still too little understanding that around the world the population explosion had to be controlled, along with economic development, or the end-result would be as disastrous as nuclear war. The projected doubling of India's population to 800 million by 1986 meant, in the words of Professor Frank W. Notestein, a leading authority on population trends, that "since the country's resources could not conceivably support this population India would collapse into a terrifying shambles of famine, disease and anarchy, perhaps carrying most of Asia with it."³⁷

WESTERN SUMMIT IN PARIS

As President Eisenhower neared Paris for the Western Summit Meeting on December 19, nothing had happened to strengthen the Western negotiating position on West Berlin.

In East Germany the Communist regime was giving a preview of one of the many ways by which the economic life of West Berlin could be strangled. New regulations required the most minute description of goods and destination for the vast quantities of goods flowing in and out of West Berlin to the West. Heavy lorries were being unloaded at the border and expertly searched to insure that their owners were conforming to the very stringent regulations. Goods were being confiscated on the ground that they were not properly described.³⁸

In West Germany another development not calculated to ease tensions was taking place. There U.S. armament manufacturers had begun "to pour massive amounts of capital and experience into the reviving arms industry." This was due to the widespread conviction that West Germany was destined

³⁷ *The New York Times*, October 2, 1959.

³⁸ *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, December 10, 1959.

to become "a major weapons producer." There was highly competitive bidding for commercial alliances with German corporations. The current trend would soon carry West Germany to the limits of its treaty restrictions on arms manufacture, particularly in the field of missiles and armored weaponry.³⁹ Then, of course, the restrictions would be lifted and the German arms boom would be on.

The American manufacturers who so calculated were not evil men intent upon earning for themselves a sordid fame as "merchants of death." They were just capitalists scenting lush profits. They did not recall how their predecessors in the U.S. and Britain had helped rearm Germany after World War I, with calamitous consequences for their own countries and all mankind. They were not enemies of President Eisenhower, bent upon defeating his efforts to dampen down the arms race. They were simply men trained in the Cold War who assumed that it would go on, profitably. The President was acutely aware of them and of the dangerous militarization of our own economy, but the best he could do was to hold the arms budget level, while he campaigned for relaxation and peace.

From Moscow Khrushchev travelled to Hungary and other East European satellites to try to make sure that no outbursts or revolts marred the prospects for the summit meeting that all now agreed must take place. He also issued stern orders to the big Communist parties of the West to work for coexistence. The Italian Communists were instructed to like Ike, and they swelled the applauding Roman crowds to prove that they did. All were informed that the Soviet Union was now for the status quo and they must stand for it too. Even in Iraq, where the Communists could overthrow the status quo, Khrushchev ordered the Reds to back Kassem, fearing that an upheaval there would wreck his policy.⁴⁰

On his side President Eisenhower had no similar means of controlling the reluctant or the recalcitrant ones. Chancellor Adenauer let it be known frequently that he was opposed to having Berlin discussed at the Summit. He suggested that "controlled disarmament" be the sole topic, knowing that nothing would come of that quickly, if at all. On the other hand President de Gaulle wanted the summit conference to discuss everything, in Europe, Asia, Africa and the world. Both united in delaying the meeting, first into early 1960 and then into the late spring. French Premier Michel Debré, in ritualistic cold war style, insisted upon proofs of Khrushchev's sincerity "at the United Nations, in Southeast Asia, in the Middle East and in Africa."⁴¹

In Washington there was "no patience with the French and German

³⁹ Arthur J. Olsen, Bonn, the *New York Times*, October 14, 1959.

⁴⁰ Isaac Deutscher, the *Statesman*, Delhi, December 23, 1959.

⁴¹ The *New York Times*, October 27, 28, 1959. However, the West German press deplored these tactics. De Gaulle received the brunt of the criticism for his excessive stubbornness. A normally pro-Government newspaper in Dortmund suggested that if France continued to balk, the U.S. and Britain should meet with Khrushchev without waiting for de Gaulle to join them.

In Munich an independent newspaper publisher regretted that "the patriarch who had governed the country with visible success and brought it back into society began to make policy more and more behind closed doors."—Sydney Gruson, Bonn, the *New York Times*, October 27, November 2, 1959.

argument that Mr. Khrushchev must be put on probation for several months to test the sincerity of Russia's devotion to peace," and the postponement of the Western summit meeting to December 19 was regarded as "an unpleasant but unavoidable tribute" to the power of Adenauer and de Gaulle.⁴²

The interval was utilized by the President in his world tour to mobilize sentiment for negotiations and peace. In this endeavor he had great success. Yet when he arrived in Paris the single concrete thing which emerged from the conference was an agreement to invite Khrushchev to the summit on April 27. Nevertheless, that was the essential point, especially since the summit conference was proposed as the first of a series. This acceptance of Macmillan's idea was an achievement in itself, since it removed the objection of a great let-down if nothing much was settled at the conference. The opposite assumption was now accepted, that the two sides would continue to meet and to discuss and gradually to make peace. This was the presumption which the world had been waiting for during fourteen years, during most of which it seemed fantastically unattainable.

Aside from this great gain, the Paris meeting also agreed to suggest to the five Communist members of the ten nation disarmament commission that this body start work around March 15, and a conference of twelve nations, including the United States, was called for January 13 to consider ways of preventing the splitting of West Europe economically between the Common Market Six and the Outer Seven.

Beyond this the expected confrontation between the President and de Gaulle over the latter's refusal to integrate French forces under NATO command did not take place. The two leaders talked only 40 minutes in all and adjourned early. Everything was referred to committees of experts. All hard planning for the summit was postponed.⁴³

The conference had had to be held to prove that Adenauer and de Gaulle could not delay the summit meeting indefinitely, but the Germans at once endeavored to prove that the concessions made on West Berlin at Geneva had been withdrawn. The British denied this firmly and the Russians could be depended on to supply the pressure at the summit for further concessions.

All in all the President had richly earned the torch-lighted welcome that awaited him as he returned to the White House for Christmas. The *New York Times* spoke truly when it said that his triumphant procession across three continents had "changed the international climate" and that the year 1960 might be remembered as "one in which the cold war entered a stage of earnest and almost continuous conversation."⁴⁴

On October 1, after Khrushchev's visit to the United States, a thoughtful observer had recorded that "Mr. Eisenhower brought honor to himself, dignity to his office, distinction to his nation, and hope to the cause of peace. He has never enjoyed more public respect than he does now, nor has he ever deserved it so much."⁴⁵

⁴² Max Freedman, *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, November 5, 1959.

⁴³ See especially the *Economist*, December 26, and the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, December 24, 1959.

⁴⁴ December 21, 22, 1959.

⁴⁵ Max Freedman, *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, October 1, 1959.

All this was even more true after he had carried the message of peace to so many nations. The President had done his part to establish the necessity of making peace and he had done it magnificently. The date for the summit conference which had been delayed for so many years was finally set for May 16 in Paris, after Khrushchev had felt unable to come on April 27.

This meeting might only make a beginning in the making of peace, by advancing agreement upon a new status for West Berlin and by continuing the ban on nuclear tests, but the world now had a right to expect that this much would be accomplished and other advances set in motion.

THE FRUSTRATED SUMMIT AT PARIS

JANUARY-JUNE 1960

THE preceding chapter was written in late January 1960, with some unexpressed misgiving that something would happen to frustrate the summit conference in the long delay before it finally met.

The danger that a revolution or an outbreak of violence somewhere would poison the atmosphere and prevent the meeting was obvious, but even more ominous was the long time given to those on both sides who did not want negotiations to erode the basis for them.

THE LONG RETREAT FROM NEGOTIATIONS

As month succeeded month it became clear that this was happening in the West, and even before the U-2 spy plane sensation it was plain that President Eisenhower had lost his campaign when he let the Western Summit Meeting in Paris, in December 1959, pass without asserting his leadership as the head of the Western coalition over President de Gaulle.

De Gaulle Ascendant. When the Paris meetings adjourned after a couple of short perfunctory sessions between the two presidents the leadership passed to de Gaulle. The summit conference could not meet until his lofty sense of grandeur had been satisfied and this required many previous conditions. Explicitly, Premier Khrushchev had to visit him in Paris and he had to go to London and Washington. Implicitly the French A-bombs had to be exploded first. Finally the conference could take place—in Paris.

President Eisenhower had a plan. He wanted to relax the tensions of the Cold War and begin to make peace, even at Berlin where the danger was greatest. But President de Gaulle also had a plan, a grandiose one in which there was no place for such minor maneuvers as Eisenhower envisaged, especially since Eisenhower's endeavor involved some pain to de Gaulle's ally, Chancellor Adenauer.

De Gaulle's plan assumed a quiet decade or two during which a great "new world power under French leadership" could develop in Western Europe, based on its skill and industry and upon the resources of the French Community in Africa. He therefore agreed with Dr. Adenauer "in delaying any serious negotiations with Russia until Western Europe can develop its latent strength." Then Western Europe would be "able to negotiate with Russia on equal terms and will no longer depend on American protection."¹

Thus Europe, which had twice ruined itself and plunged the world into war

¹ *The Observer*, December 13, 1959. This chapter was written in London in June 1960.

since 1900 would presently emerge again as a kind of *arbiter mundi*. In the meantime, de Gaulle insisted on his admission to a three-power directorate of the "free world" which would direct its strategy in every part of the globe, until the new West European power could really elevate French leadership to world proportions. Quiet was obviously necessary while this grand design was being developed, and the Americans and Russians would need to conduct themselves accordingly. Eisenhower would have to put aside his naive idea of negotiating with the Russians now, and Khrushchev would have to forego his hope of making peace with Eisenhower. Berlin? That did not matter, because Khrushchev was merely bluffing there.

To his role as the new leader of the West, pending the growth of his independent power in Europe and Africa—the latter rushing into independence with lightning speed, French territories included—de Gaulle brought little strength in being. As the weakest of the Western powers, France was beset by two revolts in Algeria, one by the Europeans and another by the natives. The war with the Arabs was waged relentlessly and endlessly, year after year, requiring nearly all of the French Army, embittered by twenty years of waging losing wars. In France, de Gaulle had removed most of his other armed forces from NATO control and in effect he had ejected the American strategic bombers from France. His atomic arsenal was yet to come and he had no means of delivering it. Hence his demand that disarmament begin with the abolition and control of missiles and long-range bombers. It was doubtful that even the Franco-German combination could afford the fantastic expense of competing in the runaway arms race.

Altogether, de Gaulle had no means for taking a commanding role in world politics, except France's geographical location and his own high sense of destiny. Nevertheless, as observers frequently noted, he acted just as if he had all the elements of strength which he so evidently lacked, and by June 1960 he was being hailed by some Americans as the only firm rock in a world beset by unprecedented earthquakes and tidal waves, both natural and diplomatic.

Eisenhower Compliant. This astonishing outcome was due to President Eisenhower's failure to exercise positive leadership in preparing for the summit meeting. As Robert Stephens, diplomatic correspondent of the *London Observer* put it on December 27, 1959, only a benign confusion had replaced the iron certainties of Mr. Dulles. The British believed that an agreement about Berlin could be concluded at the summit; the French and West Germans were opposed, since any change would worsen the Western position. President Eisenhower was "committed to negotiate about Berlin with Mr. Khrushchev, but just how nobody really yet knows."

It was obvious that Eisenhower's policy could succeed only if he insisted constantly that real progress must be made before the summit toward agreement on Berlin, nuclear tests and disarmament. But instead of this watchful insistence he permitted endless meetings to decide that nothing would be done about Berlin; the disarmament negotiations drifted into the usual deadlock and he was unable to restrain his own officials from planning to resume underground atomic tests. He neglected also to order a halt to espionage

plane flights over the Soviet Union. He seems to have assumed that if he created a better atmosphere, which he did magnificently, it would all work out. He had institutionalized the presidency and he continued to leave it to others to make the all-important day-to-day decisions which would determine the outcome of the supreme and final effort of his career.

Khrushchev Pushing Détente. On January 10, 1960, Harry Schwartz wrote about Khrushchev's campaign to make sure that in the Soviet orbit "nothing untoward happens between now and May 16." Not even Yugoslavia was being forgotten "in this effort to button up Eastern Europe." On the same day Drew Middleton cabled about uneasiness in the British Government over the long delay in the summit meeting. They had wanted President Eisenhower to attend in the plenitude of his powers and before the approach of the 1960 election put him under internal political pressure.²

On January 14, Khrushchev told the Supreme Soviet and a national radio audience that during the next year or two the Soviet Union would reduce its armed forces from 3,623,000 men to 2,423,000.³ This meant that 250,000 officers would be released from their secure living quarters and work, to go to school, learn a trade and work harder for less pay. Within a month the spectacle of Defense Chief Marshal Malinovsky "stumping the country to explain the new policy to outraged brass hats" showed that it was being "put through in the teeth of professional opposition."⁴ On January 22, a Soviet 8000 mile rocket hit about a mile off target in the Pacific. On the 24th, Philip Noel-Baker stated his belief that the Soviet Union was genuinely prepared to disarm drastically and to accept stiff controls, if the Western nations would do likewise.

Pentagon and AEC Oppose Disarmament and Détente. On January 30, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission hinted that it had a stockpile of "sophisticated" new weapons ready to try out, if the moratorium on tests should be called off.⁵ In the *New Statesman* on February 20, Paul Johnson explained how a test ban agreement would "place an ever-tightening strait-jacket on the arms race." The Teller group in the United States was angry and frustrated because it had nearly a dozen devices waiting to be tested. If a permanent, enforceable ban on tests were agreed to "the arms race would grind gradually to a standstill." On February 16, a new Soviet proposal offered to allow the West to inspect almost any suspicious explosion on Soviet territory, but only a few times a year.

On February 3, President Eisenhower, in a bow in the direction of de Gaulle and Adenauer, said that the United States should share its atom bombs with its allies. This led the Executive Committee of the Federation of Atomic Scientists to say the next day that supplying atomic weapons and technology to our trusted allies would "make inevitable the spread of nuclear technology throughout the world and virtually doom us to the ultimate calamity of nuclear war." After this step there would be no hope of preventing these

² *The New York Times*, January 10, 1960.

⁴ Paul Johnson, *New Statesman*, February 20, 1960.

⁵ *The New York Times*, January 31, 1960.

³ *Ibid.*, January 15, 1960.

devastating weapons from "sweeping further into completely irresponsible hands."

While one group of American scientists fumed to get on with the business of perfecting new means of atomic destruction, the main body of scientists warned that for humanity the clock of nuclear doom was ticking away.⁶

On February 12 France exploded her first A-bomb in the Sahara, stirring angry protests in surrounding countries. During the fortnight centering on March 1, Eisenhower made a triumphal tour through the main countries of Latin America. He told the Brazilian Congress, on February 24, that the United States would consider it intervention in the internal affairs of the Americas if any power denied freedom of choice to any republic in the Western hemisphere "by invasion, coercion or subversion."

During his absence the Pentagon revived its plan for high-level flights to Berlin, above the customary 10,000 feet level. Such flights would expand the capacity of the air corridors, open them to free use of jet aircraft and enable us to photograph nearly everything in East Germany. The Russians declared their adamant opposition, on March 1, and when the President returned he quashed the proposal. His decision "caused dismay in West Germany."

On March 14, the West gave its elaborate arms control plan to the Reds on the eve of the opening of the ten-nation, equal-sides disarmament conference in Geneva. It was a wonderful plan, calling for a new enforcement organization that would become a world government to be effective.⁷

Its provision for stages and steps led the *Times of India* to say on April 13 that the plan was "so detailed on the question of controls and so vague on specific matters of disarmament" that it was possible to appreciate the Russian complaint that the Western powers wanted to discuss controls without discussing disarmament. In particular, the West's insistence on beginning with stock-taking was surely unrealistic. The demand was "based on the premise that the Russians cannot be trusted to reveal their actual military strength. But any acceptance of the demand for preliminary stock-taking curiously presupposed implicit faith in the *bona fides* of the Western Powers."

On their part, the Soviet plan called for complete disarmament in four stages and in four years. It was vague on how and when controls would go into effect, the Russians arguing that when principles were accepted discussion could go forward on controls. One of the Soviet principles was the liquidation of all U.S. overseas bases. Thus deadlock soon developed over the opposite approaches of the two sides.

On March 16 it was announced that the United States planned an underground atomic blast in 1961 for "peaceful" purposes. Three days later the Soviet Union countered at the 188th session of the test negotiations with an

⁶ On May 16, some 1359 members of the Harvard University faculties urged President Eisenhower to end the testing of nuclear weapons. They pleaded for the acceptance of "the creative risks" which confront any individual or nation as it moves forward.

This was a heartening exception to the passive acceptance by American academic communities of the cold war drift toward annihilation.

⁷ When a Western Ambassador thought he understood the plan after reading it three times, a disarmament specialist said the man must be a genius.—A. M. Rosenthal, *The New York Times*, March 27, 1960.

offer to accept the U.S. plan to ban all major tests, if the U.S. would accept a moratorium on the "little" underground ones, of a duration to be agreed upon, while joint research on detection methods proceeded. At the end of March Macmillan flew to Washington to plead for acceptance of the proposal, and to counter a widespread tendency in Washington to label it phony. On the 30th it was announced that agreement on a voluntary moratorium had been reached. "Once again in the making of U.S. high policy the controlling factor was world opinion."⁸

On May 7, after the U-2 espionage plane affair had exploded, President Eisenhower announced a series of underground nuclear tests to improve the detection of subterranean explosions. Officials emphasized that no weapons development was intended. Days later it was announced that the Russians would be invited to attend these tests, but it was soon admitted that the law forbade showing them the devices to be exploded and they refused to attend. They could only be permitted to see a row of twelve coffin-like black boxes and to stand guard over them to see that the order in which they were exploded was not changed.

After the failure of the summit conference the President was strongly urged to break off both the test and disarmament negotiations by Defense Secretary Gates and AEC Chairman McCone, before he left Paris.⁹ Earlier, on March 20, the "Week in Review" editor of the *New York Times* said that disarmament officials admitted that "negotiations with the Russians is only 50 per cent of their problem. The other 50 per cent is negotiating with our own people, above all convincing the military that certain forms of disarmament can be in the national interest."

It was not true, as the Soviet leaders believed, that the military and the AEC had seized full control of American policy, but they had done what they could to get the nuclear arms race going again, full blast. They were both conditioned and aided by the secrecy mania which had seized them when the first A-bomb was achieved. On May 18, Dr. I. I. Rabi traced many of our difficulties to the fundamental distortion of our natural habit "caused by the exaggerated secrecy in the military field and in the atomic field especially." Because of it policy makers made decisions in "pathetic and profound ignorance of the facts," and public opinion was "formed by leaks, innuendoes and sometimes by outright distortion of the actual facts."¹⁰

On March 27 Philip Noel-Baker, the world's greatest authority on disarmament, said: "If I were asked to bet I would say it was about even that within 10 years Governments will not have disarmed. We shall have had a

⁸ Arthur Krock, the *New York Times*, March 31, 1960. Krock deplored the disparaging adjectives applied to Chairman McCone of the AEC because of his desire for underground tests to "produce the small tactical nuclear weapons needed for limited war."

⁹ Joseph Alsop, *New York Herald Tribune*, European ed., May 24, 1960.

¹⁰ The *New York Times*, May 19, 1960. At the same meeting of the National Academy of Science two other outstanding pioneers of the atomic era, Drs. Leo Szilard and Eugene P. Wigner, stated their fears that the elaborate system proposed to control atomic tests would lead to confusion, friction and difficulty.

In other words, disarmament efforts based on total secrecy and total mistrust were likely to lead to total failure by demanding total security.

nuclear war; we, our children and grandchildren will all be dead; and the world will be spinning a lifeless radio-active incinerated globe throughout eternity."¹¹

This was not an alarmist statement. On the basis of both past and contemporary power conflicts it was a realistic appraisal.

Resurgent West Germany Leading. The retreat from serious negotiations about Berlin began when the summit meeting was long postponed and the December 1959 NATO Council meeting reaffirmed the static position of the West about Germany and Berlin. On February 5, the Warsaw Pact leaders met in Moscow to reaffirm the Soviet position that a separate peace treaty would be signed with East Germany unless an agreement about Berlin could be reached.

On February 11, Alistair Cooke said, after a visit to Adlai Stevenson, that "He believes, in dead earnestness, that the Eisenhower Administration is committing a disastrous folly in saying that it wants nothing so much as peace and yet spreading the notion that the only terms available to the Soviet Union are unconditional surrender."¹²

On February 17, Eisenhower said that he expected that the position taken by the West on Berlin would represent "the common convictions" of Britain, France, West Germany and the United States. The other three were "in very close touch" with the Bonn Government. This was equivalent to saying that nothing would be done about Berlin, as Adenauer had made plain the day before when he said that the non-communist world risked the loss of West Germany if it jeopardized the freedom of West Berlin in negotiations with the Soviet Union. The word of the free nations, especially the United States, was at stake. To yield on Berlin would result in Germany's loss of confidence in the Allies.¹³

This was an open threat that West Germany would tumble into the arms of communism and of the Soviet Union if any change was made in the status of Berlin. Currently, news leaked out that West Germany was negotiating with Spain for bases there, which would be outside all the controls and safeguards which NATO had over German armaments. It had been discovered that West Germany was too small and too near the front lines to play the part of a great military power. She needed room for training and "safety" for her military stores. What better place than in Franco Spain, where the Americans had already set the example? Yet the move alarmed and distressed Western Europe and was put in abeyance temporarily.

On March 4 and 5, R. R. Chowdhury returned to India after a visit to Germany and wrote two arresting articles for the *New Delhi Statesman*. In the first he analyzed the widening gap between the two Germanies, with two economic systems which were poles apart that had come to stay. He was in no doubt that reunification meant to the West Germans the complete dissolution of the East German economy. But this was only the beginning. There was "a vigorous and unceasing campaign" for the recovery of the 44,000 square miles beyond East Germany which had been lost to Poland and the

¹¹ *The Sunday Statesman*, New Delhi, March 27, 1960.

¹² *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, February 11, 1960.

¹³ Sydney Gruson, *the New York Times*, February 16, 1960.

Soviet Union. German maps included these lands, and people said angrily that the Poles and Russians behaved as if these territories were legally theirs. Officials insisted that there could be no real relaxation of world tension until all parts of Germany are reunited, peacefully of course.

In the middle of March the absolute master of this new pacific Germany, which we had been pushing for ten years toward the military mastery of Western Europe, went to Washington to nail down his veto of any concessions at West Berlin.¹⁴ Earlier reports had indicated that his task would not be difficult, and on March 15 President Eisenhower agreed with him that the right of self-determination must be the basis of any agreement affecting West Berlin. Adenauer was "highly satisfied" with this reversion to our old position on Germany, and on March 20 he announced on a U.S. television program, carried also to Western Europe, that there were "no big compromises possible" on West Berlin at the summit. President Eisenhower had told him that "the flag of the United States will continue to fly over Berlin." Adenauer added that he did not foresee any possibility of war over Berlin, since Khrushchev "does not want any war."¹⁵

Washington had accepted the thesis currently carried in more than one hundred full-page West German advertisements in the United States, with a comparable spread in Britain, saying that if Africans were entitled to self-determination Germans must be. This easy way out of the consequences of two German world wars did not appeal to Mr. Khrushchev, who was utilizing his eleven day stay in France to warn the French people incessantly that a rearmed Germany would seek outlets in Western Europe, not in the East. This assertion was rejected by de Gaulle, who was stiff and unsmiling in the presence of his guest. At Verdun Khrushchev spoke of Adenauer's recent claim in Rome that God had invested Germany with the mission of saving Europe and recalled that Hitler had had the same mission.¹⁶

President de Gaulle rejected these ideas completely. Sulzberger reported from Paris on March 30 that de Gaulle's talks with Khrushchev had resembled a dialogue of the deaf. De Gaulle calculated that Germany would remain divided. Therefore France could work safely with West Germany and guide her. After his army was eventually freed from Algerian battlefields he wanted it to possess its own nuclear striking force, "making it dominant in West Europe." De Gaulle hoped that "one day France can be 'the arbiter between the Anglo-Saxon and Soviet camps.'"¹⁷

¹⁴ On February 24, Sydney Gruson cabled from Bonn that Adenauer had "never played such a lone hand in policy making as at present. No one can be said to be completely in his confidence. . . ."

¹⁵ *The New York Times*, March 16, 17, 20, 21, 1960.

¹⁶ On April 7 the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* reported that for eleven days Khrushchev had dominated the scene in France. He was impressive, good tempered and forceful as he answered questions at his press conference, in spite of some that were "singularly silly."

¹⁷ *The New York Times*, March 30, 1960. On March 27 it was announced that West Germany would build 12 small submarines. This recalled that astounding day in 1935 when British negotiators signed a naval treaty with Hitler, conceding his right to build as many submarines as Britain had, and as many other warships as he could afford. Then after 1939 Britain was almost strangled by German submarines for the second time.

"*The Sinking Summit.*" As de Gaulle dreamed of guiding and controlling the new West German armed forces, which in their infancy would soon exceed all other NATO forces in Europe, the *Economist* published a prophetic article on March 26 which said:

"Mr. Eisenhower must be presumed to persist, in his own mind, with the intention of trying to move toward an agreement with Mr. Khrushchev. . . . But he has failed, from the beginning, both to work out exactly what concessions the United States might have to make, and to apply the energy needed to rally the country behind him. The result has been that the opposition, silenced after his talks with Mr. Khrushchev at Camp David, is now active and vocal again and, being clear-minded where the President is indeterminate, has succeeded in narrowing the area of manoeuvre both at the summit and in Moscow afterwards."

It was increasingly clear that the President "has still failed to think through the consequences of his invitation to Mr. Khrushchev last summer." From his press conferences it had steadily emerged that he was reluctant "to envisage more than a minimum change in West Berlin;" no question of recognizing East Germany, nothing to be given up without the absolute certainty that Russia makes an equivalent sacrifice; rather than any concessions deadlock would do.

The big question was whether Mr. Khrushchev would hold his hand until the new President was installed. To the Soviet leaders, "now hesitating on the brink of accepting an international inspectorate for the first time, the idea of taking so drastic a step without the assurance of continuity in American policy must seem . . . downright foolhardy."¹⁸

Berlin Concessions Ruled Out. As if to confirm the judgment of the *Economist* that the American opponents of making peace had already reversed the Camp David assumptions, Secretary of State Herter made an address in Chicago on April 4 in which he agreed with de Gaulle that charges of militarism in West Germany were "completely without foundation." He criticized Khrushchev for not permitting self-determination to the 17,000,000 East Germans and declared that failure to reunite Germany would "inevitably result in jeopardizing the peace of the world."

This return to arguing about East Germany, instead of West Berlin, indicated a decision to maintain firmly the Western foot in the door of the East at West Berlin.

On April 14, *Pravda* carried a 4000 word statement expressing confidence that a "partial and temporary" agreement on West Berlin could be reached. The Foreign Ministers Conference at Geneva had shown there was a chance to work out "individual principles" for a temporary settlement. The article objected to Herter's Chicago speech, but called some points in it sensible. Its readers were assured that the spirit of Camp David had not vanished. Two days later Max Frankel wrote from Moscow that now that he was within

¹⁸ The *Economist* located the opposition to any détente "in the Pentagon and the Atomic Energy Commission and in some sections of the State Department."

sight of the summit Premier Khrushchev seemed respectfully silent. It was certain that Moscow would make no move in the next month to jeopardize its success. Soviet commentaries on the two Geneva arms conferences had been "restrained and mature." A series of summit meetings was envisaged, with some give on both sides. Thus whatever he might say at the summit Mr. Khrushchev was "likely to say it in hopeful and pleasant tones." He would try to leave Paris "as the reasonable leader of a reasonable, if all-powerful, state."¹⁹

As the *Pravda* article was being published, the Western foreign ministers met in Washington and decided that the West should return to its starting point on Berlin and Germany, the demand for internationally supervised elections in both Germanies to unify them. The *Pravda* suggestion that the summit should start where the Geneva conference left off was rejected. On April 17 a *New York Times* editor thought these decisions might be for bargaining purposes, but on April 21, Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon made a speech which went beyond maneuvering. He declared Berlin to be the central summit issue and said that no issue on earth was more critical. Restating the domino theory, full strength, he declared that no nation could preserve its faith in the free world's "collective security" systems "if we permitted the courageous people of West Berlin to be sold into slavery." He accepted "the issue of peace or war" and affirmed that the problem of Berlin and Germany could only be solved through German reunification. While Germany remained divided it would be a powder keg.

We are willing, Dillon said, to consider interim arrangements to reduce tensions in Berlin, "But we are determined to maintain our presence in Berlin and to preserve its ties with the Federal Republic. We will not accept any arrangement which might become a first step toward abandonment of West Berlin. . . ."

Then he went on to say that Khrushchev had been doing a great deal of talking about Berlin and Germany and his words left "the inescapable impression that the Soviet view of Berlin is far removed from the facts. . . . Moreover, the so-called German Democratic Republic is one of the outstanding myths in a vast Communist web of prodigious mythology." West Berlin was entirely independent of the so-called German Democratic Republic and it would remain so. Mr. Khrushchev complained about the abnormal situation in Berlin, but this was due to the monstrous abnormality of the "artificial separation of the East Zone from the remainder of Germany." Then he demanded the liquidation of the left-overs of World War II by free elections in East Germany and North Korea, and by the stoppage of Soviet vetoes in the UN Security Council. We were not prepared to permit the isolation and engulfment of West Berlin and when Mr. Khrushchev talked about signing a separate peace treaty with the so-called German Democratic Republic he was "skating on very thin ice."²⁰

¹⁹ *The New York Times*, April 15, 17, 1960. Currently the East German Government advocated a phased reduction of Allied military forces in West Berlin and the gradual revision of Allied rights there. At the same time it insisted that the proposed free city should be militarily neutralized and economically linked with East Germany.—*Manchester Guardian Weekly*, April 21, 1960.

²⁰ *The New York Times*, AFL-CIO Sunday Supplement, April 24, 1960.

If words meant anything, there was no room left for any agreement that would in any degree satisfy the East about the Berlin enclave.

A day or two later Georgi A. Zhukov, a trusted aide of Premier Khrushchev, came quietly to Washington, talked to several officials and prominent newspaper men and left on April 26 as quietly as he had arrived. He came to see if the Herter-Dillon speeches meant that "the cold war had started up all over again," and to charge that starting around March 15 the Voice of America had begun following a tougher anti-Soviet line. His comments as he left for Moscow indicated that he had not gained any reassurance.²¹

Khrushchev's Baku Reply. On April 25, Khrushchev replied to the Herter-Dillon speeches in an address at Baku. He would "go to Paris with the most sincere intention" to help improve the international atmosphere and to reach mutual understanding. He regarded the long negotiations about stopping tests as useful. Most of the articles of a treaty had been agreed upon. The Soviet Union had proposed a four or five year moratorium in which to improve underground detection methods, because AEC Chairman McCone had said it would take that long. Now the Western powers said this time was excessive.

He reaffirmed his position that "Disarmament is the basic issue which has to be solved if the danger of a new war is to be removed. War is a great calamity and it would be a real disaster for the peoples. . . . Many nations would be literally wiped out. The remedy was "disarmament and not control over armaments." On the Soviet side, "we shall do everything to bring about disarmament, combined with the most comprehensive and far reaching control."

For humanity there was "only one way out: It is necessary to recognize the need for the peaceful coexistence of states, with the capitalist and socialist systems, and to build normal, healthy relations and scientific cooperation. There is no other way out, because the other way out is war."

Taking up the Dillon speech he noted that the United States would "not be willing to reach an agreement on disarmament and on the ways of improving East-West relations unless its view on the Berlin question is accepted." He did not add that the Herter speech had also tied these things together.

He suggested that Dillon's speech was perhaps "no more than a manifestation of the pugnacity of a diplomat who took it into his head that some pressure on the other side before the talks might make it more compliant," but he warned that those who took a tough position and refused to budge an inch would not be able to continue to keep their troops in West Berlin. The Soviet leaders had analyzed their proposal for a free city, "over and over, trying to see whether it contained anything that would detriment our partners" and they could find nothing of the kind. "Such a solution would reliably guarantee the freedom of West Berlin residents and safeguard the population of the city from any interference in their internal affairs," including "firm

²¹ James Reston, the *New York Times*, April 27; Harrison Salisbury, May 17, 1960.

guarantees of unhindered economic and cultural ties between that city and all countries." No one intended "to encroach upon the freedom, property and the rights of West Berlin residents."

If this solution was rejected he warned again that a peace treaty with the G.D.R. would give it sovereign rights over its entire state territory and the Western powers would "naturally forfeit the right of access to West Berlin by land, water and air." For those who thought that they could afterwards maintain the presence of the Western troops in West Berlin by force, he warned "such hotheads that when they start invoking force . . . it is but natural that this force will be countered with the force of the other side. . . ."

He hoped that at Paris "we would be able to find a common language and to eliminate by further efforts the existing tension. The Soviet Government trusts that common sense will prevail, that when the summit meeting closes and the participants in the conference depart from Paris, the relations between the countries represented at the talks will be better than they were before and not the other way around."

Berlin To Be Placed "on Ice." In Washington de Gaulle rejected this appeal for some progress toward the settlement of the Berlin problem. He had arrived in Washington after a warm and impressive welcome to London, where the people remembered the time when he, alone among top French leaders, had rallied to Britain's side during the dark days of World War II. In the United States his welcome was all that he could wish, complete with great cheering crowds, motorcades and ticker tape. At the height of it, in his press conference on April 23, he did not see any possibility of a solution of the Berlin problem at Paris. It was "highly possible in an atmosphere of détente and after the passage of time, that a certain modus vivendi will appear which will be acceptable to both sides."

The conference should center on disarmament, beginning with the "control of rockets, strategic aircraft and ships capable of carrying nuclear bombs to all corners of the world."

What de Gaulle wanted, explained Robert C. Doty from Paris on the same day, was "a relaxation of those forms of international tension and rivalry that place an excessive value on the power factors in which France is relatively weak, and in which the Soviet Union and the United States are strong." He wanted stable conditions of peace in which a reviving Western Europe under French leadership could influence the decisions of the super-powers instead of being influenced by them.²²

The Eisenhower-de Gaulle communiqué reflected de Gaulle's view that the main purpose of the summit would be "to achieve an easing of tensions in the international situation." On the previous day the two Presidents issued a joint statement saying that they were in agreement on "how we should proceed at the summit meeting." Evidently nothing was to be done about Berlin. As Sulzberger analyzed the situation, Berlin was to be placed "in a diplomatic ice box." This was "the undefined purpose of next month's summit meeting." After a year of steady consultation the West had devised "no fresh

²² *The New York Times*, April 24, 1960.

Berlin approach. We are back where we were before the Geneva foreign ministers' talks; only now we seem pleasantly convinced that Khrushchev, rather charmingly, doesn't mean what he says." We seemed to reckon that "all we have to do is to talk to Khrushchev vaguely about vague things" and keep our statesmen in orbit over Berlin. Paris and London solemnly asserted that he would be "happy to talk about other things than Berlin, even though the Berlin crisis is the reason for the summit." Though he had told everybody, many times, that he would sign a separate peace with East Germany, it seemed to be assumed that he would not be able to do so while Eisenhower was in Russia in June. Afterwards Premier Menderes of Turkey would be visiting the Soviet Union. But putting statesmen in orbit was no adequate substitute for policy. West Berlin would still be isolated.²³

On May 4 the North Atlantic Council met at Istanbul, in the midst of the martial law declared by Premier Menderes to preserve his waning power, and declared entire agreement with the Western policies for the summit. The fifteen foreign ministers ratified the position that "the solution of the problem of Germany can be found only in reunification on the basis of self-determination." This aspiration had lacked any political reality for many years. There was no prospect whatever that it could be implemented, and if there had been, all of the NATO ministers who lived around Germany would have been appalled and profoundly alarmed for the future of their countries, yet with one accord they stood up and voted for the unattainable. All were in favor of disregarding completely not only their own interest but the stake of the entire East in the outcome of World War II. This is what passed for statesmanship during the eight months before the summit. The NATO Council again voiced "determination to protect the freedom of the people of West Berlin."

Deadlock Determined. In any group of people agreement can always be had on any issue by accepting the position of the most adamant man. When he has spoken, many times if necessary, the moderate men can invariably achieve harmony by accepting what he demands. This is the way a bi-partisan foreign policy works; the views of those who want to be the toughest with the Russians or the Chinese prevail.

The same method also gets the same result in an alliance. In the period under review the leaders of the West met and re-met in all of their multi-lateral combinations and they all agreed that nothing would be done about Berlin. The figure of Eisenhower, the man who had seen the need to make some start toward a settlement, faded into the background as the iron certitude of Adenauer and the noble assurance of de Gaulle took the center of the stage.

On May 16, the day the conference was to have opened, the *New York Times* published an article from Paris by James Reston, saying that a critical misunderstanding or misjudgment had arisen in the minds of Soviet spokesmen in Paris, who seemed to be under "the false impression that President Eisenhower decided several weeks ago to avoid a settlement of the Berlin question." Then he reviewed the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting at Camp

²³ The *New York Times*, April 27, 30, 1960.

David, the President's statement after it that the Berlin situation is abnormal and that "We've got to find a system that will be acceptable to all the people in that region, including those most concerned, the West Berliners."

On the basis of this Khrushchev "apparently got the idea that the President was going to come up with some new suggestions for Berlin." But, Reston continued, our experts consulted the West Germans and the West Berliners and "concluded that last year's Western position was the best the United States could offer." The result was "a crisis of absent-mindedness and miscalculation."

This was putting it very mildly indeed. For the Russians it was a crisis of confidence in Eisenhower as the top leader of the West, and as the man who would advance the making of the long delayed peace. During the waiting months before May 16 he had not led; he had left that to others, so that on the main issue the best that could be said on May 16 was that "a crisis of absent-mindedness and miscalculation" had arisen, and this at a time of precious opportunity to lessen the chances of mutual annihilation, an opportunity for which all the world had been yearning.²⁴

THE U-2 CRISIS

On May 5, in an address to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev expressed resentment at two of the President's tactical mistakes on the eve of the conference. Eisenhower had indicated that he might have to hurry back to Washington after a week at Paris or go to Portugal, leaving Mr. Nixon to sit in for him. This was certain to offend the Russians, with their strong sense of protocol. Khrushchev questioned the value of going on with the conference in Eisenhower's absence. He found it "difficult to get rid of the impression that Mr. Nixon bothers about anything, but least of all about . . . ending the cold war and the arms race."

Khrushchev announced also that an American plane had been shot down over the Soviet Union on May 1 and called it "aggressive provocation aimed at wrecking the summit conference." He did "not doubt President Eisenhower's sincere desire for peace," but evidently there were imperialist and militarist circles which restricted him.

The way was accordingly left open for the President to disavow the plane flight. He heard of Khrushchev's announcement about the plane while attending a National Security Council meeting in a secret air-raid alert headquarters.²⁵

There was a sad symbolism in this news item. On the eve of the great gathering which would record the dissipation of his peace crusade, President Eisenhower was deep in the earth, in top-secret, top-level conference, safe presumably from Soviet bomb attacks, at the moment when the shooting down of one of his own espionage planes over Russia was announced. Nothing could dramatize better the immaturity of the super-gang warfare in

²⁴ On May 14, the Washington correspondent of the *London Times* quoted Senator Mansfield as saying that all that had been done was to engage in a vast and costly holding operation—to buy time in order to buy more time.

²⁵ Jack Raymond, the *New York Times*, May 6, 1960.

which the greatest governments in the world still engage. The President had said at Santiago, Chile, on February 29 that "All of us realize no people wants war and we are amazed that Governments succeed sometimes in getting us into war." Yet he felt compelled to go along with the illusions of "defense" in the nuclear age, however dangerous.

First Denial. On May 5 the National Aeronautics and Space Administration promptly issued a "cover" story saying that the pilot of the plane downed in the Soviet Union reported that he was having oxygen trouble over Turkey. The statement described the U-2 plane's value for observing weather patterns, cosmic rays, etc., and listed a number of weather instruments carried. The next day State Department spokesman Lincoln White disputed Soviet allegations that the plane was on an aggressive mission. Assuming that the pilot had lost consciousness due to oxygen failure, he declared: "There was no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet air space, and there never has been."²⁶

Having drawn the American cover story, Khrushchev reported jubilantly on May 7 to wildly cheering Supreme Soviet deputies that the American plane had been shot down near Sverdlovsk, 1200 miles inside the Soviet Union, and that the captured pilot, Francis Gary Powers, had admitted being on a photo-reconnaissance mission all the way across the Soviet Union, from Pakistan to Norway. The plane had taken photographs of large industrial centers, airfields, missile bases and other installations.

Second Statement. In Washington officials debated all through the day. In the evening the uneasy silence was broken by a statement which said that "it had been established that insofar as the authorities are concerned, there was no authorization for any such flights as described by Mr. Khrushchev. Nevertheless, it appears that in endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain a flight over Soviet territory was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U-2 plane." The unarmed nature of the "civilian" plane was stressed three times in the short statement. Assuming the right to obtain information about anything which the Soviets concealed, it complained that the Soviet Union had rejected our open skies offer made in 1955. Therefore "in relation to the danger of surprise attack" our planes had made flights "along" the frontiers of the free world for the past four years.

As Philip Deane reported from Washington to the *Observer* that the U-2 pilots carried gold jewelry and a suicide kit, Soviet newspapers carried photographs of these items and others taken from Powers, and Reston described "a sad and perplexed capital caught in a swirl of charges of clumsy administration, bad judgment and bad faith." It was depressed and humiliated by the charge of lying. Baldwin spoke of the United States being caught red-handed in a major espionage operation. Others thought that our explanations of previous planes downed in the Soviet Union would now receive less credence and the Defense Department maintained a prudent silence about its angry

²⁶ The *New York Times*, May 6, 7, 1960. On May 6 the *London Times* said that "If it were deliberate, the flight of the American research aircraft into Russian skies on May Day was an act of reckless folly."

refutations saying that the U-2 could not possibly have gone so far, at least a thousand miles in excess of its fuel capacity.²⁷

In London, the *News Chronicle* thought the President "should be furious with blundering subordinates who used this method of espionage so close to the summit meeting." The *Times* suggested that Khrushchev might be more alarmed by the announcement that America would resume underground tests. It was common knowledge that sections of the Pentagon were "anxious to develop small nuclear warheads for weapons." Or would he "fear that the military may be tempted to steal another march behind the President's back?"

The editors of the *New York Times* looked into the abyss by which we stood and saw that little remedies would not do. They wrote: "For fear we must substitute peace of mind; for suspicion we must substitute a system of international relations under which confidence will be guaranteed; for the overwhelming and ruinous confrontation of brute force we must substitute reason. This is the true American policy, this and not the game of spies and conspiracies."²⁸

This was the voice of statesmanship, which unfortunately had not been much heard in the land during the preceding months, while the assumption of settlements at the summit was steadily pared away. Playing the game of power politics instead of striving to make peace had become the order of the day.

On May 9 Victor Zorza, expert on Russian affairs for the *Manchester Guardian*, thought that the most remarkable feature of Khrushchev's speeches in the Supreme Soviet had been "their studied moderation, and his readiness to absolve Mr. Eisenhower of any guilt or even knowledge of the actions he complains about."

This appraisal was borne out by Khrushchev's remarks on May 9 at an embassy reception. He warned the neighbors of the Soviet Union that "if they allow others to fly from their bases to our territory we shall hit at those bases." He charged that the U-2 flight had been deliberately timed for the summit meeting and wanted to know what kind of a state it was in which the military could do such things, but he declared "once again that we want to live not only in peace but also in friendship with the American people." He urged the abandonment of "this exchange of threats. It would be better to speak of peace and friendship, how mutually advantageous it is to trade, how good relations can be established between peoples, how cultural contacts and tourist travel can be developed."

Overflight Right Asserted. On the same day Secretary Herter issued a further statement in which he complained of the almost complete access of the vast Soviet espionage networks to the open societies of the free world, while they kept their own society tightly closed. Then he said:

"I will say frankly that it is unacceptable that the Soviet political system should be given an opportunity to make secret preparations to face the free world with the choice of abject surrender or nuclear destruction.

²⁷ Max Freedman, *The Manchester Guardian*, May 9, 1960.

²⁸ *The New York Times*, May 9, 1960.

"The Government of the United States would be derelict to its responsibility not only to the American people but to free peoples everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack."

Though Mr. Herter did not actually say that the United States would continue to photograph the Soviet Union, in spite of its objections, his statement was universally interpreted to mean that this would be done, especially since he continued that the President had issued "directives to gather by every possible means the information required" to guard against surprise attack. These means had "included extensive aerial surveillance by unarmed civilian aircraft, normally of a peripheral character, but on occasion by penetration."

This statement did three things. First, by associating the President with the espionage flights it rejected Khrushchev's invitation to him to disavow responsibility and made Soviet attacks on the President certain. Second, it denied Russia's right to military security of the most elementary and vital kind, though we ourselves cherished an actual mania about "our" atomic secrets. Third, it challenged Soviet sovereignty itself, making an angry response certain.

Then two days later, on May 11, these points were hammered home by the President in a prepared statement for his news conference. He declared twice that the Soviet Union made "a fetish of secrecy." This made us afraid of "another Pearl Harbor" by "massive surprise attack." Therefore we had to "have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world" because "Our deterrent must never be placed in jeopardy." Accordingly, he had ever since the beginning of his Administration "issued directives to gather, *in every feasible way*," the desired information. (Italics supplied.) All this was "a distasteful but vital necessity." Arguing again for his "open skies" proposal, which he would bring up again at Paris, he contended that "Open societies, in the day of present weapons, are the only answer."

There was, said Felix Belair, Jr., "neither regret nor apology in President Eisenhower's statement of the case nor in the firm measured tones with which he read it." However, he did admit, in response to a question, that "as far as I know" there had never been any Soviet reconnaissance flights over the United States.²⁹

Cold War Logic. The Herter-Eisenhower statements thus revealed to the world, and to the Soviet Union, the indefensible *cul-de-sac* into which the prosecution of containment and the Cold War had led us. We disliked and

²⁹ *The New York Times*, May 12, 1960.

On June 7, 1960, the *London Times* published an article about Defense Secretary Thomas S. Gates which said that in consultation with the State Department he advised the President to assume full responsibility for all U-2 intelligence missions of the previous four years and to "seek, against all tradition and apparently without consulting the Government's legal experts, to make a moral virtue of espionage."

The article added that it was Gates "who gave approval for the ill-fated U-2 mission, under broad plans of the CIA."

feared both communism and the post-war Soviet Union. Therefore both must be contained by armed bases around the Soviet Union. Then the Russians achieved atomic weapons and the power to destroy us, but would not permit us to go and see their military installations. So we went anyway and declared that we had a right to do this. We went anyway and made extensive aerial surveys of the entire country, photographing defense installations. Our high flying planes had, said Vice President Nixon, accumulated hundreds, if not thousands of photographs.³⁰

Then when the inevitable accidental engine failure—or an advance in Soviet technology—brought one of the planes down, there were many comparisons with the activity of Soviet spies in the United States, and even with the presence of Soviet trawlers on the high seas near our missile-firing activities, where they had a legal right to be.

A digest of many American editorials revealed only one, from the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, which pointed out on May 9 that "aerial mapping of bombing targets is something different from the ordinary run of espionage. It is the kind of action that is appropriate to wartime, or the brink of wartime, but is highly provocative at any other time."³¹

No principle of international law was more firmly established than the right of a nation to control plane flights through its air space. It was fixed in multilateral treaties going back to 1919 and had never been questioned. By flying more than thirty U-2 target mapping flights over the Soviet Union,³² the United States had deliberately struck the principle of national sovereignty as damaging a blow as it could suffer in peace time. The effect was to abolish all "ground rules" for keeping the Cold War cold and to assert that anything goes.

This policy was not only indefensible legally but it carried the constant risk of starting the accidental world war that all perceptive people feared. There was no legitimate comparison between a Soviet spy travelling on the ground and an American spy plane flying high over it. A competent analyst wrote that "Since it was impossible for the Russians to know whether the U-2 was merely going to take photographs or was headed for Moscow with a nuclear bomb, such reconnaissance flights are far more dangerous than espionage agents."³³

U-2 Flight Planning. Nothing could be more obvious in a time when "push-button" war had become a fact only waiting to be demonstrated. Yet these flights had become institutionalized, a leading routine part of our "defense" activity. Nothing could exemplify better the age-old maxim that

³⁰ Max Freedman, the *Guardian*, May 18, 1960.

³¹ The *New York Mirror* said: "Whoever permitted the flight-that-failed should be up on the carpet for his sense of timing, but for nothing else. . . . They spy. We spy. It's as simple as that." The *New York Daily News* said: "We're sorry Powers' mission failed, but that is all we regret about this affair." However, the *Kansas City Star* said: "The timing seems to be as incredible as the action itself," and the *San Francisco Chronicle* exclaimed: "We demand that this Government tell the truth when it tells anything."—From the *New York Times*, May 10, 1960.

³² Henry Brandon, *The Sunday Times* of London, May 29, 1960.

³³ Thomas J. Hamilton, the *New York Times*, May 29, 1960.

any kind of offensive measures can be justified as "defense." At intervals the President of the United States himself, his military and scientific advisers, the CIA head, the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff met in the President's office, selected objectives for photographing in the Soviet Union and set down a "time-band" of six weeks to two months for the execution of the missions. The President's "pass" approval was good only for this period.

The Powers' flight was authorized about the middle of March 1960. It was expected that the Soviets would launch a spectacular space flight from the Aral Sea region on May Day, but there were also "specific targets to be photographed, ranging from the borders of Afghanistan to the Arctic Ocean."³⁴

Cancellation of Flights During the Summit Rejected. During, before and after Mr. Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September this high level activity, in every sense of the word, had been suspended. Something told our leaders that it was hardly compatible with a top level attempt to move toward settling the Cold War. The "spirit of Camp David" was put into practice. But after the date of the agreed summit meeting had been left subject to de Gaulle's prestige requirements, the business of "defense" took over. Too much time was elapsing. Some defense development in the Soviet Union might be missed.

As the time for the summit conference approached, upon which the hopes of all peoples were so strongly centered, did the espionage flight planners decide to suspend the flights again, lest something happen to ruin the conference? They considered it, but by this time the spirit of Cold War had recovered control. Instead of holding the U-2's while the world held its breath for success at the summit meeting, it was decided to send a U-2 across the heart of the Soviet Union.

Secretary of State Herter testified at the Senate inquiry that "The decision not to suspend this program of flights, as the summit meeting approached, was a sound decision." Conditions at a later season would have "prevented obtaining very important information." (Others explained that the absence of cloud cover and the long Arctic day would give the Powers' flight the right conditions.) Then Herter's formal statement continued: "We believe it unwise to lower our vigilance because of *these political negotiations.*" (Italics added.)³⁵

Nothing could demonstrate more sharply the extent to which the cold war mentality had recovered its grip on Washington. We could not stop photographing Russia for military purposes, and violating her sovereignty flagrantly, because of "these political negotiations." First things had to be kept first. Was a supposedly supreme effort to make peace to interfere with taking a few more pictures of Russia's defenses?

Why the pictures had to have priority was explained fully by Secretary

³⁴ This account is based on two corroborative articles by Hanson W. Baldwin, the *New York Times*, May 30; Henry Brandon, the *Sunday Times*, London, May 29, 1960. Washington experts had explained the management system to Baldwin.

³⁵ The *New York Times*, May 28, 1960.

Herter, under questioning by Senator Albert Gore, of Tennessee. If "the summit conference had debarred carrying out these flights the President's visit to Russia may have been the next thing that might have debarred them." Or, Herter continued, Khrushchev's visit to France might have debarred them. "There may have been any number of diplomatic reasons why they shouldn't be conducted at a given period of time. In my opinion, the value of the information and the necessity of carrying out these flights under given conditions warranted their going ahead." Did he give specific consideration to the question of continuing the flights "during or near the time of the summit conference?" "Certainly," answered Herter. Did he give his approval? "I did," was the reply.

In his radio-TV report to the nation on May 25 the President took "full responsibility" for the U-2 program and for its continuance during the conference period. He maintained that "the question was really whether to halt the program and then forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date. The decision was that the program should not be halted. The plain truth is this: when a nation needs intelligence activity there is no good time when vigilance can be relaxed." Then he explained at length the great importance of the photographs obtained.

This defense revealed two things. First, the usual inability to put ourselves in the other side's place. With our Pearl Harbor complex and some of our H-bombers always in the air, what would we have done if an enemy plane had been sighted over our important defense installations? Yet we trusted the Russians, who had suffered ten thousand Pearl Harbors, to keep calm and spare the world the accidental holocaust that it feared. Also the decision to gather a few more photographs of things Russian during the summit conference showed how little heart Eisenhower had put into the climb to the summit. If he had been straining every nerve for a great achievement that would benefit mankind, no chances would have been taken with spy flights that might wreck it.³⁶

Could the Conference Be Saved? On May 11, the same day that Eisenhower was firmly insisting at his press conference upon the right to violate Russia's sovereignty, Khrushchev questioned, at the exhibit of U-2 equipment, the advisability of Eisenhower's visit to the U.S.S.R., though he left the question for discussion in Paris. Asked if his estimate of the President had changed, he replied: "You know my friendly attitude toward the President.

³⁶ The Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted four days of closed hearings on the U-2 case. In its report, issued June 26, 1960, it found that the U-2 flights had become so routine that neither the President, the Secretary of State, the Acting Secretary of State nor the Secretary of Defense knew that the Powers U-2 was in the air when it was shot down. The Committee did not question the right of the United States to make such flights. It did question the timing of the May 1 flight, but was unable to find out from the high officials before it what important objective there was for that flight. They declined to say, alleging "reasons of security."

The Committee did not think that the broader reasons which the Soviets may have had for aborting the conference would "have led to the precipitate and violent action taken by the Soviet Government in Paris."—*Ibid.*, June 26, 1960.

My hopes have not been justified. . . . I was not aware of the fact that the plan of air espionage over the Soviet Union was not the caprice of an irresponsible officer. I am responsible for the acts of my Government. I was horrified to learn that the President had endorsed those aggressive acts."

The next day Reston thought there was "still just a chance" to save the conference at Paris, but not if the President continued on his present theme. Khrushchev could not let our insistence upon crossing Soviet frontiers pass. "By demanding the *right* to intrude into the Soviet Union the President has defied Khrushchev to stop him, put Khrushchev on the spot with the Stalinists, who have always been against a *détente*, embarrassed the Allies by making their bases a target of Khrushchev's anger; and even repudiated one of Washington's own favorite principles—namely, that each nation has the right to choose its own form of government." The President could not have it both ways; he could not "defy Khrushchev and have his cooperation too."

Also ascribed the turning point to the statements in Washington on May 11 "which knocked all of Khrushchev's offered escape clauses into the next county." Reviewing the events of the first week after the U-2 flight he thought it "almost certain . . . that Khrushchev still intended to begin again very nearly where he had left off in his previous meetings with the Western leaders." But Washington, following the rules laid down long ago by James Hagerty, the President's press secretary, that the President can never be said to be ignorant of anything in his government, "put Khrushchev in a domestic political situation requiring an explosion." The "orthodox, cautious and conservative men in the Kremlin" had insisted that an issue be made of the U-2 flight and in the end Khrushchev probably did not wish to defy the Kremlin consensus.³⁷

Concealed Retreat. In Washington it was soon seen that the decisions of May 11 to avow responsibility for the spy flights and to announce their continuance had been too hasty. The two statements combined were, said Lippmann, "not only altogether unprecedented in the history of international relations, but they were also untenable." They had, moreover, been taken by a tired Secretary of State who had just made a hard flight across the Atlantic after a week of conferences on the containment rim in Iran, Turkey and Greece. Moreover, Mr. Herter returned to Washington as the President was leaving for a week-end on his farm. They did not meet and the momentous decision was taken after talks on the telephone.³⁸

The next day, on May 12, it was realized in Washington that the gamble of continuing the U-2 flights over Russia during the period of "these political negotiations" had failed. The flights had been proceeding a long time. Russian fighter planes had not been able to stop them. So the risk of a diplomatic disaster seemed a small one and it was deliberately taken. Now on May 12, the gamble had failed. In view of the Soviet threat of prompt retaliation, our containment allies could not permit further flights from their bases.

³⁷ *New York Herald Tribune*, European ed., May 18, 1960.

³⁸ Walter Lippmann, *New York Herald Tribune*, European ed., June 4, 5, 1960.

Moreover, the assertion of sovereignty over the Soviet Union could not be brazened through at Paris. So it was decided that the flights would be cancelled and not resumed.

Then the almost irreparable mistake already made was made final in a decision not to make the retreat public until at the summit it could be coupled with another attempt to get the Russians to permit aerial inspection of their country legally. The mirage of persuading the Russians to open their skies before the Cold War was settled still flitted before Administration eyes. At the least, what we had done without permission might look a little better if coupled with reiterated requests for permission. Thus four precious days were lost during which the cancellation of the flights might well have saved the conference. Reports of the decision leaked out, but were firmly denied in Washington,³⁹ drawing further on Washington's low stock of credibility.

THE FAILURE AT PARIS

Up to May 12 the Russians had only asked for assurance that the flights would be stopped. On that day *Pravda* published a fair report of Eisenhower's press conference on May 11, including his justification of overflights with the implication that they would continue, but it also carried his assurances that he would stay in Paris and would not leave Nixon in charge, and it quoted his view that the U-2 incident would not change summit prospects. It was announced that Khrushchev was going to Paris two days before the conference opened, as Victor Zorza saw it, "to give the President the opportunity to negotiate privately and to provide the assurance" that the flights would be stopped.⁴⁰

Dr. Adenauer advanced the time of his arrival in Paris a little, to avoid meeting Khrushchev at the airport, and it was soon reported, after his meeting with de Gaulle, that they were in complete agreement that the conference should discuss disarmament and leave Berlin alone. Two days later Adenauer held an ostentatious meeting with Eisenhower, Macmillan and de Gaulle, before the collapse. Though not members of the conference the West Germans were there in strength. Representatives of the East German Government were refused visas by the French Government in what seemed to British

³⁹ The diplomatic correspondent of *The Times*, London, May 30, 1960; *ibid*, May 18.

From August 18 to 20, 1960, the U-2 pilot Captain Powers was tried for espionage before a military court in Moscow, in the presence of his family and the Western press. There was no evidence that he had been brainwashed. He stood out as a helpless human being, caught in the machinations of power politics. The remorse he expressed was poignant, as was the sincerity of his testimony that he had never had any hatred for the Russian people. A powerful impression was created that all the practitioners of the Cold War stood accused, and convicted, with him.

The verdict was three years in prison, less nearly four months served, plus seven years of detention, all of which could be reduced from one-third to one-half by good conduct, according to current Soviet penal practice. He would be allowed to see his wife and perhaps later to live with her.

After a moment of painful suspense in the reading of the verdict during which a death sentence was indicated, a storm of applause "shook the chandeliers" in the crowded courtroom as the light sentence was announced.

⁴⁰ The Manchester *Guardian*, May 27, 1960.

correspondents to be "flagrant discrimination" against Khrushchev's East German friends.⁴¹

As Khrushchev arrived in Paris his missile men launched a five-ton space ship carrying the dummy of a man. The missile was three times the weight of the heaviest sputnik previously launched. Nevertheless, Mr. Khrushchev arrived glum and reserved. His airport statement was mild. He said: "We all know each other fairly well as a result of our past meetings, and I hope this fact will contribute to the successful work of the conference. We are to consider the most pressing international disputes and attempt to find ways to solve them in the interests of all the nations. . . . The Soviet Government will exert all effort to make the conference a success." He was accompanied by Defense Minister Malinovsky and Foreign Minister Gromyko, neither of whom left his side during the dramatic days which followed.

Russia's Demands. Khrushchev brought with him, on May 14, stiffer terms for opening the conference. After May 11 the Soviet newsmen in Paris read savage outbursts in their own papers about the May 11 statements in Washington, but they were inclined to interpret this turn as political strategy.⁴² However, on Sunday, May 15, Khrushchev called on de Gaulle, as President of the conference and told him that he could not take part in it unless the U-2 crisis was first cleared up. The United States Government must be prepared "to condemn the action that had been taken, undertake not to repeat it, and call those responsible to account." He left this triple demand in writing with de Gaulle, who immediately decided that the conference was dead. De Gaulle regarded the demand for apology, renunciation and punishment as totally unacceptable, and so advised President Eisenhower thereafter.⁴³

Helpless Mediator. When Mr. Khrushchev completed his Sunday calls with a visit to Macmillan, the latter did not so quickly dismiss possibilities for at least an amicable postponement. He apparently thought "that Khrushchev would settle for a cessation of flights, plus some form of apology."⁴⁴ Khrushchev had told both de Gaulle and Macmillan that he could not go to the summit under the threat of repeated U-2 flights, but Macmillan could not tell him that the flights would be called off or hold out hope that either of his other conditions would be met. President Eisenhower had been in Paris since 9:30 A.M. on that Sunday and he knew what Khrushchev was demanding. He knew also that "it was touch and go with the summit" but he still withheld the vital information that he had ordered the flights cancelled three days before. He was still saving it for the summit, leaving Macmillan unable to plead with Khrushchev that his chief demand had already been met and that the others might be discussed. Only at breakfast with the President the next morning, Monday, was Macmillan told the news, two hours before the confrontation. But Khrushchev still knew nothing of it when he faced the

⁴¹ William Forrest, *News Chronicle*, May 16, 1960. See also the diplomatic correspondent of the *Guardian*.

⁴² K. S. Karol, "Death of a Summit," *New Statesman*, May 21, 1960.

⁴³ Robert Stephens, diplomatic correspondent, the *Observer*, May 22, 1960.

⁴⁴ Paul Johnson, "What Happened in Paris," *New Statesman*, May 28, 1960.

Western trio for the first time at 11:00 A.M. So far as he knew the threat was still there. His mind was fully made up.⁴⁵

The Confrontation. He read to the others a closely reasoned statement in which he reviewed the events since May 1, recalled Eisenhower's refusal to negotiate under the threat of a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic and asked how his Government could negotiate under the actual threat that American aircraft would continue to fly over Soviet territory? The Soviet Union could not "be among the participants in negotiation where one of them has made treachery the basis of his policy with regard to the Soviet Union." If the United States would declare that in future it would not violate the borders of the U.S.S.R. with its aircraft, that it deplored the provocative actions undertaken in the past and would punish those directly guilty, the Soviet Union would be assured of equal conditions with other powers and he would be ready to participate in the conference. As matters stood, he could not participate "under the threat of aggressive reconnaissance flights." The Soviet Union wanted "to participate in the talks only on an equal footing, with equal opportunities for one and the other side."

The Soviet Government was "deeply convinced that if not this government of the United States then another, if not another then the next one, would understand that there was no other way out but peaceful co-existence. . . ." Therefore he proposed a postponement of the conference for six to eight months and politely, but firmly, asked for a postponement of the President's visit to the U.S.S.R. until he could be greeted cordially.

The President then read a statement which had been prepared with knowledge of what Khrushchev would say. In it he denied that the United States had threatened continued overflights. The United States had "made no such threat." Then he added this sentence: "In point of fact, these flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed. Accordingly, this cannot be the issue."

It was in this incidental, nonchalant fashion that the momentous announcement was made which could have changed the whole atmosphere and led to a settlement of the U-2 crisis at Paris, if it had been published when the decision was made four days earlier. A full, frank and formal statement of what had been decided might even have saved the situation the day before. When it was made only after Khrushchev had cast the die it was one of the forlorn footnotes to the lost opportunities of the pre-summit period.

Only after the full story had been told of a mistaken American policy pursued mistakenly even in its abandonment was Macmillan able to plead with Khrushchev that "the President had now made it absolutely clear that this was not American policy." In an effort to persuade Khrushchev that the policy had changed, "The Prime Minister quoted at this point the President's actual words to the effect that such flights were not to be resumed."⁴⁶ But Khrushchev would not be mollified. He released his statement to the world.

The Last Day. The meeting of the four heads had been adjourned by de

⁴⁵ William Forrest, *the News Chronicle*, May 25, 1960.

⁴⁶ *New York Herald Tribune*, Paris ed., May 17, 1960.

Gaulle with the suggestion that perhaps they should take twenty-four hours to think it over, to which Khrushchev cheerfully assented. That night Macmillan spent two hours with him. A further meeting of the Four had been arranged for 3 o'clock on Tuesday afternoon. "Khrushchev showed no desire to leave Paris immediately. He still behaved as a man who was willing to talk, provided the price was right. In the morning he left for a tour of Malinovsky's old battlefield at Sezanne."⁴⁷ But when the Western Three met the same morning "Mr. Macmillan's aim of a decent funeral gave way to the aim of ensuring that responsibility for the failure of the conference would be seen to rest on Mr. Khrushchev."⁴⁸

President de Gaulle was opposed to any attempt at mediation. Defense Secretary Gates had authorized an alert of U.S. strategic forces all over the world, with the President's consent, as a gesture of firmness and to suggest that the danger of Soviet surprise attack was real. Some in the American delegation had tried to prevent the President from saying that the flights had been cancelled and Hagerty now warned him that the concession had not been well received in the U.S. press.⁴⁹ A sudden invitation was sent after the Soviet Premier to attend a summit meeting "in circumstances, both of timing and of wording, which gave him the choice of refusal or of publicly withdrawing the conditions of his 'ultimatum' to President Eisenhower."⁵⁰ When the messenger found Khrushchev, "according to eyewitnesses, his face lit up when he saw the document, and he at once turned back to Paris."⁵¹ While he was on his way back Hagerty issued a statement asserting that Soviet participation at the 3 o'clock meeting would be taken as a withdrawal of Khrushchev's conditions. Khrushchev had a copy of this statement, which had been issued without clearing it with either the British or the French, in his hands as he returned, "and at this point the conference expired."⁵²

The U-2 Decisive. This sequence of events, from May 1 to May 16, established a strong basis for the conclusion that it was Washington's handling of the U-2 crisis which prevented the conference from meeting. It is true that Khrushchev could expect from it little progress toward a Berlin interim agreement, but the U-2 affair did not cause him to despair entirely. On June 14 officials in London confirmed the existence of a note of May 9, 1960, sent by Khrushchev to France proposing slightly better terms for a Berlin agreement.⁵³

Therefore, nine days after the U-2 flight Khrushchev still had some hope of

⁴⁷ Paul Johnson, *supra*.

⁴⁸ Robert Stephens, diplomatic correspondent, the *Observer*, May 22, 1960.

⁴⁹ John Gold cabled from New York to the London *Evening News* that the announcement that U-2 flights would not be resumed had caused bewilderment. The announcement "caught Washington flatfooted. The capital had only just reconciled itself to the announcement that such flights would in future be an instrument of national policy." See also William Jordan, the *New York Times*, May 17, 1960, the same date.

Defense Secretary Gates' combat alert order as a gesture of toughness also had a bad effect at home. Word spread over the country after midnight that pilots were scrambling for their interceptor planes. Defense Department spokesmen were caught by surprise and could give no explanation as inquiries poured in from all over the country. In the cities some people took to their cars and made for the country.—The *New York Times*, May 17, 1960.

⁵⁰ Stephens, *supra*.

⁵¹ Paul Johnson, *supra*.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *New York Herald Tribune*, European ed., June 15, 1960.

negotiating about Berlin, or at least of a postponement to another summit meeting that would advance his Berlin campaign a little. Then came the Herter-Eisenhower statements of May 11 and 12, rejecting his escape offers and justifying the whole overflight business. This made it imperative that Khrushchev secure a disavowal and an apology at Paris, if he was to proceed. After presenting his terms he waited a day and would have proceeded if the amends demanded had been made.

This was essentially the verdict reached by Eisenhower's friends and well-wishers in India, where he had been idolized and loved in December 1959 as a man dedicated to making peace. On June 14, 1960, the Delhi correspondent of the *London Times* wrote that "there is no doubt that both Indian officials and informed public opinion put the bulk of the (summit) failure on the United States and Mr. Eisenhower." After he had been "released from the thrall of the late Mr. Dulles," he had seemed to Indians to be making up for his late start by "the sincerity and even ardor of his search for peace." But "the truculent and disingenuous self-righteousness of Washington's reaction to Mr. Khrushchev's charges" about the U-2 had brought sharp disappointment. Criticism had been restrained and muted, but Mr. Nehru had made it plain that in his mind the summit meeting had been sundered because of the President's statements "that this kind of thing will continue and justifying it." An Indian journalist returning from Paris had been surprised to find that popular censure put 75 per cent of the blame on the Americans.

For four years the Eisenhower Administration had been pursuing in the U-2 flights a policy which could not be defended before world opinion.⁵⁴

Khrushchev's Press Conference. On May 18, the day after the conference collapsed, Khrushchev conducted the most remarkable press conference ever held up to that time. Before him, in a vast, awkwardly shaped hall, were 3000 people, mostly journalists. Among them were "spectators and propagandists" who greeted his entrance with "cheers and boos," said the *Daily Telegraph*; "a roar of boos, whistling, hissing and catcalls welled up to mix with the sounds of adulation," said the *New York Times*. The boos, which Khrushchev attributed to Germans, aroused him to fury, but his anger at President Eisenhower was equally great. He charged that it was the President's failure to apologize for the U-2 flight that had "torpedoed the summit conference." He "swaggered and bulled. He waved his arm and punched his fist in the air. He glowered ominously and then burst into sunbeams of jocular ribaldry," said Osgood Caruthers of the *New York Times*. "Roaring in calculated rage, sneering, pounding the table, softly protesting his devotion to peace . . . almost incoherent with anger at times, his voice shrilling to a near scream and then sinking into oily mildness, the Soviet leader outshouted choruses of catcalls and Communist-claque," wrote Tom Lambert of the *New York Herald Tribune*. "He seemed obsessed by the spy plane incident. The subject recurred constantly, sandwiched between scornful and hostile remarks about America and President Eisenhower," said the *London Daily Telegraph*. Like

⁵⁴ On June 6, 1960, former President Truman said that he had rejected a suggestion for high aerial espionage during his administration.—*The New York Times*, June 7, 1960.

a rejected suitor he kept returning to his relations with Eisenhower. "The intemperate nature of his replies must be attributed at least in part to the insults under which he believed himself to be labouring." His answers were "more excited, rambling and downright rude" than they appeared in the translations. Even the most competent interpreters could not reproduce on the spot "the venom of an angry muzhik when he is aroused," reported Victor Zorza in the *Guardian*.

Khrushchev's prepared statement rejected Eisenhower's alleged remark at the preliminary meeting of the four heads on May 16 that naturally he could not bind his successor on the renewal of the flights. He declared that international relations could not be built "on the term of office of this or that official, for what would then be the worth of an international agreement," say on disarmament? He deplored the President's refusal to "utter a single word of condemnation" of the U-2 flights and ridiculed his plan "to send planes with the same aims but under the United Nations flag." He did not, however, renew his demand for the punishment of those who had ordered the flights.

The violence of his attack drove the entire press of Western Europe to the President's side and led to the practically unanimous conclusion that Khrushchev had not been justified in breaking off the conference on account of the U-2 incident. This led to several protesting letters to the *Manchester Guardian* of May 20, asking who was to know which intruding plane carried the bomb? Didn't Khrushchev have powerful opinion at home to consider? And were not the reassurances asked for "precisely those that would have been required by any government in like circumstances?" Was it not "the failure of President Eisenhower to give them that caused the breakdown?" What kind of reasoning was it that "lays the blame for the present situation at the door of the injured party?"

Was Apology Possible? In the furore of the time most Westerners forgot that the most basic principle of international law is respect for sovereignty and that its violation customarily requires apology, including calling to account the persons responsible. The very coexistence of many sovereign states requires this. Even the smallest state must insist that its dignity and personality be respected. Moreover, in the U-2 case apology was abundantly due. The violation of sovereignty was proved, it was at once admitted boastfully to be a wholesale affair and it had calamitous consequences upon world opinion and diplomacy. Furthermore, it struck a body blow at the position of leadership of a negotiating partner whom we needed. The blow also struck at Khrushchev's long campaign to establish the rule of law in the Soviet Union, and internationally. Soviet jurists had been stressing for years "that there is one body of international law uniting countries of different social and economic systems."⁵⁵

If ever a clear violation of international law required apology, surely this one did. An apology, too, could have taken different forms. Language is

⁵⁵ See the thoughtful article by Harold J. Berman, expert on Soviet law of the Harvard University Law School, "Why Khrushchev Wrecked the Summit," *The Nation*, June 4, 1960, pp. 484-86.

subject to infinite shadings. In the midst of his campaign for the Presidency, Senator John F. Kennedy did say courageously: "I certainly would express regret at the timing and give assurances that it would not happen again. I would express regret that the flight did take place."⁵⁶

This form of apology might have been sufficient, if promptly made, though it would have been better to have gone further. After chiding Khrushchev for his behaviour, Dr. Fisher, The Archbishop of Canterbury, suggested that we might have gone on to say that "We have all helped to create the relationship of nations in which this kind of thing can happen," and then merged our apology into a plea for getting down to genuine disarmament in the summit conference.⁵⁷

But instead of taking such a rational and Christian way out of an untenable situation the President and his advisers had not only publicly challenged Soviet sovereignty, but in trying to justify this they had publicly accused the Soviet Union of being a totalitarian society and of planning aggressive war. Years of real progress by the Soviets in opening up their society to the world were ignored, and the progress imperilled, in order to justify our own self-induced obsession that they were evil incarnate, planning our downfall daily. Having pursued this obsession to tragic and self-defeating lengths, our officials tried to cover first the U-2 operation and then themselves until, by the time the President reached Paris, he was trapped in what Max Freedman called "a sickening sequence of error and miscalculation,"⁵⁸ from which he could have extricated himself only by a frank acceptance of most of Khrushchev's terms. His advisers opposed that and Western opinion supported them. The general reaction was that no President could be expected to "crawl."

The point where the most critical damage was done, said Lippmann, was not what Mr. Khrushchev did but what we did to ourselves in a series of blunders on the gravest matters in the highest quarters. "These blunders have not only angered the Russians and wrecked the summit conference but, much worse than all that, they have cast doubt among our allies and among our own people on our competence to lead the Western alliance on the issues of peace and war. . . . We must have no illusions about the depth and the extent of the loss of confidence."⁵⁹

⁵⁶ The Manchester *Guardian*, May 19, 1960. ⁵⁷ The London *Times*, June 25, 1960.

⁵⁸ The Manchester *Guardian*, May 18, 1960. In his "message to Franco, dispatched during the President's visit to Portugal," Eisenhower said that the U-2 incident was "regrettable in the extreme."—*Ibid.*, June 10, 1960.

This was an unwelcome statement to Franco, who rightly counted the summit's loss his own gain, but it might have meant something if made to Khrushchev in time.

⁵⁹ *New York Herald Tribune*, European ed., May 19, 1960. Lippmann condemned Gates for ordering on Sunday night a world-wide alert of American armed forces, one of the preliminary stages to war, while efforts were still being made to save the conference. The timing was "just a shade worse than sending off the U-2 on its perilous mission two weeks before the summit." It made no sense whatever. If surprise attack was feared, when could there be less danger of it than when Mr. Khrushchev was in Paris? The leadership of the non-Communist world "could not be conducted in such a fockless and haphazard way."

On May 20 the *Herald Tribune*, European ed., agreed that the first fact to be faced was the grave loss of prestige and confidence that President Eisenhower had suffered. What had happened had caused our greatest friends "to conclude that America's present leadership is bumbling and maladroit."

The Liberal Democrats Demand an Accounting. In this crisis the liberal wing of the Democratic Party broke away from the conservative leadership of Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn, under which it had obediently followed Mr. Dulles from brink to brink, giving him Congressional blank checks from Quemoy to Lebanon. At last, under Adlai Stevenson's courageous leadership, the shackles of a bipartisan foreign policy that always led towards war and never toward peace were broken. On May 19 Mr. Stevenson made one of the most effective and responsible speeches ever uttered by the leader of a great opposition party. Premier Khrushchev had "wrecked this conference. Let there be no mistake about that," he said, but we had "handed Khrushchev the crowbar and sledgehammer to wreck this meeting."

Tracing through the incredible series of events which had followed the U-2 espionage flight, he noted that Khrushchev finally had to protest our right to conduct these flights in order to keep his job. Then, "to compound the incredible, we postponed the announcement that the flights were terminated—just long enough to make it seem we were yielding to pressure, but too long to prevent Mr. Khrushchev from reaching the boiling point."

As if this wasn't enough, Stevenson continued, we had ordered a world-wide alert of our combined forces when there was still a chance for the situation to be saved. Was it unreasonable for suspicious Russians "to think that such a series of mistakes could only be a deliberate effort to break up a conference we never wanted anyway?" Nothing could justify Khrushchev's conduct, "But his anger was predictable, if not his violence." While Stevenson resented "deeply and bitterly the gross affront to the President and his office," he rejected the Republican call to rally around the President. The opposition party had "an obligation to our country and to our allies, whose security is also involved."

At the end of a list of things the Democrats had a duty to explain to the people in order to retrieve the situation, Stevenson placed the charge that the Administration had "helped make successful negotiations with the Russians—negotiations that are vital to our survival—impossible so long as they are in power." We could not "sweep this whole sorry mess under the rug in the name of national unity," for "in this age, unprecedented in human history, all of us, Russians and Americans alike, have one common enemy. The enemy is the danger of war. We must defeat the enemy together."

Calling for "constructive, positive, affirmative proposals to restore the hope of peace to the world," he rejected the cry of "appeasement" that he knew would be made against him, saying "this is the toughest kind of prudence, the toughest kind of common sense. For there is no future for any of us in a spiralling arms race propelled by mounting suspicion and distrust on both sides."⁶⁰

Three days later, on May 22, 1960, the Democratic Advisory Council

⁶⁰ Walter Nash, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, who had lately visited Khrushchev, also recognized that the world could not stop its search for peace. He was certain that Khrushchev wanted peace and disarmament and if we would stop saying nasty things about each other and could get over the East Germany and Berlin problem, he believed that disarmament would come gradually.—*The London Evening Standard*, May 18, 1960.

issued a strongly worded statement denouncing the collapse of American policy which "in effect adopted the view of Mr. Stevenson." It criticized the President for going to the conference when "no progress had been made towards the settlement of the issues which most threaten the peace of the world, Berlin and the arms race," and declared that "If there ever was a time for national debate that time is now." The twenty members of the Council who approved the statement included Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Truman, Senators Kennedy and Symington.

Berlin Crisis Postponed. The press photos showed a very sad and crestfallen Khrushchev as he said good-bye to Macmillan on leaving Paris. In East Berlin the preparations for a giant outdoor assembly were cancelled and instead Khrushchev addressed a meeting of party stalwarts indoors, on May 20. The Soviet Union, he said, had done everything it could to prevent any complications arising before the summit meeting. Then all of a sudden the statesmen of the United States, "as if fulfilling an order, came out with provocative, threatening speeches," and at his press conference the United States President seconded them. "There was every indication that the United States Government wanted no solution of urgent questions," he declared. Then he assailed the Pentagon and charged that the plane incident was meant to put the Soviet Union in a weak position.

About Berlin, it would be "worth while to wait a little longer and try to find by joint efforts of all four victorious powers a solution." It would be better to wait and the matter would get "more mature," but they had no intention of "waiting endlessly." This statement obviously disappointed his hearers, who had expected soon to be the sovereign rulers of East Germany.

NEGATIVE FORCES IN THE EAST

After the collapse in Paris all of the experts on the Soviet Union began to ask whether internal forces had compelled Khrushchev to make the sudden shift. Only a minority was ready to accept the obvious explanations: (1) that the U-2 challenge had hurt Soviet national dignity deeply, both as a denial of Russia's sovereignty and as an exposure of her inability to defend her skies; (2) that the Kremlin recognized that the West had decided not to concede anything at Paris, signalling defeat and immediate crisis over Berlin; and (3) that for these reasons Khrushchev's disillusionment with Eisenhower had taken a violent turn.

Their researches soon revealed that there were three strong forces in the communist world that had used the long delay in the summit meeting to mature opposition to Khrushchev's radical and daring policy of détente and peace with the capitalists. The first was obviously the Red Army, which could not be happy with Khrushchev's drastic demobilization of 250,000 officers and more than a million men, along with his crusade for total disarmament, involving Western inspectors coming into the Soviet Union.

The second force that had time to view with alarm and to gather strength, as the West obviously retreated from any serious negotiations about Berlin, was the conservatives in the party hierarchy. Much of communist doctrine,

but not all of it, taught that war was inherent in "imperialism" and the "contradictions" of capitalism, and Soviet experience since 1917, overwhelmingly supported the view that this meant invasion, ostracism, invasion again and afterwards encirclement for the Soviet Union. Wasn't Khrushchev going "soft on capitalism" when he imagined that he could fraternize with "the enemy"?

The May 4 meeting of the Central Committee of the party had demoted Aleksei I. Kirichenko, one of Khrushchev's most trusted lieutenants, removing him from the party secretariat, the real center of power. It had also reduced the number of party secretaries in the fifteen man Presidium from ten to six, thereby eliminating, apparently, Khrushchev's sure majority in this top group. If Mikoyan, his main man in opening windows to the West, still held his high posts he seemed to be in the background. In the Central Committee itself there was evidence of anger and reaction against the West, and thus at Khrushchev's policy. It was suspected that he had been outvoted after he left Moscow for Paris, if not before. At the least he would be under compulsion to take a much harder line.

The third force that worked against Khrushchev's policy of peace with the West during the long wait while de Gaulle's many conditions for the summit were fulfilled, was China. From her standpoint it was impossible to think of peace while the United States held Formosa, not to speak of Quemoy and Matsu, and ringed China with other armed bases and prevented her from taking her seat in the UN. For Khrushchev to embark on his effort to make peace with the West was not only treason to China's interests but a denial of communist orthodoxy that was bound to fail, as they saw it. It would be better to promote communist revolution abroad and prepare for the war with the United States.

Several weeks before the abortive summit, Madame Sun Yat-sen's dissent was published in *Pravda* and on April 22, Lenin's birthday, the *Peking Review* published a strong protest which, without mentioning his name, plainly labelled Khrushchev a "revisionist" and a "distorter" of Lenin's teachings. The article was full of violent revolutionary quotations from the Marxist fathers. This was a week before the U-2 incident.

After the collapse at Paris, Peking's joy was unconfined. A jubilant crowd, 1,500,000 strong, roared its applause of the Soviet Ambassador. Now the two great Red allies were together again.

This was probably not foreseen by those who hardened the West's position steadily in the months before the Paris conference. It is a remarkable thing that so few people in the West understood that Khrushchev might be the best man to negotiate with that they would ever get. When Malenkov succeeded Stalin and offered the olive branch he was almost unanimously spurned in the West, with demands for proofs of sincerity and warnings of perfidy. Then when Khrushchev staged a massive campaign for settlements, he too was rebuffed.

Khrushchev's Policy Endangered. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe there was deep disappointment and despondency after the Paris failure. Though there was some panic buying in Budapest, what people feared most was more cold war, more arms race and less consumers' goods, perhaps even

more power to the secret police, who had certainly not viewed Khrushchev's détente with favor. Was this also what the Western advocates of no concessions to Khrushchev wanted?

In the weeks after the Paris fiasco Khrushchev repeatedly wrote articles for the Soviet press justifying his course, particularly at Paris, and vilifying Eisenhower anew in the process. He still held to his policy of making peace, but his efforts to show that Eisenhower had not succeeded in "taking him into camp" injured gravely Khrushchev's reputation in the world as a serious and responsible statesman. The President had not intended to take Khrushchev into camp at Camp David, but when he permitted the main assumption of that meeting to be steadily reversed he was damaging his negotiating partner as well as destroying himself.

During June 1960 the controversy between Peking and Moscow was full-blooded and fateful for all nations. The Chinese fought for the concept that war with imperialism, meaning the United States, was inevitable and that China could survive the immense losses of a nuclear war. If this interpretation of Marxist writ won, then the world would be in the deadliest peril, but Khrushchev stoutly maintained that everything that Lenin had said, in a different time and circumstance, could not be applied *in toto* to the vastly changed conditions of another period, and of nuclear war. He mobilized all of his East European satellites at Bucharest and obtained their agreement to his thesis, proclaiming it to an audience of 100,000 people on June 25. Russia would not "retreat a single step" from the policy of peaceful coexistence, he said, and on the same day Mikoyan said the same thing in Oslo. Nuclear war, with its incalculable losses, must be avoided, tensions reduced and the Cold War "abolished."

This fateful debate in the communist world revealed the blindness of Washington's surrender to Adenauer and de Gaulle in the months before the abortive summit. On June 26 Maurice Edelman, M.P., reported on his recent visit to Russia in the *Sunday Times*. He left Russia with the conviction that a struggle for power was taking place within the Presidium, that Khrushchev's policy and his authority were in danger from those who agreed essentially with the Chinese position, and that "if Khrushchev goes, an aggressive neo-Stalinist junta will succeed him." He warned that the most vivid thought of the West after the Paris failure ought to be: "If Khrushchev goes, what winter may follow?"

In its report of June 26, 1960, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held it would have been "in our interest to have done what we could, which would have been marginal at best, to strengthen Khrushchev's position vis-à-vis the Soviet military and the Chinese Communists."

It was clear to the Committee, also, that we have a permanent interest in trying to work with those in the Soviet Union who try to work with us peacefully. In its final conclusions the Committee said:

"It remains in our interest, as the Secretary said, to encourage Soviet proponents of a peaceful course and to discourage Soviet proponents of an aggressive course. In the years ahead, this will require an unusual degree

of maturity and discrimination which will challenge the discretion and intelligence of the American people and their leaders in their approach to foreign policy."

In the *Observer*, on August 21, 1960, Edward Crankshaw marshalled the evidence that the crack between Khrushchev and the Chinese had become a rift, the Chinese maintaining that they could surmount a nuclear war. Some of their leaders were close to saying "Let it come." Crankshaw's conclusion was: "What is there left for us to do but wish more power to Mr. Khrushchev's elbow?"

This developing rift indicated that the great opportunity to make peace at the second summit conference might never be regained. Some of our leaders had thought they were merely "standing pat" but, with the fate of humanity itself hanging in the balance, standing still in a runaway age is likely to mean disastrous retrogression.

WHOSE FAILURE?

In the days immediately after the Paris collapse James Reston told how James A. Hagerty demonstrated nightly at briefings of U.S. officials that we had won a victory over Mr. Khrushchev. Reston then went on to explain, on May 20, how everyone had lost.

Surely this was sadly true. In June 1960 it was not yet certain who had lost most. Khrushchev had made a supreme effort to make peace with the West and he constantly evinced a desire to make settlements acceptable to both sides. He might be a tough bargainer, but he obviously wanted agreement. After Paris he was on the defensive, at home and abroad. His violence might have saved his position at home, but would he ever be able to get again the conditions for negotiated agreements?

By the violence of his actions and reactions at Paris, and afterwards by trying to destroy President Eisenhower utterly, he fortified those who believed in magnifying Western armaments for the indefinite future. In the United States he made constructive statesmanship "politically dangerous for leaders of both major parties who are capable of it, and who recognize this as their responsibility and their duty to the American people."⁶¹

For Eisenhower it was clear that the supreme opportunity of his life had not been grasped. Nearly everyone in the West sympathized deeply with him for the dignified way in which he bore Khrushchev's insults and for his obvious disappointment that it had all turned out so badly. Yet it was poignantly plain that having had the vision of making peace he did not have the qualities of leadership to see it through. His very willingness to try to please everyone undid him, before the appalling sequences of the U-2 affair proved that he could not make peace in the conference room while carrying on warlike maneuvers in Russian skies. Often he had seen the folly and futility of the arms race and of governments blundering the peoples into war, but he lacked the strength to break the vicious circle. He could create atmosphere, but he could not execute policy.

⁶¹ Arthur Krock, the *New York Times*, June 6, 1960.

For Macmillan the Paris tragedy was deep and personal. He had really led, by going to Moscow and striving constantly to solve deadlocks and advance settlements. At the end of his last day in Parliament, before going to Paris, emotion had overcome him. He stood for some time unable to speak, his eyes filled with tears. At Paris he had worked again to close the gulfs that had opened, but in vain. Returning to Parliament afterwards he was given the warm sympathy of the entire House. He, too, had failed, but his failure was of a different order. He had done his best to remove every stone, little or big, on the road to the summit. He had left nothing undone that he should have done.⁶²

De Gaulle's Role. For de Gaulle the failure at Paris was relative, since his contributions had been negative. He had put no heart or faith in it and so had lost none. Instead of investing in it he had sought only to make profits out of it. It was for him that it had been long delayed, until all the visits to and fro which he specified had been carried out. His sense of grandeur had received full recognition in London and Washington, as he explained that nothing could be done about such things as Berlin. The West should fix its eyes on the broad horizon.

The conference over which he was to have presided in his own capital was a great failure. For negative contributions to the success of the conference he received negative results, but he emerged as the leader of the West in the embittered weeks which followed. He now stood out as the towering "No" man of the West. "De Gaulle was like a rock," said Joseph Alsop, when the same could not be said of "Prime Minister Macmillan and President Eisenhower."⁶³

On June 1, 1960, de Gaulle gave his post-summit address on radio and television. The East-West division of the peoples was a "monstrous peril." To exorcise it three conditions were necessary: (1) a détente, stopping provocative actions and speeches, increasing trade and travel; (2) controlled disarmament, "preferably aimed at the devices capable of carrying bombs to strategic distances;" (3) organized cooperation between East and West for the service of man, such as helping the underdeveloped countries.

Khrushchev "was laying down a condition contradictory to the détente" when he tried to change the status of West Berlin. The overflight of an American "photography plane" was also not sufficient reason for refusing to open the conference. Khrushchev should have stayed in Moscow until the incident was settled. However, France took "this outcome with composure," and he staked down his claim to any future summit conference by saying that France could "consider the reopening of this Paris conference."

The Atlantic alliance was necessary "at present" for the security of France.

⁶² For his pains Macmillan was blamed afterwards, first in an article in a French newspaper and then in another in the *New York Herald Tribune* by Don Cook, for his efforts to bridge the gap at Paris. Some Americans at Paris blamed him for continuing too long his efforts to find an "apology formula." The President was said to have been "wavering at one point under Mr. Macmillan's influence."—Max Freedman, the *Guardian*, May 24, 1960.

⁶³ *New York Herald Tribune*, European ed., May 24, 1960.

Behind this shield the peoples of Western Europe must "organize to achieve their joint power and development," and to "regain this grandeur for which past centuries had given them the talent and the habit."

Earlier he had said that France "must be the sole mistress of her resources and her territories" and that her destiny must remain in her own hands, but when a Western group had been organized, "at the very least equivalent to that which exists in the East," Europe might "one day, without risk to the independence and the freedom of each nation, and taking into account the probable evolution of political regimes, establish a European entente from the Atlantic to the Urals." Then Europe "would again be the heart of civilization" and she "would lead vast countries in other continents . . . to take the way of cooperation."

In this vision de Gaulle sought to escape, or at least to repair, the consequences of both of the world wars arising from German efforts to maintain or establish hegemony over Europe. In the interest of his grand design to restore Europe to her world primacy, this time under French leadership, the East would have to be content with the anomalous position of both East Germany and West Berlin until that time in the future, to quote a *Daily Telegraph* editorial of June 2, 1960, "when the Soviet Union would seek a place within the portals of the new Europe," to "escape from the fearful Chinese wolves which may well threaten to devour all those who remain outside."

Presumably the bulk of the Soviet Union would disappear into the maw of the Chinese wolf, along with the small wards of the United States which cluster around the new China's doorstep.⁶⁴

De Gaulle's dream was impressive. It was hopeful in its recognition of the monstrous peril in the East-West confrontation, and in the statement of his belief that national interests rather than ideologies are paramount, but there was nothing in it to suggest how the rapid rise and consolidation of the power of the new Russia and the new China could be prevented. It would be convenient if they would both wait for the removal or alleviation of the thorns in their sides which unquestionably exist in West Berlin and the Formosa Strait, until in the course of time Europe had again become the directing center of the world. But if ignored in this Olympian manner it was far more likely that they would concert their immense expanding powers to settle affairs in their own neighbourhoods, and perhaps far beyond. Even the loftiest refusal to recognize the main results of World War II would not reverse them.

Momentarily the only man who could claim that the summit tragedy was a victory for him was Chancellor Adenauer, the *eminence grise* who had directed the Western retreat on Berlin, even though he would not be a member of the summit conference. It was he who had slammed shut every diplomatic

⁶⁴ De Gaulle's desire for disarmament "aimed at the devices capable of carrying bombs to strategic distances" was fully met by the Russians in a new proposal to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, after the Paris fiasco, offering to begin disarmament by abolishing all strategic bomb carriers, in exchange for the evacuation of all foreign (American) bases.

For ten days thereafter Frenchman Jules Moch, ablest disarmament negotiator on the Western side, was "not able to open his mouth."

door which Macmillan had managed to open, if only a little. So the collapse at Paris sent his prestige in West Germany up to total proportions. Yet one month later he was issuing dire warnings saying that Britain had not drawn the right conclusions from the fiasco, and expressing the greatest astonishment about reports that the West Berlin city parliament was ready to accept an "interim solution" of the problem.⁶⁵

"*The Missed Chance.*" The combination of vainglorious pride, stubbornness, alliance politics, abysmal shortsightedness and lack of American leadership in the West which had made the conference abortive, before it could meet, was summed up best by the *Economist* in its editorial of May 21, 1960. Putting its finger on the folly of the inordinate delay in both President Eisenhower's return visit to Russia and in the assembly of the summit conference, the editors continued:

"Between August, when Mr. Eisenhower announced the exchange of visits, and May 16th, when the summit conference was to open, the western governments would have been prudent to cherish such possibilities of negotiation as existed. Instead, they were concerned to bolster up their own unity by rhetoric; with visits, assemblies, and communiqués, in Paris, Bonn, London, Washington, Istanbul, the meagre room for manoeuvre was bit by bit circumscribed and the thin chance of success whittled away. No effort was spared to narrow down the possibility that about Berlin, in particular, the summit meeting might decide anything at all. This went on up to the last moment; Paris last Sunday saw demonstrative consultations with Dr. Adenauer when Mr. Khrushchev was already there seeking an audience for his complaints, while the east German government was actually refused visas for the observers (including its own foreign minister) whom, reasonably enough, it wanted to send. Not only all possible ammunition, but all possible time and scope were given to the forces of obstruction inside Russia, and in the Soviet block, which were visibly mobilising to hold Mr. Khrushchev back from any useful dealings with the West. With time, chance came to their aid in the shape of the bringing down of the U2 survey aircraft, and the die was cast."

This is the kind of truth-telling which is required to prevent the West from debilitating or destroying itself in succeeding cold war follies, and from yielding the bulk of the "free" world to communism by default because of inability to solve its social problems.

AMERICAN OVERSEAS BASES LARGELY NEUTRALIZED

In the days following the disaster at Paris it became steadily clearer that the position of the West had deteriorated gravely during the first half of 1960 in three respects: (1) the leadership of its American center of power had collapsed; (2) the failure of the dual American policy of seeming to negotiate for peace while preparing for war in Russian skies had gone far toward dissolving the ring of containment militarily; and (3) the system of right-wing

⁶⁵ The *London Times*, from Bonn, June 16, 1960.

tyrannies maintained by the United States in the ring in the name of anti-communism largely disintegrated.

During the preceding six months it had seemed a good idea to permit Dr. Adenauer to direct the policy of the West toward stonewalling about Berlin, while President de Gaulle enjoyed his season of recognition. But on May 18 a London *Times* report from the United States was headed "Gloom Falls on Washington." The Administration was being criticized for having made it so obvious in recent weeks that it did not take Mr. Khrushchev's Berlin threats seriously and was not intending to enter into any real negotiations over a new status for the city."

The lost opportunity to negotiate about Berlin might be recovered. Indeed, some hailed it as a victory. But the consequences of policing Russian skies while seeming to negotiate could not be reversed. Our allies were appalled to learn what had been done secretly from the American bases on their soils.

The diplomatic repercussions began arriving at the State Department today, said Reston on May 10, "and they were all bad." The next day the Manchester *Guardian* predicted that all of America's allies would have to close their bases to spy-flights, adding, "once having been caught red-handed, the Americans cannot really persist in an illegal course." This was at once apparent, as it should have been to the Eisenhower Administration all along. Norway was outraged at the intended violation of its confidence in us. Pakistan denied, on May 14, that any plane had taken off from Peshawar "in the direction of the Soviet Union." If an American plane had changed its direction and flown over Soviet territory, Pakistan would have "cause for bitter complaint." Apparently one of our most loyal and belligerent allies felt deceived, as the statement continued: "The American authorities must realize the delicacy of our situation and insure that all concerned refrain from such activities in the future."

The situation was that Khrushchev had threatened to shoot a rocket at any base which released a future American plane over Russia, and the status of all American bases overseas became delicate in the extreme when on May 30 Marshall Malinovsky announced that specific orders for retaliation on American take-off bases had been issued to the Soviet armed forces. Rockets were trained on each base. Of course the United States replied with a new pledge to "defend" our allies against any attack, and on June 2 Secretary Gates threatened, though with a slight qualification, a world war if Khrushchev "hits one of our allied bases for any reason."⁶⁶ But this was an unconvincing threat, since no ally could be "defended" by completing its destruction in a general war, after one of its bases had been destroyed by a Russian rocket in a genuine or fancied reprisal. The American encirclement policy was visibly destroying itself.

Demands welled up from Scottish coal miners for giving up nuclear weapons and abolishing the American bases, a cry which was multiplied in other British unions. Neutralism was bound to grow apace as preferable to permitting the Americans to play cops and robbers around the containment rim, with the lives of the nations as the pawns.

⁶⁶ *New York Herald Tribune*, European ed., June 3, 1960.

The self-defeating nature of our obsession with military containment had been revealed with lightning clarity in the exposure of the U-2 policy, at a moment when the whole world centered its hopes on the summit conference at Paris. From Europe, Drew Middleton warned: "the European powers, large and small, will want to place a restraining and perhaps controlling hand upon the United States' power of military decision." It "would be foolish to believe that the Atlantic alliance will in the present situation act as it has acted in the face of past Soviet challenges," for instance after Khrushchev's Berlin challenge in November 1958.⁶⁷

In other words, the triple American failure in Paris had greatly reduced the likelihood, if it ever existed, that our allies in Europe would really sanction their own destruction to prevent or avenge a changed status for Berlin; and there was no likelihood whatever that they would do so to prevent or avenge a changed status for Formosa.

REVOLUTION SPREADING IN THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD

While the Western decision not to negotiate about Berlin was slowly congealing into a great diplomatic glacier during early 1960, the political foundations of containment began to shift in its frontier lines. From the beginning, but especially under Mr. Dulles, these lines were built on a series of conservative tyrannies, all of them warmly embraced because of their loyal anti-communism.

Korea. Nowhere was this more true than in South Korea, where the ancient oligarch Syngman Rhee could do no wrong. His excesses, recorded in many places above, were always condoned on the ground that he was a great patriot. So he was, an insanely fanatical one who could never win a fair election among his own people. Nevertheless, "free elections" continued to be falsified in his realm until finally his police made an election on March 15, 1960, returning Rhee as President and electing a hand-picked Vice President by such outrageous majorities that the gorge of the Korean people rose. The 85 per cent majorities for Rhee were too huge when the people knew they had voted against him. So students demonstrated in a lesser port city and were suppressed with the usual police brutality, sixteen of them disappearing entirely. When some of their battered bodies were found in the bay the people of the city literally demolished all government buildings and drove the police into hiding.

Then the students of Seoul took to the streets and some thirty of them were killed before Rhee's palace on April 18. The next day about fifty more were killed, as Herter severely rebuked Rhee as repressive. Herter had seen that South Korea might well be lost to communism unless the United States took the side of the people. Rhee then issued a statement finding the revolts against his rule "almost unbelievable." The United States urged a new vote for Vice President and a halt of police brutality. On April 22, the Vice President elect, Lee Ki Poong, a semi-paralytic, resigned and Rhee was willing to relinquish much of his absolute power to save the rest. The next day he surrendered his

⁶⁷ *The New York Times*, June 5, 1960.

command of the ruling party to save his Presidency. By this time the casualties were believed to be 2000, with perhaps 200 dead. The Army called out to suppress the students was unwilling to fire on them and had orders not to do so. Accordingly, the students wrestled with the troops until they wore them out, seized their tanks in some instances, and Rhee was compelled to resign after a new warning from the American Ambassador, who was wildly cheered by the students.⁶⁸ In May, Rhee and his wife went to Hawaii.

Then at last American cartoonists portrayed Rhee as a vicious tyrant trampling upon every kind of liberty, and writers reminded us that any successful policy must rest on people, not on individual rulers, "that no dictator or dictatorship lives forever and that the government which replaces it will certainly not be friendly if the United States has allied itself with the old order."⁶⁹

Laos. On May 1 a dispatch from Vientiane, the capital of Laos, reported that the free election just held there was feared to be the prelude to crisis. Many held that the rightist victory was dishonest. Almost no one had any faith in the election returns, showing lop-sided victories for rightist candidates in the strongly communist districts. "Few disagreed that the cause of democracy had been set back by the vote. Right-wing victories over the handful of pro-Communists were patently outrageous." Guerrilla war by the Reds was feared.⁷⁰

On August 10, 1960, the *Manchester Guardian* reported that a battalion of paratroopers took control of Vientiane, the administrative capital of Laos. Their leader, Captain Kong Lae, declared that American infiltration into "every organization in the country" must cease, that all foreign troops must leave the country and all foreign bases must be liquidated. A left-wing government strongly committed to a neutralist course was formed, but ten days later it seemed that rightist forces were marching on Vientiane, presaging intervention by North Vietnam and China.

This prospect led *The Times* to review the American intervention—per capita aid higher than to any country in the world, but four-fifths of it military; a primitive economy disrupted; corruption created; exports only one per cent of imports. The editor concluded that the whole idea that Laos could be made into a bastion of the West was "totally misconceived".

South Vietnam. On May 1, 1960, Tillman Durdin wrote from Saigon that circumstances in South Vietnam were similar to the situation in South Korea. President Diem had a political machine, run largely by a younger brother and his wife, which controlled the elections. There was a severe system of press censorship, secret police arrests and surveillance. Eighteen well known Vietnamese leaders had just ventured to release a petition to the President asking him to permit them to function as an opposition. They charged his Government with denying elementary civil liberties, carrying on one-party

⁶⁸ Knowing that they could not otherwise face their students again, as well as from patriotic motives, some 120 professors met in Seoul and denounced the regime at the height of the revolution, reading their proclamation from the steps of the Capitol.

⁶⁹ William Jordan, Thomas J. Hamilton, the *New York Times*, May 1, 1960.

⁷⁰ The *New York Times*, May 1, 1960.

rule, filling the prisons to overflowing, maintaining a corrupt and swollen bureaucracy, and copying dictatorial communist methods.⁷¹

The correspondent of the *Economist*, on May 7, thought it remarkable that the eighteen had dared to challenge Diem's "mystical absolutism." When one properly elected critic of the regime was banned from the parliament, a spokesman of the President had informed Western diplomats that criticism of "a symbol of the state" could not be tolerated. On May 28, American Admiral Harry D. Felt gave a SEATO Council meeting a gloomy report on South Vietnam. He told of worsening conditions, with bandits active, despite a pretty good army of 150,000 men.

Formosa. Contemporaneously, Representative William Meyer of Vermont reminded his colleagues in the House that an election had recently been held on Formosa, in which President Chiang Kai-shek was the only candidate allowed on the ballot, the constitution was suspended for a day because it forbade a third term, blank ballots were thrown out as invalid, and 85 per cent of the native Formosans were allowed only 2 per cent of the electoral votes.⁷²

Turkey. The success of the Korean uprising at once gave courage to the students of Turkey to demonstrate against the oppressive regime of Premier Menderes, another dependable cog in the containment ring. For years his regime had been becoming increasingly dictatorial, jailing newspapermen and violating other civil liberties with police state methods. It harassed the opposition party, giving mounting evidence that it would not permit itself to be voted out of power. Finally, it "suspended" all political activity for three months and appointed a partisan commission to "try" the opposite political party.

When the first demonstrations began on May 1, Menderes called out the Army to break up the marchers and to prevent a hundred black-robed lawyers from marching to the NATO conference hall. Again students disappeared and the hated police were blamed. Observers noted that there was the same sequence of repression, riot and death as in Korea. On May 22, Menderes closed all the colleges in Turkey and Army cadets in Ankara marched in demonstration, defying the order of a General to return to quarters. On May 27, the Army suddenly took over Turkey, jailed Premier Menderes, President Bayar and most of their supporters, holding them for trial.

This development "completely surprised high ranking officials in the State Department." Until the very last the United States Embassy in Ankara had been reporting that Menderes would probably withstand his clamoring opponents.⁷³ When Menderes fell, James Cameron reviewed the reasons for American support of his long tyranny, at a cost of more than two billion dollars. Turkey had "the most implacable, traditional, unshakable hatred of Russia to be found anywhere around Soviet borders." Her enormous army had accordingly been financed by the Americans and some two billion dollars

⁷¹ The *New York Times*, May 1, 1960.

⁷² The *Nation*, May 14, 1960.

⁷³ The *New York Times*, May 28, 1960.

worth of American investments had supported big projects which made the top levels of society prosperous, leaving the peasantry to live "in sensationally grinding poverty." However, it had finally turned out "that it was easier to purchase governments than people."⁷⁴

On June 4, the *Economist* published a disquieting analysis of the economic reasons for Menderes' fall. As a bastion of containment he had kept a huge army of more than 500,000 men in mobilization, without its making any contribution "to the much needed capital investment in roads, schools, dams, irrigation and drainage." A "vast number of tractors" came in from the West. The large landowners ploughed up semi-arid land, and when drouth brought catastrophe Menderes "redoubled the stakes" by ploughing up more land. To get quick returns he introduced goats, which destroyed forests, bush and grass cover. To curb the perpetual inflation, Turkey's allies imposed "a savage deflationary policy" which "added to the misery and hopelessness."

Then the *Economist* correspondent added an arresting paragraph:

"The real threat is implicit in the fact that the Turkish-speaking Soviet citizens on the other side of the frontier have a standard of life which is nearly twice that of the mass of Anatolian peasants. Again, while the vast majority of the Turks in Turkey are illiterate and higher education (despite American efforts) is extremely scanty, there is little or no illiteracy among the Soviet Turks and their higher education is advancing at an astounding pace. Moreover, in Turkmenistan agricultural investment now rates a high priority amid an accelerating industrial development."

Thus the result of our arming Turkey perpetually against war with Russia was misery for Turkish citizens, while their nearby cousins in the Soviet Union advanced and prospered. The Truman Doctrine, applied faithfully and prodigally at its point of origin since 1947, had financed economic chaos and the suppression of virtually all democratic liberties.

In Turkey and South Korea there were now chances for democracy to take root. If we could learn belatedly that rightist police states are poor bulwarks of freedom, still other places might be saved for democracy. It was the salvation of the "free world" that revolutions could still take place in it. In the communist lands they apparently could not succeed; progress could come only through evolution. In the non-communist part of the world it was essential that both revolution and free elections should advance real reforms. Supposedly "free elections" that were manipulated in the interest of corrupt oligarchies could not be depended on to compete with communist revolutions which did eliminate corruption and extend social welfare down to the lowest levels of society.

South Africa. On March 21 the rapid movement of another state of the "free world" toward police state status was signalled when a large demonstration of black people at Sharpeville in South Africa was fired on by the police with sub-machine guns. Some 72 persons were killed and 187 wounded. Thereafter the enforcement of an "apartheid" policy upon the Africans led

⁷⁴ *News Chronicle*, April 28, 1960.

an international commission of jurists in Geneva to predict that soon all non-whites would be deprived "of almost all human rights and fundamental freedoms" and the whites "will have suffered the grievous impairment of those same rights and freedoms. South Africa will then be a police State."⁷⁵

Spain. On June 2, 1960, the Catholic Abbot of Montserrat in Spain sent a telegram to General Franco profoundly regretting the "repressions and tortures" his police had inflicted on twenty Catholic students who sang the Catalan hymn during Franco's visit to Catalonia. On June 13 more than 340 Basque priests addressed letters to their bishops protesting against police brutality to Spanish political prisoners and the violation of civil rights.⁷⁶

Dominican Republic. In June 1960 the number of political prisoners had reached record proportions in the small Caribbean state ruled by dictator L. R. Trujillo for thirty years. On June 8 the Inter-American Peace Committee of the Organization of American States reported violations of human rights by his regime, including "the denial of free assembly and of free speech, arbitrary arrests, cruel and inhuman treatment of political prisoners, and the use of intimidation and terror as political weapons."⁷⁷

The overthrow of police state regimes in the West during this half year was highly encouraging. The number of states in which free elections were prevented or subverted decreased, but there were still too many states in which this was still true.

Latin America. In mid-1960 there was mounting evidence of highly dangerous social conditions just below the United States, in nearly the whole of Latin America.

In April President Lleras Camargo of Colombia, long the highly respected head of the Pan American Union in Washington, gave addresses in the United States in which he explained that throughout most of Latin America the small aristocracy descended from colonial days still ruled, "a tiny class based on superior training and education" as well as wealth. Economic development had given even greater political and economic power to "this small privileged class." But populations were exploding and misery was deepening steeply, at a time when the miserable ones were learning that others were wealthy. "We have at best only a few years to meet the social challenge," he said, or within ten or fifteen years chaos would take place on the South American continent.⁷⁸

The same note of desperation ran through the appeal of the Students Federation of Chile to President Eisenhower on March 8. They agreed that it made sense to defend the existing order in countries like the United States, but to do so in Latin America meant "maintaining the privileges of a thin layer of the population, surrounded by an ocean of poor people for whom 'the social order' means little or literally nothing." Quoting the shocking

⁷⁵ The Manchester *Guardian*, from Geneva, June 7, 1960. The same Commission charged the Chinese with genocide in Tibet, in the sense of killing a culture.

⁷⁶ The *New York Times*, June 2, 14, 1960.

⁷⁷ E. W. Kenworthy, the *New York Times*, June 23, 1960.

⁷⁸ The *New York Times*, April 14, 24, 1960.

statistics, they cried out: "If trees are known by their fruit, it is a mockery to pretend that this situation reflects the Christian or the Democratic order. It is a crime against the spirit. If the injustices of today are all that Christianity or democracy can offer this continent, no one should be surprised if the best children of these nations turn toward communism." Saying that the Castro revolution in Cuba was "being observed with great attention and even with immense hope by all progressive Latin American sectors, especially the university youth," the appeal noted that an American Ambassador spoke recently in such an arrogant way about the "lesson of Guatemala," that the Chilean Senate condemned his statement unanimously. Then the appeal warned that those who tried to give Latin America lessons in submitting to North American private interests were "digging the grave of the Inter-American System and, perhaps, of democracy itself in this part of the hemisphere."⁷⁹

This appeal received little attention in the American press. A reply was eventually made in President Eisenhower's name, and the section dealing with the Castro revolution was printed in the *New York Times* on April 9. It urged the students not to "become so obsessed with the destruction of undemocratic regimes" as to get into something worse.⁸⁰

The inability of the United States to curb the Cuban revolution, even though it nationalized vast American properties, at its own prices and for payments promised in bonds redeemable several years later, was a sobering portent. In 1947 President Truman formally opened the containment era with a proclamation which was intended to proscribe all future communist revolutions and which in effect forbade all revolution. In 1960 revolution was rampant on the doorstep of the United States and it was no longer sufficient to label it as communist.⁸¹

This situation dramatized the prospect that while the "free world" was busy holding West Berlin and Formosa, the one for free elections and the other without any, it might well lose a large part of the planet.

⁷⁹ For the text see *J. F. Stone's Weekly*, March 21, 28, 1960.

⁸⁰ See "Castro's Cuba" by Robert Taber, *The Nation*, January 23, 1960. Taber, a CBS newsmen who had been in Cuba many times, observed that American newspapers were little interested in Cuba during the seven years of Batista's police state rule, but when Castro came in an army of journalists flocked to Havana and "torrents of sensational, adjective-packed prose" began to flow back. He detailed the benefits of the Castro upheaval to the people, and some of the injuries to the American owners of much of Cuba's wealth.

See also "Time-Bomb in Panama," by Martin B. Travis and James T. Watkins, *The Nation*, April 30, 1960.

⁸¹ On May 29 the *Sunday Times* of London published a long article by Norman Lewis on "Castro's Revolution in Action." After extended investigation in Cuba he reported that this revolution was as thorough as a communist one, even rooting out corruption. Yet Lewis could find no evidence of communist mentality, in school books or elsewhere. There were no references in the press or periodicals to the Russian or Chinese revolutions. Castro and his lieutenants always quoted Papal encyclicals in their speeches, never Marx. The revolution might use Marxist techniques, but its inspiration was "Christian and reformist." He was sure that only if the revolution was compelled "quite literally, to fight for its life, is there any danger of Cuba's becoming the first Communist satellite in the Western Hemisphere."

Nevertheless, the example to Latin America of a sweeping revolution was there.

Canada. There was food for American thought also in the lament of a Canadian author that as long as the Cold War continued, Canada would have to submit to American military control. She could not be free. "If the terror were lifted, then the ties between the two nations could be loosened to let Canada stand as independently as any nation can in our day."⁸²

Japan. The desire to escape from the American cold war embrace was greatest in Japan, and it grew very rapidly after the U-2 exposure and the failure at Paris to make a real beginning in liquidating the Cold War, or any beginning at all.

Alone of all the peoples, the Japanese had had an actual taste of what atomic war was like, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki—a fact which Americans may forget, but the Japanese never. The memory of Hiroshima is "for ever etched" in Japanese minds, said one editor; it is "an undying issue" in Japan, said Hanson W. Baldwin on June 18. The Japanese knew, also, how easily they could be destroyed from the mainland. Then it became known that several U-2s had been based on Japan and that Soviet threats to wipe out their take-off bases applied also to Japan. Moreover, a great many Japanese objected to "the American use of the bases behind their backs for action of which their Government is left unaware. The U-2 episode touched deep fears."⁸³

For a long time the Socialist Party, the opposition in Japan, had been struggling against the ratification of the new American-Japanese security treaty, which left in doubt Japan's ability to prevent the Americans from using Japan as a base for war elsewhere, say at Quemoy or Formosa, thus drawing the Red lightning on Japan. Now, after the U-2 affair, the Socialists resorted to unjustifiable tactics in the Japanese Parliament, cooping up the Speaker in his room, and they were all carried out bodily by 500 policemen. Then the Kishi Government rushed the treaty through and was condemned for this act by virtually all Japanese newspapers.

Demonstrations by a left wing students federation increased in violence and in opposition to Eisenhower's visit to Japan, which had been timed for the very day that the treaty would be ratified in the upper House in default of action at the end of thirty days. This timing accentuated the charge of the treaty's opponents that Eisenhower was now coming as a cold warrior to inspect American bases in the Far East, instead of arriving from Russia after a successful summit meeting as the man who was leading the world toward peace. The difference in the atmosphere of his approach was undeniable, and the violence of the left-wing protest posed an impossible dilemma for Washington: if Eisenhower went he would be humiliated by hostile demonstrations and his life endangered; if he did not go Kishi would probably fall

⁸² Miriam Chapin, *Contemporary Canada*, Oxford Press, 1960. Quoted from *The Nation*, February 6, 1960.

In mid-March the Governor of the Bank of Canada warned that Canada would have to halt her excessive importation of American capital and live within her own means. He urged her "to move firmly in that direction on a broad front without delay."—*The Economist*, March 19, 1960.

⁸³ Guy Wint, the *Observer*, June 19, 1960.

and the treaty with him, perhaps, also, parliamentary government. This is what Kishi is said to have pleaded.

The decision was to go and James Hagerty was sent ahead to prepare the way. Though demonstrations had been threatened against him, the Japanese Government permitted the American Ambassador and Hagerty to be surrounded and their car belaboured by several thousand hostile students for more than an hour, on June 10, until an American military helicopter finally rescued the two. This led to renewed American demands on Tokyo for protection for the President, as he toured Alaska and the Philippines, but on the 14th some 10,000 students battered down the gates to the Diet, and when the police finally charged them several hundred police and students were wounded in the pitched battle which followed. One girl student was killed. Throughout Japan the socialist labor organization Sohyo led other hundreds of thousands in token strikes and street demonstrations.

At this point officials in Washington were quoted as thinking that the cancellation of the President's visit was "unthinkable,"⁸⁴ but on June 16 the Kishi Government was forced to concede that it could not guarantee the President's safety and to postpone the visit.

Thus second shattering blow to American prestige within a month led to the usual explanation that the Communists had done it. Hagerty said it first and both the American and Japanese Governments repeated the alibi. It was "a small organized minority led by professional agitators." Did they not sing the Internationale? (It was also the battle song of the 3,500,000 member Sohyo unions.)

But this explanation was self-defeating, as it had so often been before. The Manchester *Guardian* pointed out, on June 17, that "it takes more than a few agitators to bring out the crowds that have been disorganizing Japanese towns for weeks." And even if the Communists were "as all powerful as Mr. Hagerty thinks them it is bad diplomacy to say so." What he was telling the world was: "We the mighty American people, anxious to protect you from international communism, have just suffered a smashing blow to our prestige at the hands of a handful of conspirators 'acting under external direction and control.'" As usual, the United States Government had "laid the whole weight of its policy and reputation on a plank too weak to bear it."

Then the *Guardian* called the roll of five of the lately fallen right wing despots on whom we had relied, and asked: "Who is the most reliable friend of the democratic way of life in Asia? Not President Ngo Dinh Diem (of South Vietnam) but Mr. Nehru, who is also a friend of Mr. Khrushchev."

The truth of this analysis had already been set forth in a full-length dispatch by Robert Trumbull from Tokyo to the *New York Times* on June 12. He, too, explained that in Japan there was neutralism of the Indian variety. He called the roll of seven Asian neutralist countries and asked who could say how many people in the five countries overtly committed to us "wish, secretly or otherwise, that they too could reach a modus vivendi with the other camp?" Surveying these five countries he concluded that "Those who harbor occasional doubts of the wisdom of Washington's policies from time to time are not

⁸⁴ *London Times*, June 11, 1960.

just a few Communists—they are legion." Of course the Communists leaped into every troubled situation, but "in the case of a majority of individual demonstrators, the real motive is likely to be neutralism." At bottom the Japanese were demonstrating against war and it was difficult to convince them that the security treaty was meant to prevent war. When President Eisenhower came to the Orient, he would "stand as the symbol personified of all that Asians consider wrong with United States policy."

In London it was realized at once that American cold war policy was collapsing. The dominoes that our cold warriors had so often feared were falling, but not militarily as they had so incessantly predicted. On June 17 the London *News Chronicle* warned that American restoration of the Japanese industrialists to power had made a Right-Wing government possible, but that this was not the answer. The *Times* thought that the U-2 incident and the American handling of it had brought matters to a head in Japan. The widespread tendency in Asia to blame the Americans, and not the Russians, for the failure to hold a summit conference had evidently "gained ascendancy in Japan."

The *Daily Telegraph* predicted that the more significant effect of this Tokyo debacle was likely to be on "the ideological conflict within the Communist camp." Now the Chinese side of it, arguing against Khrushchev's détente policy and preaching inevitable and triumphant war with imperialism, would be greatly strengthened. From Singapore Vernon Bartlett, the able correspondent of the *Guardian*, cabled that observers there regarded the decision in Tokyo "as presaging the crumbling of the entire American wall built round the Sino-Russian territories." Every Asiatic instrument of American policy would now be looking constantly over his shoulder, instead of fighting communism. The hope now was, he concluded, that the Western powers would "realize that the best they can hope for in Asia is neutrality."⁸⁵

Crumbling Policy. Thus the magnitude of the disaster at Paris grew relentlessly and alarmingly in mid-June 1960. For fifteen years successive American Governments had refused to accept the two main results of World War II, and had sought instead to confine the two communist giants closely with armed bases and alliances. Finally, in the summer of 1959 the untenability of the Berlin enclave was realized by Herter and Eisenhower and a broad movement toward ending the Cold War was begun. But there was no constancy of purpose to see it through. President Eisenhower returned from his triumphal welcome in India in December 1959, failed to assert his leadership over his intransigent allies and permitted matters to drift toward deadlock again. Then the incredible folly of making war maps in Russian skies wrecked both the summit conference and the cold war policy of the United States.

Thereafter Eisenhower could only go to the Far East as a defender of the frozen and failing American policy there, publicly throwing a protecting arm around Chiang Kai-shek, thus dramatizing his own first and greatest failure. With his great prestige and after his ending of the Korean war, Eisenhower

⁸⁵ The treaty passed the Japanese upper house silently on June 19, as 300,000 "students unionists and intellectuals" shouted their "undying repudiation of the military alliance." Then Premier Kishi announced that he would resign.—The *New York Times*, June 19, 1960.

could have begun gradually to change American policy toward the giant new China of the future. Instead, he went along with Dulles, Knowland and all the advocates of keeping the entire Pacific Ocean area an American lake. Thus after his abortive effort to make peace with Russia in 1959 he was condemned to go to the Orient to bolster shaky bulwarks there, and to endure the humiliation of being shut out of our greatest base area in the Pacific. In every crisis he always ended by preferring "a policy of status quo everywhere," until the dikes suddenly broke and history began "catching up with his omissions." It was "a sad and tragic end for a man so sincere and blessed with so many good intentions."⁸⁶

Leaderless Giant. When President Eisenhower put his hand to the plough of peace in inviting Premier Khrushchev to the United States and to Camp David and then turned back he was lost, and with him much of Western policy. Even apart from the U-2 misadventure, he could not start to lead the peoples toward surcease in the Cold War, for which they yearned, and then gradually slide back into a stand-still, negative position. He had to go forward toward settlements or events would leave him behind.

He did not lead, and as events rapidly took their course the United States stood leaderless, waiting through long months for a leader who would have the wisdom and courage to make peace and help to turn the world away from preoccupation with annihilation toward building a world society, while there was still time.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Henry Brandon, the *Sunday Times*, June 19, 1960.

⁸⁷ Shortly before the Paris conference, headlines said: "400 Cops Fight Mob Storming City Hall," "Battle Outside Red Hearing—12 Hurt, 52 Arrested."

The accounts told of 200 college students "sitting with arms locked against the jets from fire hoses, singing, cheering and howling while police clubs fly and water runs three inches deep over the marble floors of San Francisco's City Hall."

The students were demonstrating in opposition to a hearing being conducted by the House Committee on Un-American Activities.—*The Nation*, May 28, 1960.

WHY THE WEST LOST THE COLD WAR

THE communization of the vast heart of Eurasia, the world's largest island, is the towering political fact of the twentieth century. It is a development so momentous and alarming that it has kept the Western world in a state of apprehension and hostility ever since it began in November 1917.

The splitting of the world into two almost equal rival parts, from the standpoint of stalemated power, was the inescapable and inexorable consequence of two world wars, both of which broke out in the heart of Europe, the bosom of the West. It was these wars which shattered the rule of Europeans over the entire globe, ended the undisputed sway of democratic-capitalism over it and brought into question the ultimate survival of our way of life.

From any standpoint this is a deeply disturbing development, and unless we understand why it happened we may really witness that decline of the West which Spengler foresaw so darkly. If we are unable to profit from our nearly fatal errors, there may indeed be no way to halt the decline of the West and the rise of the East.

The starting point should be a full recognition that this trend is not due to any mysteriously potent power in the virus of communism, but to the fundamental international anarchy which produced the two world wars. It was the wars which loosed communist revolution from Moscow to Shanghai and to Stettin. Communism is not the cause of the West's loss of control over the vast bulk of Eurasia; it is the consequence.

It is true that some have argued that Russian mobilization in 1914 made it impossible to stop World War I at the last minute. It is also true that many believe firmly that it was the Hitler-Stalin truce in 1939 which touched off World War II. But in both cases the offense charged was the last act of a long chain of far more serious and culpable plunges toward world war on the part of others—Germany-Austria in 1914, Germany-Italy-Japan in 1939, encouraged in the latter case by the appeasement policies of Britain, France and the United States.

In 1914 the German Government had three opportunities to halt the headlong plunge of her ally Austria-Hungary toward the crushing of Serbia, in a tinderbox condition of highly armed alliances. On July 5-6, 1914, Germany gave Vienna a blank check to go ahead. On July 22-24 Berlin failed to stop the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, knowing that it carried war on its face. On July 27, with full evidence that a grand clash of the alliances was imminent, Germany permitted Austria to issue a declaration of war on Serbia the next day, after nearly a month of carefully planned dissimulation.

Russian mobilization after these events was not the cause of World War I, but a last minute reaction to the evident intent of the Central Powers to destroy Russia's protégé Serbia and an attempt to prepare for the impending collision of the grand alliances.

In 1939 a still longer chain of events preceded the Hitler-Stalin pact. The Western powers would not enforce the law of the League of Nations against Japan's aggression in Manchuria. They pretended to restrain Mussolini in Abyssinia, but never intended to do so. With great determination they held a blanket of non-intervention over the Spanish civil war, until Italy and Germany had strangled the Republic to death beneath it. They would not march when Hitler broke all the great treaties upon which the public order of Europe rested and militarized the Rhineland. Before Hitler took Austria they told her not to expect any help from the League, or from them. With cold-blooded resolution they broke up Czechoslovakia and turned all of East Europe and the Balkans over to Hitler.

It was only when Hitler's mighty Wehrmacht was poised to plunge through Poland to Russia's borders that the Kremlin made the pact which deflected him westward for nearly two years. Up to that moment the Soviet Union did everything that a government could do to form an alliance with the West in order to restrain Hitler, or to defeat him without undue sacrifice, but on each and every occasion her overtures were rebuffed. Time and again Moscow asked for a conference with the Western powers to initiate collective security measures against Hitler, but without avail. In the end Litvinov was left alone in Geneva to make his valedictory to the League and go home with his failure.

In both cases it was not possible for the Western powers to initiate, support or tolerate a long series of diplomatic steps or open drives toward war and then at the last minute cast the responsibility upon a power which was reacting defensively against the march of events in the West that it could not control.

Our Irretrievable Error in 1919. The responsibility for both wars clearly centered in the West, but the two responsibilities were of a very different order. Early in 1914 all the great powers could in large measure be excused for failing to understand that their destructive capacities had advanced enough to make another world war suicidal, or half suicidal. There had been a century of peace and many recent crises which had been resolved. Surely there would not be another great war. But there was—one which destroyed the Austrian, German and Russian empires. It also gravely and permanently weakened France and Britain.

One would have thought that this lesson would have spurred the West to organize firmly against a repetition of a tragedy so pitiful and devastating. The need was deeply felt. There was a world leader of unprecedented moral power to spearhead the demand for a league of nations. In fact Woodrow Wilson actually did create the League of Nations, aided by many millions of people strongly aroused by the historic opportunity.

Then an unbelievable thing occurred. His political opponents in the United States emasculated the Covenant of the League and finally turned their backs

upon it, after Wilson had been broken physically and destroyed politically. The result was a weak League of Nations which failed to prevent World War II.

The crushing of Wilson happened at one of those great climactic turning points in history. The event itself was in all probability the most decisive error in American history.

The enormity of the error was clearly stated by Dr. Virgil M. Hancher, President of the State University of Iowa, in a lecture for the Walter J. Shepard Foundation at Ohio State University on May 4, 1955, when he said:

"Certainly we must recognize that we may have missed our great opportunity for world leadership toward peace and prosperity. In 1919 that leadership could have been ours for the taking. The nations of Europe were tired and battered; Russia was laid low by revolution; and Asia had not yet awakened. Opportunity knocked at our door, and we turned her away. How different was the situation at the end of World War II! Europe—our natural ally—was devastated and exhausted; Russia had become a mighty power; and Asia had awakened. Now, if we lead at all, we can lead only half the world. Our great opportunity may never return. When the historians of the twenty-second century write the history of our times, we may be described as 'the nation that missed the bus,' the nation that came to maturity and turned aside from its opportunity, only to discover upon looking back that the center of world affairs was Asia, and not Europe or America."

What was lacking when the decision was made? asked Dr. Hancher. It was not wealth, or any kind of national power. "It was men that we needed—great men, men of vision! And we did not have them. Even the best of Constitutions will not work without good men."

This states the constant danger of bad leadership under which we live. It highlights the tragedy of 1919 also, for then we had a great leader, but he could not overcome the opposition of jealous, vindictive, and partisan men. They won their partisan victory and shut their minds to the opportunity of a national life-time.

Wilson had "world power and influence in its most profound sense," such as no other world leader has ever had, though Franklin D. Roosevelt came close to it. Wilson called upon all men to learn while there was yet time, to do the thing which was terribly, poignantly, and plainly needed. He called to his nation to provide the leadership that could come only from it. For many months, too, his people were ready to respond, but the Senate leaders blocked the way.

Thus the opportunity was lost. Our leadership in the League might not have made the difference. It would not have unless we had put ourselves into League leadership. But the haunting remorse lingers that we did not try. After World War II came upon us we repented and forced the Senate to pass the Connally Resolution of November 5, 1943, calling for another league of nations and tacitly assuring the world that the Senate would not block the march of history again.

But history had moved on. In matters of this magnitude there are no

second chances. After World War I power was still distributed, if unevenly, among seven great powers, no one of which could have defied the League of Nations led by the United States. After World War II there were only two great powers left—each bestriding half the earth. Neither of them could be coerced by the new United Nations without bringing on the final world war. There would be no peace unless they cooperated in the UN, and they did not cooperate. Instead they plunged into many years of dangerous, gruelling cold war, first under the sign of the American atomic monopoly and presently of both American and Russian hydrogen mushrooms in the skies.

A Long Legacy of Soviet-American Hostility. Was it "inevitable" that the victors of 1945 should promptly fall out and split the world? Given human nature it was highly probable. Before the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. became allies in 1941 there were twenty-four years of mutual hostility between them, beginning with our participation in the ill fated Western intervention in Russia from 1918 to 1920, an adventure which had plausible reasons at the start, but which ended in a full-scale effort on the part of the West to stamp out communism at its birth. This effort was pursued until the British and French peoples put a stop to it, and it resulted in the death of 7,500,000 Russians—as many as had died in World War I, but in more horrible ways.

We often assume that the Russians should have forgotten all this during World War II, when we fought as allies, along with the sixteen year refusal of the United States to recognize the Soviet Union. We are sure that the Soviets should have magnanimously forgotten the three disastrous invasions of the Soviet Union through Eastern Europe since 1914 and let us keep that area in our social and economic orbit. We did not understand that it takes centuries for experiences like this to recede into the past, and we insisted that our method of settling things, by free elections, should at once determine the future of East Europe, on the other side of Europe in Russia's zone of occupation.

THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE COLD WAR

There can be no real understanding of the Cold War unless chronology is kept in mind. What came first? What was action and what reaction? Not everything that came after a given act was due to that act, but a later event could not be the cause of an earlier one.

Below are the principal events of the Cold War in the order in which they occurred.

1. September 1938—Control of East Europe achieved by Hitler at Munich.
2. December 5, 1941 to February 4, 1942—State Department decisions not to make any wartime agreements about Russia's western boundaries.
3. April 1942 to June 1944—The second front postponed. Peripheral war conducted in Africa and Italy.
4. October 9, 1944—Churchill and Stalin agreed on spheres of influence in the Balkans: Greece to Britain; Bulgaria and Rumania to Russia; Yugoslavia 50-50.
5. December 3, 1944 to January 15, 1945—The British crushed the Greek leftists in heavy fighting.

6. December 24, 1944 to May 14, 1945—Bulgarian purge trials executed 2000 rightists and imprisoned 3000.
7. March 29, 1944 to February 1945—Soviet armies occupied East Europe.
8. February 1945—The Yalta Conference conceded friendly governments in East Europe to Russia, but with free elections and a reorganization of the Polish Government.
9. March 6, 1945—Russia imposed a communist-led coalition in Rumania.
10. March 1945—Friction with Russia over German surrender negotiations in Italy.
11. April 12, 1945—Franklin D. Roosevelt's death, four months after Cordell Hull's resignation.
12. April 23, 1945—Truman's White House lecture to Molotov on the Polish Government.
13. July 17-25, 1945—The Potsdam Conference failed to alter Russian arrangements in East Europe.
14. August 6, 1945—The first American A-bomb upset the expected world strategic balance.
15. August 18, 1945—Beginning of the Byrnes-Bevin diplomatic drive to force free elections in East Europe.
16. September 1945—First Council of Foreign Ministers deadlocked over East Europe.
17. March 5, 1946—Churchill's Fulton speech demanded an Anglo-American preponderance of power against Russia, with reference to East Europe.
18. April 1946—Russian troops forced from Iran through the United Nations.
19. August 1946—Soviet demands upon Turkey for the return of two provinces and for a base in the Straits.
20. July to December 1946—Peace treaties for Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland hammered out.
21. November 1946—The Republicans won control of the Congress, aided by charges of widespread communist infiltration in the United States.
22. Late December 1946—General relaxation and expectation of peace.
23. March 12, 1947—The Truman Doctrine, calling for the containment of the Soviet Union and communism.
24. March 23, 1947—Truman's order providing for the loyalty investigation of all government employees.
25. March to August 1947—The freely elected Smallholder's Party Government of Hungary disintegrated by communist pressure.
26. June 5, 1947—The Marshall Plan announced. Rejected by Russia August 2, 1947.
27. November 1947—The Cominform organized, uniting all the principal communist parties of Europe, including those of France and Italy.
28. January 22, 1948—A plan for a Western Union in Europe announced by Bevin.
29. February 25, 1948—A communist coup seized control of Czechoslovakia.
30. March 25, 1948—Western Union treaty signed. Devil theory address by President Truman.

31. June 28, 1948—Yugoslavia expelled by the Cominform. Received help from the West.
32. June 1948 to May 1949—The Berlin blockade.
33. March to August 1949—The signing and ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty creating NATO.
34. September 23, 1949—The first Soviet A-bomb hung the threat of total destruction over West Europe.
35. February 1, 1950—Drive for the H-bomb announced by Truman.
36. February 9, March 9 and 16, 1950—Acheson explained the policy of no negotiation with the Russian river of aggression until strength had been accumulated.
37. October 1948 to January 1950—The Chinese Nationalist armies captured or destroyed by the Communists.
38. February to May 1950—The first explosion of McCarthyism.
39. June 25, 1950—The outbreak of the Korean War.
40. September 12, 1950—The United States demanded the rearmament of Germany and began a vast rearmament.
41. October 1950—Having liberated South Korea, we decided to conquer the North Korean Republic.
42. February 1952—Acheson's Lisbon NATO arms goals overstrained our allies.
43. May to November 1952—Our allies escaped from control during the long American election campaign.
44. November 1952—The first American H-bomb exploded, on the ground.
45. March 6, 1953—The death of Stalin created uncertainty and a desire for relaxation in Russia.
46. May 11, 1953—Churchill repealed his Fulton address and called for an end of the Cold War on the basis of guaranteeing Russia's security in East Europe.
47. July 26, 1953—Korean cease-fire signed.
48. August 9, 1953—The first air-borne H-bomb achieved by Russia, and growing Russian air power brought the threat of incineration to all large American cities.
49. November 6, 1953—Ex-President Truman officially charged with knowingly harboring a communist spy.
50. May 1952 to January 1954—A growing realization that the world power struggle had become a stalemate.
51. April 22 to June 15, 1954—The crest of McCarthyism.
52. July 18-24, 1955—The First Summit Conference recognized the atomic arms stalemate and the inevitability of competitive coexistence.
53. February 15-20, 1956—Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin accelerated a wave of reforms behind the iron curtain, relaxing police state controls and giving greater incentives to individuals.
54. March 7, 1956—President Eisenhower urged that we counter the threat to us "more by positive measures that people throughout the world will trust, than just by trying to answer specific thrusts."

55. October-November 1956—Revolution in Poland and Hungary against Soviet control and Communism.
56. November 1956—Attacks upon Egypt by Israel, France and Britain.
57. August 26, 1957—The first intercontinental ballistic rocket claimed by the Soviet Union.
58. October 4, 1957—The first of the increasingly heavy Sputniks demonstrated Russia's ability to lay down large pay-loads accurately across great distances.
59. April 1958—The pro-American Liberal Party ousted in Canada by the strongly nationalistic Conservatives.
60. May 1958—Vice President Nixon mobbed in Peru and Venezuela.
61. July 1958—Revolution in Iraq and the sending of American troops to Lebanon.
62. August-October 1958—The second Quemoy crisis, ending in China's defeat.
63. November 1958 to July 1959—The second Berlin crisis.
64. April 16, 1959—The resignation of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.
65. September 1959—Khrushchev's visit to the United States, inaugurating President Eisenhower's effort to move toward making peace and ending the Cold War.
66. September-October 1959—A Soviet *Lunik* rocket hit the moon and another went around it relaying to earth pictures of its hidden side, emphasizing Russia's continued leadership in rocketry and the conquest of space.
67. November 16, 1959—Secretary of State Herter's appeal for keeping the great competition of our time with communism "within the bounds set by the conditions of co-survival."
68. December 1959—Eisenhower's eleven nation crusade for a new international climate and peace, climaxed by his statement to the Parliament of India on December 10 that the mistrusts, fixations and tensions that exist in the world "are the creations of Governments, cherished and nourished by Governments. Nations would never feel them if they were given freedom from propaganda and pressure."
69. October 1959 to May 1960—The Second Summit Conference frustrated by the steady erosion in the West of the expectation of serious negotiations about West Berlin and by the U-2 spy plane incident at Sverdlovsk.
70. June 16, 1960—President Eisenhower turned back from a visit to Japan by the inability of the Japanese Government to protect him from great hostile demonstrations.

It is of cardinal importance to remember that East Europe was given away not at Yalta but at Munich. Before that the curbing of Hitler might have cost the West the same territories which Hitler yielded to Russia. After Munich the *marching armies would grind back and forth across the face of Europe until the Red armies came to rest in Berlin and Vienna.*

Decisions During the War. This was not foreseen in the State Department as late as December 5, 1941 and February 1942 when the Atherton-Dunn

memoranda reasoned that Stalin might not be able to recover all of his lost territories and ruled against recognizing his seizure of the Baltic states and half of Poland.¹ Our fear of another uproar in this country over "secret treaties," such as had been raised after World War I, and of the outcry of Polish and other citizens, combined with aversion to any extension of the area of communism to prevent the British from making a more realistic agreement with Russia in April 1942.

Then the British managed to lead Western war operations through peripheral warfare in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy until May 1944. This was justifiable strategy for us, but it left the main brunt of the land war on the Russians to the end and created in their minds lasting suspicions of being deliberately sacrificed. More important, it gave the Russian armies time to come into Central Europe, at the cost of many hundreds of thousands of casualties, losses which we would have suffered had we struck sooner and directly at Germany.

All during the war years Churchill sought manfully to retrieve in East Europe what Chamberlain had given away. His eyes were always on the non-existent "soft underbelly" of Europe, then in the late stages of the war on an invasion through Trieste, and finally for lunges into Germany to seize areas beyond the agreed zones of occupation for bargaining purposes. But always the actual balance of forces defeated him. The Russians were required to maul the bulk of the German forces to the last day of the war. Allied forces thrown through Trieste might well have enabled the Russians to skirt the Baltic Sea and appear on the English Channel. Furthermore, attempts to change the zones of occupation against the Russians would have been rejected by allied public opinion. Long afterward General Bedell Smith, one of General Eisenhower's most trusted generals, recorded his conviction that it "would have been quite impossible in the light of world public opinion in our own country," and his advice to Churchill at the time was "that I didn't think his own public opinion would permit it."²

Soviet control of East Europe was the price we paid for the years of appeasement of Hitler, and it was not a high price. In Toynbee's judgment "the Nazis would have conquered the world," if we and the Soviets had not combined our efforts. They would eventually have crossed the narrow gap of the South Atlantic to Brazil and the rest of South America, where strong fifth columns could have been organized in more than one country. By our war alliance with the Soviets we prevented the unification of the world by the Nazis. That was a victory beyond price, but, says Toynbee, we "could not have put down Hitler without consequently producing the situation with which all of us now find ourselves confronted."³

All this was fully evident during the war and it is still true. C. B. Marshall has reminded us that we do not have to guess what the Axis powers would have

¹ Cordell Hull, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, pp. 1165-70.

² Walter Bedell Smith, "The Cold War—An Audit," *the New York Times Magazine*, October 10, 1954, pp. 30-1.

³ Arnold J. Toynbee, "What World War II Did and Didn't Settle," *the New York Times Magazine*, May 1, 1955, p. 66.

done had they won. They set it down plainly in their *Tripartite Alliance* on September 27, 1940—"a pattern for the conquest of the rest of the world and the beleaguering of the United States."⁴ Why then did we have ten years of cold war over Russia's control of East Europe and over her desire to have a military base on the Turkish Straits?

East Europe Divided by Churchill and Stalin. Early in October 1944 Churchill sought to come to terms with the inevitable. Over the strong opposition of our State Department, but with Roosevelt's permission, he went to Moscow to make a temporary agreement for three months concerning the Balkans.

On October 9 he proposed to Stalin that Russia have 90 per cent predominance in Rumania, others 10 per cent, and 75 per cent predominance in Bulgaria, others 25 per cent. In Greece Britain would have 90 per cent predominance, and others 10 per cent. The "predominance" was to be divided 50-50 in Hungary and Yugoslavia. Nothing was said about this division of influence being temporary.⁵

Stalin accepted this proposal without a word. He permitted a really free election in Hungary, which the old ruling classes duly won, and he did his best to force Tito to honor the bargain about Yugoslavia.⁶ Also he held his hand completely while Churchill promptly crushed the left forces in Greece, thereby sealing his agreement with Churchill and committing Roosevelt to it, before Yalta.

The communist revolution in Bulgaria was already in full cry when the Yalta conference met. The overthrow in the preceding December of the mighty ELAS movement in Greece by the British army and the Greek officer caste had suggested to the Russians that something very similar could occur in Bulgaria, where the Bulgarian army officers used the coup d'état "as a normal political instrument."⁷ "People's Court" trials began on December 24, 1944, and cut down the Bulgarian army officers as with a scythe until the end of February 1945.

On March 6 the Soviet Government imposed a communist-led government upon Rumania, deposing the Rumanian conservatives. It was "very hard to think of any constructive alternative," since free elections in Rumania under their control would have been "an invitation to Fascism here more than elsewhere."⁸

The situation was worst in Rumania, where government was notoriously "so corrupt that it is a synonym for corrupt government,"⁹ but there was no country in East Europe, with the exception of Greece, where the kind of free elections we wanted would not have been controlled by the old ruling classes. They had manipulated the elections for generations. No free election had ever been held. The Hungarian landlords had been ruthless rulers for a thousand

⁴ C. B. Marshall, *The Limits of Foreign Policy*, New York, 1954, p. 72.

⁵ Winston Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 227-8.

⁶ Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito*, New York, 1953, pp. 232-4.

⁷ Howard K. Smith, *The State of Europe*, pp. 351, 289.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 364.

⁹ Joseph C. Harsch, *The Curtain Isn't Iron*, New York, 1950, p. 48, London, Putnam.

years, and elsewhere the cliques which ruled for their own benefit had virtually all of the knowledge of political manipulations. The Hungarian and Rumanian ruling groups had also sent two million conscripted troops deep into Russia, behind Hitler's armies.

Free Elections. In these circumstances the question arises, why did Stalin agree at Yalta to conduct "free elections" in Eastern Europe? Why we demanded them was clear. That is the American way of doing things, subject to the operations of political machines, and we wanted very much to prevent East Europe from being communized. No one at Yalta dreamed of denying that the region must cease to be a hostile *cordon sanitaire* against the Soviet Union and become "friendly" politically to the Soviet Union. No one could deny that, with the Red armies at that moment across Poland, within thirty miles of Berlin, and beyond Budapest sweeping up the Danube, while the Western allies were still in France, set back by the Ardennes offensive.

But could governments friendly to Russia be obtained in this region by "free elections" in which the ruling groups participated freely? It was inconceivable that these groups could be friendly to Russia, or that communist Russia could think of depending on them. That was as incredible as that we should freely arrange for a communist government in France or Italy. The Soviets also happened to believe that their system of government was as valid as ours, and that they could really depend only upon it to stop East Europe from being used as an invasion corridor into the Soviet Union.

If the Americans at Yalta committed a fault, it was not in "giving away" East Europe. That had been done at Munich long before. It was in trying to achieve the impossible under the formula of "free elections." Yet free elections were in their blood and they could do no other than to believe that this was a solution which all must accept. On his side, it is not likely that Stalin thought the formula would prevent him from purging the long dominant elements in East Europe, whose hostility to Red Russia needed no further demonstration. These elections might be managed and "people's democracies" set up which would be acceptable to the Americans. He knew that the decisive settlement for the area had been made in his gentleman's agreement with Churchill, on October 9, 1944, and that its execution was already far advanced on both sides.

He was loyally holding to his side of the bargain with Churchill and he could hardly have believed that the Yalta formulas would disrupt allied relations as soon as the war was over and lead to long years of bitter cold war.

Truman's Reversal of the Roosevelt-Hull Policy. It is possible that if Roosevelt had lived the same deadly quarrel would have developed, though it is far more likely that he already understood the deeper forces involved and the impossibility of frustrating them. What made a clash certain was the accession of Truman just at the close of the war. He intended to carry out Roosevelt's engagements, loyally and fully, and to exact from Stalin the same complete fulfilment, including free elections in East Europe. This theme runs through the first volume of his *memoirs*.

However his methods were poles apart from those of Roosevelt and Hull. All through 1944, his last year in office, Hull had conducted off-the-record

conferences with groups of editors, clergymen, and members of Congress, to explain to them how far the Russians had come with us, how they had been "locked up and isolated for a quarter of a century," used to receiving violent epithets. It would "take time for them to get into step," but they would do it. He urged that "we must be patient and forbearing. We cannot settle questions with Russia by threats. We must use friendly methods."

No one was more opposed than Hull to Soviet control of East Europe, "interfering with her neighbors," but as he left office his policy rested on two bases: to show the Russians by example how a great power should act and to continue in constant friendly discussion with them. "Consult them on every point. Engage in no 'cussin matches' with them."¹⁰

Nothing could have been further from President Truman's approach. He quickly read all the dispatches about friction with Russia over German surrenders, listened to everybody who wanted to get tough with the Russians, and when Molotov came by on April 23, 1945, to pay his respects to the new President, he received such a dressing down that he complained at the end of it that no one had ever talked like that to him before.¹¹

This was exactly eleven days after Roosevelt's death. It took Truman just that long to reverse the entire Roosevelt-Hull approach to Russia and to inaugurate an era of toughness and ever greater toughness in our dealings with her. Then on August 6, 1945, the Hiroshima explosion gave him the means to back insistence on free elections in East Europe and when the London Conference of September 1945 deadlocked over this issue he made up his mind at once to contain Russia.¹² It was at this moment that Lippmann, noting that we had terminated lend-lease "abruptly and brutally" and had drifted into an arms race with the Soviet Union, warned: "Let no one deceive himself. We are drifting toward a catastrophe."¹³

To the already deep fears of Russia for her own security, thrice justified since 1914, was added a new and dreadful fear of a fourth Western attack, backed by the atomic bomb. From the psychological point of view the policy of toughness was "the worst treatment" that could have been devised. "If a patient is suffering from genuine fear, you do not cure his fears and establish a rational relationship with him by making him more afraid. You endeavor to show him patiently and by your actions toward him that he has nothing to fear."¹⁴

Exactly the opposite course was followed, with increasing momentum. In the following spring of 1946 Churchill issued at Fulton, Missouri, and in President Truman's applauding presence, his call for an overwhelming preponderance of power against Russia, hinting broadly at later forcible interventions in East Europe. Nevertheless, peace was made in Europe during the remainder of 1946. In three sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers and a conference of 21 nations in Paris, peace treaties were hammered out in substantially the terms established by the various armistices. Really free

¹⁰ Hull, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, pp. 1464-71, 1406-8.

¹¹ Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. I, p. 82.

¹² Arthur Krock, *The New York Times*, March 23, 25, 1947.

¹³ *The Nashville Tennessean*, November 4, 1945.

¹⁴ Kenneth Ingram, *History of the Cold War*, New York, Philosophical Library, 1955, p. 228; London, Darwin, 1955.

elections had been held in Hungary and there were many signs of relaxation of tension as the year closed.

Results of the Truman Doctrine. However, in February the British turned the burden of supporting Greece over to us and Truman seized the occasion to proclaim the doctrine of containment, on March 12, 1947, which George F. Kennan spelled out fully in the July issue of *Foreign Affairs* as "long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." Otherwise the Kremlin would take its time about filling every "nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power."

On its face this was the rashest policy ever enunciated by any American leader. For the first time in history the encirclement of a great power was openly proclaimed. This power, too, was in firm possession of the great heartland of Eurasia. It had already demonstrated that it could industrialize itself quickly and enough to defeat Hitler's armies. What it would do, after the Cold War was declared by Churchill and Truman, was easily predictable by any average man. The Soviet Union would put up a bold front to cover its frightening post-war weakness and work mightily to gain strength to hold what it had and then break the encirclement.¹⁵

This was a difficult undertaking, for not only was the Soviet Union frightfully devastated, but Eastern Europe was in nearly as bad shape. However, what the Soviet peoples had done twice already they could do again under the lash of containment. After the two gruelling forced marches, before 1941 and after the German invasion, they undertook still a third and within eleven years from 1946 they had achieved first their A-bomb in 1949, then the H-bomb in 1953 and the first ICBM in 1957. In all other vital respects also they had gained that position of strength which was our announced goal after March 1950.

In the course of containment, "negotiation from strength" and liberation, we revived fully the machinery of totalitarian rule in Russia. As William A. Williams has pointed out: "Appearing as a classic and literal verification of Marx's most apocalyptic prophecy, the policy of containment strengthened

¹⁵ In the July 1959 issue of *Population Bulletin*, the journal of the Population Reference Bureau in Washington, there appeared an analysis of Russian manpower losses in World War II based on the currently released statistics of the 1959 Soviet census.

The census had shown that women outnumbered men 55 to 45 in every 100 and that this disparity was concentrated entirely in the war-time generation. Computing on the basis of these figures and a 1959 Soviet population of 208.8 million, the article estimated that Soviet losses in men during the war had been, not the 7,000,000 usually accepted but between 15 and 20 million males.

The implications of these statistics are clear, the study said. "At the end of World War II the U.S.S.R. was far weaker in manpower resources than the Western powers assumed. —*The Times of India*, July 6, 1959.

This was the fearfully wounded Soviet Union, suffering also from deliberate German-Austrian-Hungarian-Rumanian devastations too vast to comprehend, that was easily assumed by Roosevelt's successors to be out to "fill every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power." It was this exhausted ally that was said to be out to conquer the world and to require prompt and close armed encirclement.

It is no justification, either, to say that we did not know the full extent of Russia's wounds. Any regular reader of the war-time news knew that Russia's losses were colossal.

the hand of every die-hard Marxist and every extreme Russian nationalist among the Soviet leadership."

Containment also gave Stalin total power over the Soviet peoples. Williams continues: "Armed with the language and actions of containment, which underwrote and extended his existing power, Stalin could and did drive the Soviet people to the brink of collapse and, no doubt, to the thought of open resistance. But the dynamic of revolt was always blocked, even among those who did have access to the levels of authority, by the fact of containment and the open threat of liberation. Thus protected by his avowed enemies, Stalin was able to force his nation through extreme deprivations and extensive purges to the verge of physical and psychological exhaustion. But he also steered it through the perils of reconstruction to the security of nuclear parity with the United States."¹⁶

Stalin's first reply to containment was the destruction of the Smallholder's Party in Hungary, between March and August 1947, into which he had allowed the dispossessed landlords to go, and to take over the Hungarian government in its first free elections. The ending of this government was not difficult, since a topnotch American newsmen found in Hungary that the "political sterility" of these elements was so great and their inclinations toward corruption so "incurable" that an astonishing number of anti-communists accepted the communist claim to represent the people.¹⁷ The kind of democracy for which we had fought throughout East Europe might have been destroyed in Hungary anyway, but the Truman Doctrine made it a matter of life and death for the Hungarian Reds to end it.

FROM THE MARSHALL PLAN TO TOTAL DIPLOMACY

The Marshall Plan. Meanwhile the yawning economic void in West Europe had led to the American Marshall Plan, an offer of economic help to all the nations of Europe, a "policy not directed against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos."¹⁸

If this magnificent conception had come earlier, while the Russians were asking in vain for a six billion dollar loan, before UNRRA was abolished and before the Truman Doctrine had drawn the lines of conflict tightly, there would have been no Cold War. In the context of the declared Cold War, Russia not only rejected the Marshall Plan for herself but forbade her East European satellites to participate, foreseeing that the American largesse would dissolve shaky loyalties to her satellite governments in more than one East European quarter.

Molotov's angry departure from the Marshall Plan conference in Paris, on August 2, 1947, convinced much of Western opinion that Russia was hostile to the West and that she had deliberately split the world in two. Three months later Russia created the Cominform, an organization of all the Communist parties in East Europe, plus those of France and Italy, to back the Molotov

¹⁶ William A. Williams, "The Irony of Containment: A Policy Boomerang," *The Nation*, May 5, 1956, pp. 376-8.

¹⁷ Joseph C. Harsch, *the Christian Science Monitor*, July 8, 9, 1947.

¹⁸ Quoted from Marshall's Harvard speech of June 5, 1947.

Plan for East European reconstruction, to oppose the Marshall Plan and to fight the Cold War generally. This response to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan convinced many people throughout the West that the Russians had reverted to the world revolution and were plotting to take over the earth.

Then the Communist seizure of Czechoslovakia hardened this fear into frightened certainty. This high peak of the Cold War, in late February 1948, had been preceded by the announcement on January 22 of a plan for a Western Union in Europe, which the London *Times* later thought might have "provoked the Soviet Union to hurry forward its own plans" for the consolidation of the Communist bloc.¹⁹

Czechoslovakia. But Czechoslovakia had been lost to the West at Munich, and in the successive events of the German occupation, which had destroyed most of the conservative classes and made it impossible for the Czechs to wish to oppose Russia. Both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan had also made it certain that Russia would bring Czechoslovakia behind the Iron Curtain before long. When this happened, the West lost nothing from the power standpoint. On broader grounds it was a time for sorrow and remorse that big power politics had twice deprived the Czechs of the democracy and freedom they did not deserve to lose either time.

However, all this was forgotten in the wave of shock, alarm and anger which swept over the West. Within a month the five power Western Union treaty was signed and on the same day, March 25, 1948, President Truman made an address in which he developed the devil theory fully. One nation, and one alone, had refused to cooperate in making peace, had broken the agreements it did make, had obstructed the United Nations and destroyed both the independence and the democratic character of a whole series of nations in Central and East Europe. To stop this nation Truman demanded prompt passage of ERP, more funds for Greece, Turkey and Chiang Kai-shek, and universal military training.²⁰

Thereafter the United States proceeded rapidly along an essentially negative course, in which we rushed to counter each communist move, tied up our resources in blocking efforts, selected our friends on one test alone, and rapidly adopted at home the methods and weapons of "the enemy."²¹

Berlin Blockade. There is more cause for satisfaction in our handling of the Berlin blockade from June 1948 to May 1949. The Russians had a strong case for terminating the four power occupation of Berlin, because the West had announced plans on June 7 for the creation of a West German government. Since the four power occupation of Berlin was based on the assumption that Berlin would be the capital of a united Germany, the quadripartite occupation did become an anomaly when the assumption was destroyed. Thereafter West Berlin became from the Russian standpoint only a listening post and spy center for the West in the center of East Germany, and an ideological thorn in her side.

¹⁹ Quoted in James P. Warburg, *Germany, Key to Peace*, Cambridge, Harvard U.P., 1953, p. 58; London, Deutsch, 1954.

²⁰ *The New York Times*, March 26, 1948.

²¹ Warburg, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

The announcement of a new currency for West Germany, imperatively needed, also created urgent problems for East Germany, since it would circulate in Berlin.

These were real grievances, but from the Western standpoint they did not justify an attempt to starve out 2,000,000 West Berliners. The crisis was grave and it was met by the West imaginatively, boldly and resolutely. The advocates of sending an army of tanks to Berlin were silenced and the airlift did the job, dramatically lifting allied prestige to new heights. In this engagement of the Cold War the action of the West was a model of combined courage and restraint, and President Truman deserves his large share of the credit for it.

"*Total Diplomacy.*" The Cold War as proclaimed by Churchill and Truman would have been impractical from the start had it not been for the American A-bomb monopoly, in which both leaders took the deepest satisfaction. When it was abruptly ended in September 1949, long before the expected time, a severe crisis of confidence shook Washington, a crisis which was ended by the decision to produce H-bombs and rearm further for the successful prosecution of the Cold War. It would be a long pull and take very steady nerves, Secretary of State Acheson explained on three occasions early in 1950, but the Russian river of aggression would be contained.

Restored confidence was expressed in Acheson's Berkeley speech of March 16, 1950, in which he laid down seven pre-conditions for negotiation with Russia amounting to Soviet surrender of its positions before negotiation.

Korea. Then on June 25, 1950, the Russian river of aggression actually moved into Western held territory for the first time when the North Koreans invaded South Korea. Hardly anyone in the West questioned this verdict. Yet there were two other equally strong probabilities: that the North Koreans plunged southward on their own initiative, and that Syngman Rhee provoked them to do so by taking the initiative along the border in the day or two after the UN observers returned to Seoul. That he would be wholly capable of precipitating a war for the unification of Korea has been amply demonstrated several times since. Both sides in Korea were highly keyed for civil war, each intent on unification its way.

Ingram's conclusion is sound when he says: "Nor are we in possession of any positive proof that in Korea or elsewhere she (Russia) has conspired to instigate minor war against the Western allies through one of her satellites." He adds that "suspicions are not proof" and doubts that any evidence can be found later to sustain the charge that the Korean trouble arose as the result of a plot by China, or the Soviet Union, or both, to embarrass the West.²²

²² Kenneth Ingram, *op. cit.*, pp. 226, 222-3. For an able book about the Cold War which assumes Communist aggressive objectives everywhere, see W. W. Rostow, *The United States in the World Arena: An Essay in Recent History*, New York, Harper, 1960. About Korea it says: "The meeting of Stalin and Mao early in 1950 undoubtedly confirmed the ambitious Asian strategy and planned its climax in the form of the North Korean invasion of South Korea. . . ." It asserts that "Stalin hopefully launched the invasion of South Korea. . ." and refers to "Stalin's and Mao's military adventure in Korea. . ." pp. 169, 242, 342.

No doubts on this score entered the minds of our leaders in June 1950. It was assumed at once that the Kremlin had ordered the invasion and that this was the first of a series of satellite wars which would stampede both Asia and eventually West Europe into the Soviet camp, unless this attempt were promptly scotched. The United Nations was instantly mobilized, to minimize the shock of our intervention in an Asiatic civil war.

If our cold war purpose had not been predominant, the defeat of the North Korean aggression would have been a great victory for collective security and the United Nations. As the crisis did develop the UN Security Council approved our military action before it had heard the North Koreans, and it never did hear them—a serious breach of normal, fair procedure.

Then when the 38th Parallel was recovered, within three months and relatively painlessly, the monumental error was committed of trying to abolish the North Korean state. This mistake ranks close behind our failure to lead the League of Nations and our enunciation of the Truman Doctrine among the foreign policy errors committed by the United States. It was a political mistake of the first magnitude because it challenged both China and Russia in the North Korean triangle, a strategic area of the utmost importance to them. Moreover, it challenged them as communist powers to permit the Americans to destroy a communist state in their own front yards and set up a model capitalist democracy. It was a military gamble because it launched our armies precipitately into untenable territory. It was a moral blunder because it invalidated the central idea of the United Nations that it is a police force and not a partisan belligerent. When the United Nations invaded North Korea "they were no longer acting as police, but as co-belligerents on the side of the South Koreans."²³

Consequently, when China intervened on behalf of the North Koreans "the United Nations by becoming belligerents instead of a police force were no longer morally entitled to indict China."²⁴ But she was indicted as an aggressor, under total pressure from Washington, and is still excluded from the United Nations on that ground.

Thus what should have been a brief, successful UN police operation was converted into a full-scale war which dragged on for three more years, always on the edge of a world war, until neutralism had been made a world movement, until the whole idea of the United Nations being a policeman had been made highly doubtful, and until President Truman and his party had been driven from office, more because of "Truman's war," never declared by Congress, than for any other reason. The war had become to the American people a never ending horror in a far country, for veiled cold war reasons.

Truman's Leadership. The tragedy of the second war in Korea brought out sharply both the defects and the good qualities of President Truman's leadership. His ability to make up his mind and act is a great quality in a ruler. Without it he is lost. But it is not the only quality necessary. There are occasions, perhaps more of them, when restraint is what is needed. There are even times when a President must have "the courage to be timid" or to seem so.

²³ Ingram, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

Restraint is a far greater virtue than rashness. Truman could plunge in easily and too far, but he did not expand the second Korean war into World War III, as so many urged him to do, and he finally recalled General MacArthur who had flagrantly exceeded his instructions and was leading the cry for a greater war. Thus Truman did not compound his great Korean error into an irretrievable one, even when there was a widespread, angry belief that the Kremlin planned to bleed us white in a series of satellite wars around Russia's vast perimeter—accepting the challenge and logic of the Truman Doctrine.

On the great issue of the Chinese Revolution Truman also avoided disaster. His Doctrine was breached in gigantic fashion by the Communist Revolution in China, and his political enemies pushed him relentlessly to enforce it there, but he had the good sense to send his greatest lieutenant, General Marshall, to China for a long effort to mediate the Chinese civil war, and afterwards he accepted Marshall's report that we could not settle that gigantic conflict. It must have been difficult to put his Doctrine into abeyance, in the place where it was violated on the greatest scale, but he did it and avoided inaugurating a third world war by that route.

By 1950, an experienced editor and biographer could write of Truman: "In 1945 the moral hegemony of the world was within his grasp, but it has slipped from his fingers."²⁵

At the close of his presidency the moral leadership of the world had passed in large part to Nehru, the neutral opponent of the Cold War, but much of it went begging for lack of a truly powerful voice. Truman, who might have voiced it, had become only the belligerent leader of an anti-Soviet, anti-communist crusade.

The Dulles Period. The never ending pressure and anxiety of the Korean war and of the Cold War had overstrained our allies, the real ones in West Europe and the British Commonwealth, until they feared being engulfed in another world war by the Americans more than by the Russians. As the stern power of Truman and Acheson neared its end they escaped from control and the equally stern rigors of Secretary of State Dulles could never fully restore it.

No one excelled him as a cold warrior. Containment was too tepid and passive for him. He came in pledged to a strong, positive policy of "liberation" for East Europe. He unleashed Chiang Kai-shek upon China, voiced "massive retaliation," threatened "agonizing reappraisal" if the French did not accept EDC and thundered his way impotently through the Indo-China crisis. He mobilized the Congress and poised the United States on the brink of atomic war in the Formosa Strait, years before any military emergency was due there. He finished the ring of containment around the entire communist world, insofar as it was theoretically conceivable, by adding SEATO and the Baghdad Pact to NATO. He precipitated the Suez crisis of 1956 by an emotional miscalculation in the Aswan Dam decision and then cajoled and maneuvered the British and French Governments from one

²⁵ Gerald W. Johnson, "Truman's Third Term," *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1950, p. 24. Johnson wrote also: "The most grievous of all his errors was enunciation of the Truman Doctrine that involved us in the Greek adventure and might have brought on far worse evils had it not been partially retrieved by the Marshall Plan."

mirage position to another until all confidence in him was lost in Western Europe, never to be regained. Then in the simultaneous Hungarian tragedy his liberation thunders trailed into an impotent murmur of helpless protest, as our propaganda arms, especially Radio Free Europe, stirred the Hungarians excessively with demands for continued revolutionary action.²⁶

One of the most prominent Americans of this century had this to say in the summer of 1957 about the conduct of our foreign affairs during the preceding years:

"Our government has kept us in a perpetual state of fear—kept us in a continuous stampede of patriotic fervor—with the cry of grave national emergency. Always there has been some terrible evil at home or some monstrous foreign power that was going to gobble us up if we did not blindly rally behind it by furnishing the exorbitant funds demanded. Yet, in retrospect, these disasters seem never to have happened, seem never to have been quite real."²⁷

The author of these words was General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, speaking as a corporation head to the Sperry Rand stockholders in explanation of the atmosphere which supports our huge arms budgets.

It was Truman who began the conduct of our foreign affairs with crisis sessions of Congress and world shaking doctrines. Then Dulles made the practice routine, as runaway military technologies threw a dark shadow over every man's life.

Churchill's Evolution. The first American H-bomb, in November 1952, had convinced Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and with him all West Europeans, that there would be nothing left of Britain and West Europe if the Cold War exploded. So on May 11, 1953, Churchill made a historic speech in which, far from suggesting the forcible liberation of East Europe, he declared that "Russia has a right to feel assured as far as human arrangements can reach, that the terrible events of the Hitler invasion will never be repeated and that Poland will remain a friendly power and a buffer. . . ."

How much strife and strain and waste of resources might have been avoided if Churchill and all of us had kept that axiom firmly in mind in 1945 and 1946! Recognizing in 1953 that the Cold War had reached a dangerous stalemate and had to be liquidated, Churchill went on to propose an immediate conference "on the highest level," to let "the uneasy toiling masses of mankind" have a chance to be happy.

On May 10, 1956, Churchill went still further in an address at Aachen, Germany. He stressed again "how deep and sincere are Russia's anxieties about the safety of her homeland from foreign invasion," warned that any attempt to achieve German unity by violence would be "a unity of ashes and death," welcomed the post-Stalin developments in Russia, and urged her inclusion in NATO. Even beyond that, he proposed a "grand alliance" of the

²⁶ See Senator Fulbright, the *New York Times*, August 15, 1957; Joseph Alsop, the *Nashville Tennessean*, August 20, 1957; Chapters XXV and XXVI above.

²⁷ *The Nation*, August 17, 1957, p. 62.

European powers, the United States and the British Commonwealth, and repeated that "the spirit of this arrangement should not exclude Russia and the East European states."

Churchill had evolved with the times, turning away from an explosive, armed division of the world toward some kind of unity. But Truman had not. The day before Churchill spoke he had made a speech lauding Governor Averell Harriman, his cold war candidate for the Presidency, as one who was never taken in by Kremlin smiles. The Soviet Government, he declared, was as much an enemy of freedom in 1956 as it was in 1941 and 1945.

Concerning Russia, nothing had changed with Truman since 1941, when he wanted both Germany and Russia destroyed in the war and thought we should try to manage it that way. Now, he declared in 1956, the new Soviet rulers were only "spreading a trap before the free people of the world." Speaking again on June 21 he refused to believe that they had "cast out the old Adam." Having once espoused the devil theory about the Soviet Union it was altogether unlikely that he would ever operate on any other basis.

Peace at the Summit. The State Department and the Foreign Office would never let Churchill convene the Summit Conference, but he spoke for a world public opinion too powerful to be denied. His successor, and Truman's, were forced to go to Geneva and to say publicly, with the Russians, that a hydrogen war was too terrible to contemplate and that competitive coexistence would have to ensue, without benefit of H-bomb threats, open or implied.

This saving end to the First Cold War was greatly facilitated by three momentous events in 1953, all within the space of six months, which completely changed the outlook of the Soviet Union. The first was the death of Stalin, on March 6, which inaugurated a long-term wave of reforms to remove the iron police state controls in which he had held the Soviet peoples and to replace them with more normal incentives. His successors also multiplied the overtures for coexistence which he had made periodically and made many gestures toward relaxing the Cold War, culminating in the surrender of their Finnish base, making peace with Yugoslavia and freeing Austria.

The second event which changed Moscow's outlook was the signing of the Korean cease-fire on July 26, 1953. This development removed a great load of anxiety and dread which hung over the Soviet Union that the Korean war would erupt across the Manchurian frontier, as so many powerful Americans urged.

The third event, which really transformed the Kremlin's outlook, was the successful explosion of the first Soviet H-bomb on August 9. From that moment the Soviets could count upon moving rapidly into full armed parity with the United States. From that day, also, the dread of a preventive war upon the Soviet Union, so often demanded by prominent Americans, was progressively lessened. Now the Soviet Union could face a top level conference from the same "position of strength" toward which Truman and Acheson had labored. American power had been checkmated. Neither would be able to dictate to the other or to force any change in the status quo.

In the United States, also, the ameliorating personality of Eisenhower in the Presidency augured peace. He had fought a gigantic war in alliance with the Russians. He knew what they had suffered. Marshal Zhukov was his friend, perhaps a slender thread across the chasm of hate and fear which had divided the two great nations, but it symbolized a possible recognition of human qualities in the new "enemy." Eisenhower did not appear to restrain directly the cold warriors who surrounded him, but in the Indo-China crisis he refused to accept atomic war, and in the Formosa Straits affair he put a stop to the last fling of our preventive warriors in the Carney episode, late in March 1955.

That opened the way to the Geneva Summit Conference of 1955 in which Eisenhower played a role of friendliness, of willingness to live and let live which humanity will not forget.

Back in Washington he was soon led to revive the demand for liberation, but "by peaceful means," without the implied threat of atomic force behind it. His aides and many other public opinion leaders did their best to revive the Cold War. Dulles celebrated the "art" of balancing on the brink of atomic war and the American attitude hardened again. But in the Ides of March 1956, the season when cold war thunderbolts had been released so often before, Eisenhower had the courage and good sense to urge publicly that we counter the threat to us "more by positive measures that people throughout the world will trust, than just by trying to answer specific thrusts." Soon afterwards his effort to tell us that the great world of neutrals was not composed of wicked people seemed to be countermanded and frustrated by Dulles and Nixon, but in the end Dulles was forced to admit that there are no immoral neutrals, as unilateral Soviet demobilization started a wave of demands for similar action that reached into Washington itself, before the Soviet achievement of the first ICBM in August 1957 highlighted against the fragility of civilization's future.

In the meantime, the eruptions of November 1956 in East Europe and at Suez plunged the world again into fear, hate and uncertainty, emotions which largely revived the Cold War again. Yet in the Spring and Summer of 1957 relaxation and modification set in once more. In China Mao Tse-tung made a remarkable address calling for more amelioration and understanding in the Communist drive there. In Russia the old guard leaders tried to block similar policies and depose Khrushchev, only to be deposed themselves and retired to well paid posts of exile in Siberia. In the United States the Supreme Court delivered a series of decisions which all but demolished, legally at least, the grand inquisitions set up at the height of our cold war hysteria and outlawed the shocking negations of freedom which had ensued. Everywhere most men wanted relaxation and peace, instead of big power rivalry, the frightful waste of resources in ever more expensive preparedness and nuclear death.

Consequently, the influence of the two super powers continued to decline, as it had since the end of World War II when they plunged into the Cold War instead of making peace. Between the Big Two "the ritual of proposals, offers, demands and declarations" continued, with little pretense that they were serious, each side laying down "terms which presuppose unconditional

surrender." The game went on, continued Lippmann, accompanied by the "erosion and dissolution of allegiances" within the coalitions.²⁸

Then in 1958 Dulles carried the West to the brink of a world war twice in the Lebanon and Quemoy crises, without disaster, and did his best to hold the line in 1959 at its weakest point, in West Berlin, before the West was compelled to acknowledge that it had come to a dead end in the Cold War. It was then that President Eisenhower decided to try to change the course and work our way out of the increasingly failing and wearing Cold War.

On the public relations front he did his work well at first, but for six critical months he failed to exercise leadership over the cold warriors in Washington, Bonn and Paris. Then he suffered the deep frustration of the U-2 affair at Paris in May 1960, only to undergo even greater humiliation at the gates of Tokyo in June.

In 1960 no one could give any full or final explanation of the reasons for our failure to win the Cold War, but some of them were clear, and our future existence might well depend on understanding them.

WHY WE LOST THE COLD WAR

1. *We refused to accept the consequences of World War II.*

The Cold War arose because the leaders of American public opinion could not accept the chief consequences of World War II. They had fought to defeat the fascist powers and having done that discovered that communism had taken over great areas and that social revolution was on the march elsewhere. To President Truman, and a host of others, Soviet-communist control of East Europe was unacceptable. To the Republican right wing, and many others, the communist revolution in China could not be accepted.

One recent student of the Cold War says that the forcible installation of communist controlled regimes began it and that "virtually no American would regard the present state of affairs in East Europe as anything but malignant."²⁹ Another says that the Soviet Union "dominant—though not physically present in Eastern Europe was just bearable," but a Soviet empire "firmly established in Berlin, Vienna, Prague and Budapest was clearly intolerable," because it was backward and despotic.³⁰

Dorothy Thompson condensed the history of the Cold War into short compass, as follows: "In the past decade the United States, alarmed by recognition that the second world war had greatly extended the Soviet imperium in Europe and exacerbated national and social revolution in Asia and Africa, set out to redress the balance of power, by intensive rearmament at home and economic aid and military alliance abroad."³¹

²⁸ Lippmann, the *Nashville Tennessean*, August 15, 1957.

²⁹ Henry L. Roberts, *Russia and America: Dangers and Prospects*, New York, Harper, 1956, pp. 195-6.

³⁰ G. L. Arnold, *The Pattern of World Conflict*, New York, Dial Press, 1955, p. 43. This is one of the best efforts to grasp the nature of the East-West conflict and to look ahead toward solutions.

³¹ *The Globe and Mail*, Toronto, September 9, 1955.

"This led to a culminating state of tension between the two worlds," she continued, which reached the point that both sides regarded a third world war as "a probably inevitable development." Each side was convinced that the other intended war. But sobering considerations intervened; the fear of atomic war and of preventive war; the unpredictability of allies on both sides under the unprecedented conditions of thermonuclear war; the growth of neutralism; growing recognition that the largely American concept of the United Nations as a world policeman was "not a formula for peace but for perpetual war" and would certainly destroy the UN; and the danger that the opposing giants would be drawn into world war by their allies or ideological sympathies over small issues.

Now in 1955, Miss Thompson concluded, we were returning to reason, but the President and Vice President seemed afraid to tell the American people the extent of the turnabout. They were still "trying to present the spirit of Geneva as compatible with a crusade to liberate Soviet satellites and accept no unjust solutions."

The consequences of World War II were unpalatable for us, but they were inescapable. Real insurance that East Europe would cease to be an invasion corridor into the Soviet Union could not be denied her, without robbing her of the fruits of her infinitely painful victory, and unless Russia was sure of the new regimes there she had lost the war, from her standpoint. No Russian would doubt that, and the Soviet Union had physical possession of the region.

Our attempt to keep it in the West, except diplomatically, not only began the Cold War but made the new East European governments more authoritarian than they would have been, more harsh, more repressive, and in a desperate hurry to press the peoples into a new mold. We shall never measure accurately how many people in East Europe were liquidated, in one way or another, because of the pressure of the Cold War.

In China also we lacked the power to stop communist revolution, in the conditions created for it by the war. What the West lacked the strength to do in Russia during its war weariness after World War I, it could not do in China in the similar revulsion from war after World War II.

It is often said that we should not have demobilized after that war so rapidly, but who could have prevented it? Paul Hoffman, who is a far-seeing American, has written that he and his wife were insistent after VJ Day that their sons be brought home.³² It must be remembered also that it was necessary to rush troops from Europe toward the Japanese war. That could be done where the perpetrator of Pearl Harbor was concerned—though it was a highly risky operation politically which the Hiroshima A-bomb forestalled while the troops were home on furlough—but what democratic government could have sent the troops on to stop revolution among 600,000,000 Chinese?

In the same sense the war doomed Western rule from China to Morocco. In this vast area forces had been turned loose by the war which could never thereafter be put back into the bottles of acquiescence.

It is the nature of world wars to release revolutions. When we failed to prevent World War II by abdicating our responsibility to lead after 1918 we

³² Paul G. Hoffman, *Peace Can Be Won*, Garden City, 1951, p. 31.

could not thereafter avoid or control the upheavals released by the Second World War, and when we refused to accept the results of that conflict we thereby made ourselves in large degree into losers of that war instead of victors.

2. *We relied on our atomic monopoly and discounted Soviet science and industry far too heavily.*

Our atomic scientists did all that dedicated men could to convince our leaders that after Hiroshima there were no atomic secrets, and that the Soviets would make their bomb soon, but the politicians and military men would not believe them. They were sure that it would be a long time before the inefficient communists worked it out.

It was normal nationalistic behavior to hoard the "secrets." It was natural and human for us to work out a plan of international control which would make it certain that the Soviets would never have an A-bomb in their hands, and it was equally certain that they would stall and try for their own. It was unusual indeed when elder statesman Stimson urged that something be worked out directly with the Russians. It was still more unusual when British opinion almost unanimously favored sharing the secrets with the Russians.

Had this been done the Soviets would not have the pride of power in their own achievements that they have today, and West Europe might not live under the dread of atomic annihilation that it acquired as soon as the Soviets exploded their bomb in 1949—and started European neutralism.

Our decision in 1949 to plunge at once for the H-bomb was age-old balance of power response, and unavoidable, but the decision to wait for new positions of strength before making a great effort to end the arms race, and the Cold War, was not inevitable. As the race continued the Russians got their H-bomb into the air first and went on to acquire the means to deliver the new weapon to us, while forging far ahead in the guided missile race and in the conquest of outer space.

Our Scientists Mishandled. Long before the heavy Russian Sputniks had cast us into a deep trauma it was clear that an atomic arms race had not been good politics for us. And years before the brilliant achievements of the Soviet Luniks in hitting the moon and in photographing its hidden side it was equally plain that there was no wisdom in the way we hoarded and guarded and suspected our scientists, lest one of them give away the "secrets." It was a sad day when Dr. Vannevar Bush, perhaps the dean of our wartime scientists, told a House Committee in 1954 that the security-risk program had demoralized the scientific community and hindered weapons research. The mutual respect between the scientists and the military had been "almost destroyed." The scientists still served the military, but without enthusiasm and without fruitful inspiration. "They go on working, but they feel they are not welcome; that they are regarded with suspicion; that some of the men who led them through the war are now being questioned and their security and loyalty are in doubt."³³

³³ Zechariah Chafee, Jr., "The Encroachments on Freedom," *Atlantic Monthly*, May 1956, pp. 41-2.

Nor did this take place in communist Russia; it occurred in the citadel of the "free" world, in the land where freedom and mutual trust had been the breath of life.

Russian Scientists Esteemed. While this stultification of our verities went on we assumed that of course the regimented Russian scientists wouldn't be able to do anything important. But soon Professor John Turkevich of Princeton University was reporting that except for top Government officials Soviet scientists enjoyed "the highest standard of living and the greatest esteem that Soviet society has to offer." Consequently, "young people want to be scientists in Russia."³⁴ He did not attempt to estimate how many bright young Americans had decided that in free America science was too dangerous an occupation, though later investigation found American youth very wary of it.

Then on June 8, 1956, even Vice President Nixon discussed the defection of British scientist Bruno Pontecorvo to the Soviets, saying that "One of the most important reasons for his defection, according to his colleagues, was the fact that he thought he would have more honor, prestige, and even greater freedom of research in the Soviet Union. Likewise, many of the scientists who got caught in the Soviet espionage network in the United States, Canada and Great Britain, were partially influenced at least by the feeling that they were not sufficiently appreciated in the free world."

In the process of keeping our atomic monopoly we had helped to generate in Russia a veritable scientific crusade—100,000 scientists employed at the university level, 1,000,000 high school graduates annually, each with "five years of physics, four of chemistry, five of biology and ten of mathematics," whereas less than a third of approximately the same number of American high school graduates had taken as much as a year of chemistry.³⁵

This is what a great nation can do when its existence is made to depend on scientific achievement.

3. *We equated Stalin with Hitler.*

That was the main analogy upon which the Cold War was built. Hitler was incontestably out to conquer the world; Stalin is acting the same way; therefore world conquest is the Soviet aim.

When this theory was argued, which was seldom, two different lines of reasoning were used. The first was to list all of the Soviet territorial acquisitions since 1938. The list is long and on its face seems to prove the case.

The five blocks of territory acquired under the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939 come first. Yet these "aggressions" were made in a moment of dire peril created for Russia by Western appeasement. They were made to give Russia a buffer zone against Hitler and to prevent imminent collision with him. The urgent defensive intent was obvious.

The other Stalin conquests are in East Europe and the Balkans. They were the result of Hitler's attack upon Russia, which Stalin went to such extremes to prevent in fulfilling his pact with Hitler. Nor did he try to deny

³⁴ "The Soviet's Scientific Elite," *Saturday Review*, March 24, 1956, p. 61.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

these peoples any life or future whatever as Hitler did when he was there, exterminating the Jews and making a large beginning on the depopulation of Poland for the benefit of German *Lebensraum*.

If, too, there were other reasons for Russia to retain control of East Europe, the over-riding reason was unquestionably a need for military security unprecedented in history. No great nation had ever been ravaged as deeply and as often through the same invasion corridor.

The real gravamen of the charge of unlimited land grabbing against Stalin was his effort to pinch off Iranian Azerbaijan and to get some North Iranian oil; and his attempt to recover two provinces from Turkey and secure a foothold in the Turkish Straits. It was these moves which convinced our policy makers of his limitless ambitions. It was these moves, plus Communist aid to the Greek rebels, which led to the Truman Doctrine.³⁶

This did look like too many gains for Russia and our opposition to them, apart from the Doctrine, was powerfully supported by geo-political reasoning. Yet these attempts to get toward warm water were expressions of the deepest and oldest urge in Russian life, one regarded as legitimate for every other important nation. Nor will this urge cease to be a driving force until it is satisfied in some way, if not with our agreement then by a very powerful Soviet Union without it, in some troubled time.

Stalin's Conservatism. The second explanation given for our Soviet world conquest axiom was the world revolution-international conspiracy side of Russian communism. It came up out of underground conspiracy with a theory of world revolution. Then the Western interventions of 1918-20 at once proved to the Soviets the need of world revolution and also the advantages of organizing all the communist parties abroad for it, and for Red Russia's defense. So it was never difficult to find a paragraph of Lenin's proclaiming the "either-or" nature of the struggle, though he sometimes spoke in a contrary vein.³⁷

What was overlooked was the fact that Stalin was the apostle of building socialism in one country, Russia, and that after purging all of the contrary minded he devoted himself single mindedly to that end from 1928 to 1941. In this period he was subduing Russian barbarism, using a mixture of modern technology, Marxian socialism and terror.³⁸

Stalin was operating on the principle of self containment, and he tried to revert to it after the war. Isaac Deutscher contends that Stalin also shared the illusion of our statesmen that in East Europe Russia's personality could be split "and her national-power ambitions separated from her social and

³⁶ Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, pp. 39-66.

³⁷ William A. Williams believes that the Kennan thesis of containment assumed that the Soviet leaders had to create imaginary foreign dangers to maintain their evil system, but that outside pressure would hasten its failure. He thinks that "Kennan's 1946-1947 explanation of Soviet behavior established the framework and set the tone for all but a tiny corner of the American discussion of Russian action," and lent "superficial validity to the analogy with Nazi Germany and to the argument that Soviet Russia corresponds in reality to the sociological abstraction known as totalitarian society."—William A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Foreign Policy*, Cleveland, 1959, pp. 186-7.

³⁸ Isaac Deutscher, *Russia, What Next?* New York, Oxford U.P., 1953, p. 34.

political outlook." He reasons that when Stalin sliced territories away from Poland, Hungary and Germany, expelling many millions of people from their homes and levying heavy reparations on those remaining, he could not have expected communist governments to succeed anywhere in the region.

Near the end of the war Stalin scoffed at communism in Germany, urged the Italian Reds to make peace with the monarchy, did his best to induce Mao Tse-tung to come to terms with the Kuomintang and angrily demanded of Tito that he take back the monarchy, thus fulfilling his bargain with Churchill.³⁹

By this time Stalin was a conservative, interested in restoring the wreckage of what he had built and almost as oblivious of the revolutionary ferment turned loose by the war as his Western allies were. But the ferment was there, continues Deutscher. It was present throughout East Europe, where Stalin's military men, schooled in contempt of capitalists and used to a one-party system, could not operate a multi-party system in behalf of the hated bourgeoisie. Therefore they made the revolution. So did Mao in China, where the revolutionary dynamics were really explosive, and where Stalin's officers were psychologically unable to keep Mao's partisans from taking over the Japanese arms in Manchuria. Yet even after that Stalin urged Mao to disband his armies.

It is Deutscher's conclusion that the revolutionary movements of the time drove Stalin from his nationalist redoubt and hoisted him to a dizzy eminence as the head of a vast world of communist states, and that even then he sought only to hold communism's positions.⁴⁰

The evidence indicates that Stalin became a mad man among his associates towards the close of his career, but it does not show him as a raging-tearing aggressor on Hitler's model, whose chief victim Russia was. Nor is history likely to convict him of being a revolutionary firebrand after World War II. It was the war which others began that turned loose revolution—of several different kinds. One of them, the communist revolution, is still loose in the world. Its continuing menace will be discussed below.

No Urge Toward Conflict with the West. It is difficult to find evidence of any desire on the part of the Soviets to plunge into conflict with the West. Frederick C. Barghoorn, who spent the years 1942-47 as an American attaché in Moscow, has made a careful effort to analyze the feelings of Soviet leaders and people in the period from March to September 1945, when the Kremlin hoped to have both its security belt and large American loans.

These "grandiose ambitions," he says, reflected fear as well as hope and after "angry disillusionment" had set in in the United States the first steps were taken to transfer the symbols of hostility and aggression from Germany to America.

Certainly there was nothing of the kind when Roosevelt died on April 12. Barghoorn observed "the great popular affection for Roosevelt and the genuine grief at his death." To the Soviet people he was "one powerful

³⁹ Isaac Deutscher, *Russia, What Next?* New York, Oxford U.P., 1953, pp. 99-101.

⁴⁰ Deutscher, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-117.

leader who had extended the hand of friendship in the hour of need." Then came VE day early in May, with "the almost indescribable joy of the Soviet people" and "the great good feeling toward the Allies prevalent then and for some time thereafter." This was the reaction of relief "from what was perhaps the most grueling war ever experienced by any country."

During the week of May 13-19, 1945 (after Truman's castigation of Molotov in the White House on April 23) the Soviet press stressed the superiority of Soviet institutions, the differences between Allied and Soviet policies concerning East Europe and suggested that the microbes of Hitlerism were present on both sides of the Atlantic. After that, articles increasingly attacked "certain circles" in the United States for their hostile attitude and on May 29 *Pravda* ascribed this to the rise of "the forces of reaction" after Roosevelt's death. (On May 26 an Assistant Secretary of State of the United States had made a radio address to counteract the rising talk of inevitable war with Russia.)

In August 1945 a great re-education campaign began, to counteract the lure of Western luxuries experienced by so many Soviet troops. But it was not until after the deadlock in the London Foreign Ministers' Conference in September 1945 that "the anxious treatment by the Soviet press of Soviet-Allied problems" hardened. By then there was widespread popular fear of the American A-bomb.⁴¹

Close scrutiny of this eyewitness study of Russia in 1945 does not reveal any desire to fall into a conflict with her former allies, much less rush into one.

Overwhelming American Certainty. Whatever the merits of our Soviet world conquest belief, the reasons for it were seldom stated. Very early in the Cold War the idea became a slogan, an axiom, our main article of faith. It was simply asserted by virtually all of our leaders so many thousands of times, and carried into every mind by all the mass avenues of public information so often, that only a few continued to question it. The American mind was filled with this idea, so essential to the conduct of any big war, hot or cold.

After Harrison Salisbury returned from Russia and lectured hundreds of times all over the United States, he reported that the question most often asked him, with minor variations, was this: "Do you think Russia has changed its intention of conquering the world?" His hearers were "enormously surprised" to learn that ordinary Russians feared American world conquest deeply—and the dropping of American H-bombs on Moscow and Leningrad.

He found our people thinking that the Russians belonged to a separate race, that they were eight feet tall and all mysterious enigmas. They thought that Russia was to blame for the trouble in the Formosa Strait, that all trouble with communists originated in Moscow. Some keen young people saw that our government propaganda was exaggerated, contradictory and one-sided, but he concluded that "our minds have not been properly trained to receive and analyze the outpourings from newspapers, radio, magazines

⁴¹ Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The Soviet Union Between War and Cold War," *The Annals*, May 1949, pp. 1-8. The British press attaché in Moscow confirmed Barghoorn's observation of the evolution of Russian opinion in this period in his reports to London. —W. A. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

and television. And we are still turning out from the schools many students who lack the background to understand the roots and origins of major international crises."⁴²

This is a strong indictment of our educational system, and of the overwhelming propaganda which swamped our minds during the red-hot years of the Cold War.

An Ohio farmer also returned from Russia in 1955 reporting that the Russians were as much afraid of capitalism as we are of communism. They regarded "capitalist" and "war-monger" as interchangeable terms and "thought we were trying to take over the world."⁴³

It should give us pause to note that Thomas P. Whitney, of the Associated Press, returned from Moscow in 1954 to write that "the Russian people are even more jumpy about prospects for a new war than any other people anywhere. One can hardly imagine a population less interested in crusades in the name of revolution or anything else." The Russian leaders also needed a long peace.⁴⁴

This, of course, was inherent in the terrible mauling the Soviet peoples had had in World War II, and twice before that since 1914, though we ignored this in going all-out for the world conquest fixation. But couldn't Russian armies march to the Channel at any time? Physically they could, but every Russian leader knew that the Soviet peoples were incapable of undertaking any offensive war, especially one which would bring in the United States, with its tremendous undamaged strength.

No Attack on the West Intended. After his study of the Cold War it was Ingram's conclusion that the Soviet Union never intended at any time "to undertake a major offensive against the West, or a minor offensive which would involve the risk of precipitating a major war." He did not believe that Western rearmament deterred a Soviet attack, asking if it did why Moscow did not launch an attack when the West was comparatively weak in West Europe?⁴⁵

The same conclusion is reinforced by Theodore White's observation that all during our big NATO military buildup in West Europe, "the Russians have not budged." While we were trebling our strength the Russians maintained exactly the same twenty-two divisions they had in 1948. They re-equipped their forces, expanded runways and improved communications, "but basically they have stood pat."

It would seem strange if the Russians did not become nervous at some time during the Cold War and get ready for the worst. Yet neither the high tension of the Berlin blockade, the threat of the NATO buildup, nor the long drawn out danger of the Korean war exploding into world war led to any Soviet stirring in East Germany. This phenomenon led White to decide that "it is questionable, looking back, that the Red Army's garrison divisions

⁴² Harrison Salisbury, "What We Do (and Don't) Know About Russia," the *New York Times Magazine*, June 26, 1955.

⁴³ Ferns Owen, "Can We Get Along with the Russians?" *Minutes*, December 1955, p. 16.

⁴⁴ *The New York Times Magazine*, October 17, 1954.

⁴⁵ *Ingram, op. cit.*, pp. 226-7.

were ever deployed for attack at a preconceived date. It is more likely that they represented an insurance policy."⁴⁶

This common sense conclusion was available to everybody throughout the Cold War. George Kennan, who made the most formal statement of the containment doctrine, said in 1954 that he had never seen any evidence that the Soviet leaders at any time "desired a general war between the Soviet Union and the major capitalist powers, or looked upon such a war as a likely means of achieving their objectives." That would be too risky, too expensive and would involve "too much in the way of sudden assumption of inordinate political responsibility over conquered areas to be a hopeful device of Soviet policy."⁴⁷

In other words, the cautious Stalin and his aides had too much sense ever to think they could take over West Europe and digest it, with their hands already full in East Europe. The Soviet Union required decades of peace, to say the least.

However, this did not prevent Lord Halifax, British Ambassador to the United States, from telling all Rotarians in 1952 that behind the vast arc of containment Soviet Russia moved her forces—"at present the forces of the satellites—now to this point and now to that, testing the strength of the defenses, seeking a vulnerable spot where it may be possible to break through."

At that moment it was trouble in Korea, Vietnam and Malaya—all directed from Moscow—tomorrow West Germany, Greece, the Persian Gulf or Hong Kong—and "wherever the thrust may come, we must be ready to meet it, to hold it, to strike back."⁴⁸

4. *We equated communism with fascism.*

We had had to fight fascism, and communism was just as bad or worse. This was the second analogy on which the Cold War was fought. It too was false, but this could be said only at one's peril. The black curse of fascism was quickly transferred to the Reds.

Yet this analogy was an unstable foundation for a cold war, for fascism was negative, regressive, predatory and utterly cynical about people. Communism appropriates the garb of democracy but fascism disowned it absolutely, ridiculed it and sought to kill the very idea. Both democracy and communism profess to strive for the good of the largest number, whereas fascism was openly founded on elitism at home and the extermination of peoples abroad, or strict gradations of servility for them. Communism is a Christian heresy, born of the callous injustices of the early industrial revolution in the minds of two middle class Germans, fired with a deep passion for social justice. It was very difficult indeed to find anything in either the creed or the practices of fascism which could be identified with Christianity or humanism.

Fascism was war itself, combined with gangsterism. It despised education as such and drastically cut down the amount of it, while the communists seek to extend it upward and outward. Communism can be ruthless and capable of

⁴⁶ Theodore White, *Fire in the Ashes*, pp. 303, 386.

⁴⁷ George Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy*, Princeton, 1954, pp. 69-70; Oxford U.P., 1954.

⁴⁸ *The Rotarian*, February 1952, p. 9.

frightful purges, but it pushes hard to raise standards of living and culture, along with heavy industry, which is the promise of all things for the future. Its efforts to push ahead sometimes overstrain the people and it violates most of our canons of freedom for the individual. Yet, as Arnold Toynbee put it, "communism is the less narrow hearted of the two movements, and for that reason, it is the more formidable."⁴⁹

5. *We disregarded the power of education and evolution in the communist lands.*

Early in their career the communists gave two hostages to fortune which could not avoid propelling them in the direction of more liberal methods. They promised everyone a better standard of living and they practised universal education. The original purpose of the education was to enable the party to control vast masses of illiterate and benighted people. But more and more education was required to operate a technical civilization, so much that the power to think and to question police state controls was bound to go along with it. Long ago the Tsar Alexander II learned that when he gave some people technical education he raised a crop of rebels. Now a great class of technicians is being created, and to shoot them would not help matters but make them insoluble.

But far from fearing education the Soviets strive to give "as much training to every boy and girl" as can be absorbed, in long hours, six-day weeks and more weeks than we do. In 1956 all education was made free and each student "pushed, prodded, pressured and enticed to reach the limit of his capacity for training." It is still education "without human spirit or soul," without academic freedom or tenure, with little classroom discussion. Acceptance of the existing set-up is expected, but great capacity to think is being created.⁵⁰

As the standards of education and of living rise, wants are constantly expanded. These forces have already compelled a wave of liberalizing reform in Russia and some of the satellites, and eventually the same processes will operate in China.

This upward thrust of communism educationally, culturally and economically does not guarantee that the Red nations will be peaceful neighbors, but it does mean that their societies are constantly evolving and changing. No power on earth can prevent that, and we have every reason to expect that evolution will create societies less different from ours, since evolution cannot be stopped in the West itself. This does not mean that the two will ever become the same, but if there are any universal verities they will operate eventually over the entire globe.

6. *We embraced negativism in defeating other peoples' purposes.*

This is one of the saddest things about the Cold War—that in the post war period a great creative people should have been led into a blocking campaign to frustrate the purposes, needs and solutions of others.

In 1949, Archibald MacLeish wrote a historic article in the *Atlantic Monthly* for August under the title "The Conquest of America," in which he

⁴⁹ *The New York Times Magazine*, May 1, 1955, p. 76.

⁵⁰ William Benton, "How Strong Is Russia? And How Weak?" *the New York Times Magazine*, June 10, 1956, pp. 76ff.

said: "Never in the history of the world was one people as completely dominated, intellectually and morally, by another as the people of the United States by the people of Russia in the four years from 1946 through 1949." Our foreign policy was a mirror image of theirs. In domestic politics nobody could be elected unless he publicly detested the Russians and nothing could be done unless it would injure or displease the Russians.

This did not happen, either, to a declining people, but to the most powerful nation on the planet, one still young and blessed with opportunity. Unable to understand that a historical era was ending, we "chained ourselves, as a sort of fast sea anchor, to the purposes and policies of a rival state." Even the Marshall Plan, so courageous in the beginning, became in the press and Congress "a negative and defensive operation."

We wandered into the Russian looking glass, MacLeish continues, because we were fainthearted in our own thinking. Instead of setting up our own goals, dreaming new dreams, making plans for fresh achievement, we chose "a negative and defensive state of mind." This was mistaken because it could not achieve even its own negative purpose; mischievous because it choked our moral life; evil because it deprived the world of a positive alternative to authoritarianism.

Opposing communism strongly and agreeing heartily that we had to rearm, MacLeish wrote that we did not then go on about our American purpose; "our policy *became* resistance" to the Russians, an end and object in itself, and "the result was a declaration of political bankruptcy such as few great nations in the course of history have ever confessed to."

This is a severe indictment, but one not likely to be refuted. Instead of helping to bind up *all* the wounds of war, we abruptly ended lend lease aid and killed off UNRRA. Instead of putting our undamaged selves in the place of the ravaged Russians, we assumed that all of their security measures were steps to world conquest. Instead of going on with the business of creation at home, we were swamped with propaganda to the effect that nothing needed to be changed, that everything was perfect. The necessity of never ending change and evolution into a better society was denied or ignored. There was communism to be feared.

So we yielded the initiative to it and to the Soviet Union. Instead of re-living with all the peoples emerging from colonial rule our own vibrant youth as a nation, we feared revolution of every kind, everywhere. Instead of seeing vividly that all the old feudalistic regimes must go, we put ourselves in the position of seeming to try to save them in East Europe and China and the Arab world, ending by embracing Chiang Kai-shek, Franco, and King Saud. Instead of remembering our own need for neutrality and peace during our national youth, we condemned as immoral the same need in many newly liberated peoples.

These negations were all self-defeating. But worse still was the over-all negation of merely opposing communism. We never sought to find any common ground with it, or anything hopeful in it. But if that was humanly impossible it was all the more imperative to oppose it with a better idea, and we had that idea—the dignity and worth of the individual human being, his

right to grow and develop the full use of his powers, his right to economic opportunity and, above all, his right to learn and think and speak freely, without fear of any man, his right to be a whole man.

This is what the American goal had been, until the great negation came upon us. This was the living image which should have been held high before the world. It was the image which had won the world's admiration and respect. It should have continued, vivid and strong, in the years after our second world war victory. But instead of the sovereign individual man, living under any economic arrangements which maintain his sovereignty and welfare, we offered the world opposition to communism and shrank down the freedom of the individual American alarmingly.

7. *We copied some of the worst features of our rival's system.*

Forgetting that negation never built anything, we started building walls. Then the global wall around Russia and communism had to be buttressed by all sorts of internal walls, until finally they stood around each American individual, silencing most dissenters.

The conspiratorial aspects of communism were magnified into a deadly menace to the very existence of the mightiest nation of all time. A disease theory of communism was accepted, making each communist the carrier of a virus so deadly that a single Red was likely to infect the entire body politic. Then all the engines of law and social pressure were operated to destroy all communists, and with them fellow travellers of fellow travellers, until every person and idea not extremely conservative was in danger of attack.

In denouncing Stalin, Khrushchev told how Stalin invented a brand name, "enemy of the people," with which he struck down all suspects and disarmed their defenders. For this purpose our counterpart was the brand "Un-American," administered by Congressional committees whose very existence was a negation of the central American principle that a man is free to think what he will. Nevertheless, these committees ranged through the country to expose anyone who had ever had any contact with communist ideas, even during the great depression, with heavy damage to lives and livelihoods.

Our thought controllers did not like the word hysteria, but it mounted until a leading newspaper publisher, Mark F. Ethridge of the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, warned that our illness had become "a malady of the soul that summons all the evil forces of the Inquisition, of the Cheka, of Hitlerism, of Stalinism, of the Ku Klux Klan, and of all those nauseous forces that claim dominion over the conduct and souls of other men." The danger was that those who had "arrogated to themselves the right to judge who is subversive and what is 100 per cent American" would whittle away our liberties and set in motion forces which would destroy us.⁵¹

Justice William O. Douglas wrote also that "we deprive men of jobs and destroy their reputations with practices as callous as those involved in the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh; and we traffic in hysteria almost as acute as the atmosphere surrounding the witch trials."⁵²

⁵¹ D. F. Fleming, "Are We Moving Toward Fascism?" *the Journal of Politics*, February 1954, p. 65.

⁵² An address before the American Law Institute, Washington, May 20, 1953.

Then at the top of the witch hunt Judge Learned Hand, one of the most respected jurists in the land, wrote that poignant warning and record which will haunt us for generations, saying: "that community is already in process of dissolution when each man begins to eye his neighbor as a possible enemy, where non-conformity with the accepted creed, political as well as religious, is a mark of disaffection; where denunciation, without specification or backing, takes the place of evidence; where orthodoxy chokes freedom of dissent; where faith in the eventual supremacy of reason has become so timid that we dare not enter our convictions in the open lists to win or lose." There is in each of these phrases a telling indictment of our back-track from freedom. Such things as these, Judge Hand continued, "are a solvent which can eat out the cement that binds the stones together; they may in the end subject us to a despotism as evil as any that we dread."³³

How Our Freedoms Shrank. This was the abyss that yawned before us in 1952. Seeing us stand before it convinced the world that we no longer believed in ourselves or in freedom—a self-defeating status for a nation claiming to be freedom's chief defender. In Great Britain, where the very idea of a Committee on Un-British Activities was unthinkable, Bertrand Russell voiced publicly the general opinion of his countrymen that liberty was "drying up in the United States."³⁴

So it was, and with frightening rapidity. It dried up widely when 33 states passed laws to compel the loyalty of teachers and free the schools of "subversive" tendencies. It shrank when textbooks were widely attacked by self-appointed censors, when some books were burned, a librarian fired for keeping liberal periodicals on the racks, and all our overseas libraries purged of books written by a long list of reputable authors—one of the chief devices of authoritarianism.

Toward an American Police State. Liberty dried up massively when President Truman, beset by a Red-hunting Congress, issued that epochal executive order in 1947 instituting loyalty checks by the FBI for *all* federal employees and setting up a series of loyalty review boards to process the charges. At one stroke of the pen the assumption that American citizens were loyal was destroyed and all government employees became second class citizens, living under the shadow of FBI dossiers whose contents could never be revealed to them on the ground of protecting secret informers.

Nevertheless, the 1947 order required the loyalty boards to have "reasonable grounds" for dismissal. But this entailed difficult decisions, and the order was amended in 1950 to make the standard of disqualification "reasonable doubt." Another stroke of the pen had shifted to the accused employee the burden of proof in establishing his loyalty. Then in 1953 President Eisenhower issued a new order setting up broad standards for determining whether the employment of an applicant for government service, or the continuance of a government employee in service, would "be clearly consistent with national

³³ From an address to the State University of New York on October 24, 1952.

³⁴ William G. Carleton, "An Atlantic Curtain," *the American Scholar*, Summer 1953, p. 265.

security," and in practice "many administrators interpret this to mean that any doubtful case must be decided in favor of the government."⁵⁵

This is the steady progression toward police state supervision of all government employees which occurred in six years. But that was not the end, for the investigative procedures were extended from 2,500,000 government employees to 3,000,000 members of the armed forces and 3,000,000 employees of defense contractors. Thus at least 8,000,000 Americans are always under the shadow of having to prove their loyalty, if any anonymous, protected informer questions it. Including the families of the 8,000,000, about 20,000,000 American citizens are subjected to investigative procedures at any time. As people enter and leave investigated employment the vast total of people who have secret police dossiers compiled about them increases year by year and huge buildings will continue to be filled by the files of the investigated—unless we can make our way back through the totalitarian looking glass through which we plunged during the Cold War.

Nor did the most massive anti-communist activity insure one's immunity, for on November 6, 1953, the Attorney General of the United States, Herbert Brownell, Jr., publicly charged former President Harry S. Truman with knowingly harboring a Russian spy. Then J. Edgar Hoover, head of the FBI, promptly appeared before a Congressional committee and "struck at the very heart of former President Truman's defense of his handling of the White Case."⁵⁶ Thus the ex-President who had issued that first devastating order that the loyalty of every government employee should be investigated found himself pilloried publicly by the highest law enforcement officer, and by the head of the secret police, for soft handling of communists. The fact that Mr. Truman had issued a global anti-communist doctrine, and that he had spent a hundred billion dollars trying to enforce it around the world, did not give him any immunity.

The curtailment of our ancient hard won liberties was described and summarized by John Lord O'Brian, one of the most conservative lawyers in the United States, in two Godkin lectures at Harvard University in 1955. These lectures etch the swift and appalling change in our way of life which had taken place after that time in 1945 when every American was assumed to be loyal and everyone innocent until proved guilty in the courts. By 1955, O'Brian pointed out, the judgments passed upon individuals for the opinions they held, or had held, were made, for the first time, not by the courts but by administrative officials, who also passed judgment on a man's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Violations of Fair Play. O'Brian listed nine other "developments which seem to provide unmistakable evidence of an expanding trend of policies at variance with the American conception of fair play." They are:

1. The acceptance of the doctrine of guilt by association.
2. "Adjudging men to be untrustworthy not because of wrongful *acts*, but

⁵⁵ John Lord O'Brian, *National Security and Individual Freedom*, Cambridge 1955, pp. 28-31.

⁵⁶ W. H. Lawrence, the *New York Times*, November 18, 1953.

because of their ideas, because of motives attributed to them, or because of suspicion as to their future conduct."

3. The compiling of lists of organizations thought to be subversive and using membership in these organizations to determine fitness for employment.
4. The use of secret information from secret accusers.
5. Denial of the right of cross examination to the accused.
6. The lack of any constitutional protection through judicial review.
7. Limitation of freedom to travel abroad by denying passports.
8. "The participation of military officials in many decisions affecting the guarantees of the Bill of Rights."
9. Interference with the right to work in defense plants or on any American ships.

Another 17,000,000 Suspected Americans. The extent of the infringements of our liberties which violate the American conception of fair play was highlighted in an article by Anthony Lewis in the *New York Times* on April 29, 1956. He had interviewed the head of the passport bureau in the State Department and learned from her that the applications of those desiring to travel were checked for communists against what Miss Knight called "a very voluminous file called the card index—17,000,000 cards, including some duplications." She emphasized that the files were "secret."

Since the FBI had never counted more than 100,000 American communists at one time, it was evident that the views of a vast mass of other citizens were suspected and their natural right to travel questioned. By contrast, British communist leaders travelled to Moscow freely and the great body of British citizens suffered no loss of the right to travel where they pleased.

It was the young American giant, in the fullness of his strength as a great power, who bound himself with so many of his rival's fetters that his leadership as the champion of freedom was questioned throughout the world, and it would take much retracing of steps along the highway of freedom to reclaim that leadership.

8. *We overcompensated for our isolationist fiasco.*

Knowing that we had made a monumental mistake in leaving the world to drift as it would after World War I, we not only created a new league of nations before World War II was ended, but went on to engage in balance of power politics afterward on an all-out basis.

Having refused responsibility for anything which went on in the world after 1918, we came close to assuming responsibility for everything everywhere after 1945. The containment doctrine was planetary in scope. Under it we mounted guard throughout the old world, and the new.

Our accomplishments as a people had been so enormous, and so uninterrupted until lately, that we still held the pioneer belief that what is desirable is attainable. As the Cold War waned, James Reston wrote that this illusion was still prevalent in the Congress. It still "runs through every foreign affairs debate in the Congress." It was obviously desirable to have such things as "a democratic government in China, and a unified German Republic," but it

does not follow that they can be achieved. Yet "a remarkable number of normally intelligent legislators keep insisting that when these things do not happen," it is because somebody failed to do his duty.⁵⁷

Between 1914 and 1945 we had been able to prevent the most undesirable developments in the world, at the cost of decisive intervention in two world wars, but after the disruptive effects of the two wars it was no longer true that we could do so.

After 1945 there were at least five things which we did not have the power to accomplish. They were: (1) conquer the Soviet Union; (2) liberate Eastern Europe without destroying Western Europe; (3) destroy the communist revolution in China by force; (4) keep Germany and Japan from trading with their essential markets in Eurasia, except momentarily; and (5) prevent nationalistic revolutions in most of the remaining colonial areas of the world, and social revolutions in the feudal independent states.

We lacked the power, either active or potential, to accomplish these objectives. The spaces involved were "too vast, the populations too enormous, the economic needs too deep, the fears of destruction too great, the urge for a better life too elemental to permit us to succeed."⁵⁸

It took several years for it to become apparent that there were forces and situations in the world which were beyond our control, and especially for it to be proved that all of the non-communist nations could not be lined up on our side against the communist ones.

After swinging back into isolation, with disastrous results, and then going to the opposite extreme of enlisting allies until we pointed with pride to 44, it is now necessary to find a middle ground place in world affairs, in which we are one nation among many, few of whom we can control and whose friendship we need.

We cannot afford to oscillate between selfish isolation and anxious pactomania. We need to settle down for the long pull or there is not likely to be any. Our rise in the world, from nothing to our present majestic strength in some 300 years, has been meteoric and unprecedented, but there is nothing to prevent our rushing out of the pages of history even faster than we came in, nothing except our own common sense, our moderation and foresight.

Healing Policies Twice Rejected. We must learn also not to commit the same mistake repeatedly. As we gain perspective it will become apparent that we did that after each of the two world wars. Nor was this for lack of wise leadership during the wars. On the contrary, we had great leaders during both crises, leaders with vision who charted the right course for us to pursue. Wilson labored mightily to build collective security against another deluge. Roosevelt and Hull strove long and patiently to build enough accord with the Soviets to enable the two of us to make the peace and keep it in friendship.

In both cases the right policy was deeply felt and fully prepared, but in each case it was never tried. The Roosevelt-Hull policy was reversed by their successors just as abruptly and completely as Wilson's was. In both cases the

⁵⁷ *The New York Times*, May 31, 1953.

⁵⁸ D. F. Fleming, "Are We Headed Toward a Third World War?" *the Western Political Quarterly*, September, 1952, p. 358.

new leaders went off in exactly the opposite direction. Harding chose "normalcy" and no involvement. Truman chose toughness in dealing with the Russians. He believed that he was carrying out Roosevelt's policy by executing to the letter what he thought Roosevelt had agreed upon, but the spirit was so wholly different that Roosevelt's policy died with him and instead of peace we got cold war and fifteen years of the bitterest and most dangerous rivalry.

If we are to have mature, long-range policies, it is essential that we learn to avoid such abrupt and momentous reversals with the election or death of a president.

9. *We did not know that cold wars cannot be won.*

There is general agreement about the immaturity of our twentieth century diplomacy among those who have analyzed it. There is some comprehension also that the Cold War was a substitute for thought. With the shining exception of the Marshall Plan in its early stages our policies offered little opportunity for constructive thought, but only for struggle and more struggle to win the Cold War.

Perhaps this is one of the reasons why there has been almost no realization that cold wars cannot be won, because they are self-defeating in their very nature. Our belief that we can do what we will is so strong that it nearly precludes this idea.

Yet once considered, the conclusion is unavoidable. The objective of a cold war is to isolate enemies and win friends, but "the very act of waging it repels friends and makes more enemies. *Waging a cold war and winning a cold war are thus mutually exclusive.* Or to put the matter the other way around, the only possible way to achieve the *objective* of cold war is to renounce the *method* of cold war."⁵⁹

This is the way the Cold War worked out after 1945. Our urge to limit Russia's gains in Europe became so strong that it frightened the West Europeans we were intent upon saving until they feared that our overwhelming urge to destroy communism everywhere would lead us into a war which would destroy them in the process. They even thought that many Americans would be willing to see Europe destroyed if Russia fell in the process.

When we hated both Russia and communism too much, and descended into the depths of McCarthyism, we lost the confidence and trust of the very peoples we were "saving." When we drove the French into and out of EDC we convinced them that we did not have their welfare at heart. When we drove unceasingly for Germany's rearmament we alarmed all of her neighbors and convinced the Germans themselves that the army which they didn't want might lead to their destruction—especially after NATO atomic war maneuvers showed a large part of them reduced to cinders.

Our excess of zeal in trying to destroy communism in North Korea alarmed the whole world, but its effects were deepest in Asia, where "neutralism" and

⁵⁹ Editorial, the *Monthly Review*, February 1956, p. 438.

active opposition to the Cold War became the only course that promised continued existence.

Asia weathered the Korean crisis only to face the same danger in acute form through the Indo-China and Formosa crises, with explicit and repeated American threats to start the bombs dropping—all of which convinced Asia that there was much more danger from America than from communism. Then SEATO was imposed upon Asia from the outside, bringing more fear of involvement than sense of security, as military pacts were pressed upon the Asiatics or economic aid with military strings. Finally, the decision was made to arm Pakistan and prepare the airfields from which the Central Asian centers of the Soviet Union might be bombed.

Nehru and India were already angry with us for bringing the Cold War to their part of the world. Our Pakistan alliance clinched their conviction of the danger from an aggressive America intent only on completing the ring of containment, oblivious of everyone else's feelings and interests. India, too, is our best hope of keeping the rest of Asia from going communist.

Thus the result of overplaying our hand in stopping communism in Asia was that immensely significant gathering of all the uncommitted colored nations at Bandung, including China, the great people bitterly ostracized by the Americans, and Chou En-lai's triumph there.

In the Middle East the exclusion of Russia from all of the oil riches, and from any voice in that region so near to her, finally led to the crowning folly of pactomania, the Baghdad Pact, centering on Iraq, intended really to seal up a vast stretch of Russia's southern border with American financed airfields. This, too, came late in the day, after Russia had achieved the H-bomb. But instead of completing the encirclement of Russia on the ground, the Baghdad Pact split the Arab countries and opened the way for Russia to emerge as the armorer and defender of Egypt and Syria, with consequences which are still unfolding. In 1958 Iraq revolted against her old regime and against the Pact, hovering on the verge of communism.

So all around the world our efforts to isolate Russia lost us friends and earned us enemies, until finally there was nothing left to do but go to the Summit at Geneva in 1955 and call off the Cold War, temporarily at least. There, as Stewart Alsop put it, almost single-handed, the President "removed the false face of the United States as an unstable and warlike power."⁶⁰

This magnified considerably the President's achievement at this conference, great as it was. Unfortunately he came home, failed to move on to settling up the issues remaining from World War II, and permitted his subordinates to go on into the Second Cold War and push it well beyond the point of no return. It continued, ever more dangerously, for another five years until Eisenhower was driven to the summit again, under far more unfavorable circumstances than in 1955. This time, too, he was compelled to travel to eleven countries to restore in the minds of the world's peoples the image of the United States as a nation which wanted peace as much as anyone.

This he did magnificently and, much more important, he did his best to

⁶⁰ *The Nashville Tennessean*, June 12, 1956.

end the cold war climate and really move toward making the long delayed peace.

But as Eisenhower crusaded for peace he also authorized the continued policing of Russian skies by our espionage planes, oblivious of everything except the ever more drastic mechanics of enforcing containment. By this time the most obvious violation of Russia's sovereignty was a routine practice, with impunity until a U-2 was shot down in the heart of the Soviet Union and the second summit conference, upon which humanity had set its hopes, aborted. It would be difficult to imagine a more devastating example of method defeating objective, whether Eisenhower's aim was peace or espionage.

Our *methods* in waging the Cold War defeated the *objective* of winning it. This was "inevitable," because there is no way to win a cold war without using strong methods, fighting methods, aggressive methods, which repel peoples of every race and degree of culture, because the oneness of mankind is a fact.

These methods give to the other side of the Cold War, any cold war, at least a hearing among the uncommitted, and in the end much sympathy. They also gave "the enemy" the opportunity to oppose a face of moderation, friendliness and no strings on economic aid; to evacuate foreign military bases while we accumulated them; to moderate his police state practices greatly while we clung to our imitations of his; to pose as the head of a great peace campaign, and to make real headway in lumping all of the uncommitted peoples with his coalition in "the zone of peace."⁶¹

10. *Our attempts to encircle and confine the Red giants helped to generate the power we feared.*

This was inherent in containment. In 1945 the Soviet Union was exhausted and devastated beyond our power to comprehend. In 1960 she had not only achieved a remarkable reconstruction but had become the leading military power in the world in missile striking power, in submarines, with their approaching capacity to blanket all North America with H-bombs, and in conventional strength. At the same time her ability to aid the underdeveloped countries rapidly increased.

In 1950 China was another exhausted ex-ally, laid waste by a decade of war, when we gambled on her quiescence while we seized control of the strategic North Korean triangle on her frontiers. In 1960 China had already passed the crucial point of self-generating economic development and was headed toward accelerating growth in economic and military strength, including nuclear power.

It did not seem likely that by 1970 any exterior power could control or protect the neighbourhoods of these two world powers. Nor can it be doubted that the United States would generate similar capacity to control her environs, if they were policed militarily from afar. Any great people would.

Since cold war methods are self-defeating, there remains the much harder

⁶¹ See *Atlantic Monthly*, "Report on Washington," July, 1956, for an account of the success of this tactic in "forcing our hand" toward more moderate policies.

task of accepting competitive coexistence with the communist world, and of working into policies first of toleration and then of friendliness and cooperation with all peoples.

In an earlier time we might have swung back into a new and frustrated isolationism, but the nation-killing weapons now in the hands of both sides preclude that. We can only go forward toward cooperation.

OVER-BURDENED GIANT

In late 1960 the strains of containment were beginning to be starkly visible. Washington was urging West Germany, with its lush prosperity and heavily over-valued currency, to assume a share of foreign aid and pay our troop costs in Germany. The U.S. foreign deficit continued to run at the rate of four billions a year. The outflow of gold also continued, featured by a run on gold in London, and increasing talk abroad of a coming devaluation of the dollar, as the foreign claims on our gold reached an alarming total.

In an effort to reduce this unsupportable drain, the Eisenhower Administration ordered, on November 16, a reduction of military dependents abroad by 284,000. Other dollar savings would increase the total to a billion and the President hinted strongly that a reduction of troop strength abroad might follow. Others forecast the evacuation of some unpopular foreign bases.

Great as our undamaged strength had been after 1945, it had not been sufficient to contain half the world and manage the other half perpetually. Yet there was a strong urge in the new Kennedy Administration to try to increase our strength with another large addition to unproductive arms expenditures.

The same months brought reports of growing neutralist sentiment from every part of the "free world"—Britain, West Europe, South Asia, Africa, even Latin America. From the UN General Assembly, just enlarged by 15 new African members, James Morris reported to the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, on October 6, that the new impetus to neutrality was "the most virile political movement of the time, more forceful by far than the stale antipathies of East and West." This was "an Assembly sick to death of the cold war, an embryo authority realizing its own strength."

THE FUTURE

As we face the future, perhaps a short one for all of us, there are several questions, the answer to which will determine our place in the world.

That the coming era will not be "The American Century" seems to be already decided. There was a considerable amount of talk about that in 1945, but this dream has been dissipated by the Cold War and its corollaries: world-wide alarm over our belligerence; fear of world annihilation; aversion to our alliances with the dying regimes abroad; alarm at our rapid economic expansion into many countries; distrust of our almost complete identification of private enterprise with freedom; and our shocking exhibition of disbelief in ourselves and in freedom at home.

This was the combination which dissolved The American Century and shrank it to a decade. If after 1945 we had kept the moral leadership of the world which we then had; and if we had striven mightily to pull the whole world together, instead of promptly dividing it, there might indeed have been a century of American leadership, based not on power but on statesmanship. The power basis for an American Century disappeared in September 1949, when the Soviets exploded their first A-bomb. The *Pax Britannica* lasted for several centuries because the world-wide supremacy of the British Navy could be maintained, and because of a world trading system and wise leadership but our power base for world supremacy lasted exactly four years, just as the atomic scientists had almost unanimously predicted.

By 1955 there was a paralysis of terror between two great power blocs and a growing diversity of powers and nations—the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., China, India, the British Commonwealth, a stronger West Europe, and rising middle powers such as Canada, Japan and West Germany.

It is in this diversified world that we have to find our place, let us hope a place of great influence and statesmanlike leadership. What that place is to be will depend on our success in finding the right answers to several of the issues growing out of the Cold-War.

1. *Can we withdraw successfully from the ring of containment?*

Unfortunately it is easier to get into a cold war than to liquidate one. It is easier to throw out a circle of containment, though that requires great effort, than it is to withdraw from one.

Yet this is essentially what is required. The United States is over-extended and over-committed. In 1959 we had 275 major base complexes in 31 countries and more than 1400 foreign bases if one counts all sites where Americans are now stationed or which are designed for emergency occupation. Their capital cost was *nearly four billions*.¹

¹ Senator J. W. Fulbright in the Senate on June 20, 1958. He observed that these bases must certainly provoke the Russians and asked if we had understood that fact? "Have we

Manned by about a million American troops, these bases are more than foreigners are likely to tolerate. Our armies in Germany, already unpopular, except to German officialdom, will be less and less welcome. The wall of American bodies we think essential there will have to become thinner and thinner. The same considerations apply to Japan and our need for ever longer air strips where land is precious. In mid-1957 the Girard case hastened the withdrawal of our ground forces from Japan and our airmen must eventually follow them. Deficits of nearly four billions annually in our foreign accounts also point in the same direction.

In the Arab world our great air bases exist on slender political sufferance. The French and the Americans neglected to get Moroccan consent to the building of the air bases there, before Morocco became independent. Consequently an agreement to withdraw from these bases was announced after President Eisenhower's visit to Morocco in December 1959. In Saudi Arabia our great expenditures are always subject to nullification by revolution against the rule of feudal landlords. Even in Spain, that citadel of fascist reaction, Franco's rule is drawing toward a close, and the bargains he made may not seem valid to his successors.

The great Spanish air and sea bases will stand as the ultimate expression of the containment complex, in which nothing mattered except military considerations. The abhorrence of Franco's rule in most of Western Europe, and the implied confession that the rest of Western Europe could not be defended, were both overbalanced by the military lure of the "safe" spot behind the Pyrenees, in staunchly anti-communist Spain.

Then the people of Ceylon voted the British out of their big base there, to get rid of a cold war spot, as well as to express their sovereignty. The people of Iceland asked the Americans to leave because their simple life had been spoiled, though they reversed their action, temporarily at least, after the Hungarian tragedy. On December 5, 1959, one-fourth of our forces in Iceland were withdrawn, after renewed friction.

There is also another powerful force which works to dissolve containment, growing Soviet atomic air power. As Lippmann has said, "our atomic monopoly in 1947 made it safe to encircle the Soviet Union with bomber bases." Otherwise it could not have been attempted. But "now, the Soviet Union has nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them against the bomber bases. This is the underlying reason why a tide of military neutralism has set in throughout the whole vast semi-circle, from Japan to Scandinavia."²

In other words, the American bases are now at least as much a danger as a defense to the peoples where they are situated, since in the event of war the Soviets would make a tremendous effort to knock them out promptly, with atomic weapons and from nearby bases.

On February 17, 1955, the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* remarked that made allowances for it, in our absolute unwillingness to negotiate on the subject of bases? We have treated the constant Soviet preoccupation with our overseas bases as sort of an unreasonable Soviet obsession." All the world knows, he continued, that our bases pose a threat to the Russians, that their missiles and submarines are a threat to us, and "that we live on the brink of disaster."

² The *Nashville Tennessean*, February 26, 1956.

American air bases could reach any part of the Soviet Union, equipped with bombs of every kind, but late in the year a new threat to the encircling ring arose. On December 10 Baldwin reported an 800 mile Soviet guided missile. On February 1, Senator Henry M. Jackson predicted that the Soviets would achieve a 1500 mile missile first, a development which would cancel our bases overseas, with "shattering effect" upon the morale of our allies and ourselves. Four days later Senator Stuart M. Symington, the Senator most deeply interested in the arms race, declared flatly that "they are ahead of us in ballistic missiles," hundreds of miles further, a statement strongly confirmed by Reston on February 23. On March 8 the Alsops declared that the Soviets were already flight testing a 1500 mile missile, while we did not even have one out of the drawing-board stage. They stated "on undoubted authority" that both of our air chiefs had sure evidence to this effect. On the 12th they explained that most of our bomber force was composed of B-47s, which depended on the overseas bases to reach the Soviet Union. The loss of the bases would cut off four-fifths of our striking power. The bases were becoming less and less reliable politically and more and more vulnerable strategically. In two years' time, or a little more, "these already doubtful bases" upon which SAC was so dependent would "become utterly undependable." "At that time Le May's power to kill" might be "lost any morning."

Our power to kill the Soviet Union was fading away, while the Soviets were gaining, the Alsops concluded, a "large, wholly contained force of long range jet bombers, with no crippling dependencies of any kind, and plenty of power to destroy this country."

That was written more than two years before the Soviets announced the successful testing of the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile on August 26, 1957, and verified the claim by launching their Sputniks.

The authors of containment should have thought of developments like these when they set out to encircle and contain the Soviet Union close around her borders, on the other side of the globe, leaving her no choice but to build intercontinental weapons to even the score. When the Cold War began she had no long range bombers or guided missiles and no reason whatever to use scarce materials and labor to build them.

The American engineers of public opinion who quickly developed the Cold War to its full power should have remembered that the encirclement game has a way of turning upon him who begins it. There was the tragic example of Hitler freshly before them. He had begun the encirclement game by seizing Austria and encircling Czechoslovakia. Then he received Czechoslovakia as a gift from the West and Poland was encircled. She fell and Hitler controlled a vast arc all along the European face of Russia. He thought she was encircled enough to enable him to destroy her. But at the end of the game Germany herself was wholly encircled and destroyed as no great power had ever been. It happened because Hitler lost the sympathy of the world and aroused many nations against Germany.

This disastrous result should have been pondered before we, the smaller island, set out in 1947 to encircle the biggest one. Within ten years the Soviet Union had achieved great striking power, which increased steadily. It can be

taken as axiomatic that she will never rest until our containment ring is dissolved, or greatly reduced.

Beyond that it does not follow that the Soviets will attempt to go on until we are encircled and destroyed with armed power. The nuclear stalemate precludes that. However, we are left with the difficult and delicate task of withdrawing gradually from the most untenable of our bases around the Soviet Union and China, hoping to retain the more stable ones, or at least to leave them in friendly hands. In each case it will be better to act in time than to wait until we are forced out.

Our Own Encirclement. While this withdrawal proceeds, it will be essential to remember that military encirclement has already closed in upon us as inexorably as upon the Russians. When we began the atomic arms race with them we did not remember that the earth is round, and if the final war comes Soviet bombers and guided missiles can take off from a much wider land arc of home bases than we possess, to descend on all of our chief population centers, from Los Angeles to Boston, while we are destroying the population centers of the Soviet Union, though their war plants would be much better dispersed and concealed and they are far less urbanized.

When the arms race began we did not foresee, either, that we could be encircled by sea, and with atomic-hydrogen weapons. Yet the natural reply of the Soviets to our overwhelming control of the waves, and to our air encirclement, would be a great fleet of submarines. There was no reason for not anticipating this development, since the Germans had almost won each of the two world wars with submarines.

Perhaps we can be excused from failing to foresee the deadly new details—atomic powered submarines and others which can travel under water long distances, even under the North Polar ice cap into Hudson's Bay, and nuclear warheads. On his visit home in April 1956 Ambassador to Russia Charles E. Bohlen warned that in four or five years the Russians might have submarines equipped with guided missile warheads which could stand off our coasts and rain destruction on this country. He urged more money to meet this menace, instead of building huge aircraft carrier targets for the submarines.³

By 1957 the Soviets had some 450 submarines, and a knowledgeable authority, Henry A. Kissinger, estimated that in 1960 they might have 700, most of which could fire missiles. The threat both to our allies and to our command of the seas was tremendous. Submarines with 1500 mile missiles could lie 500 miles off our shores and cause fearful damage to the 50 per cent of us who live within 300 miles of the sea, and they could reach virtually every city in the United States. They could also place any island under deadly siege and might well take control of the seas, since submarines can now outrun surface ships and fire missiles from deep water. Also, a miss of several miles may still put any ship out of action.

Kissinger added that unless the Red submarine fleet can be destroyed in the early stages of a war the supply by sea of foreign bases and allies may become impossible. But how could 700 or 1000 new submarines be destroyed?

³ The Nashville Tennessean, AP dispatch, April 21, 1956.

He noted that Hitler began World War II with only 65 submarines and never at any time had more than 100.⁴ Yet this number of crude submarines, merely surface ships that could submerge, required everything that the British and American navies and air forces had to master them.

Shall We Live in Fear? Ever since the Cold War got under way and the Soviets got the A-bomb we have assumed that we lived increasingly under the danger of surprise, all-out attack. This is the logic of power politics plus atomic technology plus our certainty of evil incarnate in Moscow. But now that the capacity for devastating attack upon us is present, by sea and air, a capacity which will steadily increase with the Soviet stockpiling of ICBMs, it is essential that we do not merely live in fear and spend our time in frantically devising devices for a defense that can never again be achieved.

It would be more profitable really to work on making peace and at building the now indispensable world community. But instead of that there was in 1959 and 1960 a considerable revival of preventive war talk in the United States. To lessen the enormity of this idea in the nuclear age, it was called "pre-emptive war" and men tried to identify various circumstances under which the "first strike" should be made.⁵

2. *Shall we retreat into "Fortress America"?*

Hereafter, three powerful forces will work to move us into a Fortress America position: (1) the outward pressure of the Communist bloc against the ring of containment; (2) the closely related but partly independent desire of our allies to be less involved in the power-ideological struggle, particularly to avoid certain nuclear death; and (3) our own natural resentment against allies who may no longer desire our erratic leadership to or away from the brink of war, depending on the mood of our leaders, and against the costs of global containment.

These pressures both push and pull us toward a fortress position. Yet a retreat all the way back would have extremely bad consequences. The attempt to man the fortress with ever more enormously costly weapons would cramp our economy, whose voracious needs require raw materials from all the world in increasing amounts. But even more important would be the psychology of resentment and frustration, to be followed by fears, hysterias, and internal witch-hunts worse than those which afflicted us at the height of the Cold War. A fortress, even a mighty one, which considers itself besieged is not a good place for those who love liberty for the individual.

It is essential to avoid such a fate and to seek a middle ground role in the world, one which attempts neither to run it nor to retreat from it.⁶

⁴ Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, New York, Harper, 1957, pp. 115-16. On June 17, 1960, the Chief of the New Zealand Naval Staff said that about 100 Russian submarines were having long-range exercises in the Pacific.—*The London Times*, June 18, 1960.

⁵ From his lifetime study of the Soviet regime, George F. Kennan says that he has never detected any suicidal tendencies in it and that he does "not suspect them of any desire to wreak destruction upon others for destruction's own sake. These people are not ogres."—Kennan, *The Realities of American Foreign Policy*, p. 83.

⁶ D. F. Fleming, "Are We Moving Toward Fortress America?" *The Annals*, July 1957, pp. 14-15.

The preceding words were written in 1957. By mid-1960 the danger of our enforced isolation had greatly increased. By that time the tragic exposure of our assertion of sovereignty in Russia's skies and the collapse of the Paris summit conference had practically destroyed our leadership of the West, and at the same time made our bases on the containment rim more of a danger to our allies than a protection to us. Then the consequent rejection of the President's visit to Japan, after he was nearly there, implied such a disintegration of the containment ring as could rapidly leave us in a precarious position, isolated by the recoils from containment.

On July 8, 1960, the *New York Times* carried a syndicated article by David Lilienthal in which he warned that there was clear and present danger of isolation being enforced on us, "a gradually tightening suffocation and quarantine." Our officials and "experts" seemed to have run out of ideas about how to maintain our position in "a world in revolution, economic and political." He called for an angry public opinion to demand public discussion of such accepted ideas as keeping bases on other people's soils, the merits of establishing overseas state trading corporations, and means of acquiring information about China. He insisted that we must have more realistic observers and interpreters, both at home and abroad, and the widest public information about new impending shocks which he foresaw.

Such a re-thinking by our whole people could indeed help to ward off the effects of a too blind reliance on military containment, to avoid a panic retreat into another big spurt in the already calamitous arms race, and to avert a relapse into another period of self-destructive McCarthyism.

3. *Can we compete constructively with communism?*

This is the real question, and we cannot answer it successfully unless we rid our minds of the great fear and resentment arising out of the dogma that communism—apart from Russia as a great power—is out to conquer the world.

Here the first requisite is to recognize that this is true and then cut the menace down to its proper proportions.

There is no doubt whatever that the original Red leaders believed in world revolution, and that it was "either-or" for communism, a belief we gave them every reason to hold during the Western interventions from 1918 to 1920. Nor is there any doubt that the current leaders of communism think that it is due to inherit the earth. But unlike Hitler and fascism, they are "in no particular hurry to see the global victory of communism," and they are now ready to admit that communism may be reached in a variety of ways.⁷

This was emphasized by Khrushchev and other party theorists in connection with the 1956 Soviet Party Congress. Communism through revolution by the "working class" is still in order, but getting it by elections will be equally welcome. "Armed intervention by the socialist countries in the internal affairs of the capitalist countries" is specifically abjured, and the simultaneous existence of both systems is accepted as "inevitable" for a long

⁷ Edward Crankshaw, *the Progressive*, December, 1955, pp. 11-12.

time, pending the final victory of communism without war. In the meantime communist power will prevent any capitalist assault on its citadels.⁸

In other words, it is to be a long-term struggle, fought on more orthodox lines. This is still a grim prospect for the democratic-capitalist system, which in 1914 was world-wide, but there is no reason why it should not hold its own, subject to the inevitable erosion of evolution on all systems.⁹

This is the more probable since universality is an exceedingly difficult goal for any system to attain. The Chinese way of life once aspired to it, and thought it was virtually accomplished. Christianity has aspired to universality for 2000 years and is still far short of it. Islam has the same goal, but with limited success. Democratic-capitalism spread throughout the world only because of the abnormal out-thrust of the people on the smallest continent, aided by the industrial revolution, and it squandered its primacy in world wars.

There is, accordingly, no reason why our way of life cannot hold its own in the world, if the democratic side of it is not subordinated too much to the capitalist. We have already created in the West welfare states which work, dynamic capitalism which gets things done. We also have in the mechanism of the graduated income and inheritance taxes the means of preventing our societies from congealing into plutocracies.

How to prevent paralyzing economic depressions is our Achilles heel, and we have no reason to conclude yet that we have this problem mastered. However, the methods of dealing with economic sickness are now known, and they must be further developed and used firmly, not only nationally but in the West as a whole. We must cope with any future depressions constructively and resolutely because the communist world is watching, and all of the uncommitted peoples. We rightly detest and reject the communist method of avoiding depressions by total planning and by regimentation. But that system avoids the great wastes of economic collapse, and its competition obliges us to use enough planning and government controls to keep our economic life operating with acceptable regularity.

The chief danger from communism is not subversion; it is communist production. During the past twenty-five years Soviet economic growth has averaged 8 per cent, through famines, purges, and World War II. Its industrial output promises to be in 1970 above three times what it was in 1950.¹⁰ By comparison the economic growth of the United States in the post war years was between 4½ and 5 per cent annually. In industrial growth alone the rate was about 5 per cent in the United States and about 12 per cent in the Soviet Union.¹¹

⁸ Philip E. Mosely, "Soviet Foreign Policy: New Goals or New Manners?" *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1956, pp. 541-56.

⁹ In a thoughtful address to the Western Political Association on April 12, 1958, Professor Neal D. Houghton, of the University of Arizona, observed that he knew of no case in history in which "any old order in any comparable ideological contest with a new, virile well-seated system has ever been able to do better than a stalemate." In communism we had come to grips with the "world-wide mass-betterment drive, which underlies this great convulsive transition period."

¹⁰ Abram Bergson, *Soviet Economic Growth*, Evanston, 1953, Chapter VII.

¹¹ Arnold, *Pattern of World Conflict*, p. 54.

The annual reports of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe always show the Soviet bloc accumulating industrial capital much faster than the West. The 1956 ECE report predicted that by 1960 the Soviet Union would be devoting about 60,000,000 tons of steel to the making of capital goods and defense goods, about the same as the United States would be. The United States would be producing far more steel, but the rest would be going into consumers' goods.

The share of the national income in Russia and the satellites which was currently devoted to heavy industry, the report continues, was around 25 per cent. In Western Europe only Norway and Finland had approximated the Soviet rate, with about 20 per cent of net national product invested. West Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark and Italy invested from 12 to 15 per cent; France 8 per cent; Britain and Belgium 6 per cent.¹²

These figures, or similar ones, are commonly accepted by economists as describing the advantage in economic growth which the communist states have. There is also every reason to expect a similar forging ahead in China.

This discrepancy creates much uneasiness in the West, partly because of its implications in the uncommitted countries. It is reasoned that rapid economic growth is the chief consideration with them and that they will go with the side which wins the production race.

This is a weighty consideration, and it might become important even in Western Europe, if the Red growth continued at the same rate. However, there is a very large question about the willingness of the communist peoples to deny themselves present benefits forever in order to promote future growth at the current fast rate. They will do so if they feel encircled and in danger, but in a state of relaxed international tension they are bound to think more about a better life, here and now.

This is certain to be true where the communist system presses the people too hard, as it often does. The riots in East Germany in 1953, and the Polish-Hungarian revolutions of 1956 were touched off by too much hard work, repaid by too little food and consumers' goods. In the Soviet Union not so many people remember lusher times, and most people get a little more each year, but the great new middle class of technicians, managers, army officers and others created in the Soviet Union will not be satisfied to forego the good things of life—and pressure from below will make it dangerous for these people alone to enjoy them.

Edward Crankshaw, one of the most perceptive students of the Soviet Union, revisited Russia in 1956 and came away with a strong impression that the standard of living will have to go up. He concluded that the "very lives of the new leaders" depend on turning the Soviet people into a prosperous and contented society. The industrial base was ready to do it. Stalin's 1946 goals would be achieved long before 1960. Indeed, heavy primary production had already reached the point where more men must be taken away from it to exploit the products.

He found the Sixth Five Year Plan paying homage in words to heavy industry, but leaning strongly toward more consumers' goods—the requisite

¹² Hoffman, *the New York Times*, March 23, 1956.

for making the Soviet Union into "a modern and upstanding society." Out in the provinces at Kiev he found life improving and he came away with the feeling that "Soviet society had at last got up steam and was moving now with a considerable momentum behind it." With all its suffering and terror the age of Stalin had quickly industrialized, urbanized and educated a very backward people. The foundation had been firmly laid for a further advance in living standards which "should utterly transform the country."¹³

This must happen if Russia is really to compete with the West. The good life is the ultimate test of the system, and now that the Soviet peoples have it within their grasp they will not be denied, unless the tensions of the Cold War are heightened again. The rising infinity of human wants is not a phenomenon confined to the West. Nor do the boasts of Khrushchev to the West that "We will bury you" automatically mean death for us in radio-active rubble. They mean faith in the ability of Soviet industry to pour out torrents of goods, to go mostly into making the Soviet peoples the equals of the Westerners, both physically and in their morale.

This basic need must reduce the amount of industrial goods going into new industry and into arms, and there are added compulsions moving in the same direction. Some of the East European satellites—overworked, impoverished and rebellious—have required a sustained outflow of strength from Russia. Moreover, Soviet industry has the really great burden on it of continuing to push the huge drive for modernization in China, for it too must succeed. Nor is that all. If communism is to hold its own as a world system the Soviet leaders must be able to continue helping to industrialize other backward lands.

All of these heavy demands upon Soviet industry will operate to slow down the rate of Soviet economic growth, and to channel it into non-military outlets, where the Soviet leaders so obviously wish to direct it. With our own great industrial lead there is accordingly no reason for panic or fear that the Red lands will outproduce us—and for military purposes. If military production were stopped completely there would still be great need for everything the communist countries can produce.

The situation would not be automatically disastrous either if production in the communist world should some time exceed that of the West. We are not compelled to pursue the arms race to the death of civilization. Nor does greater strength enable one side to destroy the other. Our currently greater stockpiles of nuclear weapons do not enable us to destroy the other side, and the same thing would be true if the situation were reversed.

We should look forward with confidence to long-term constructive competition between our way of life and communism. All the while, too, both systems, and others, will be evolving constantly and in all probability becoming somewhat more alike. The passion of the Russians to equal the Americans in the production of consumers' goods cannot be satisfied without making the Soviet Union much like the United States, a rich contented defender of the status quo. If either system does the most for mankind it will

¹³ Edward Crankshaw, *Russia Without Stalin*, New York, Viking, 1956, London, Joseph, 1956, pp. 146-59, 212.

ultimately spread everywhere, which is another way of saying that its rival would have to adapt itself to the methods and practices of the more successful system.

In the meantime, a world sweep is not a working objective for either system. It is only a faith and an aspiration, to be sought in the long unfolding of history.

4. *Can we avoid the penalties of imperialism?*

If we are to be regarded by most of the world's peoples as friends and good neighbors, it will be essential to revise our economic relations with them. In his penetrating book, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, Professor William A. Williams has surveyed the tremendous economic out-thrust of the United States into the world during the past fifty years, under the doctrine that all nations must maintain the Open Door to our capitalist enterprise. During this period the policy was a brilliant success, from the standpoint of increasing the wealth and power of the United States. Williams cites much evidence also of a belief in our leaders after 1945 that the further extension of the Open Door system was essential to the maintenance of full employment and prosperity, and to our continued economic growth. This belief made the extension of Soviet territorial control, with its consequent restriction of capitalist enterprise, a prime cause of the Cold War.

Certainly from the moment of its inception it began to seem to our leaders to be a matter of life and death importance to prevent any further areas from falling under communist control, thus automatically shutting out American enterprise from them. One by-product of the Cold War also has been to speed the inflow of American business into areas from which the European colonial powers were driven out, such as South Vietnam. The extension of American economic control in the Western hemisphere, especially since 1945, has likewise been very powerful, as described in earlier pages.

Williams' main conclusion is that "The Open Door Policy has failed because, while it has built an American empire, it has not initiated and sustained the balanced and equitable development of the areas into which America expanded. When it increased the gross national product of an area, for example, it did so under conditions which immediately removed much of the added wealth to the United States. Little of what remained was invested in the development of the political economy, let alone distributed among the population. Finally, the basic change that occurred over the period of American penetration was an intensification of the tensions and conflicts within the other society."¹⁴

The evidences of revolt against our policy of the economic suction pump, and against our wholesale purchase of basic properties in both Latin America and Canada, have been recorded in the chapters above. The revolt is most sweeping and revolutionary in Cuba, but it has concrete manifestations in many countries. It is deep seated enough to suggest that in the future we must demand less ownership, accept smaller profits, and work more cooperatively with the economic interests of the local country. Williams believes that "If

¹⁴ W. A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, pp. 200-1.

clung to much longer, the policy of open-door expansion will very probably end by producing the literal isolation of the United States."¹⁵

Instead of moving toward such a fate, he suggests "that America's political and economic well-being depend upon the rational and equitable use of its own human and material resources at home and in interdependent co-operation with *all* other peoples of the world. America can neither take its place in nor make its contribution to the world community until it believes and demonstrates that it can sustain prosperity and democracy without recourse to open-door imperial expansion."¹⁶

The pursuit of such a policy would compel a drastic modification of our methods of aiding the underdeveloped countries. There has to be a place for private investment in foreign aid, under guarantees for the security of investment and reasonable returns, but a good neighbor policy would require much more stress upon aid through intergovernmental loans, private loans and through international agencies.

Such a policy is more likely to be essential also because of Soviet and, eventually, Chinese competition. When the communists make loans at two per cent interest, construct factories on a contract basis, ask for no ownership whatever and accept payment in commodities, it will be difficult for us to compete on the basis of asking for ownership, high profits and the exploitation of raw materials on a permanent basis. Much less than that should give us healthy and friendly economic relations with those whom we aid.¹⁷

5. *What Kind of Foreign Aid?*

Forced draft industrialization is undoubtedly the chief asset of the communists in the underdeveloped countries. And where misery is so deep the short cut has an attraction so strong that we cannot afford to attach military alliance strings to our aid to them. We are obliged to think only of helping the underdeveloped to help themselves, because that is the right thing to do, and because stronger peoples will be much more likely to maintain their independence and reject communism.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 209. Williams states our dilemma sharply as follows: "America found itself impaled on the traditional dilemma of empire. It could resort to nuclear war or it could disengage, safeguarding its strategic position by formulating a new outlook which accepted the reality of a world in revolution and devising new policies calculated to assist those revolutions to move immediately and visibly toward their goal of a better human life."

—*op. cit.*, p. 202.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

¹⁷ The 1959 Spring issue of the Phi Beta Kappa magazine, the *American Scholar*, contained an arresting article by Professor J. A. Lukacs, a former European scholar, on "The American Imperial Disease." He thinks that not even our Government "consciously knew what it was doing as it spun out a network of bases and alliances all around the Soviet Union," though he did note with amazement that the Republican Party platform of 1956 called for "the establishment of American bases strategically dispersed all around the world."

Seeing young Americans so eager for the luxurious benefits of being employed abroad, our industry growing permanently dependent on military orders and other evidences of "our gradual transformation into an imperial garrison state," he was reminded of the Roman Empire. He had also seen in his own lifetime what happened to great European nations when they had been bitten by the imperial disease, and he was seeing what it was doing to Russia.

In mid-1957 the Princeton Center of International Studies published a devastating analysis of the success of our military aid programs. They admittedly heightened international tensions and caused economic dislocations in the recipient countries. It was hoped annually that Turkey, supplied with our arms ever since 1947, would become self-supporting, but she never did. Crisis succeeded crisis. In Thailand the burden of defense retarded the country's development. In the rest of South East Asia the heavy arms structures contributed by us were too small to resist aggression, too heavy to be supported economically, and too large for internal security missions. No feasible expansion of the military strength of the rimland fringes around Communist Asia "could endow these countries with the capability of resisting external aggression, either alone or until direct American power appeared on the scene," but they were paying "an increasingly heavy price in the lack of progressiveness in their internal economies."

In West Europe the study found only West Germany of the NATO countries in sound economic health—the last to undertake a burden of arms. The verdict on the accomplishments of our military aid to Europe was that it had helped the French to lose Indo-China and Algeria, and the British and French to lose Suez, while providing "a continuous and ultimately unacceptable drag on European economies, all for the purpose of introducing and maintaining direct American military and economic interest in the area."

Altogether, the study concluded, the heavy American emphasis on military aid shifted attention away from the fact that the struggle between East and West "is an economic, a political, even a psychological, but not a military one."¹⁸

Our Military Obsession. This report concentrated attention upon one of the most self-defeating aspects of our conduct of the Cold War, our intense insistence upon military strength. In mid-1956 George F. Kennan, a principal author of the containment doctrine, regretted "the over-militarization of our entire approach to world problems in these recent years—by our obdurate preoccupation with a war that might or might not come—by a concentration on this possible war so exclusive that it was bound to leave us empty-handed and devoid of suggestion if, in fact, war did not come." This "over-militarization of approach to the cold war was losing us the sympathies of world opinion."¹⁹

Our obsession with militarization during the Cold War has been one of the most appalling things about it. Historians will be puzzled by the way a democratic and religious people like the Americans have "concentrated so exclusively on military answers to complicated, human, non-military problems," that "we have shackled our abilities to deal effectively with the psychological, ideological and economic forces which are so clearly shaping modern society."²⁰

¹⁸ Edgar S. Furness, Jr., "Some Perspectives on American Military Assistance," Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1957, pp. 29-39.

¹⁹ George F. Kennan, "Overdue Changes in Our Foreign Policy," *Harpers Magazine*, August, 1956, pp. 31-2.

²⁰ Chester Bowles, *The New Dimensions of Peace*, New York, Harper, 1955, pp. 332-3; London, Lane, 1956.

It is a near-certainty that the American people have been unaware that in the years preceding 1960 well above 75 per cent of our "foreign aid" has been military, and that much of it has gone to pile up arms in Formosa, South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand, Pakistan and Turkey, in an effort to keep control of these fringe areas. In all these countries we have sought military strength instead of neutralization and demilitarization.

This effort to control the neighborhoods of Russia and China has involved us in never-ending militarization of these small countries, with perpetual adverse effects upon both the giver and the receiver. The South Korean economy is not able to support the kind of armed strength considered necessary to deter another communist attack, and there is no sign that it will ever be able to do so. Our military expenditures on Formosa already approximate three billions, and run at the rate of \$600,000,000 a year, not counting the cost of the Seventh Fleet or of keeping our own air and ground forces there. We sank over three billions in military support of the French in Indo-China, and we still militarize South Vietnam heavily.²¹

In Laos, which had been neutralized by treaty, our military intervention has reached scandalous proportions, with self-defeating results. In Pakistan we have given the military nearly a billion, not counting military hardware, with the result that two-thirds of her revenue now goes to the military and that Afghanistan and India are deeply disturbed. In Iran the same dangerous inflation of military costs and egos goes on, leaving Marquis Childs to wonder whether the military fed on its own ambitions for larger tanks and newer planes, and what the utility was of "a large military establishment in the defense of primitive Iran against its mighty Communist neighbor." In Turkey the same outpouring of our military aid unbalanced the economy and produced never ending demands for more help, while democratic liberties were progressively suppressed. Jordan lives upon our military largesse, as does Libya; in Spain the dictatorship of Franco has been saved by it.²²

This military munificence is of course the life blood of the Cold War. Uncle Sam had become the manipulator of so many anti-communist puppets that he was increasingly bewildered, but most Americans agreed, at least up until the great thaw set in in mid-1959, that the game must go on.

²¹ On December 23, 1959, after a delay of six months, President Eisenhower turned over an edited version of an ICA report on an aid program in South Vietnam to a Senate committee, after admitting on November 10 that it would not be in the public interest to give the committee the full report. In September the Congress had voted to shut off funds from any foreign-aid program on which it was refused information, unless the President personally forbade disclosure.—*The New York Times*, December 24, 1959.

In Paris, on January 9, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Prime Minister of Cambodia, said: "I wish that the Western friends of Thailand and South Viet Nam, who are also ours, would make them understand that if Bangkok and Saigon persist in not admitting our neutrality and in threatening our independence, our territorial integrity, we shall call on the Communist Powers to make us Communists. I met in Prague and Warsaw people who did not like Communism but who adopted it to protect themselves against Germany. And Cambodia would do likewise."—*The Sunday Statesman*, Delhi, January 10, 1959.

²² Edgar Snow, "China: The Ghost at the Summit," *The Nation*, March 23, 1959; James P. Warburg, an address on "U.S. Post War Policy in Asia"; Averell Harriman, the *Nashville Tennessean*, March 30, 1959; the *Washington Post*, March 6, 1959.

James Reston wrote on December 7, 1958, that almost everybody high in the Administration, spenders and savers alike, agreed that "every Communist offensive must be countered; on every continent, in every field of science, education, trade, and aid; in almost every class of weapons." The perplexing thing lay in how all these things were to be done "without undermining the currency any more than is absolutely essential."

"Irrational" Behavior. The increasing strain of militarily policing the world led the *Wall Street Journal* to observe, on December 3, 1958, that to a greater or lesser extent the United States seemed to have assumed military obligations to forty-odd nations "in perpetuity, which is something no nation should have to take upon itself." Then the editor continued: "The basic trouble with our foreign economic and military aid program is that we have tried to do too much for too many and so lost our standards for judging what is and is not important for our purposes. And this has seemed to the rest of the world abnormal, the behavior of an irrational nation, not of a nation properly concerned with its own legitimate interests in the world." Foreign aid had become "a hopelessly costly chaos."

This cutting indictment by one of the most responsible and conservative editors in the United States ought to cause every American to stop and think about the consequences of our cold war effort to manage the world in all of its multifarious parts. We have often said that some giant brain in Moscow directed a vast "international communist conspiracy" in every part of the world, but has this supposed center ever conceivably matched Washington's efforts to be everywhere and all at once? Has the Soviet war office ever come within hailing distance of the Pentagon's labors in arming the world?

Beyond the political, economic and psychological consequences of our wholesale distribution of armaments are the human costs, often overlooked. We were not aware that during the Batista dictatorship in Cuba "our tanks, planes and small arms brought death to the rebels and their families, manufactured in American factories, paid for by American tax payers and shipped to Cuba by the American Government."²³ It is a somber thought also that "for the next fifty years" most of the blood-letting in the world "will be traceable to military equipment of United States origin."²⁴ And it is equally disturbing that Senator Fulbright's efforts to get the emphasis shifted from military aid to economic aid resulted only in the Draper Committee's insistence throughout 1959 on *more* military aid. The military aid business was like the opium habit, on both sides.²⁵

Communist Producing Conditions Neglected. While we pour out arms to supposed anti-communists, one of the closest observers of Latin America reminds us that there is a yawning void just below us, characterized by "a very few rich people controlling a large proportion of a nation's wealth while a vast majority lives in poverty." The years are passing "and they still live in utter

²³ Chester Bowles, the *New York Times*, January 25, 1959.

²⁴ Senator J. W. Fulbright in the Senate, June 20, 1958.

²⁵ In 1958 the President estimated that our military assistance had provided recipient nations with 200 divisions, 23,000 aircraft and 2300 naval vessels.—Arthur Krock, the *New York Times*, February 12, 1959.

misery," with the result that "one of the most striking manifestations of Latin American life today is the extent to which communism has caught the imaginations and enthusiasms of university students in every country." This means that democracy must either improve the lot of the hungry, ill-clothed, ill-housed, diseased and illiterate "or face revolutionary upheavals."²⁶

Here is a vast field for economic aid that could prevent a continent from going communist. Another exists in India, where the Western way of life is undergoing an equally critical test. There a very promising start has been made to get a new, modern economy off the ground. The conditions for success exist, but will enough help be provided in time to prevent India's misery from forcing a communist solution?

The answer in both cases is almost surely *No*, unless the arms race is stopped and large chunks of the military budgets of the West are directed to genuine economic aid to the Southern Hemisphere. Nothing else but real disarmament can provide the funds which are essential to keep these huge areas and populations democratically governed.

As the diminishing returns of our policy of making the export of military "aid" an end in itself become more evident, we should turn strongly toward channelling much of our economic aid through the United Nations and challenging the Red bloc to do so. Seeking our own cold war gains we have long blocked the growth of a big Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED), but its advantages should be increasingly apparent. The newly liberated peoples are afraid that aid from the West will mean the return of imperialism in a new guise, but they welcome it through UN. Since our deepest concern is their growth and stability, we can afford to forego the direct credit of giving aid for the larger gain and incidentally receive greater credit. Only cooperative aid will give us real returns in friendship. Nor should we overlook the strengthening effect on the UN.

It cannot be too often reiterated that economic aid for selfish reasons is self-defeating. When after the Cuban revolution we began in mid-1960 to talk of aid to Latin America on the scale of the Marshall Plan it was already too late to get the credit for so tardy a move. Too many Latins would feel that we were trying to protect our investment billions, divert the natives from revolution and buy their acquiescence. If after 1945 we had spent a small fraction of the 400 billions lavished on the Cold War in aid to our Latin neighbors, purely because we wanted to help them, our fortunes there would not be hanging in the balance. Now they can be saved only by really unselfish aid, through the governments and the United Nations. So long as we seek credit and gain we will fail to get either.

6. *Will our conservatism defeat us?*

Our current ideology is deeply haunted by the fear of revolution "by force and violence," the communist kind. But in fearing this specter we are likely to overlook the still greater revolutions which are running in the world.

They are variously described. Marshall calls them three concurrent mass revolutions, the revolution of technics and production, the colonial revolution

²⁶ Herbert L. Matthews, the *New York Times Magazine*, January 11, 1959.

and the social revolution.²⁷ Dr. Curtis Martin, of the University of Colorado, describes them as the political revolution, the industrial revolution and the social revolution. He reminds us also that we led the way in all three of these revolutions. Now that they are spreading everywhere "we are caught in a trap of our own making." We are the prisoners of all that we have and are. We must, he continues, support movements toward self government, democratic change, and even revolutionary change on occasion. "If we fail to do these things we will be, in a sense, fighting ourselves." Then he raises "the really significant question: Can a prosperous and self-satisfied United States tending toward conservatism carry out these liberal policies?" This is a crucial question and his answer is not reassuring. "Perhaps not, but if we play a reactionary role we will become a backwater at the edge of the stream of world history."²⁸

This is a fate that we shall not easily avoid, for our dislike of revolution is so great that we do not want even to hear the word. Yet this is a century of concurrent revolutions and none of them can be repressed—colonial, technical or social—especially since the communists embrace all three and do their best to swim with them. On the other hand, we seek to protect and preserve all the backwaters of the past, such as the lost cause of Chiang Kai-shek, the stagnation of Franco and the medieval feudalism of Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Anti-Socialism. Throughout the post-war period we gave the breaks to the capitalists and turned thumbs down on the socialists of Europe and Japan. This was done under the slogan that "socialism is just as bad as communism and it leads to communism." This idea was propagated in the United States until it became a hotly held article of faith, and it was acted on abroad until most of the socialist parties were in a state of frustration.

This was probably the most shortsighted campaign that any group of ruling conservatives ever waged. It was so because the slogan was false. Democratic socialism is the real antithesis of totalitarian communism, and has never in a single recorded case led to it. The one puts personal liberty and democratic self government first; the other subjects every man to the centralized rule of party and state and puts production above everything. Traditionally, also, there has been deep hatred between the two, the communists scorning the socialists as milk and water bedfellows of the capitalists, and the socialists abhorring the communists as the executioners of freedom.

This was the gulf which our conservatives failed to widen and make permanent. Instead, both communists and socialists were lumped together and a large part of the non-communist world offended. In 1956 democratic socialism was politically potent in 22 nations of the free world. In 16 countries the socialists were in the governments; in the other 6 they were the strongest opposition party. These 22 nations contain some 725,000,000 people, exclusive of colonial populations.

A keen British liberal concludes that the great majority of Europeans want something in between regimented communism and unregulated private

²⁷ Charles Burton Marshall, *The Limits of Foreign Policy*, p. 66.

²⁸ Curtis Martin, "The Soft War," *The Western Political Quarterly*, June, 1956, p. 246.

capitalism. Here, says G. L. Arnold, "is a source of neutralism as potent as any atom bomb." The sterile capitalism of Europe "inspires a medley of feelings running all the way from uneasiness through dislike and contempt to positive hatred," and its support by the United States "has gone a long way toward wrecking the Atlantic cause. The cause is lost if it is not supported by European labor and socialist opinion," including much of the managerial stratum and technical intelligentsia.²⁹

In Asia and in all the newly emerging lands there is also a powerful trend toward a large measure of socialism, combined with a great deal of private enterprise. There, capitalism is associated with exploitative imperialism. There, also, the conditions for the rapid accumulation of capital by free enterprise do not exist. If it is to be done, as it must be, the choice is between democratic socialism and communism, which is not feared as we fear it. In Asia, therefore, for us to appear as scorning and opposing socialism is to hand the decision to communism, or at least to lose it for capitalism.

Vera M. Dean put it accurately when she said about the incompleting revolution of the colonial peoples that it "cannot be won by any great power which is alarmed by revolution, fearful of socialism in under-developed areas, and insistent on maintenance of the status quo."³⁰

Reliance on the Market as a Regulator. We have been deceived by the dynamism of our own capitalism into thinking that the automatic functioning of the market would bring about economic growth in the non-communist world. But, says Averell Harriman, "the market is not doing the job." Only "a more rapid advance than the market provides toward socially strong, democratic, national states can provide a successful defense" against communism.³¹

What we have not realized is that the two wars, the great depression and communism have made a great deal of national and international economic planning unavoidable. Around the world "every conceivable brand or species of nationalism and/or socialism has been affected by the Soviet plan era."³² With Soviet planning avoiding depressions and providing unprecedented economic growth this could not be otherwise.

We have failed to see that planning for prosperity, welfare and stability can no longer be avoided. We rashly equated planning with communism, failing to understand that some degree of collectivism is here to stay. The only question is how far it shall go. On that issue there is legitimate ground for conservative resistance to democratic socialism, but not as a mortal enemy, rather as a friendly rival who stands between private capitalism and its total extinction by communism. If this is realized, a great deal of "free enterprise" can survive permanently, in cooperation with public enterprise and the welfare state.

"One thing is certain:" says Arnold, "as long as freedom is identified with 'free enterprise'—i.e. with the untrammelled rule of market forces—no amount of propaganda will halt the march of totalitarianism." He believes

²⁹ Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-100.

³⁰ *The Foreign Policy Bulletin*, December 15, 1955.

³¹ *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1954, p. 530.

³² Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

also that those who wish to preserve the status quo in the United States should welcome "a planned economy linking Western Europe and the British Commonwealth with the United States."³³

One of the deepest thinkers on world problems in the United States has come to a kindred conclusion. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of State, does not believe that the high degree of exchange with many areas far beyond our borders which is essential can be maintained on an unequal basis, sustained by foreign aid. "No such exchange can be continuous save on a more or less equal basis—or at least on a basis by which the less favored areas are moving toward equality with the United States. This implies not 'foreign aid' but integration."³⁴

A much closer integration—the opposite of nationalistic trading—with West Europe is obviously needed. Yet it may be even more urgent in the Western Hemisphere. Berle notes that "Little attempt has been made to work out a hemisphere system for finance, capital development, orderly marketing, gradual equation of standards of work and the like." Nor does he shrink from looking beyond large regional integration to world organization for welfare and survival, instead of nuclear death and extinction, "for, as nationalism lost its logical base in World War I, regimentation is quite likely to become obsolete in the lives of children already in school."³⁵

We have hardly begun to consider solutions so fundamental. Instead, we have pressured the Europeans heavily to pool their strength and weakness, with no thought of following our own advice. Instead, we have relied for our security on a group of regional alliances, all coordinated in Washington for our own good, and tending to "treat other countries as expendable in a potential third world war which most Europeans regard as inevitable under such a system." If this tendency prevails, Arnold predicts that the United States "will find itself in a condition of moral isolation culminating in actual political divorce from its present associates."³⁶

7. *Can we dismantle the thought control apparatus left over from the Cold War?*

We are too likely to assume that since the fevers of the McCarthy period of witch hunting have subsided the danger from thought policing is ended. Yet the apparatus for it is still there, created by law or tolerated by custom. Many millions of Americans, in vast categories, must still have their loyalty investigated, perhaps repeatedly. The FBI and several other investigative agencies still spend many millions of man hours doing it, hours which might be spent productively in combating and preventing crime. Several Congressional committees and their staffs have a vested interest in continuing to ferret out non-conformity. It is their chief hope of headlines and appropriations. In short, we now have great bureaucracies, and smaller ones, which earn their pay and support their self esteem by investigating the opinions of their fellow citizens.

³³ Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 104, 157.

³⁴ A. A. Berle, Jr., *Tides of Crisis*, New York, Reynal, 1957. The Communist Council for Mutual Economic Assistance plans and coordinates production for the entire Soviet bloc (not including China or Yugoslavia).

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 310-11.

³⁶ Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

No bureaucracy ever dies voluntarily and there is no reason to expect that these will, even when they perform the most fantastic duties. In 1958 the World Health Organization of the United Nations held its tenth anniversary session in Minneapolis and six members of Congress for Minnesota were appointed as delegates. However, their attendance was not a simple matter of boarding a plane, for the 1948 Republican Congress had passed a law decreeing that no American delegate could attend a WHO conference without a loyalty and security clearance. Consequently, in 1958 a group of investigative agencies, including the FBI, teamed up to question the office help and neighbors of Senators Hubert Humphrey and Edward Thyne about their personal habits and political views. Was there anything questionable in their backgrounds? Did they drink excessively? Were they patriotic? This went on for three weeks also in the cases of four Minnesota members of the House, and a fifth, who was not a delegate, was questioned about all six.³⁷

The American police state conjured up during a wave of hysteria to combat a non-existent inundation by the Soviet police state, which Khrushchev has since very largely dismantled, still grinds away, and will do so until positive and determined action is taken to dismantle it. Our communist "enemy" has proved that it can largely purge itself of such practices. Is a great democracy helpless to do so?

The beginning of the answer seemed likely to come on the issue of requiring students to take oaths about what they do and do not believe in. On September 2, 1958, the Congress, spurred by the Russian Sputniks, passed a National Defense Education Act which supplied large sums of money for scholarships to college students, on condition that (a) they take the usual oath of allegiance and (b) swear that they do not *believe* or belong to an organization that *believes* in the overthrow of the Government by force. This extension of the monstrous assumption that all Americans are disloyal, even to young people, finally aroused a dozen reputable colleges to refuse the proffered aid and started a nation-wide protest which almost led to a repeal of the provision in the Senate in July 1959, with good prospects that another attempt would succeed. If it does, the many other millions of Americans who have to have their loyalty proved by oaths and investigations may regain their birthright. It may be a sign of returning sanity that the most lucid and compelling speech

³⁷ "Edward P. Morgan and the News," The American Broadcasting Company, May 23, 1958. The best description of the American police state apparatus is contained in a small book by a former Research Director for the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Benjamin Ginsburg, *Rededication to Freedom*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1959.

He describes the "Expanding Universe" of anti-Communism; tells how the Federal loyalty-security programs have grown until they directly cover about a fourth of the working population, reaching into the most unlikely occupations; and traces the spread of administration lawlessness. He describes the practice of using paid informers with flexible memories and vivid imaginations to put red fingers on citizens, and tells why he came to the conclusion that "the whole government anti-Communist campaign was wrong from top to bottom."

Ginsburg traces "the myth of the Communist menace" through successive phases and explains why "the anti-libertarian security system is unnecessary even in the so-called sensitive areas." He warns that the machinery of the campaign against opinion is still deeply entrenched in our institutions.

against student oathism was made by a new Senator McCarthy—Eugene P. McCarthy of Minnesota.³⁸

8. *Can we help to settle the remaining post-war issues without war?*

There cannot be any doubt that non-communist Europe is a legitimate defense zone for us, and that it is vital to keep its great productive capacity in our community, or at least out of the communist orbit. Otherwise, the world balance would be heavily against us. But even more important is our need for friendly neighbors, our own kind, sharing our deepest beliefs, especially in freedom.

Germany and Berlin. For the same reasons we have a deep interest in the question of Germany's future, but it does not follow that we can determine what it will be. We have largely lost the power of decision about Germany because we tried hastily to rearm her against our recent ally, the Soviet Union, whom she had injured so deeply. That was not only wrong, but to advance toward her nuclear armament is an extremely dangerous thing, because it would put it in her power to threaten a world war to recover lost territories, and to touch off such a conflict if there should be a revolt in East Germany. What is to be said for giving the Germans such power after experiencing what they have done with power twice in this century? Of course it is said that they have become good democrats, but fifteen years is far too short a time for this to be a trustworthy calculation, especially when that fatal willingness of the Germans to follow the leader, whoever he may be and whatever he may do, is still fully evident.

It is astonishing that we should seem to shut our eyes to this German habit, which has virtually dominated the life of Europe for a century. Whether it is the arrogant—yet conservative and status quo—leadership of Bismarck; or the maniacal, world-conquest leadership of Hitler; or the personal autocracy of Adenauer, the Germans always follow the "strong man" who seizes control of their destinies, and without any effective protest.³⁹

³⁸ Kevin Sullivan, "Oathism on the Campus," *The Nation*, December 5, 1959, pp. 416-18. In the same magazine Sir Compton Mackenzie, who spent several years working in British Intelligence, questioned the usefulness of nearly all of the investigative, spying and "intelligence" work going on in the world today. He declared that "the parasites encouraged by Intelligence are the most noxious of all because their existence depends on being able to produce the conditions in which they can flourish."

He admitted that the public, fed by spy stories and pretended true stories of Secret Service adventure, likes to believe in spies, cloaks and daggers, but he nevertheless owed it to his conscience "to declare that the effect of Intelligence work on international understanding is perhaps the greatest threat facing peace today."

³⁹ R. H. S. Crossman wrote about Adenauer, in the *New Statesman* on January 30, 1960, that "the personal autocracy he has achieved in Bonn politics, the arbitrary powers he wields in the administration and the sinister methods he adopts in dealing with opponents have closed the parliamentary pipe through which the weak democratic spirit could have drawn into its lungs the breath of freedom."

The *London Times* of July 11, 1960, carried a full account of a rally of former East Prussians at which Adenauer told them that their lost province, now devoid of Germans, must have "the right of self-determination." It is difficult to imagine more irresponsible and dangerous demagoguery than this deliberate stoking of the fires of irredentism. If the status of the former East Prussia is not settled, nothing is.

Nor can there be any doubt that a dominating personality will always be ready to lead the Germans whither he wishes. On February 28, 1960, Sydney Gruson wrote from Bonn to the *New York Times* that Defense Minister Strauss, "a dynamic, emotional man of 44" is "certainly a possible future Chancellor. To many Europeans he is a dangerous man in the sense that they believe he will be prepared to risk much to regain German pre-eminence on the Continent. Whatever Herr Strauss may say or do, the fear that Germany will one day plunge Europe into another disaster is going to take a long time dying." Dr. Adenauer's policies were based on the conviction that the best way to avoid another disaster is to merge West Germany absolutely into Western Europe. Strauss seemed to share this conviction but, Gruson added, "it would be a foolhardy reporter who would try to predict what the burly Bavarian will believe ten years from now, and how a Germany led by him would seek outlets for its strength and energies."

Whatever happens it should be a never-forgotten aim of Western policy to see that a third world war to conserve or expand German *lebensraum* does not end our civilization. In 1960 the merging of West Germany into West Europe seemed to be the best way to do this. If so, then it follows that the present division of Germany is essential to success. Otherwise, a reunited Germany of 75,000,000 people would certainly dominate the new West Europe, with redoubled power to destroy it in an attempt to recover lost lands in the East.

Since this is known to every person living in the East, nothing is more improbable than the surrender of East Germany by the East. This cannot be done, any more than the West could turn over West Germany to the East. What then is to be gained by continued Western relapses into talk of recovering East Germany by "free elections"?⁴⁰

Are we really going to perpetuate a state of war in the heart of Europe forever under the banner of "self-determination"? Of course we would all like to see the East Germans enjoy it. But are we going to repeat the supreme folly which the appeasers of 1938 committed in breaking up Czechoslovakia to permit Hitler to self-determine the fate of the Sudeten Germans, under the banner of "self-determination"? It is too facile an answer, too, to say that what is good for Africans and Asians must surely be applied to East Germans. Many of the Africans and Asians will doubtless make a mess of their new liberties from foreign control, but we know that the Germans cremated 6,000,000 people in Europe, that they had planned the depopulation of much of East Europe in their own behalf, and that they sought to impose lesser gradations of servitude on the entire European continent.

⁴⁰ This near-impossibility of German union was driven home by Soviet Ambassador to Bonn Andrei A. Smirnov in a meeting with a group of West German politicians in which he said that a unified and neutralized Germany would have to nationalize big industry, break the power of monopoly and be dominated politically by the working class.—Sydney Gruson, Bonn, the *New York Times*, March 14, 1960.

These terms seem outrageous to us, but they are no more extreme than ours, which would dismantle the entire system in East Germany.

This interview, and other evidence, killed the hopes of the German Social Democrats for a neutralist solution. Years earlier this might have worked out.

Since it required all the carnage of World War II to prevent this, we ought not now to be refusing to make peace because some Germans do not have self-determination and because Germany is divided. The division is the end result of what the Germans themselves did. No one planned it, but it is a fact which in the foreseeable future nothing but the final world war could alter.

This was recognized in a television interview given by Professor Karl Jaspers, one of the most eminent of West German philosophers, which was reported in the *London Times*, August 16, 1960. He concluded that reunification was not only politically impossible, but that the Germans who did not oppose Hitler's regime were politically responsible for the division of Germany. He would like to see East Germany become another neutralized Austria, but Germans ought to recognize that the war had destroyed Bismarck's Germany. They should give up the idea of national unity and understand that "what may have made sense in the nineteenth century had been destroyed by Hitler's Reich."

If this is patently true, it follows that West Berlin cannot be used as a Western foot in the door to pry East Europe out of the East. Everyone knows that the situation of West Berlin is anomalous and that it must change. How is the change to be effected?⁴¹

Three courses are open to us:

(a) *To expel the Russians from East Europe.* This is the course advocated by William S. Schlamm, an Austrian-born American citizen and former editor of *Fortune* magazine, in his book *Germany and the East-West Crisis*.

He wants the United States and West Germany in tight alliance to "massage the nerves and feed the apprehensions of the Soviets with a sometimes inscrutable, sometimes coldly forceful, always imaginative policy of incessant pressures and incessantly increasing urgency; get out of the territory of sovereign Germany, a senior ally of the United States!"

He wishes communism to be "constantly compelled to *give up territory*" (his italics) even if it takes a nuclear holocaust to do it. He insists that "communism *thrives on peace, wants peace, triumphs in peace*" and denies that if

⁴¹ The artificiality and instability of West Berlin's situation was clarified in two authoritative articles in British papers during May 1960.

In the *Observer* on May 22, Andrew Shonfield, Economic Editor, described the many devices for pumping additional investment capital into West Berlin. These economic transfusions totalled \$450 million a year. In addition one-fourth of the people received old-age or widow's pensions from West Germany. This brought in an additional \$420 million to a population with an unusual number of old people, since the young went West.

Like the young people, the money earned in Berlin did not stay there. Since it was exported back into West Germany the city needed more industry if it was to support an aging population—in spite of the fact that the West had built up West Berlin into the largest manufacturing city in all Germany. Once it was plain that there was no hope of Berlin being the capital of Germany again the business man's mood was likely to grow more and more like that of the young people.

This indication of future developments was underlined by Heinrich Vockel, Plenipotentiary of the Federal Republic in West Berlin, in the *Manchester Guardian* on May 12. He explained that in 1959 more than DM 2000 millions were given free to West Berlin. About 40 per cent of the city's budget was from federal sources. West Berlin's entire system of public finance would immediately break down if these federal payments were cancelled. "Even the most radical measures could not prevent this."

it was "moral and reasonable to resist and to overthrow nazism by getting more than 50 million people killed and more than 100 million people maimed, it would be immoral and unreasonable to prevail over communism by getting *much* more than 50 million people killed and *much* more than 100 million people maimed." (His italics.)⁴²

His assumption that we could "prevail" over communism by getting hundreds of millions of people killed, including ourselves, is apparently explained by a further assumption that sufficient will power on our part would force the Russians to retreat without war.

This policy might have been considered harmless, because of the enormity and irrationality of what is involved, had not Mr. Schlamm taken it directly to the youth of Germany. On February 12, 1960, the *New York Times* carried an article by its Bonn correspondent, Sydney Gruson, describing Schlamm's crusade in German universities, already six months old, where he was receiving enthusiastic response. Hecklers were being threatened with court action. Nearly 100,000 copies of his book had been sold in West Germany within a period of a few months and Fritz Ehrler, a Social Democratic speaker in parliament, had compared him "to another Austrian who led Germany to ruin."

Schlamm may not be another Hitler, but he has already "excited German passions" more deeply than Hitler did in his early years. Later, many people throughout the West accepted Hitler as the one who would handle the Communist East, without too much risk to the West. This also Schlamm promises. He is telling German youth, says Gruson, "that the Soviet Union would not fight and therefore Western threats of belligerence would achieve their aim without the shooting." Schlamm's book is also much more successful than *Mein Kampf* was in its early years.

(b) *The evacuation of the people of West Berlin.* This is a solution which would be highly unpalatable to us. We feel a strong moral obligation to defend the 2,500,000 people in West Berlin, who endured the blockade of 1948-9 so courageously. It would be hard to tell them that we cannot preserve their present way of life unless they will undergo the hardship of migration to West Germany, to the United States, or to other countries.

The cost of moving and equipping for a new life all who would choose to migrate might be large, but it would be microscopic beside the hundreds of billions that we have poured out so willingly for the Cold War. Nor would the displacement of a large number of West Berliners as a result of World War II be unprecedented. After World War I the Turks drove as many Greeks who had lived in Anatolia for centuries out of their homes into new ones, which the League of Nations provided in Greece. The Hitler-Stalin truce and the war drove some 8,000,000 Germans out of East and Central Europe. Their hardships were great, but West Germany's great prosperity is largely founded on their acquisition.

There would be some loss of prestige to the West in making such an adjustment, but is any real loss of face involved in abandoning an untenable

⁴² Wilham S. Schlamm, *Germany and the East-West Crisis*, New York, David McKay Co., 1959, pp. 232, 169, 186.

political outpost, while at the same time recognizing and fulfilling an obligation to each human being involved? Would it be more honorable to incur the destruction of the West Berliners, and much more, in order to "defend" them? Or would it be more valiant to see the economic and political life of the West Berliners slowly strangled over a period of years?

(c) *The negotiation of a new status for West Berlin.* Our cold war reflexes tell us that this would only postpone and make gradual the destruction of all individual rights and liberties in the city. Sooner or later, and probably sooner, West Berlin would be completely absorbed into Communist East Germany.

It might work out that way. No one should promise that it would not. Yet this probability does not relieve us of the duty to examine the possibilities. President Eisenhower has rightly and wisely said twice that the situation of West Berlin is abnormal. Are, therefore, any tolerable changes possible?

Khrushchev has said repeatedly that the communications of the city with the West could be guaranteed by the four occupying powers, with the participation of the United Nations. He has indicated that some of the city's economic relations should be with the East, which would seem to be inherent in the situation on any long-term basis. He has repeatedly denied any intention to change the political and economic system in West Berlin, suggesting that he knew there were some things the West could not accept.

His entire campaign for a summit conference and for disarmament also reveals a deep desire to transfer the competition between the two systems from the military to the economic level. He needs to spend more on consumers' goods, economic development and foreign aid, and less on arms. He appears to want negotiated peace settlements.

None of these things would be possible if he took a completely intransigent position on the liberties of the people of West Berlin. To get peace, and an acceptance of the division of Germany, he could pledge a good deal of the Soviet Union's credit in the world to guarantees of liberty in West Berlin. For that matter his regime has been devoted to ending Stalin's slave labor empire in Siberia, to reducing police state controls and to setting up the rule of law in the Soviet Union.

If peace is really made, and the fearful pressures of the Cold War are relaxed, this salutary evolution could be expected to continue, both in Russia and in East Europe. In such a general amelioration and expectation of fruitful living the position of West Berlin without the protection of Western troops could be better than our built-in beliefs would tell us. In any event the effort to work out a detailed set of guarantees is an alternative which should be weighed along with nuclear war and evacuation. Our individual opinion of Soviet good faith may be low, but the Soviet Union's reputation in the world can hardly be valueless in Soviet eyes. It should be remembered, also, that we are likely to get better terms for West Berlin from the Soviets than from the East German Government.

Since the choice of leaving the situation as it is does not appear to be open to us, we should weigh the advantages of having strong assurances for the West Berliners against the slow, inexorable loss of all their current rights and

privileges. The surrender of our power position in West Berlin would be unpleasant, but would it improve matters to lose it without any consent or compensations?

Above all, there is the basic alternative of prolonging our refusal to accept the results of World War II until a nuclear explosion destroys all of us, or of recognizing that the irresistible power of evolution perpetually changes all systems and all ideologies. Would it not be better to have some faith in this law of life?

Eastern Europe. In this region we could claim that the Cold War and our long continued talk of liberation had produced the pressures which led to the 1956 revolutions. This was largely true. "In 1948, coincident with the Cold War, Stalin tightened the screws."⁴³ Frightened by the Kremlin and acting on its instructions "the satellites ruined their economies to reinforce their armies."⁴⁴

But after the Hungarian revolution, with its abortive result, it is more evident than ever that our best hope of aiding the liberalization of the East European regimes is to promote relaxation and peace, an atmosphere in which an evolution toward freer forms of life will not seem to the Soviet Union to imperil its security. This was always our best policy, but now it is the only one by which the lot of the East Europeans can be improved.

Their greatest hope lies in a disengagement of the hostile forces in Germany which would promote the withdrawal both of Western and Russian forces. This is at present blocked by our fear that the Russian troops could return easily, whereas ours would be across the Atlantic. So they might. Any retreating glacier might decide to start advancing again. However, there has never been any evidence that the Soviet forces in Germany ever had any offensive function and it is the objective of a policy of making peace to create situations in which there will be less and less reason for any Soviet troops which retire eastward to return.

We owe it now to the peoples of East Europe to promote such a relaxation of tensions as will allow the universal aspirations of men for greater individual freedom and security to find greater expression in that area.⁴⁵

Japan. After the events of 1960 we must be prepared for the younger generations of Japanese eventually to carry Japan out of our power structure. All Japanese know that they could fight neither of their continental neighbors without being annihilated from the air. It is therefore unrealistic to think that they can arm against their giant neighbors.

They must strive for a state of neutrality which would allow them to live in

⁴³ Sidney Lens, "The Second Communist Revolution," *the Progressive*, September, 1957, p. 13.

⁴⁴ Louis Fischer, *Russia Revisited*, New York, 1957, p. 270.

⁴⁵ In an article in *Harpers Magazine*, "Overdue Changes in Our Foreign Policy" (August 1956, pp. 27-8), George F. Kennan reaffirmed his conviction that Stalin's intentions "did not include the determination to unleash a third world war in the grand manner.

If this was a correct appraisal of Stalin, and time has proved that it was, Khrushchev, with his great ambition to prove peacefully the success and superiority of communism, is still less likely to provoke a nuclear war by any armed incursions into West Europe.

friendship with these neighbors and to trade with them. Their neutrality could be defended by strong defensive armaments and it could be guaranteed by China, Russia, the United States and the United Nations. This would imply the retrocession of our Okinawa base, but it would still allow our long-range power to act as a deterrent to any attack upon Japan.

Korea and Vietnam. On the Asiatic mainland we can enforce the division of the small Korean and Vietnamese peoples for a time, and it is possible that if peace were made with China she might agree to the admission of the four halves to the United Nations, on a neutralized basis. In a condition of peace, also, the two little peoples might find ways to unite that would not automatically mean the communization of both. Neither of them has ever done anything to deserve the partition enforced upon it by the great powers. Our aim should surely be to try to create conditions over a term of years in which these two small victims of the Cold War might live either separately or in unity. We might well consider James P. Warburg's suggestion of trying to bring about the evacuation of all foreign troops from both, and an arms embargo, with a neutral strip between each to be watched by United Nations peace forces until peaceful unification could come about. If the UN could also supervise elections, so much the better.

Formosa. It is highly unlikely that the West will ever know any real peace while it clings to its two most untenable outposts, Berlin and Formosa. Of these, Formosa may well be the more dangerous because there a proud and angry great power will before many years have the nuclear and other military power to take the island, leaving it to us to convert a local war into a world holocaust. We can bluff and threaten to do this, but no rational American government could do it, with no ally in the world of any consequence, especially in the face of the current exalted belief of the Chinese that they could survive a nuclear war, even if they lost 200,000,000 people in the process. We should anticipate also that if any people inherited the earth after a nuclear war it would be the Chinese, with their great numbers, closeness to the soil and to privation, and their form of government already inured to surviving in the hills.

Before it is too late we should try for a peaceful solution of the Formosa issue. If we really believe in free elections, outside of East Germany, we could try for a UN supervised plebiscite to give the native Formosan majority a chance to influence its destiny. We would owe Chiang Kai-shek and his top aides asylum in the United States, if that would enable the Formosans to have their own independent life under a United Nations trusteeship.

It is most unlikely that China would accept this solution. In any event we have a few years in which the attempt could be made. Of course, Chiang Kai-shek would object to such an end to his illusions, in which case the suggestion of Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery should be effective, "that the United States withdraw its armed forces from Formosa and the Formosa Strait and let the merging of Nationalist China and the Peoples Republic be carried out by peaceful negotiation between the two Governments."⁴⁶ This

⁴⁶ *The Sunday Times* of London, June 19, 1960.

would give Chiang a few years in which to negotiate before he could be overwhelmed.

In any case, there must some time be an end to the obligations and dangers which the United States incurs in his behalf. Nor can we afford to regard Formosa as something about which the national mind has been locked and the key thrown away. Events will not permit us to reject all attempts at a settlement, even though all of them are unpalatable. It is essential to recognize that Formosa can be held only temporarily against the united will of 650 million Chinese, soon to be a billion.

Nor does a Formosan settlement mean our retirement to California. The Philippines are a far better military base and outpost in the Far East, even for the defense of South East Asia. We are also as welcome there as an occupying power can be, and we have historic ties with the Filipinos. The world would understand our fighting for the defense of the Philippines.

China. Any move toward a Formosan settlement would have priceless value in the eyes of the world as an indication that we have the capacity to adjust our relations with China, while there is still time.

What we have to realize is that behind our economic, diplomatic and military embargoes of China, and behind our self-imposed wall of non-intercourse, the foundations have already been laid for the same swift industrialization and armament of a great people as occurred in Russia.

On May 17, 1956, the London *Times* published an article by its special correspondent in China which said that the world cannot afford to ignore "the iron determination of the leaders to achieve their goals, reshaping the whole structure of the State, society and industry. Neither can there be any illusions about the loyalty and obedience which they now command." Ten days later the *New York Times* carried the eyewitness report of Nicholas Kaldor, a Fellow of Kings College, Cambridge University, saying that he would be relieved if United States' aid to India were one-fifth as large as Russia's aid to China. The Soviets were supplying technical assistance on the widest scale and vast amounts of equipment. He added "nothing can stop China in a generation or two from becoming one of the leading countries of the world. Communism is a new religion there and has released tremendous energy."

On August 6, 1957, the director of the Columbia Broadcasting System news service returned from an inspection trip to the Far East to report that "the next century will be the Chinese century." China is "on the move and we had better take cognizance of it." "There is no doubt about it. They are the people of the future," said a Russian to Gerald Clark in China, with a mixture of awe and trepidation.⁴⁷ A Canadian lawyer returned from witnessing in China "an unrivalled capacity for hard work and an almost super-human energy" which he could not explain. He had seen a great "human power plant now being developed and controlled with skill and intelligence by Communist leaders."⁴⁸

⁴⁷ The *Montreal Star*, November 26, 1958.

⁴⁸ E. B. Jolliffe, "China May Soon Be The World Power," *Maclean's Magazine*, November 22, 1958. He even saw hard-fought soccer games at 7 A.M.

Another Canadian, James Muir, President of the Royal Bank of Canada, returned saying: "The growth in industry, the change in living standards, the modernization of everything and anything, the feats of human effort and the colossal impact of human labour are not within our power to describe and still give a worthwhile picture of the scene. All I can say is that it must be seen to be believed. It's truly stupendous."⁴⁹

An Indian scientist and a British member of parliament found evidences of spontaneity in the organization of the huge agricultural communes, and a shortage of labor.⁵⁰ A French economist was surprised by the variety of goods available. He reported immense growth in agriculture and "the enormous acceleration of Chinese industrial growth which henceforth attains an extraordinary rhythm."⁵¹ The London *Daily Telegraph* predicted on February 10, 1959, that by 1967 China would be a formidable power, already outproducing the Western European countries in steel. A New Zealand professor of geography surveyed much of China and concluded that China has all the essentials for large-scale industry—iron, coal, oil, water power, vast labor resources—conclusions which were fully shared by J. Tuzo Wilson, a Canadian scientist who visited a new Chinese capital of science deep in the interior. He had no doubts that China's great resources would be scientifically developed.⁵²

This is the new China that we are endeavoring to ostracize and confine in every known manner, and to bottle up physically. Up to 1960 we would not even permit any of our citizens to go to China to see what is transpiring there—a form of self-blindness which would be difficult to imagine if it did not exist. Before the great acceleration of the Chinese dynamo just described, a survey of our relations with China for the American Assembly concluded that the prospects for maintaining our China policy were "not very bright," and it was "possible to foresee a succession of small diplomatic retreats and defeats, with the United States carrying out one delaying action after another."⁵³

This is a very conservative appraisal, for our defeats could be large and they could involve grave consequences. It is essential that we take a cold, hard look at our relations with the rapidly emerging new China, before it is too late. William E. Hocking, Professor Emeritus at Harvard University, pointed the way when he suggested that containment was a suitable policy to curb the ambitions of would-be dictators, "but not to limit the needs of great peoples" and that "to defeat the natural intercourse among populations is folly." Noting that our containment policy was "visibly breaking down in the Middle East," he added that it is not possible to contain the needs of the Soviet peoples "for ample sea outlets," and that "the effort to keep the Chinese

⁴⁹ Royal Bank of Canada Bulletin, June 26, 1958.

⁵⁰ D. D. Kosambi, the *Monthly Review*, March, 1959; R. H. S. Crossman, the *New Statesman*, January 10, 1959.

⁵¹ The *Monthly Review*, March, 1959.

⁵² "A Visit to Red China's Hidden Capital of Science," *Saturday Review*, November 8, 1958, pp. 47-56.

⁵³ A. Doak Barnett, in *The United States and the Far East*, New York, American Assembly 1956, p. 169.

coast in permanent pawn to Formosa, in whole or in part, is doomed to failure."⁵⁴

Nothing would seem to be more obvious, more inexorably inevitable. Where then is the realism in clinging to a policy which is worse than self defeating?

For sixteen years after 1917 we pursued a policy of non-recognition and hostility toward communist Russia. Then after our immensely beneficial alliance with her during World War II we went all-out to contain and encircle her. This provided the essential stimulus for one of the most remarkable recoveries that the world has ever seen, one which has catapulted the Soviet Union into scientific leadership in the field of weaponry, in which we thought our supremacy safe, and has put her in a position to challenge the United States to a production race in every other direction. All of our embargoes and other efforts to contain the Soviets only spurred them to invent and perfect their own means of doing things, until in 1959 they were close to being able to force us to make peace on their terms.

Must we now repeat this dismal record in China's case, perhaps on a still more disastrous scale? Can we learn nothing from our Russian experience? Must we continue trying to blockade and encircle China closely until she has generated the power to smash the blockade, and perhaps to impose her will on the entire Orient? It will not do to rely on China's world-wide unpopularity as a result of her border disputes with India in 1959. The largest, oldest, toughest people in the world—probably also the proudest, cleverest, most adaptable and most capable of closely organized effort—such a people cannot be successfully ostracized. To continue their hostile encirclement after they have already *demonstrated intense dynamism is to invite great explosions of every kind*—political, economic and military. It is idle to think that peace can be made in a nuclear world while excluding such a giant factor. Peace must be made with China too, perhaps by degrees but effectively. We are already late in beginning, and there is no safety in assuming that time is on our side. It is never on the side of those who waste it.

Though we are apparently unaware of the inconsistency, we cannot much longer enforce the Monroe Doctrine principle, which forbids any other power to intrude into the Western Hemisphere, and at the same time extrude our power *into the Eastern Hemisphere*, close up to the borders of China and Russia. This may seem fair enough to us, but it is bound to look like arrogance to others.

The Middle East. Similar considerations apply to the Middle East. During the period of Russia's great weakness after 1945 we successfully excluded her from any voice in this key area, just under her frontier, and from a single drop of more than 75 per cent of the world's oil. We forced her from North Iran and denied her a base in the Dardanelles or in Libya. Her access to warm water is no better or more secure than it had been before the Straits were closed to her, with calamitous consequences, in the two world wars.

All this we could do while Russia was weak, and there was seemingly strong

⁵⁴ Letter to the *New York Times*, April 29, 1956.

justification for each step. But did they all add up to long-range statesmanship? Then after Russia had become strong again, and after she had achieved the H-bomb, we persisted in the crowning folly of trying to close the encirclement ring around her with the Baghdad Pact. We had to have certainty, the same kind of impregnable security-seeking of which we accuse the Russians, except that ours was in her dooryard. By overplaying our hand, much too far and long, we produced a situation in which, aided by brusque American diplomacy about the Aswan Dam, the Suez Canal was nationalized, war precipitated at Suez in 1956 and our alliance with antiquated Arab governments momentarily established through the Eisenhower Doctrine, until the revolts in Iraq and Lebanon in 1958.

For the first time our dominance of the Middle East is challenged by the Soviet Union. Here, also, the tinder is thickly piled and long-range solutions should be sought, aiming at neutralization and the recognition of Russia's vital interests in the region. Both sides pouring arms into it obviously keeps it explosive.

A Western guarantee of the frontiers of Israel, accompanied by a long-time program of economic aid to the area, would be a far better means of stabilizing it.⁵⁵

9. Is "antagonistic coexistence" the best we can hope for?

To some readers the view of what is attainable presented here will seem defeatist, or worse. The psychology left by the Cold War prescribes a far different course. For example, the Roberts report is based on the principle that the United States must prevent the world-wide establishment of "Soviet" communism, "even at the cost of a general war." If the war is abjured, then "whatever other means there are, or may be, for averting the disaster of Communist world hegemony" are destroyed. Similarly, withdrawal "involves an irrevocable loss of the power of decision." Therefore we should have more money for arms, not less; total inspection throughout the Soviet Union if we have any arms limitation; "more allies;" firm defense of Formosa, "if only as a symbol and an inspiration, an alternative to the Chinese Communist regime;" prevent Quemoy and Matsu from falling under Communist rule or from being "wiped out by bombing from either side," if it is at all possible; try to give the people of China "a sense of community with the world which has been shut off from them;" obtain free elections in Germany, Korea and Vietnam, though "we see no definite or assured way of realizing these principles in the immediate circumstances;" and have no expectation of great progress without "a profound change on the Soviet side." Pending such a change we must have the ability to "inflict a damaging defeat at whatever level of force the Soviets may contemplate trying," and to "oblige them to work at a disadvantage if they resort to subtler tactics." In short, "antagonistic coexistence, if such a term has any use."⁵⁶

⁵⁵ The *Spectator*, Edinburgh, September 6, 1957. The Editor recognized that there would be opposition from some Arab states, but thought that "constructive proposals are better than relying on mercenary allies."

⁵⁶ Henry L. Roberts, *Russia and America*, pp. 80, 81, 106, 127, 221-2, 234, 241, 246, 249-50. This is the report of a discussion group organized by the Council on Foreign

"Antagonistic coexistence" is a welcome advance from the white heat of the Cold War. It is a carefully reasoned and moderately stated position, but the question remains whether it is more than a transitional program toward a more friendly coexistence. It was an excess of antagonism which lost us the Cold War.

The limitations of our power in the world after two world wars also remain. For example, we can defend Western Europe, if we continue in close and friendly association with her. But is it clear that we can dominate the Middle East? It is admitted that the Mediterranean Sea is now far too narrow a place for our battle fleets in the event of war.

In the Far East we can and should defend the Philippines. With Australia we should also be able to shield Indonesia during her growing pains. But there is no reason whatever to expect that we can or should control all of the shores of the other side of the Pacific Ocean. This would be true even if two giant peoples did not live there, in the air age.

Nor does it benefit us to cling to positions which are indefensible on any grounds. Instead it would be better to concentrate on more friendly activities, such as a real program of aid to India. Rather than pursue the objective of total containment in the Middle East, curtly telling the Egyptians in effect to get the Russians to build the Aswan Dam, which the Soviets began to do in 1960, it would have been far better to risk a billion dollars in the Dam and to work closely with Egypt for a generation, turning her energies away from revenge upon Israel and toward constructive labor and hope.

It is a characteristic of antagonistic rivalry that it always believes itself extremely "realistic," hard headed, practical. Yet the opposite is likely to be true. How realistic was it to jump to the conclusion that Stalin was a world conqueror on the loose? How realistic was it to assume that we could physically encircle the Soviet Union on the other side of the globe—and dominate the Middle East successfully? How realistic was it to think that the soundly beaten and crushingly devastated Germans and Japanese could be quickly rearmed and turned against the Soviets? How realistic was it to think that Chiang's corrupt lid of landlordism could be clamped on the people of China again—or that the same thing could be done in Indo-China? How hard-headed was it to ignore China's warning not to invade North Korea? How far-seeing was it to arm Pakistan, promptly throwing Afghanistan into the arms of the Soviet Union and India into resentful neutrality toward us and warmer neutrality toward Russia? How practical is it to stake our whole prestige and the issue of peace and war on an attempt to control all of the Pacific Ocean—up into China's harbors?

Relations. It was composed of about thirty-five leading Americans and met over a two-year period.

Cook and Moos go further. They say that "our strategy, which may indeed lead soon or late to war being thrust upon us by an increasingly insecure Russian regime, must be directed to encouraging germs of discontent within the Soviet Union and its satellites wherever possible, and to the extent possible. We must organize and aid potential revolutionaries there, yet as far as possible restrain them from ill-calculated or premature action."

—Thomas I. Cook and Malcolm Moos, *Power Through Purpose*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, Oxford U.P., 1954, p. 203.

10. *Can we get back to limited war?*

As the nuclear stalemate advanced, a deep sense of frustration stirred the minds of military men and many others. War between great powers had lost all sense. It could not be directed or controlled. It could not achieve any sane objective. No victory could even be imagined. There could only be senseless destruction and mutual annihilation.

At the same time no one had been able to conceive of any way to push the Communists out of East Europe or North Korea without precipitating universal disaster. Conversely, too, it was feared that they might nibble at Western-controlled fringe areas around them, fairly secure in the knowledge that we could not risk the atomizing of our cities for a bit of far away land.

Yet our scientists and technicians were producing a great variety of smaller nuclear weapons—whole families of them, of many sizes, and in quantity—so that nuclear weapons for almost every conceivable use in war accumulated.

In these circumstances it was inevitable that efforts should be made to develop a doctrine of limited war which would enable our most ancient international institution to continue, and the greatest game man has ever invented to go on, with the newest means of playing it.

Appalled by the danger of mutual annihilation in another world war, and disturbed by the prospect of communist "nibbling" in the fringe areas, a group of 33 distinguished leaders assembled by the Council on Foreign Relations met in New York City for a period of 18 months, beginning in 1954, to consider the alternatives. At the end of their deliberations the research director, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, was asked to write a book based on them, but on his own authority, with full freedom to express his own judgments.⁵⁷

The volume which resulted is founded firmly upon our cold war assumptions: "the existence of an irreconcilably hostile bloc of powers"; irrational Soviet leaders, about whom we must not make the mistake of thinking they will act in accord with "our own standards of rationality"; and constant pressure against us—"just short of the challenge which they believe would produce a final showdown."⁵⁸

This incessant "thrust of Soviet aggression will always be directed at the weak points" in our psychological armor, says the Kissinger report, each successive Soviet move being more "ambiguous" (not so clearly outright aggression) and so "designed to make our moral position that much more difficult." Confronted with this clever strategy, we had "never succeeded in translating our military superiority into a political advantage," even during our atomic monopoly. Nor had we been winning the Cold War. "Neither regarding German unity, nor Korea nor the satellite orbit have we succeeded in mobilizing world opinion. But Formosa has become a symbol of American intransigence and our overseas bases a token of American aggressiveness."⁵⁹

Seeking reasons for our failure to find "an effective relationship between

⁵⁷ Henry A. Kissinger, *op. cit.*

About the book, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Editor of *Foreign Affairs*, says: it proposes a doctrine "that could avoid the twin perils of all-out war and being nibbled to death by the Russians."

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 417, 405, 338.

⁵⁹ Kissinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 428-9, 338.

force and diplomacy," Kissinger found that we had been defeated by the fear of atomic holocaust, involving an unwillingness to take sufficient risks. Our failure to take enough risks was stressed at least ten times. Our policy "was bellicose enough to lend color to Soviet peace offensives, but not sufficiently so to induce Soviet hesitations" or concessions on "the satellite orbit, German unification and, above all, international control of the atom." We "hesitate not only in the face of Soviet blandishments but also before Soviet intransigence. Every Soviet aggressive move finds us debating its implication and creates pressures for deferring a showdown. . . ." The stalemate is "not so much in equality of power as in the assessment of risks"; it is "more a testimony to the fears and conscience of the non-Soviet world than to actual Soviet power," though this would not be true later. To deal with the ambiguous thrusts of Soviet aggression "presupposes above all a moral act; a willingness to run risks on partial knowledge and for a less than perfect application of one's principles." And finally, in the last sentence of the book: "we face the challenge of demonstrating that democracy is able to find the moral certainty to act without the support of fanaticism and to run risks without a guarantee of success."⁶⁰

Obviously such a policy of strong nerves and risks involves taking the offensive, since mere containment ensures our fighting militarily "at the point of our greatest weakness," in situations of maximum diplomatic embarrassment to us. Moreover, we face the task "not only of stemming the Soviet pressures but also of reducing the Soviet sphere and demonstrating the limitations of Soviet power and skills"—in other words, of enforcing roll-back.⁶¹

The means, too, for achieving these positive objectives are ready at hand in the infinite variety of smaller atomic weapons now available. By the 1960's, Kissinger continued, "choices will have to be made among hundreds of weapon systems," with such a variety of combinations that "the number of conceivable weapons systems reaches fantastic figures." Furthermore, all of our planning, procurement and research development is "built around nuclear weapons," and if the use of our wealth of lesser nuclear weapons were ruled out, "then the whole thrust of our military policy toward developing a diversified nuclear establishment is meaningless and dangerous."⁶²

What is it all for, if not for use? And yet the fear of annihilation paralyzes our will to such an extent that "the Soviet bloc may decide to absorb the peripheral areas of Eurasia by means short of all out war." If the Soviets can "force us" to shoulder the risk of initiating all out war, no areas in Eurasia may seem "worth" fighting for.⁶³

To overcome this "psychological block," says Kissinger, we must perfect a strategy of *limited* nuclear war. But before wars of this kind can be attempted two educational campaigns are essential: one against the horrors of nuclear war in the minds of our people and our allies; and another to convince the Soviet leaders that in each war we intend to inflict only a limited nuclear defeat or stalemate upon them. We must "break down the atmosphere of special horror which now surrounds the use of nuclear weapons." We must

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 42, 425, 60, 111, 429.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 176, 174.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 430, 147.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 134, 244.

treat the use of nuclear weapons as non-negotiable, but "put great emphasis on measures to mitigate their effect."⁶⁴

"The enemy" must be persuaded that we do not mean to attack his strategic air force (or ICBM stations) or his cities. Any city in the fighting zone could also contract out by claiming the absence of military objectives and admitting inspectors, receiving immunity for a radius of thirty miles, though it is not clear whether from nuclear attack or from all participation in the war. Fighting would be confined to a zone 500 miles wide on either side of an initial demarcation line.

Within this restricted zone we would not fight "a small all-out war," which could too easily grow into the big one, but conduct the operations "in phases which permit an assessment of the possibilities for settlement at each stage." For this purpose our diplomacy would be more active than ever during the war, instead of ceasing, as we sought to persuade the enemy to come to terms after each carefully graded application of nuclear force. Since the purpose would be "to affect the will of the enemy not to destroy him," each campaign would be "conceived as a series of self-contained phases," with an interval between "to permit the application of political and psychological pressures."⁶⁵

The prospect of the Kremlin, or any other spirited government, engaging with us in a thermonuclear minuet, one composed and directed by us, is exceedingly remote. A stalemate may occasionally be accepted, as in Korea, if the breakthrough into nuclear war is not made, but if we begin with little H-bombs the fatal upward spiral into using the nation-killers would seem to be about as certain as anything could be.

This near certainty was not reduced either by Secretary Dulles' espousal of the idea. In his revision of the massive retaliation doctrine on September 18, 1957, he assumed that the Western powers would begin their defense with tactical nuclear weapons, compelling the would-be aggressors to "weigh the consequences of invoking nuclear war."

Actually our assumed superiority in the smaller nuclear weapons is as transitory as all of our other monopolies in atomic weapons have been, and as little subject to exploitation. For that matter there is small reason to assume that the new formula for limited nuclear wars on the Eurasian perimeter would work in our favor. A well prepared China could suddenly overwhelm Formosa, leaving it to us to extend a local war into a world war. In such a case would China oblige us by not using big enough weapons at the start to accomplish their local objective? At other places also geographic proximity could turn the limited nuclear war formula against us, even if it were observed.

Senator John F. Kennedy's comment on the new plan for clean and tidy wars was that "washing one's hands of responsibility, like plans for 'sanitary war' and 'clean bombs,' induces an illusion of antiseptis and tidy order, but it is only an illusion."⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

⁶⁵ Henry A. Kissinger, "Strategy and Organization," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1957, pp. 388-9.

⁶⁶ *The New York Times*, September 19, 1957.

This attempt to get back to the days of knighthood and establish rules for war which will permit us to use our nuclear plenty in carefully graded doses to impose our will upon the Communists, and to get force and war back into usable instruments of diplomacy, runs directly counter to the deadly progression of this century, the ever faster acceleration of the technology of destruction. The lethal fact is that we are in the grip of a runaway military technology, which turns out "ultimate" weapons in rapid succession—each much faster and more fabulously expensive than the last one.

The one certainty is that there is no "ultimate weapon," and that tomorrow's will be worse than today's. The gadgets of destruction have escaped all bounds and they will infallibly destroy man unless he pushes on to the making of peace and the organization of the world community. There is no road back to power politics by way of a superior ability to take carefully modulated risks in the use of the smaller H-bombs. The clash of the sovereign wills of great states can only go on to mutual annihilation. The acceleration in killing has long since passed the point of control.

In early 1957 our vulnerability to nuclear attack was virtually complete, so much so that all of Kissinger's fears of our inability to control the fringes of the Communist world (except West Europe) were fully justified. On February 17, 1957, our Defense Administrator, Val Peterson, testified that a surprise attack would kill 40 to 45 per cent of the American people, even if they had the best bomb shelters that can be built, with the weapons then available, i.e., bombers. When the ICBM was perfected, city evacuation plans would be out of the window in the event of a surprise attack.⁶⁷ In 1959 there was ample evidence that the Soviet ICBMs had been perfected and were being stockpiled.

Warning and evacuation might cut down the toll from the first attack wave, if the warning provided several hours of time, but would not prevent incalculable casualties from succeeding waves of attack. This certainty was taken into account by two weather bureau experts who testified on May 27, 1957, that a Soviet attack could kill 82,000,000 Americans, wounding 24,000,000 survivors and affecting some 60,000,000 others. They testified also that radio-active debris from bomb testing circulated around the North temperate zone, over most of the world's great cities. On April 18 Hanson W. Baldwin added the comment that 30 to 60 bombs could devastate the United States.

These estimates were made before the announcement of the Soviet ICBM brought close the time when thousands of these weapons would be lined up on each side, triggered and trained upon every city and other objective in the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. If ever turned loose, what they did not finish would be finished by other means, including the more pedestrian jet bombers and the submarines.

Yet we do nothing effective to escape from the black magic of the fabulous weapons.

"Throughout the cold-war years, Western military planning—and general strategy—have been dictated by the logic of a revolutionary military technology. The new weapons have made us their prisoners. As

⁶⁷ *The New York Times*, February 19, 1957.

each new 'ultimate weapon' has been projected—A-bomb, H-bomb, guided missile—negotiations have been suspended until the latest series of the latest tests could be staged, regardless of the dangers or the consequences. Each test, like each innovation, has simply added to the existing tensions. Today we stand on the threshold of the era of guided missiles and the same fantasy-ridden minds are assuring us that over-all strategy and world policy must be determined by the technology of the latest 'ultimate weapon'.⁶⁸

We are ruled by logic-of-weapon instead of logic-of-peace.

11. *Can we get real disarmament?*

Up to 1959 the hold of the Cold War upon us was so complete that any hope of genuine disarmament seemed unreal. Then the events of that year changed the outlook very greatly. Khrushchev's proposal of universal disarmament was doubtless propaganda, but this did not keep it from being sound statesmanship and common sense. The *détente* inaugurated by his visit to the United States also provided the atmosphere in which the saving of civilization could be considered.

This had already been done magnificently in 1958 in a book *The Arms Race* by Philip Noel-Baker, the greatest living authority on disarmament.⁶⁹ It was natural that the publication of his great book should be followed by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1959, for no one could read it and still maintain that this arms race must go on to the traditional end. The book contains the experience, the wisdom and the hard-headed remedies that are essential to our salvation.

On the crucial point of inspection it shows that it is far from true that the Russians have rejected all inspection proposals. On the contrary they went a long way in the debates of 1955 and 1957 to meet the Western demands, and they have always maintained that it would be easier to settle the details of inspection after the detailed reductions of armaments have been agreed upon. The greatest difficulty has been agreement about substantive reductions, not inspection.⁷⁰

It is imperative to keep in mind that essential as inspection is it can never be absolutely fool-proof. The Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy sensibly says that every inspection system has limits of accuracy and that any system will undermine internal security. This makes the question basically a political issue, "not a scientific one, in which the risks of any agreement must be weighed against the risks of having none." President Eisenhower made the same point in his letter to Senator Humphrey on November 17, 1959, saying that "some risks, at least theoretically, of evasion," must be balanced against "the enormous risks entailed if reasonable steps are not taken to curb the international competition in armaments."

This is the cardinal point to remember. If we wait for our military scientists to be perfectly satisfied that a global inspection system will give us absolute

⁶⁸ *The Nation*, April 20, 1957, pp. 334-5.

⁶⁹ New York, Oceana Publications; London, Stevens.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 530-45.

safety, there will be no disarmament; there will be a constant acceleration of the arms race until the fatal explosion occurs.

The urgent lesson of Noel-Baker's book is that "a grand design, an overall plan" for disarmament is required, that attempts at partial disarmament have always failed. "Against the great evil of the present arms race and the modern weapons, small remedies would not produce a small result; they would probably produce no significant result at all. Even if they were signed and ratified, they would be so difficult to control that, in all probability, they would soon break down."⁷¹

The arms race cannot be stopped, either, unless military research is also abolished. This conclusion will startle all cold warriors and most traditional patriots, but its logic is inexorable. So long as scientists and military men team up to invent ever more miraculous and destructive weapons the game will go on, on both sides—many sides soon—with no end other than the destruction of civilization to be expected.

It is here that the resistance to general disarmament will be greatest in the United States. Both soldiers and researchers chafe restlessly under the suspension of nuclear tests, aching to get on with perfecting new families of nuclear weapons, wanting to train missile squadrons in real combat conditions, i.e., with nuclear explosions, determined to get that super-miracle the anti-missile missile and others beyond it.

To get the ban on testing lifted it is essential for our military researchers to show that testing can't be policed, that the Soviets can cheat in underground tests. Then it is calculated that the resultant demands for our inspectors to chase phantom earthquakes over every part of the Soviet Union will lead the Soviets to put themselves in the position of rejecting proper inspection.

On August 7, 1959, Marquis Childs, one of the most responsible of American journalists, reported that the forces in the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission which are bent upon frustrating any agreement to stop tests were conducting an experiment in a Louisiana salt mine to prove that it will be possible to cheat on any agreement that covers underground testing. Eventually, Childs continued, "this experiment may provide for the moving of a volume of earth equivalent to five to seven football fields—a vast undertaking—to show that a 50-kiloton explosion could be smothered by a process known as de-coupling."⁷²

The lengths to which our military researchers will go in frustrating disarmament was further demonstrated in an article by Philip Deane from Washington to the London *Observer* on November 8, 1959. He quoted two high research officials, whom he named, as advising the President that "the resumption of nuclear testing gives the best chance of reducing defense expenditure." Both were "men of peace who do not want to be misunderstood." However, the packaging of greater explosive power per pound in new "geometric configurations for bombs or warheads" would give more explosive power per pound, maybe four times as much, and thus save money. If only the new techniques can be tested, the "vitrified earth technique" promised to show that exploding a relatively small number of multi-megaton weapons in

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 559.

⁷² *The Nashville Tennessean*, August 7, 1959.

a pattern 40 miles high above Russia would burn everything below. Or if a one-megaton bomb can be put in a small enough package a very few detonated off the Russian coast would do the job. In either case, "the cost of deterrence would drop spectacularly."

For these and other reasons, such as the need to test the elaborate shelters designed for the ICBM, the President was being urged "to make such stringent demands of policing in connection with a test ban that Russia will reject them."

Other scientists who had misgivings about continuing the test ban, Deane continued, advanced a case which "hinges on the paradox that while disarmament must be diligently pursued, the West must not lose its deterrent power until final disarmament is achieved, but, on the contrary, as each category of weapons is controlled or eliminated, the remaining weapons must be stronger than before."

Deterrence requires, according to these scientists, "that at all times until total disarmament or arms control is accomplished," Russia should know that if she struck first the Western forces would be able to drop on Soviet targets "3000 megatons of nuclear weapons," more if defensive measures had been taken.

The discovery of this new "paradox"—that the power to destroy the Soviet Union totally, and cheaply, must be retained up to the very last moment of total disarmament—would of course compel the Soviets to resume testing and continue it indefinitely to gain the same absolute power over the Americans, thus continuing the arms race into infinity, or until the final explosion.

It would be difficult to illustrate better the impossibility of ever stopping the arms race unless a strong American President effectively curbs his highly patriotic military researchers and insists that the arms race be halted and ended by a drastic general disarmament treaty.

Man's Last Arms Game. On August 11, 1960, the Manchester *Guardian* quoted a sentence from Lord Hailsham's lecture at Fulton, Missouri, which should stir many people to action. He said: "Viewing the matter as I do against the backdrop of history, I am solemnly convinced that if we go on indefinitely experimenting with these weapons, manufacturing them, and stockpiling them, boasting of their potentialities and keeping them at instant readiness, sooner or later a situation will arise, sometime, somewhere, where one will go off. If it does it will give rise to a chain reaction. . . ."

This is sound history and it is plain common sense.

We have reached the point, in the words of Noel-Baker's informed warning, where "the politics misnamed 'defence' may bring the final consummation of the use of force; the end of man." This is the fate for which we are all lined up, attempting to defend the undefendable and to be always ready to destroy "the enemy" totally. Nothing less than a sweeping world disarmament treaty can restore the safety of mankind, and this will never be achieved unless we constantly remember that "the romanticists are those who still believe that modern armaments can make a nation safe."⁷³ It will not be achieved, either,

⁷³ Noel-Baker, *op. cit.*, pp. 561-3.

without the powerful compulsion of public opinion and without resolute leadership.

12. *Can we solve the problem of leadership?*

What we require hereafter is not generals to preside over catastrophe, but statesmen to prevent war and build the world society.

We have been providentially fortunate in having great presidents for our worst crises. Lincoln, Wilson and Roosevelt were all men of great stature. All three were true statesmen who had wise, far-seeing policies for avoiding a repetition of the wars over which they presided. In each case, too, their healing policies were quickly reversed by their successors.

For the most part our presidents have been noted for their mediocrity. Our politicians have generally preferred them that way, finding strong presidents hard to manage.

When we were really isolated and protected by the British Navy we could get along with that kind of leadership, until the invention of atomic and nuclear bombs and missiles made it imperative that we always have in the White House a man of maturity, strength and wisdom, especially the latter. The master of these world destroying weapons must not be a lesser man. By the same standards, too, we must see to it that the vice presidential candidates are of like stature.

We must have in high office the kind of vision without which the people perish, such as Adlai Stevenson has demonstrated on many occasions. Whenever a man of his rare capacity develops it will be dangerous not to utilize him.

In 1960 we had the third chance in our national lifetime to repair the damage of post-war reaction, this time to avoid a nuclear holocaust, but there is no reason to believe that we shall ever have a fourth opportunity. In 1959 President Eisenhower made an abortive effort to return to the Roosevelt-Hull policy of making peace in cooperation with the Soviet Union, after a long succession of increasingly dangerous cold war crises. In this long overdue effort he not only failed to carry through, but he did not even attempt the equally imperative task of beginning to make peace with the new China.

Now our future existence, not to speak of our "security," requires a successor to him who will really find ways to make peace, achieve disarmament and help to organize the world community, before it is too late.

13. *Can we build a world community through the United Nations?*

There are some who believe that the United Nations can never keep the peace or solve the world's problems. They reason that it was nearly smothered at birth by the Hiroshima bomb and then reduced to a state of anemia by the Cold War.

There is much force in this view. Certainly the bomb changed in a twinkling the world everyone had expected to live in, and it provided the sinews and focal point for the Cold War, which promptly took over the UN and reduced the forum for peace and cooperation to a vitriolic battleground.

Roberts compressed the story into one sentence, as follows: "In virtually

every case the heart of the conflict was the American effort to oppose, through the instrumentality of the UN, further Soviet and Communist expansion (or the consolidation of areas of postwar Communization)."⁷⁴

Yet in 1960 the United Nations had become almost universal. A dramatic sweep of 16 new members into UN late in 1955, over our opposition, demonstrated that everyone wants to belong, and presaged complete universality at an early date. Soon there were 82 members, with about 100 in sight. Membership in the United Nations had come to be regarded as a natural right and the badge of statehood.

It may well be, therefore, that after being subordinated to power politics for many years the influence of the UN will rise. A universal organization of men is in itself a major miracle—one common meeting ground in which the representatives of every people may meet, regardless of race, color or previous condition of servitude. Who knows what may come out of that?⁷⁵

It is something of a miracle, too, that the Cold War did not break the UN asunder. If dissension could do it there would surely be no UN today. But there is, and the organization lies ready for any constructive use that the governments will make of it.

It may be said that the Soviet Union and China will not so employ it, that they will merely use it as a place to combat colonialism and otherwise embarrass the West. This may be true, but actually Soviet collaboration in collective security has never been welcomed, either in the League of Nations or the United Nations, because the West denied the legitimacy of a communist government and feared it above everything else. This attitude is still powerful. Yet Soviet parity in H-bombs and leadership in ballistic missiles has created a kind of legitimacy which would seem to make a new start in the UN essential, such as we apparently witnessed the beginnings of in the 1959 General Assembly.

In the case of China, too, our fear that her seating would enable the communist powers to control the UN is self defeating. We are due to lose control anyway, as the many African states come in and the ferment in Latin America increases. The great majority of lesser members seem to be strongly disposed to constitute themselves into an effective Third Force and interpose it between the warring great powers. Such a trend appears to have begun in the Suez affair and gathered strength in the Congo crisis.⁷⁶ Having muffed their chance to develop the UN constructively, the great powers ought now to help the little ones to do so.

In these circumstances it will be better to welcome China to her rightful place in the UN before her admission is forced upon us, especially since we can have neither disarmament nor peace until she is a working member of the world community.

What is required is a new spirit of using the UN for constructive purposes. The Soviets have already indicated a willingness to cooperate in a large development fund, and it should not be difficult to turn up many other

⁷⁴ Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

⁷⁵ See James A. Joyce, *The Revolution on East River*, New York, 1956.

⁷⁶ See the thoughtful editorial in the *New Statesman*, August 13, 1960.

things for the good of all which the UN might attempt. The UN specialized agencies are far stronger than those of the League of Nations, and there is much work that needs to be done in the world to promote health and wealth and mutual understanding. In the latter field UNESCO has been permitted by governments only to scratch the surface.

Surely a search for healing and unifying things to do through the UN is not premature. For centuries we were told that national wills and war were paramount in men's affairs. Now, however, war has become absurd, literally and tragically.⁷⁷ Yet reliance upon mutual terror alone as a means of salvation is a very doubtful expedient. The 18 scientists, all Nobel Prize winners, who issued a statement in 1955 wisely warned that "it is a delusion if governments believe they can avoid war for a long time through fear of these weapons," or if they believe that the deadly progression beginning with little weapons can be avoided in war. There is no safety, they continued, short of a decision to abandon force as the "final resort of policy." If the nations are not prepared to do this "they will cease to exist."⁷⁸

Man has finally outsmarted himself. He has perfected the means of destroying his brothers to such an extent that if he uses them he himself will cease to exist. Now he has no choice but to grow up rapidly and learn on the international level to practise cooperation instead of conflict. He can no longer make the law of the jungle work among the nations.

Yet the peace will remain precarious until an organized world community is established. Of course we are not ready for that, but it is none too early "to begin to conceive the needed social and political inventions and then to proceed to draw an image of a functioning world community."⁷⁹

The basic question before us is whether we can move fast enough to build such a community, before we "cease to exist." The time before us may be so short, before a fatal thermonuclear clash occurs, that real progress should be made each year in turning the United Nations into a place of cooperation and constructive achievement, looking toward dependable world law.

To say that this is utopian or idealistic after the abysmal tragedies of the two world wars, and after a thermonuclear arms race is well along, is to invite the oblivion which now hovers over us.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Bernard Brodie, "How War Became Absurd," *Harper's Magazine*, October, 1955, pp. 33-7.

⁷⁸ *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September 1955, pp. 236-7.

⁷⁹ Leo Szilard, "Disarmament and Peace," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, October, 1955, p. 307.

⁸⁰ See the challenging book by Leo Perla, *Can We End the Cold War: A Study in American Foreign Policy*, Macmillan, New York, 1960. The book attacks the Machiavellian basis upon which the whole structure of power politics rests, that there must be one moral standard for regulating the relations between individuals and a much lower one to govern the conduct of national states.

He maintains that our very biological survival depends on getting away from double-standard reasoning, toward the acceptance of "union and cooperation in mutual aid and brotherly love." What is right is now required of us, if we would survive. We must be willing to "assume prudent and gradually increasing risks for peace, based on faith in our fellow men." Pp. 231-51.

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